UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY.

Facts:
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
against the perceived hostility of Congress.

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned
taxpayer[.]"8 He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and
uphold the Constitution"9 because he believes in the rule of law.10He is concerned
about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority
Development Assistance Fund11 case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement
Acceleration Program12 case on July 1, 2014.

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President
after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.

Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court."
Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the
‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court."

Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and
EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the
judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to
better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."

Issue:
Whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to
grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus

Ruling
This court resolves to deny the petition.

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject
to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial
review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of this petition.
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging." The controversy must be justiciable — definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and
not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must
resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for.
Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since
there is no actual case or controversy.

DOCTRINES:
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.

Petition for mandamus.— When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
G.R. No. 135945 March 7, 2001
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., represented by its
President RODRIGO S. MACARIO, SR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, represented by its Commissioner, RUFINO
V. MIJARES, et al, respondents.
Dominican Hills, formerly registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. was
mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which eventually foreclosed
the mortgage thereon and acquired the same as highest bidder. On April 11, 1983, it
was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB through its President,
Eduardo Cojuangco. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be
utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and
economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.

On December 12, 1986, the then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements.
All agencies under the latter's supervision as well as all its assets, programs and
projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).

On October 18, 1988, the petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL,

INC. (UNITED, for brevity), submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property. In Memorandum of Agreement, the
petitioners and PMS agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said
property from Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) on a selling price of
P75.00 per square meter.

Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The
deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be
paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of
execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican
Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was
able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.Unable to stop the razing of
their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO
RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an
action for injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Private respondents
were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was later denied.

The ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries

Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed a separate civil case for
damages, injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between
UNITED and HIGC. Upon motion of UNITED, the trial court in an Order dismissed
the case No. 3382-R. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court
of Appeals.

The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor
and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private
respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed

on September 29, 1998 a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-253, in the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner,
HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of
Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the
contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.

Issue:
Whether or not COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing
thereof.

Ruling

COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges

a quasi-judicial function.

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of

public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit
one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not
considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed
judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of
government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches — the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each department being co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department
may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the
judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

DOCTRINE

FORUM SHOPPING - is evident where the elements of litis pendentia or res

judicata are present. Private respondents' subterfuge comes to naught, for the effects
of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the
parties or changing the form of the action or adopting a different mode of presenting
one's case.

G.R. No. 201816 April 8, 2013

HEIRS OFF AUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN
MESINA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN
YRAY, ET AL., Respondents.

Facts:

The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their
lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and MariaFian (spouses Fian)
two parcels of land on installment
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs––whose names do not appear on the
records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of them––
refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents
sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed
away.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and
to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina
Thus, on August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria
and Lorna, filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the Heirs of Fian,
naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian.

Respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the case should be dismissed for gross
violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the RTC, on November 22, 2005, granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint.

Issue:

THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER AND RESOLUTION X X X OF RTC,

BAYBAY, LEYTE IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT THE
COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION

Ruling
Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v.
Tinghil is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts
in cases of non-joinder of indispensable parties, viz:

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an

action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable

Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What
the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all
the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice
with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

DOCTRINES:

NON-JOINDER means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in

this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit."

INDISPENSABLE PARTY - is a party-in-interest without whom no final

determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or
defendant.