B.M. No.
2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL
A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines
with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791and passed
the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together
with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed
to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library
Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken
belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer”; 8 and “the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.” 9cralaw
virtualaw library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances
to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys,
he was unable to provide his roll number.
individuals who were successfully admitted as members
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado
filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to
this Court on 4 February 2013.13The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s
prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is
warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good
moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third
party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why
it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado
very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time,
what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo,
you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time,
it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s
gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have
to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and
that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and
able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation,
the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals
who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner
Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest
error of judgment.”22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse
a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its
consequences. 25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado
may have at first operated under an honest mistake of
fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that
what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known
that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys,
as it was the act of signing therein that would have made
 him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of
law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court,27which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while
it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal
charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the B.M.
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit
lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound
to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations
of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the
amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner
is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice
of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll
of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE
(1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad,
Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.
No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The
death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each
of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18
June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed
a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations.
In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to
take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this
Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10)
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
 granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
his Petition for Admission to the Bar. the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an consequence that both those who have not such
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
citizens of good moral character, with special educational minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of general public and the proper administration of justice are
quote with approval and which we regard as having a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
persuasive effect: evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
In Re Farmer: 3 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
more difficult situation is presented to the court when
proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling
xxx xxx xxx and annulment of his license. The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition In Re Keenan: 6 upright moral character. The possession of this by the
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to
law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
to make up such a character. It is something more than an
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued character the chances are that his character will remain
absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead
man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . . inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
remain in it.
Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
xxx xxx xxx properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings
Re Rouss: 7 for disbarment:
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with Re Stepsay: 10
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer.
conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
of fitness.
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of Re Wells: 11
justice. . . . Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for

xxx xxx xxx 4 Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability,
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
so that they may not only protect the rights and interests
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710: disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
could such agents give? They are required to be of good
 inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, responsible members of the community who have a good
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to
those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a
very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan,
certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had
failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them
that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and B.M.
was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial
court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself
of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession
of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to
the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of
the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words,
submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient
and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this
Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be
furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS
OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations
held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction,
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew
their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty
to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment
dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4)
months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a
report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
 On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the
sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated: all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
states that: lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue
homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is
the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery. and other services to the more unfortunate members of
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
society.
referred to above.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be
wife of one of the accused who went to their house on set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a SO ORDERED.
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
involvement in the incident. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co- having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a
death.
position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally
fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
the sound discretion of the Court.
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who profession with the following admonition:
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he
noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
and public service. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are RESOLUTION
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, CORONA, J.:
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted
temerarious and uncalculating.
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in
May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant
opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to
resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on
his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this
Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance
of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is
entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The
Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such
as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking
the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership
in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of
annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession
and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with
RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court
the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay
is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.
LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena
(Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances. [1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already
administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740,
resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the
Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months
suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter
Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,
[3]
this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission
on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and
respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred
Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They
established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of
their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent
relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General
Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a
CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,
respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen)
Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977
Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano
Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo
filed an administrative complaint against respondent for
immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension
from office for a period of six months without pay was
meted by this Court upon respondent. [5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit
with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and
other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These
cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court
ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to
mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which
resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their
second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he
completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte
back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two
children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted
marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of
Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents
marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record
shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United
States of America upon her retirement from the
government service in 1990. However, her children, who
remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they
allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts, including
deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having
previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in
1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition
for disbarment under the compulsion of the material
impulse to shield and protect her children from the
despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant
secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma.
Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. After
conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission
through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended
that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the
ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed
upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent
continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two
months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same
girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered
separated in later administrative case constitute double
jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will
constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a
Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation,
as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein
made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and
that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the
Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and
support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the
recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in
agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the
sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must
live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must
maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as
morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For
they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public
opinion and community approbation. Needless to state,
those whose conduct both public and private fails this
scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was
once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this
professional infractions. For having occupied that place of
honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be
free from any appearance of impropriety. [11] For a judge is
the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of
strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. [12] Indeed, a
judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of
his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.
[13]
Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of
Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. [14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and
ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with
public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration
of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must
ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is
administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he
resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in
an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
[16]
Exacted from him, as a member of the profession
charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as moral character. To achieve
such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor
and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus
improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court of and member of the bar. [18] For
disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties
thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before
disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that
those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice
are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in
whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for
disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his
wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife
and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a
married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to
overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a
lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child.The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent
continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to
investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far
from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against
him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine
whether he still merited the privileges extended to a
member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against
him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct
abounds against him and could not be explained
away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage
while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the
law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a
long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in
the community, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike
out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo,
PARAS, J.:p
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
Purisima, J., no part.
the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l),
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as
to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
GR No. 100113 September 3, 1991 an appointive office.
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, Black defines "practice of law" as:
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO application of legal principles and technique to serve the
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
Management, respondents. appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court
for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation
of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be
made available whenever this provision on the qualifications
as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it
will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides,
among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified
public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which
is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it
is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called
 shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates."
(Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance
Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's
role colors much of both the public image and the self perception
of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public
mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one
legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless
the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation
and mediation are both effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the
salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein
below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice,
a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed
upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively
little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's
or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He
is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer
who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters
as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved
in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in
the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one
who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel;
(2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to
a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and
(3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
— often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends
are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as
the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and
to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
 levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-
based models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally
with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is
to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit
to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security:
Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or
will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On
the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having
hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use
of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which
Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as
a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks
of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so
than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in
the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank
v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within
the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the
case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-
3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani
Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited
the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use
of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law
for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter,
I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that
he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications
as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by
the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body
in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court
would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured,
the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case
No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and
counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar
as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation
of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court
to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable
to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in
opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the
Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed
significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had
grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277
entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep.
Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this
Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for
the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on
the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also
embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as
well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well
as ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice,
for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report,
thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This requires membership and financial
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by
an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration,
therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority
of a national organization of the legal profession based on
the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of
the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high
ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public
service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the
relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it
possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule
of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of
tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend
itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up
any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence
or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices
and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country
so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that
are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful
country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the
solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may
integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of
the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In
providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of
the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of
Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of
freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent
discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration
pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures
has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation;
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with
public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be discharged
through collective action; but there can be no collective
action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it
is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or
the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes
only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function
of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar
to the end of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified
as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members
does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the
Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray
the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the
Bar is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such
views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not
nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to
practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to
fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would
be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that
have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if
his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
 condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above
the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising
because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a
new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new
system which they hitherto have not had and through which,
by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have
been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay
dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at
the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive,
it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court
should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time —
requires a careful overview of the practicability and
necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and
the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following
benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the
Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective
discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to
its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than
these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in
the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will
not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to January 16, 1973.
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience
in England, Canada and the United States. In all the Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando,
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it concur.
has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of
the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090
lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in
their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted
in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-
commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar
association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a
single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855
(or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per
cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-
committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming
nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
August 15, 1961
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary to the Philippine Bar without taking the examination.
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to RESOLUTION
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
BARRERA, J.:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it
by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among
others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City,
Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he
had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato
Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by
the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law
course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that
thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in
Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the
petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by
applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have
obtained recognition of the validity of their academic
degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the
Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and
Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and
16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before
anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he
must first successfully pass the required bar examinations;
and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not
have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
for the reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter
or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil.
Constitution).
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was

intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to
practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to
Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained

degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in
either of the Contracting States, issued by competent
national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise
said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the
laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the

Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject