Republic of the Philippines

Twelfth Judicial Region

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Cotabato City, Maguindanao
BRANCH 12

KRIS AQUINON YAP-YAP,

Plaintiff,

-versus - Civil Case No. 00000

For: Unlawful Detainer
SPOUSES GRETCHEN BARRETTE,
TONY BOY COJUANGCO,
Defendants,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

This resolves the appeal filed by the Spouses Gretched Barrette and
Tony Boy Cojuangco under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court from the decision
of the 108th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Westeros and Northumbria in
Civil Case No. 00101. The original case before the lower court is an
unlawful detainer case, which sought to evict the defendants-appelants
Spouses Yap Yp from a parcel of land presently claimed by the plaintiff-
appellee.

The main issue being disputed by the parties in the instant appeal is
the applicability of Article 448 of the Civil Code to the defendants-
appellants who allegedly introduced necessary and useful improvements on
the disputed property upon the invitation and consent of its registered owner.

The defendants-appellants insist that following the provisions of

Article 448 of the Civil Code, they may not be evicted from the property
until and unless the plaintiff-appellee reimburses them of the value of the
improvements they had introduced thereon. The plaintiff-appellee, on the
other hand, argues that Article 448 is not applicable to the defendants-
appellants’s casse as they are not builders in good faith in the strict sense of
the term.

ANTECEDENTS

The plaintiff-appelle claims that she is the registered owner and

rightful possessor of the disputed property- a 441 sq meter parcel of land
located in Westeros and covered by TCT No. T-0000. She bases her claim to
the property on the fact that she is the widow of the property’s deceased
registered owner, James Yap-Yap.

Page 1 of 7
 According to her, the defendants-appellants, the current possessors of
the disputed property, are merely occupying the property upon the consent
and previous invitation of her deceased husband. Sometime in 2016, she
requested the defendants-appellants to vacate the disputed property, as she
would already be using the same. The latter, however, accordingly refused to
do so.
The defendants-appellants, on the other hand, do not contest the
plaintiff-appellee’s right to the property as the rightful widow of the
deceased owner. They, however, insist, that they may not be summarily
evicted from the provisions of Article 448 of Civil Code. They argue that
they should first be reimbursed of the necessary and useful improvements
they introduced to the property in compliance with the said Civil Code
provisions.

ISSUES

The main issue being now presented by the parties for this Court’s
consideration and resolution can be stated as follows:

1. Whether or not the defendants-appellants are builders in good faith

who are entitled to the possessory right provided under Article 448 of
thr Civil Code.

2. Whether or not the defendants-appellants should pay the plaintiff-

appellee reasonable compensation for the use of the disputed property
from the time of last demand.

3. Whether or not the issue of whether the defendants-appellants are

builder in good faith may be considered by the trial court considering
that the instant case is a case for unlawful detainer.

THE COURT’S RULING

On the issue of whether the defendants-

Appellants’ status as builder in good
Faith may be tried in an unlawful
Detainer

Let us now resolve on the plaintiff-appelle’s assertion that the issue of

whether or not the defendants-appellants are builders in good faith may not
be considered and resolved by the Court in an unlawful detainer case. In
support of the said position, the plaintiff-appelle cites the cases of Barrientos
v. Rapal (G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011) and Carbonilla v. Abiera (G.R.
No. 177637, July 26, 2010).

Page 2 of 7
 We have thoroughly reviewed the above-cited cases but cannot seem
to find any declaration by the Supreme Court to the effect that in unlawful
detainer cases, the issue of whether or not a defendant is a builder in good
faith entitled to the rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code may not be
considered.

It should be pointed out that what the Supreme Court only declared in
both the Barrientos and Carbonilla cases is that the issue of possession de
jure is not a proper issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case, the only
relevant matter being only possession in an unlawful detainer case, in either
case tha the defendant’s status as a good faith builder cannot be touched
upon in an unlawful detainer case.

Upon the other hand, the case of Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses

Macasaet (G.R. Nos. 15491-92, September 30, 2004), the proper
interpretation of which has been submitted for resolution of this Court by
both parties, involves an unlawful detainer case; and there, the Supreme
Court extensively determined whether or not the defendant is entitled to the
rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448 of Civil Code.

In the later case of Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar (G.R. No.

182754, June 29, 2015), also involving an unlawful detainer case, the
Supreme Court likewise made an extensive determination of whether the
defendant therein is a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil
Code is.

In light of the foregoing, it is without a doubt that issue of the

defendants-appellant’s status as a good faith builder under Article 448 of the
Civil Code may be properly considered and reviewed by this Court in the
instant case. Nothing in the law nor in the jurisprudence precludes in the
Court from doing so.

On the issue whether or not the defendants-

Appellants are builders in good faith within
The purview of Article 448 of the Civil Code

As a preliminary note, it should be pointed out that the defendants-

appellants in this case does not contest the status of the plaintiff-appellee as
the legitimate heir of the disputed property’s deceased owner.

Upon the other hand, there also seems to be no dispute with respect to
the allegation that the defendants-appellants only came to possess the
disputed property upon the invitation and consent of the previous owner,
James Yap-Yap. The fact the defendants-appellants introduced certain
necessary and useful improvements upon the property likewise does not
seem to be in dispute.

Page 3 of 7
 The only issue that the parties seem to be in disagreement with each
other is the applicability of Article 448 of the Civil Code to the case of the
defendants-appellants, who have supposedly intorduced improvements of
the disputed property upon the invitation and consent of its previous owner.

Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith has the
right to retain the property subject of the dispute until s/he hs been fully
reimbursed by the rightful owner of the property of the value of the
necessary and useful improvements s/he has introduced on the property.

The plaintiff-appelle and the MCTC both insist that the defendants-
appellants are not possessors in good faith under the strict sense of the term
as their very well knew form the start they were merely occupying the
property because of the imprimatur of the registered owner. As such, they
are not entitled to the said reimbursements; the defendants-appellants argue
the opposite.

After reviewing the arguments of both parties, this Court is inclined to

side with the defendants-appellants. The exact issue now being disputed by
the parties has actually already been resolved by the Supreme Court in the
case of Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet (G.R. Nos. 155491-92,
September 30, 2004).

Among the issues that had to be settled by the Supreme Court in that
case is whether or not a builder who has introduced improvements on the
disputed property upon the invitation of its owner is entitled to the
reimbursements provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

In ruling affirmatively, the Supreme Court declared that Article 448 is

not strictly to be confined to cases of builders who believe themselves to be
the owners of the disputed property. Some specila cases falling outsied the
traditional and limited definitation of a possessor in good faith actually merit
and warrant the provision’s application.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, children who introduce

improvements on their parent’s properties upon the latter’s invitation and
consent, though not strictly speaking falling within the limited definition of
builder in good faith, should be considered as builders in good faith and
granted all the rights accruing to such, including the right to the
reimbursements under Article 448 of Civil Code.

Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to one

whose house-despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner-
overlapped with the land of another. This article was also applied to cases
wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the
owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good faith.

Page 4 of 7
In Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith despite
their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed
to be the owner of the land.

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the

present factual milieu. They established facts of this cases show that
respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners.
In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the
parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the
improvements introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have
been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots.

The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier. In that case,

this Court deemed the son to be in good faith for building the improvement
with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged the land
upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448 was applied.

As correctly argued by the defendants-appellants, their case is

identical to the case of the builders in the case of Spouses Macasaet. Like
the builders therein, the defendants-appellants only introduced constructions
on the land of the plaintiff-appellee because the latter’s husband invite them
and allowed them to do so. This being the case, they are rightfully entitled to
all the reimbursements under Article 448 of the Civil Code, as well as the
right to retain the property until they have been fully paid of the same.

Finally, while this Court so holds that defendants-appellants are

entitled to the reimbursements under Article 448 of the Civil Code, we note,
however, that the evidence presented in the MCTC does not establish the
value of the necessary and useful improvements the defendants-appellants
have introduced on the property. Thus following the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Depra v. Dumlao (G.R. No. L-57348, May 16, 1985), this Court
finds it proper to order the remands of this cse to the court a quo for the
purpose of determining the value of the improvements to be reimbursed to
the respondents.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the 108th Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Westeros is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

The defendants-appellants are ordered to restore possession of the

disputed property to the plaintiff-appellee but only upon compliance by the
latter with the provisions of Article 448, 546 and 548 of thr Civil Code on
the payment of the required reimbursements. The award of reasonable
compensation for the used of the premises, as well as the award for
attorney’s fees, are deleted.

The case is further remanded to the 108th Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Westeros for further proceedings consitent with the proper
application of Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code as follows:

Page 5 of 7
 1. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall determine:

a. the present fair price of the plaintiff-appellee’s lot

b. the value of the necessary and useful improvements
introduced by the defendant-appellants on the property
c. the increase in value (plus value) which they said lot may
have acquired by reason of the imporvements; and
d. whether the value of the said land is considerably more than
that of the improvements introduced thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determind by competent evidence,

the MCTC shall render judgment as follows:

a. The MCTC shall grant the plaintiff-appelle a period of

fifteen (15) days within which to exercise her option
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, whether to
appropriate the improvements as her own by paying to
the defendants-appellants as either the amount for the
imporvements they introduced, or increase in value
(plus value), which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof,or to oblige defendants-appellants to
pay the price of said land.
b. The MCTC shall further order that if the plaintiff-
appellee exercises the option to oblige the defendants-
appellants to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the MCTC,
the value of the land is considerably more than that of
the improvements introduced, the defendants-
appellants shall give written notice of such rejection to
the plaintiff-appellee and to the MCTC within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the plaintiff-appellee’s option
to sell the land.
c. The periods to be fixed by the MCTC in its Decision
shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of the party
obliged to tender to the MCTC the amount due to the
obligee, the party entitled to such paymeny shall be
entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of
payment of the amount due and for the compliance
with such other acts as may be required byt the
prestation due obligee.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 2nd day of April, 2019 at Cotabato City, Philippines.

Page 6 of 7
 Rachel Green-Geller
Presiding Judge

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MONICA BING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PHOEBE BUFFAY-TRIBIANNI

Chief Justice

Page 7 of 7