Kurram Agency and the U.S.

and Pakistan's Divergent Interests

November 2, 2010 | 1214 GMT

Summary

Two of prominent militant leader Jalauddin Haqqani’s sons have been meeting with tribal
elders from Kurram agency in Peshawar and Islamabad in a bid to end Sunni-Shiite
violence in northwestern Pakistan’s Kurram agency. Many outside parties have an interest
in what happens in the strategic region, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan
Taliban, Islamabad and Washington. While having the Haqqanis negotiate a settlement may
be a boon to Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban, it will create challenges for the Pakistani
Taliban and Washington.

Analysis

Media reports have emerged that two of important Taliban leader Jalauddin Haqqani’s sons,
Khalil and Ibrahim, are involved in peace talks in Pakistan’s tribal belt between Sunni and
Shiite leaders from Kurram agency. The talks, which have been held in Peshawar and
Islamabad, represent an attempt to settle the long-running sectarian dispute in Kurram
agency.

This dispute has expanded beyond localized sectarian violence into one with much further-
reaching consequences involving the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The implications of the
wider struggle encapsulate divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests in the wider region.

A Strategic Area

Kurram agency is one of seven districts in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). With an area of 3,380 square kilometers (about 1,300 square miles), it is the third-
largest agency of the FATA after South and North Waziristan. The only area in the tribal
badlands with a significant Shiite population, Kurram has a long history of sectarian
violence predating the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

The area became the main staging ground for joint U.S.-Saudi-Pakistani intelligence aid for
the multinational force of Islamist insurgents battling Soviet forces and the pro-Moscow
regime in Kabul during the 1980s, during which time Kurram’s capital, Parachinar,
frequently came under attack by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. The influx of predominantly
Sunni Afghan and other Islamist fighters altered the sectarian demographic balance to some
extent. The Shia bitterly resisted, but Islamabad’s support of Sunni locals overcame their efforts.

Kurram saw its most intense sectarian clashes only after the rise of the Pakistani Taliban
phenomenon in 2006-07, however. The agency saw two weeks of violence in April 2007 as
sectarian attacks spiraled out of control after a gunman opened fire on a Shiite procession in
Parachinar. The violence spread all the way southeast to Sadda before the Pakistani military
went in to restore order. Despite a peace agreement between the two sides that officially
ended the conflict in October 2008, antagonism between the communities continued to
simmer. Violence comes mostly in the form of tit-for-tat small-arms attacks carried out by
tribal militias on their Sunni or Shiite neighbors.

Tribal and geographic differences reinforce the sectarian conflict. The Shia break down into
three major tribes, the Turi, Bangash and Hazara. Meanwhile, eight major Sunni tribes
populate most of central and lower Kurram. Sunni and Shia live in close proximity to each
other throughout Kurram, which has a population of around 500,000 consisting of roughly
58 percent Sunni and 42 percent Shia.

The Sunnis’ main advantage lies in control of lower Kurram. They have exploited this to
close off the only major road from Parachinar, which lies on the edge of the mountains of
Upper Kurram, to Thal in lower Kurram — where connections to larger markets of
Peshawar and Karachi can be made. Without access to this highway, supplies have become
scarce in upper Kurram.

The Shia’s main advantage is control of a strategic piece of high ground that forms a
peninsula of Pakistani territory jutting into Afghanistan, territory that has shifted over the
centuries between Mughal, Afghan, British and Pakistani control. Upper Kurram provides
powers from the east easy access to Kabul, which lies just under 100 kilometers (about 60
miles) from the border between Kurram agency and Paktia province, Afghanistan. This
geographic advantage is why the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate
decided on it as the location for training and deploying Mujahideen fighters into
Afghanistan to fight the Soviets during the 1980s. It is thus key territory for anyone who
wants access into eastern Afghanistan — Islamabad and the Taliban included.

The sectarian violence simmering in Kurram complicates Islamabad’s efforts to defeat the
Pakistani Taliban while maintaining ties with the Afghan Taliban. The violence has become
a more serious threat to Islamabad’s efforts in recent years, as outside forces reportedly
have begun to exploit the sectarian violence. Sunni leaders in Kurram have blamed Iran for
supplying weapons and cash to their Shiite rivals. While there is little evidence to back up
this claim, it would make sense that Iran would want to establish a bridgehead in the Shiite
population allowing it to operate in eastern Afghanistan.

The Sunni Militant Landscape in Kurram and the Afghan Angle

Well-known Pakistani jihadist Baitullah Mehsud used the base of the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai to expand TTP influence in Kurram. Following Baitullah’s
death, Mullah Toofan (aka Maulana Noor Jamal) emerged as the main TTP leader in the
central rim of the FATA. Mullah Toofan now leads efforts targeting Kurram from Orakzai,
which has become the main TTP hub since the Pakistani army evicted the group from South
Waziristan in a late 2009-early 2010 ground offensive. Many militants subsequently
resettled in Kurram.

The TTP formed alliances with the Sunni tribes in Kurram in its bid to establish a sanctuary
there. The TTP later began using the sanctuary provided by allied Sunni tribes in Kurram in
coordination with Orakzai and South Waziristan to conduct attacks in the core of Pakistan.

For their part, the Haqqanis want a more stable environment in Kurram. Kurram is a key
piece of territory for the Haqqani network, which organizes and has sanctuaries in
Pakistan’s northwest from which it engages U.S., NATO and Afghan government military
forces in eastern Afghanistan as part of the Afghan Taliban’s eastern front.

Islamabad is very open to cooperation with the Haqqanis. They pose no direct threat to
Islamabad but have the military and political clout to shape conditions on the ground in
northwestern Pakistan — to say nothing of Afghanistan, where Pakistan is trying to rebuild
its influence. The Haqqanis are best positioned to convince Sunnis in lower Kurram to open
up the road to Parachinar and to restrain Shiite forces from attacking Sunnis (and vice
versa). The easing of sectarian tensions, likely if this happens, would hamper the TTP’s
ability to grow in Kurram, satisfying Islamabad’s goal in the agency.

If the Haqqanis can successfully negotiate a peace in Kurram (or at least a cease-fire —
Kurram’s geopolitical and sectarian rivalries will not simply vanish) it would give them a
stronger foothold in an area close to Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. This arrangement
would not bode well for security in eastern Afghanistan, where U.S. and coalition forces are
concentrating much of their efforts in their current offensive against the Taliban and al
Qaeda.

This would come at a bad time for Washington, which is looking to contain the Afghan
Taliban as it seeks to bolster the U.S. negotiating position ahead of eventual talks regarding
a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Kurram sectarian conflict is also the most prominent example of Islamabad trying to
eliminate “bad” Taliban while supporting “good” Taliban. Preventing sectarian violence in
Kurram from spiraling out of control and benefiting the TTP requires that Islamabad seek
the services of the Haqqanis. This also will help Pakistan’s longer-term efforts to re-
establish its influence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces. Kurram thus
encapsulates the larger challenges Washington faces in containing a militant movement that
enjoys Islamabad’s tacit support.

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