Crimpro Doctrines Ver. 5

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
1. People vs. Regalario

-------------------------------------------------------------------Read at your own risk. Read the full text-----------------
DOCTRINE: Thus, in People vs. Tamani, although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of
time, to obviate a miscarriage of justice the Court nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered
judgment on the merits thereof, in view of the fact that the filing of the appeal out of time was due to
the inadvertence of the defense counsel and the further consideration that the briefs of the parties had
already been filed. Considering that the same features also obtain in the present case, and in view of the
gravity of the offense and the penalty involved, the Court felt that it should also follow the same judicial
path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests of substantial justice, grant to appellants in this case the
benefit of judicial review.
2. Miranda vs. Tuliao

DOCTRINE: It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to
the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that
an accused may invoke the processes of the court.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
3. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

DOCTRINE: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore,
it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Compare with Regalario-----------
It is the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
It was however held in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy that the appellants were barred by laches, considering
that it took the appellants 15 years in raising the issue of jurisdiction (based on the Judicial Act of 1948)
from the filing of the case (January 17, 1948) to the appeal (January 8, 1963) despite their active
participation throughout the case. The same principle was cited in the case of People vs. Regalario,
holding that parties are estopped from appealing a case after the reglemetary period provided by law.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

However, in the latter case, appeal was granted in view of the gravity of the offense and its penalty.
The offense charged, having been murder, and the penalty, having been reclusion perpetua, the
Supreme Court still afforded the appellants judicial review to avoid miscarriage of justice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of Compare with Regalario-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Compare with Fukuzume----------
A similar ruling to that of People vs. Regalario was held in the case of People vs. Fukuzume as opposed
to the denial of the court of the appeal in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In People vs. Fukuzume, the
Court granted the appeal of the appellant for want of jurisdiction (the proper court, having been
Paranaque RTC and not Makati RTC). The court noted the distinction between the facts surrounding the
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy as a civil case and the facts surrounding the case of People vs. Fukuzume
as a criminal case.
As a general rule, question on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal
(people vs. Fukuzume) but exception to the rule is when the appellant is barred by laches (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy). But even when barred by laches, appeal may still be granted in view of the gravity of the
offense and its penalty (People vs. Regalario).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of Compare with Fukuzume-
4. Paderanga vs. CA
DOCTRINE: Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though they have not been
physically arrested.
Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been arrested, detained, or otherwise
deprived of their freedom. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:
 When he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest
 When he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the
proper authorities
In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally under custody.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person:
 Firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court
 Secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and
 Thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
An arrest is made either by:

 Actual restraint of the arrestee; or
 Merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. (house arrest)
5. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

DOCTRINE: R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office
if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the

performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must
appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence
the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
6. People vs. Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. Those that are classified as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold
the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Another Doctrine---------------------------
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------End of another doctrine------------------
7. People vs. Paliza
DOCTRINE: Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a
warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
8. Pestilos vs. Generoso

DOCTRINE: Even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances
should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of
the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The term “invited” is construed to mean as an authoritative command. Arrest is defined as the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An
arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. The application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical
restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the

part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.
9. People vs. Villareal

DOCTRINE: For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur:
(1) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) of section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest,
an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the appellant had committed it.
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph
(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
"Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in
appellant’s case.
10. People v. Martinez

DOCTRINE: Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.
11. People vs. Molina

DOCTRINE: To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
12. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE (G.R. No. 87059. June 22, 1992)

DOCTRINE: The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view.
Mere holding of one’s abdomen and shifty look on suspicion cannot be a ground to arrest or restrain
someone’s liberty. The officers were not aware of what crime the offenders committed until Danganan
appeared in the police headquarters. It was also only later when they discovered that Mengote did not

own the weapon nor he was licensed to possess it. The Court reversed the decision and Mengote was
acquitted. (Emphasized by Judge.)
13. PEOPLE vs. TANGLIBEN; G.R. No. L-63630 | April 6, 1990

DOCTRINE: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-
the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly.
14. People vs. Malmstedt

DOCTRINE: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN

DOCTRINE: A lawful arrest must precede a valid search; the process cannot be reversed. While a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs
or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his
immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid
arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
16. PEOPLE vs. SALCEDO

DOCTRINE: In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being investigated, it is not enough that
the subject be informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the
same and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be
provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel ofhis choice or avail himself of one to
be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and
effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
A voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without the
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
17. People vs. Cogaed (2014)

DOCTRINE: Rule 126, Section, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful
arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in
possession of drugs at that time. (Prelim exams, accused held a paper bag and was immediately arrested
for being a known pusher.)
18. People vs. Mariacos (2010)

DOCTRINE: When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
RATIO: It is impracticable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle since it can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (Asked by Judge.)
19. Miclat vs. People (2011)

DOCTRINE: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the plain
view doctrine to be valid, the elements are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are;
c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:
1) Warrantless search incidental to a 4) Consented warrantless search;
lawful arrest; 5) Customs search;
2) Search of evidence in "plain view"; 6) Stop and Frisk; and
3) Search of a moving vehicle; 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
20. Roan vs. Gonzales (1986)

DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
21. Sps. Marimla vs. People (2009)

DOCTRINE: A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be
an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI,
PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.
On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application
for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from the Supreme Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And
Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly
stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
the two provisions are in harmony thus no violation in the enforcement of the search warrant. The case
was dismissed.
22. People vs. CA (2000)

DOCTRINE: The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.
23. People vs. Bolasa (1999)

DOCTRINE: For the plain view doctrine to be valid, the elements are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are;
c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
24. People vs. Montilla (1988) (EDIT)

DOCTRINE: A legitimate warrantless arrest, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority
to validly search and seize from the offender: (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense.
On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an
arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a).These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto.

In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but
all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the
police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to
Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival
of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup,
unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would
show up, and how he would do so.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender:
(1) Dangerous weapons, and
(2) Those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
25. Homar vs. People (2015)

DOCTRINE: There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
26. FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR. vs. WILSON GO
DOCTRINE: The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion
of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of
Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of
Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions.
The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or
resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for review under Rule 43. (Emphasized. Refer to definition of Quasi-judicial Bodies.)
Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged.
The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the
prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are
not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasized)
27. Rolito Go Y Tambunting vs. Court Of Appeals | G.R. No. 101837 (February 11, 1992)
DOCTRINE: The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal
or technical right; it is a substantive right.

The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before
or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
28. ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

DOCTRINE: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by
the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of
the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper
investigation.
29. DUTERTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (APRIL 27, 1998)

DOCTRINE: The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right, it is a substantive right. To
deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
30. BAUTISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 143375 | July 6, 2001
DOCTRINE: Preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus: the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
31. Webb vs. de Leon

DOCTRINE: Preliminary investigation should determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender
a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
There need not be a full blown parade of evidence in a preliminary proceeding for the quantum of
evidence that is needed in a preliminary investigation is mere probable cause. Such probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
probably committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
Section 5 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.”
The decision whom to prosecute is not a judicial function but of the executive department whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of this right is the prosecution of its violators.
32. Ho vs. People | Narciso vs. People

DOCTRINE: The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge while the
preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused

is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.
In the issuance of a warrant, the SC gave these 3 vital matters to be considered:
First, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e.
whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must
decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence other than the prosecutor's bare
report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable
cause to issue an arrest order.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the
very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
33. LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA; G.R. No. 182677 | August 2010

DOCTRINE: Reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information.
Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without
conducting another or a new preliminary investigation.
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter
of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner “cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be
since the extent of the judge’s examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the
circumstances of the case require.”
The standing principle is that once an information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a
reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
A substantial amendment to the complaint or to the information, however, requires another or a new
Preliminary Investigation.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following
have been held to be mere formal amendments:
(1) New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction;

(2) An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in
the original one;
(3) Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) An amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and;
(5) An amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and
not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.
The fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the
substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
34. Mendoza v. People; G.R. No. 197293 | April 21, 2014)

DOCTRINE: While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function
of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the
case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish
probable cause.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information:
(a) Dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(b) Issue a warrant of arrest if it binds probable cause; and
(c) Order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
35. CRESPO vs. MOGUL | 151 SCRA 462

DOCTRINE: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court.
36. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA | January 13, 2014

DOCTRINE: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court
and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In criminal cases, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting
on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In
such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in the name of said complainant.
The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings
of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.
37. RICARZE vs. CA | February 9, 2007

DOCTRINE: Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment
may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
38. PEOPLE vs. AQUINO | August 6, 2002

DOCTRINE: Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege, specify or
enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These
circumstances need not be preceded by the words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” or “qualified
by” to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified

in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for
his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the
Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving
them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law.
This includes the death penalty in proper cases.
39. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE | March 20, 2013

DOCTRINE: When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be
proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of
the action. (Emphasized by Judge)
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.―A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense.―It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.
40. AGUSTIN vs. PAMINTUAN | August 22, 2005

DOCTRINE: Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of
residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence
involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must
abide in a place where he had a house therein.
To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily
presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for
an indefinite time.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such
person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence

within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for
purposes of venue.
The absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing
where the crimes charged were allegedly committed is a substantial defect.
41. PACOY vs. CAJIGAL | September 28, 2007

DOCTRINE: It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
AMENDMENT SUBSTITUTION
Amendment may involve either formal or Substitution necessarily involves a substantial
substantial changes change from the original charge
Amendment before plea has been entered can be Substitution of information must be with leave of
effected without leave of court court as the original information has to be
dismissed
Where the amendment is only as to form, there is In substitution of information, another
no need for another preliminary investigation and preliminary investigation is entailed and the
the retaking of the plea of the accused accused has to plead anew to the new information
An amended information refers to the same On the other hand, substitution requires or
offense charged in the original information or to presupposes that the new information involves a
an offense which necessarily includes or is different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where
the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise,
where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:

(1) A first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

(2) The first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) A second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only:

(a) After a valid indictment;
(b) Before a competent court;
(c) After arraignment;
(d) When a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) When the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof;
or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
The last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different
from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge
and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a
second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
42. PEOPLE vs. CATUBIG | August 23, 2001

DOCTRINE: The term “aggravating circumstances” used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense; The ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil, liability of the offender—relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on 01 December 2000, requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court now provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. —The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient

to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.”
A court would thus be precluded from considering in its judgment the attendance of “qualifying, or
aggravating circumstances” if the complaint or information is bereft of any allegation on the presence
of such circumstances. (Emphasized by Judge)
The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the
private offended party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said rules.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The revelations of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused, coupled with her willingness to
face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial, should merit
credence unless strong justifications dictate otherwise.
The trite defenses of alibi and denial proferred by the accused cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical statements of the complainant.
It a settled doctrine that the assessment made by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserves
great regard and weight on appeal.
42. BALTAZAR vs. CHUA | February 27, 2009

DOCTRINE: The rule is that once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, be it
dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

1. People vs. Regalario

2. Miranda vs. Tuliao

3. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

An arrest is made either by:

5. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

6. People vs. Sandiganbayan

8. Pestilos vs. Generoso

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

9. People vs. Villareal

10. People v. Martinez

11. People vs. Molina

12. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE (G.R. No. 87059. June 22, 1992)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

13. PEOPLE vs. TANGLIBEN; G.R. No. L-63630 | April 6, 1990

14. People vs. Malmstedt

15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN

16. PEOPLE vs. SALCEDO

17. People vs. Cogaed (2014)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

18. People vs. Mariacos (2010)

19. Miclat vs. People (2011)

20. Roan vs. Gonzales (1986)

21. Sps. Marimla vs. People (2009)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

22. People vs. CA (2000)

23. People vs. Bolasa (1999)

24. People vs. Montilla (1988) (EDIT)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

25. Homar vs. People (2015)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

28. ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

29. DUTERTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (APRIL 27, 1998)

31. Webb vs. de Leon

32. Ho vs. People | Narciso vs. People

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

In the issuance of a warrant, the SC gave these 3 vital matters to be considered:

33. LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA; G.R. No. 182677 | August 2010

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

34. Mendoza v. People; G.R. No. 197293 | April 21, 2014)

35. CRESPO vs. MOGUL | 151 SCRA 462

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

36. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA | January 13, 2014

37. RICARZE vs. CA | February 9, 2007

38. PEOPLE vs. AQUINO | August 6, 2002

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

39. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE | March 20, 2013

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.―A complaint or information is sufficient if it

40. AGUSTIN vs. PAMINTUAN | August 22, 2005

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

41. PACOY vs. CAJIGAL | September 28, 2007

There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

(1) A first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only:

42. PEOPLE vs. CATUBIG | August 23, 2001

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

42. BALTAZAR vs. CHUA | February 27, 2009

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS | Ver. 4

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