RULE 35: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to the complaint, limited to the necessary passage of the
38.) Ancieto Calubaquib vs. Republic of the Philippines
GR. 170658, June 22, 2011
FACTS: On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon
issued Proclamation No. 80, which declared a 39.3996-hectare
landholding located at Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation
expressly stated that it was being issued "subject to private
rights, if any there be." Accordingly, the respondent obtained
an Original Certificate of Title No. over the property. On
January 16, 1995, respondent filed before the RTC of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of possession
against petitioners. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the
subject property despite repeated demands to do so.
They maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open and continuous possession of the subject
property since the early 1900s.
Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No.
80 on August 17, 1936, but maintained that the subject
property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly occupied by them
since 1900s) was excluded from its operation, citing a proviso
in the proclamation “private rights, if any there be.”
ISSUE:
Whether a motu propio rendition of a summary judgment
violative of due process?
RULING:
No. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the
plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed
by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any
material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A deeper understanding of summary judgments
is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be
an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of
them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
"A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." The test of the propriety of
rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine
issue of fact, "as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim." "[A] factual issue raised by a party is
considered as sham when by its nature it is evident that it
cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the
same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence
to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by
defendants merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby
gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers
are not under oath anyway.
39.) Auman vs. Estenzo
G.R. No. L – 40500 February 27, 1976, Munoz-Palma, J.
FACTS:
Sps. Capahi file a complaint against Auman for an easement of
right of way and damages, alleging that spouses Capahi are
the lessees of five parcels of land located in Barrio R.M. Tan,
Ormoc City, belonging to one Eulogio Simon, while Fausto
Auman and his codefendants are the co-owners of four parcels
also located in the same barrio; that the lots leased to spouses
Capahi have no adequate outlet to a public highway except
through the lands of the Auman's, hence, the necessity for an
easement of right-of-way, as shown in the sketch plan attached
vehicles of the Capahi's and the transportation of their
sugarcane through the servant estate to the public highway
and to the sugar mills. Petitioners, as defendants, answered
the complaint specifically denying the material allegations
thereof and setting up in turn the following special and
affirmative defenses.
The case was set for pre-trial for February 17, 1975. On
February 17, a copy of their reply dated February 14, 1975,
was furnished by respondents-spouses to petitioners together
with a new sketch plan of the lands involved with the
explanation that the new sketch showed the Pagsanga-an river
which traversed the lands leased by respondents-spouses.
When the case was called for pre-trial, the petitioners were
ready to proceed but the private respondents were not as they
did not have the required affidavits of their Witnesses, and
upon their request the Judge reset the case for February 26,
1975 for the omission of said affidavits. On February 24, 1975,
petitioners' counsel received a telegraphic notice from the trial
court that the case had to be reset for February 25 since the
original date of February 26 had been declared a special public
holiday.
Petitioners however filed by registered mail a "Motion to Admit
Amended Answer" to which was attached the Amended
Answer dated February 24, 1975. Petitioners alleged in their
motion that since the reply of private respondents presented a
sketch different from that attached to the complaint and in
order that the issues would be dealt with squarely, it was
necessary and expedient that the answer of petitioners be
amended accordingly without altering the theory of their
defense. n March 5, a wire was received by petitioners from
Judge Estenzo to the effect that the Motion to Admit Amended
Answer had become moot and academic because a Summary
Judgment had already been rendered by him. The trial court
ruled in favor of Sps. Capahi ordering Auman to open lot tight
of way. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground
that it was prematurely rendered and prayed that their
amended answer be admitted and the case set for pre-trial and
trial.
Issue:
Whether Judge Estenzo of CFI of Leyte committed GAD when
he rendered a Summary Judgement in favor of Sps. Capahi
RULING:
Yes. There was no motion for a summary judgment with
supporting affidavits and of depositions that was ever filed by
respondents Capahi and served on petitioners herein.
A summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion
by any of the parties, x x x after both parties have pleaded, the
motion to be supported by affidavits, depositions, or other
documents, after notice thereof had been served upon the
adverse party, who in turn may oppose the motion with
supporting affidavits and other documents and, after hearing, it
appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
except as to the amount of damages, and that the movant or
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The summary judgment rendered by respondent Judge
Estenzo was in violation of the foregoing basic rule. There was
no motion for a summary judgment with supporting affidavits
and/or depositions that was ever filed by respondents Capahi
and served on petitioners herein.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to enable
the trial court to determine whether or not a bona fide issue
exists between the parties, and if none, for the court to render
a summary judgment as prayed for. This the court can do only
after proper notice to the adverse party who has to be served
with a copy of the motion for summary judgment with its
supporting affidavits at least 10 days before the specified date
of the hearing of the motion.
1

39.) Estrada vs Consolacion
G.R. No. L-40948, June 29, 1976
FACTS:
Estrada filed a complaint for damages against Uy and Galaura,
owner and driver, respectiovely of an AC jeep, for breach of
their obligations as a common carrier, in view of the death of
his wife while she was a passenger of the vehicle. Defendants,
in their answer, while admitting that plaintiff's wife was a
passenger and that she died as a result of the accident,
alleged that the proximate and only cause of the accident was
the negligence of third persons (the drivers, Danilo Ang and
Rodolfo D. Endino, of a Toyota pick-up truck bearing Plate No.
T-RU-221, and a Ford pick-up truck with Plate No. TRU-420,
respectively) over whom defendant Corazon Ramirez Uy had
no supervision and control, and who were then driving their
respective vehicles at a fast rate of speed and from different
directions, as a result of which said vehicles collided, and
because of that collision the Ford pick-up truck was deviated
from its lane and hit the jeep of defendants.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment against
plaintiff on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages
(for filing an unfounded suit) defendants are seeking from
plaintiff by way of counterclaim. Petitioner opposed the above
motion, relying heavily on the presumption that in case of
death of the passenger, the common carrier is presumed "to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently,” unless the
carrier proves that he has observed extraordinary diligence
with due regard to all the circumstances, which movants failed
to do.
Respondent Judge issued an order and has found that there is
no genuine issue as to material fact and no controversial
question of fact to be submitted to the trial court, and has
concluded that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law except as to the amount of damages recoverable.
Issue:
WON Judge Consolasion committed GAD when he rendered
summary judgement in favor of Uy and Galaura
Decision:
Yes. In the absence of any findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the aforesaid order of respondent Judge cannot be
considered a judgment. It has been held that "a trial court in
granting summary judgment should file findings of fact and
conclusion of law or a memorandum opinion so as to disclose
grounds upon which the trial court reached its determination."
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34, of the Revised Rules, "A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof." 2 The defendant who believes that he is
entitled to a judgment either on the pleadings or on the basis of
extrinsic facts established by affidavits or depositions may
move for summary judgment in his favor. 3 In other words,
when the moving party is a defending party, his pleadings,
depositions or affidavits must show that his defenses or denials
are sufficient to defeat the claimant's claim. The affidavit
submitted by the party moving for summary judgment shall be
by persons having personal knowledge of the facts; it shall
recite all material facts and show that there is no defense to
the cause of action or that the cause of action has no
merits. 4This motion shall be served on the adverse party at
least ten (10) days prior to the time specified in the hearing.
The adverse party may also, prior to said date, serve opposing
affidavits. The opposing papers, including pleadings,
depositions, and affidavits must establish a genuine issue of
fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. After
hearing, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted if,
on the basis of all the papers and proofs submitted, the cause
of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant
the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of
any party. The motion shall be denied if any party shall show
facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact other than
an issue as to the amount or extent of the damages. 5 This
Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. 6 The very object is "to separate what is
formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine
and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to
the burden of a trial. 7 In conducting the hearing, the purpose
of the judge is not to try the issue, but merely to determine
whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried. Where a
motion is made for summary judgment, such motion is not
directed to the pleadings and deals only with the question of
whether there are triable issues of facts and where such issues
exist summary judgment must be denied. 8 Summary judgment
should not be granted where it fairly appears that there is a
triable issue to be tried. 9 "The Court should not pass, on
questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that the
summary judgment procedure 'should not be perverted to the
trial of disputed questions of fact upon affidavits". 10 The test,
therefore, of a motion for summary judgment iswhether the
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motions are
sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a
finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action
or the claim is clearly meritorious.
In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action and to show that
the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of
delay. 12 After plaintiff's burden has been discharged,
defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him
to defend.
There being no judgment, the present petition is, therefore,
premature. Certainly, petitioner could move for the setting
aside of the aforesaid Order of May 20, 1975 by the
presentation of opposing affidavits showing that, other than the
issue as to the amount or extent of damages, there is a
genuine issue of fact on the carrier's liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari with prohibition is
dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
40.) Grand Farms Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 91779, February 7, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over their mortgaged
properties, with damages, against respondent’s clerk of court,
deputy sheriff and herein private respondent Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank. Soon after private respondent
had filed its answer to the complaint, petitioners filed a request
for admission by private respondent of the allegation, inter alia,
that no formal notice of intention to foreclose the real estate
mortgage was sent by private respondent to petitioners.
Private respondent, through its deputy liquidator, responded
under oath to the request and countered that petitioners were
"notified of the auction sale by the posting of notices and the
publication of notice in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a
newspaper of general circulation in the province where the
subject properties are located and in the Philippines on
February 13, 20 and 28, 1988." On the basis of the alleged
implied admission by private respondent that no formal notice
of foreclosure was sent to petitioners, the latter filed a motion
for summary judgment contending that the foreclosure was
violative of the provisions of the mortgage contract. The motion
was opposed by private respondent which argued that
petitioners' reliance on said paragraph (k) of the mortgage
contract fails to consider paragraphs (b) and (d) of the same
contract.
On February 27, 1989, the trial court issued an order, denying
petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent-judge
on the ground that genuine and substantial issues exist which
require the presentation of evidence during the trial, to wit: (a)
whether or not the loan has matured; (b) whether or not private
2
respondent notified petitioners of the foreclosure of their
mortgage; (c) whether or not the notice by publication of the
foreclosure constitutes sufficient notice to petitioners under the
mortgage contract; (d) whether or not the applicant for
foreclosure of the mortgage was a duly authorized
representative of private respondent; and (e) whether or not
the foreclosure was enjoined by a resolution of this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in denying petitioner’
DECISION:
YES. The Rules of Court authorize the rendition of a summary
judgment if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Although an issue may be raised formally by the pleadings but
there is no genuine issue of fact, and all the facts are within the
judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be
granted.
The real test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is
whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the
motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to
justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to
the action or that the claim is clearly meritorious.
Applying said criteria to the case at bar, we find petitioners’
action in the court below for annulment and/or declaration of
nullity of the foreclosure proceedings and damages ripe for
summary judgment. Private respondent tacitly admitted in its
answer to petitioners’ request for admission that it did not send
any formal notice of foreclosure to petitioners. Stated
otherwise, and as is evident from the records, there has been
no denial by private respondent that no personal notice of the
extrajudicial foreclosure was ever sent to petitioners prior
thereto. This omission, by itself, rendered the foreclosure
defective and irregular for being contrary to the express
provisions of the mortgage contract.
41.) Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation vs. IAC
G.R. No. 75502, November 12, 1987
FACTS:
On 17 November 1976, Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo
T. Salonga, President-General Manager and Comptroller,
respectively, of P.B. De Jesus and Company, Inc., executed a
promissory note (PBC No. 1202-76) in favor of respondent
Philippine Banking Corporation in the amount of P600,000.00,
the obligation maturing on 29 December 1976. Similarly, on 2
December 1976, a second promissory note (PBC No. 1255-76)
was executed this time in the amount of P300,000.00, payable
on or before 3 January 1977. On 5 March 1978, P.D. De Jesus
and Company, Inc., by vote of its stockholders, changed its
corporate name to Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation
(hereafter "Kalilid"), an act subsequently validated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Thereafter, respondent
Bank served several letters of demand upon petitioner Kalilid
for payment by the latter of the obligations contracted under
promissory notes PBC No. 1202-76 and PBC No. 1255-76
which had apparently remained unsettled. Petitioner Kalilid,
however, disowned its alleged indebtedness under both
promissory notes.
Statement of the Case: Philippine Banking Corporation filed a
complaint for collection against Kalilid and Messrs. de Jesus
and Salonga with Branch 23 of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal. In its Answer, Kalilid alleged that it "ha[d] no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of [the material allegations in the complaint]. 5 As its
affirmative defense, petitioner Kalilid asserted that the authority
to borrow money or contract loans on its behalf had not been
granted to Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga who, it was further
asserted, should be held solely liable under the two promissory
notes. The answer of petitioner Kalilid, however, was not
verified.
The complaint was dismissed, though without prejudice, with
respect to Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga whose whereabouts
could not then be ascertained. The parties were unable to
arrive at an amicable settlement between themselves at the
pre-trial stage of the litigation. Subsequently, a motion for
summary judgment was filed by respondent Bank to which
petitioner Kalilid raised neither objection nor opposition.
Upon motion, the trial court found petitioner Kalilid liable to
respondent Bank for the obligations contracted under the
promissory notes. The trial Judge based his decision primarily
on two factors: (1) the failure of petitioner Kalilid to verify its
answer, which failure the trial Judge considered as amounting
to an admission by petitioner Kalilid of the genuineness and
due execution of promissory notes PBC No. 1202-76 and PBC
No. 1255-76, which were annexed to respondent Bank's
complaint; and (2) the fact that the two disputed promissory
notes were signed by Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga both for
and in behalf of the former P.B. de Jesus and Company, Inc.
(now petitioner Kalilid) and in their own personal capacities.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.
Moreover, the statements of account Annexes A and B are
also attached to the same complaint as integral part thereof.
Annex A pertains to the promissory note No. 1202-76 with the
principal of P600,000.00 while Annex B pertains to the
promissory note No. 125576 with the principal of P300,000.00.
Explained in said statements of account are the charges for
past due interest and penalty charges and the total of said
obligation as of April 30, 1981 showed a total of principal,
interest and penalty charges of P1,780,253.08. The
genuineness and due execution of said promissory notes and
statements of account are deemed admitted by the failure to
deny under oath said documents
ISSUE:
Whether the IAC erred in extending such admission to the two
aforementioned Statements of Account—Annexes "C" and "D"
of the Complaint-since none of petitioner Kalilid's duly
authorized representatives had participated in the preparation
thereof.
RULING:
Yes. In respect, however, of the amount of petitioner Kalilid's
total indebtedness to respondent Bank under the two
promissory notes, it was error for the appellate court (as for the
trial Judge) to have expanded the scope of petitioner Kalilid's
implied admission of genuineness and due execution so as to
include the two Statements of Account annexed to the
complaint.
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must
establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as
to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b)
the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis
of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents
appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact
exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is
entitled to a summary judgment.
We rule that the issue regarding the propriety of the service of
a copy of the demand letter on the petitioner in his office is a
sham issue. It is not a bar to the issuance of a summary
judgment in respondent’s favor. A genuine issue is an issue of
fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. To forestall summary judgment, it is
essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of
genuine issues, as to which he has substantial, plausible and
fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the
presentation of evidence upon which reasonable findings of
fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, although a
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry thereof.
We have consistently expostulated that in summary judgments,
the trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of
3
the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter
affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to any fact, and summary
judgment is called for.
We further affirm the findings of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that, given the settled facts of this case, petitioner
cannot avail himself of the benefit of excussion fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to
do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be
indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be
compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted
all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal
remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known
as the benefit of excussion.
The afore-quoted provision imposes a condition for the
invocation of the defense of excussion. Article 2060 of the Civil
Code clearly requires that in order for the guarantor to make
use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the
creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment and point out to
the creditor available property of the debtor within the
Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. It must
be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at
his office, petitioner still failed to point out to the respondent
properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as
required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such failure on
petitioner’s part forecloses his right to set up the defense of
excussion.
42.) Bitanga vs. Pyramid Construction
G.R. No. 173526, August 28, 2008
FACTS:
Pyramid Construction filed a complaint for specific
performance before RTC against Bitanga to compel them to
pay for the services they rendered.
They alleged that Macrogen Realty hired them to construct
Shoppers Gold Building and the petitioner signed as a
guarantor.
In his answer, petitioner said that he did not offer to guarantee
the obligations of Macrogen Realty to entice respondent. As a
special and affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the
benefit of excussion was still available to him as a guarantor
since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to exhaust all legal
remedies to collect from Macrogen Realty the amount due.
Pyramid filed a motion for summary judgment. They said that
petitioner, during the pre-trial, admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Contract of Guaranty. In opposing
respondent’s foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment,
petitioner and Marilyn countered that there were genuinely
disputed facts that would require trial on the merits.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. It ordered Sps. Bitanga
to pay Pyramid Construction.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. CA modified RTC’s
decision making Marilyn Bitanga not liable with her husband
but still made petitioner liable.
Bitanga filed an appeal with the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the summary judgment was proper in this case.
RULING:
Yes, the summary judgment is proper.
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must
establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as
to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b)
the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis
of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents
appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact
exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is
entitled to a summary judgment.
In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues
raised by the opposing party not genuine so as to justify a
summary judgment?
First off, we rule that the issue regarding the propriety of the
service of a copy of the demand letter on the petitioner in his
office is a sham issue. It is not a bar to the issuance of a
summary judgment in respondent’s favor.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. To forestall
summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to
confirm the existence of genuine issues, as to which he has
substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e.,29 issues
of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which
reasonable findings of fact could return a verdict for the non-
moving party, although a mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the party opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to
preclude entry thereof.
Significantly, petitioner does not deny the receipt of the
demand letter from the respondent. He merely raises a howl on
the impropriety of service thereof, stating that "the address to
which the said letter was sent was not his residence but the
office of Macrogen Realty, thus it cannot be considered as the
correct manner of conveying a letter of demand upon him in his
personal capacity.
Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may
be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or
his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk
or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is
found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no
office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s
or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
The affidavit of Mr. Robert O. Pagdilao, messenger of
respondent’s counsel states in part:
2. On 4 January 2001, Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar, then
one of the Associates of the ACCRA Law Offices,
instructed me to deliver to the office of Mr. Benjamin
Bitanga a letter dated 3 January 2001, pertaining to
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (hereafter,
"CIAC") Case No. 99-56, entitled "Pyramid Construction
Engineering Corporation vs. Macrogen Realty Corporation."
3. As instructed, I immediately proceeded to the office of
Mr. Bitanga located at the 12th Floor, Planters Development
Bank Building, 314 Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati
City. I delivered the said letter to Ms. Dette Ramos, a
person of sufficient age and discretion, who introduced
herself as one of the employees of Mr. Bitanga and/or of
the latter’s companies.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
We emphasize that when petitioner signed the Contract of
Guaranty and assumed obligation as guarantor, his address in
the said contract was the same address where the demand
letter was served.32 He does not deny that the said place of
service, which is the office of Macrogen, was also the address
that he used when he signed as guarantor in the Contract of
Guaranty. Nor does he deny that this is his office address;
instead, he merely insists that the person who received the
letter and signed the receiving copy is not an employee of his
company. Petitioner could have easily substantiated his
allegation by a submission of an affidavit of the personnel
4
manager of his office that no such person is indeed employed
by petitioner in his office, but that evidence was not
submitted.33 All things are presumed to have been done
correctly and with due formality until the contrary is proved.
This juris tantum presumption stands even against the most
well-reasoned allegation pointing to some possible irregularity
or anomaly.34 It is petitioner’s burden to overcome the
presumption by sufficient evidence, and so far we have not
seen anything in the record to support petitioner’s charges of
anomaly beyond his bare allegation. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to complain that there was an irregular service of the
demand letter, as it does not escape our attention that
petitioner himself indicated "314 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati
City" as his office address in the Contract of Guaranty.
Moreover, under Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
there is sufficiency of service when the papers, or in this case,
when the demand letter is personally delivered to the party or
his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with
a person having charge thereof, such as what was done in
this case.
We have consistently expostulated that in summary judgments,
the trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of
the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter
affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to any fact, and summary
judgment is called for.35
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that:
Here, the issue of non-receipt of the letter of demand is a
sham or pretended issue, not a genuine and substantial
issue. Indeed, against the positive assertion of Mr. Roberto
O. Pagdilao (the private courier) in his affidavit that he
delivered the subject letter to a certain Ms. Dette Ramos
who introduced herself as one of the employees of [herein
petitioner] Mr. Benjamin Bitanga and/or of the latter’s
companies, said [petitioner] merely offered a bare denial.
But bare denials, unsubstantiated by facts, which would be
admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.
43.) YKR Corporation vs. Philippine Agri-Business Center
Corporation
G.R. No. 191838; October 20, 2014
FACTS:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of
the Resolutions promulgated on June 30, 20091 and April 8,
20102 of the Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, in Civil Case No.
0024 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Peter Sabido, et al.,
rendering summary judgment in favor of respondent Philippine
Agri-Business Center Corporation (PABC).
In G.R. No. 191838, petitioners Yulo King Ranch Corporation
(which later changed its name to YKR Corporation and
hereafter will be referred to as such) and six out of the ten Yulo
heirs raise purely questions of law as they seek to set aside or
modify the assailed Resolutions. YKR Corporation is a
domestic corporation with office address at C-J Yulo & Sons
Building, Pasong Tamo corner Don Bosco Road, Makati City.
The six out of the ten Yulo heirs include six out of the nine
children and legal heirs of the late spouses Luis A. Yulo and
Teresa J. Yulo. The late Luis A. Yulo was one of the original
defendants in this civil case. After his death on January 10,
1999, his late wife Teresa J. Yulo and their six children
became substitute defendants. Teresa J. Yulo subsequently
passed away on July 21, 2008. Petitioners have three other
siblings who, according to the petition, “have gone their own
separate way[s] when Luis A. Yulo died.”3 The petition further
states that “[p]etitioners have no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief if their siblings are aware of the
proceedings in (Sandiganbayan) Civil Case No. 0024,
including respondent’s move for a summary judgment and the
assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.”4 Respondent
PABC, a domestic corporation, is a plaintiff-in-intervention in
Civil Case No. 0024 which sought, among others, that the
Sandiganbayan adjudge it as the true and lawful owner of a
real property known as the “Yulo King Ranch” located in
Busuanga, Palawan, and order petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) to lift the sequestration and return
possession of the subject property to said respondent. The
Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolutions in its favor.
G.R. No. 191863 is a petition filed by the Republic,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). The Republic is the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 0024 – an action for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages. Similar to the petition in
G.R. No. 191838, petitioner Republic raises a pure question of
law on whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting
respondent PABC’s motion for summary judgment.
PABC filed a motion for intervention and a complaint-in-
intervention to recover passion of real properties registered in
its name located in Busuanga, Palawan and prayed that (a) it
be adjudged the true and lawful owner of the subject
properties; and (b) defendant-in-intervention Republic be
ordered to return possession of the subject parcels of land to
plaintiff-in-intervention. The complaint-in-intervention was
granted. PABC received Sabido’s Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim wherein he denied that he had acted in concert
with defendants-in-intervention Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos in illegally acquiring the real property which
is the subject of the Complaint-in-intervention, the truth being
that at the time of the alleged unlawful act in 1975, defendant-
in-intervention Sabido had no involvement directly or indirectly
with co-defendants-in-intervention Marcoses and YKR
Corporation, much less in the alleged unlawful acquisition of
said property.
PABC served a request for admissions on all the defendants-
in-intervention. Defendant-in-intervention Republic filed its
Reply. Defendants-in-interventon YKR Corporation and seven
out of the ten Yulo Heir filed their Answer tot eh Request for
Admissions, According to YKR Corporation and seven out of
the ten Yulo Heirs, a truthful admission or denial of the above-
stated matters could not be made because all the records of
YKR Corporation have been taken by the PCGG when it was
sequestered. On the other hand, [d]efendant-in-intervention
Sabido did not answer PABC’s Request for Admissions despite
due notice.
Statement of the Case: PABC filed a motion for summary
judgement. On the other hand, defendants YKR Corporation
and seven out of the ten Heirs of the Late Luis A. Yulo filed
their “OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT” and argued that the motion for summary
judgment filed by plaintiff-in-intervention PABC is not proper
considering that herein defendants have not filed an answer to
the complaint-in-intervention. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion. It ruled that The Sandiganbayan ruled that there was
no genuine issue of fact in the case at bar since none of the
parties to whom the Request for Admissions was served by
respondent PABC specifically denied the latter’s ownership
over the subject properties. The court a quo formulated the
following conclusions:
1. Since respondent Sabido failed to file an answer to
respondent PABC’s Request for Admissions, the court
considered him to have impliedly admitted each of the matters
to which an admission was requested.
2. For petitioners YKR Corporation and then seven out of the
ten Yulo heirs, they did not make a categorical admission or
denial of the matters set forth in the Request for Admissions
“allegedly because all the records of YKR have been taken by
the PCGG when it was sequestered.”9 The court a quo, while
conceding that this form of response to the Request for
Admissions is allowed by the Rules of Court, found the reason
given to be “unconvincing because the matters requested for
admission ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR
Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.”
3. Petitioner Republic, claiming a superior right to the subject
properties by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1387 and
5
Presidential Decree No. 1297 (PD 1297), asserted that
whatever rights PABC may have acquired on the properties
“must yield to or at least be subjected to the rights of the
government, as conferred by [the cited laws] which came
before the subject lands were registered in the name of PABC
on 12 May 1975.”11 On this form of answer, the court a quo
concluded that “[e]ven plaintiff Republic did not specifically
deny PABC’s title to the properties.”12 Petitioner Republic also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to determine
the ownership of the subject lands under Republic Act No.
7975,13 where the Sandiganbayan allegedly does not have the
power and jurisdiction to determine ownership of land not
falling within the civil cases filed under Executive Orders Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-a. The Republic contended that since the
subject properties are neither ill-gotten wealth nor sequestered
assets as they are reserved grazing public lands belonging to
the government pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
1387 and PD 1297, the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction to resolve any claim of ownership involving the
subject properties.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in law when it granted
respondent’s motion for summary judgement even if the same
is not supported by deposition, affidavit, or admission on the
records.
Decision
Yes. To determine whether summary judgment was properly
rendered by the court a quo, we shall examine if the following
requisites under Rule 35 of the Rules obtain in the case at bar,
viz.:
1. there must be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, except for the amount of damages; and
2. the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
A “genuine issue of fact” is an issue “which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. x x x When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.”
A prudent examination of the evidence on record yields to no
other conclusion that there exists a genuine issue of fact as
raised in both petitions. In ruling on the issue of whether a
genuine issue of fact exists, there was no mention of any
circumstance or situation upon which the court a quo derived
its conclusion that the matters requested for admission “ought
to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR Corporation and
seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs. We cannot thus properly
ascertain whether the facts which the latter could not make any
truthful admission or denial are so plainly and necessarily
within their knowledge.
Considering that petitioners YKR Corporation and the
remaining six out of the ten Yulo heirs were deprived of their
day in court, the court a quo should have made its ruling as to
the non-existence of genuine issues of fact by clearly stating its
basis both in fact and in law and not on purely conjectural
determinations, i.e., that “the matters requested for admission
ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation
and [the then] seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs”40 and that “they
ought to have made allegations of any knowledge or
information as to the nature of such right or interest, or at the
very least denied PABC’s ownership or right to possession
over the subject properties.”41 To be sure, YKR Corporation
and the then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs tendered an
answer which is a permissible form of making a specific denial
under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules. The court a quo itself
stated in the assailed June 30, 2009 Resolution that “this form
of response to a Request for Admissions is allowed by the
Rules.”42 Even respondent PABC – the party that moved for
summary judgment and which has the burden to prove that
there are no genuine issues of fact in the case at bar – did not
submit any supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions to
prove that the matters requested for admission “ought to be
within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the
then] seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.”43
There also exists a genuine issue of fact as to petitioner
Republic. While the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out that,
on their face, the original certificates of title – from which the
transfer certificates of title of respondent PABC were derived –
were issued in the name of respondent PABC’s predecessors-
in-interest as early as July 1, 1916 and May 21, 1919,
evidence is still required to prove that the “private rights”
acquired by respondent PABC are superior over the rights of
petitioner Republic which also claims to have a better right
over the same properties by virtue of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1387 and PD 1297. To be sure, respondent PABC’s
Motion for Summary Judgment48 was not supported by
“supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions”49 as stated
under the Rules. Without clear, positive and absolute evidence
that respondent PABC has a better right than petitioner
Republic, such “genuine issue of fact” could not be resolved
because we simply do not have the facts to rule on the issue.
RULE 36: JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY
44.) Lacurom vs, Judge Tienzo
A.M. No. RTJ – 07 – 2075. October 9, 2007
FACTS:
In its appellate jurisdiction for unlawful detainer, the RTC
rendered a decision in the form of memorandum affirming the
MTC decision. The entirety of the minute resolution is
reproduced as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the said Lower Court, MTCC,
Branch III, Cabanatuan City, is hereby AFFIRMED en toto. SO
ORDERED. Cabanatuan City, July 21, 2005.”
Herein petitioner now filed this administrative complaint
alleging that the memorandum decision was rendered in
blatant disregard of the constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which is based.
ISSUE:
Whether the minute resolution of the RTC was invalid for
failure to distinctly express the factual and legal bases?
HELD
Short Answer
Yes. First, it is violative of the constitutional requirement for
rendering judgment. Second, it does not measure up to the
requirements in Sec 1. Rule 36. Third, the factual findings of
the case was not at least attached to the memo. Fourth, while
memorandum decisions are not prohibited, they must sparingly
be used only in instances when the facts are substantially
accepted by both parties, there are no doctrinal complications,
in simple litigations, or in cases of groundless appeals.
Long Answer
The quoted decision does not measure up to the clear
constitutional command:
SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the
foregoing mandate, thus:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.—A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall
6
be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court
only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the
facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to
and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no
study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its
decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of
the facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least of
the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin
with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become
an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be
resorted only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge
and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations
only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time
needed to dismiss it.
45.) Barrazona vs. RTC Br. 61
G.R. No. 154282, April 7, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner was a lessee of the premises owned by private
respondent San-an Realty. The private respondent file a case
against petitioner in the RTC captioned as collection of sum of
money. However, plain reading of the complaint would suggest
that the action was in fact one for ejectment as there was a
demand for rental arrears, and to vacate the premises.
In view thereof, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss since
the RTC had no jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However,
the RTC denied the motion to dismiss in the form of a minute
resolution herein reproduced:
“This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Motion to
Dismiss to be without merit, hence, the same is denied. SO
ORDERED.”
The petitioner went up on certiorari to the SC alleging that the
resolution denying the motion was unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution denying the motion was invalid for want
statement of factual and legal bases.
HELD:
Short Answer
Yes. First, it is violative of the constitutional requirement.
Second, it is also contrary to the requirements of the rules that
a resolution denying a motion must state clearly the reasons
therefor. The reason is so when the decision is assailed, the
higher court reviewing the same would readily determine the
merits upon casual perusal thereof.
Long Answer
We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute
order or resolution like the one specified above. A trial court
should state in its order the reasons for the dismissal of the
complaint so that when the order is appealed, the appellate
court can readily determine from a casual perusal thereof
whether there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.
Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, we require that resolutions disposing of a motion
to dismiss shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
This requirement proscribes the common practice of
perfunctorily dismissing a motion to dismiss for “lack of merit.”
Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking
recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called
upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.
46.) Sumbilla vs. Matrix Finance Corp.
G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a cash loan from respondent. As partial
payment, petitioner issued 6 checks each bearing a uniform
face value of 6.6k. All the checks were dishonored for being
drawn against a closed account. In view thereof, the petitioner
was charged with 6 counts of violation of BP 22.
The MTC, with the finding of criminal and civil liability, meted
the following penalties: a fine of 80k for each count of violation
of BP 22, with subsidiary imprisonment.
Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner filed an MR, which
was denied for being a prohibited pleading under Rules on
Summary Procedures. When the appeal was filed, it was
dismissed for being filed out of time. Certiorari with the RTC
was also denied. The decision has already attained finality at
this point. Hence this present recourse directly to the SC.
Petitioner prayed for the relaxation of the rules as the decision
of the MTC was beyond the maximum imposable penalty
provided by law.
ISSUE:
Whether a decision that has already attained finality may still
be modified.
HELD:
Short Answer
Yes. Generally, the principle of immutability of judgments must
be upheld, however there are exceptions. One exception is if
the judgment is not in accord with law, it can be modified for
the purpose of making it in accord with law.
Long Answer
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard
and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to
suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural
rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice.
This Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c)
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a
criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which
the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for
which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess
of jurisdiction as to the excess.
7
The face value of each of the six checks that bounced is
P6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of
fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only P13,334.00, or
the amount double the face value of each check. Indubitably,
the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond
the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The
fine of P80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of the
face value of each check that was dishonored.
47.) Delfino Vs. Anasao
G.R. No. 197486, Sept 10, 2014
FACTS:
The petitioner was the owner of a total of 14.6 hectares of
agricultural land. Of that, 9.8 was tenanted and being tilled by
the respondents. The tenanted lands amounting to 9.8
hectares were placed under Operation Land Transfer pursuant
to PD 27. After full payment by the government, emancipation
patents were granted to the respondents as farmer
beneficiaries.
Prior to the registration of the patents, petitioner filed an
application for retention of the entire 14 hectares. The DAR
Regional Director denied the application for retention as to the
9.8 tenanted but granted the retention as to the remaining 4.8
hectares.
This decision was appealed to the DAR Secretary, which set
aside the decision of DAR Director, and granted the petitioner
5 hectares from the tenanted lands (from the 9.8). The
respondents filed MR arguing that the decision had the effect
of practically cancelling the patents awarded to them already.
The MR was denied. The decision became final.
In view thereof, petitioner sold 2 hectares from the tenanted
lands. Petitioner also filed a cancellation of the emancipation
patents pursuant to the decision of the DAR Secretary, which
was granted by the provincial adjudicator.
Respondents filed a motion for clarificatory judgment praying
that the portion to be retained by the petitioner be
particularized in the decision.
The new DAR Secretary issued a clarification of the judgement
which stated that the sale of 2 hectares shall form part of the
right of retention accruing to the petitioner and the remaining 3
hectares shall be taken from the 4.8 untenanted lands.
Petitioner now assails this decision for being invalid as the
previous decision can no longer be modified nor clarified, it
being already final.
ISSUE:
Whether a final judgment may still be clarified or modified.
HELD:
Short Asnwer
Yes. By way of exception, a final judgment may be modified if
circumstances transpired after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Long Answer
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule, namely: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
In this case, the clarification made by the DAR Secretary in his
February 2, 2006 Order falls under the fourth exception. It is
true that the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao
stated that the five hectares shall be taken from the tenanted
area, which pertains to the 9.8597 hectares of which 6.5671
hectares were already issued with EPs in favor of respondents.
Subsequently, however, without prior clearance from the DAR,
Delfino sold two hectares of land covered by OLT to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. The DAR Secretary thus found it fair and
equitable to include the said portion to Delfino’s retention area,
which meant that Delfino is entitled only to the balance of three
hectares.
As explained by Secretary Pangandaman in his order denying
Delfino’s motion for reconsideration, this clarification was made
in order not to circumvent the five hectare limitation as said
landowner “cannot [be allowed to] simultaneously enjoy … the
proceeds of the [sale] and at the same time exercise the right
of retention” to the maximum of five hectares.
48.) Club Filipino, Inc. Vs. Bautista
G.R. No. 168404, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Respondent is one of the officers of the CLUFEA labor union.
Since the demands to negotiate a new CBA was not heeded
by Club Filipino, a mandatory conciliation was initiated.
Unfortunately, it resulted into deadlock. The union eventually
staged a strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock.
The petitioner filed a complaint to declare the strike illegal
which the LA granted and declared the officers of the union
terminated from service. However, the LA also ruled for Club
Filipino to pay the terminated officers their separation pay.
Respondents assailed the decision on certiorari. The CA
granted the petition and set aside the orders of the LA, and
ordered the payment of backwages in view of the finding that
the strike was not illegal.
On review, the SC affirmed the decision of CA. Hence,
petitioner filed an MR which was also denied with finality.
Subsequently, a supplemental MR was filed by petitioners.
During the pendency of the resolution of the supplemental MR,
a motion for execution was filed with the LA for the payment of
back wages. This was assailed by the petitioner arguing that
the decision has not attained finality due to the fact that there
was still a pending supplemental MR to be resolved by the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of a supplemental MR tolls the running of the
period for the decision to attain finality.
HELD:
Short Answer
No. The supplemental motion for reconsideration is technically
a second MR which is generally not allowed, and if allowed, it
is subject to the condition that it does not toll the finality of the
decision being assailed.
Long Answer
Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 13, 2009 is in the
nature of a second Motion for Reconsideration. As a general
rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration.—No second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained.
For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration,
the second Motions must present “extraordinarily persuasive
reasons and only upon express leave first obtained.”74 Once
leave to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration
is no longer prohibited.
8
This court explained the rationale:
“Piece-meal” impugnation of a judgment by successive
motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by
the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a
judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the
grounds therefor, and those not so included are deemed
waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions.
The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, however, did not prevent this court’s July 13,
2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A decision
or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after
the lapse of 15 days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the
decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file the second
Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It
only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be
lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be
granted.
Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from receipt of the
denial of the second motion for reconsideration would be
absurd. First, the Rules of Court and the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may resort to
filing prohibited pleadings just to delay entry of judgment.
49.) National Transmission Corporation vs. Alphaomega
Integrated Corporation, 731 SCRA 299
G.R. No. 184295 July 30, 2014
Quickie Notes: This case involves a discrepancy between the
amount of award stated in the body and in the dispositive
portion of the decision. AIC sought to rectify this before the CA
but they filed the proper motion out of time as provided under
the CIAC rules. The SC said that clerical errors such as
mathematical computations may be corrected by the appellate
court but if there is a specific procedure dealing with such
error, such rule must prevail and be followed.
FACTS:
AIC, a duly licensed contractor, participated in the public
biddings conducted by TRANSCO and was awarded six (6)
government construction projects.
In the course of the performance of the contracts, AIC
encountered difficulties and incurred losses allegedly due to
TRANSCO’s breach of their contracts, prompting it to
surrender the projects to TRANSCO under protest.
In accordance with an express stipulation in the contracts that
disagreements shall be settled by the parties through
arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC), AIC submitted a request for arbitration
before the CIAC and, thereafter, filed a Complaint against
TRANSCO alleging that the latter breached the contracts. AIC
prayed for judgment declaring all six (6) contracts rescinded
and ordering TRANSCO to pay damages.
The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Final Award ordering
the payment of damages. Unconvinced, TRANSCO instituted a
petition for review with the CA.
AIC moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. It sought the
correction of the discrepancies between the amount of the
award appearing in the dispositive portion (₱18,896,673.31)
and the body of the Final Award (₱17,495,117.44).
The Arbitral Tribunal, however, denied AIC’s motion, holding
that AIC failed to file its motion for the purpose within the time
limitation of 15 days from its receipt of the Final Award.
The CA affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal’s factual findings and
upheld the Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Award but modified the total
amount of the award after noting a supposed mathematical
error in the computation. The CA held that the correct amount
of the award should be ₱18,896,673.31, and not
₱17,495,117.44 as stated in the Arbitral Tribunal’s Final
Award.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in increasing the amount of
compensation in favor of AIC despite the latter’s failure to raise
the erroneous computation of the award before the CIAC in a
timely manner
RULING: YES. Jurisprudence teaches that mathematical
computations as well as the propriety of the arbitral awards are
factual determinations. The perceptible essential difference, at
least insofar as the CIAC’s Final Award and the CA Decision
are concerned, rests merely on mathematical computations or
adjustments of baseline amounts which the CIAC may have
inadvertently utilized.
CA improperly modified the amount of the award in favor of
AIC, which modification did not observe the proper procedure
for the correction of an evident miscalculation of figures,
including typographical or arithmetical errors, in the arbitral
award.
AIC never elevated before the courts the matter concerning the
discrepancy between the amount of the award stated in the
body of the Final Award and the total award shown in its
dispositive portion. The issue was touched upon by the CA
only after AIC raised the same through its Comment (With
Motion to Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award) to
TRANSCO’s petition for review. The CA should not have
modified the amount of the award to favor AIC because it is
well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not
appeal and that a party who did not appeal the decision may
not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other
than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose
decision is brought up on appeal. The disposition, as stated in
the fallo of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Award, should
therefore stand.
Having failed to move for the correction of the Final Award and,
thereafter, having opted to file instead a motion for execution of
the arbitral tribunal’s unopposed and uncorrected Final Award,
AIC cannot now question against the correctness of the CIAC’s
disposition. Notably, while there is jurisprudential authority
stating that "[a] clerical error in the judgment appealed from
may be corrected by the appellate court," the application of that
rule cannot be made in this case considering that the CIAC
Rules provides for a specific procedure to deal with particular
errors involving "[a]n evident miscalculation of figures, a
typographical or arithmetical error." Indeed, the rule is well
entrenched: Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply
to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the
said case must prevail over the other.
50.) Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Guariña
Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation
G.R. No. 160758 January 15, 2014
Quickie Notes: This case involves a loan agreement sought to
be enforced and the nullification of a foreclosure proceeding.
From this initial suit, two cases were lodged before the CA: (1)
a certiorari for the determination of propriety of the issuance of
writ of possession and (2) an appeal to determine whether the
foreclosure proceeding was valid. DBP asserts that the
decision in the first CA case constitutes “law of the case” and
that the second case should no longer be decided by CA. The
SC held that the assertion is wrong since the first CA case is
not at all intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and
litigated in the second CA case.
FACTS: Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP for
construction of a resort. A real estate mortgage in favor of DBP
was executed as security. DBP released the loan in
installments. When Guarina Corp. demanded the release of
the balance of the loan, DBP refused.
DBP found out that Guariña had not completed the
construction of the resort. Thus, it demanded that Guariña
expedite the completion of the project and warned that it would
initiate foreclosure proceedings if it fails to do so.
9
Unsatisfied with the non-action Guariña Corporation, DBP
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
Guariña Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific
performance of the latter's obligations under the loan
agreement, and to stop the foreclosure.
In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of
possession by the RTC which was granted. Aggrieved,
Guariña assailed the granting of the application before the CA
(C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP) which was dismissed.
In the main case, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of
Guarina Corporation which the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491),
on appeal, sustained.
Hence, this appeal by DBP.
DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No.
12670-SP already constituted the law of the case. Hence, the
CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491
differently.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP
already constituted the law of the case
RULING:
NO. DBP's insistence is unwarranted.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on
a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.
The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v.
Bacon, an American case, thusly: The general rule, nakedly
and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the
concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the power
of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but
they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps
below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded
on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule
there would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination,
and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that
when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case,
its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid
down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical
considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full
opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties,
the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case
and should not be reopened on remand of the case to
determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law
of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal
questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for
the issuance of the writ of possession was entirely independent
from the judicial demand for specific performance herein. In
fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal
concerning the issuance of the writ of possession while the
main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any
legal issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
59491, which was the appeal to determine whether or not
DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And, secondly, the
ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of
law involved herein because this case for specific performance
was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was
limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession
in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
51.) Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. vs. Macatlang
G.R. No. 180147 June 4, 2014
Quickie Notes: This case involves an illegal dismissal case.
The NLRC issued an interlocutory order granting the motion to
reduce bond. The aggrieved complainant-employees filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA to assail that grant of the
aforesaid motion. While the petition before the CA was
pending, the NLRC rendered a decision on the merits of the
case. Sara Lee invoked this NLRC decision to declare the
petition before the CA as moot and academic. However, the
SC said the decision of the NLRC is premature. NLRC should
have waited for the decision of the CA since its decision would
determine if NLRC did acquire jurisdiction over the appeal of
Sara Lee.
FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from a Notice of Permanent Closure
filed by Aris with DOLE stating that it will permanently cease its
operations. All employees of Aris were duly informed.
The affected employees filed separate complaints against Aris
for illegal dismissal alleging that FAPI, a newly incorporated
company was organized by the management of Aris to
continue the same business of Aris, thereby intending to defeat
their right to security of tenure.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding the dismissal of
the complainants as illegal and awarding them separation pay
and other monetary benefits amounting to ₱3,453,664,710.86.
The Corporations filed their Notice of Appeal with Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond with the NLRC. They asked the NLRC to
reduce the appeal bond on the grounds that it is impossible for
any insurance company to cover such huge amount and that,
in requiring them to post in full the appeal bond would be
tantamount to denying them their right to appeal.
Macatlang, et al., opposed the motion asserting that failure to
comply with the bond requirement is a jurisdictional defect
since an appeal may only be perfected upon posting of a cash
bond equivalent to the monetary award.
The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond, in light of
the impossibility for any surety company to cover the appeal
bond and the huge economic losses which the companies and
their employees might suffer if the ₱3.45 Billion bond is
sustained. The NLRC also issued an Order dated 31 March
2006 directing the Corporations to post an additional ₱4.5
Million bond.
Macatlang, et al., filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 96363, before the CA charging the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal of
petitioners despite the gross insufficiency of the cash bond.
They declared that the appeal bond must be equivalent to the
amount of the award.
While the case was pending, the NLRC issued a Resolution
setting aside the Decision of the labor arbiter and remanding
the case to the "forum of origin for further proceedings." In view
of this related development, the Corporations filed their
respective Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari for being moot and academic.
The CA proceeded to reverse and set aside the 31 March 2006
NLRC Resolution and deemed it reasonable under the
circumstances of the case to order the posting of an additional
appeal bond of ₱1 Billion.
Six (6) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari was filed
with the SC pertaining to the ₱3.45 Billion appeal bond, which
is mandated by the Labor Code.
The Corporations invoked the decision issued by the NLRC
last 19 December 2006 which set aside the labor arbiter’s
decision and ordered remand of the case to the forum of origin
to have the instant petitions dismissed for being moot.
10
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent NLRC ruling on the merits during the
pendency of the petition questioning an interlocutory order
renders the instant petition moot and academic
RULING:
NO. When the NLRC granted the motion to reduce the appeal
bond and the Corporations posted the required additional
bond, the appeal was deemed to have been perfected. The act
of the NLRC in deciding the case was based on petitioner’s
appeal of the labor arbiter’s ruling, which it deemed to have
been perfected and therefore, ripe for decision.
Prudence however dictates that the NLRC should not have
decided the case on its merits during the pendency of the
instant petition. The very issue raised in the petitions
determines whether or not the appeal by the Corporations has
been perfected. Until its resolution, the NLRC should have held
in abeyance the resolution of the case to prevent the case from
being mooted. The NLRC decision was issued prematurely.
The Resolution of the NLRC dated 19 December 2006 is
VACATED for being premature.
RULE 37: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
52.) Abe Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
162 SCRA 48, No. L-77632 June 8, 1988
FACTS:
Erlinda Leonardo, as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband, Victoriano Leonardo, filed a complaint for
recovery of property against petitioners before the RTC of
Cebu.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Copy of
the decision was received by the private respondent on
November 4, 1985, while petitioners received theirs on
November 7, 1985.
The defendants filed a notice of appeal which the trial court
gave due course to. The trial court ordered the elevation of the
records to the appellate court,
The plaintiff filed with the trial court a motion for partial
execution of the decision pending appeal. This was opposed
by the defendants on the ground that the appeal had been
perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case.
The court issued the special order granting the partial
execution of the decision pending appeal. The respondent
Court of Appeals sustained the lower court's order granting
partial execution pending appeal.
ISSUE: Whether respondent judge still had jurisdiction to issue
a special order granting the winning party's motion for partial
execution pending appeal, after he had already given due
course to the appeal of the losing party and ordered the
elevation of the records of the appealed case to the appellate
court.
RULING: YES. If one party has already perfected his appeal,
the clause “upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party” obviously no longer applies to him, but only to the other
party whose period to appeal has not yet expired. Thus, in the
instant case, since the petitioner had already perfected their
appeal on November 15, 1985, although they had until
November 22, 1985 within which to file their appeal, the latter
date had become immaterial. However, the other party
received the decision on November 4, 1985, hence she had
until November 19, 1985 within which to appeal. Her motion for
execution pending appeal which was filed on November 19,
1985 was therefore filed on time. Had she filed the motion on
November 22, 1985 it would have been filed late.
53.) Mendoza vs. Bautista
121 SCRA 760, No. L-45885 April 28, 1983
FACTS:
Mendoza and spouses Macapagal entered into a contract
whereby for and in consideration of the sum of P320,000.00,
Mendoza undertook to construct a residential house for the
spouses Macapagal. Misunderstanding led to the
abandonment of the job and refusal to pay by the other.
Mendoza filed a complaint in the CFI of Bulacan against the
spouses for the recovery of sum of money. The spouses filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the same
does not state a cause of action.
The judge dismissed Mendoza's complaint and also denied the
motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari of an
order of the respondent Judge.
The spouses contend that the petition for certiorari may not be
entertained because it is being utilized as a substitute for
appeal, and that it was filed out time. The spouses also argue
that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when the motion for
new trial is filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to the
motion.
ISSUE:
The instant proceeding is not a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. It is an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari. It is illogical therefore, to claim that the petition is
resorting to this proceeding as a substitute for appeal, it being
an appeal in itself.
(1) Whether the petition was filed out of time;
(2) whether an affidavit of merit is required
RULING:
(1) NO. The contention that the petition was filed out of time is
predicated on the claim that the motion for reconsideration was
defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply with the
requirements of the Rules of Court regarding such a motion.
We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same having
called the attention of the trial court to a point which the latter
totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint.
(2) NO. Private respondents misinterpreted the rules. While it
is true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a
motion for new trial if based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran,
1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called “motion for reconsideration”
which is not called as such in Rule 37 is the term commonly
used to refer to a motion for new trial under subdivision (c) of
Section 1 of Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a
motion for new trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if the
motion for new trial is based on any of the causes mentioned in
subdivision (a) of Section 1 of Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. No similar requirement is
imposed under subdivision (c) of the same section.
54.) Llantero vs. Court of Appeals
105 SCRA 609, No. L-28421 July 20, 1981
Quick summary: J.M. Tuason Co owned a land in Sta. Mesa
Heights in QC. Petitioner entered into such property and
constructed a house there-in. Corporation sought to recover
such property and filed a case for recovery of possession. RTC
ruled in favor of corporation. Petitioner appealed to CA but it
affirmed RTC. Petitioner filed an MR but placed an erroneous
docket number, hence CA remanded the case to RTC for
judgment because such MR was not legally existent.
SC ruled that Petitioner’s Motion, although seasonably
presented from the foregoing standpoint, bore an erroneous
docket number. For this reason, it could not be attached to the
expediente of the correct case. To all intents and purposes, the
Motion was legally inexistent. it was inexcusable for having
been sheer negligence
FACTS
11
Respondent J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., a domestic corporation,
is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision, situated in Quezon City. Title over
the said tract of land was originally registered under the
Torrens system as far back as July 8, 1914.
the Corporation instituted an action for recovery of possession
against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It
alleged that petitioner, through force, strategy and stealth, and
without its consent, entered into, occupied and subsequently
constructed his house on a 200-square-meter portion of the
land at Barrio North, Tatalon, Quezon City, covered by the title
of the Corporation.
Petitioner, in his Answer, claimed that he bought the land from
Felicidad Campos, whose title thereto could be traced back to
Telesforo Deudor, the first known "owner" of the property.
The trial Court rendered judgment ordering petitioner or any
person claiming under him, to remove his house and other
constructions from the property in question; to surrender
possession thereof to the Corporation
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court affirmed the
Decision of the trial Court. Petitioner received a copy of the
same.Through counsel, he filed a Motion for
Reconsiderationby registered mail, but erroneously placed a
docket number thereof, CA-G.R. No. 26772-R (J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., vs. Paciencia P. Bayang), instead of CA-G.R. No.
27311-R. The Motion was attached to the expediente of the
former case. There being no Motion for Reconsideration of
record in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R, the judgment against
petitioner became final, an entry of judgment was made, and
the records of the case were remanded to the Lower Court for
execution.
Before the Appellate Court, petitioner moved to set aside the
entry of judgment on the ground that, except for the mistake in
docket number, reconsideration was timely filed so that the
Decision had not yet become final. CA denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the motion for reconsideration was filed
HELD
NO. Petitioner’s arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration
were a mere reiteration of his evidence presented to the trial
Court. Clearly then, the Motion for Reconsideration, even if
correctly numbered, was pro forma, filed to gain time, and
could not toll the running of the period of appeal.
Petitioner’s Motion, although seasonably presented from the
foregoing standpoint, bore an erroneous docket number. For
this reason, it could not be attached to the expediente of the
correct case. To all intents and purposes, the Motion was
legally inexistent. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no
error in remanding the case to the Court of origin for execution
of the judgment. Petitioner’s counsel’s oversight cannot be
considered excusable. As claimed by the Corporation,
petitioner’s counsel, who was also the lawyer in the Bayang
case, had prepared the Motion for Reconsideration in the latter
suit a month before. Both Motions were not being prepared at
approximately the same time, as contended, such that a
mistake could have been committed, and if it had been, it was
inexcusable for having been sheer negligence. This is one
case where petitioner has to bear the adverse consequences
of his counsel’s act, for, it has been held, a client is bound by
his lawyer’s inexcusable negligence. No abuse of discretion,
therefore, can be laid at the door of respondent Court when it
declared its judgment final.
55.)Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Ortiz,
150 SCRA 380, No. L-49223 May 29, 1987
Quick summary: An action for recovery was filed by Maraviles
against PCIB for recovery of the dishonored checks due to the
negligence of its employees. Duing the Trial lawyers of PCIB
failed to appear and pointed out they did not receive any
notice. They filed an MR grounded on exorbitant award of
damages and on account of failure to reassign the case
because the one handling it resigned. However they failed to
attach affidavits therein. RTC ruled in favor of Mariveles.
SC ruled in favor of Mariveles. No other defense has been
asserted by PCIB, whether in an affidavit of merit attached to
its two (2) motions for reconsideration or otherwise.
FACTS : Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, hereafter
simply referred to as PCIB is petitioner. An action was
instituted by one of its depositors, Rogelio Maraviles, for the
recovery of damages resulting from the dishonor of two (2) of
his checks on account of the negligence of employees of PCIB.
The law firm of Ledesma, Saludo & Associates appeared for
PCIB in the suit.
After Maraviles had presented his evidence, the trial was reset
for the reception of PCIB’s proofs, but the latter’s lawyers failed
to appear at the appointed time. Consequently, the Trial Court
dictated an Order considering the case submitted for decision
and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
PCIB’s lawyers filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They
argued that the award of damages was exorbitant and for their
non-appearance is explained by the fact that in the middle of
June 1978, Atty. Mangohig suddenly resigned from the law
firm. As is the usual procedure, Atty. Mangohig was required to
submit a list of his pending cases accounts with their
respective status. Atty. Mangohig did submit a report.
Unfortunately, the present case was not listed in his report.
Thus the present case was not reassigned in time for another
lawyer to attend the hearing . In addition PCIB said that there
was no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for
reconsideration, this being required only when the motion for
new trial was based on grounds other than excessive award of
damages.
An opposition was presented by Maraviles, in which he
asserted that judgment had already become final, and
Mangohig’s failure to include the case in his report did not
constitute excusable negligence warranting relief, and clients
are bound by their counsel’s mistakes.
The Trial Court denied PCIB’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the motion for new trial is pro forma for lack of
the required affidavits.
HELD: YES. Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the
ground of fraud, etc., is unaccompanied by either or both
affidavits, the motion is pro forma a scrap of paper, as it were,
and will not interrupt the running of the period of appeal. But
where, as here, the motion for new trial is founded not only on
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also on
the ground of "award of excessive damages," as to which no
affidavit of fraud, etc., or of merits is required, what being
required of the movant being to "point out specifically the
findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating the
invoked ground, the motion cannot be denied as pro forma
simply because no affidavit of merits is appended thereto,
provided there is a specification of the findings or conclusions
of the judgment alleged to be erroneous because awarding
excessive damages. The tenability of the grounds is dependent
upon different premises. The untenability of one does not of
itself, render the other unmeritorious.
Moreover, the Trial Court's ruling that as "appears in the
answer." PCIB "has no good and valid defenses which might
change or alter the judgment of this Court if it were to set (it)
aside and ** (reopen the case) to allow the defendant to cross
examine the plaintiff and to present its evidence," appears to
be correct. A perusal of PCIB's unverified answer in the Court
a quo discloses that is made up mostly of denials for lack of
knowledge" and an averment of "special and affirmative
defenses" consisting in the insinuation that the dishonor of
Maraviles checks was due to mechanical and human errors
which are expected and inevitable and for which reasonable
12
allowance" should be made; and that Maraviles should verify
the amount of his deposit before issuing any check against it.
In the light of its express admission that Maraviles did indeed
have a sufficient deposit at the time of the issuance of the
checks in question, these defenses are patently unsubstantial
and unmeritorious. It furthermore appears that no other
defense has been asserted by PCIB, whether in an affidavit of
merit attached to its two (2) motions for reconsideration or
otherwise. It would thus really make no sense, as the Court a
quo opines, to set aside the judgment reopen the case and
allow PCIB to present evidence of defenses which are
inconsequential, and would not at all negate or mitigate its
liability.
It is true that when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence is invoked as ground of a motion for new trial, it
should "be proved in the manner provided for proof of
motions," i.e., by "affidavits or depositions" unless the court
should direct that "the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions." It is also required that "affidavits of
merits" be attached to the motion. A motion for new trial
grounded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
should thus ordinarily be accompanied by two (2) affidavits:
one, setting forth the facts and circumstances alleged to
constitute such fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence; and the other, an affidavit of merits, setting forth
the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's
meritorious cause of action or defense. The reason for the first
is quite obvious: it is to enable the court to determine if the
movant's claim of fraud, etc., is not a mere conclusion but is
indeed borne out by the relevant facts. The reason for the
second is equally evident: it would be useless, a waste of time,
to set aside the judgment and reopen the case to allow the
movant to adduce evidence when he has no valid cause of
action or meritorious defense.
56.) Republic vs. Asuncion, 502 SCRA 140
G.R. No. 159695 September 15, 2006
Quick Summary: Asuncion et. al filed for application of
registration of their titles. Petitioners with assistance of OSG
opposed stating the lands were inalinenable. Applicants and
oppositors agreed to a compromise agreement despite the
opposition of OSG. RTC approved the agreements. SG filed an
MR but was denied. Trial court ruled that the Solicitor General
was in effect seeking a new trial and that the motion for
reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of
merit required by the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37
of the Rules of Court. SC ruled that the Solicitor General’s
motion for reconsideration did not aver grounds for new trial.
FACTS Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe
F. Asuncion applied for the registration of the titles of nine (9)
parcels of land, all located at Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan,
Court of First Instance. The applicants alleged that they have
registerable titles over the subject lands which they acquired
by inheritance, accretion and through open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under color of title for at
least thirty (30) years.
Petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the
application on the ground that the subject lands are inalienable
forest lands of the public domain. The applicants' motion to
admit an amended application for eleven (11) parcels of land
was granted by the trial court. The applicants and the other
oppositors entered into a compromise agreement.
Despite the Solicitor General's opposition that the State was
not bound by the compromise agreement since the subject
lands were not susceptible of private appropriation, the trial
court approved the compromise agreement and excluded four
(4) parcels of land from the application. The trial court also
dismissed the application over two (2) other parcels,
Due to the applicants' voluminous formal offer of evidence, the
Solicitor General asked for additional time, to file his comment
on the applicants' formal offer of evidence.
Meanwhile, the trial court had considered the case submitted
for decision rendered its decision ordering the registration of
five (5) parcels of land.
The Solicitor General received his copy of the decision. Five
days later, the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision dated but it was
denied. The trial court ruled that the Solicitor General was in
effect seeking a new trial and that the motion for
reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of
merit required by the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37
of the Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General received the Order of denial on March
13, 2002, and filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 2002. The
trial court dismissed the notice of appeal for being filed out of
time.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals seeking the annulment of the Orders .The appellate
court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate
court considered the Solicitor General's motion for
reconsideration as a motion for new trial and held that the case
cannot be re-opened because the motion was filed after
judgment. The appellate court also held that the motion for
reconsideration was fatally defective without an affidavit of
merit.
ISSUE
WON the motion for reconsideration is in fact a motion for new
trial.
HELD
NO. A motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial if based on a ground for new trial. Section 1, Rule 37
of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial must
be based on the following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) newly
discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which
if presented would probably alter the result.
Here, the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration did not
aver grounds for new trial. The motion was not based on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence that would need
affidavits of merit, nor is the motion based on newly discovered
evidence as to require affidavits of witnesses. The two main
arguments raised by the Solicitor General in the motion for
reconsideration were: (1) that the trial court deprived petitioner
of its right to present evidence; and, (2) that the decision was
tainted with serious errors of law and fact. Both are not the
valid causes for new trial per Section 1, Rule 37. Hence, we
are unable to agree with the trial and appellate courts that the
motion for reconsideration was actually a motion for new trial.
Mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court
does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro
forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of
the Rules.
57.) Tadeja vs. People
691 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013
Quick summary: Petitioners pray for the reopening of the
homicide case against them. Their prayer is for the reception of
newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that this Court's
Decision affirming their conviction already became final and
executory on 26 July 2007. Notably, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) does not object to the reopening of the case.
Petitioners pleaded that the case be reopened and citing the
case of People vs Licayan which was cited by SC as pro hac
vice. SC denied to re-open the case.
13
Facts: As found by the trial court, the incident happened while
prosecution witnesses Maria Elena Bernardo Almaria (Elena)
and Jacinta del Fierro (Jacinta) were watching a public dance
during the celebration of the annual
fiesta of Barangay Talabaan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
It was then that they witnessed Ruben Bernardo (Elena's
brother and Jacinta's uncle) being hacked to death by the
brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand
(petitioners), and petitioners’ first cousin Plaridel – all
surnamed Tadeja. They also testified that Plaridel accidentally
hit Reynante while trying to hack Ruben; hence, Reynante's
injuries. According to them, they stayed at the scene of the
incident until Ruben was brought to the hospital.
RTC issued a Decision in Criminal Case No. Z-814 finding
Reynante, Ferdinand, Plaridel, Ricardo and Ricky guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. In Criminal Case No. Z-
815, the RTC acquitted Russell and Robenson of frustrated
homicide.
Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused
(petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA issued a Decision affirming the findings and Decision
of the RTC in Criminal Case No. Z-814. The CA held that
although the prosecution witnesses were relatives of the victim,
they had no evil motive to testify falsely or to concoct a story
against petitioners.
The CA also found that conspiracy was properly appreciated
by the RTC on the basis of sufficient evidence. It did not give
credence to the apparently conflicting testimonies of Reynante,
Plaridel and Ricky regarding what happened at the time of the
incident.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and submitted the
transcripts of the testimonies of Leticia Bernardo, Maria Regina
Cortuna (Regina), and Eduardo Eraso. These witnesses,
whose testimonies were missing from the records of Criminal
Case No. Z-814 forwarded to the CA, testified in Criminal Case
No. Z-815. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on
the ground that nothing in the transcripts provided would affect
the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elena and
Jacinta.
Petitioners then filed with this Court a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the CA
Decision and Resolution.
Petitioners claimed that since Criminal Case Nos. Z-814 and Z-
815 were tried jointly, and all pieces of evidence presented by
the parties in one case were adopted in the other, all the
evidence in both cases should have been considered and
given due weight in the resolution of the two cases. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No.
Z-814 as to how Ruben was killed ran counter to the testimony
given by Regina (neighbor to both parties), who was presented
by Russel and Robenson as defense witness in Criminal Case
No. Z-815
The SC issued affirming the Decision and Resolution of the
CA. We held that while petitioners were correct in asserting
that the totality of the evidence in Criminal Case Nos. Z-814
and Z-815 should have been considered and given due weight,
the testimonies of Leticia, Regina and Eduardo would not have
altered the judgment of conviction by the RTC. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, alleging that this Court had failed to
reconcile the testimonies of witnesses Elena and Jacinta on
the one hand and Regina on the other.SC denied the motion
with finality.
Petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate
Judgment, invoking the power of the Supreme Court to
suspend its own rules for the purpose of substantial justice and
to remand the case to the RTC for further reception of
evidence. Petitioners attached the sworn statements of
attesting to the innocence of Reynante et.al.
Later, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with
Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening Event
alleging that the Mamburao Municipal Police Force of
Occidental Mindoro finally arrested Plaridel. Petitioners
attached a statement, executed by Plaridel with the assistance
of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr. admitting therein that he had killed
Ruben.
With the arrest of Plaridel and his account of what happened,
petitioners argued that the situation called for the application of
the rules on newly discovered evidence, which provided
grounds for a new trial.
The SC treated the motion of petitioners as a second motion
for reconsideration and denied it on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading under the Rules. SC noted without action
their supplemental motion, stated that no further pleadings
would be entertained, and directed that entry of judgment be
made in due course.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and later filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Set
Aside Minute Resolution. They argued that their motion to
vacate judgment could not be considered as a second motion
for reconsideration, because the relief prayed for was different
from that which had already been passed upon for review.
Instead, the motion prayed for the reopening of the case and
its remand to the RTC for a new trial on grounds of newly
discovered evidence and supervening event.
SC denied the motion of petitioners with finality for lack of
merit. The Decision was then recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgments.
Ferdinand prayed for the reopening of the case on the basis of
the confession of Plaridel. SC required the OSG to file its
comment thereon. The OSG manifested that it was not posing
any objection to the reopening of the case. Ferdinand then filed
an Urgent Manifestation and/or Motion to Suspend or Hold in
Abeyance the Execution of the Decision Pending Resolution of
the Letter.
The Court received a letter from Sonia A. Bernardo, widow of
Ruben, manifesting her objection to the reopening of the case.
Following the receipt of another letter from Ferdinand
reiterating the request to reopen the case, SC issued a
Resolution denying the motion to suspend the execution of
their Decision, on the ground that there was no legal basis to
justify the reopening of the case.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied with finality for lack of merit, with a statement that no
further pleading or motion shall be entertained in the case.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration and/or for Review by En Banc, which was
denied on the grounds that it was a prohibited pleading, and
that the Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which
decisions/resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
A letter sent by Ferdinand and a Motion to Suspend Procedural
Rules with Prayer to Declare the Proceedings Below as a
Mistrial and/or to Grant Petitioners a New Trial Due to Newly
Discovered Evidence were ordered expunged from the
records.
In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona,
Ferdinand reiterated the request for the reopening of the case.
Petitioners later filed a Plea for Alteration, Modification and/or
Reversal of Resolutions (In the Sublime Interest of Justice,
Equity and Fair Play) with Leave of Court. He alleged that, in a
parallel case, SC had granted pro hac vice a motion to reopen
14
a case for further reception of evidence filed by the accused,
whose judgment of conviction had already been entered in the
Book of Entry of Judgments.
Issue
WON a motion for new trial be granted after the judgment of
conviction become final and executory
Held
NO. Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to
grant a motion for a new trial after the judgment of conviction
had become final and executory. In People v. Licayan, 363
SCRA 234 (2001), all the accused were convicted of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death by the trial
court. More than two years after their conviction became final
and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent
Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. They
attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of
their co-accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and
Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime.
Since the OSG also recommended the reopening of the case,
this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the reception
of newly discovered evidence. It is worth pointing out that the
motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin
term used by courts to refer to rulings rendered “for this one
particular occasion.” A ruling expressly qualified as such
cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.
Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some
definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. This is the reason why we have consistently denied
petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision
and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case. Section 1
of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may
only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu
proprio with the consent of the accused “(a)t any time before a
judgment of conviction becomes final.” In this case, petitioners’
judgment of conviction already became final and executory on
26 July 2007―the date on which the Decision of this Court
denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for
the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a
new trial may no longer be entertained.
58.) Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim
752 SCRA 215, G.R. No. 187916 March 10, 2015
Quick summary: Shell filed an MR for the decision of the SC
dated Nov. 25, 2014 in which it ordered them and several other
petroleum companies to vacate their oil terminals in Pandacan.
Shell states that the decision of SC was not supported by
competent evidence. SC denied the MR with finality.
FACTS
In the Decision promulgated on 25 November 2014, this Court
declared Ordinance No. 8187 UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan
Oil Terminals. The following timelines were set for the
relocation and transfer of the terminals:
The intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a
non- extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation
shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date
the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of
Branch 39 shall monitor the strict enforcement of this Decision.
Before SC are the following submissions of the intervenor oil
companies, (but pay attention only to MR by Pilipinas Shell.)
(1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25
November 2014 filed by intervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell);
(2) Motion for Clarification filed by intervenor Chevron
Philippines, Inc. (Chevron); and
(3) Manifestation of Understanding of the Dispositive Portion of
the Decision of 15 December 2014 (the correct date of
promulgation is 25 November 2014) filed by intervenor Petron
Corporation (Petron).
Shell seeks reconsideration of the Decision based on the
following grounds:
1.Erroneous reliance on the factual pronouncements in G.R.
No. 156052 entitled "Social Justice Society v. Atienza," which,
it argues, were completely unsupported by competent
evidence;
2. Adoption of "imagined fears, causes, surmises and
conjectures interposed by the petitioners," which it also raises
as totally unsupported by evidence because the petitions,
which involve factual issues, were wrongfully filed with this
Court;
3. Conclusion that there is no substantial difference between
the conditions in 2001 and the present setup with respect to
the oil depots operations; and
4. Failure to dismiss the petitions despite the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8187, which, it maintains, has rendered the
cases moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON the MR be granted
HELD :
NO. As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
in Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 254
SCRA 234 (1996), on the effect and disposition of a motion for
reconsideration: The filing of a motion for reconsideration,
authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose
on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically
with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way
that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the
issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a
useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or
final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to
issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated,
deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It
suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the
motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for
its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion
contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already
submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its
judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed upon,
or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent
reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the
judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too
unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.
These cases being a mere sequel to the Social Justice Society
earlier petition, we so hold that the relocation and transfer
contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities,
especially so when the city plans on building commercial
establishments to replace the Pandacan terminals and provide
a source of employment for displaced employees. Accordingly,
the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45)
days from receipt of the Decision shall also include the removal
of the facilities.
15
RULE 38: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR
OTHER PROCEEDINGS
59.) Demetriou v. CA
238 SCRA 158
FACTS
Petitioner sought to annul the decision of RTC. Petitioner was
the buyer of a parcel of land from private respondent Almine.
When the land was bought, it was subject to the 10 year lease
agreement. By reason of such, the petitioner honored the lease
contract and did not immediately cause the registration of the
title.
Upon the expiration of the lease, when the title was registered
with the RD, it was found that such title was declared lost and
a duplicate copy was issued by the RTC in favor the private
respondent.
The CA held that the fraud committed was intrinsic and
therefore not proper ground to annul judgment. Hence this
present petition.
ISSUE
Whether annulment of judgment proper in this case.
HELD
Short Answer
Yes. While the fraud was not extrinsic, such was not the only
ground for annulling judgment. Another ground is when the
court did not jurisdiction over the subject matter. Here, the
court did not acquire jurisdiction since the title was not in fact
lost, hence the court did not have any authority to issue a
duplicate copy.
Long Answer
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the
ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction
of the court which rendered it.
If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.
Consequently the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed,
Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that “in case a certificate of title,
considered lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same
shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title.”
60.) Arcilla v. Arcilla
138 SCRA 560
FACTS
Petitioner was one of several defendant in an action for
annulment of sale. Petitioner was declared in default for failure
to appear during pre-trial (yes during this time, parties can still
be declared in default for failure to appear during pre-trial). The
case was subsequently resolved in favor of the respondent,
and the decision became final and executory.
The petitioner filed a petition for relief arguing that the reason
he was not able to appear during pre-trial was because there
was no notice of pre-trial served. The RTC denied the petition
for being filed out of time. Hence this present recourse directly
with the SC.
ISSUE
Whether petition for relief may still be accepted even if filed out
of time on the ground of meritorious cause.
HELD
Short Answer
No. Regardless of the merit of the petition, when the same was
filed out of time, it will no longer be accepted. Petition for relief
from judgment is an equitable remedy and the petitioner of the
same must first and foremost prove that it is being filed within
the period allowed.
Long Answer
“The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality
of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments of courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law.
The law gives an exception or “last chance” of a timely petition
for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within
60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment)
under Rule 38 supra, but such grace period must be taken
as “absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted and
cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency.
Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or
contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect),
the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another and last
chance, and failure to avail of such last chance within the
grace period fixed by the statute or the Rules of Court is
fatal.”
61.) Ibabao v. CA
180 SCRA 70
FACTS
In an action for quieting of title, the CFI ruled that petitioner
Ibabao was the true owner of several lots and ordered the
private respondents Rico to vacate the properties.
Respondents did not appeal so the decision became final.
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for relief from
judgment within the period allowed. The petition was denied. It
was appealed to the CA, but the CA remanded the case to the
CFI. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether petition for relief may be availed of when the party
failed to perfect appeal.
HELD
Short Answer
No. Petition for Relief is only available when there are no other
remedies available to the party. Failure to perfect an appeal is
not a ground for filing petition for relief when appeal was in fact
available but the party did not take advantage of the same.
Long Answer
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a
remedy provided by law to any person against whom a
decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of
equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party had another adequate remedy available to him,
which was either a motion for new trial or appeal from the
adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented
by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the
relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of
procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure
by counsel.
16
No appeal was filed by the respondents causing the trial court's
decision to become final and executory. Only then did the
respondents file the petition for relief from judgment (Annex
"F", page 68, Rollo) explaining therein the reasons for the lack
of notice of time and place of hearing of their motion for
reconsideration and alleging that "there is no other remedy left
of the plaintiffclaimants to pursue or avail of but that provided
in Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court." Yet no reasons were
offered for their failure to appeal. No allegations of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence as to prevent them
from having done so was made by the respondents.
There was, likewise, no assertion that the decision of the Court
sought to be set aside was entered against them through such
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Thus, as the
trial court held in its decision dated July 13, 1983, dismissing
the respondent's petition for relief from judgment, "Plaintiffs'
failure to appeal within the reglementary period of
perfecting an appeal is NOT a, ground to grant a petition
for relief from judgment.''
62.) Quelman v. VHF
G.R. No. 138500, September 16, 2005
FACTS
In an ejectment suit, MTC decided in favor of VHF. The
decision was served upon Quelnan via registered mail. The
same was returned unclaimed. No appeal was perfected hence
the decision became final.
6 months thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for relief in
the RTC. The RTC granted the petition. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC decision for being filed out of time. Hence
this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether the presumption of the completeness of service of
registered mail is applicable in relation to the 60 day period for
filing the petition for relief.
HELD
Short Answer.
Yes. The 60 day period must be reckoned from the date the
decision was actually received or deemed constructively
received.
Long Answer
There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee.
However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post
office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice,
service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days
therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the
service was complete at the end of the said five-day period.
This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary
pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given
by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that
point.
With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the
postmaster on November 25, 1992, it follows that service of a
copy of the MeTC decision was deemed complete and
effective five (5) days therefrom or on November 30, 1992.
Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must
be reckoned from such date (November 30, 1992) as this was
the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. In short,
petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC
decision on November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a
petition for relief thus expired on January 29, 1993.
Unfortunately, it was only on May 24, 1993, or 175 days after
petitioner was deemed to have learned of the judgment that he
filed his petition for relief with the RTC. Indubitably, the petition
was filed way beyond the 60-day period provided by law.
63.) Sps. dela Cruz v. Sps. Andres
G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007
FACTS
In the complaint for annulment of title, the MTC resolved the
case in favor of respondent. On appeal, the RTC set aside the
MTC decision. The petitioner filed a petition for review with the
CA which was dismissed as the certification of nonforum
shopping was signed by the counsel instead of the petitioners.
In the CA, a motion for extension to file the petition was prayed
but was subsequently abandoned by the petitioners, hence the
case was declared closed and terminated.
A petition for relief was filed with the CA, praying that the
decision of CA denying the petition for review be set aside due
to the gross negligence of their counsel. The CA denied the
petition. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether a decision of the Court of Appeals may be subject of
petition for relief from judgment.
HELD
Short Answer
No. While the rules state decision of any court may be subject
of petition for relief, the same was construed to be limited only
to decision of MTC and RTC.
Long Answer
While the law uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.9 The
procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are governed
by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from
time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated
by this Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands,
neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
Court of Appeals.
64.) JULIO B. PURCON, JR. Vs.. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 161864
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for
reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
LA rendered its decision5 dismissing the complaint for utter
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter explained that petitioner was fit
to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002 as his
"hernia" was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner
was ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he was not
accommodated due to lack of vacancy. The fact that he was
not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he was suffering
from disability.
NLRC likewise dismissed the case and the MR.
The NLRC resolution became final and executory and was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA).
However, on June 7, 2006, the CA dismissed the case due to
formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution became
final and executory.
Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
17
SC denied said petition.
petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
interposing the following grounds:
I. The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE
when he based his decision on the fit to work certification
issued by the company-designated physician and on the
Quitclaim and Release executed by the complainant;
II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS
MISTAKE when he adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited
by the respondents and by adopting it in his decision;
III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a
GROSS MISTAKE when it affirms the ERRONEOUS decision
of the Honorable Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the
Honorable NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial
evidence and that their decisions are contrary to the applicable
law and jurisprudence; andcralawlibrary
V. The collaborating counsel of the petitioner committed a
GROSS MISTAKE in filing defective pleadings to the prejudice
of the herein petitioner.9
ISSUE:
Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our
resolution denying his Petition for Review?
RULING:
NO. The case is not originally cognizable by the SC. It should
have filed it before MTC. Nowhere in the rules provides that a
petitioner can file a petition for relief in SC or CA. It is a settled
rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken
mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a
judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file
a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted
in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. - Only petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the
judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the
Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of
Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.12 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers
only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as
it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which
decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for
relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment
or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
judgment of inferior court. - When a judgment is rendered by
an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly
deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from
taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the province in which the original judgment was
rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the
case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the
judgment or other proceeding thereof. - When a judgment
order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a
party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5,
prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial
Courts13 and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts
as courts of record.14
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court.15 It
may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA16 allows the remedy of
petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition
for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in
the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45
which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies
available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or
final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for
relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies
available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot
be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts
on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition,
the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the Petition
for Review does not amount to excusable negligence.
Petitioner's lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of
counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the client's cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party
who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own
negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because
of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by
counsel.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost either because of
18
inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure
by counsel.
65.) ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL
vs. ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 173379 December 1, 2010
FACTS:
Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against petitioners, Zenaida Guijabar
(Guijabar), John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons
claiming rights under them docketed as Civil Case No. 3719
before the Municipal Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna (MTC).
Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other
persons claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere
tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s name.
Respondent filed the complaint before the MTC.
Petitioners failed to file an answer.
Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with
position paper submitting the case for decision based on the
pleadings on record.
MTC ruled in favor of respondent and then issued writ of
exection.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment with the
MTC. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or strike out the
petition for relief. Subsequently, petitioners manifested their
intention to withdraw the petition for relief after realizing that it
was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. MTC granted petitioners’ request to
withdraw the petition for relief.
Petitioners filed the petition for relief before the RTC.
Petitioners alleged that they are the lawful owners of the
property which they purchased from spouses Martha D.G.
Ubaldo and Francisco D. Ubaldo. Petitioners denied that they
sold the property to respondent. Petitioners added that on 15
December 2003, petitioner Abubakar filed with the Commission
on Elections his certificate of candidacy as mayor in the
municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the 10 May
2004 elections. Petitioners said they only learned of the MTC’s
23 August 2004 Decision on 27 October 2004. Petitioners also
pointed out that they never received respondent’s demand
letter nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the
proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they
were not served a copy of the summons and the complaint.
RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing the petition for relief.
The RTC said it had no jurisdiction over the petition because
the petition should have been filed before the MTC in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
which provides that a petition for relief should be filed "in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside."
MR was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief
from judgment.
RULING:
NO. Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in
an unlawful detainer case. However, SC granted the petition
for reason that there is improper service of summons.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other
proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and
not a prohibited pleading, should be filed with and resolved by
the court in the same case from which the petition arose.
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief
with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful
detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief
with the RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the
RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment of the MTC.
The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition
for certiorari with the RTC under Rule 6518 of the Rules of
Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the
person of petitioners in view of the absence of summons to
petitioners. Here, we shall treat petitioners’ petition for relief
from judgment as a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal
service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly
served in person will substituted service be availed of.28 In
Samartino v. Raon, we said:
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained
in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal
service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant
to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service
cannot be upheld.30
In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and
personal service on petitioners was rendered impossible. It
failed to show the reason why personal service could not be
made. It was also not shown that efforts were made to find
petitioners personally and that said efforts failed. These
requirements are indispensable because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an
extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to
the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action
is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could
only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory
requirements of substituted service renders such service
ineffective.31
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records
of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom
substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners’ residence. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,32 we said:
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house
or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age
and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age
and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal
capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which
represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding
of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed." Thus, to
be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read
and understand English to comprehend the import of the
summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons
and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for
the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must
have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring
that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt
of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
19
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.33 (Emphasis supplied)
The process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his
relationship to petitioners and to ascertain whether he
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons
and his duty to deliver it to petitioners or at least notify them of
said receipt of summons.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 3719 by substituted service.
Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioners and, thus, the MTC’s 23 August 2004 Decision
is void.34 Since the MTC’s 23 August 2004 Decision is void, it
also never became final.35
66.) CITY OF DAGUPAN vs.. ESTER F. MARAMBA
G.R. No. 174411, July 02, 2014
FACTS:
We are asked in this petition1 filed by the City of Dagupan
through its then mayor, Benjamin S. Lim, to: (1) reverse the
Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution and (2) declare that
the damages awarded to respondent Ester F. Maramba are
excessive. Petitioner, thus, prays that this court affirm the trial
court’s August 25, 2005 and November 30, 2005 rulings in
toto.2cralawred
Respondent Ester F. Maramba was a grantee of a Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) miscellaneous
lease contract3 for a 284-square-meter property in Poblacion,
Dagupan City, for a period of 25 years.4 Sometime in 1974,
she caused the construction of a commercial fish center on the
property.5cralawred
On December 20, 2003, petitioner city caused the demolition of
the commercial fish center, allegedly without giving direct
notice to Maramba and with threat of taking over the
property.6cralawred
This prompted Maramba, through her attorney-in-fact, Johnny
Ferrer, to file a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.7cralawred
The complaint alleged that the demolition was unlawful and
that the “complete demolition and destruction of the previously
existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five
Million (P10,000,000.00) pesos.”8 The word, “ten,” was
handwritten on top of the word, “five.”
In the complaint’s prayer, Maramba asked for a judgment
“ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present
value of the commercial fish center completely demolished by
public defendant.”9 The word, “million,” was handwritten on top
of the word, “thousand,” and an additional zero was
handwritten at the end of the numerical figure.
The handwritten intercalation was not explained in any part of
the records and in the proceedings.
She also prayed for P5 million as moral damages and
P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees.10cralawred
On July 30, 2004, the trial court decision,11 penned by Judge
Crispin C. Laron, ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded P10
million as actual damages.
Petitioner city filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court
denied petitioner city’s motion for lack of notice of time and
place of hearing, thus, “the motion for reconsideration is not
entitled to judicial cognizance.”14 In a separate order on the
same date, the trial court also granted Maramba’s motion for
execution and ordered that “a writ of execution [be] issue[d] in
the above-entitled case upon submission of the certificate of
finality.”1
Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction dated October 29, 2004, together with an
affidavit of merit.16 The city alleged that “the decision, were it
not for the City Legal Officer’s mistake, negligence and gross
incompetence, would not have been obtained by the plaintiff,
or should have been reconsidered or otherwise overturned, the
damage award in the total amount of P11M being not only
unconscionable and unreasonable, but completely baseless.”
The trial court denied petitioner city’s petition for relief and
ordered that the writ of execution dated October 26, 2004 be
implemented.18 The court stressed that “[t]he negligence of
counsel binds the client.”19 Petitioner city filed for
reconsideration.20cralawred
The trial court, through acting Judge Silverio Q. Castillo,
granted the petition for relief and consequently modified its July
30, 2004 decision.
Maramba filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals24 granted Maramba’s petition for
certiorari. It held that petitioner city’s motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper 25
that did not toll the period to appeal. Consequently, the July 30,
2004 decision penned by Judge Laron became final and
executory. 26 The Court of Appeals also denied
reconsideration,27 prompting petitioner city to elevate the case
before this court.
ISSUE:
Whether the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from
judgment, when reckoned from receipt of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, is considered filed on time
RULING:
YES. The petition was filed on time.
The time for filing a petition for relief is found under Section 3,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional
and should be strictly complied with.99 Otherwise, a petition for
relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period will
be dismissed outright.
The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is
reckoned from actual receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration when one is filed.
Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on
August 11, 2004. It filed a motion for reconsideration on August
26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a copy of the
October 21, 2004 trial court order denying its motion for
reconsideration. Four days later or on October 29, 2004, it filed
20
its petition for relief from judgment. Thus, the petition for relief
from judgment was considered filed on time.
RULE 39: EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECTS OF
JUDGMENT (SECTIONS 1 – 14)
67.) LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 144882, February 4, 2005
FACTS:
Under an agreement denominated as a pacto de retro sale,
Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo acquired a parcel of land
from Luisa Briones. The latter thereunder reserved the right to
repurchase the parcel of land up to December 31, 1970.
Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo passed away on May 27,
1979.[2] On June 14, 1990, Hipolita Ocampo Paulite and
Eusebio Mendoza Ocampo, the heirs of Maria Mendoza Vda.
De Ocampo, filed a petition for consolidation of ownership,
alleging that the seller was not able to exercise her privilege to
redeem the property on or before December 31, 1970. [3]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch
32 rendered
1. declaring that exh. A is a true pacto de retro sale;
2. declaring that the defendant can still redeem the
property within 30 days from the finality of this
judgment, subject to the provisions of Art. 1616 of
the New Civil Code;
3. No costs.
Plaintiffs therein -- herein private respondents -- appealed the
RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.
CA reversed RTC.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court
of Appeals denied through a Resolution. The Court of Appeals
Decision became final and executory and entry of judgment
was made.
At the RTC, both petitioner and respondents filed their
respective motions for a writ of execution. The RTC issued a
writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unserved per
sheriffs return.
The Sheriff was unable to effect the satisfaction of the alias writ
as stated in the sheriffs report.
Unable to effect the execution of the Court of Appeals decision,
petitioner filed with the RTC an omnibus motion.
The RTC denied the omnibus motion in an Order dated
November 16, 1999, which states:
Acting on the omnibus motion of plaintiff dated 25 May 1999
and the opposition thereto of defendant, and considering that
the decision of the Court of Appeals referring the decision of
this Court has become final and executory, hence, this Court
can no longer alter, modify or add anything thereto, the prayers
set forth in the omnibus motion is, as it is, hereby denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[16] of the above
Order, which was denied by the RTC in an Order.
Petitioner then filed a motion for clarificatory judgment, dated
April 5, 2000, with the Court of Appeal. The motion was denied
in a Resolution.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
Resolution. The Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to grant
petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment.
RULING:
NO. The judgment is not a judgment Nunc pro tunc judgment
contrary to petitioner’s allegation.
As a general rule, therefore, final and executory judgments are
immutable and unalterable except under the three exceptions
named above: a) clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party; and c) void judgments.
In the present case, petitioner claims the second exception,
i.e., that her motion for clarificatory judgment is for the purpose
of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the final and
executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized
by this Court in the following manner:
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of
the court done at a former time which was not then carried into
the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is
restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action
which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the
record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did
not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court has not
rendered a judgment that it might or should have
rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper
judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or
omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper
judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro
tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means,
but only to enter of record such judgment as had been
formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of
record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to
enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual
rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not
furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the
rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper
form on the record, the judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show
what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial
errors, such as to render a judgment which the court
ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court,
however erroneous the judgment may have been.
(Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126
Ala., 268.)
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of
something which was actually previously done, to have effect
as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted
action by the court, but to supply an omission in the
record of action really had, but omitted through
inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E.,
670, 672.)
It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc
after the term at which the transaction occurred, even though
the rights of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc
pro tunc will not be ordered except where this can be done
without injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order
is to supply on the record something which has actually
occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the court . . .
(15 C. J., pp. 972-973.)[23]
From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment it
is clear that the judgment petitioner sought through the motion
for clarificatory judgment is outside its scope. Petitioners did
not allege that the Court of Appeals actually took judicial action
and that such action was not included in the Court of Appeals
Decision by inadvertence. A nunc pro tunc judgment cannot
correct judicial error nor supply nonaction by the court. [24]
Since the judgment sought through the motion for clarificatory
judgment is not a nunc pro tunc one, the general rule regarding
final and executory decisions applies. In this case, no motion
21
for reconsideration having been filed after the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on June 29, 1995 and an entry of
judgment having been made on July 17, 1996, the same
became final and executory and, hence, is no longer
susceptible to amendment. It, therefore, follows that the Court
of Appeals did not act arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the
aforementioned Resolution denying petitioners motion for
clarificatory judgment and the Resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, for purposes of guiding the parties in the
execution of the aforesaid Decision of the CA, without altering
the same, the following should be noted:
The Court of Appeals pronounced in its Decision that the
contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage. Since
the contract is characterized as a mortgage, the provisions of
the Civil Code governing mortgages apply. Article 2088 of the
Civil Code states:
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of
pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the
contrary is null and void.
Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to
equitable mortgages, in Montevergin v. CA,[27] the Court
enunciated that the consolidation of ownership in the person of
the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor
in equity to pay the obligation, would amount to a pactum
commissorium. The Court further articulated that an action for
consolidation of ownership is an inappropriate remedy on the
part of the mortgagee in equity. The only proper remedy is to
cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity. And if the
mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure
sale.
The private respondents do not appear to have caused the
foreclosure of the mortgage much less have they purchased
the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore, retains
ownership of the subject property. The right of ownership
necessarily includes the right to possess, particularly where, as
in this case, there appears to have been no availment of the
remedy of foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground of default
or non-payment of the obligation in question.
68.) SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO Vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 157644; November 17, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners obtained a loan amounting to ₱400,000.00
from the respondent. To secure the loan, the petitioners
executed a real estate mortgage over a Lot in Bulacan in favor
of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan,
prompting the respondent to file a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, pursuant to Act No. 3135. To satisfy
the obligation, the property was sold the mortgaged property at
public auction, where the respondent emerged as the highest
bidder. Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in favor
of the respondent and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
RTC granted the petition, conditioned on the posting of a
₱100,000.00 bond. Upon posting of the required bond, the
RTC issued, on February 16, 1984, a writ of possession,
commanding the sheriff to place the respondent in possession
of the property.
The writ of possession was not implemented because the
petitioners filed a petition to set aside the auction sale and the
writ of possession.
RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent and the Deputy Sheriff from implementing the writ
of possession it previously issued. 9 After hearing, the RTC,
issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the sheriff to
desist in implementing the writ of possession.
More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the
Reply, and after a series of postponements at the instance of
both parties, then Presiding Judge Teresita D. Capulong
issued an Order dated December 16, 1986, dismissing the
respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
on the ground of "failure to prosecute."
When this case was called for hearing, counsel for the
oppositors [now petitioners], Atty. Constancio R. Gallamos,
was present. Atty. Francisco Rivera [counsel for the
respondent] was absent despite notice. Upon petition of the
counsel for the oppositors, this case is hereby ordered
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Nearly six (6) years later (after the Court ordered the
reorganization and resumption of the respondent’s operations
in G.R. No. 70054) or on August 19, 1992, the respondent filed
a Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986. In the
same motion, the respondent likewise moved for the issuance
of an alias writ of possession.
RTC made a clarification that the Order of Dismissal of
December 16, 1986 refers to the dismissal of the "main case
for issuance of a writ of possession." In that same Order, the
RTC denied the respondent’s motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of possession.
Respondent moved for the reconsideration. RTC reconsidered
and set aside the Order of December 16, 1986 and granted the
respondent’s prayer for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
June 2, 1993 Order and prayed that the implementation of the
alias writ of possession be held in abeyance.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and declared that
the respondent as the winning bidder, "has an absolute right to
a writ of possession.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction before the CA.
CA denied the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming RTC’s order:
1) the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order constitutes an
adjudication on the merits which has already attained finality,
and
2) a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion
of the applicant after the lapse of more than five (5) years from
the time of its issuance.
RULING:
NO. CA did not err in affirming RTC order. RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion.
1. The Dec 16 order never attained finality in view of the
absence of a valid service, whether personally or via
registered mail, on the respondent’s counsel. SC note
in this regard that the petitioners do not dispute the
CA finding that the "records failed to show that the
private respondent was furnished with a copy of the
said order of dismissal.
The petitioners now claim that the Motion for Reconsideration,
filed by the respondent on May 18, 1993 from the September
18, 1992 Order of the RTC, was filed out of time. The
petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that the
22
subsequent rulings of the RTC, including the June 2, 1993 and
October 1, 1993 Orders, are barred by res judicata.
We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only
for the first time on appeal, particularly, in their Memorandum.
In fact, the petitioners never raised this issue in the
proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for
review.
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory
upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will
not be permitted to change the theory on appeal.48 Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not
be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the
adverse party who would have no opportunity to present
further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have
done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before
the trial court.49 Thus, to permit the petitioners in this case to
change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the
respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.
2. Petitioner is wrong in invoking Sec 6 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the
nature of a civil action governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed
separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which
regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.
Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale
made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may
petition the [Regional Trial Court] where the property or any
part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during
the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the
sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall
be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in
the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any
other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly
registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance
with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court
shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified
in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of
Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by
Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the
court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that
commences from the filing of a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by
the Court, and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff
of the province in which the property is located. Based on the
text of the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of
the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the
writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. 55 In fact,
the issuance and the immediate implementation of the writ are
declared ministerial and mandatory under the law.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil,56 we emphatically
ruled that "once the writ of possession has been issued, the
trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without
delay." The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in
an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in
nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer
of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the
issuance thereof;57 it must grant the issuance of the writ upon
compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the
provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ
immediately.
Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from
the moment of the issuance of the writ of possession, leaves
no room for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta.
Ana, to be applicable only to civil actions. From another
perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be
executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment
may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by
the statute of limitations.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil
actions.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support
of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is
so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is
to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
69. ANDRES DY and GLORIA DY Vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment of petitioners
from his property in the MTC of Makati. The inferior court
rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiff (herein
respondent) and against the defendants ordering the latter to
vacate the premises and pay the rentals.
An appeal therefrom was interposed by petitioners to the RTC.
The trial court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision
of the MTC. An ex-parte motion for immediate execution of
judgment was filed by the private respondent in the inferior
court and it was granted on the same day. On the following
day, respondent sheriff, ejected petitioners from the premises
by throwing out all their belongings into the street and turning
over possession of the premises to private respondent.
Petitioners filed an urgent ex- parte motion to quash and/or
recall writ of execution and nullify all proceedings had therein
on the ground they have not been served a copy of the
23
decision of the trial court. The motion was denied by the
inferior court on the same day.
On March 6, 1990, petitioners received a copy of the decision
of the trial court. On the following day, petitioners filed in the
CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that they have not
been furnished a copy of the decision of the trial court when its
immediate execution was effected. The appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment or order of the regional trial court be
immediately executed even before a copy thereof was served
on the losing party?
RULING:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that "(e)xecution shall issue only upon a judgment or
order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding." A copy
of such final order or judgment shall be served personally or by
registered mail on the parties.
There must be proof of service.
By the same token, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, the execution pending appeal of a judgment or order
may be granted upon motion of the prevailing party, upon good
reasons, with notice to the adverse party. Of course, such
judgment or order may not be considered to be pending appeal
unless notice of such judgment or order had been served on
the losing party. Thus, its execution pending appeal cannot be
authorized without previous notice to the losing party of such
judgment or order.
Applying these rules in a suppletory manner to cases falling
under the Rules on Summary Procedure, it is clear that a
judgment or order of a Regional Trial Court which disposes of
the action or proceeding must be served on the losing
party before the same may be considered immediately
executory. While an ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of
execution thereof may be filed in the proper court, such motion
must be supported by a proof of service of the judgment or
order on the losing party.
Consequently, the Court finds and so holds that in a civil case
which was decided under the Rules of Summary Procedure,
the immediate execution of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court may not be effected unless prior notice of the judgment
or order had been served on the losing party and proof of such
service accompanies the motion for execution of the judgment.
This will enable the losing party to take any appropriate steps
to protect his interests when warranted. The losing party is
entitled to such notice as an essential requirement of due
process; otherwise, the entire proceedings leading to the
execution of the judgment may be nullified and set aside.
While the petitioners' cause in this case is meritorious,
unfortunately they failed to interpose an appeal from the
questioned judgment of the Regional Trial Court within the
reglementary period after notice thereof on March 6, 1990.
They explained it is a futile exercise as they have already been
actually dispossessed of the property subject of litigation.
Needless to say, the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of
Appeals cannot take the place of appeal. What petitioners
should have done, besides filing this special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is to
interpose an appeal within the reglementary period. As it is
now, the judgment had lapsed into finality and no further relief
can now be afforded the petitioners under the circumstances.
The judgment of the appellate court must thus be upheld on
this account.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
70.) ANASTACIO TUBALLA HEIRS Vs. RAUL CABRERA,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 179104; February 29, 2008
FACTS:
Anastacio Tuballa filed a Complaint against Cabrera
Enterprises for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of sugar
land. Tuballa is the registered owner of Lot No.
5697. Sometime in 1982, the men employed by Cabrera
Enterprises intruded into the subject land without Tuballa’s
consent. The laborers of Cabrera Enterprises did not heed
Tuballas protestation and admonition, prompting him to make
several attempts to accost the manager of Cabrera Enterprises
but to no avail, as the manager either was always out of office
or refused to meet Tuballa.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering Cabrera Enterprises
Incorporated to vacate, pay damages and to pay the costs of
the proceedings. Aggrieved, Cabrera Enterprises interposed its
timely appeal before the CA. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of RTC.
The CA issued an Entry of Judgment, stating that its Decision
has become final and executory. Subsequently, Tuballa filed a
Manifestation before the RTC, pointing out that there was a
typographical error in the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, which indicated Lot No. 6597 instead of Lot No.
5697, and that the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
The RTC issued an Order stating that the decision sought to
be executed is not the decision of the RTC but rather of the
CA. Hence, any correction or clarification of the decision of the
Court of Appeals must be addressed to the said court.
Tuballa was thus compelled to file a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus under Rule 65 before the CA, which, dismissed the
same due to a number of procedural omissions and
deficiencies. The appellate court also denied Tuballa’s motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition filed by the children and heirs of
Tuballa.
ISSUE:
Whether a final judgments may be modified for the correction
of clerical errors
RULING:
Yes. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.
The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no
longer be modified in any respect are (1) the correction of
clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
Under OCT No. FV-16880, the technical description of the
land refers to Lot No. 5697, Pls-659-D and not Lot No.
6597. The RTC committed a typographical error in its Decision
when it ordered Cabrera Enterprises to vacate Lot No. 6597,
Pls-659-D and turn over the possession of the same to
Tuballa. And, in accordance with the first exception to
modification of final judgment mentioned earlier, this Court
hereby modifies the clerical error in the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 30, 1994 of the
RTC is hereby MODIFIED by changing Lot No. 6597 to Lot
No. 5697 in the first paragraph thereof.
72.) EUFEMIA A. CAMINO Vs. ATTY. RYAN REY L.
PASAGUI,
A.C. No. 11095 January 31, 2017
24
FACTS:
In a Disbarment Complaint filed by complainant against
respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui (Atty. Pasagui) before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CED), complainant alleged, that respondent
violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and secure a
loan in order to finance the payment of necessary expenses to
transfer the title of a certain property under her name. She
claimed that respondent obtained a loan in her name and that
of her husband, using their property as collateral, but Atty.
Pasagui arrogated the proceeds thereof to himself.
In a Per Curiam Decision, the Court, ruling in favor of the
complainant, found that respondent was guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct for converting the money of
his client to his own personal use without her consent. Thus,
the Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the IBP
Board of Governors, but modified the recommended penalty
and instead imposed the penalty to Disbarment.
In the present Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,
complainant now prays for the issuance of a Writ of Execution
for the enforcement of the said judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Writ of Execution prayed for should be granted
RULING:
Yes. Generally, once a judgment or order becomes final and
executory, the judgment obligee may file a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided
for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, a judgment or final order may also be executed
pending appeal as provided for in Rule 39, Sec. 2.
Corollarily, judgments declared to be immediately executory,
as in the present case, are enforceable after their rendition.
Similar to judgments or orders that become final and
executory, the execution of the decision in the case at bar is
already a matter of right. The judgment obligee may,
therefore, file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in
the court of origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this particular case, however, the case did not originate from
the lower courts, but instead is an original action for
disbarment filed by the complainant against Atty. Pasagui,
accusing the latter of Estafa through Abuse of Confidence.
Consequently, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court should issue
the Writ of Execution prayed for. But, in as much as this Court
does not have a sheriff of its own to execute its own decision
and considering that the complainant resides in Tacloban City,
the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is directed to execute
the money judgment against the respondent in accordance
with Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is ordered to enforce the
Court's directive for respondent to return all the pertinent
documents in his possession to the complainant pursuant to
Section 11of the Rules of Court.
72.) Heirs of the Late Justice JOSE B. L. REYES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND METRO MANILA BUILDERS,
INC.,
G.R. Nos. 135180-81; 135425-26. August 16, 2000
FACTS:
Brothers Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes (also known as
Justice J. B. L. Reyes) and Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes were co-
owners of a parcel of land located at Taft Avenue. The brothers
entered into a lease contract with Metro Manila Builders, Inc.
(MMB, Inc.). However, later, petitioners found out that
respondent MMB, Inc. had sub-leased the property to third
parties. Consequently, petitioners served on respondent MMB,
Inc. a notice terminating the lease contract and demanding that
they vacate and surrender the premises subject of the lease to
petitioners. Failing to do so, petitioners filed with the MTC of
Pasay City, a complaint for unlawful detainer based on breach
of the contract of lease.
Respondent MMB, Inc. filed its answer to the complaint. MMB,
Inc. did not deny the violations imputed to it but questioned the
absence of a judicial rescission of the contract of lease.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the MTC of Pasay City a
motion for execution of the judgment of eviction. On the other
hand, respondent appealed the decision to the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch 113 but such appeal was dismissed. In its appeal
to the RTC, respondent MMB, Inc. never raised the issue of
jurisdiction. Hence, on a later date, respondent MMB, Inc. filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the MTC of Pasay City, granted the motion for
execution that petitioners filed and issued the corresponding
writ of execution. However, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order against the execution of the ejectment
judgment.
Even before the appellate court could rule on the injunctive
relief, respondent MMB, Inc. withdrew its appeal.
Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the first CA case, private
respondent also filed a petition for annulment of the ejectment
decision before the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 231 (RTC 231)
on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
ejectment case. Petitioners filed with the RTC a motion to
dismiss which was denied.
Respondent MMB, Inc. then filed with the Court of Appeals a
series of petitions and motions urging the Court of Appeals to
issue injunctive relief. In addition to this, respondent MMB, Inc.
also filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion for the
issuance of another TRO to enjoin the MTC-Branch 45, Pasay
City from enforcing the writ of execution.
Respondent MMB, Inc. filed with the Court of Appeals another
case seeking to set aside the order of the RTC Pasay, Branch
231. The Court of Appeals consolidated the second and third
CA cases. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
setting aside the decisions rendered by the MTC of Pasay City.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for review of the decision of the CA. The CA, however, despite
the pending petition with this Court issued a writ of Execution
Pending Appeal on its own Decision. The CA designated a
special sheriff to enforce the writ, and on the same day, he
evicted petitioners from the premises and restored possession
in favour of private respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari to nullify the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals has authority to issue
immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision
RULING:
No. It was bad enough that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the lease contract must be judicially rescinded before
respondent MMB, Inc. may be evicted from the premises. It
was worse that the Court of Appeals immediately enforced its
decision pending appeal restoring respondent in possession of
the leased premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to
carry out the writ of execution. In the first place,
we emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals has no
authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of
its own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39,
Section 2 (a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of
the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing. A judgment of the Court of Appeals
cannot be executed pending appeal. Once final and executory,
the judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a
motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry. In
25
other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be
executed. There can be no discretionary execution of a
decision of the Court of Appeals. In the second place, even in
discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded
upon good reasons. The court must state in a special order the
"good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. The good
reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute
superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh
the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is
reversed. Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons"
that justify a premature execution of judgment, such as
"deterioration of commodities subject of litigation" and "the
deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V 'Valiant' . . . left to rot
at the pier and without a crew to guard it".
In this case, the good reasons given by the Court of Appeals to
support the discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that
respondent would be deprived of income from its business
endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court are clogged with cases and it
may take some time before the decision in the case may attain
its finality; and (3) that petitioners acted with bad faith and
malice. None of the cited reasons is "good" enough. According
to jurisprudence, respondent's precarious financial condition is
not a compelling circumstance warranting immediate
execution.
By the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of the
Court of Appeals' decision was stayed, and there could be no
entry of judgment therein, and, hence, no premature execution
could be had. The Court of Appeals adopted its resolution
granting execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998,
after the petition for review was already filed in the Supreme
Court.[81] It thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the
Supreme Court. Worst of all, the Court of Appeals has no
authority to appoint a special sheriff. It appointed an
employee of the mailing section, who was not even bonded
as required by law.
73.) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Vs.. HEIRS OF
ANTONINA RABIE
G.R. No. 210218, August 17, 2016
FACTS:
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Heirs of Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the
acquisition of a residential lot located in Laguna to be used as
access road for the Caliraya Hydro Electric Power Plant
Project of the NAPOCOR. The case was raffled to RTC of
Laguna (trial court).
Respondents filed a Verified Answer and prayed for a just
compensation. In addition, respondents sought payment for
NAPOCOR's alleged unauthorized entry and use of the
property from 1940 to date. After NAPOCOR deposited with
the Land Bank of the Philippines, it filed a Motion to Issue
Order of Expropriation and a Motion for
Annotation/Registration of Partial Payment. The trial court
granted the motions.
Subsequently, the trial court also issued an Order directing the
expropriation in favor of the NAPOCOR upon payment of the
FMV of the property. However, the court also ruled that
defendants' claim that said property was occupied by plaintiff
since 1940 is unrebutted, hence, reasonable rentals were
awarded to defendants.
NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order.
However, the trial court denied the motion in an Order dated 30
April 2013 which was received by NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013
and by respondents on 15 May 2013.
On 22 May 2013, respondents filed a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal. While on 6 June 2013, NAPOCOR filed its
Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal.
The trial court gave due course to NAPOCOR's Notice of
Appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals. The trial court also granted
respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
The trial court's Officer-in-Charge issued a Writ of
Execution. Sheriff Claveria issued a Notice addressed to the
President of NAPOCOR demanding payment of yearly rentals
plus 12% interest from 1940 up to the present until fully paid
within ten days from receipt thereof. Aggrieved, NAPOCOR
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA dismissed
the petition.
Hence, this petition
ISSUES:
(1) whether the trial court still had jurisdiction when it ruled on
the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal; (2) whether there
exists good reasons for the execution of the trial court's
decision pending appeal
RULING:
Trial court had jurisdiction to resolve motion for
discretionary execution
Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary execution
under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is allowed
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing. Section 2(a), Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending
appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court
may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
In this case, the motion for execution pending appeal was filed
by respondents seven days after their receipt of the trial court's
order denying the motions for reconsideration filed by both
parties. Clearly, respondents filed the motion for execution
pending appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal,
which is fifteen days from notice of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the trial court still had
jurisdiction when respondents filed their motion for execution
pending appeal.
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of the case, the trial
court does not lose jurisdiction over the case and in fact, may
issue an order for execution pending appeal. In this case, the
trial court issued its Order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal on 11 July 2013. That Order expressly stated
that the trial court was still in possession of the original record
of the case at the time. In fact, the records were transmitted to
the Court of Appeals on 19 July 2013. In other words, the trial
court issued the Order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal before the transmittal of the records to the
Court of Appeals. Hence, contrary to NAPOCOR's contention,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court still had
jurisdiction when the motion for execution pending appeal was
filed and when the trial court resolved such motion.
Discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments
pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to
eminent domain proceedings.
26
As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and
Paredes, the Court held:
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally
take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the
award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a
personal judgment against the Government could not be
realized upon execution.
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less
than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained
the rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and
properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Non-existence of good reasons for the execution pending
appeal
The trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when
it failed to specify and discuss any good reason required for
granting execution pending appeal.
The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph
3 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is that
discretionary execution is permissible only when good reasons
exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or
pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to
appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory,
or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy
it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have
apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which
will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise, execution
pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and
inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.
The execution of judgment pending appeal is an exception to
the general rule and must, therefore, be strictly construed. So,
too, it is not to be availed of and applied routinely, but only in
extraordinary circumstances.
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts
look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment
which has not acquired a final character. In the same vein, the
Court has held that such execution is "usually not favored
because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be
ascertained on appeal."
74.) Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Tan
G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013
Statement of the Case: PETITION for review on certiorari of
the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner lease out two
of its properties in Cabanatuan City to herein respondents. Due
to the failure of the Tans to comply with the terms of the lease,
petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans for cancellation
and termination of contract of lease. The RTC of Cabanatuan
City ruled in favor of O. Ventanilla. Both Alfredo and Adelina
Tan appealed from said Decision. However, herein petitioner
filed a motion for execution pending appeal and the same was
granted by the trial court. The appeal was dismissed.
Private respondent Adelina Tan then filed with the trial court a
Motion for Execution10 dated March 27, 2003, praying that the
excess of the amounts she previously paid as exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and liquidated damages be refunded
to her, in accordance with the judgment of the CA. The RTC
granted the motion for execution. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent
Motion for recall and reconsideration of order and quashal of
alias writ of execution, levy, and notice of sheriffs’s sale. But
this motion was denied in an Order. Hence, this petition for
certiorari
Issue: WON the action of the RTC in ordering the issuance of
the writ of exeution against herein petitioner for it to return the
excess amount is in accordance with the Rules.
Decision:
Yes. As held in Legaspi v. Ong, 459 SCRA 122 (2005),
“[e]xecu tion pending appeal does not bar the continuance of
the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely
provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed
judgment is reversed on appeal.” Note Section 5, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that: Sec. 5. Effect reversal
of judgment.―Where the executed judgment is reversed totally
or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court
may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation
of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the
circumstances.
In sum, there is nothing amiss in ordering petitioner to refund
the amount of P1,968,801.616 to herein private respondent, as
the appellate court has ruled with finality that petitioner is not
entitled to such amount.
The Court strikes down the argument that the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because
petitioner’s counsel, who died while the case was pending
before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. The CA
was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary
circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry
of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by
petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA
Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified
of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious
consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security
Service Agency, Inc., 675 SCRA 353 (2012), the Court
explained that it is the party’s duty to inform the court of its
counsel’s demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact
shall be considered negligence on the part of said party.
Expounding further, the Court stated: x x x It is not the duty of
the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether
the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants
continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive,
or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. x x x
They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to
monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and
their counsel.
For failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of its
counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then
service of the CA Decision at the place or law office designated
by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The
case then became final and executory when no motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary
period therefor.
75.) Carpio v. CA
G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013
Statements of the Facts: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court Certiorari. Carpio informed Sps. Oria of their
alleged encroachment on his property to the extent of 137.45
sqm. He demanded that respondents return the allegedly
encroached portion and pay monthly rent thereof.
Statement of the Case: Petitioner filed an action for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The case was appealed to the RTC which affirmed
in toto the MeTC’s decision. However, in a Petition for Review
before it, the CA held that the RTC should not have dismissed
the case, but should have tried it as one for accion publiciana,
as if it had originally been filed with the RTC, pursuant to
paragraph 1 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner filed
a motion for immediate execution. The RTC granted the
motion. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that
while the RTC still had jurisdiction to grant the Motion for
Immediate Execution, the latter stated no reason at all for the
issuance of the writ.11 The statement of a good reason in a
special order is strictly required by the Rules of Court, because
execution before a judgment has become final and executory
is the exception rather than the rule
Issue: WON the the case for accion publiciana on appeal with
the CA Special Eighth Division has been rendered moot and
academic by the intervening implementation of the writ of
27
execution of the RTC Decision dated 11 November 2013
pursuant to the trial court’s Omnibus Order, although the Order
was later annulled with finality by this Court.
Decision:
The writ of execution is void. In any case, we proceed to rule
that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and
proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no
legal effect. To recall, this Court affirmed the Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTC’s Omnibus
Order granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending
appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision because of the RTC’s
failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the
issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the
exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for
strict compliance with the requirement for the statement of a
good reason, because execution pending appeal is the
exception rather than the rule.
Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been
issued without compliance with the rules, it is without any legal
effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all.
Consequently, all actions taken pursuant to the void writ of
execution must be deemed to have not been taken and to have
had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a
violation of the right to due process of the judgment debtors—
respondent-spouses herein.
In any case, the issues in the appealed case for accion
publiciana cannot, in any way, be characterized as moot and
academic. In Osmeña III v. Social Security System of the
Philippines, 533 SCRA 313 (2007), we defined a moot and
academic case or issue as follows: A case or issue is
considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to,
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss
it on the ground of mootness —save when, among others, a
compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
judicial review.
76.) Katon v. Palanca
G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004
Statement of the Facts: Petition for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Katon filed a
request with the District Office of Bureau of Forestry in Puerto,
Princesa, Palawan for reclassification of a piece of real
property. A Land Classification Investigator undertook the
investigation, inspection ans survey of the area in the presence
of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo
Katon. [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey,
there were no actual occupants on the island but there were
some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner
and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of
petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to
undertake development work, like planting of additional
coconut trees.
In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of
Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila,
that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest
purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan
Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of
the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application
on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March
3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Statement of the Case: Petitioner assails the validity of the
homestead patents and OCT covering certain portons of
Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground
that the same were obtained through fraud. On the other hand,
[R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself
requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and
that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents
Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their
respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In
addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any
homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that
Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the
island.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999,
they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged
defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his
Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal
heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29,
1999.
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while
petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island
from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a
homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never
acquired title to that land. From the allegations of the
Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly
had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land,
because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a
homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for
cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and
for reversion of the land to the public domain. Finally, it ruled
that prescription had already barred the action for
reconveyance.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for
Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case)
in the Petition
Decision:
No. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ
does not include a review of the evidence, more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial
court, as in this case.
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the
propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the
appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its
December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its
November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:
“Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it
may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety,
complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues
involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the
judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the
conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on incidental
matters. We stand corrected.”
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue.
The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s
issue moot. Heence, there is no need to discuss it further.
Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra
jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only
issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court
in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is
the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a
review of the evidence,10 more so when no determination of
the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
28

77.) Miranda vs. Miranda
G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013
Facts: In 1994, petitioners Cirila, Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr.,
Erlinda, Lolita, Rufina, Danilo, Alejandro, Felimon, Teresita,
Elizabeth, and Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, representing
themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, a
Complaint5 for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-612, against the heirs of Pedro
Miranda, namely: Pacita and Oscar Miranda; the heir of
Tranquilino Miranda, Rogelio Miranda; and the spouses
respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. After trial, the
RTC ruled in favor of herein petitioners. The Decision became
final and executory.
Respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion11 praying that the RTC
issue a "Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel
the petitioners to vacate his property. 12 But since more than
five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution
should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its
Order13 dated August 16, 2005.
This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for
Revival of Judgment. The RTC rendered a Decision granting
the Petition.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal 18 via LBC, which was
opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision dated
August 30, 1999 has long become final and
executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the
original records of the case to the CA, insisting that
respondent’s opposition is without merit.2
The CA denied the Petition for Mandamus on the ground that
the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
Issue:
WON the action for revival of judgement is appealable
Decision
No. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent
action.44 It is different and distinct from the original judgment
sought to be revived or enforced.45 As such, a party aggrieved
by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may
appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action
for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is
already final and executory, may no longer be reversed,
altered, or modified.46
In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30,
1999, which is the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced by respondent.1âwphi1 Considering that the said
Decision had already attained finality, petitioners may no
longer question its correctness. As we have said, only the
merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits
of the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced
78.) Infante vs. Aran Builders
G.R. NO. 156596, August 24, 2007
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City
presided over by Hon. Norma C. Perello was an action for
revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc.
against Adelaida Infante. The judgment sought to be revived
was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in an
action for specific performance and damages. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on the
grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties and that venue was improperly laid.
Private respondent opposed the motion. The MOTION TO
DISMISS is denied.
Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati Regional
Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at that time there
was still no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, then under
the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases
from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the
creation of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City,
matters involving properties located in this City, and cases
involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be
litigated before these Courts.
The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared the
plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa
City. It is this judgment which is sought to be enforced thru this
action which necessarily involves the interest, possession, title,
and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa city
and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying that the
complaint should be filed in the latter City where the property is
located, as there are now Regional Trial Courts hereat.
The CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favor of herein
private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment
sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for
revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real
property is located. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
CA Decision but the motion was denied per Resolution dated
January 7, 2003.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in finding that the complaint for revival of
judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed with the
RTC of the place where the disputed real property is located.
DECISION:
No. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of
judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by
action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for
revival of judgment should be filed.
The proper venue depends on the determination of whether
the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a
personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if
the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that
must be filed with the court of the place where the real property
is located. If such action does not fall under the category of
real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with
the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
he previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private
respondent has an established interest over the lot in question;
and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought
suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the
present action to revive is the enforcement of private
respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the
action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects
private respondent's interest over real property.1avvphi1
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action,
the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the realty is located.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a
particular territory defined by the Supreme Court.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction
of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on
September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of a
29
branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is
now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has
territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and
processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
79.) Augustus Caezar R. Gan Vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes
And Francheska Joy C. Pondevida, Assisted By
Bernadette C. Pondevida
G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002
FACTS:
Bernadette Podevida (private respondent) instituted in behalf
of her daughter (Francheska) a complaint against Gan for
support with prayer for support pendente lite.
Gan moved to dismiss the case arguing that he Francheska’s
father but said motion to dismiss was denied. Gan failed to file
his answer and hence he was declared in default. Respondent
presented her evidence ex parte.
Trial court ruled in favor of respondent and ordered Gan to
support Francheska with Php 20,000 every month and
recognize her as his illegitimate child. Respondent moved for
the execution of the judgment of support which was granted by
the trial court.
Gan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
contending that the trial court judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion by issuing the writ of execution despite the absence
of good reason for immediate enforcement. The judgment was
not yet final hence there should be an exceptional reason to
warrant its execution. He also attacked the validity of the writ of
execution because there was no notice and hearing. CA
dismissed the petition. Sec 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure states that judgments for support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
Gan elevated the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
1.) Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the writ of execution for support
despite the absence of good reasons for its
immediate execution;
2.) Whether the writ of execution is valid despite absence
of notice and hearing
RULING:
1.) No, the judge did not act with grave abuse of
discretion. The immediate execution of the judgment
is proper. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court
clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court,
judgments in actions for support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is
an exception to the general rule which provides that
the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the
judgment and that advance executions will only be
allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The
aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate
execution of all judgments for support and makes no
distinction between those which are the subject of an
appeal and those which are not. To consider then
petitioner's argument that there should be good
reasons for the advance execution of a judgment
would violate the clear and explicit language of the
rule mandating immediate execution.Petitioner is
reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision
we should make no further explanation. Absoluta
sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the
interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon
us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance
negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of
the petition.
2.) The writ of execution is valid. The SC reminded Gan
that enough has been done by petitioner to delay the
execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial
fulfillment of the writ of execution petitioner
surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as
it was later ordered released to a third party who laid
claim over the levied vehicle. Also, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to
Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite promising to
deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the
month, but to date has not deposited any amount in
complete disavowal of his undertaking. He was not
even deterred from appealing before us and
needlessly taking up our time and energy by posing
legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as
flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to
abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of
private respondent for substantial justice would be
better served if petitioner be precluded from
interposing another barrier to the immediate execution
of the support judgment. The SC clarified that they
are not intimating that in every case the right to notice
of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It
appears in this case that there has been too much
temporizing in the execution of the writ which must
not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for
speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a
technicality should be an aid to justice and not its
great hindrance and chief enemy. Truly, if the writ of
execution would be voided on this ground alone, then
procedural rules which were primarily drafted to
protect parties in the realm of constitutional
guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the
expense of equity and justice.
80.) EDUARDO JALANDONI Vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. L-47579 October 9, 1981
FACTS:
CFI of Manila rendered a judgment ordering Eduardo
Jalandoni to pay PNB the sum of P63,297.53. That judgment
became final and executory. Within five years from the entry of
judgment in that case, the sheriff of Silay City, pursuant to an
alias writ of execution, levied a parcel of land registered in the
name of Eduardo Jalandoni. The levy was annotated (notice of
embargo) on the back of the TCT of the land. No effort was
made by the bank to have that land sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment against Jalandoni.
More than ten years after the levy was made, Jalandoni filed
with the CFI a petition for the cancellation of the levy on the
ground of prescription.
CFI of Negros Occidental directed Jalandoni to ask the Manila
court to quash the writ of execution on the ground of
prescription.
Jalandoni filed an action to quiet title or for the cancellation of
the notice of embargo on the ground that, although more than
ten years had elapsed from the time the levy was made, no
execution sale had been held and, therefore, the levy had
become inefficacious and was a cloud on his title.
The trial court dismissed the action.
Heirs of Jalandoni appealed to the SC under R.A. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether levy can be enforced after the expiration of the ten-
year period for enforcing the judgment.
RULING:
No. It should be borne in mind that an action upon a judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues (Art. 1144, Civil Code). As clarified in the Rules
of Court, that prescriptive period means that "a judgment may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory" and
"after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
30
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action"
(Sec. 6, Rule 39).
The bank holds the view that that the execution sale can be
made beyond the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment as
long as the levy was effected within five years from the entry of
judgment as in the instant case.
They rely on the dictum that while section 6 of Rule 39 "limits
the time within which a writ of execution may be issued to
enforce a judgment, it does not prescribe a period when the
sale at public auction by the sheriff shall take place after the
issuance of the writ of execution and a valid levy made
pursuant thereto".
The trial court should have applied the ruling in Ansaldo vs.
Fidelity and Surety. In said case, the SC said that "properties
levied upon by execution must be sold in public auction within
the period of ten years during which the judgment can be
enforced by action" The reason for that rule is that an
execution is enforced (and therefore accomplished) by levy
and sale, not by levy alone.
In the present case, The employees of the bank were
negligent. They did not require the sheriff to sell Jalandoni's
land at public auction. The bank is bound by its employees'
negligence. This case should teach the responsible officers of
the bank to be more vigilant in exercising its rights and in
supervising its employees. The law helps the diligent and
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
For laches and neglect on the part of those, who, under
the law are entitled to require of others the fulfillment of
their obligations, the statute of limitations has been
enacted, which provides that such rights prescribe after a
certain period of time, in order that it may serve alike as a
punishment for those who do not know how to look after
their own interests, and as a source of reassurance to
those who may have rested in the belief that their
creditors had waived their rights, and also to insure
economic stability and the certainty of rights. (Villareal, J.,
in Lutero vs. Siuliong & Co., 54 Phil. 272, 280.)
We find that the "notice of embargo" annotated in 1964 on
Jalandoni's title is no longer enforceable and has become a
cloud upon his title. Following the rule in the Ansaldo case, he
and his heirs have a good cause of action under article 476 of
the Civil Code for the removal of that state encumbrance.
Moreover, article 478 of the Civil Code provides that "there
may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom
when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been
extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by
extinctive prescription.
81.) Jaime Pelejo and Belen Zaballero Vs. Court of
Appeals, Paterno C. Zaballero And Aurora Gonzales
G.R. No. L-60800, August 31, 1982
FACTS:
Pelejo and Belen Zaballero filed a case for annulment of deed,
title, reconveyance, and damages against Paterno Zaballero.
According to the petitioners, private respondents borrowed the
title TCT No. T-49125, covering the property so that they could
have a collateral for a loan from the Monte de Piedad Bank,
the proceeds of which would finance respondents' rice mill
business in San Juan, Batangas. To accomodate herein
private respondents, who are the brother and sister-in-law,
respectively of petitioner Belen C. Zaballero, a simulated Deed
of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed in
favor of Mr. and Mrs. Paterno C. Zaballero. The Zaballeros
took the Deed of Sale to mean what it stated and had the title
transferred to their names. As a consequence, TCT No. T-
49125 was cancelled and TCT No. 130117 was issued in the
names of the Zaballeros.
In their answer, respondents denied the allegations and
claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was properly executed
in good faith.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. No appeal was made.
Instead, the petitioners filed a similar case with another branch
of Manila CFI.
The case was again dismissed for res judicata.
In the meantime, respondents filed a civil case with CFI of
Manila, Branch XX for Accion Reinvendicatoria or Publiciana,
with Collection and Damages which was dismissed too for lack
of jurisdiction (it was an unlawful detainer case). Such
dismissal was appealed by the respondents.
Thereafter, private respondents filed a motion for writ of
possession. This was granted and hence, petitioners were
ejected in the land.
Petitioners questioned the validity of the issuance of writ of
possession before the CA. CA sustained the lower court
stating that respondent Judge obviously believed that to issue
a writ of execution to implement an order dismissing a
complaint was a superfluity. The effect of a writ of execution
would have been the same. he very arguments of the
petitioners support the action taken by the respondent Judge.
According to the petitioners, Judge Dayrit could not issue a writ
of execution because Civil Case No. 124771 was dismissed
without determining the rights of the parties and hence no
judgment was rendered. They argue that no writ of execution
may issue because a writ of execution must conform to that
ordained in the dispositive part of the decision. If this argument
is right and no writ of execution may issue, the action taken by
the respondent Judge could not be error, much less grave
abuse of discretion. How else could an order of dismissal, long
final and executory, be given meaning and effect? What the
petitioners really seek to achieve through this petition for a writ
of certiorari is to delay execution of a final and executory order
while they file case after case in attempts to reopen the issue
of simulated deed of sale. A petition for certiorari cannot take
the place of a long lost appeal. It cannot be used to delay or
prevent the logical consequences of an order that has become
final and of issues that have become res judicata because of a
failure to appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of execution was propery issued.
RULING:
The writ of execution was not properly issued.
Execution is the remedy provided by law for the enforcement of
a judgment and the only portion of a decision that becomes the
subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the body of the
decision can only be considered as part of the reasons, or
conclusions of the court and while they may serve as guide or
enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is
controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the
decision (Robles vs. Timario et. al., 107 Phil. 809).
In the case at bar, the trial judge issued the writ of possession
in Civil Case No. 124771 which was dismissed in an Order,
dated August 22, 1980. In other words, the complaint for
"Annulment of Deed of Sale, Title, Reconveyance and
Damages" was not decided on the merits because the order
states:
Acting on defendants Motion to Dismiss for the grounds
therein alleged which the Court finds to be well taken, the
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs. However, considering that
defendants have no objection to plaintiffs amending their
31
 complaint, plaintiffs may do so, provided they file in Court
an amended complaint within ten (10) days from today.
82.) City of Manila Vs. Court of Appeals and The Army &
Navy Club, Inc.
G.R. No. 100626, November 29, 1991
FACTS:
City of Manila filed an unlawful detainer case against Army &
Navy for violation of the lease agreement over a parcel of land
on Roxas Boulevard. A summary judgment in favor of the
petitioner was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila and seasonably elevated to the Regional Trial Court. To
stay its execution, ANC filed a supersedes bond in the amount
of P2,700,000.00, which was approved by Judge Reyes. 2 He
subsequently affirmed the appealed judgment on June 7, 1991.
Petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground
that the judgment has already become final and executor. It
was granted and hence, the writ of execution was served on
ANC.
ANC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA. CA
set aside the order of execution.
City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari to review said
decision of the CA.
The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and
contends that decisions of the regional trial court in cases
exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and are final and
executory under RA 6031. Thus:
Sec. 1. . . .
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of
first instance, the decision of the latter shall be
final: Provided, That the findings of facts contained in said
decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the law
and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the concurrent
jurisdictions of the municipal and city courts with the courts
of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the
Court of Appeals whose decision shall be final: Provided,
however, that the Supreme Court in its direction may, in any
case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party
aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions
that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be
certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had
been brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129,
decisions of the regional trial court in cases originating from
and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts are not final but subject to appeal in a
petition for review to the Court of Appeals. Such decisions
cannot be executed where the period of time for the defendant
to perfect his appeal has not yet expired. Thus:
Sec. 22. (BP 129) — Appellate jurisdiction. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdiction. Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Courts. The decision of the RTC in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Intermediate
Appellate Court which may give it due course only when the
petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modifications of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment of the lower court has already become
final and executory and hence a motion for execution was
proper.
RULING:
It is useful at this point to review the distinction between a
"final" judgment and one which has become "final and
executory."
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law.
Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such
a situation, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution,
and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court.
Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the
regional trial court in its appellate capacity may be elevated to
the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both
laws recognize that such judgments are "final" in the sense
that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the rights
of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final
and executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary
period for appeal. During that period, execution of the
judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a
matter of right.
In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25,
1991, to appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The
motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June 10,
1991, before the expiration of the said reglementary period. As
the decision had not yet become final and executory on that
date, the motion was premature and should therefore not have
been granted. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the
trial court authorized was an execution pending appeal.
While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under
Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court, this provision must be
strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule. The
reason allowing this kind of execution must be of such urgency
as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should
it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any
such justification, the order of execution must be struck down
as flawed with grave abuse of discretion.
The SC see no such justification in this case/
It is worth remarking that as the case was not tried under the
Rule on Summary procedure, the writ of execution did not even
fall under the following Section 18 thereof :
d) Sec. 18. Appeal. — The judgment or final order,
including that rendered under Section 5 hereof, shall be
appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall
decide the same on the basis of the records, in accordance
with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision
of the regional trial court in such civil cases shall be
immediately executory.
To stay the execution, a supersedes bond is necessary except
where one has already been filed in the lower court. This bond
continues to be effective if the judgment of the regional trial
court is appealed. But during the pendency of the appeal, the
defendant-appellant must continue to depositing with the
appellate court the payments required in the appealed
judgment. The rentals accruing during the pendency of the
appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated, if
there is one, and in the absence thereof, on or before the dates
provided for in Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to make such
deposits or payments is ground for execution of the judgment.
Since the private respondent in the case at bar has filed a
supersedeas bond and the stipulated rental is
yearly, execution may issue only when it fails to make the
32
yearly deposit of the rental, and after notice and hearing. Such
default has not yet been established.
The Court notes with disapproval the arbitrary manner in which
Sheriff Dominador Cacpal and Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo
Cordero acted in delivering possession of the leased premises
to the petitioner. The evidence shows that they enforced the
writ of execution on the same date they received it, forcibly
taking out movables from the said premises, including
chandeliers, furniture and furnishings, music organs, stereo
components, lighting fixtures and computers. They turned off
the water, cut off the electricity and disconnected the
telephones. They also unreasonably prevented ANC members
from entering the premises to get their personal belongings.
Cacpal and Cordero are hereby sternly reprimanded and
warned that a repetition of similar arbitrariness will be dealt
with more severely. Their conduct was a clear violation of the
requirement that:
Under the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement
of a writ of ejectment execution is carried out by
giving the defendant notice of such writ, and making a
demand that defendants comply therewith within a
reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5)
days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff
enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the
defendant and his personal belonging. 12
On the issue of the propriety of a special civil action
for certiorari to assail an order of execution pending appeal,
this Court has held that —
. . . Although Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides
that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked
when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the (ordinary) course of law" this rule is
not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course
of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy
— not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without merit that usually
determines the propriety ofcertiorari.
While appeal is normally employed to question an order or writ
which varies the terms of the decision being executed, it is
nevertheless not the sole and exclusive remedy. The special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 was
available to the private respondent on the allegation that the
regional trial court, in issuing the writ of execution, committed
grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction and
that the ordinary remedy of appeal was inadequate.
The last question to be resolved is, assuming that the decision
of the regional trial court had already become "final and
executory," could the said court order its execution?
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is
appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter
is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through
the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for
execution. 14 The only exception is the execution pending
appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial court under
Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.
As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty
justification for the application of the exception. Hence, the
respondent court committed no error in reversing the Regional
Trial Court of Manila and annulling the writ of execution issued
by it on June 10, 1991, pending appeal of its decision.
83.) Juan Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137391. December 14, 2001
FACTS:
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa rendered a decision in
an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1355,
favoring private respondents and ordering petitioners to
vacate, restore the premises to private respondents, and pay
the accrued rentals.
Respondents failed to enforce the judgment by motion within
the five-year period from its entry. They then filed an action to
revive the judgment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the then
Rules of Court.
Petitioners answered that respondents were not the owners of
the land subject of the unlawful detainer case and that the
supervening death of some of the parties brought changes in
their relationship that would render enforcement of the
judgment unjust and inequitable.
MTCT rendered decision directing the enforcement of the
judgment.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Muntinlupa City which
affirmed the MTC. Thereafter, petitioners elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals where they reiterated their arguments in
the lower courts.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
They then filed a petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondents have to prove the enforceability
of the judgment.
RULING:
Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an action to
revive judgment only requires proof of a final judgment which
has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the
lapse of five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years from its
finality.
Nowhere does the rule require proof that the judgment is still
enforceable by and against the original parties who have died.
While the action is still subject to defenses and counterclaims
which arose after the judgment became effective, proof of the
death of some of the parties is not required because the
judgment call still be enforced by the executor, administrator or
successor-in-interest of the judgment creditor against the
judgment debtor.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents are not the owners
of the subject premises, hence the action must fail. An action
to revive judgment is not meant to retry the case all over
again. Its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the
merits of the original action. The non-ownership by private
respondents refer to the merits of the first civil case which has
long been decided with finality and thus become conclusive
between the parties.
84.) Cordero vs. Go, 389 SCRA 288
G.R. No. 149754 September 17, 2002
FACTS:
The RTC rendered a judgment by default in the Civil Case
entitled “Mortimer F. Cordero v. Alan C. Go, et. al,” ordering
the defendants, together with the others, to jointly and solidarily
pay to petitioner Mortimer F. Cordero damages.
Prior to his receipt of the decision, petitioner had filed a motion
for execution pending appeal of the judgment. This was
33
opposed by respondents, who moved for a new trial. The trial
court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal
and denied respondents motion for new trial.
A writ of execution was issued. However, execution was
stayed in view of the TRO issued by CA at the instance of
respondents. Respondents also filed a notice of appeal of the
trial court’s decision to which the latter gave due course.
Petitioner filed two motions, one entitled Ex-Parte Motion for
Break Open Order and another one entitled Ex-Parte Motion
for Encashment of Check, to implement the writ of execution
earlier issued by the trial court. However, in view of the TRO
issued by the CA, the trial court, denied the aforesaid motions
of petitioner, set aside its earlier order for the release of
garnished funds, and canceled the sheriffs notice of sale.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order giving due
course to respondents appeal and, after the expiration of the
60-day TRO, again moved for the issuance of a break open
order and the encashment of checks. In addition, he filed two
other motions entitled Ex-Parte Motion to Proceed and Ex-
Parte Motion to Appoint Cebu City Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino
as Special Sheriff.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the order giving due course to respondent’s appeal. As to
petitioners’ motions for the implementation of the order of
execution and respondent’s opposition to the motion for the
appointment of a special sheriff, it directed the parties to
reiterate the same before the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
69113 on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
over the case by reason of the perfection of respondent’s
appeal.
The CA rendered judgment in CA G.R. SP. 60354, granting
respondents petition for certiorari and setting aside the trial
courts orders of execution pending appeal.
Petitioner, therefore, brought this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in holding that the trial court had lost its
jurisdiction to issue the order for execution pending appeal
RULING:
NO. The trial court still had jurisdiction of the case when it
ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal.
However, the fact is that the enforcement of its order was
restrained by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 60354.
On the other hand, the subsequent perfection of respondent’s
appeal forced the elevation of the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals. The twin moves of respondents rendered
execution pending appeal impossible not only while the TRO
was effective but even after its expiration, in view of the
elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals.
The trial court properly held itself to have no jurisdiction to act
further on the case. Instead, in its order, it referred petitioner to
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 69113 with regard to
his efforts to seek implementation of the order of execution.
Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling.
85.)Piedad vs. Bobilles
846 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 208614 November 27, 2017
FACTS:
Piedad filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale
against Bobilles. The trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and
declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery.
Bobilles appealed the trial court Decision, but the CA affirmed
the trial court ruling. The CA Decision became final and
executory.
Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition and referred it to
Sheriff Bellones for implementation.
In the same case, Bobilles filed a Petition for the Probate of the
Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola
ordered that the petition be heard independently and that it be
raffled to another branch. Bobilles' petition for the probate was
eventually docketed.
Bobilles also filed a petition for the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him
from enforcing the writ of demolition.
After summarily hearing the case, Judge Estrera issued a
restraining order against Sheriff Bellones.
Again upon Bobilles’ motion, Judge Villarin extended the TRO
against Sheriff Bellones.
Several motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but
he never resolved them. Thus, the Heirs of Piedad filed an
administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin for
Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and
Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions. SC found both
Judges administratively liable.
The civil case was eventually transferred to another RTC. The
heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an Order Be
Issued to Sheriff Bellones to Resume the Unfinished Writ of
Execution and/or writ of demolition.
The presiding judge denied the motion and opined that since
more than 12 years had passed since the CA Decision became
final and executory, the execution should have been pursued
through a petition for revival judgment, not a mere motion.
The Heirs of Piedad appealed the denial of their motions with a
petition under Rule 42. The CA denied the appeal for being the
wrong remedy.
The heirs of Piedad filed a petition for certiorari before the SC
asserting that CA committed grave abuse when it denied their
motion for the resumption of the writ of demolition.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to revive judgment was timely filed
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the CA’s ruling on the nullity of the
deed of absolute sale executed between Piedad and
respondents became final and executory on November 1,
1998. Judge Gaviola, upon motion, then issued an order for
the issuance of a writ of demolition on October 22, 2001.
However, the writ of demolition was never served on
respondents due to their dilatory tactics and the gross
ignorance of the law and undue delay caused by Judges
Estrera and Villarin. The case only began to gain traction on
July 12, 2010, when petitioners filed their motion for the revival
of judgment. But by this time, almost 12 years had passed
since the CA Decision became final and executory. This led
RTC where the case was transferred to deny the motion for
being the wrong remedy.
The prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and
executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years
from the entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this
period, the judgment is converted to a mere right of action and
can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the revival of
judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of
judgment.
However, in a long line of cases, SC has allowed for the
execution of a final and executory judgment even if prescription
has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment
obligor for his or her benefit or advantage. The purpose of the
law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or
actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far
from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued
their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow
petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation
because of sheer literal adherence to technicality. After all, the
34
Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the
Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
86.) Villareal, Jr. vs. MWSS
G.R. No. 232202 February 28, 2018
FACTS:
In a Decision, MeTC of Quezon City dismissed a case entitled
"MWSS v. Villareal" for Unlawful Detainer, for being
prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
On appeal by MWSS, the RTC rendered a Decision on
reversing the MeTC's judgment.
The RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of Judgment/Order,7
stating that the RTC Decision dated September 27, 2002 has
become final and executory.
Within a period of two years or on May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution8 with the MeTC.
Villareal filed his Comment/Opposition, praying that the motion
be held in abeyance pending compliance by MWSS with the
provision of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.
More than 10 years from the filing of MWSS' motion for
execution or on July 28, 2014, the MeTC issued an Order in
granting the motion.
The MeTC issued a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of the
RTC Decision. Pursuant to the writ of execution, the MeTC
Sheriff III sent a Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay to Orlando.
Villareal filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the
RTC challenging the Writ of Execution and the Sheriffs Notice
to Vacate and Pay. He argued that the five-year period under
Section 6,16 Rule 39 of the Rules was violated since the
execution was done more than 10 years from the finality of the
RTC decision.
In response, MWSS filed its Comment/Opposition, and
countered among others, that the five-year period under the
Rules within which to enforce a judgment by mere motion run
only against the judgment obligee and not the court that will
resolve/decide it.
The RTC dismissed the petition and affirmed the Writ of
Execution and the Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition based on
erroneous application of Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court and ignorance of applicable jurisprudence
RULING:
YES. By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be valid, the
judgment creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts
within the five-year prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing
of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and (b)
the court's actual issuance of the writ.
Here, the RTC Decision became final and executory on
December 15, 2002. By operation of law, December 15, 2002
is likewise the date of entry of judgment. Consequently, the
five-year prescriptive period for the execution of the RTC
decision by mere motion must be reckoned from December 15,
2002.
MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the
RTC Decision on May 17, 2004. This is within five years from
December 15, 2002 - the date when the decision became final
and executory. Thus, the first act was accomplished.
There is, however, non-compliance with the second act. The
five-year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of
judgment mentioned in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules, should
be observed both by the winning party who filed the motion,
i.e., judgment obligee/creditor, and the court that will resolve
the same. Simply put, the winning party may file the motion for
execution within the five-year period; and the court should
issue the actual writ of execution pursuant to the motion within
the same period. After the lapse of the five-year period, any
writ issued by the court is already null and void, since the court
no longer has jurisdiction over the issuance of the writ.
Records show that after the filing of MWSS' Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, and Orlando's
Comment/Opposition thereto, the MeTC issued an Order
granting the said motion only on July 28, 2014. More than a
year after the grant, or on October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued
the Writ of Execution. Reckoned from the entry of judgment on
December 15, 2002, more than 12 years have elapsed after
the actual writ of execution was finally issued by the MeTC.
This is clearly beyond the five-year prescriptive period within
which the court may issue the writ of execution. By then, the
MeTC was already stripped of its jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of
execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.
87.) Republic vs. Court of Appeals
137 SCRA 220, No. L-43179 June 27, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Bureau of Buildings and Real Property Management, is the
owner of a parcel of land. Respondents, spouses de Vera are
the lessees of the abovementioned parcel of land, pursuant to
a written contract of lease.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of
Buildings and Real Property Management filed a complaint
with the then CFI against herein spouses de Vera for collection
of unpaid rentals and termination of the lease contract.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of petitioner.
The private respondents, then defendants, appealed the
foregoing decision to the CA which affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court.
The decision became final and entry of judgment was made on
August 27, 1968. Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for
the execution of the decision. The motion was granted, and the
corresponding writ of execution was issued directing the Sheriff
of Manila to cause the execution of the appealed decision.
Attempts were made by private respondents to nullify the entry
of judgment made by filing a petition before the CA but turned
out to be futile.
Respondents came to this Court, through a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. The petition was
dismissed by SC. Entry of judgment was accordingly made on
November 1, 1973.
Petitioner filed before the trial court, a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution, alleging among others, that the
writ of execution previously issued on April 17, 1969, was
recalled in view of the pendency of respondents' petition before
the CA which had already been dismissed and the entry of
judgment was upheld.
The trial court granted petitioner's motion for an alias writ of
execution.
Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
which was eventually dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the trial court can be executed by
mere motion
RULING:
YES. Under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
35
years from the date of its entry or from the date it became final
and executory and, thereafter, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, it may be enforced by an independent
civil action.
The prescriptive period for the enforcement of a judgment by
ordinary action is 10 years computed from the time the
judgment became final. In the instant case, it is settled that the
judgment sought to be executed became final and executory
on August 27, 1968. On April 15, 1969, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines filed a motion for execution which was granted
by the trial court on April 17, 1969. However, on April 28, 1969,
private respondents filed a motion to recall and/or quash the
writ of execution alleging as ground therefor that they have a
pending petition with the Court of Appeals questioning the
validity of service of the decision on counsel of record and
consequently the correctness of the entry of judgment. Acting
on the aforesaid motion, the trial court recalled that writ of
execution previously issued and held in abeyance the
enforcement thereof pending resolution of private respondents’
petition. Since then and up to the termination of the dilatory
schemes and maneuvers resorted to by the private
respondents all the way up to this Court without avail,
petitioner could not have sought the execution of the judgment
in question.
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution,
although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is
that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time,
by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to
operate as supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise.
Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend
the time within which the writ may be issued without scire
facias.
In the case at bar, the resultant interruption in the execution of
the judgment, being occasioned by and attributable to the
private respondents, the filing by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, of a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution is thus still seasonable and well within the five (5)
year period. The statute of limitations has been devised to
operate primarily against those who slept on their rights and
not against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes
beyond their control.
88.) Moslem vs. Soriano
No. L-36837 August 17, 1983
FACTS:
Antonio M. Soriano filed Civil Case No. 5788 against Atal
Moslem and Amado Moslem to recover possession of four (4)
hectares of land plus damages.
The court, therefore, rendered a decision ordering the
petitioners to vacate the disputed land and pay the costs.
When the judgment was being executed, the petitioners
refused to vacate the land. Soriano filed a motion to declare
them in contempt of court.
The respondent court issued an order finding defendants guilty
of contempt and was ordered arrested and imprisoned until
they obey the orders.
The petitioners are now raising an issue for resolution.
The petitioners contend that Section 8(d) of Rule 39 is
appropriate because the judgment requires delivery of real
property. According to them, the refusal to vacate the disputed
land is not contempt of court because the judgment is not a
special judgment enforceable under Section 9 of Rule 39. The
respondents, however, argue that the order of the court is not
to deliver possession of land but to vacate it and to pay costs.
They would apply Section 9, Rule 39.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 8(d) of Rule 39 or Section 9, Rule 39 should
be applied
RULING:
Rule 39 should be applied. It is plain from the records that the
judgment being enforced is an ordinary one. It is not a special
judgment. The case filed by Antonio M. Soriano is an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land
and damages. The judgment directing the petitioners to vacate
the land is nothing but a judgment to deliver possession of real
property. A special judgment under Section 9, Rule 39 is one
which “requires the performance of any other act than the
payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal
property.”
How is an ordinary judgment enforced?
Section 13 of Rule 39 provides:
How execution for the delivery or restitution of property
enforced — The officer must enforce an execution for the
delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the
person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the
judgment creditor in possession of such property, and by
levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property
of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the
judgment and costs included in the writ of execution.
We applied the above rule in Rom v. Cobadora (28 SCRA 758)
and declared that the mere refusal or unwillingness on the part
of the defeated party to relinquish the property would not
constitute contempt. The proper procedure must be followed in
the execution of the judgment.
If the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of real
property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other
officer to whom it must be to deliver the possession of the
property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means
his means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing
party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to
the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or
ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or
upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession or in any manner disturbs the
possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then
and only then may be loser be charged with and punished for
contempt.
It is not enough for the sheriff, in the enforcement of a
judgment for delivery or restitution of property, to merely direct
the defeated party to effect such delivery or restitution. The
refusal of the defeated party to surrender the property to the
winning party upon the order of the sheriff does not constitute
contempt. The sheriff himself must oust the defeated party
from the property and effect the delivery or restitution by
placing the winning party in possession of the property.
89.) Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals
185 SCRA 751, G.R. No. 81552 May 28, 1990
Quick Summary: Spouses Fiestan owned a lot which was
mortgaged to DBP. They failed to pay the mortgaged hence
DBP foreclosed the lot, it then sold it to Peria. Peria now
mortgaged it to PNB. However since the possession of the lot
is still with the spouses, Provincial Sheriff ordered them to
vacate. Spouses did not vacate and filed annulment of
mortgage and sale. RTC denied their claim, they went to CA
stating that the extrajudicial foreclosure was invalid because
absence of a valid levy.
FACTS:
For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita
Arconada (spouses Fiestan) to pay their mortgage
indebtedness to respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the latter was able to acquire at a public
auction sale the parcel of land (Lot No. 2-B covered by TCT
No. T-13218) that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur
after extrajudicial foreclosure of said property.
The Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale that which
was registered on September 28 in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Earlier, or on September 26, spouses
Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which
36
was likewise registered on September 28, 1979. When
spouses Fiestan failed to redeem their parcel of land within the
1 year period which expired on September 28, 1980, the
Register of Deeds cancelled their title over the subject property
and issued TCT No. T-19077 to DBP upon the latter’s duly
executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership.
DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria, so the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBP’s title over said property and
issued TCT No. T-19229 to Peria’s name, who later secured a
tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due
thereon.
He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as
security for his loan of P115,000.00. Since the spouses Fiestan
were still in possession of the property, the Provincial Sheriff
ordered them to vacate the premises, but instead of leaving,
they filed a complaint in the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur for
annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer
certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City, PNB-Vigan
Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur.
The lower court dismissed said complaint, declaring valid the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor
of the DBP and its subsequent sale to Francisco Peria as well
as the real estate mortgage constituted in favor of PNB-Vigan.
The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision. The
spouses Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that
the Provincial Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without first
effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the
public auction sale.
ISSUE:
WON the extrajudicial foreclosure be null and void for lack of a
valid levy
HELD:
NO. The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a
valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid
attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not
basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed
property can be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction
should be made of the three different kinds of sales under the
law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure
sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, because a different
set of law applies to each class of sale mentioned. An ordinary
execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies
in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. On the other hand, Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as “An
Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers
Inserted in or Annexed to Real Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals,
185 SCRA 751, G.R. No. 81552 May 28, 1990
Estate Mortgages” applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure
sale.
The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. The public auction sale conducted on August
6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur refers to the
“sale” mentioned in Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
which was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or
attached to a real estate mortgage made as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation. It
must be noted that in the mortgage contract, petitioners, as
mortgagor, had appointed private respondent DBP, for the
purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, “as his attorney-in-fact to
sell the property mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended,
to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and
necessary to accomplish said purpose x x x. In case of
foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment
of the mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without
any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once,
and to hold possession of the same x x x.”
The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. The public auction sale conducted on August
6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur refers to the
“sale” mentioned in Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
which was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or
attached to a real estate mortgage made as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation. It
must be noted that in the mortgage contract, petitioners, as
mortgagor, had appointed private respondent DBP, for the
purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, “as his attorney-in-fact to
sell the property mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended,
to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and
necessary to accomplish said purpose x x x. In case of
foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment
of the mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without
any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once,
and to hold possession of the same x x x.”
90.) PCIB vs. CA
193 SCRA 453
91.) Nudo vs. Caguioa 595 SCRA 208, G.R. No. 176906
August 4, 2009
Quick summary: Petitioners Petronila and Marcela filed a
complaint for partition of their land in Baguio City against
private respondents, Gumersindo and Zosima. During the
pendency of the case Gumersindo died, RTC rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents. On appeal with CA, it
ruled in favor of private respondents still. After such Zosima
died. Petitioner Andrew Nudo now assails the decision of the
CA and wants to declare it null and void because they were not
substituted.
FACTS:
Private respondents, spouses Petronilo and Marcela Nudo,
filed a complaint for partition and damages against the
spouses, Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo.
Petronilo and Gumersindo are brothers and pro-indiviso co-
owners of a parcel of land in Baguio City. Petronilo had
requested Gumersindo to accede to the partition of the
property, but the latter refused, thus forcing him to initiate the
complaint.
During the pendency of the case, Gumersindo Nudo died. No
substitution was effected by the court. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of private respondents.
Defendants' counsel brought the case to the CA on appeal. CA
issued a resolution dismissing the appeal for failure to file
appellants' brief. It then issued an entry of judgment.
Thereafter, on June 22, 2003, Zosima Nudo died.
Private respondents filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the court. A writ of execution was issued by the
Clerk of Court. Sheriff Ruben L. Atijera returned the writ
unenforced on the ground that Susana Nudo, daughter of
Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo, promised to settle with private
respondents and offer the purchase of their share in the
subject property.
Private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of an Alias Writ of Execution, which the court granted. An Alias
Writ of Execution was issued, but the same was again returned
unenforced, that Susana Nudo refused to accept private
respondents' proposed partition.
Petitioner, Andrew B. Nudo, son of Gumersindo and Zosima
Nudo, filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, seeking to
annul the RTC Decision in the partition case. Petitioner alleged
therein that neither he nor the other heirs were substituted in
place of their parents in the proceedings for partition before the
trial court. This allegedly rendered the proceedings null and
void.
CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition for
annulment of judgment. According to the CA, annulment of
37
judgment could not be availed of since petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest had availed themselves of the remedy
of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment in Civil Case No. 3493-R could be
annulled on the ground that petitioner was not substituted for
his deceased parents in the said case.
HELD:
NO. The records, however, show that Zosima died on June 22,
2003, after the CA's resolution dismissing the appeal became
final and executory. Therefore, at no time were the petitioner's
parents deprived of any representative in the partition case,
until the judgment therein became final and executory.Ï‚
Petitioner cannot therefore claim now that the judgment in the
partition case is null and void for failure of the court to implead
him, as the judgment became final and executory prior to the
death of his mother. The judgment in the partition case is now
enforceable against Gumersindo and Zosima's successor-in-
interest, including herein petitioner, following Sec. 7(b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 7. Execution in case of death of party. - In case of death
of a party, execution may issue or be enforced in the following
manner:
(b) In case of death of the judgment obligor, against his
executor or administrator or successor in interest, if the
judgment be for the recovery of real or personal property, or
the enforcement of a lien thereon;
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy,
which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a
recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional
cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this
extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make
a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long
become final and executory. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the claim.
Non-substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is not
jurisdictional. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was designed
to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. It is only when
there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not
represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court
nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.
92.) Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. vs. Ramolete
203 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 60887 November 13, 1991
Quick Summary: A collision happened between a jeep owned
by Nelia Enriquez and Jeepney owned by Palmes. Calixto died
in the incident and hence Primitiva his widow filed a complaint
for damages against Enriquez for death of his husband. RTC
ruled in favor of Primitiva and its decision became final and
executory. However garnishment cannot be commenced
because Enriquez stated by oath that the jeepney they owned
was covered by third-party liability insurance issued by Perla.
Primitiva prays that garnishment be done against Perla which
was granted by court. Enriquez questioned such decision
stating that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Perla as
he was not issued summons. SC ruled that the court had
jurisdiction over Perla.
FACTS:
A Cimarron PUJ owned and registered in the name of Nelia
Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, was travelling from
Cebu City to Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu,
the Cimarron PUJ collided with a private jeep owned by the
late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent Primitiva
Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep.
Calixto Palmes He died in such accident. The accident also
caused physical injuries on the part of Adeudatus Borbon who
was then only two (2) years old.
Private respondents Primitiva Palmes (widow of Calixto
Palmes) and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of minor Adeudatus
Borbon) filed a complaint against Cosme Casas and Nelia
Enriquez (assisted by her husband Leonardo Enriquez) before
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu claiming damages.
The claim of private respondent Honorato Borbon, Sr., being
distinct and separate from that of co-plaintiff Primitiva Palmes,
and the amount thereof falling properly within the jurisdiction of
the inferior court, respondent Judge Jose R. Ramolete ordered
the Borbon claim excluded from the complaint, without
prejudice to its being filed with the proper inferior court.
The Court of First Instance rendered a Decision in favor of
private respondent Primitiva Palmes. The judgment of the trial
court became final and executory and a writ of execution was
thereafter issued. The writ of execution was, however, returned
unsatisfied.
Consequently, the judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez was
summoned before the trial court for examination. She declared
under oath that the Cimarron PUJ registered in her name was
covered by a third-party liability insurance policy issued by
petitioner Perla.
Private respondent Palmes filed a motion for
garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued
against the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the
judgment debtor. Respondent Judge issued an Order directing
the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party
liability insurance policy.
Petitioner then appeared before the trial court and moved for
reconsideration and for quashal of the writ of
garnishment, alleging that the writ was void on the ground that
it (Perla) was not a party to the case and that jurisdiction over
its person had never been acquired by the trial court by service
of summons or by any process. The trial court denied
petitioner's motion.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the
garnishee
HELD:
YES. Garnishment has been defined as a species of
attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or
payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a
forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment
debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through
service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment
creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee.
Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a
person having in his possession property or credits of the
judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property
to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit.
In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to
bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that
summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be
impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the
trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any
person who has in his possession credits belonging to the
judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment.
The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the
38
garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in
order to make him liable xxx Through service of the writ of
garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual party” to, or a
“forced intervenor” in, the case and the trial court thereby
acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with all orders
and processes of the trial court with a view to the complete
satisfaction of the judgment of the court.
Every interest which the judgment debtor may have in property
may be subjected to execution. xxx In a third-party liability
insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of
paying the injured third party to whom the insured is liable. The
insurer becomes liable as soon as the liability of the insured to
the injured third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured
to the injured third person is not necessary in order that the
obligation of the insurer may arise. From the moment that the
insured became liable to the third person, the insured acquired
an interest in the insurance contract, which interest may be
garnished like any other credit.
93.) Solco vs. Provido
544 SCRA 350, G.R. No. 176533 February 11, 2008
Quick summary: Villaruels executed a MOA with Solco over a
lot in Bacolod. The MOA stated that Villaruels will clear the
land and after such Solco may construct improvement therein.
Villaruels sued Solco for not complying with the agreement
because he entered the property without the Villaruels clearing
the land first. Solco countered that Villaruels violated the
contract because they did not clear the land within the period
stipulated in the contract. Villaruels wanted to rescind the
contract. Case reached the SC and it ruled in favor of Solco
hence the sale should continue. Solco now moves for
execution of judgment. However as the sheriff demands from
Solco that he pay the remaining balance for the lot he failed.
Villaruels wanted to rescind the contract and forfeiture of prior
payments of Solco. Solco stated that he already issued checks
to RTC. RTC ordered that a deed of absolute sale be issued.
Villareals contested because the writ of execution was void
because it varied the terms of the judgment. RTC denied their
claim. CA reversed it however. Solco argues that the payment
with the clerk of court of MBTC cashiers check was in
accordance with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Josefa Pea vda. de Villaruel et.al, through their attorney-in-fact
respondent Maria Teresa P. Villaruel, executed a Contract to
Sell and Memorandum of Agreement with petitioner Jerome
Solco over a lot located at Mandalagan, Bacolod City for P3M.
The agreement provided for the payment of P1.6M upon the
signing of the contract, and the balance of P1.4M upon the
dismantling of the structures thereon and the clearing of the
premises of its occupants within six (6) months from the
execution of the contract. Thereafter, Solco entered the
premises and commenced the construction of the
improvements.
However,the Villaruels filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with damages and application for a writ of preliminary
injunction with the RTC of Bacolod City. They alleged that
Solco violated the terms of their agreement when he entered
the premises without notice and started delivering rocks, sand
and hollow blocks which destroyed the gate and barbed wire
fence that secured the premises, and uprooted the ipil-
ipil tree. The construction materials allegedly blocked their
access to Lacson Street, rendering impossible the dismantling
of the structure and removal of the materials therein within the
period set by the contract. They also alleged that Solco hired
men of questionable repute to work in the premises,
threatening their life, security and property.
In his Answer, Solco alleged that the Villaruels had not
substantially complied with their obligations under the contract
as the house and the billboard were not dismantled and the
occupants had not vacated the premises yet. He claimed that
the contract allowed him to take full possession of, and to
commence construction on, the premises upon the execution
thereof and the payment of P1.6M.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Solco.
The Villaruels appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modifications the decision of the trial court.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the
Villaruels filed a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 152781. However, it was denied.
Villaruels motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
Solco then filed a motion for execution before the trial court
which was granted. Sheriff Garbanzos served the writ on
Solcos counsel who informed him that the balance of the
purchase price will be paid only if all the adverse occupants
have vacated the property. Upon ocular inspection of the
property on May 24 and 27, 2005, all adverse occupants had
vacated the premises, but the billboard of Trongco Advertising
was still there.
The Sheriff again demanded from Solco payment of the
balance of the purchase price less all damages awarded, but
to no avail. The Villaruels sent a letter to Solco informing him
of their decision to cancel and terminate the sale transaction,
and the forfeiture of the P1.6M to answer for the damages
caused to them.
Villaruels counsel wrote a letter to the clerk of court stating that
Solco failed to pay the balance of the purchase price, and
prayed for the full implementation of the writ of execution by
garnishing cash deposits of Solco.
Solco filed a manifestation with motion asking the court to
accept the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC)
cashiers check dated August 22, 2005 in the amount of
P1,287,786.00 as full compliance of his obligation under the
contract.RTC accepted the payment as full compliance of
Solcos obligation and ordered the Villaruels to execute the
deed of absolute sale over the property, and appointed the
clerk of court to execute the said deed in their behalf should
they fail to comply with the order.
The Villaruels filed a complaint for Cancellation of Contract,
Quieting of Title and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
12614 and raffled to Branch 49, RTC of Bacolod City. The
Villaruels also filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and
to set aside the Order claiming that the writ of execution was
void because it varied the terms of the judgment and that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to alter or modify a final judgment. The
RTC denied the said motion to quash.
Thus, the Villaruels filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.CA granted the petition. Solco filed an MR
but was denied.
Solco argues that the payment with the clerk of court of MBTC
cashiers check dated August 22, 2005 in the amount of
P1,287,786.00 as full payment of the balance of the contract
price was in accordance with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides that if the judgment obligee is not present
to receive the payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the
said payment to the sheriff, who shall turn over all the amounts
coming to his possession to the clerk of court. The clerk of
court encashed the check for the Villaruels, but they refused to
accept the payment. Moreover, assuming the RTC erred in
accepting the payment as full compliance under the contract, it
pertains only to an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction
correctible by certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the payment to the clerk of court was valid
HELD:
YES. The RTC has a general supervisory control over its
process of execution. This power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution, as well as the power to compel the
Villaruels to accept the payment made pursuant to a validly
issued writ of execution. As the prevailing party, Solco should
not be deprived of the fruits of his rightful victory in the long-
39
drawn legal battle by any ploy of the respondents. Courts must
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Under the foregoing
rules, a sheriff is under obligation to enforce the execution of a
money judgment by demanding from the judgment obligor the
immediate payment directly to the judgment obligee or his
representative of the full amount stated in the writ of execution
and all lawful fees. However, if the judgment obligee or his
representative is not present to receive the payment, the rules
require the sheriff to receive the payment which he must turn
over within the same day to the clerk of court. If it is not
practicable to deliver the amount to the clerk of court within the
same day, the sheriff shall deposit the amount in a fiduciary
account with the nearest government depository bank. The
clerk of court then delivers the amount to the judgment obligee
in satisfaction of the judgment. If the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor.
The fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no
moment. Indeed, the Rules require that in case the judgment
obligee or his representative is not present to receive the
payment, the judgment obligor “shall deliver the aforesaid
payment to the executing sheriff,” who “shall turn over all the
amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the
clerk of court,” who in turn shall deliver the amount to the
judgment obligee or his representative in satisfaction of the
judgment. However, it would be defeating the ends of justice to
rigidly enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the
payment made directly to the clerk of court just because it was
not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty bound to “turn over
all the amounts coming into his possession” to the clerk of
court. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided. Besides,
payment was made not immediately after the June 7, 2005
demand of the sheriff but after the Villaruels wrote the clerk of
court on August 8, 2005 requesting for the full implementation
of the writ. Considering that there was no chance for Solco to
deliver the payment to the respondents or their
representatives, or even to the sheriff, it was only logical for
him to make the payment to the clerk of court who issued the
writ of execution.
94.) Yau vs. Silverio
G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008
FACTS:
Philfinance issued postdated checks to Yau for the promissory
note purchased by the latter. When the checks were deposited,
they were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Yau then
filed a complaint for sum of money against Philfinance, and its
officers, Silverio, Macapagal, Biagan, Cano, and Carlos, which
the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Yau.
Only Carlos appealed the decision, hence as to the other
defendants, the judgement became final in 1992. The court
ordered for the execution of the decision. The bank accounts of
the defendants who did not appeal were garnished. The
judgment was only partially satisfied.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the execution, Macapagal
filed a petition for certiorari, while Silverio filed a petition for
reinstatement of his appeal and annulment of the writ of
execution. While the separate petitions were being resolved,
the execution was stayed. Subsequently the separate actions
were both denied by the CA.
Execution was resumed in 1999. Thereupon, Macapagal filed a
petition to quash the writ on the ground that its lifetime had
already expired. RTC denied the petition on the ground that
delay was imputable to the respondent, by virtue of the petition
filed with the CA. On certiorari, the petition was dismissed.
Silverio also filed a separate omnibus motion with the RTC
praying that the execution be declared void for becoming
functus officio since more than 5 years have already elapsed,
which was also denied. On certiorari however, the petition was
granted by the CA.
We now have a situation where 2 defendants filed separation
petitions of certiorari with the CA raising the same issue, but
one was granted (Silverio), and the other was denied
(Macapagal).
Both of the actions were consolidated in the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether a writ of execution that was not fully satisfied may still
be implemented after 5 years from its issuance.
HELD
Short Answer
Yes. The execution of the writ may still be implemented after
the lapse of 5 years without the need to institute an action to
revive, if the delay was imputable to the judgement obligor.
Long Answer
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended provides:
“Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.—A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations.”
It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be
executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry
or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter,
before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However,
there are instances where this Court allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious
grounds.
The time during which execution is stayed should be
excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay
occasioned by the debtor. There had been many instances
where this Court allowed the execution by motion even after
the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit
or advantage.
95.) Jacinto v. Gumaru
G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014
FACTS
In a complaint for illegal dismissal, LA rendered decision in
favor of respondent Gumaru and ordered the payment of
separation pay, unpaid wages, and other unpaid benefits.
Petitioner appealed with the NLRC but the same was not
perfected due to failure to pay the proper bond. Hence,
decision became final.
A writ of execution was issued but the same was not satisfied.
An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued on the
ground that the writ already “expired”. In view thereof, the
petitioner filed a motion to annul the alias writ on the ground
that the life of the writ had already elapsed. The LA denied the
motion. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA but it was
dismissed due to failure to sign the certification against forum
shopping. Hence this present petition.
During the pendency of the petition with the SC, the
respondent manifested that the judgment has already been
satisfied in full.
ISSUE
40
Whether the case may still be reviewed even after the
judgment has been satisfied in full.
HELD
Short Answer
No. Once judgment is fully satisfied, the case is deemed
terminated once and for all, beyond review by any court.
Long Answer
While the Court takes the petitioner’s side with regard to the
procedural issue dealing with verification and the certification
against forum shopping, it nonetheless appears that the
Petition has been overtaken by events. In a May 24, 2011
Manifestation, respondent informed this Court that the
judgment award has been satisfied in full. The petitioner does
not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor case is now
deemed ended. “It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been
fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all.”
And “when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond
review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the
proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation
thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable
discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and
voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking
an appeal therefrom.”
With the above development in the case, the instant Petition is
rendered moot and academic. The satisfaction of the judgment
in full has placed the case beyond the Court’s review. “Indeed,
there are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these
were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment.”
96.) Villasenor v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 202303, June 4, 2014
FACTS
Petitioners were administratively held liable in relation to the
Manor Hotel fire tragedy. Villasenor filed an MR assailing the
findings of Ombudsman, while Mesa appealed the decision.
Ombudsman ordered the Mayor of QC to effect the penalties
immediately upon receipt of the order.
Petitioners filed an action for certiorari with the CA assailing
the immediate implementation of the decision despite the
pendency of the MR and appeal filed by petitioners
respectively. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence this
present petition.
ISSUE
Whether the order of the Ombudsman is immediately
executory despite pendency of appeal.
HELD
Short Answer
Yes. Revised rules of Ombudsman clearly states that the
orders are immediately executory and appeal cannot stay the
implementation of the orders. While the revisions have been
issued after their cases have been decided, the same were
made to apply to them on the ground that rules are
retrospective in nature.
Long Answer
From the rules, it can be gleaned that the Ombudsman
decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable
or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory,
and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the
charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4)
a fine equivalent to one month’s salary.
Appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those which fall
outside said enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from
receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing
that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of
course.
It is of no moment that A.O. No. 17 took effect on September 7,
2003, after the Joint Decision was issued against Mesa and
Villaseñor on June 17, 2003.
Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall
have no retroactive effect. Rules regulating the procedure of
courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus,
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to
or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence, retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person adversely
affected.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are
procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied
retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and
unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. No
vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because
the respondent in the administrative case is considered
preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. It is important to note that there is no
such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office
97.) Holasca v. Calibuso, Jr.,
A.M. No. P-14-3198, July 23, 2014
FACTS
Holasca was the winning party in an ejectment suit. She
sought the execution of the decision thru respondent Sheriff
Pagunsan. Accordingly, the sheriff visited the losing party in
the ejectment suit and told them that he would not levy upon
any of their properties. The sheriff also did not make an
inventory of the properties. When Holasca personally
inspected the property the defendants had already vacated the
place and left the premises in total disarray. When she
reported the incident to the sheriff, the latter did not do
anything. The sheriff was hesitant to locate the defendants
because he did not have the money to advance for the
possible expenses he will incur in looking for the defendants.
In view thereof, Holasca charged the respondent sheriff with
dereliction of duty.
ISSUE
Whether the sheriff was guilty of gross inefficiency in
implementing the writ of execution.
HELD
Short Answer
Yes. The duty of the sheriff in implementing the writ is
ministerial and must be effected with dispatch to avoid further
delay. The litigants must never be in a position where they
would have to follow up with implementation of the writ.
Long Answer
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice
because they are tasked to execute final judgments of the
courts, which would otherwise become empty victories for the
prevailing party, if left unenforced. As agents of the law,
sheriffs are mandated to uphold the majesty of the law, as
embodied in the decision, without unnecessary delay to
prevent injury or damage to the winning party. There is no
need for the litigants to “follow up” the sheriff’s implementation
of the writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs are
41
duty-bound to proceed and see to it that the execution of
judgments is not unduly delayed.
The provisions in the rules enumerate the following duties of a
sheriff: first, to give notice of the writ and demand that the
judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate
the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ
by removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming
under the latter; third, to remove the latter’s personal
belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or
remove the improvements constructed thereon upon special
court order; and fourth, to execute and make a return on the
writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days
thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires.
These provisions leave no room for any exercise of discretion
on the part of the sheriff on how to perform his or her duties in
implementing the writ. A sheriff’s compliance with the Rules is
not merely directory but mandatory. A sheriff is expected to
know the rules of procedure pertaining to his functions as an
officer of the court.
In the present case, we find that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss
in performing his mandated duties.
98.) Spouses Tabino v. Tabino
G.R. No. 196219, July 30, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Mauricio and respondent Lazaro were brothers.
They occupy a lot in Makati amounting to 350 square meters.
The lot was subdivided into 2 lots namely lot 2 and lot 3. Lot 2
was applied for coverage by Mauricio, while Lot 3 by Lazaro
pursuant to Proclamation 518. Mauricio was the actual
possessor of the entire 350 lot while Lazaro actually lived in
Novaliches. Lazaro was granted permit but he was only
allowed to occupy a total of 150 square meters.
There are 3 cases involved here. 1 is the DENR protest filed by
Lazaro against Mauricio, 1 is the DENR protest filed by
Mauricio against Lazaro, and 1 is the ejectment suit filed by
Lazaro against Mauricio.
Lazaro also filed a protest with the DENR in relation to Lot 2,
which was dismissed by the DENR Director on the ground that
respondent was not qualified as he was already awarded a
home lot in Fort Bonifacio.
On the other hand, Mauricio also filed a protest in relation to
Lot 3, which was granted by the DENR Director on the ground
that respondent was disqualified as he was already awarded a
home lot in Fort Bonifacio.
Subsequently, respondent Lazaro filed an ejectment suit
against petitioner Mauricio alleging that respondent Lazaro is
the true owner of the entire 350 lot and he only used Mauricio
to circumvent the 300 square meter limit set by Proc 518.
Petitioner interposed the argument that there was an
agreement for him to be a caretaker of the lots and was being
paid 800 pesos a month.
The MTC dismissed the ejectment suit. RTC affirmed the
decision in toto. Before the CA, the petition was granted and
the decision of the RTC and MTC were set aside. The CA
ordered Mauricio to vacate the premises.
Meanwhile, the DENR protest filed by Lazaro was also
appealed to the CA, which the CA dismissed. At this point, we
now have 2 separate actions, both involving possession of the
same property, one was ruled by the CA in favor of Mauricio
(DENR protest), and the other in favor of the opposing party
Lazaro ( ejectment suit).
ISSUE:
Whether the decision in the ejectment suit, which is
immediately executory, may be stayed pending review with the
SC
HELD:
Short Answer
Yes. Generally, decision in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory pending appeal, however there are exceptions such
as when it would result in demolition of the improvements
therein despite the pendency of an action resolving issues of
possession and ownership.
Long Answer
The Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering
petitioners to vacate the premises. With the pendency of the
DENR Protests, respondent’s claim of possession and his right
to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If the
ejectment case is allowed to proceed without awaiting the
result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where
the existing structures thereon would have to be demolished. If
petitioners’ position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld
with finality by the courts, then it would mean that respondent
had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject lots,
which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the
ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a
consequence of the demolition of petitioners’ residence and
other permanent improvements on the disputed lots.
99.) JUANARIO G. CAMPIT Vs. ISIDRA B. GRIPA
G.R. No. 195443, September 17, 2014
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a 2.7360-hectare agricultural land
situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, presently
occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and
Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga,
but covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioner’s
name.5 The petitioner claimed to have purchased the property
from his father Jose Campit in 1977.
On the other hand, respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga
and Severino Bardiaga (as represented by his son, Rolando
Bardiaga) claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject
property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil Case No.
11858 decided on June 12, 1961, and in Civil Case No. 15357
decided on August 8, 1978.
The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner
and his father Jose because they were obtained through the
misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather, Isidro Campit.
The respondents further contended that they have long desired
to divide the subject property among themselves, but the
petitioner adamantly refused to surrender his title to the
property to them, or to the Register of Deeds, despite their
formal demand.
Respondents filed anew an action for annulment and
cancellation of title with the RTC on August 15, 2003.
The petitioner opposed the respondents’ action and argued
that the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357,
which declared his title null and void, could no longer be
enforced because its execution was already barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as the said decision was never executed
within 10 years from July 19, 1979 - the date of finality of the
judgment.
Noting that the action filed by the respondents was not one for
revival of judgment, the RTC proceeded to hear the case and,
in a decision dated August 13, 2008, ruled in the respondents’
favor.
CA affirmed RTC.
CA denied MR.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct that he acquired the said
property not only because the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil
42
Case No. 15357, which declared his title null and void, was
never executed, but also because, under the Torrens system
of registration, a certificate of title is an indefeasible and
incontrovertible proof of ownership of the person, in whose
favor it was issued, over the land described therein. He now
contends that he had acquired the property in good faith and
for valuable consideration and, thus, entitled to own and
possess the subject property.
RULING:
NO. SC considered the case as an action to quiet title because
the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the
respondents is substantially in the nature of an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust,
combined with the fact that the respondents have always been
in possession of the subject property, hence, the filing of which
does not prescribe. Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of
Civil Case No.18421 to be proper and not barred by the time
limitations set forth under the Rules of Court in enforcing or
executing a final and executory judgment.
The issue on the validity of the petitioner’s title to the subject
property has long been settled in Civil Case No. 15357, where
the court, in its decision dated August 8, 1978, which became
final and executory on July 19, 1979, had found and declared
the petitioner’s title null and void by reason of fraud and
misrepresentation.
Thus, the validity of petitioner’s title, having been settled
with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no longer be
reviewed in the present case.
The August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357,
however, was not executed or enforced within the time allowed
under the law. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
a final and executory judgment may be executed by the
prevailing party as a matter of right by mere motion within five
(5) years from the entry of judgment, failing which the judgment
is reduced to a mere right of action which must be enforced by
the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10)
years from finality of the judgment.13cralawlawlibrary
It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever
filed by the respondents - the prevailing party in Civil Case No.
15357, to execute and enforce the August 8, 1978 decision.
The title to the subject property, therefore, remained registered
under the petitioner’s name. As the petitioner argued, his title
had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system
of land registration provides for the indefeasibility of the decree
of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the
registration decree.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the
registered owner can still be compelled under the law to
reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner 16 under
the principle that the property registered is deemed to be held
in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered.17 The party seeking to recover title to property
wrongfully registered in another person’s name must file an
action for reconveyance within the allowed period of time.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 18 There is,
however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such
action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in
possession of the subject property, the action, being in
effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not
prescribe.
100.) ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO Vs. BIENVENIDO S.
REYES, JR.
A.M. No. P-14-3246 October 15, 2014
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from the Alias Writ of Execution
issued on March 9, 20 I 0 by Branch 98 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-89-3580, the
validity of which was then pending determination in the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 91285. Pending its
resolution, Atty. Quicho sought the relief of Reyes as Sheriff of
RTC, whom he claimed exceeded his authority in the
enforcement of the Alias Writ of Execution on December 9,
2010 at the main office of BOC and on December 17, 2010 in
another BOC branch in Lipa City, Batangas.
In his sworn Letter-Complaint, dated December 27, 2010,2
Atty. Quicho alleged that the procedure observed by Reyes in
implementing the alias writ violated the 2002 Revised Manual
for Clerks of Court (Manual). He cited the Manual which
provides that "[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of
the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall
levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind
and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the
option to immediately choose which property or part thereof
may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment."
He asserted that as the holder of the assets and properties of
Traders Royal Bank (TRB), which was the judgment obligor in
Civil Case No. Q-89- 3580 and whose assets were the subject
of the alias writ, BOC was given the option to choose which
property to be surrendered to satisfy the judgment. It was only
when BOC was unable to exercise the option that Reyes was
allowed to levy on other properties. He added that BOC was
forced to surrender under protest a real estate property
situated in Barangay Manggahan, Paranaque City, to satisfy
the judgment and preserve its other properties from being
wrongfully levied by Reyes. He argued that Reyes did not give
BOC a chance to exercise that option.
Instead of accepting the said property, Reyes blow-torched the
locked grill door of BOC’s cash vault in Lipa City and forcibly
took the money deposits of its clients as well as its computers.
Reyes denied the charges against him. According to him, he
did not violate any law when he refused to accept BOC’s offer
of a property located in Paranaque City to satisfy the judgment
debt. He contended that under the law, the judgment obligor
was mandated to pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee and the law was silent on a real estate
property being offered as a form of payment. He also argued
that BOC had refused to pay the judgment award despite the
fact that the CA, in its Decision, dated December 8, 2009, had
already affirmed the validity of the writ of execution which
decision was affirmed by the Court in 2002 and became final in
2003.
Reyes argued that there was no basis to order his relief or
suspension as Sheriff as he merely performed his ministerial
duty to implement the alias writ of execution.
In his Reply, Atty. Quicho reiterated that Reyes was guilty of
ignorance of the law when he refused the real estate property
offered by BOC to satisfy the judgment debt.
Atty. Quicho refuted Reyes’ argument that BOC was not
entitled to exercise the option to choose the properties to be
levied. On the contrary, he explained that under Section 9,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it was clear that if the judgment
obligor could not pay the judgment debt in cash, certified bank
check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment
oblige, he still had the option to choose which of his properties
he could offer to satisfy the obligation. Citing Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc. v. Bellones,5 Atty. Quicho stated that it was the
judgment obligor, not Reyes, who could exercise the option.
Reyes could only garnish or levy if BOC did not exercise the
option.
In his Rejoinder,6 dated March 10, 2011, Reyes countered that
BOC had already waived its option to choose properties to be
levied upon because its offer to pay its liabilities by cashier’s
check and real property came only on December 11 and
December 17, 2010, respectively, or eight (8) months after he
43
had served the demand to pay the judgment award on April 7,
2010. He denied having disrupted the operations of the BOC
when he levied the computers as he did not take the computer
servers with him.
Reyes argued that the Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB) case relied
upon by BOC was not applicable because, unlike the present
case, the decision in the former case was executed with
"deliberate swiftness," and that EPCIB, after being served with
the demand to pay, immediately exercised its option to choose
which of its properties would be levied for the satisfaction of
the money judgment.
The OCA found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes
administratively liable for his overzealousness in implementing
the alias writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reyes shall be held administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes for grave abuse of authority. Reyes’ act of rejecting BOC’s
offer cannot be considered as one brought about by his
ignorance of the law, but is apparently due to his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution.
The Court, thus, agrees with the OCA that Reyes’ actuation
only amounted to grave abuse of authority.
Reyes, in his Comment, had admitted that he refused to accept
the real estate property offered by the BOC to settle the
judgment award because he believed that it was not allowed
under the law and also because it was offered late.
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the
procedure as to how execution of judgments for money is
enforced. It reads:
SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
(a) Immediate payment on demand.- The officer shall enforce
an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the
judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment
obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the
judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to
the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper
receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized
representative if present at the time of payment.
xxx
(b) Satisfaction by levy. – If the judgment obligor cannot pay all
or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of
every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of
for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the
latter the option to immediately choose which property or part
thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If
the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer
shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on
the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment.
xxx
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. – The officer may levy on
debts due the judgment obligor and other credits, including
bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and
other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the
possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by
serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in
his possession or control such credits to which the judgment
obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such
amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under this rule, the duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first make a
demand from the obligor for the immediate payment of the full
amount stated in the writ of execution and of all lawful fees; (2)
to receive payment in the form of cash, certified bank check
payable to the obligee, or any other form of payment
acceptable to the latter; (3) to levy upon the properties of the
obligor, not exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all
or part of the obligation; (4) give the obligor the opportunity to
exercise the option to choose which property may be levied
upon; (5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the
personal properties of the obligor, including the garnishment of
debts due the obligor and other credits, i.e., bank deposits,
financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal
properties not capable of manual delivery or in the possession
or control of third parties; and (6) to levy on real properties if
the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.11
From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the sheriff shall
demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment in
cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor
cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can
exercise his option to choose which of his property can be
levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or
when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right,
and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any,
and then the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment.12 In this case, BOC
exercised its option, although belatedly, by offering a parcel of
land located in Paranaque City. The Court notes that a second
petition for certiorari questioning the subject writ of execution
was filed by BOC with the CA on November 8, 2010.13 The
said petition was dismissed in the CA Resolution promulgated
on November 26, 2010. On December 9, 2010, BOC filed its
motion for reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration or on December 17, 2010, the notice of levy
was served with BOC at its Lipa City Branch. BOC offered
under protest its real property in Paranaque City to settle the
judgment sum. The motion for reconsideration was, however,
denied by the CA on February 9, 2011.14
Yet, Reyes ignored BOC’s option to surrender the said
property.1âwphi1 He insisted and pursued to levy on cash and
other personal properties of the BOC despite the said offer.
Such act indeed constituted a clear violation of the Rules.
Even on the assumption that BOC waived its right to exercise
the option by belatedly offering its real estate property as
satisfaction for its obligation, still, it would not exonerate Reyes
from liability.
Considering that BOC’s offer was not exercised immediately as
strictly required by the prescribed procedure under the Rules,
Reyes was confronted with a crucial issue that should have
been threshed out. The nature of his function as sheriff being
ministerial, he had no discretion or authority to decide the legal
question involved. As aptly ruled by the OCA, Reyes was duty-
bound to seek clarification from the judge who issued the writ
to determine whether the offer was acceptable under the
circumstances. Instead of consulting Judge Cabochan who
was in the best position to resolve the matter, Reyes acted on
his own and rejected the offer outright.
As an officer of the court, he should have known the proper
action to take when questions relating to the writ require
clarification.15 Regrettably, he failed in this regard.
Reyes’ claim that he did not act arbitrarily in serving the writ
believing that his act was correct and in accordance with law
cannot be a valid defense. It is of no moment whether he
executed the writ in good faith because he is chargeable with
the knowledge on what is the proper action to observe in case
44
there are questions in the writ which need to be clarified and to
which he is bound to comply.16
Reyes also admitted having blow-torched the cash vault and
taken the cash as well as the computers of BOC’s Lipa City
branch, but the Court rejects his explanation that he was
constrained to use such force to get the cash inside the vault,
for him not to be accused of being remiss in his duty.
Clearly, there was no legitimate reason for him to resort to a
drastic act of using acetylene torch on the iron grills in order to
have access to the bank’s main vault. He was even escorted
by the Regional Director of the NBI with his agents carrying
high-powered firearms which served no apparent purpose but
to cause fear and terror among the bank employees and the
clients. Indubitably, such use of force and influence in the
enforcement of the writ was totally unnecessary.
Moreover, Reyes’ act of taking the bank’s computers cannot be
justified. As held in Equitable PCI Bank v. Bellones, 17 the
sheriff can not arbitrarily levy on property essential to the work
or business of the judgment obligor. He should have heeded
the repeated pleas of BOC’s officers to spare the computers so
as not to hamper its banking operations.
It is observed, however, that Reyes’ act of rejecting BOC’s
offer cannot be considered as one brought about by his
ignorance of the law, but is apparently due to his
overzealousness in implementing the alias writ of execution.
The Court, thus, agrees with the OCA that Reyes’ actuation
only amounted to grave abuse of authority.
101.) CONRADO B. NICART VS.. MA. JOSEFINA C. TITONG
AND JOSELITO M. ABRUGAR, SR
G.R. No. 207682, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of
Eastern Samar Ben P. Evardone (Evardone) issued ninety-
three (93) appointments between May 11, 2010 and June 29,
2010, including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong
(Titong) and JoselitoAbrugar, Sr. (Abrugar), which
appointments were later confirmed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Consequently, the appointees immediately
assumed their respective positions.
Upon submission, however,of the appointments to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VIII,
all 93 appointments were disapproved for having been made in
violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16,
series of 2007.
Evardone appealed the disapproval but it was dismissed for
non-payment of the requisite filing fee and the appointments
having been issued in violation of said circular. Respondents,
for their part, individually moved for reconsideration of the
disapproval of their respective appointments but later withdrew
their motions via an Omnibus Joint Motion and separately
converted the same to an Appeal by means of a petition for
review with the CSC proper.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 2010, Titong and Abrugar requested
the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of their
first salary which was denied by the Commission on Audit
(COA) Provincial Office and by petitioner, who at that time was
already the incumbent Governor.
Acting on the appeal, the CSC rendered Decision No. 10-02422
dated December 13, 2010, granting the petition, modifying the
CSCRO’s ruling, and declaring the appointment of Titong and
Abrugar valid on the ground that the two are qualified for the
positions to which they were appointed.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said Decision, but it
wasdenied by the CSC
Undaunted, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)a
petition for review.
Pending resolution thereof by the CA, the CSC, upon
respondents’ motion, issued a writ of execution under CSC
Resolution No. 1101319 dated October 6, 2011, ordering
petitioner and the Provincial Government to pay the salaries
and other emoluments due to respondents from the time of
their assumption of office on June 21, 2010 up to the present.
n view of petitioner’s continued refusal to pay their salaries,
among others, despite the service of the writ of executionupon
him and with CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 still pending resolution,
respondents filed before the RTC a Petition for Mandamus with
Unspecified Damagesagainst herein petitioner, the Vice
Governor, and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan,docketed as in Civil Case No. 4236.5 In it, they
prayed that therein respondents be directed to: (a) pay Titong
and Abrugar their salaries and other emoluments or benefits
due them from their assumption of office on June 21, 2010 up
to the present; (b) incorporate their salaries in the annual
budget of the Province; (c) pay herein respondents damages
and attorney’s fees; and (d) recognize their appointments as
valid, among others.6
Respondents, in their Comment, maintain that the petition
should be dismissed on any of the following grounds, viz: (a)
mandamus is not the proper remedy; (b) litis pendentia, since
there is another action pending between the same parties and
for the same cause of action; (c) wilful and deliberate act of
forum shopping is punishable by summary dismissal of the
actions filed; and (d) the action is already moot and academic
as regards petitioner’s co-respondents thereat since they are
being compelled to do an act that has already been done.
CA granted the petition.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from this Court via a
Rule 45 Petition. However, on February 27, 2013, SC denied
the petition for review of the CA Decision, ruling that there is no
reversible error in the challenged decision to warrant the
exercise of the Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction,
thereby affirming the CA’s finding that respondents’
appointments are invalid.
RTC ruled in favor of Titong and Abrugar as it grant the petition
for Mandamus.
According to the RTC, the non-issuance by the CA of a
restraining order or injunction restraining it from proceeding
with Civil Case No. 4236, coupled with respondents’ filing of a
Rule 45 petition before this Court (G.R. No. 203835) thereby
staying the Decision of the CA which reversed the ruling of the
CSC and declared respondents’ appointment as invalid, results
in the continued effectivity of the CSC Decision in respondents’
favor.13Furthermore, the RTC held that this is consistent with
Section 82 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
Civil Service (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999;
CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999), which
states that “[t]he filing and pendency of a petition for review
with the [CA] or certiorari with the [SC] shall not stop the
execution of the final decision of the Commission, unless the
Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.” 14
Their motion for reconsideration15 having been denied,16
petitioner now seeks recourse from this Court.
On February 10, 2014, SC issued a Resolution affirming
February 27, 2013 Resolution where it upheld the finding of the
CA that the appointments of herein respondents are invalid,
thereby resolving with finality G.R. No. 203835 and writing finis
to the question on the status of their appointment
ISSUE.
45
Whether or not the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC
upholding the legality of respondents’ appointment remains to
be proper considering SC affirmation of the invalidity thereof in
SC Resolutions of February 27, 2013 and February 10, 2014.
RULING:
NO. The SC already ruled that such appointments were
already invalid and therefore the petition for mandamus will be
rendered moot and academic as it is grounded upon the
validity or invalidity of the appointments.
Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or
restraining order would make the CSC Resolution executory
pending appeal per Section 82 of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 19, s. 1999, making it a proper subject of a petition for
mandamus. However, what the RTC failed to take into account
is the fact that the propriety of the very directives under the writ
of mandamus sought is wholly reliant on the CA’s resolution of
CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 and that judicial courtesy dictates that
it suspend its proceedings and await the CA’s resolution of the
petition for review.
When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well
aware of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 the subject
of which is the reversal and setting aside of the CSC’s
affirmation of respondents’ appointments, embodied in the very
Resolution which respondents seek to be enforced in the
petition for mandamus. Nevertheless, the trial court, implying
that the petition for review pending before the CA will not, in
any way, affect or be affected by the petition for mandamus,
held that “such review of the [CA] deals primarily with the
validity or invalidity of the alleged midnight appointments
xxx,”19 as opposed to the petition before it which only seeks the
enforcement of the CSC’s Resolution.It then went on to state
that “the ground relied upon by [petitioner] is the mere fact that
[respondents’] appointments were allegedly a ‘midnight
appointments’ (sic) which the [CSC], however, ruled out to be
devoid with (sic) merit. The prohibition under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution, it must be noted, applies only to
presidential appointments, but not to local appointments, like in
this case. This is true even if the grounds relied [upon] by
[petitioner] are with respect to CSC Circulars and/or
Memorandum, Resolutions, Laws, Rules, and Regulations
relative to the civil service.”
Furthermore, the trial court held that it is an accepted principle
that “quasi-judicial bodies like the Civil Service Commission
are better-equipped in handling cases involving the
employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service
since it is within the field of their expertise” 21 and that “the
appointments of [respondents] having been accepted by them
and in fact assumed office[,] shall remain in force and in effect
until disapproved by the [CSC], the only office who has the
authority to recall such appointments by [respondents].” 22
To cap it all off, the trial court issued the writ of mandamus and
directed petitioner, among others, to immediately pay
respondents’ salaries, emoluments, and other benefits due
them by virtue of the positions to which they were appointed to,
and to recognize the validity of their appointments, among
others.
In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there
are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial
courtesy.23 Unfortunately, the RTC did not find the said
principle applicable in Civil Case No. 4236 as it disregarded
the fact that there is an intimate correlation between the two
proceedings––though technically no prejudicial question exists
as it properly pertains to civil and criminal cases. 24
To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily
relies on the validity or invalidity of the appointments which
issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo incorrectly
concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without
erroneously disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy.
What is more, the RTC went beyond the issues of the case
when it affirmed the validity of respondents’ appointments,
considering that the only issue presented before it is the
propriety of executing CSC Resolution No. 1100653 through a
writ of mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
119975.25 By making said findings, conclusions, and directives,
the RTC, in effect, affirmed the CSC’s finding that the disputed
appointments were valid, pre-empted the CA’s Resolution of
the appeal, and made its own determination thereon, despite
the non-presentation of said question before it and the
pendency thereof before the CA. And all of this was made
under the pretext of enforcing CSC Resolution No. 1100653
via a writ of mandamus.
Nevertheless, enforcementof the disputed CSC Resolution is
no longer proper and necessary in light of Our Resolutions
dated February 27, 2013 and February 10, 2014, affirming the
CA’s ruling that respondents’ appointments were not valid,
making the issue on the propriety of enforcing the CSC
Resolution pending appeal, moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.26 Whatever judgment is reached, the
same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, can no longer be enforced. 27
Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of
two minute resolutions––one denying the petition, and the
second denying reconsideration thereof––thereby affirming
CA’s finding against the validity of respondents appointments
and effectively reversing the RTC’s affirmation of the CSC’s
findings. It is well to note that although contained in a minute
resolution, Our dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 203835
was definitely a disposition of the merits of the case and
constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues raised there
under the doctrine of res judicata. When we dismissed the
petition and denied reconsideration thereof, we effectively
affirmed the CA ruling being questioned
Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents’ were
validly appointed or not, the mandamus now has no basis upon
which its issuance can be anchored under the principle of res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
102.) EDMUND SIA, VS. WILFREDO ARCENAS,
FERNANDO LOPEZ, AND PABLO RAFANAN
G.R. Nos. 209672-74, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Due to the real property tax delinquencies of Panay Railways,
Incorporated (PRI) over the subject lots covering the years
1992 to 1996, the City Treasurer of Roxas City (City Treasurer)
auctioned the subject lots, with petitioner as the highest
bidder.6 Consequently, on December 20, 1996, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in petitioner’s favor.7 This notwithstanding,
petitioner was not able to take possession thereof in view of
the refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale
despite the lapse of the one-year redemption period. Worse,
then-Mayor Juliano Alba (Mayor Alba) of Roxas City issued
Executive Order No. (EO) 08-97, nullifying the auction sale.8
Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a Petition 9 for the
annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus, and damages on
February 4, 1998 against the City Treasurer, Mayor Alba, the
members of the City Council of Roxas City, the Roxas City
Government, and the PRI before the RTC of Roxas City,
Branch 17 (RTC Br. 17), docketed as SCA No. V-7075,
ultimately seeking that a Final Bill of Sale over the subject lots
be issued to him.
RTC Br. 17 ruled in petitioner’s favor, and accordingly ordered
the City Treasurer to issue the Final Bill of Sale as prayed for. 12
PRI appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Br. 17’s ruling
in toto.13 Dissatisfied, PRI appealed to the Court,14 which was
denied outright for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period and for failure to pay the docket and other
46
fees on time. On October 23, 2007, the Court’s ruling became
final and executory.
Petitioner moved for execution16 before the RTC Br. 15 and
was granted the corresponding writ.
the City Treasurer refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale,
positing that petitioner still had to settle the delinquent real
property taxes over the subject lots in the amount of
P2,394,526.44 which accrued during the pendency of the
case.1
Instead of paying said delinquent taxes, petitioner filed a
Motion for Order Divesting Panay Railway, [Inc. of] Title and
Vesting Title to Plaintiff Edmund Sia19 dated March 31, 2008.
Finding the motion to be meritorious, the RTC Br. 15 issued an
Order20 dated June 10, 2008 granting petitioner’s motion, and
likewise holding that petitioner cannot be held liable for any
real property tax prior to the issuance of a Final Bill of Sale.
petitioner moved for the delivery of the possession 22 of the
subject lots as they were already being occupied by third
parties, including herein respondents Wilfredo Arcenas,
Fernando Lopez, and Pablo Rafanan (respondents). Thus, a
Writ of Possession23 dated June 19, 2009, and eventually, a
Writ of Demolition24 dated August 28, 2009 were issued in
petitioner’s favor.
Respondents, who, at that time, were occupying the subject
lots as lessees of PRI, moved for the quashal of the
abovementioned writs.
They posited that the execution of a final judgment in a
mandamus case is similar to the execution of special
judgments as provided in Section 11, Rule 39 in relation to
Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RTC Br. 15 denied respondents’ motion to quash. It held that
the proceedings for tax delinquency sale at a public auction
takes the nature of, or is akin to, an extrajudicial foreclosure,
thus necessitating the issuance of the corresponding writs of
possession and demolition. In this relation, it agreed with
petitioner’s posture that his entitlement to the aforesaid writs
arose from the ruling in SCA No. V-7075, as well as the orders
directing the issuance of the Final Bill of Sale, thereby vesting
unto petitioner title over the subject lots.
RTC denied MR.
CA set aside RTC Br. 15’s June 19, 2009 Writ of Possession 35
and August 28, 2009 Writ of Demolition,36 and directed the said
court to enforce with dispatch the Writ of Execution dated
February 28, 2008 in accordance with Section 11, Rule 39 in
relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
whether or not the CA correctly declared the writs of
possession and demolition null and void, and accordingly
directed the RTC Br. 15 to enforce the Writ of Execution dated
February 28, 2008 in accordance with Section 11, Rule 39 in
relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
YES. The CA correctly ruled that the Writ of Possession dated
June 19, 2009 and the Writ of Demolition dated August 28,
2009 issued in this case are null and void for having been
rendered beyond the authority of RTC Br. 15 in enforcing the
judgment in SCA No. V-7075. The judgment in SCA No. V-
7075 sought to be enforced in the case at bar only declared
valid the auction sale where petitioner bought the subject lots,
and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill
of Sale to petitioner. Since the said judgment did not order that
the possession of the subject lots be vested unto petitioner, the
RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid
judgment – and thus, exceeded its authority in enforcing the
same – when it issued the corresponding writs of possession
and demolition to vest unto petitioner the possession of the
subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution
of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may
not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce.58 Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity. 59
Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or
reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and
demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil
action for mandamus, as in this case.
As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a “command
issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the
writ is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.”46chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 primarily
compels the City Treasurer to issue the Final Bill of Sale
covering the subject lots in favor of petitioner pursuant to
Section 262 of the LGC, a ministerial duty, which said officer
unduly refused to perform. Thus, it may be properly deemed as
a judgment ordering the issuance of a writ of mandamus
against the City Treasurer.
Given that the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 ordered the
issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the performance of
a ministerial duty, and not the payment of money or the sale or
delivery of real or personal property, the same is in the nature
of a special judgment47 – that is which a judgment directs the
performance of a specific act requiring the party or person to
personally do because of his personal qualifications and
circumstances.48 As such, execution of the said judgment
should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 11. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment
requires the performance of any act other than those
mentioned in [Sections 9 and 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court], a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the
writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the
party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other
person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and
such party or person may be punished for contempt if he
disobeys such judgment.
This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement
of orders or judgments concerning, among others, the special
civil action of mandamus under Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. – A
certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the
last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and
disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An
execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
The rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special
judgment, such as a favorable judgment in mandamus – as in
this case – should be deemed to be limited to directing
47
compliance with the judgment, and in case of disobedience, to
have the disobedient person required by law to obey such
judgment punished with contempt.

In this case, it is undisputed that the City Treasurer obstinately

refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale in petitioner’s favor,
despite the finality of the judgment in SCA No. V-7075, as well
as the issuance and service of the Writ of Execution dated
February 28, 2008 commanding him to do so. In view of such
refusal, the RTC Br. 15 should have cited the City Treasurer in
contempt in order to enforce obedience to the said judgment. 49
However, instead of simply doing so, it granted petitioner’s
numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the issuance of
a writ of possession.

A writ of possession is defined as a “writ of execution

employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of
land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment.”50 It may
be issued under the following instances: (a) land registration
proceedings under Section 1751 of Act No. 496,52 otherwise
known as “The Land Registration Act;” (b) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 753 of Act No. 3135,54 as amended by
Act No. 4118;55 and (d) in execution sales.56 Proceeding
therefrom, the issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in
order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific
properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule
39,57 of the Rules of Court.

48