Gochanco vs.
CFI Negros Occidental
PLAINTIFF: Juan Gochangco, Hon. Garcia (Judge), Sheriff De Jose
DEFENDANT: CFI Negros Occidental, Sy Ho, Milagros Minoria
DATE: January 15, 1988
PONENTE: J. Narvasa
TOPIC:
TYPE OF CASE:
VENUE:
CAUSE OF ACTION: Unlawful Detainer - Ejectment
RESOLUTION: Petition, granted.
Facts:
 Hodges was the original plaintiff died substituted by court appointed
administrator Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank; the lots subject for
ejectment were sold the subject parcel of land to Juan Gochangco on
December 17, 1975 by the heirs and administrators and he obtained titles in
his name in due course
 Hodges sought for the ejectment of several persons, each were duly served
summons
o Macanan – died, heirs cannot be located
o Santiago & Nolan – voluntarily vacated
o Minoria – refused to acknowledge such service
 Subsequently filed an answer to the complaint through
consel
o Sy Ho – summons evidenced that it is claimed, by the Provincial
Sheriff – but was recounted and later on denied such service
 PCBI filed a motion to declare Sy Ho in default for failure to answer the
complaint – alleged that he (Sy) never received such summons, because
the place where it was delivered was not his residence (it was served in his
scrap business is located)
o Court refused to lift order of default
o On a separate order, granted PCIB to require SY Ho to pay
monthly rentals to the premises he occupied instead of his co-
defendant Minoria, acting as caretaker.
 Gochangco immediately informed Minoria and Sy Ho of his acquisition of
the property and demanded their vacation
o Gochangco filed for ex parte substitution and reception of
evidence – this as regards to Sy Ho who had been declared in
default
 As regards defendant Minoria, Gochangco filed
o Motion for judgment on the pleadings, contended that Minoria’s
answer failed to tender any issue because it admitted the material
allegations of the complaint
o Her answer failed to disclose any privity between her and the late
Manuel Moreno whom she claims to be co-owner of the house
found in the premises in question – nor any evidence that
substantiate that had been properly designated caretaker of the
house
o That her occupation was by mere tolerance and she was bound
by an implied promise to vacate upon demand and her failure to
do so despite demand rendered her amenable to summary
ejectment
 Sy Ho also filed a motion to set aside order of default in which he prayed to
be allowed to file a written complaint and that the default was due to the
fault of his counsel who failed to make the proper follow up
o Both parties made several attempts to reach amicable settlement
 City Court ordered Sy Ho and Minoria to vacate the premises and to pay
rent
o Denied both MR
 Gochangco moved for the execution pending appeal –
o asserted that the judgment had become final against Minoria,
because she no appeal perfected
o as for Sy Ho whose 2nd MR is still pending because the judgment
was against the defendant as per section 8 Rule 70, be
immediately executory
 Both defendants filed a joint certiorari and prohibition
Issue: W/N the failure of the party to answer within the time allowed renders the party
in default, YES
Ruling:
The claim for improper service of summons by Sy Ho is untenable since he voluntarily
complied with the Courts order of payment of rentals – thus jurisdiction over the
person was already acquired by the court.
As for Minoria, her answer failed to include allegations establishing her claim for
compensation as caretaker of the house – where an answer fails to tender an issue or
otherwise admits the material allegations or admits the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of the party, direct judgment on
such pleading
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that the defendant's failure to
answer the complaint despite receiving copy thereof together with summons, is
attributable to one of two causes: either (a) to his realization that he has no defenses
to the plaintiffs cause and hence resolves not to oppose the complaint, or, (b) having
good defenses to the suit, to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
prevented him from seasonably filing an answer setting forth those defenses,. It does
make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of
the specific relief prayed for in the complaint, to forego the filing of the answer or any
sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result would be
the same: since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having none in
fact, judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be an acceptable
result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the judgment did not
go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. It would moreover
spare him from the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the indefensible. On
the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be unnatural for him not to set
them up properly and timely, and if he did not in fact set them up, it must be presumed
that some insuperable cause prevented him from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence. In this event, the law will grant him relief, and the law is in truth
quite liberal in the reliefs made available to him: a motion to set aside the order of
default prior to judgment; a motion for new trial to set aside the default judgment; an
appeal from the judgment by default even if no motion to set aside the order of default
or motion for new trial had been previously presented; a special civil action
for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction.

A defendant in default is not and should not be placed in a situation more favorable
than a defendant who has answered but who fails to appear for trial despite notice. In
the latter case, as in the former, the trial may proceed ex parte, but is not invalidated
by the fact merely that reception of evidence had been undertaken by the clerk of
court on the Court's instructions; this, despite the fact that the judgment that may be
rendered on the basis of such an ex parte trial may award reliefs exceeding the
amount or different from that, prayed for in the complaint, unlike a judgment by default
which cannot differ from or go beyond what is set down in the prayer of the complaint.
Carson Realty vs. Red Robin Security Agency and Santos
GR No. 225035
PLAINTIFF: Carson Realty
DEFENDANT: Red Robin Security Agency and Monina Santos
DATE: February 8, 2017
PONENTE: J. Velasco
TOPIC:
TYPE OF CASE: Rule 45
VENUE:
CAUSE OF ACTION: Collection for Sum of Money and Damages
RESOLUTION:
Facts:
 That respondent Monina Santos filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioner Carson, RTC QC
 As per the Officer’s return, a copy of Summons together with the Complaint
and its annexes was served upon Carson at its business through its
corporate secretary, Precilla Serrano
 Atty. Tomas Roxas, their legal counsel filed an appearance and motion with
the court wherein the latter entered his appearance and acknowledged that
the summons was served and received by one of the staff assistants of
Carson
o He prayed for an extension of 15days within which to file a
responsive pleading
o RTC in its Order noted the appearance of Atty. Roxas as counsel
for Carson and granted his request for extension of time to file a
responsive pleading
 Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the
complaint – alleging that the summons was not served on any of the officers
and personnel authorized to receive summons under the ROC
 RTC denied the MTD and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be
served upon the corporation
 Process Server Pajila submitted his Officer’s Report stating in essence that
he attempted to serve the alias Summons on the President and GM of
Carson, Board of Directors and Corporate Secretary – but they were not
around
o He was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez, the “secretary” of
the company to bring the Summons to the law office of Atty.
Roxas
o Pajila attempted to serve the alias Summons at the law office,
twice but to no avail
o Prompted him to resort to substituted service of Summons be
leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila – but later
on refused to acknowledge the receipt of the alias Summons
 Santos filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default
 RTC denied them motion – finding that there was an improper service of
Summons on Carson
 Santos then requested another issuance of alias Summons to the RTC –
which was granted and issued an alias Summons
o Received by a receptionist – Loreta Fernandez, posited that as a
receptionist she had no authority to receive the said documents
and that there was an improper service of summons
 Santos filed a 2nd Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default
o RTC granted the motion and allowed her to present her evidence
ex-parte
 Carson filed petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
 CA denied the petition and ruled that RTC had properly acquired jurisdiction
over Carson due to its voluntary appearance in court
o Considered Carson’s act of requesting additional time to file its
responsive pleading as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the trial court.
Issue: W/N Carson was properly declared in default, YES
Ruling:
The SC ruled in the affirmative. Carson was properly declared in default as per
Section 3, Rule 9 of ROC states that when a party may properly be declared in default
and the remedy available in such case:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to
the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case,
the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice.
Carson moved to dismiss the complaint instead of submitting a responsive pleading
within 15days as prayed for in its Appearance and Motion. Clearly, Carson failed to
answer within the time allowed by the RTC – Carson could have already been validly
declared in default. However, believing that it has yet to acquire jurisdiction over
Carson, RTC issued alias Summons. This culminated the issuance of the assailed
Order decalring Carson in default on the basis of the substituted service of alias
Summons. While Carson filed its Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Default – CA found
that the same failed to comply with the requirement under Section 3b that the motion
be under oath.

It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from Carson’s failure to file
its responsive pleading despite its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial
court reckoned from its filing of the Appearance and Motion and not due to its failure to
file its answer to the alias Summons.

This conclusion finds support in Atiko Trans, Inc. and Cheng Lie Navigation Co., Ltd v.
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., wherein the SC upheld the trial court’s
order declaring petitioner Atiko Trans, Inc. (Atiko) in default despite the invalid service
of summons upon it. In this case, respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance
Inc. (Prudential) moved to declare Atiko in default due to the latter’s failure to file its
responsive pleading despite receipt of the summons. Acting on Prudential’s motion,
the trial court declared Atiko in default. In affirming the validity of the default order, We
took note that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Atiko due to its voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court by filing numerous pleadings seeking
affirmative relief, and not on the strength of the invalidly served summons.