Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon

learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation
with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite
and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they
arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that
the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither
unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily
surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they
contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless,
FIRST DIVISION they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing
thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec.
4(2) of the Rules of Court.3
A.C. No. 5379 May 9, 2003

For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant,
co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III,
vs.
received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and
CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q.
the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to
SUSA, respondents.
receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the
hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was
RESOLUTION authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful
performance of his ministerial duty.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin
Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
oath.1 submitted her report and recommendation as follows:

Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
"People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the Regional Trial that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be
Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a
counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q.
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention." 2 Upon Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit.5
personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000,
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-
as shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the
Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
Security Management Division of the NBI.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the
laws and rules, and in view of respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty.
Motion as Annex "1".
Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.6

Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 1

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients."8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10 While a
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. 11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 12
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them
as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it
found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the
truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was
under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and
thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading
is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they
resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement
of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That
they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the
hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the
allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two
days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day
notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court
should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial
court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that
his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are
vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. 16 Thus, he should not hesitate to
inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary
to the established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they
are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

In Comia vs. Antona, we held:

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities

on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To
our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not
absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not
have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who,
at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the
court.13

In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing
is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.14

Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 2

 THIRD DIVISION
[ Adm. Case No. 2152, April 19, 1991 ]
TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R. VIOLA,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990[1] addressed to this Court, complainant Teodoro I.
Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other appropriate penalty upon respondent
Escolastico R. Viola, a member of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice.
The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus
Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with Civil Case No. 3330-
M[2] filed sometime in 1966 with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Bulacan against
Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz and Eugenio dela
Cruz. In the complaint,[3] respondent alleged, on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein),
that Felicidad Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications
Nos. V-1284 and 2807 covering portions of public land situated in Barrio Baluarte,
Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and that lease contracts[4] had been executed
in their favor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent prayed in
the complaint that his clients (the Alvendias) be declared "bona fide lessees of the land in
controversy x x x."[5] In an Order dated 2 October 1969,[6] the CFI dismissed the complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M for non-appearance of the Alvendias.
On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which provides:
"SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the foreshore fronting the
Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan x x x is hereby withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be
called the Bulacan Fishing Reservation."[7] (Underscoring supplied)
It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was part of the communal
fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470.
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application for
Original Registration of Title[8] in Land Registration Case ("LRC") No. 3711-M with the then
CFI of Bulacan praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2[9] be registered in the
name of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the Amended Application that the
applicant Alvendias were the owners of the land, they having acquired the same from one
Teresita Vistan by sale sometime in 1929.
It is petitioner's contention that respondent, in filing the Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating that his clients were the owners of the
property applied for despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere lessees of
the land in controversy as so described in the complaint respondent had filed in Civil Case
No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of
a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a
member of the Bar.
In his Answer,[10] respondent alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title was
originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance
therein, respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he
believed his clients had the right to apply for the registration of the land; and that assuming
his clients did not in fact have any such right, the court where the Application for Original
Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this complaint for
disbarment was filed prematurely.
Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer.[11]
In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[12] the complaint for disbarment. In
said Motion, he alleged -- for the second time -- that he was not the original lawyer who filed
the application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty. Montesclaro. Respondent
further alleged:
"x x x Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty. Montesclaro when he
took over, even went to the extent of verifying from the Bureau of Lands if the application was
proper. The Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it
was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is one of the methods of
acquiring such lands, said lands being 'alienable and disposable.' There are, however, other
means of obtaining the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the
present action for land registration.
Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the original lawyer when said
counsel withdrew his appearance. Your respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took
over the land registration case, subject matter of this present administrative investigation."
The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to Dismiss to the
Solicitor General.
In a Report[13] dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated that:
"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e., the Alvendias,
have the right to apply for registration of the land in question. However, respondent does not
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 3
deny that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood in
in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the Alvendias are the owners of the violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of
land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
why his submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his allegations in the of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that the Alvendias were permittees and later similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the lessees of the same property. this Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in the
land registration case. As proven by complainant, respondent has willingly aided and Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
consented in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land
registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar.[14]
It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially
towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that
expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could
proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to
their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist
the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of
the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.[16]

In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were
merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same
clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the
ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts,
did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no
falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than that
he had not originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the
Amended Application, and that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for
registration of their rights. Respondent's excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor
General and the complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the respondent.

It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer's oath and as well Canon 22
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that "[t]he conduct of the lawyer before the
court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the courts)". He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him
as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to
the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to the
law itself.

Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 4

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder.
Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of
murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court.1
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he
"lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the
motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which
motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003,
respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to
the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder
suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion
that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a
policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases
when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the
case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and
would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent
and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in
court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of
court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its
lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described
the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case
for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 5
court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the
harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent,
in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the
trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was
respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added
by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to
answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion
to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30,
2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give
it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt
and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August
18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have
committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is
hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a
bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.7
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should
not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding
judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 8 and Rule 13.02 of Canon
13.9
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that
the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between
6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on
October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio
interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar,
and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed
ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly
prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and
ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not
be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20,
2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by
someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his
comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that
he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his
response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of
speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly
violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 6
 the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10
The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October
2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng
panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna
na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind
yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang
pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado,
mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of
the law should be disbarred. That's it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-
ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya
nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako
nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa
balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado.
Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the
law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to
insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his
law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the
law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a
look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako
nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy
sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order
was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon
siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal."
Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross
ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na
siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an
nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang
akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 7
 (He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a
judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the
law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the
case of murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero
unsa may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya
akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi
mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr.
Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong
hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did
not accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to
humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but
because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan,
what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That
when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord
me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan
kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the
problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang
balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao
bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are
ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been
reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado(mahjongero) and that is why he is
studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court,
is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust
in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec.
2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be
silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules
of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant
the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14,
2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order
dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with
Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that
the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an
opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as
a consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 8
others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
to the proper authorities only." respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 No costs.
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for Puno, Chief Justice Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Reyes, JJ., concur.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities
only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for
his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the
law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and
that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example
of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo
v. Gica19 held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an
officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect,
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 9
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in
contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the
limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to
insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled
"Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this
Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to
elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek
a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that
might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the
former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for
oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu
City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075
in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782,
and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica
"stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two
hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus
costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-
13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the
Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to
the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S.
Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence
favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the
negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were
insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and
instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel
for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled
threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering
unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the
Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion
for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of
the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember
that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration,
filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal
violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles
171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue
of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its
admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive
language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to
assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on
January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that
the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only
informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date,
respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing
them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof,
and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the
hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of
Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 10
Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if
provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of
mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be
right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and
individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and
determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973,
cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar
to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which
happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting
lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the
Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos
and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by
insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly
rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man,
just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just,
he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not
succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p.
150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it
be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so
much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than
abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the
authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this
anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del
Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered
suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of
these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals
and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our
resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to
circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar
from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three
Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying
to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-
13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the
dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned,
and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the
undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the
Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making
them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their
judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10,
1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the
three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned
against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion
for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the
names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition,
together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion
for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He,
then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other
things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a
language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar
again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our
judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal
beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of
justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements
contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed
to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his
contemptuous statements.
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 11
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in
question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang
man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo
should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the
evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive
evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo
on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him
liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review
on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because
We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the
aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final
and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he
should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he
submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching
hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex
"A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as
Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing
correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that
human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous
statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued
veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear
personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973,
respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other
things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils
will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as
compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements
without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption,
graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are
among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a
complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with
understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the
legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped
by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are
absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant
to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated
December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was
given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of
respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts
involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed
submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar
stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and
unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily
forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have
committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in
violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals
committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in
trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic
standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the
undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of
law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could
have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his
pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical
ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for
respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the
Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the
affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 12
 was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still
subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now
independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated
therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite
ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading
that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del
Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of
sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever
penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily
done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this
case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which
would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of
Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138,
Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren
its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment.
That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-
445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the
latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to
securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to
extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without
basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court
in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court
pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so
essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People
vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and
Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based
on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-
36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short,
his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law,
in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that
his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's
faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 13
invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous
statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely
pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what
to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that
what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint
of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without
considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of
mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in
the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a
sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who
dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his
long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with
ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future
will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March
5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our
resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such
suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31
SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma
and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 14

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing
and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand
name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L.
Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids
including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program
Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation
of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the
spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD
conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero
demanded ₱150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the
demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event,
"outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the
meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page
of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No.
122 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices
and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless
complainant gave in to the ₱150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon
reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for ₱50,000, ₱15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and ₱35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to
place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint
before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a
tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract5 asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at
₱15,000 per issue or a total amount of ₱360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements
with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at ₱4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second
TVC at ₱7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for ₱130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to ₱45,000 at ₱15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in
the television program at ₱7,700 each or a total of ₱23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer,
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer
and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio
station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program,
which announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas
Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa
telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito
muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan
malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread
ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st
433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 15
mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g]
may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad
light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an
article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA
PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its
September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004
issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA
published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver
spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e)
"Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO
itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO
guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards,"
Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,"
Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold
binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21,
2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004
(Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon
7,Blg. 293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote
an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi
Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be
the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel
and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints
were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on
his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor,
can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude
them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of
their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had
been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also
with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the
past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to
think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere
staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in
their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their
associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints
against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting
treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31 which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their
thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 16
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and
several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court,
Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant34 and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5,
2005 Report and Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the
Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the
instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or
file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is
GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents,
representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from
further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch
Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated
10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein
addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came
out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the
December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1
of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibilitywhich reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the
following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity
of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases
filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A
lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial
[o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of
the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein
complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a
media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are
the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to
17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to
come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary
restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not
deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 17
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose
the defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there
is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated
for complainant’s failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against
complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit
behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD
for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and
then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already
settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case
proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero.
Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The
actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.36(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter
alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds
for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his
television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to
the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order,
despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.
In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s
services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a
media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein
complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him.
Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio
and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent,
have affected the sales of complainant.
Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 18
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when
he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.43

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Legal Ethics//Assignment No. 4 pg. 19