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Thematic

Belief
By Jackson, Frank Braddon-Mitchell, David

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V006-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 22, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-1

Article Summary
We believe that there is co ee over there; we believe the special theory of relativity; we
believe the Vice-Chancellor; and some of us believe in God. But plausibly what is
fundamental is believing that something is the case – believing a proposition, as it is usually
put. To believe a theory is to believe the propositions that make up the theory, to believe a
person is to believe some proposition advanced by them; and to believe in God is to believe
the proposition that God exists. Thus belief is said to be a propositional attitude or
intentional state: to believe is to take the attitude of belief to some proposition. It is about
what its propositional object is about (God, co ee, or whatever). We can think of the
propositional object of a belief as the way the belief represents things as being – its content,
as it is often called.

We state what we believe with indicative sentences in ‘that’-clauses, as in ‘Mary believes that
the Democrats will win the next election’. But belief in the absence of language is possible. A
dog may believe that there is food in the bowl in front of it. Accordingly philosophers have
sought accounts of belief that allow a central role to sentences – it cannot be an accident
that nding the right sentence is the way to capture what someone believes – while allowing
that creatures without a language can have beliefs. One way of doing this is to construe
beliefs as relations to inner sentences somehow inscribed in the brain. On this view although
dogs do not have a public language, to the extent that they have beliefs they have something
sentence-like in their heads.

An alternative tradition focuses on the way belief when combined with desire leads to
behaviour, and analyses belief in terms of behavioural dispositions or more recently as the
internal state that is, in combination with other mental states, responsible for the
appropriate behavioural dispositions.

An earlier tradition associated with the British Empiricists views belief as a kind of pale
imitation of perceptual experience. But recent work on belief largely takes for granted a
sharp distinction between belief and the various mental images that may or may not
accompany it.
Citing this article:
Jackson, Frank and David Braddon-Mitchell. Belief, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V006-
1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-1.
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