TABLE OF CONTENTS
PCSO BOD vs. Lapid 1 to the Commission on Audit. ‘I asked Ms. Lapid if
Vinzons-Chato vs. Natividad 4 she had a problem.’ Right then and there, she
Divinagracia vs. Sto. Tomas 6 shouted at me with patients around who were
GSIS vs. COA 9 seeking medical assistance. I told her to please
Rabor vs. CSC 12
PCSO BOD v. Lapid | Kat
April 12, 2011
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS and REYNALDO P. MARTIN, Petitioners, vs.
MARIE JEAN C. LAPID, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.
SUMMARY: Lapid was employed as a Casual Clerk (Teller by
PCSO Bataan Provincial District Office. Due to an incident where
she allegedly confronted, badmouthed and shouted invectives at
Mr. Guemo, the latter executed a sworn statement. Subsequently,
the PCSO BOD passed a resolution terminating Lapid as she was
found guilty of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and
Grave Misconduct. CSC dismissed Lapid‟s appeal. CA and SC
ordered her reinstatement. While she was a casual employee, she
was never formally charged with the administrative offenses.
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Law echoes this constitutional edict
of security of tenure of the employees in the civil service. Thus,
Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law after due process."
Even a casual or temporary employee enjoys security of tenure
and cannot be dismissed except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22,
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and
other pertinent laws."
FACTS
 Marie Jean C. Lapid: Casual Clerk (Teller), Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Bataan Provincial
1
District Office, Balanga, Bataan, appeals the Decision of
the PCSO, embodied in Board Resolution No. 340, Series
of 2005, dated October 12, 2005, through the PCSO
Board of Directors, which found her guilty of Discourtesy
in the Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct
and imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from the
Service.
 The Sworn Statement executed by Mr. Lolito O. Guemo,
Chief Lottery Operations Officer, PCSO Bataan Provincial
District on June 23, 2005 documented an incident which
allegedly occurred on June 17, 2005, wherein Lapid
confronted, badmouthed and shouted invectives at
Mr. Guemo, in the presence of other employees and
patients seeking assistance from the PCSO-Bataan
Provincial District Office. It included the filing of an
2
administrative complaint against Lapid
 Guemo‟s declaration in his sworn statement was also
documented in the Memorandum sent by the former to
Josefina Sarsonas, then OIC Manager of the PCSO
Northern and Central Luzon Department, dated June 20,
2005.
 Guemo‟s Incident Report:
o ‘The facts of the case are as follows: Ms. Jean
Lapid was heard crying for unknown reason.
Minutes later, she confronted me at the table of
Mr. Manuel Arazas, SLOO Accountant while we
1
RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors confirms, as it hereby confirms, the
recommendation of the Assistant General Managers for On Line Lottery and
Administration, and OIC Manager for Northern and Central Luzon, On Line Lottery
Sector, the termination of Marie Jean Lapid, as Casual-Teller assigned at the Bataan
Provincial District Office for Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and Grave
Misconduct effective immediately subject to compliance with applicable Civil Service
rules and regulations.
2
‘8. That in view of the foregoing, I am filing an administrative charge against Ms. Marie
Jean C. Lapid, designated Casual Teller for violation of civil service rules and
regulations for Misconduct; Discourtesy of official function;’
are discussing about the report to be submitted
calm down and asked her to discuss her problem
in front of my table. I tried to give her a seat but
she remained standing and again shouting at me
and saying something like these, ‘Tawagin ninyo
na ako sir na bastos wala akong pakialam at
talagang bastos ako at magkakabastusan na
tayo dito. Inaamin ko na ako ay bastos.’ Pero
mas bastos ka sa akin dahil tinanggalan ninyo
ako ng telepono at iniusog ninyo ang mga lotto
supplies malapit sa teller booth para si Tracy
Anne ay hindi makagtrabaho doon. Pinapagamit
ninyo sa kanya ang maliit na office table na ayaw
naman niya. Then she continued saying with
high tone without due respect to the
undersigned and shouting bastos ka, bastos
ka, while she was finger pointing at me.’
 The foregoing incident report was also signed by 6
employees of the PCSO-Bataan Provincial District Office,
as witnesses.
 The information contained in the Incident Report and
Sworn Statement of Guemo was also echoed in the
incident report of Security Guard Jayson M. Enriquez,
who was assigned to the PCSO-Bataan Provincial District
Office at the time of the incident.
 June 20, 2005: Guemo sent a Memorandum to Lapid,
requiring her to explain in writing within 72 hours why no
administrative charges should be filed against her as a
result of the June 17, 2005 incident. Lapid was also
furnished with a copy of the incident report.
 June 24, 2005: Lapid submitted her reply where she
denied the events and gave her own version. Lapid also
alluded to the filing of a case against Guemo with this
Commission for harassment, insulting behavior,
discourtesy and oppression.
 PCSO Legal Department, through Investigating Officer
Atty. Victor M. Manlapaz, sent a Memorandum to Lapid
on June 27, 2005, asking the latter to respond to the
Affidavit-Complaint of Guemo.
 Lapid submitted her „Answer, with Comment and Motion
and Motion to Dismiss‟ on July 19, 2005 where she stated
that Guemo‟s complaint against her must be dismissed on
the ground that the said complaint does not conform to the
essential requisites prescribed by Section 8 of the Uniform
Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. She
also asserted that the administrative offense of
„Discourtesy of Official Function‟ does not exist under Civil
Service Rules.
 July 29, 2005: Guemo filed his reply to the Answer of
Lapid
 August 11, 2005: Legal Department of the PCSO
submitted its recommendation to the PCSO General
Manager and Board of Directors for the issuance of the
Formal Charge against Lapid for Discourtesy in the
Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct.
 The PCSO also submitted a copy of the Resolution of the
Legal Department signed by Atty. Victor M. Manlapaz,
Investigating Officer, on the issuance of the Formal
Charge, as well as an unsigned copy of the Formal
Charge, with PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte as
signatory. Both documents are dated August 11, 2005.
 August 31, 2005: Guemo, again, sent a Memorandum to
Sarsonas, to report an incident which occurred on August
31, 2005 involving Lapid.
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 1
 o In the Incident Report, Guemo stated that on said
date, between 4:10 to 4:20 in the afternoon,
Lapid, for no apparent reason or provocation,
painted over her name, the name of Tracy Anne
Ventura and that of Rolando S. Manlapid in the
Organizational Chart of the PCSO-Bataan
Provincial District Office. Lapid shouted within the
hearing of those present that Guemo ordered her
to paint over the name of Manlapid. She also
shouted threats and invectives against Guemo.
 Another incident involving Lapid took place on October 6,
2005, where the latter caused a scene in the office. The
incident was again witnessed by her co-employees and
some of them also signed as witnesses in the Incident
Report that Guemo wrote to PCSO General Manager
Rosario C. Uriarte.
 In Resolution No. 340, Series of 2005 dated October
12, 2005, the PCSO Board of Directors resolved to
confirm the recommendation to terminate the services
of Marie Jean Lapid due to Discourtesy in the Course of
Official Duties and Grave Misconduct.
 Lapid received her Notice of Termination from Reynaldo
P. Martin, OIC-Regional Operations Manager of the
PCSO on October 17, 2005 with a copy of the PCSO
Board Resolution which contained the board decision to
terminate her services.
 Lapid moved for reconsideration on October 20, 2005. It
was denied on January 6, 2006.
 CSC (Resolution No. 070396 dated March 6, 2007)
dismissed Lapid‟s appeal.
o Records clearly show that Lapid was never
formally charged for the administrative offense of
Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and
Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed
from service. PCSO‟s vain attempt to remedy
their lapse with the submission of the copy of the
unsigned Formal Charge with their Comment
must be censured.
o However, PCSO‟s failure to observe due process
is irrelevant in this present case and the real
issue for the Commission‟s determination is the
termination of Lapid‟s casual employment.
o Based on the status of Lapid‟s employment
[as] a casual employee, this Commission
finds this present appeal moot and
academic and all proceedings conducted
pursuant to the aforementioned incidents,
bereft of any legal effects.
o The Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions which is implemented in CSC
Memorandum Circular No., 40 (sic), s.
1998 provides a definition of a casual
employment in Rule III, Section 2(f):
o ‘f. Casual – issued only for essential and
necessary services where there are not enough ISSUE: W/N Lapid should be reinstated? YES
regular staff to meet the demands of the service.’ RATIO:
o The fact that Lapid was employed by the PCSO
as a casual employee, means that she does not
enjoy security of tenure. Lapid‟s services are
terminable anytime, there being no need to show
cause. Lapid‟s allegations that there is no
substantial evidence to sustain the finding of
her guilt for Grave Misconduct and her dismissal
from the service is irrelevant in the present
case as she is a casual employee, without any
security of tenure. Hence, she may be
separated from service at any time (Erasmo vs.
Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation).
o This Commission, in RODRIGO, Filma A., CSC
Resolution No. 011947 dated September 10,
2001, cited in LECCIO, Nemia E., CSC
Resolution No. 030858 dated August 8, 2003,
ruled as follows: ‘The fact that she was in the
employ of the municipal government as a casual
employee, which she admitted in her appeal,
means that she enjoys no tenurial security
granted by the Constitution. Her services are
terminable anytime, there being no need to show
cause. Her invocation of alleged political
motivation or color underlying her ouster cannot
afford her any relief for the same does not alter
the fact that hers was a casual employment,
devoid of security of tenure.’
o The present administrative case against Lapid is
declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
o MR denied by the CSC in its Resolution No.
071401 dated July 24, 2007.
 Lapid: CSC erred in denying her appeal on the ground
that she was a casual employee who was "without any
security of tenure and may be separated from service at
any time." CSC should have decided her appeal on the
merits and resolved the issue of whether or not her
termination from service was executed with due process.
"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by
law and after due process."
 CA agreed with Lapid. While it was previously held that
casual employees were not protected by security of tenure
as they may be removed from the service with or without
cause, a recent case decided by the Court held otherwise.
In the said case, entitled, Re: Vehicular Accident involving
SC Shuttle Bus No. 3 with Plate No. SEG-357 driven by
Gerry B. Moral, Driver II-Casual, the Court ruled that since
there was no evidence supporting the charge against the
respondent therein, it could not sustain his recommended
dismissal on the mere ground that he was a casual
employee, "for „even a casual or temporary employee
enjoys security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except
for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and other
pertinent laws.‟" Absent a proven cause to dismiss, Lapid
was dismissed without cause as contemplated in law.
o Lapid argued that she was denied her right to
due process because the charges against her
were not duly proven. The supposed Formal
Charge was unsigned and, worse, it was not
served on her. No formal investigation was ever
conducted on her case.
o Petition GRANTED. Lapid REINSTATED and
RETAINED in the service until the expiration of
her casual employment, unless she has been
earlier dismissed for cause in another case.
 The Plantilla of Casual Appointment (pertinent parts
only):
o The abovenamed personnel are hereby
hired/appointed as casuals at the rate of
compensation stated opposite their/his name(s)
for the period indicated. It is understood that
such employment will cease automatically at
the end of the period stated unless renewed.
Any or all of them may be laid-off any time before
the expiration of the employment period when
their services are no longer needed or funds
are no longer available or the project has
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 2
 already been completed/finished or their
performance are below par.
 Thus, by the nature of their employment, casual
employees were deemed to be not covered by the
security of tenure protection as they could be removed
from the service at anytime, with or without cause.
 Then came the recent case of Moral, which was the basis
of the CA Decision where the Court resolved the issue of
whether or not a shuttle bus driver could be terminated
from his casual employment without cause. Pertinent
portions of the said en banc Resolution reads:
o Article IX (B) of the Constitution, Sec. 2. x x x
 (3) No officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
 (6) Temporary employees of the
Government shall be given such
protection as may be provided by law.
o The Civil Service Law
 Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions.
– (a) No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided
by law after due process.
o Further, Civil Aeronautics Administration v.
IAC held that "the mantle of protection against
arbitrary dismissals is accorded to an employee
even if he is a non-eligible and holds a temporary
appointment."
o Hence, a government employee holding a casual
or temporary employment cannot be terminated
within the period of his employment except for
cause.
o Since there was no evidence supporting the
charge of gross neglect of duty on the part of
respondent, the recommendation of the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS) for his dismissal
on the ground that he was a mere casual
employee could not be sustained.
o Even a casual or temporary employee enjoys
security of tenure and cannot be dismissed
except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations and other pertinent laws."
 Despite this new ruling on casual employees, it is not the
intention of the Court to make the status of a casual
employee at par with that of a regular employee, who
enjoys permanence of employment.
 The rule is still that casual employment will cease
automatically at the end of the period unless renewed as
stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment.
 Casual employees may also be
terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or
qualifications with reference to the abovequoted CSC
Form No. 001.
 Thus, they may be laid-off anytime before the expiration of
the employment period provided any of the following
occurs:
o (1) when their services are no longer needed;
o (2) funds are no longer available;
o (3) the project has already been
completed/finished; or
o (4) their performance are below par.
 Equally important, they are entitled to due process
especially if they are to be removed for more serious
causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in
CSC Form No. 001.
o This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX(B) of the
Constitution and Section 46 of the Civil Service
Law.
o The reason for this is that their termination from
the service could carry a penalty affecting their
rights and future employment in the government.
 CAB: The action of petitioners clearly violated Lapid‟s
basic rights as a casual employee.
o Lapid was NEVER formally charged with the
administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the
Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct.
The Formal Charge, was even unsigned, and it
categorically stated that PCSO failed to observe
due process.
 Lapid moved for the reconsideration of Resolution No.
340. In Resolution No. 401, Series of 2005, the Board of
Directors of PCSO, upon the recommendation of the
Assistant General Manager for Online Lottery Sector and
the Manager of the Northern and Central Luzon, denied
said motion for reconsideration. It was only in the said
resolution that it was belatedly stated that her services
was no longer needed per the list of Plantilla of Casual
Appointment. This was an empty statement, however, as
this was not substantiated.
 Section 3(2), Article XIII of the Constitution guarantees the
rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization,
collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the
right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage but also to security of tenure.
 Likewise, Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution
provides that "no officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law."
 The Civil Service Law echoes this constitutional edict of
security of tenure of the employees in the civil service.
Thus, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides
that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law after due process."
 To somehow remedy the situation, the petitioners
mentioned in their Memorandum before the CA that there
was no reason anymore to pursue the administrative
charge against Lapid and to investigate further as this was
superseded by Memorandum dated September 14, 2005
recommending the termination of Lapid‟s casual
employment. They pointed out that this was precisely the
reason why no Formal Charge was issued.

3
The September 14, 2005 Memorandum , however, was
not an action independent of the administrative case
which dispensed with the filing of a Formal Charge.
3
Subject: Termination of Services of Ms. Marie Jean C. Lapid
This is with reference to the two (2) complaints for multiple acts of Grave Misconduct
and Discourtesy in the Course of official Duty filed by Mr. Lolito O. Guemo, CLOO,
Bataan PDO against Ms. Marie Jean C. Lapid, casual employee of PDO Bataan.
1.) The 1st complaint was the subject of Memorandum dated August 11, 2005 of Legal
Department recommending the filing of Formal Charge against subject employee for
Discourtesy in the Course of Duties and Grave Misconduct committed on June 17,
2005. The Memo was forwarded to your office [on] August 18, 2005; and
2.) The 2nd complaint dated August 31, 2005 for Grave Misconduct and Discourtesy in
the Course of official duties was filed against the same employee by the CLOO of
Bataan PDO for disciplinary action.
As an immediate disciplinary action for her wanton behavior in the performance of
duties and obligations which constitute violation of office and civil service rules, we
respectfully recommend that her services as casual employee be terminated.
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 3
Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad | Joan
June 2, 1995
HON. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO IN HER CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, AND SOLON B.
ALCANTARA, PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
48, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, AND SALVADOR NORI B. BLAS, RESPONDENTS.
MENDOZA, J.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to EO 132 which approved the streamlining
of BIR, Commissioner Vinzons-Chato issued Revenue AO 5-93
redefining the areas of jurisdiction of the revenue district offices
(RDOs). She subsequently issued a Revenue Travel Assignment
Order directing 90 RD officers to report to new assignments. RD
Officer Blas was thus reassigned from Pampanga to Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. He applied for a TRO with WPI, arguing that his transfer
would cause his "dislocation" and demotion or "a diminution in
rank, status, and span of duties and responsibilities”. Respondent
Judge Natividad granted the application. On petition to SC, SC
ruled in favor of Vinzons-Chato and HELD that 1) There was no
clear legal right to the issuance of the WPI; 2) Thus, in the
issuance of such, Judge Natividad acted with grave abuse of
discretion; 3) There was failure on the part of Blas to exhaust
administrative remedies (CSC); 4) The 3 motions to cite Vinzons-
Chato in contempt are denied since the reassignment remained
st nd
effective (1 and 2 motion), and the ground of the third motion
has no relation at all to the transfer.
DOCTRINES:
 To sustain the contention that the transfer constitutes a
demotion simply because the new assignment is not to his
liking would be to subordinate government projects, along
with the great resources and efforts they entail, to the
individual preferences and opinions of civil service
employees. Such contention would negate the
principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is
not the private preserve of any person.
 Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of
his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service
Commission.
FACTS:
 Oct 26, 1993: Pres. Ramos issued E.O. No. 132, entitled
"Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue."
 Dec 1993: Pursuant to this, Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons R. Chato issued Revenue Administrative Order
No. 5-93, "Redefining the areas of jurisdiction and
renumbering of regional district offices."
o It subdivided the 19 revenue regions provided
for under NIRC into 115 revenue districts and
renumbered the resulting revenue district office
(RDOs).
o It abolished the previous classification of RDOs
into Class A-1, A, B, C, and D and provided that
henceforth all RDOs shall be treated as the same
class.
 Vinzons-Chato, citing the "exigencies of the revenue
service," issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order No.
80-93 (RTAO 80-93), directing ninety revenue district
officers to report to new assignments in the
redesignated and renumbered RDOs nationwide.
 Among those affected by the reassignment was private
respondent Salvador Nori Blas, who was ordered to report
to RD No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In turn, petitioner
Solon Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post
in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as RD No. 21.
 Blas wrote Commissioner Vinzons-Chato requesting a
reconsideration of his transfer. He felt that his
accomplishments and performance had not been taken
into consideration in the reshuffle and that his transfer
from what he thought is the larger revenue district of San
Fernando, Pampanga to the smaller district in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan was a demotion. He claimed that
he was among the top ten examiners of Revenue Region
No. 5 for six consecutive years and that he was a model
employee in 1981. Also, he was a diabetic and that he
needed to be near his doctor, and could not endure long
travels.
 Jan 1994: With his letter unacted upon, Blas filed with
RTC a verified complaint for "Injunction with PI and
TRO" against Vinzons-Chato and Alcantara. He alleged
that:
o the transfer without his consent from the RD in
San Fernando, which was formerly designated
as a Class "A," to the RD in Tuguegarao, which
was classified as a Class "C," with a smaller pool
of personnel and only ¼ of the revenue capacity
of Pampanga, would cause his "dislocation"
and demotion or "a diminution in rank, status,
and span of duties and responsibilities."
o invoked E.O. No. 132:
 §2. Redeployment of Personnel. The
redeployment of officials and other
personnel on the basis of the
streamlining embodied in this Executive
Order shall not result in the dislocation
of existing personnel nor in the
diminution of rank and compensation
and shall take into account pertinent
Civil Service Law and rules.
 Respondent Judge Natividad issued a TRO and set the
hearing on WPI. He subsequently granted WPI. Accdg to
Judge Natividad, the issue of whether or not there is a
reduction in duties and responsibilities, demotion and
dislocation on the part of Blas when Commissioner
Vinzons-Chato Chato issued Revenue Travel Assignment
Order (RTAO), must be threshed out in a full blown trial
and to maintain status quo, WPI is granted. CIR to cease
and desist from enforcing the RTAO.
 Vinzons-Chato thus filed the present petition assailing this
Order, alleging that Judge Natividad acted with GAD in
granting the WPI because nowhere in the order was it
stated that Blas had a right which was violated as a
result of the issuance of the RTAO. She further argues:
o 1) Blas did not have any vested right to his
station in San Fernando, Pampanga since he
was only designated to the post and not
appointed thereto. Neither did he show any
right to be exempted from the reorganization.
o 2) The transfer was made pursuant to E.O. No.
132, and this being so, it should not be
considered disciplinary in nature. On the
contrary, it was made in the interest of the
public service, as an exception to the rule
requiring the employee's consent in non-
disciplinary transfers.
o 3) Neither was the transfer a demotion, since
there was no reduction in duties,
responsibilities, status, rank, or salary. The
RTAO actually abolished all classes of RDOs
and considered them to be of the same
class. Blas‟ reliance on the classifications
previously followed was, therefore, without basis.
o 4) The failure of Blas to exhaust all
administrative remedies prior to filing the case
was a jurisdictional defect and a valid ground for
dismissal. P.D. No. 807, §24(c) provides that if
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 4
 an employee believes his transfer to be
unjustified, he may appeal his case to the Civil
Service Commission.
o 5) The issue is moot and academic since
Alcantara took his post as RD officer of
Pampanga on January 3, 1994, before the action
below was filed on January 19,
1994. Consequently there was no status quo to
be preserved by the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
 Blas, on the other hand, contends that:
o He never claimed, and does not claim, that he
has any vested right at all to his present
assignment/designation. All that he asserts is his
constitutional right to protection from a
demotion not for cause, and without his
consent under the guise of a "transfer in the
exigencies of the service").
o He never did, and does not question the power
of, nor the need for, the CIR to "reshuffle"
personnel in the interest of ensuring better --
more honest -- public service from the BIR.
Hence the claim that the government efforts at
reorganizing the revenue district service would
be "derailed" by a dispute on the
unconstitutionality of the demotion of one such
revenue district officer is sheer speculation, not
grounded on reality. On the other hand, it is the
injustice, oppression and the manifest disregard
of the constitutional standards of merit and
fitness, committed under the guise of such
reorganization that will definitely erode the
morale and hamper the consequent performance
of BIR personnel.
o DEMOTION. His transfer constitutes a demotion
because, in effect, his span of control in terms of
jurisdiction and personnel has been considerably
diminished. He has earned, through hard work,
as evidenced by his service record, the position
at San Fernando, Pampanga which has a larger
staff and revenue capacity and is much closer to
Manila.
o He denies that petitioner Alcantara assumed
office as RDO of Pampanga because he never
relinquished his position. Hence, there was a
status quo that could be served by the injunction.
 SC issued TRO enjoining Judge Natividad to cease and
desist from implementing his order.
ISSUE: Whether or not Blas has a clear legal right to the issuance
of the WPI (NO) / Whether or not there was GAD on the part of
Judge Natividad in issuing such WPI (YES)
RATIO:
 Blas has shown no clear legal right to the issuance of
WPI.
 In his complaint, Blas claimed that he was demoted
because:
o The revenue district that is the northernmost
mainland province of Cagayan has only ¼ (85
million Cagayan vs 194 million Pampanga);
o A diminution in rank, status and span of duties
and responsibilities; and
o A dislocation from Pampanga, a province 100 km
north of Manila to Cagayan; over 500 km
northeast of Manila;
 SC HELD: His transfer did not really entail any diminution
in rank, salary, status and responsibilities. The claim that
the Tuguegarao revenue district is smaller than that in
San Fernando, Pampanga has no basis because, as
already noted, the classification of RDOs into Class A-1,
A, B, C and D has been abolished and all RDOs are now
considered to be of the same class.
 Nor did Blas allege that he had a vested right to his post.
TC‟s order granting the WPI cites no right of Blas which
might have been violated as a result of his unconsented
transfer to Tuguegarao. The only reason given is that it is
needed to preserve the status quo until the issues can be
"threshed out in full blown trial."
 But the preservation of the status quo is not alone
sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction. The
plaintiff must show that:
o he has a clear legal right;
o such right has been violated; and
o he is entitled to the relief he demands,
consisting in restraining the commission of
the acts complained of.
 Indeed, the transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or
reassignment of RD officers designed to improve revenue
collection. More specifically the objective of the
reassignment, as stated in Revenue Administrative
Order No. 5-93, is "to strengthen the decentralization of
the Bureau's set-up for the purpose of maximizing tax
assessments and revenue collections, intensifying
enforcement of revenue laws and regulations and bringing
the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public."
 It could be that Blas is being transferred precisely to
improve the capacity of the new assignment. His new
assignment should therefore be considered by him a
challenge (haha) to his leadership as RD officer rather
than a demotion or a penalty.
 DECS V. CA: The respondent, who was a principal, was
transferred because of the exigencies of the service. She
questioned the order invoking right to security of tenure.
SC held that the reassignment is in the exigencies of the
service. Her reassignment is a recognition of her
capabilities in improving the high school she was
transferred to and that she should look at her new
assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger
projects. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a
recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the Quezon City
public schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to
MEC Circular No. 26, Series of 1972. Such policy was
based on the experience that when school officials have
stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for
them to become stale and unchallenged by new situations
and conditions, and that some administrative problems
accumulate for a good number of years.
 CASE AT BAR:
o Blas failed to show patent illegality in the action
of the Commissioner constituting violation of his
right to security of tenure. To sustain the
contention that his transfer constitutes a
demotion simply because the new assignment is
not to his liking would be to subordinate
government projects, along with the great
resources and efforts they entail, to the individual
preferences and opinions of civil service
employees. Such contention would negate the
principle that a public office is a public trust and
that it is not the private preserve of any person.
o In granting an injunction despite the absence of
any legal right to be protected, Judge Natividad
committed a grave abuse of its discretion.
 Moreover, under the law, any employee who questions
the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. Judge Natividad should have
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 5
 dismissed the action below for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
 While this case was pending in SC, Blas filed 3 separate
motions to cite Commissioner Vinzons-Chato for
contempt:
o 1) Alleged that Vinzons-Chato had filed an
administrative complaint for gross
insubordination against Blas for refusing to take
his new assignment and that this was an act of
harassment;
o 2) Claimed that Vinzon-Chato had ordered him
preventively suspended in connection with
another case filed against him for grave
misconduct, for having allegedly caused the
investigation of the 1991 Income Tax and Value-
Added Tax cases of the Central Fermentation
Industrial Corporation;
o 3) Claimed that Vinzons-Chato rendered a
decision in the case for gross insubordination
and imposed the penalty of suspension for 6
months and 1 day on him.
 The first and second motions are based on Blas‟
allegation that pending the determination of the validity of
his transfer, he could not be compelled to assume the new
post.
o HELD: BUT the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by TC, which enjoined the transfer of
Blas, was countermanded by the TRO
subsequently issued by SC, with the result that
his transfer became again effective. There was
nothing to stop Vinzons-Chato from enforcing the
RTAO.
 On the other hand, the filing of another administrative
case against Blas for grave misconduct appears to have
no relation at all to his transfer to a new post or to the
fact that he could no longer act as Revenue District Officer
on any case in Pampanga. The administrative case is
based on the fact that he allegedly violated a Revenue
Memorandum Order prohibiting the investigation of tax
cases. The charge is that caused the investigation of the
1991 Income Tax and Value Added Tax cases of the
Central Fermentation Industrial Corp. There is, therefore, FACTS:
no basis for Blas‟ complaint that in instituting the
administrative case, petitioner committed contempt of
court.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Order of Judge Natividad annulled
and set aside. Blas‟ complaint dismissed. Motions for contempt
denied.
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas │ Gab
May 31, 1995
DELFIN N. DIVINAGRACIA, JR., AND ALEXIS D. SAN
LUIS, Petitioners, v. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, RAMON P.
ERENETA, JR., and PRESCILLA B. NACARIO, Respondents
Bellosillo, J.
NATURE: Petition
SUMMARY: Filomena Mancita was initially appointed Municipal
Development Coordinator (MDC). Sometime after the position was
renamed to Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
(MPDC), Prescilla Nacario, then Municipal Budget Officer, was
appointed MPDC in Mancita‟s place. Mancita was only informed
later on that her services were being terminated. The Merit
Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), however, declared
Mancita‟s separation from the service illegal, ordering Mayor
Divinagracia was ordered to reinstate Mancita to the position of 4
Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted
MPDC. Mayor Divinagracia then informed Nacario that she was simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of
being relieved of her position as MPDC to comply with the MSPB‟s a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower
decision. Alexis San Luis, then Cashier II of the DENR, was later positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the
appointed Municipal Budget Officer, first in a temporary, and then affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered
in a permanent, capacity. Responding to Nacario‟s query, the CSC
stated that Mancita‟s reinstatement of Mancita as MPDC was not a
valid cause for Nacario's termination and as Nacario was the
former Municipal Budget Officer, she had the right to return to that
position. When the case reached the SC, the SC affirmed the CSC
insofar as it ordered the Nacario‟s reinstatement to the Office of
Municipal Budget Officer.
DOCTRINES:
 Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1978), Rule VI, Sec.
4
13 , before a public official or employee can be
automatically restored to her former position, there must:
(1) Be a series of promotions; (2) all appointments are
simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval; and
(3) the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person
proposed to a higher position.
 Sta. Maria v. Lopez:
o “A transfer is a „movement from one position to
another which is of equivalent rank, level and
salary, without break in service.‟ Promotion is
the „advancement from one position to another
with an increase in duties and responsibilities as
authorized by law, and is usually accompanied
by an increase in salary‟…."
o “A transfer that results in promotion or demotion,
advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims
to „lure the employee away from his permanent
position,‟ cannot be done without the employees'
consent. For that would constitute removal from
office.”
o “…no permanent transfer can take place unless
the officer or employee is first removed from the
position held, and then appointed to another
position.”
o “…there are transfers which do not amount to
removal….Where the appointment does not
indicate a specific station, an employee may be
transferred or assigned provided the transfer
affects no substantial change in title, rank and
salary…”
 Filomena Mancita was appointed Municipal
Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines Sur
in a permanent capacity.
 When the Local Government Code (LGC) took effect, the
MDC office was renamed Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC).
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Pili approved Resolution 38,
creating and organizing the Office of MPDC, with
Mancita holding over said position.
 The Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel
Administration then approved the reorganization plan and
staffing pattern of Pili Municipality.
 June 10, 1985: Prescilla Nacario, who was then the
Municipal Budget Officer, was appointed MPDC, which
was to take effect on July 1, 1985.
o Nacario was replaced as Municipal Budget
Officer by various individuals.
 In a letter dated June 17, 1985, Mayor Anastacio Prila
notified Mancita that her services were being terminated
effective at the close of office hours on 1 July 1985 on the
at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 6
 ground that the Office of MDC was abolished due to the
reorganization of Pili‟s local government.
 The Local Government Officers Services, which included
the local Budget Office, was nationalized and placed
under the DBM.
o The authority to appoint the Budget Officers of
LGUs devolved upon the Budget Secretary.
 After Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit
Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), the MSPB
declared her separation from the service illegal,
holding that the Office of the MDC was abolished by the
LGC.
o Mancita was qualified for the newly-created
position of MPDC since the powers and duties
of the 2 positions were essentially the same.
o Mayor Delfin Divinagracia was ordered to
reinstate Mancita to the position of MPDC or
to an equivalent position and to pay her
backwages from the date of her separation.
 Mayor Divinagracia‟s appeal of the MSPB‟s decision
was dismissed by the CSC per CSC Resolution 90-657.
 Mayor Divinagracia informed Nacario that she was
being relieved of her position as MPDC to comply with
the MSPB‟s decision to reinstate Mancita as MPDC.
 Nacario filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Pili RTC
against CSC Chairperson Patricia Sto. Tomas, Mayor
Divinagracia, Elium Banda, CSC Regional Director in
Region 5, and Mancita, praying for the annulment of CSC
Resolution 90-657.
o The judge issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of the questioned CSC
resolution.
 Mancita‟s motion to dismiss was later dismissed.
 Alexis San Luis, Cashier II of the DENR, was
temporarily appointed Municipal Budget Officer of Pili
by Secretary Guillermo Carague of the DBM.
 When control over the Local Government Officers
Services was returned to LGUs due to the LGC, San Luis
was reappointed to Municipal Budget Officer, this time
in a permanent capacity, by Mayor Divinagracia.
 Mancita then filed a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, questioning the denial of her motion, before the
SC.
 Nacario sent a query to the CSC asking about her
status as a permanent employee of Pili Municipality
after she had accepted the position of MPDC.
o The CSC stated that Mancita‟s reinstatement
of Mancita as MPDC was not a valid cause for
Nacario's termination and as Nacario was the
former Municipal Budget Officer, she had the
right to return to that position.
 Mancita‟s special civil civil action for certiorari was granted
by the SC.
 Mayor Divinagracia asked CSC Chairperson Sto.
Tomas to reconsider her past opinion.
o Mayor Divinagracia explained the factual
circumstances behind Mancita‟s ouster and the
resulting appointment of Nacario to the position
of MPDC, arguing that San Luis was validly
appointed by the Secretary of the Budget and
confirmed by the CSC, thus entitled to security of
tenure.
 CSC Chairperson Sto. Tomas denied Mayor
Divinagracia‟s request per CSC Resolution 93-1996.
o Upholding Nacario's right to security of tenure,
the CSC held that Mancita‟s reinstatement to the
position of MPDC could not be a valid cause for
the termination of Nacario.
o The CSC relied on the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292 (Revised
Administrative Code of 1978), Rule VI, Sec. 13 in
directing Nacario‟s restoration to her former
position.
 Mayor Divinagracia and San Luis then filed the present
petition with the SC, praying that CSC Resolution 93-1996
be nullified for having been issued with GAD.
 Upon motion by Mayor Divinagracia and San Luis, the SC
issued a status quo ante order enjoining the enforcement
of CSC Resolution 93-1996.
ISSUE #1: W/N Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292
(Revised Administrative Code of 1978), Rule VI, Sec. 13 is
applicable at bar (NO)
RATIO #1:
 Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1978), Rule VI,
5
Sec. 13 , before a public official or employee can be
automatically restored to her former position, there
must: (1) Be a series of promotions; (2) all
appointments are simultaneously submitted to the
CSC for approval; and (3) the CSC disapproves the
appointment of a person proposed to a higher
position.
 The essential requisites prescribed under Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 (Revised
Administrative Code of 1978), Rule VI, Sec. 13 do not
avail at bar.
 First, Nacario‟s movement from the Budget Office to
the Office of MPDC cannot be considered a promotion
as the term connotes an increase in duties and
6
responsibilities and a corresponding increase in salary.
7
o Nacario‟s movement was a lateral transfer .
 Under the qualifications, powers and duties of a Budget
Officer and an MPDC under the LGC, Secs. 475 and 476,
respectively, an MPDC is not burdened with more duties
and responsibilities than a Budget Officer.
 There was a reduction in the basic salary of Nacario, from
P30,505.20 per annum as Budget Officer to
P27,732.00 per annum as MPDC.
 Also, Nacario admitted in her comment and in her
memorandum that the positions of Budget Officer and
MPDC were of the same rank, salary grade, and level.
o This was attested to by Vilma Martus, the Human
Resource Management Officer of Pili, who
certified that per Position Allocation List (PAL) of
Pili, the Budget Officer and MPDC are of equal
level.
5
Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted
simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of
a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower
positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the
affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered
at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
6
Sec 1. Rule IV of the implementing Rules defines promotion as the advancement of
an employee from one position to another with an increase in duties and
responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in
salary. Promotion involves a movement from one department or agency to another, or
from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency.
7
Pars. 1 and 2, Sec. 5, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules implementing Book V of E.O.
292 define transfer as "a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent
rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an
appointment….The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from
one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency; Provided
however, that any movement from non-career service to the career service shall not be
considered a transfer."
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 7
  Second, the appointments of the parties concerned
were not simultaneously submitted to the CSC for
approval.
o Nacario‟s permanent appointment was approved
by the CSC on June 13, 1985 while the San
Luis‟s permanent appointment was approved by
the CSC on February 9, 1993.
 Third, Nacario‟s ouster from the Office of MPDC was a
result of the MSPB decision directing the
reinstatement of Mancita, not because the CSC
disapproved Nacario‟s appointment as MPDC.
ISSUE #2: W/N Nacario‟s lateral transfer was validly made in
accordance with Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292,
8
Rule VII, Sec. 5, Par. 3 (NO)
RATIO #2:
 According to Nacario, she never applied or sought
appointment by transfer to the position of MPDC since
she had no prior knowledge of her appointment.
o She assumed the new position only to comply
with Mayor Prila‟s move to "reorganize" Pili‟s
municipal government.
o Nacario did not question her transfer because
she did not intend to displease the mayor.
 Although Nacario was not informed of the reasons for
her transfer, she did not complain to the mayor or appeal
her case to the CSC if, in fact, the same was not made in
the interest of public service.
o It is not common among local officials to oppose
or question the incumbent local executive on his
policies and decisions, no matter how improper
they may seem.
 Nacario appeared to be satisfied with her work and felt
fulfilled as Budget Officer of Pili until Mayor Prila
appointed her MPDC to fill up the position, which was not
even vacant at that time.
o It was only 7 days after Nacario's appointment
when Mayor Prila informed Mancita that her
services were being terminated.
 Although Nacario continued to discharge her duties, this
did not discourage her from trying to regain her former
position.
o Nacario applied with the Office of the Budget
Secretary for the position of Budget Officer upon
learning that it was placed under the DBM. Not
successful
 Sta. Maria v. Lopez:
o “A transfer is a „movement from one position
to another which is of equivalent rank, level
and salary, without break in service.‟
Promotion is the „advancement from one
position to another with an increase in duties
and responsibilities as authorized by law, and ISSUE #3: W/N Divinagracia and San Luis were denied due
is usually accompanied by an increase in process of law by Nacario (NO)
salary‟…."
o “A transfer that results in promotion or RATIO #3:
demotion, advancement or reduction or a
transfer that aims to „lure the employee away
from his permanent position,‟ cannot be done
without the employees' consent. For that
would constitute removal from office.”
o “…no permanent transfer can take place
unless the officer or employee is first
8
Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public
service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons
therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may
appeal his case to the commission. (emphasis supplied)
removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position.”
o “…there are transfers which do not amount to
removal. Some such transfers can be effected
without the need for charges being proffered,
without trial or hearing, and even without the
consent of the employee….Where the
appointment does not indicate a specific
station, an employee may be transferred or
assigned provided the transfer affects no
substantial change in title, rank and salary…”
 Nacario‟s unconsented lateral transfer from the
Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary
since it amounted to removal without cause, hence,
invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure.
o When Nacario was extended a permanent
appointment and she assumed the position,
she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable,
right to the position.
o Such right to security of tenure is protected by
statute and by the Constitution and cannot be
taken away from her either by removal,
transfer or by revocation of appointment,
except for cause and after prior notice.
 Thus, it could not be said that Nacario vacated her
former position as Budget Officer or abdicated her
right to hold the office when she accepted the position
of MPDC since she could not be deemed to have been
separated from her former position or to have terminated
her official relations therewith, notwithstanding that she
was actually discharging the functions and exercising the
powers of MPDC.
o The principle of estoppel cannot bar her from
returning to her former position because Nacario
reluctantly and hesitantly accepted the office of
MPDC.
o The element of involuntariness tainted her
lateral transfer and invalidated her separation
from her former position.
 San Luis‟ appointment as Budget Officer carried with it a
condition.
o At the back of his appointment was inscribed “Sa
kondisyon nasa ayos ang pagkakatiwalag sa
tungkulin ng dating nanunungkulan, which,
meant "Provided that the separation of the former
incumbent is in order."
 Considering that Nacario‟s separation was not in order,
San Luis should relinquish his position in favor of Nacario.
o This is without prejudice to San Luis' right to be
reinstated to his former position as DENR
Cashier II, he being also a permanent appointee
equally guaranteed security of tenure.
 Divinagracia and San Luis had the opportunity to question
CSC Chairperson‟s Sto. Tomas in a letter.
o The correspondence, which was in the nature of
a MR, constitutes sufficient opportunity for
Divinagracia and San Luis.
 What is sought to be safeguarded in the application of due
process is not the lack of previous notice, but the denial of
opportunity to be heard.
DISPOSITION: The petition was dismissed.
Davide, Jr., J. (Dissenting):
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 8
  Nacario should bear the prejudicial consequence of
Mancita‟s reinstatement to the position of MPDC and in
restoring Nacario to the position of Municipal Budget
Officer (MBO) and ousting therefrom San Luis, the CSC
acted with GAD.
 Nacario voluntarily accepted her appointment as MPDC,
thereby effectively relinquishing and abandoning her
position as MBO.
 Nacario held the new position continuously and
uninterruptedly until she was told to vacate it to comply
with the MSPB‟s decision reinstating Mancita.
 Nacario was also aware that several persons had
succeeded her as MBO.
 Nacario's explanation that she assumed the new position
only to comply with Mayor Prila‟s move to reorganize the
Pili municipal government is implausible and incredible.
o On the contrary, she appeared to have relished
the prestige and ascendancy of her new office
and the challenge of a new role as coordinator of
planning and development in the municipality.
o If Nacario was "forced" to accept the new
position, then she could have requested Mayor
Divinagracia, to return her to the position of
MBO.
 The majority‟s conclusion that Nacario‟s transfer to the
position of MPDC was an "unconsented lateral transfer" is
without factual basis.
o There was no reception of evidence before the
CSC.
 San Luis‟ appointment as MPDC was regularly done and
without any protest from Nacario.
o If Nacario believed that she was illegally and FACTS:
arbitrarily transferred to the position of MPDC,
she should have protested San Luis‟
appointment.
 Nacario had lost her position as MBO of Pili by having
voluntarily accepted her appointment as MPDC and
voluntarily and faithfully serving the new office.
 Even if the majority's theory of "unconsented lateral
transfer" was to be accepted, Nacario must be barred on
the ground of estoppel.
 San Luis‟s security of tenure should be protected.
o The disposition in the majority opinion that the
dismissal is without prejudice to regaining his
former position in the government, if legally
feasible, is inconsistent with its conclusion that
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292, Rule VI, Sec. 13 on appointments involved
in a chain of promotions is inapplicable at bar.
Regalado, J. concurred
GSIS vs. COA │ Erika
November 10, 2004
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs. ALFREDO D. PINEDA, DANIEL GO, FELINO BULANDUS,
FELICIMO J. FERRARIS, JR., BEN HUR PORLUCAS, LUIS
HIPONIA, MARIA LUISA A. FERNANDEZ, VICTORINA JOVEN,
CORAZON S. ALIWANAG, SILVER L. MARTINES, SR., RENATO
PEREZ, LOLITA CAYLAN, DOUGLAS VALLEJO and LETICIA
ALMAZAN, on their own behalf and on behalf of all GSIS retirees
with all of whom they share a common and general
interest, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
SUMMARY: Respondents Pineda et al filed various motions in
relation to the April 2002 Decision of the SC. One such motion is a
motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment. They alleged
that the SC did not resolve in the previous decision the issue on
whether or not GSIS may lawfully deduct any amount from their
retirement benefits in light of Sec 39 of the Revised GSIS Act of
1977. SC ruled in their favor, ordering the refund of all deductions
from their retirement benefits, EXCEPT those pertaining to their
obligations to the GSIS.
DOCTRINE: Cruz v. Tantuico, Jr., citing Hunt v. Hernandez: x x x
we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally
construed in favor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a
bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended
to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the
pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his
family.
 Thus, monetary liability in favor of GSIS refers to
indebtedness of the member to the System other than
those which fall under the categories of pecuniary
accountabilities exempted under the law. Such liability
may include unpaid social insurance premiums and
balances on loans obtained by the retiree from the
System, which do not arise in the performance of his
duties and are not incurred relative to his work.
 The general policy, as reflected in our retirement laws and
jurisprudence, is to exempt benefits from all legal
processes or liens, but not from outstanding obligations of
the member to the System. This is to ensure maintenance
of the GSIS fund reserves in order to guarantee fulfillment
of all its obligations under RA 8291.

st
SC Decision (Apr 16, 2002): partially granted the 1
petition, thereby reversing the COA disallowance of
certain fringe benefits granted to GSIS employees.
o As a result, SC ordered the refund of amounts
representing fringe benefits corresponding to
st
those allowed in the 1 petition in favor of the
nd
respondents Pineda et al in the 2 petition
o The benefits included increases in longevity pay,
children‟s allowance and management
contribution to the Provident Fund as well as
premiums for group personal accident insurance.
o On the other hand, SC affirmed the COA
disallowance of loyalty and service cash award
as well as housing allowance in excess of that
approved by the COA. Amounts corresponding to
these benefits were previously deducted by GSIS
from respondents Pineda et al‟s retirement
benefits in view of the COA disallowance in the
1st petition. COA did not seek reconsideration of
the judgment ordering said refund, which thus
became final and executory.
 Aug 7, 2002: the respondents Pineda et al, all GSIS
retirees, filed a motion for amendatory and clarificatory
judgment:
o averred that SC did not categorically resolve
the issue raised in the 2nd petition, namely:
whether or not the GSIS may lawfully deduct
any amount from their retirement benefits in
light of Sec 39 of RA 8291 (Revised GSIS Act
of 1977).
o said provision of law clearly states that no
amount whatsoever could be legally deducted
from retirement benefits, even those amounts
representing COA disallowances.
o SC should have ordered refund not only of
benefits allowed in the 1st petition,
but all amounts claimed, regardless of whether or
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 9
 not these were allowed by the COA. These
include items which were correctly disallowed by
the COA in the 1st petition, as well as disallowed
benefits under the 2nd petition. The latter
consists of initial payment of productivity bonus,
accelerated implementation of the new salary
schedule effective Aug 1, 1995, 1995 mid-year
financial assistance and increase in clothing, rice
and meal allowances.
o further insist that SC should have awarded
damages in their favor, citing the GSIS alleged
bad faith in making the deductions.
 GSIS‟s Comment: the other benefits not passed upon in
the main judgment should be understood as having been
impliedly denied
o also sought clarification insofar as the Decision
declared that there was no identity of subject
matter between the COA proceedings, from
which the 1st petition stemmed, and respondents
Pineda et al‟s claim under the 2nd petition, which
emanated from an order of the GSIS Board of
Trustees (Board).
o As for the damages claimed, GSIS insists that it
made the deductions in good faith for these were
done in accordance with COA directives.
 Pineda et al filed a 2nd motion, this time for leave to file a
motion for discretionary and partial execution
o prayed that GSIS be ordered to effect the refund,
as finally adjudged in the Decision, pending Preliminary
resolution of their amendatory motion as to the
other deducted amounts.
o GRANTED on Sept 3, 2002
 Dec 26, 2002: counsel for respondents Pineda et al, Atty.
Agustin Sundiam, filed a motion for entry and
enforcement of attorneys lien (motion for charging lien)
and a supplement to this motion on Jan 10, 2003
o He sought entry of a charging lien in the records
of this case pursuant to Sec 37 of Rule 138.
o He prayed for an order directing the GSIS to
deduct, as his professional fees, 15% from
respondents Pineda et al‟s refund vouchers since
the GSIS was already in the process of releasing
to his clients checks in compliance with SC‟s
judgment in the 1st petition.
o The payment scheme was allegedly authorized
by the Board of Directors of his clients, the GSIS
Retirees Association, Inc. (GRIA), through a
board resolution that he has attached to the
motion.

GSIS: opposed Atty. Sundiam‟s motion for charging lien
on the ground that it was through its efforts, and not Atty.
Sundiam‟s, that the retirees were able to obtain a refund.
 Meanwhile, the GRIA confirmed the payment scheme it
adopted with Atty. Sundiam and prayed for its approval.
 Jan 10, 2003: Pineda et al filed another manifestation
and motion as well as supplement thereto, claiming that
GSIS was deducting new and unspecified sums from the
amount it was refunding to respondents Pineda et
al. These new deductions purportedly pertain to another
set of COA disallowances.
 Jan 21, 2003: respondents Pineda et al again filed a
motion praying for the inclusion in the refundable amount
of dividends on the management contribution to the
Provident Fund (motion for payment of dividends).
o claimed that the contribution, which amounted to
P50M, was retained by GSIS for more than 5
years and thus earned a considerable sum of
income while under its control. GSIS declared
and paid dividends on said contribution to
incumbent officials and employees, but refused
to extend the same benefits to respondents
Pineda et al/retirees.
 Mar 6, 2003: GSIS filed a joint comment to respondents
Pineda et al‟s two foregoing motions contending that the
new deductions are legitimate. The deductions pertain to
car loan arrearages, disallowed employees compensation
claims and the like.
o As for the dividends on the Provident Fund
contributions, respondents Pineda et al are not
entitled to the same because while the 1st
petition was pending, the contributions were not
actually remitted to the fund but were withheld by
COA pursuant to its earlier disallowance.
 Oct 2, 2003: respondents Pineda et al filed another
motion for an order to compel the GSIS to pay dividends
on the Provident Fund contributions pending resolution of
their other motions.
o They also sought refund of Permanent Partial
Disability (PPD) benefits that GSIS supposedly
paid to some of the respondents, but once again
arbitrarily deducted from the amount which the
Court ordered to be refunded.
 SC‟s minute resolution (Nov 11, 2003): denied the last
motion for lack of merit.
o likewise denied with finality respondents Pineda
et al‟s MR from the denial of said motion.
 The question raised before this Court in the 2nd petition
was the issue of the Board‟s jurisdiction to resolve
respondents Pineda et al‟s claim for refund of amounts
representing deductions from their retirement benefits.
o CA did not rule on the main controversy of
whether COA disallowances could be deducted
from retirement benefits because the Board
ordered the dismissal of respondents Pineda et
al claim for alleged lack of jurisdiction, before it
could even decide on the principal issue.
o The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would
ordinarily preclude us from resolving the matter,
which calls for a ruling to be first made by the
Board. However, both the GSIS and respondents
Pineda et al have extensively discussed the
merits of the case in their respective pleadings
and did not confine their arguments to the issue
of jurisdiction. Respondents Pineda et al, in fact,
submit that we should resolve the main issue on
the ground that it is a purely legal question.
Pineda et al further state that a remand of the
case to the Board would merely result in
unnecessary delay and needless expense for the
parties.
o Indeed, the principal issue pending before the
Board does not involve any factual question, as it
concerns only the correct application of the last
paragraph of Sec 39, RA 8291.
o China Banking Corporation v. CA: To avoid and
gloss over the issues raised by the parties, as
what the trial court and CA did, would unduly
prolong this litigation involving a rather simple
case of foreclosure of mortgage. Undoubtedly,
this will run counter to the avowed purpose of the
rules, i.e., to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding.
o Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA: the
remand of a case is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 10
 on the records before it. The Court will decide
actions on the merits in order to expedite the
settlement of a controversy and if the ends of
justice would not be subserved by a remand of
the case.
ISSUE #1: W/N COA disallowances could be legally deducted from
retirement benefits on the ground that these were Pineda et al‟s
monetary liabilities to the GSIS under the said provision (NO)
RATIO #1:
 Last paragraph of Sec 39, RA 8291:
o SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process
and Lien.- x x x The funds and/or the properties
referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or
monies corresponding to the benefits under this
Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes
issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowances and from all
financial obligations of the members, including
his pecuniary accountability arising from or
caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or
incurred relative to or in connection with his
position or work except when his monetary
liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor
of the GSIS.
 COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits
under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt
by law from such deductions. Retirement benefits cannot
be diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear
mandate of the foregoing provision. It is a basic rule in
statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation. This is what is known
as plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
 Accordingly, the GSIS interpretation of Sec 39 that
COA disallowances have become monetary liabilities
of respondents Pineda et al to the GSIS and therefore
fall under the exception stated in the law is wrong. No
interpretation of the said provision is necessary given the
clear language of the statute. A meaning that does not
appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of
the statute cannot be placed therein by construction.
 Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then
it would be unnecessary to single out COA disallowances
as among those from which benefits under RA 8291 are
exempt. In such a case, the inclusion of COA
disallowances in the enumeration of exemptions would be
a mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply consider
COA disallowances as monetary liabilities in its
favor. Such a construction would empower the GSIS to
withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted by
law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
 That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the
government has been settled in several cases.
 Cruz v. Tantuico, Jr., citing Hunt v. Hernandez: x x x we
are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally
construed in favor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is
a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the
same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with
which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise
clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the
benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and
application of the amount involved was had under section
624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial
process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied
upon execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of
Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative
action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result
and enable the respondents Pineda et al to do indirectly
what they can not do directly under section 3 of Act No.
4051
 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo: benefits under retirement laws
cannot be withheld regardless of the petitioners‟ monetary
liability to the government.
 The policy of exempting retirement benefits from
attachment, levy and execution, as well as unwarranted
deductions, has been embodied in a long line of
retirement statutes. Act No. 4051, which provides for the
payment of gratuity to officers and employees of the
Insular Government upon retirement due to
reorganization, expressly provides in its Section 3 that the
gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attached or
levied upon execution.
 The law which established the GSIS, Commonwealth Act
No. 186 (CA No. 186), went further by providing as
follows:
o SEC. 23. Exemptions from legal process and
liens. No policy of life insurance issued under this
Act, or the proceeds thereof, except those
corresponding to the annual premium thereon
in excess of five hundred pesos per annum,
when paid to any member thereunder, shall be
liable to attachment, garnishment, or other
process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or
applied by any legal or equitable process or
operation of law to pay any debt or liability of
such member, or his beneficiary, or any other
person who may have a right thereunder, either
before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds
thereof, when not made payable to a named
beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the
member for payment of his debt.
 PD No. 1146, which amended CA No. 186, likewise
contained a provision exempting benefits from
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.
However, the exemption was expressly made inapplicable
to obligations of the member to the System, or to the
employer, or when the benefits granted are assigned by
the member with the authority of the System.
 The latest GSIS enactment, RA 8291, provides for a more
detailed and wider range of exemptions under Sec
39. Aside from exempting benefits from judicial processes,
it likewise unconditionally exempts benefits from quasi-
judicial and administrative processes, including COA
disallowances, as well as all financial obligations of the
member. The latter includes any pecuniary accountability
of the member which arose out of the exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties or incurred
relative to his position or work. The only exception to such
pecuniary accountability is when the same is in favor of
the GSIS.
 Thus, monetary liability in favor of GSIS refers to
indebtedness of the member to the System other than
those which fall under the categories of pecuniary
accountabilities exempted under the law. Such
liability may include unpaid social insurance
premiums and balances on loans obtained by the
retiree from the System, which do not arise in the
performance of his duties and are not incurred
relative to his work.
 The general policy, as reflected in our retirement laws
and jurisprudence, is to exempt benefits from all legal
processes or liens, but not from outstanding
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 11
 obligations of the member to the System. This is to
ensure maintenance of the GSIS fund reserves in
order to guarantee fulfillment of all its obligations
under RA 8291.
SC differentiates between those benefits which were properly
disallowed by the COA and those which were not
 Anent the benefits which were improperly disallowed, the
same rightfully belong to respondents Pineda et al without
qualification. As for benefits which were justifiably
disallowed by the COA, the same were erroneously
granted to and received by respondents Pineda et al who
now have the obligation to return the same to the System.
 It cannot be denied that respondents Pineda et al were
recipients of benefits that were properly disallowed by the
COA. These COA disallowances would otherwise have
been deducted from their salaries, were it not for the fact
that respondents Pineda et al retired before such
deductions could be effected. The GSIS can no longer
recover these amounts by any administrative means due
to the specific exemption of retirement benefits from COA
disallowances. Respondents Pineda et al resultantly
retained benefits to which they were not legally entitled
which, in turn, gave rise to an obligation on their part to
return the amounts under the principle of solutio indebiti.
 Art 2154 of the Civil Code: if something is received and
unduly delivered through mistake when there is no right to
demand it, the obligation to return the thing arises.
Payment by reason of mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult question of law also
comes within the scope of solutio indebiti.
 In the instant case, the confusion about the increase and
payment of benefits to GSIS employees and executives,
as well as its subsequent disallowance by the COA, arose
on account of the application of RA 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law and its implementing rules, CCC No.
10. The complexity in the application of these laws is
manifested by the several cases that have reached the
Court since its passage in 1989. The application of RA
6758 was made even more difficult when its implementing
rules were nullified for non-publication. Consequently, the
delivery of benefits to respondents Pineda et al under an
erroneous interpretation of RA 6758 gave rise to an
actionable obligation for them to return the same.
 While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against
respondents Pineda et al retirement benefits, it can
nonetheless seek restoration of the amounts by
means of a proper court action for its recovery.
Respondents Pineda et al themselves submit that this
should be the case, although any judgment rendered
therein cannot be enforced against retirement benefits
due to the exemption provided in Section 39 of RA
8291. However, there is no prohibition against enforcing a
final monetary judgment against respondents Pineda et al
other assets and properties. This is only fair and
consistent with basic principles of due process.
Accounting
 As such, a proper accounting of the amounts due and
refundable is in order. In rendering such accounting, the
parties must observe the following guidelines:
o (1) All deductions from respondents Pineda et al
retirement benefits should be refunded except
those amounts which may properly be defined as
monetary liability to the GSIS;
o (2) Any other amount to be deducted from
retirement benefits must be agreed upon by and
between the parties; and
o (3) Refusal on the part of respondents Pineda et
al to return disallowed benefits shall give rise to a
right of action in favor of GSIS before the courts
of law.
Atty’s Fees and Dividends
 Any fees due to Atty. Sundiam for his professional
services may be charged against respondents Pineda et
al retirement benefits. The arrangement, however, must
be covered by a proper agreement between him and his
clients under (2) above.
 As to whether respondents Pineda et al are entitled to
dividends on the provident fund contributions, the same is
not within the issues raised before the Court.
o There are factual matters that need to be
threshed out in determining respondents Pineda
et al‟s right to the payment of dividends, in view
of the GSIS assertion that the management
contributions were not actually remitted to the
fund. Thus, the payment of dividends should be
the subject of a separate claim where the parties
can present evidence to prove their respective
assertions. The Court is in no position to resolve
the matter since the material facts that would
prove or disprove the claim are not on record.
 In the interest of clarity, SC reiterates its ruling that there
is no identity of subject matter between the COA
proceedings, from which the 1st petition stemmed, and
respondents Pineda et al‟s claim of refund before the
Board. While the 1st petition referred to the propriety of
the COA disallowances per se, respondents Pineda et al‟s
claim before the Board pertained to the legality of
deducting the COA disallowances from retirement benefits
under Sec 39 of RA 8291.
No proof of Bad Faith
 Except for bare allegations, there is no proof or evidence
of the alleged bad faith and partiality of the GSIS. GSIS
cannot be faulted for taking measures to ensure recovery
of the COA disallowances since respondents Pineda et al
have already retired and would be beyond its
administrative reach. The GSIS merely acted upon its best
judgment and chose to err in the side of prudence rather
than suffer the consequence of not being able to account
for the COA disallowances. It concededly erred in taking
this recourse but it can hardly be accused of malice or bad
faith in doing so.
DISPOSITION: The April 16, 2002 Decision is AMENDED. In
addition to the refund of amounts corresponding to benefits allowed
in G.R. No. 138381, the GSIS is ordered to REFUND all
deductions from retirement benefits EXCEPT amounts
representing monetary liability of the respondents Pineda et al
to the GSIS as well as all other amounts mutually agreed upon
by the parties.
Rabor vs. CSC │ Des
May 31, 1995
DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.
NATURE: Petition for review of a decision of the Civil Service
Commission.
SUMMARY: Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of
the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a
Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in
May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 12
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that
he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by
showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his
service is extended for him to complete the 15-years requirement
for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City
informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to
what action should be taken on Rabor‟s case. Director Caward
replied by saying that Rabor‟s continued employment is contrary to
Office of the President M.C. No. 65 hence, it is non-extendible
Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawad‟s letter and
ordered him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for
extension of his job until he completed the 15-year requirement but
was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an extension. His request
was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabor‟s
request Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC ruling citing Cena
case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor Duterte
but was rebuffed.
In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached its conclusion primarily on the
basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11(b) of P.D.
No. 1146. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally
unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service
that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and
OPM.C. No. 65. The Court resolved the challenges posed by the
above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as
invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by
interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No.
65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
Nevertheless, the Court now ruled that the SC in Cena made a
narrow interpretation. It is incorrect to decide the issue on the basis
only of PD 1146. Reading the pertinent provisions the Admin Code
particularly the provisions governing the CSC, it is clear that both
the Admin Code and PD 1146 are the governing laws relating to
retirement of government officials and employees
DOCTRINE:
 In subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies, all that may be reasonably demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general
purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute.
 The extension of service of government retirees who have
reached sixty-five years of age is an area that is covered
by both P.D. 1146 and the Administrative Code of 1987.
 The physiological and psychological processes associated
with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected
from individual persons
 Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, more specifically par. 1 thereof, is valid and
effective, and the doctrine in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission, 211 SCRA 179 (1992), is modified
accordingly
FACTS:
 Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the
Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the
government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at
the age of 55 years.
 Sometime in May 1991, Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in
the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M.
Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had
already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and
seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1)
month of government service.
 Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a Certificate
of Membership issued by GSIS
o At the bottom of this Certificate of Membership is
a typewritten statement of the following tenor:
“Service extended to comply 15 years service
reqts.” This statement is followed by a non-
legible initial with the following date “2/ 28/91.”
 Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote
to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission,
Region XI, Davao City (CSRO-XI), informing the latter of
the foregoing and requesting advice “as to what action
[should] be taken on this matter.”
 Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao
City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte:
o that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is
contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the
President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
 “Officials and employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years shall not be retained in the
service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6)
months.”
 Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter
of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him “to stop
reporting for work effective August 16, 1991.”
 Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director,
CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for
extension of his services in the City Government until he
shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service
[requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also
avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to
employees of the Government.
o Asserting that he was still in good health and
very able to perform the duties and functions of
[his] position as Utility Worker, Rabor sought
extension of [his] service as an exception to
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President.
o Denied by Director Cawad
 Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President
on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the
decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the
President referred Mr. Rabor‟s letter to the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.
 CSC Resolution 92-594 dismissed the appeal of Mr.
Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad
o It cited CSC MC 27 which provided that: “Any
request for extension of service of compulsory
retirees to complete the fifteen years service
requirement for retirement shall be allowed only
to permanent appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be
granted for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year.”
 Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-
594. He also asked for reinstatement with back salaries
and benefits, having been separated from the government
service effective 16 August 1991.
 MR denied by CSC
 Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to
the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that
he be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao
City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement invoking Cena v.
Civil Service Commission - Denied
o In his letter to Rabor, he said that “both the City
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 13
 Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission are one in these opinion
(Cena v. CSC) that extending you an
appointment in order that you may be able to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement is
discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment
but circumstances are that we can no longer do
so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday
may no longer be able to perform the duties
attached to your position. Moreover, the position
you had vacated was already filled up.”
 Rabor then filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993
appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and
from Mayor Duterte‟s letter of 10 May 1993.
 The Court then resolved to give due course to the Petition
and required the parties to file memoranda.
ISSUE # 1: W/N Rabor‟s request for extension should be granted
in view of Cena Case (No; Cena case overturned)
RATIO # 1:
 Rabor: his claim falls within ruling in Cena v. CSC
 CSC: Rabor‟s case is different from Cena
o It stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that
the employer agency, the Land Registration
Authority of the Department of Justice, was
vested with discretion to grant to Cena the
extension requested by him. The Land
Registration Authority had chosen not to
exercise its discretion to grant or deny such
extension.
o CAB: In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao
City Government did exercise its discretion on
the matter and decided to deny the extension
sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
Cena v. CSC
 Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July
1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-
five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his
government service would have reached a total of eleven
(11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days.
 Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the
Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the LRA
that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the
fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire
with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section
11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
 The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil
Service Commission on whether or not Cena‟s request
could be granted considering that Cena was covered by
Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17
October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1)
year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22
January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
 Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to the SC, claiming that he was
entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3)
months and twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-
year service
 SC ranted Cena‟s petition
 Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held
that a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at
the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of
government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D.
No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may
be granted an extension of his government service for
such period of time as may be necessary to “fill-up”
or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service
requirement.
 The Court also held that the authority to grant the
extension was a discretionary one vested in the head
of the agency concerned.
 The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the
basis of the “plain and ordinary meaning” of Section 11 (b)
of P.D. No. 1146.
o “unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at
least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that
if he has less than fifteen (15) years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen (15) years.”
 The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal
construction
 While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified
terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the
extension of service that may be granted to an
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years
o The first administrative issuance is Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990:
“Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
and shall be granted for a period not exceeding
one (1) year.”
o The second administrative issuance,
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President, dated 14 June 1988: “Officials or
employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained
in the service, except for extremely meritorious
reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.”
 Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the
above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly,
considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No.
27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the
President‟s Memorandum Circular No. 65 as
inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
 As to Civil Service Commission‟s Memorandum
Circular No. 27
o The Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by
the principle that administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions
o The rule on limiting to one year the extension of
service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of
service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be
accorded validity because it has no relationship
or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146
supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was
an addition to or extension of the law, not merely
PUB OFF: WEEK 6B │ 14
 a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service
Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146
o Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a
considerably higher degree of detail in the statute
to be implemented, went against prevailing
doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or
enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to
begin with, there would be very little need (or
occasion) for implementing administrative
regulations. I
o It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative
bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible
detailed situations in respect of any relatively
complex subject matter, that makes subordinate,
delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that
may be reasonably demanded is a showing that
the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or
enabling statute.
o We consider that the enabling statute that
should appropriately be examined is the
present Civil Service Law found in Book V,
Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292
and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known
as the Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977.
 For the matter of extension of service of
retirees who have reached sixty-five
(65) years of age is an area that is
covered by both statutes and not alone
by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
o It was on the bases of Section 12 of the present
Civil Service Law set out in the 1987
Administrative Code that the Civil Service
Commission promulgated its Memorandum
Circular No. 27.
 In doing so, the Commission was acting
as „the central personnel agency of the
government
o We find it very difficult to suppose that the
limitation of permissible extensions of
service after an employee has reached sixty-
five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the
foregoing provisions of the present Civil
Service Law.
o Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees
or would be retirees, something that is, in itself,
quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we
are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the
employer agency and of other government
employees as a whole.
 The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for
rational personnel administration and management in the
Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered
together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service
Commission.
 Toledo v. Civil Service Commission.
o Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III,
Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which
prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven
(57) years old or above in government service
without prior approval of the Civil Service
Commission.
o Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series
of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57)
years of age may be appointed to the Civil
Service provided that the exigencies of the
government service so required and provided
that the appointee possesses special
qualifications not possessed by other officers or
employees in the Civil Service and that the
vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified
officers or employees of the Civil Service.
o The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22,
Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view
of permissible administrative legislation that
Cena relied on.
 When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling
in Cena, very strange results follow.
o Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-
four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may
demand extension of his service for the next
fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age
seventy-nine (79).
o The net effect is thus that the general statutory
policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65)
years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable.
o That general statutory policy may be seen to
embody the notion that there should be a certain
minimum turn-over in the government service
and that opportunities for government service
should be distributed as broadly as possible,
specially to younger people, considering that the
bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of
age.
 Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be
and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146 must, accordingly, be read together with
Memorandum Circular No. 27.
 We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head
of the government agency concerned is vested with
discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the
service of an official or
 employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government
service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
 As to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President
o SC does not believe it necessary to deal
specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of
the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988.
o SC also does not believe it necessary to
determine whether Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of
the President‟s Memorandum Circular No. 65
DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED
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