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Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the
neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died
in 1963. The four heirs believed that the
deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they
filed an intestate proceeding. However, the
parties executed an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.
2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate
of the deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet.
Hence the annulment of the proceedings and
a probate petition was filed by the devisees
and legatees. The said will was allegedly
burned by the househelp under
the instruction of the deceased
3. The lower court denied the probate on the
ground that the animus revocandi in the
burning of the will was sufficiently proven.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid
revocation of the will
RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a
valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and
'animus' must concur, one without the other
will not produce a valid revocation. The
physical act of destruction of a will must
come with an intention to revoke (animus
revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of
evidence to comply with the said
requirement. The paper burned was not
established to be the will and the burning
though done under her express direction
was not done in her presence.
Under Art. 830, the physical act of
destruction, in this case the burning of the
will, does not constitute an effective
revocation, unless it is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. Since
animus is a state of mind, it has to be
accompanied by an overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling
done by the testator himself or by another
under his express direction and presence.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one
in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The
latter will contained a revocation clause
which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He
died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana.
The oppositors to the probate were his
nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was
found. The widow filed a petition for the
probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to
probate but subsequently set aside on
ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another
petition for the probate of the 1918 will this
time. Again the oppositors alleged that said
will had already been revoked under the 1939
will. They contended that despite the
disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation
clause is valid and thus effectively nullified
the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still
be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine
laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking
a previous will, having been disallowed for
the reason that it was not executed in
accordance with law cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is
void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No
evidence was shown that the testator

deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.
The earlier will can still be probated under the
principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
an instrument intended to revoke a will with
the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the
new disposition fails of effect for some
reason.
Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by
the appellees on the ground that the
deceased did not leave any will, holographic
or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for
probate and held that since the original will
was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in
the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can
be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting
of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court with the standard writings of
the testator.
As in the case of Gam v Yap, “the execution
and contents of a lost holgraphic will may not
be proved by bare testimony pf witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. Will
itself must be presented, otherwise it shall
produce no effect. But it may be proved by a
photograhic or photostatic copy.. or by other
similar meanw, whereby the authenticity of
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the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate
court.”
Azaola v. Singson
GR L-14003 Aug 5, 1960
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon
City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner
submitted for probate her holographic will,
in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir
as against the nephew, who is the defendant.
Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was
presented to testify on the handwriting of
the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it
one month, more or less, before the death of
the testatrix, as it was given to him and his
wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s
handwriting. He presented the mortgage,
the special power of the attorney, and
the general power of attorney, and the deeds
of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his
statement. Two residence certificates
showing the testatrix’s signature were also
exhibited for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that
(1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the petitioner
and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
seriously intend the instrument to be her last
will, and that the same was actually written
either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957
and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on
the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that
under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses
who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix,
the probate being contested; and because
the lone witness presented “did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was
not boundto produce more than one witness
because the will’s authenticity was not
questioned; and second, that Article 811 does
not mandatorily require the production of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting
and signature of a holographic will, even if its
authenticity should be denied by
the adverse party.
ISSUE:
W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory
or permissive.
HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not
mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will
was not contested, petitioner was not
required to produce more than one witness;
but even if the genuineness of
the holographic will were contested, Article
811 can not be interpreted to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses
to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at
the execution of a holographic will, none
being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence
of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control
of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses “who
know the handwriting and signature of the
testator” and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not so express)
“that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator”. There may be
no available witness of the testator’s hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of
Article 811 allows the court to resort to
expert evidence. The law foresees the
possibility that no qualified witness may be
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found (or what amounts to the same thing,
that no competent witness may be willing to
testify to the authenticity of the will), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to
supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the
court should be convinced of the will’s
authenticity. Where the prescribed number
of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call
for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of
those produced is convincing, the Court may
still, and in fact it should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry,
for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.
Cuenco vs CA
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
o The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in
Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and
children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the
first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator
died intestate in Manila but a resident of
Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon
City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a
petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the
last will and testament, where she was

named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu
but this court held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall
have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue,
considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of
Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to
CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the QC court
o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of
probate over intestate proceedings
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the
last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73 Sec. 1, the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
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over the subject matter but merely of venue.
If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed
must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other
courts, but this does not mean ‘exclusive
jurisdiction’ per se. Such court, upon learning
that a petition for probate of will has been
presented in another court in compliance
with residence requirement, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold it in
abyrancr, and defer to the second court
which has the probate proceedings the
alleged last will.
Here, this is what happened; Cebu CFI first
assumed jurisdiction, but held in abeyance
the intestacy proceedings due to pending
probate proceedings in QC CFI. Doctrine of
precedence of probate proceedings over
intestatce proceedings apply. QC’s order
already long final since respondents did not
appeal.
Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay,
Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the
said will. They attested to the genuineness
and due execution of the will on 30 August
1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel
Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that
the will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. They raised doubts as regards
the repeated appearing on the will after
every disposition, calling the same out of the
ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6
witnesses and various documentary
evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the
probate court who produced and identified
the records of the case bearing the signature
of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar
who was made to produce and identify the
voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same
was already destroyed and no longer
available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that
she had acquired familiarity with the
deceased’s signature and handwriting as she
used to accompany her in collecting rentals
from her various tenants of commercial
buildingsand the deceased always issued
receipts. The niece also testified that
the deceased left a holographic will entirely
written, dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for
the deceasedin the intestate proceedings of
her late husband, who said that the signature
on the will was similar to that of
the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who
testified that she was familiar with the
signature of the deceased which appeared in
the latter’s application for pasture permit.
The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay,
claimed that she had lived with
the deceased since birth where she had
become familiar with her signature and that
the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence
was granted by the lower court. It was
reversed on appeal with
the Court of Appeals which granted the
probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing
that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
the signature in a contested will as the
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genuine signature of the testator, is
mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently
establish the authenticity and due execution
of the deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion
and that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by
the law, is to give effect to the wishes of
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals
who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present
petition is to determine the true intent of
the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to
declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was that of
the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to
produce the voter’s affidavit
for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared
receipts and letters of the deceased and did
not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal
belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the
fact about the will from the children of
the deceased, putting in issue her motive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she
saw the decreased write a note or sign a
document.
The former lawyer of
the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-
witness requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will
convinces that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by
the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the
oppositors to adduce evidence in support of
their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their
truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise the
right to make a will. (Ajero v CA)
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility
of a false document being adjudged as the
will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law
requires three witnesses to declare that the
will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the
probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three
of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory
order, an imperative obligation and is
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inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
Roberts v. Leonidas
GR L-55509 April 27, 1984
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died
in 1977. He was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda),
and by his two children by a first
marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by
divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco,
California on January 23, 1959. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate
described as conjugal property of himself
and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were
presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on
March 1978. Maxine admitted that she
received notice of the intestate petition filed
in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah
Court admitted the two wills and codicil to
probate on April 1978 and was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation between
the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate
proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March
1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion
to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a
copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to
the compromiseagreement, Maxine
withdrew the opposition and the motion
to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in
the record.The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for
the probate of the two wills (already
probated in Utah), that the partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside
and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointedexecutrix and Ethel
be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and return the same to
Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel,
that the compromiseagreement was illegal
and the intestate proceeding was void
because Grimm died testate so partition was
contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition
which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack
of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying
Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimmdied with two wills and “no
will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing
the two cases.
Nepomuceno v. CA Digests
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals
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Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will
wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as
the sole and only executor. It was also
provided therein that he was married to
Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of
the will but the legal wife and her children
opposed alleging that the will was procured
through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage
with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the
ground of the testator's admission of
cohabitation, hence making the will invalid
on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the will is valid except the
devise in favor of the petitioner which is null
and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on
the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the
general rule is that the court's area of inquiry
is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
This general rule is however not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and may pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The will itself admitted
on its face the relationship between the
testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance
with law but the court didn't find it to serve a
practical purpose to remand the nullified
provision in a separate action for that
purpose only since in the probate of a will,
the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739
which voids a donation made between
persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the
time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is
also prohibited.

Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her
legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6
brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed
a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario 11 years before her death and prayed
that she be admitted to the probate and be
appointed administrator. The parents
opposed saying that they are the
compulsory heirs of the decedent in
the direct ascending line and that the will
should be void on the ground of
absolute preterition.
ISSUE:
Is the will void on the ground of preterition?
RULING:
YES. The decedent left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents. And, the will completely omits
both of them; thus receiving nothing by the
testament, depriving them of their
legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Note that A. 854 of the NCC
merely nullifies the “institution of heir”.
Considering that the will presented solely
provides for the institution of the petitioner
as universal heir and nothing more, the result
is the same. The will is null and void.
“Preterition” is he omission in the testator’s
will of forced heirs or snyone of them, either
they are not mentioned or though
mentioned, neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Governed by Art. 854
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“Disinheritance” is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of
his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. Governed by Art. 918
Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent,
claiming to be the sole heir of sister
Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the
latter's holographic will in 1968. The will
contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name,
designated as the sole heir was crossed out
and instead "Rosario" was written above it.
Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was
crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's
ma,e was written above it. This alteration was
initialed by the testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first
written should be given effect so that she
would be the sole heir. The lower court
denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
Whether or not the original unaltered text
(where Rosa is sole heir) ,after the
subsequent alterations were voided by court
order, shall be probated
RULING: Basic rule is “when a number of
erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic will has
not been noted under testator’s signature…
the will is not invalidated as whole but only as
tomthe particular words erased, corrected,
or altered”
But here, the will is voided or revoked since
nothing remains in the will which could
remain valid as there was only one
disposition in it; which is he assignment of
sole heir of all of Natividad’s estate”. Such

was altered by the substitution of the original
heir with another.
To rule that the first will should be given
effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of
mind. However, this change of mind cannot
be given effect either as she failed to
authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or
by affixing her full signature.
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245
FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon
Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the
estate of the deceased and also delivered
the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon
stated that he found a notebook belonging
to deceased, which contained a “letter-will”
entirely written and signed in deceased’s
handwriting. The will is dated“FEB./61 ” and
states: “This is my will which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact
that the same is a holographic will of
deceased, identifying her handwriting and
signature. Respondent opposed probate on
the ground that it such does not comply with
Article 810 of the CC because the date
contained in a holographic will must signify
the year, month, and day.
ISSUE:
W/N the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on
the holographicWill of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the
Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court
departs from a strict and literal application of
the statutory requirements regarding the
due execution of Wills. The underlying
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and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law wills consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission
of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
testator. If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with
the formalities of the law, and the possibility
of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof
is obviated, said Will should be admitted to
probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts
to comply with all the requisites, although
compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the
objective or purpose sought to
be accomplished by such requisite is actually
attained by the form followed by the
testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476,
we ruled that: The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. …
In particular, a complete date is required to
provide against such contingencies as that of
two competing Wills executed on the same
day, or of a testator becoming insane on the
day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v.
Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no
such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of
this case and found no evidence of bad faith
and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is
no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix
herself and in a language known to her. There
is also no question as to its genuineness and
due execution. All the children of the
testatrix agree on the genuineness of
the holographic Will of their mother and that
she had the testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of said Will. The

objection interposed by the oppositor-
respondent Luz Henson is that
the holographic Will is
fatally defectivebecause the date “FEB./61 ”
appearing on the holographicWill is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code. This objection is too technical to
be entertained.
As a general rule, the “date” in
a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date “FEB./61” appearing
on the holographic Will is a valid compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic Will should be allowed under
the principle of substantial compliance.
Maloles II vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino
and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition
for probate of his will 1 in the Regional
Trial Court. He alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his
will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by
his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only
child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and
Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-
blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was
a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order
10
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, being
a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as
the nearest next of kin and creditor of the
testator, his interest in the matter is material
and direct. Even if petitioner is the nearest
next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an “heir” of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession
that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.
Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
“One who has no compulsory heirs
may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs
may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s
—
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a
compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor
does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of
the deceased. Since the testator instituted or
named an executor in his will, it is incumbent
upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. Only if the appointed executor is
incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
Dr.Santos’ probate of his own will is valid in
accordancd to Art. 838, which allows filing of
petition ofmprobate of he will filed by the
testator himself.
Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. n 1977, Lourdes
Dorotheo, petitioner who claimed to have
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed
a special proceeding for the probate
of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The
children of spouses filed their opposition.
The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the
wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void,
though extrinsically void; the oppositors are
the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes
filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that
she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although they were not legally married to
each other. This was denied by the trial court.
The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to
wile the same within the extended period. CA
order became final.
ISSUE:
11
May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executor still
be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can
no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will
of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are
void. Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one
cannot dispose what he does not own. In this
case, the whole property is
the conjugalproperty of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final and executor.
The only instance where a party interested in
probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence with circumstances
do not concur herein.
Under Art. 960, testacy is preferred over
intestacy. But before there can be testacy
distribution, the will must pass the tests and
safeguards provided by law. No intestate
distribution can be done until and unless the
will failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity.
If will is extrinsically void, rules of intestacy
applies regardless if intrisicslly valid. If
extrinsically valid, next to determine is
intrinsic (whether provisions of will are valid
according to laws of succession). Here the
will is ruled extrinsically valid but intrinsically
invalid as it deprived compulsory heirs of
their share and the property involved is
conjugal propert of Alejandro and Anita.
Intestacy applies.
Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488

FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was
submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on
the grounds that: neither the testament’s
body nor the signature therein was in
decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the
will was procured by petitioners through
improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero
with respect to the disposition in the will of a
house and lot. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the
decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide
only the question of the identity of the will,
its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it
finds no reason for the disallowance of the
will for its failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision
holding that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found
that certain dispositions in the will were
either unsigned or undated, or signed by
not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellationsmade
had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles
813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies
with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its
requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
12
sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the
authenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator’s signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that
he requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Article 813 and 814) separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions
for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810).
This separation and distinction adds support
to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC –
and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 –
are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and
Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds
can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the
only issues to be resolved are:
1.whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
2.whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law;
 13

3.whether the decedent had the necessary RULING:

testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and
4.whether the execution of the will and its
signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this
subject should be interpreted to attain these
primordial ends.
In case of doubt, under Art. 220 of the NCC,
all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage
the legitimacy of children. Even in
the absence of any certificate of marriage or
other documentary proof of the existence of
marriage, the law presumes a man and
woman cohabiting with each other as being
married, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures Based on this unrefuted legal presumption,
authenticity is the requirement that they be Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
totally authographic or handwritten by the Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question,
testator himself. Failure to strictly observe in addition to the intriguing circumstances
other formalities will no result in the surrounding Jose’s claim that he was a
disallowance of a holographic will that is legitimate son.
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. the legal effect of requiring the three
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and witnesses as stated in Art. 811. The testimony
ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents. of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. who
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990 authenticated the wills as having been
written and signed by their father, was
FACTS: sufficient.

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy

resident of that town named Venancio Rivera
died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming
to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Venancio’s
estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076,
this petition was opposed by Adelaido J.
Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the son of
the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not
die interstate but in fact left
two holographic wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose Rivera was the

legitimate son of the deceased Venancio
Rivera.