RULE 40: APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURTS TO THE
as the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Silverio, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
600 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009
QUICK SUMMARY: Beatriz Silverio died and her son Silverio
Jr. filed for a petition to remove Silverio Sr. as the administrator
of the estate. RTC granted the petition and designated Silverio
junior as administrator. An MR was filed by Nelia Silverio.
Silverio Jr. further filed a petition to prohibit the occupation of
the property which was granted also. RTC issued on MAY 31,
2005 an OMNIBUS MOTION denying MR of Nelia. Nelia filed
an MR on the Omnibus motion. On DEC. 12, 2005 RTC
reinstated Silverio SR. as administrator. Silverio Jr filed an MR
but was denied. RTC allowed the sale of properties of the late
Beatriz Silverio including the lot in Forbes Park. Nelia filed an
appeal on the decision of the RTC of DEC 12, 2005. Silverio
Jr. filed a MTD on her appeal stating that it was filed beyond
the reglementary period. (Rule 41, sec.3). RTC denied Nelia’s
appeal. RTC moved for execution of the May 31 decision.
Respondent filed TRO in CA which was granted. SC ruled in
favor of PETITIONER stating the appeal of Nelia was
IMPROPER.
FACTS:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate
of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving
spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of her estate.
During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator
of the subject estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a
comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C.
RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate
Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming
its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private
respondent's motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order,
the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt
of the... order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator
of the subject estate.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
June 15, 2005 of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by
the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was
received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 also
recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with
letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz
Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr.
administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC.
In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various
properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other
charges due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be
sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City.
Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal the Order dated
December 12, 2005.
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution against the appeal of Nelia
Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed
ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it
was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC
further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to
vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia,
Forbes Park, Makati City.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) with the CA. CA issued the assailed Resolution
granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the
TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within
the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court
applying the “fresh rule period” enunciated by this Court in
Neypes v. CA.
Afterwards, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the
petition of private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005
(Annex “G” of Annex “C”) and the Order dated December 12,
2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal
under Sec. 1 of Rule 41
HELD: YES. An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final
order, was defined in Tan v. Republic (523 SCRA 203 [2007]):
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is
one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in
the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory
order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately
from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to
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vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not
a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution
of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It
must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each
heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate,
such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. In
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 526 (1998), we
succinctly ruled: Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that
where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs,
subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a
co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which
is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use
and enjoyment of the same. Although the right of an heir over
the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-
owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal
by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing
the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been
dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of
appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the
instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost
her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
McBurnie vs. Ganzon, 600 SCRA 658
G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 . September 18, 2009.
Quick Summary: Mcburnie filed for complaint for illegal
dismissal against Ganzon. LA ruled in favor of Mcburnie and
awarded damages of almost 60million pesos. Ganzon
appealed in NLRC and filed a motion to reduce bond, they paid
100,000 as appeal bond. NLRC denied their motion and
ordered them to post bond of 54 million. Their MR was denied.
They appealed to CA. Ca ruled in their favor and reduced the
bond to 10 million. Mcburnie sought for Reconsideration.
SC ruled in favor of McBurnie stating that the failure to post the
required bond in NLRC was fatal to Ganzon’s appeal.
FACTS: McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims
against the Ganzon. McBurnie claimed that he signed a five-
year employment agreement with the company EGI as an
Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management
of the company’s hotels and resorts within the Philippines. He
performed work for the company until sometime in November
1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him to go
back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries. While in
Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his
services were no longer needed because their intended project
would no longer push through.
The respondents opposed the complaint. Ganzon stated that it
did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship,
and the execution of the employment contract that was being
invoked by McBurnie was solely for the purpose of allowing
McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines. At
the time McBurnie left for Australia for his medical treatment,
he had not yet obtained a work permit.
The LA declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed
from employment, Feeling aggrieved, the respondents
appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. They filed their
Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and
posted an appeal bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00. The
respondents contended in their Motion to Reduce Bond, inter
alia, that the monetary awards of the LA were null and
excessive (60 million pesos), allegedly with the intention of
rendering them incapable of posting the necessary appeal
bond.
The NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond, explaining that
"in cases involving monetary award, an employer seeking to
appeal the [LA’s] decision to the Commission is unconditionally
required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award x x x." Thus, the NLRC
required from the respondents the posting of an additional
bond in the amount of ₱54,083,910.00.
Motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents
decided to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Extremely
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order)
In the meantime, in view of the respondents’ failure to post the
required additional bond, the NLRC dismissed their appeal
.The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied. This
prompted the respondents to file with the CA the Petition for
Certiorari (With Urgent Prayers for the Immediate Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)
CA issued a Resolution granting the respondents’ application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It directed the NLRC,
McBurnie, and all persons acting for and under their authority
to refrain from causing the execution and enforcement of the
LA’s decision in favor of McBurnie, conditioned upon the
respondents’ posting of a bond in the amount of
₱10,000,000.00. McBurnie sought reconsideration of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, but this was
denied by the CA in its Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether failure to post a bond equivalent to the
amount of the monetary award is fatal to an appeal.
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HELD: YES, The failure of the respondents to comply with the
requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the
monetary award is fatal to their appeal. For filing their motion
only on the final day within which to perfect an appeal,
respondents cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal
application of the rules. Under such circumstance, there is
neither way for the NLRC to exercise its discretion to grant or
deny the motion, nor for the respondents to post the full
amount of the bond, without risk of summary dismissal for non-
perfection of appeal.
While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper
cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances, but none obtains in this case. The NLRC had,
therefore, the full discretion to grant or deny their motion to
reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the labor
tribunal that respondents did not present sufficient justification
for the reduction thereof cannot be said to have been done
with grave abuse of discretion.
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not
a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence,
parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the
statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting
an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a
losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the propriety of
the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding
upon this Court, much more with the Court of Appeals.
Francisco vs. Permskul
173 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989
Quick Summary: Petitioner leased his property to private
respondent. Private respondent advanced payments(deposits).
When he vacated the property before expiration of the lease he
wanted to refund some of the deposits (unused). Petitioner
rejected such request because he said respondent still owed
him for other chargers (electricity, water and repainting). MTC
ruled in favor of respondent. The decision was appealed in
RTC, however only a memorandum decision was made in
favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to CA stating that the
memorandum agreement is unconstitutional. SC ruled in favor
of the respondent and the validity of the memorandum
decision.
FACTS: Petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated
rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract,
the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount
of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to
the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear
and tear.
Private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter
requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of
P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of
his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner
rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for
other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the
sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to
restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati. A summary judgment was rendered sustaining the
complainant and holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. This decision was appealed to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed .This was done in a
memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of
the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition
for review was denied. He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum
decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it
violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether a memorandum decision is valid.
HELD : YES. The Court has deliberated extensively on the
challenge posed against the memorandum decision as now
authorized by law. Taking into account the salutary purpose for
which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed
restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us,
we have come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down
the following requirement, as a condition for the proper
application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum
decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to
be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and
the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum
decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become
an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
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condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be
resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge
and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations
only, such as ordinarily collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time
needed to dismiss it.
Casolita, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
275 SCRA 257, G.R. No. 115703 July 8, 1997
QUICK SUMMARY: ATROP filed for recovery of possession of
a land in Intramuros which was claimed by Casolita and
several other petitioner. The lower court ruled in favor of
ATROP. Atty Aguilar lawyer of Casolita received notice of
decision but failed to file an appeal, Atty gatpatan, filed an
appeal. ATROP filed motion to dismiss the appeal which was
granted. Atty Baylon filed an MR for all the defendants. ATROP
questioned this because as to Casolita the case has been final
and executory. Casolita et. al countered that they did not
receive a notice of appeal. SC Ruled in favor ATROP.
FACTS: Private respondent ATROP, INC filed a complaint
against herein petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, for recovery of possession of a parcel of land located in
Intramuros, Manila.
Petitioner Casolita through his counsel, Atty. Jose L. Aguilar,
alleged that he and his family had been in continuous
possession of the land since 1953, having been designated as
caretaker by the supposed “real owners” Ramon LeQuina and
Portia Pueo. The other petitioners, represented by Atty. Benito
Gatpatan, Jr. filed their answer unequivocally adopting and
incorporating the allegations of Casolita in his answer to the
complaint.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of ATROP, INC.,
ordering the defendants to vacate the premises, to remove the
structures they built, and to pay compensation for the use of
the land, attorney’s fees and costs. Atty. Aguilar received a
copy of the decision but failed to file a notice of appeal. On the
other hand, Atty. Gatpatan, Jr. filed a notice of appeal.
In its omnibus motion to dismiss the appeal and for the
issuance of a writ of execution, ATROP INC., argued that as
far as petitioner Casolita was concerned, the decision had
become final and executory for his counsel, Atty. Aguilar,
received a copy thereof without filing a notice of appeal. As to
the other petitioners, ATROP, INC., observed that while they
timely filed the notice of appeal the notice was fatally defective
for they did not serve the same to the counsel of ATROP, INC.
The lower court granted the omnibus motion to dismiss and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Atty. Alfredo C. Baylon, Jr. thereafter filed a notice of
appearance as “counsel for all the defendants” and moved for
reconsideration .He contended that petitioners Casolita, et al.,
were not properly notified of the decision since Atty. Aguilar
had withdrawn as counsel “due to poor health”; hence, the
decision had not become final and executory. However Court
denied such MR.
A notice to vacate the premises having been made, the
petitioners through Atty. Baylon filed before respondent Court
of Appeals a petition via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 seeking the annulment
of the Orders of the lower court. Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals “committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction” in
denying their petition for certiorari based on their failure to
furnish private respondent with a copy of the notice of appeal.
Such omission, they insist, was a mere technicality which
should be cast aside to attain substantial justice.
ISSUE: Whether notice to the adverse counsel of the Notice of
Appeal is a mandatory requirement for perfecting an Appeal.
HELD: NO. Under the previous rule, an appeal may be taken
“by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a
notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.”
This provision was amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
particularly Section 39 thereof, by deleting the need to file an
appeal bond and record on appeal, except in multiple appeals
and in special proceedings, and by fixing the period of appeal
to fifteen (15) days. The entire original record of the case
instead is transmitted to the appellate court. Appeals from
final judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are
now taken to public respondent Court of Appeals by
simply filing a notice of appeal. The simplification of the
procedure for elevating to a higher court final judgments or
orders of the lower courts correspondingly underscored the
importance of the notice of appeal. The adverse party may only
be apprised initially of the pendency of an appeal by the notice
of appeal. To deprive him of such notice is tantamount to
depriving him of his right to be informed that the judgment in
his favor is being challenged. This requirement should be
complied with so that he may be afforded the opportunity to
register his opposition to the notice of appeal if he so desires.
And service of the notice of appeal upon him may not be
dispensed with on the basis of the appellant’s whims and
caprices, as in this case.
We hold, however, that respondent court neither
committed an error nor abused its discretion in upholding
the lower court’s denial of Casolita’s motion for
reconsideration, motion to admit appeal and notice of
appeal on the ground that Atty. Baylon was not Casolita’s
counsel of record.
The records show that Atty. Aguilar was petitioner Casolita’s
counsel of record. Even Atty. Gatpatan, Jr. impliedly
recognized his separate representation when he adopted the
allegations in the answer filed for said petitioner by Atty.
Aguilar. That Atty. Aguilar was the counsel of petitioner
Casolita was noted by the lower court in its Order of November
10, 1993. This was buttressed by the fact that Casolita was
furnished a copy of the decision through said counsel of
record. The failure of Atty. Aguilar to file a notice of appeal
binds Casolita which failure the latter can not now disown on
the basis of his bare allegation and self-serving
pronouncement that the former was ill. A client is bound by his
counsel’s mistakes and negligence.
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Casalla vs. People
391 SCRA 344, G.R. No. 138855 October 29, 2002
Quick Summary: Lamberto Casalla was convicted in MTC for
violation of the BP 22. He filed an appeal in RTC but the RTC
denied his appeal. He filed an MR but was also denied
because it lacked a notice of hearing. SC still ruled in favor of
respondent because a notice of hearing is mandatory even in
RTC contrary to the contention of the petitioner.
FACTS: Lamberto Casalla issued two (2) Bank of Commerce
checks in payment of the obligation of his wife, TERESITA
CASALLA, to private respondent MILAGROS SANTOS-
ESTEVANES, in order to avert a court litigation. The two (2)
checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank for
reason of insufficiency of funds.
Private respondent filed two (2) criminal complaints against
petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) in
MTC. It rendered a decision convicting the accused (petitioner
herein) of the crime charged on two (2) counts.
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, it affirmed the judgment of MTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Lower court
denied the motion for reconsideration on account of the
absence of a notice of hearing. Petitioner filed a second motion
for reconsideration.
Private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution .Opposition to the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution was filed by petitioner. The
court a quo denied petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration and granted the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution
Petitioner interposed an appeal via a petition for review with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order. The appellate court promulgated its decision denying the
appeal for lack of merit.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals noted that the petition
before it did not contain a statement of material dates showing
the timeliness of the petition. It also maintained that the petition
was filed out of time, because the motion to reconsider the
decision of the trial court did not contain a notice of hearing.
Hence, being a mere scrap of paper, it did not interrupt the
period for filing the petition before the appellate court, and the
period had lapsed before the petition was filed. It also ruled
that petitioner's second motion was not only a prohibited
pleading but it was also filed out of time. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was denied.
ISSUE: Whether a notice of hearing for an MR is required
when such is filed in RTC
HELD: YES. The requirements laid down in the Rules of Court,
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties
concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of
the motion are mandatory.—We have ruled in a number of
cases that the requirements laid down in the Rules of Court,
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties
concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of
the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they
render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a useless
piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
Under the present rules, the notice of hearing is expressly
made a requirement. In the instant case, it is undisputed
that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with
the Regional trial Court did not contain any notice of
hearing. It was therefore pro forma; hence, it did not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period. This
defect was not cured by the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, which is prohibited under the rules.
Petitioner claims that the requirement of a notice of hearing did
not apply to the motion for reconsideration he filed before the
Regional Trial Court, since it was acting only in its appellate
jurisdiction. This is error, as the Rules of Court apply to all
courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme
Court. Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from
conducting hearings on matters on which the parties need
to be heard, even in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction.
Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals
396 SCRA 377, G.R. No. 140473 January 28, 2003
Quick Summary: Tigle filed an action for unlawful detainer
against Enriquez in MCTC. Tigle stated that she is the owner
of the land and he is merely tolerating Enriquez presence
there. Enriquez countered that the land is owned in common
and still undivided. MCTC ruled in favor of Tigle. Enriquez filed
an appeal in RTC. In RTC Enriquez failed to file a
memorandum as ordered by the court hence its appeal was
dismissed. On appeal with CA, it dismissed the petition. SC
ruled that the MEMORANDUM IS MANDATORY.
FACTS: Respondent Victorina Tigle filed an action for unlawful
detainer against herein petitioner Melba Moncal Enriquez
before the MCTC of Bayawan-Basay, Negros Oriental.
Tigle's complaint, alleged inter alia, she bought a parcel of land
located at Tinego, Bayawan, Negros Oriental from Engracia
Macaraya. Prior to the sale, Enriquez was staying at said lot by
mere tolerance of Macaraya. Enriquez was given an option to
buy said lot but she refused to exercise it. After the sale, Tigle
then made demands on Enriquez to vacate the property, but
Enriquez adamantly refused.
In her Answer with Counterclaim filed before the MCTC,
Enriquez averred that the subject property is owned in
common by the heirs of Felix Moncal and any sale by
Macaraya (one of the heirs of Felix Moncal) could only refer to
Macaraya's undivided 1/7 share of the lot. Since said 1/7 share
of Macaraya is still unidentified, the same cannot be a subject
of ejectment
MCTC of Bayawan-Basay rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and ordered defendant MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ
to immediately vacate the premises of the parcel of land
mentioned
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Enriquez seasonably appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City.
RTC directed respective counsel for the parties to "submit
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order their
respective memoranda and/or briefs." The RTC stated that
upon expiration of the period to submit memoranda, it "shall
decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings in the court of origin and/or such brief(s) as may
have been filed."
The counsel for Enriquez failed to comply with the order to
submit a memorandum. RTC issued the following order: For
failure of defendant-appellant to file and submit a
memorandum within the reglementary period as required by
Rule 40, Section 7 (b), her appeal is dismissed.
Enriquez then moved for reconsideration, manifesting that she
was adopting her position paper in the MCTC as her
memorandum.RTC denied Enriquez's motion on the ground
that "the records does (sic) not show of such manifestation."
Enriquez then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. CA
dismissed the petition. The appellate court held that "under
Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the
filing of a memorandum) is a mandatory obligation on the part
of the appellant, such that, the failure to do so warrants a
concomitant dismissal of the appeal."
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the memorandum of appeal is
mandatory.
HELD: YES. Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, “it shall be
the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum” and failure
to do so “shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.” The
use of the word “shall” in a statute or rule expresses what is
mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Rule imposes upon
an appellant the “duty” to submit his memorandum. A duty is a
“legal or moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility,
charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission, debt,
liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and)
engagement.” Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule,
the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on
appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his
part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said
duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules.
This the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her
memorandum of appeal in Civil Case No. 12044 as required by
Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That
she lost her case is not the trial court’s fault but her own.
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
595 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 165697 August 4, 2009
Quick Summary. Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were
married and owned parcels of land which were registered in
the name of Antonio and Belen Navarro. MBTC foreclosed
such lots because it was used by Antonio to secure a loan.
Clarita filed with RTC declaration of nullity of the REM because
she was not informed of such transactions. The case reached
CA and it ruled in favor of MBTC. Clarita again filed a new
case for declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the
properties now in RTC. MBTC moved to dismiss it because
they are mere reiterations. RTC ruled in favor of Clarita. CA on
appeal ruled in favor of MBTC. SC ruled in favor of MBTC
citing the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
FACTS
Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were married.
During their union, they acquired three parcels of land in
Alabang, Muntinlupa City on which they built their home. These
pieces of land were registered in the name of "Antonio N.
Navarro… married to Belen B. Navarro."
Respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC)
had caused the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
which Antonio had earlier constituted on the subject properties
as security for a loan he allegedly obtained from MBTC. In
December of that year, the properties were sold at public
auction where MBTC, as the lone bidder, was issued a
certificate of sale.
Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
Clarita alleged that the properties involved belonged to her and
Antonio’s conjugal partnership property as the same were
acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with the
connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had secured the
registration thereof in their names without her knowledge. She
pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the
properties to MBTC in 1993 likewise without her knowledge.
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground,
inter alia, of laches. With the denial of its motion, MBTC filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals found merit in the petition and ordered the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the same was already barred
by laches, pointing out that it had taken Clarita 11 long years
since the issuance of the TCTs. The decision had attained
finality without a motion for reconsideration being filed or an
appeal being taken therefrom.
Clarita instituted another action also before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City but this time for the declaration of nullity of the
TCTs covering the same properties and for reconveyance and
damages. This constitutes the root of the two petitions at bar.
The said complaint was basically a reiteration of Clarita’s
allegations in the previous case. MBTC moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it was already barred by the prior
judgment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss noting
that the dismissal of previous case did not constitute res
judicata because a dismissal on laches and failure to implead
an indispensable party could never be a dismissal on the
merits. MBTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied.
MBTC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with an application for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, attributing
Page 6 of 64
grave abuse of discretion to the trial court in denying its motion
to dismiss.
In the meantime, a compromise agreement was executed by
Antonio and Clarita in which the latter waived and condoned
her claims against the former, who in turn acknowledged his
wife’s share in the properties subject of the case. Antonio
likewise stipulated therein that he had not availed of any
mortgage loan from MBTC and that it was the bank manager,
Danilo Meneses, who facilitated the manipulation of his
account with the bank which led to the constitution of the
mortgage and the eventual foreclosure thereof. The trial court
approved the compromise thereby leaving the case to proceed
against MBTC.
Court of Appeals, finding merit in MBTC’s petition, rendered
the assailed Decision. It held that the dismissal the previous
case on the ground of laches should preclude the filing of
present case because the former had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. Also, it pointed out that inasmuch
as the two cases presented identical issues and causes of
action and prayed for the same relief, the second complaint
must likewise suffer the effect of laches.
ISSUE: Whether the present petition should be barred by
UNDER the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
HELD: YES. While the Court agrees that an action to declare
the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of limitations,
the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such
action at the first instance has already been settled by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in
the proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the
applicability of the principle of laches vis-à-vis the
imprescriptibility of Clarita’s cause of action because the
said decision is not the one on appeal before us. But more
importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered
in that case had already become final without any motion for
reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom.
Thus, we are left with no other recourse than to uphold the
immutability of the said decision. No other procedural law
principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment
becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision,
amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical
errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. The
underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in
the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial
controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors,
inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on
indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant must
not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to
thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to
savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.
Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc. vs. Tansipek
593 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009
Quick Summary: Transipek received payments for JOCI.
However he was not able to turnover a check to JOCI
amounting to 4 million and deposited it to PCIB under his name
and his wife. JOCI filed a case against PCIB, it refused to pay
and filed a motion to dismiss. It also filed a third party
complaint against Transipek.
In the third party complaint Transipek was declared in default.
Transipek filed petition for certiorari IN CA assailing the default
order but it was dismissed.
In the Main case RTC ruled in favor of JOCI. Transipek
appealed the decision to CA. CA issued a decision stating that
PCIB’s motion to declare Transipek in default is erroneous. It
remanded the proceeding to RTC, CA denied the MR of PCIB.
SC said that Transipek may not appeal again the order of
default. He can only appeal based on the decision being
CONTRARY TO LAW OR THE EVIDENCE ALREADY
PRESENTED.
Note: See doctrine of Law of the case in the ruling
FACTS
J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), a domestic corporation in Cebu
City, filed a complaint against Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City .The Complaint alleges that JOCI entered into a
contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. for the construction of
a Duty Free Shop in Mandaue City. As actual construction
went on, progress billings were made.
Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein
respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments
received by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to
JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check No. 0000302572
in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI.
Instead, respondent Tansipek endorsed said check and
deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the
said deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for
the deposit to payee’s account only, and despite the alleged
lack of authority of respondent Tansipek to endorse said
check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check
despite demands made by the latter. JOCI prayed for the
payment of the amount of the check.
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint . PCIB likewise
moved for leave for the court to admit the former’s third-party
complaint against respondent Tansipek. The third-party
complaint alleged that respondent Tansipek was a depositor at
its Wilson Branch, San Juan, Metro Manila, where he
maintained an account, in his name and/or that of his wife,
Anita.
Respondent Tansipek had presented to PCIB a signed copy of
the Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of JOCI
stating the resolution that Checks payable to J.O. Construction,
Inc. may be deposited under the name of John and/or Anita
Tansipek, maintained at PCIB, Wilson Branch.”
Respondent Tansipek had also presented a copy of the
Articles of Incorporation of JOCI showing that he and his wife,
Anita, were incorporators of JOCI, with Anita as Treasurer.
Page 7 of 64
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint.
The amendment consisted in the correction of the caption, so
that PCIB appeared as Third-Party Plaintiff and Tansipek as
Third-Party Defendant.
Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to
file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was,
however, declared in default for failure to do so. The
Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied.
Respondent Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals assailing the Default Order and the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition for failure to attach the assailed Orders.
Court of Appeals denied respondent Tansipek’s Motion for
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
RTC promulgated its judgment in favor of the plaintiff [JOCI]
Respondent Tansipek appealed the Decision to the Court of
Appeals.
Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision finding that it
was an error for the trial court to have acted on PCIB’s motion
to declare respondent Tansipek in default. The Court of
Appeals thus remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
PCIB. Petitioner Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor-in-
interest to PCIB, filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, assailing the above Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals,
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the proper remedy was to file a motion
for reconsideration or motion to lift order of default
2. Whether Tansipek may still appeal from the judgment
of the main case.
HELD:
1. Respondent Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default
was erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek
should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a
Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court: (b) Relief from order of default.
2. YES. The dismissal of a Petition for Certiorari assailing the
denial of a party’s Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the
same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the
case.—Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that
respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration may be
treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition for
Certiorari on the denial thereof has already been
dismissed with finality by the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the
Court of Appeals to this Court. The dismissal of the
Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of respondent
Tansipek’s Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the
same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the
case.
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal—more specifically, it means that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.—In People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 (1958), we held that:
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. It may be stated as a rule of general application that,
where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal,
all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior
appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and
will not be considered or readjudicated therein.
There is no substantial distinction between an appeal and
a Petition for Certiorari when it comes to the application of
the Doctrine of the Law of the Case. The doctrine is founded
on the policy of ending litigation. The doctrine is necessary to
enable the appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily
and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question once
considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the
same case upon any and every subsequent appeal.
A party declared in default is not barred from appealing from
the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had
previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and
regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals
therefrom.—It is important to note that a party declared in
default—respondent Tansipek in this case—is not barred
from appealing from the judgment on the main case,
whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the
latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal
should be based on the Decision’s being contrary to law
or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged
invalidity of the default order.
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Makati Insurance v Reyes
GR 167403 August 6, 2008
Summary of Facts with RULING:
Complaint for damages was filed against Rubills international
and Tong Woon shipping for breach of contract. RTC
dismissed the case without prejudice as petitoner’s counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference of which
order was received Nov 29, 2001. MR was filed on Dec 4,
2001 which was denied by RTC which order was received July
3, 2002. Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal on July 17. 2002.
RTC dismissed as it ruled that it was filed out of time. CA
affirmed and declared that even if the NA was filed on time, the
same is dismissible as petitioner took a wrong remedy. SC
affirmed CA and ruled that case is dimissible. The Notice of
appeal was filed within the reglementary period based on
Neypes ruling “fresh period rule”, however, petitioner took a
wrong remedy. H of Rule 41 provides that “No appeal may be
Page 8 of 64
taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice”.
The case may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule
65, if there is GAD. Even if the appeal is to be taken as Rule
65 petition, the same will be dismissible as CA did not commit
GAD as it acted correctly in stating that NA filed by petitioner
was dismissible.
FACTS:
Makati Insurance filed a complaint for damages for breach of
contract against Rubills International and Tong Woon Shipping
for breach of contract of carriage. Complainant alleged that
shipment was in apparent damaged condition upon arrival at
point of destination.
Petitioner’s counsel fails to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference and hence, RTC judge dismissed the case without
prejudice. It received the order dismissing the case on Nov 29,
2001.
On Dec 4, 2001, MR was filed alleging that sickness prevented
its counsel from attending the pre-trial conference. RTC denied
MR of which received by petitioner on July 3, 2002.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 17, 2002.
Respondents opposed filing of notice of appeal contending that
it was filed out of time.
RTC dismissed petitioner’s notice of appeal for being filed 3
days beyond the 15 day reglementary period. Petitioner filed its
Verified Motion for Reconsideration five days after receiving
the Order dismissing the case without prejudice. Excluding the
day the said motion was filed, petitioner had only 11 days left
to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner received the Order of 17
June 2002 denying its Verified Motion for Reconsideration on 3
July 2002. Accordingly, it had only until 14 July 2002 to file a
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner, however, filed its Notice of Appeal
on 17 July 2002.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which CA
dismissed as it affirmed RTC’s decision. CA declared that even
if petitioner’s Notice of Appeal was considered filed on time, it
was dismissible for being the wrong remedy. MR was also
denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
RULING:
No, the notice of appeal was indeed filed within the
reglementary period as per Neypes Ruling. However, SC had
to dismiss the case for failing as petitioner avail of a wrong
remedy.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41, Section
1(h), thereof expressly provides that no appeal may be taken
from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. It may be
subject of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by the said 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted correctly in
stating that the Notice of Appeal filed by the petitioner was
dismissible.
PNB v Sps. Cordova
GR 169314 May 14, 2008
Summary of Facts with Ruling:
Complaint for rescission was dismissed by RTC and petitioner
filed a notice of appeal timely.Respondents filed MR which
RTC granted. Upon receiving the modified decision order of
RTC, petitioner filed MR which was also denied by RTC. A
second notice of appeal was filed of which respondents
opposed contending that since the first decision was vacated
and replaced by the new decision, the first notice of appeal
became ineffective. CA denied the motion and the subsequent
MR. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. SC ruled that
the first notice of appeal is still effective. The filing of a second
notice of appeal from a modified decision is a superfluity
because the appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of the
first notice of appeal as to the party who filed as such. Also,
filing a second notice of appeal does not constitute as waiver
of the first notice of appeal.
FACTS:
Complaint for rescission was filed but later dismissed by RTC
however, it granted Sps Cordova’s counterclaim on its order
dated Feb 18, 2002. Petitioner filed notice of appeal timely on
March 20, 2002.
Respondents also filed MR of which RTC granted and
amended to increase amount of damages awarded to
respondents on its order dated July 2, 2002. After receiving the
order of RTC on Aug 7, 2002, petitioner filed MR on Aug 22,
2002 of which RTC denied.
It subsequently filed second Notice of Appeal on Oct 23, 2002.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal. As this
motion was denied by the trial court, they re-filed it with the
appellate court. In their motion, respondents argued that
petitioner only had one (1) day left to file the second notice
when it received the order denying the MR, inasmuch as it had
already consumed the 15-day reglementary period when it filed
the MR on August 22, 2002. Since the February 18, 2002
Decision was vacated, revised and replaced by the July 2,
2002 Order, the first notice of appeal became ineffective and
invalid.
CA deny the motion. MR was denied.
Petition for review on Certiorari was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in granting motion to dismiss on the
ground that the first notice of appeal became ineffective and
invalid.
RULING:
Yes. CA erred, petitioner’s appeal is deemed perfected as to it
when it timely filed its first notice of appeal following Sec 9
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Incidentally, this perfected appeal is not docketed with the CA,
because the trial court, which was still to resolve respondents’
Page 9 of 64
motion for reconsideration, had not yet transmitted the records
of the case to the appellate court. Incumbent, nonetheless, on
the part of the RTC is the elevation of the records after a
resolution of the merits of respondents’ motion.
Its appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not need to file
a second notice of appeal even if the trial court granted, as it
did, the other party’s motion for reconsideration and modified
the decision to increase the monetary award. This is in
accordance with our ruling in Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation v. Sison, 16 thus:
We hold that petitioner did not have to file another notice of
appeal, having given notice of its intention to appeal the
original decision.
x x x Since the decision, as modified by the order of March 11,
1993, more than doubled petitioner’s liability, there is no
reason to believe that petitioner’s failure to appeal therefrom in
any way indicated its acceptance thereof.
An essential and logical implication of the said rule is that the
filing of a second notice of appeal from the modified decision is
a superfluity, if not a useless ceremony. It, therefore, matters
no longer whether that second notice is timely filed or not.
Hence, in this case, petitioner’s filing of a belated second
notice of appeal does not affect or foreclose its already
perfected appeal.
Respondents want the Court to depart from the aforesaid rules
because, in this case, petitioner, in effect, abandoned its
perfected appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order modifying the decision. The Court does not agree.
Petitioner’s filing of the said motion does not have the effect of
a waiver of the appeal, and, like the second notice, is a
pointless formality which does not prejudice the already
perfected appeal.
The necessary consequence of our ruling that petitioner’s
perfected appeal springs from the first notice is that such first
appeal should be the one docketed by the appellate court. CA-
G.R. CV No. 80735, the subject of this petition, is the mistaken
appeal, for it traces its origin from the superfluous second
notice. Considering, however, that the records were already
transmitted to the appellate court in the appeal docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 80735, for us to have to go through the
process of dismissing the said mistaken appeal, then have the
perfected appeal from the first notice docketed, and finally,
order the records of the case re-transmitted through that
docketed appeal, would be too circuitous a procedure. Thus,
for expediency, we simply reinstate the appeal without a further
re-docket, and direct the appellate court to resolve the case
without further delay.
JULIETA PANOLINO vs. JOSEPHINE L. TAJALA
G.R. No. 183616 June 29, 2010
QUICK SUMMARY:
DENR denied the application of petitioner for a free patent over
a parcel of land. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)
14 days after receiving a copy of the decision which was
denied. 7 days after receiving the denial, she filed a Notice of
Appeal. RD of DENR denied the notice of appeal, holding that
it was filed out of time. Petitioner argued that she still had a
fresh period of 15 days from her receipt of the Order denying
her MR. However, her motion was denied. Petitioner elevated
the matter via certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the
petition. SC ruled that the fresh period rule will only apply if the
MR decision is reversed, it may not apply to the case of
petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied.
Facts:
The DENR Regional Executive Director Jim O. Sampulna (RD
Sampulna), denied for lack merit the application of Julieta
Panolino (petitioner), which was opposed by herein respondent
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land
located in Sultan Kudarat, and directed petitioner to vacate the
contested property and remove at her expense whatever
improvements she may have introduced thereon.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007, of
which she filed a motion for reconsideration on July 11, 2007.
Her motion was denied on September 6, 2007, copy of which
she received on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal bef
ore the Office of RD Sampulna, stating that she was appealing
the decision and order to the Office of the DENR Secretary. By
Order of October 16, 2007, RD Sampulna denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period. The RD explained that petitioner should have filed her
appeal on September 13, 2007 as she had only one day left of
the 15-day reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant to
DENR Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990 which
provides that if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision/order of the Regional Office is filed and such motion
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right
to perfect his
appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned
from receipt of the resolution of denial.The administrative
order also provides that “The Rules of Court shall apply when
not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.”
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the 2005 case
of Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., petitioner argued in
her motion for reconsideration of RD Sampulnas October 16,
2007 Order that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days from
her receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the Order
denying her motion for reconsideration. However, her motion
was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before the CA
which, by Resolution, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, she having
bypassed the Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of
the President before resorting to judicial action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that her petition
for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. The appellate court,
holding that the issue raised is clearly a question of fact,
denied petitioners motion. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the fresh period rule laid down
in Neypes applies to petitioner’s case
Ruling: NO.
The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate court
is one of law because it can be resolved by merely determining
what the law is under the undisputed facts. The appellate
court’s ruling that such issue raises a question of fact which
Page 10 of 64
entails an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties is thus erroneous.
As reflected in the decision in Neypes, the fresh period rule
shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioners present case is administrative in nature involving an
appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office
to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As
earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal
during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas if the decision
is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to
perfect his appeal.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified
in Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case of
petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied.
EMELINDA V. ABEDES vs.CA, RELIA QUIZON ARCIGA and
SHERIFF RONBERTO B. VALINO
G.R. No. 174373 October 15, 2007
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed an action for support against the husband of
petitioner. The RTC ruled in favour of respondent and the
sheriff levied upon petitioner’s property to satisfy the judgment.
Petitioner alleged that the property belongs exclusively to her
and not a conjugal property. RTC ruled in her favour. CA
reversed RTC’s judgment. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, she filed a petition
under Rule 65 of the ROC. SC ruled that the proper remedy of
petitioner is an ordinary appeal via a petition for review under
Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Facts:
Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an action before the
RTC of Pasig City against Wilfredo, husband of herein
petitioner, seeking support for her daughter, Dannielle
Ann. Wilfredo was ordered by the RTC to support Danielle
Ann.
The Sheriff caused the registration of a Notice of Levy on
Execution on TCT No. 292139. Petitioner filed a Notice of Third
Party Claim with the RTC alleging that the property belongs
exclusively to her.
Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice of
Sheriffs Sale was made. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages before the RTC of
Tarlac City
After due hearing, the RTC issued a TRO. Meanwhile,
respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
of petitioner which was denied. RTC of Tarlac City issued the
assailed Order ruling that the property covered by TCT No.
292139 is petitioner’s paraphernal property, hence, it may not
be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing order
was denied by the RTC, prompting respondents to file an
appeal with the CA.
The CA, reversed and set aside the Resolution of the RTC of
Tarlac City. In its ruling, the CA said that the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between petitioner and Wilfredo. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied the motion. Hence,
the Petition before us filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the petitioner used the appropriate mode of
appeal
Ruling: No.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper
remedy of petitioner from the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a
petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56,
Sec. 5(f) of the Rules of Court, which governs the procedure in
the Supreme Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal,
as in this case, merits an outright dismissal. Patently, the
petition must fail.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court elaborates on the
modes of appeal:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
Page 11 of 64
 petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the
Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule
42, is brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appeal, provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme
Court only on questions of law.
In the case at bar, respondents utilized the first mode of
appeal. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC of
Tarlac City on 18 August 2004, giving notice that they were
appealing its Order and Resolution, dated 9 June 2004 and 3
August 2004, respectively, to the Court of Appeals. Indeed,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an
appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The question
now arises whether respondents raised questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law before the Court of Appeals. A
review of the records reveals that respondents, in their appeal
with the Court of Appeals, raised mixed questions of fact and
law.
GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA
and EVA VIERNES vs. CA and Spouses JOSE and ANITA
ALESNA
G.R. No. 137761. April 6, 2000
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondents filed an action for annulment of title against
petitioners before the RTC. RTC rendered judgment in favour
of the petitioners. Respondents filed an appeal to CA which
was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fees within
the prescribed period. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration
was granted. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. SC ruled that the payment
of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period
is both mandatory and jurisdictional and failure of the appellant
to pay the docket and other fees is a ground for the dismissal
of the appeal.
Facts:
Before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Spouses Jose
and Anita Alesna, private respondents herein, filed a civil
action for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages (with
prayer for preliminary injunction) against Petitioners Gabriel
Lazaro and the heirs of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a Notice of
Appeal before the trial court.
The CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein private
respondents to pay the required docket fees within the
prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued its first assailed
Resolution granting their Motion for Reconsideration and
reinstating the appeal.
Subsequently, the petitioners also filed their own Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said Resolution. As earlier
stated, the CA denied their Motion. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether the failure to pay docket and other lawful fees
within the prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal.
Ruling: Yes.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that
appellate court docket and other lawful fees should be paid
within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, Section 4 of Rule
41 reads:
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. --
Within the period for taking an appeal,[9] the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal."
Contrary to the submission of private respondents that the
aforecited rule is merely directory, the payment of the docket
and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court provides: "Failure of the appellant to pay the
docket and other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has been held
that failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal
renders the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or the rule.
In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the
required docket fees within the reglementary period. In fact, the
Court notes that they paid the fees only after the CA had
dismissed the appeal, or six months after the filing of the
Notice of Appeal. Clearly, existing jurisprudence and the Rules
mandate that the appeal should be dismissed.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Indeed, in no
uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be
relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." In this case,
the CA and the private respondents failed to show that this
case is one such exception.
REPUBLIC vs. CA, HON. MADRONA and APOLINARIA
MALINAO JOMOC
G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005
QUICKSUMMARY:
Absentee spouse of herein respondent was declared
presumptively dead hence, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court disapproved petitioner’s notice on the ground
that no record of appeal was filed and served as required. After
its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was also denied
because the petition is not sufficient in form. SC ruled that the
petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of
Appeal, a record on appeal.
Page 12 of 64

Facts:
In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, RTC, granted the petition and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his
petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to
appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and
served as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a
special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts
order of disapproval having been denied, it filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA, contending that the declaration of
presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or
separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on
procedural and substantive grounds stating that the petition is
not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified
true copy of the assailed Order. However, despite the
procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the
substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is
30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its
appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the
period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final
order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a
notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether a record on appeal shall be required in order
to perfect an appeal
Ruling: Yes.
This Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The instant
petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of
Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129
and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on
Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving
petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition
before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his
petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial
courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the
disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for
the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical
sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to
comply with the rule.
MAJOR ROMEO G. ELEPANTE vs. HON. MADAYAG and
MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON
G.R. No. 93559 April 26, 1991
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the SC. SC
directed RTC of Makati to hear and decide the case. The trial
court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas
corpus for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the SC. OSG filed his comment saying that
when petitioner filed this petition, the assailed decision had
attained finality, an appeal in habeas corpus should be filed
within 48 hours from notice of the judgment. SC ruled that 13
days had lapsed when petitioner filed the instant petition.
Hence, the decision sought to be reviewed is already final.
Facts:
Major Romeo Elepante filed a petition for habeas corpus with
this Court. The Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the
Executive Judge of the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila. Also this
Court directed the latter to hear and decide the case.
In the hearing, Romeo Elepante testified that he is a Major in
the Philippine Navy (Marines) and the Executive Officer of the
Metropolitan Citizens Military Training Command; that on April
15, 1990, a platoon of armed soldiers led by Captain Doctor
brought him to the NCR Defense Command where he was
detained; that there was no warrant for his arrest; that he was
confined as prisoner at Fort Bonifacio; that no formal charges
have been filed against him. The trial court rendered a decision
dismissing for lack of merit the petition for habeas corpus. The
trial court opined that Major Elepante was arrested because of
his involvement in several coup attempts.
Major Elepante filed this petition for review on certiorari,
alleging inter alia, that there is no criminal complaint filed
against him so that his continued detention is a violation of the
Constitution. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
comment. In his comment the Solicitor General pointed out that
counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990, a copy of the
trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990, so that when he filed
this petition on June 11, 1990, the assailed decision had
attained finality. Citing Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised
Rules of Court, appeal in habeas corpus should be filed within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment.
Page 13 of 64
Issue: Whether petitioner’s appeal in habeas corpus was
timely filed
Ruling: No.
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, explicitly
provides, viz:
Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken.
— An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the
judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement
that the person making it appeals therefrom.
As interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109
Phil. 379 [1960]), which also involved a habeas corpuscase,
this Court ruled that the requirement under Section 18 of Rule
41 of the Old Rules of Court which provides that an appeal
in habeas corpus should be perfected within twenty-four (24)
hours (now forty-eight hours under Rule 41, Section 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court), is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Hence, this Court has no other alternative but to
dismiss the appeal filed out of time.
In computing the forty-eight (48) hour period of appeal, this
Court in Kabigting v. Director of Prisons (6 SCRA 281 [1962]),
ruled that the date on which the decision was promulgated
and/or served is not counted and the period starts to run the
following day unless the same by a Sunday or legal holiday in
which case the period of appeal is to be considered from the
succeeding day. To perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal is
required to be filed with the Clerk of Court or Judge who
rendered the judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules of
Court).
In the case at bar, counsel for petitioner received on May 29,
1990 a copy of the trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990
(Rollo, p. 8). Clearly when he filed the instant petition on June
11, 1990, thirteen (13) days had lapsed, so it was filed outside
the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary period. This being so,
the decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that this
Court following the Saulo ruling, has no alternative but to
dismiss the instant petition.
Sesbreno v CA
GR 84096 January 26, 1995
Summary of Facts with Ruling:
A case of estafa was filed before the RTC against Rodis et. Al.
During trial and after prosecution rested its case, respondents
then filed a demurrer to evidence. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. On petition for certiorari and prohibition, CA granted
the petition. Petitioner interposed an appeal before SC
contending that the CA has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter because when petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, in
effect, it admitted the allegations and the evidence presented
by the prosecution and therefore, the only issue to be resolved
is whether or not respondents shall be held liable for estafa,
which is a pure question of law of which CA has no jurisdiction.
RULING: CA has acquired jurisdiction though what was raised
is a pure question of law because SC ruled that petitioner is
estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of CA as (1) he did not
assail it during the pendency of the petition (2) While it is true
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be
raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes
that laches or estoppel has not supervened. As distinguished
from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts"
— "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when
the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation
to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the
situation.
FACTS:
Private respondents Hermilo Rodis, Sr., together with Douglas
Sandiego and Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was charged with estafa
before the RTC.
Respondent Rodis moved to quash the information on the
ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
not the regular courts, had jurisdiction over the offense
charged and that the facts stated herein did not constitute an
offense.
RTC denied the motion and elevated the case before the IAC
on a petition for certiorari.
IAC dismissed the petition after finding there is no GAD. MR
was likewise denied. private respondent filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. The petition was denied.
Trial ensued in the criminal case. Respondent then filed a
demurrer to evidence. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Respondent
before CA.
CA granted the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA has acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner is estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of CA as
(1) he did not assail it during the pendency of the petition (2)
While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule
presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.
Petitioner contends that by the filing of a motion to dismiss on
demurrer to evidence, private respondent, in effect, admitted
the truth of the allegations in the information, as well as the
evidence presented by the prosecution to support said
allegations. Therefore, the only issue raised by private
respondent before the Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not he
can be held liable for estafa under the facts obtaining in the
case, is purely a question of law for which said appellate court
had no jurisdiction
Page 14 of 64
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 224 (1992), this
Court clarified the distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact in this wise:
. . . . As distinguished from a question of law which exists
"when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts" — "there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to
the whole and the probabilities of the situation."
An examination of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
disclosed that indeed no question of fact was raised. What
private respondent asserted therein was that the facts as
alleged and proved by petitioner did not constitute a criminal
offense. Clearly then, the only issue to be resolved by the
Court of Appeals, which it did resolve, was whether private
respondent could be held liable for estafa under the facts
obtaining in the criminal case. This certainly is a question of
law that should fall within the jurisdiction of SC.
Oro vs Diaz
G.R. No. 140974 July 11, 2001
Summary of Facts with Ruling:
A case before DARAB for collection has become final and
executory. However, respondent still failed to pay the rentals
as tenant. Petitioner then filed a complaint for damages in
RTC. After urgent motion to dismiss filed by respondent, judge
granted the motion to dismiss. The RTC Order dismissing the
Complaint was received by petitioner on June 2, 1999. On that
date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which to file an
appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, petitioner
filed his Motion for Reconsideration on June 14, 1999. After
hearing, judge denied such motion. On August 19, 1999,
petitioner received the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until
August 22, 1999 to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal on August 26, 1999 however, the respondent
judge denied the said notice of appeal on the ground that the
period to appeal ha[d] already expired. RULING: SC ruled that
RTC is correct in denying the notice of appeal. On August 19,
1999, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until
August 22, 1999 to file a notice of appeal. However, he filed
notice of appeal on Aug 26, of which 4 days late. The approval
of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower
court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If the notice of
appeal is, however, filed beyond the reglementary period, the
trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the
same in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
Due to failure of respondents to pay his rentals as tenant,
petitioner brought action before DARAB for collection.
Case was decided and finally executed of which respondents
did not pay. Petitioner then filed a case for damages before the
RTC. After considering the 'urgent' motion to dismiss filed by
the private respondent, and before trial, the respondent judge
dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. The RTC Order
dismissing the Complaint was received by petitioner on June 2,
1999. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which
to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal,
petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on June 14,
1999. After hearing, judge denied such motion. On August 19,
1999, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until
August 22, 1999 to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal on August 26, 1999 however, the respondent
judge denied the said notice of appeal on the ground that the
period to appeal ha[d] already expired.
Hence, this Petition before the Honorable Court.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the notice of appeal.
Ruling:
NO. The RTC is correct in denying the notice of appeal as it
was filed out of the reglementary period.
On August 19, 1999, petitioner received the RTC Order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had
three (3) days or until August 22, 1999 to file a notice of
appeal. Unfortunately, he was able to do so only on August 26,
1999, or four (4) days late.
The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial
duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If
the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond the reglementary
period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or
disallow the same in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
The trial court was correct in disallowing the Notice of Appeal,
also because it was directed at an Order denying a motion for
reconsideration, instead of at the judgment or final order
disposing the case. Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
proscribes the filing of an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration. That provision reads:
"Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65." (Emphasis supplied)
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process. Rather, it is a procedural remedy
of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise." Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied
Page 15 of 64
with. Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period
fixed by law renders final the decision sought to be appealed.
As a result, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to
review the decision.
Moreover, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in
the manner prescribed by law is essential; noncompliance with
this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory. After a decision is declared
final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the case.
Hufana v Genato
GR 141209 Sep 17, 2001
Summary of Facts with Ruling:
Genato filed a complaint before RTC to foreclose a real estate
mortgage over two parcels of land owned by Oakland. RTC
ruled in favor of Genato. Oakland sought relief from the Court
of Appeals which, however, affirmed the trial court on July 28,
1992. When the CA Decision became final and executory on
August 27, 1992, Genato filed a Motion for Execution, which
was granted by the RTC on December 7, 1992. A Petition for
Prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction was filed before the Supreme
Court. Through this Petition, the alleged owners/buyers of the
mortgaged properties sought to restrain the trial court from
proceeding with the auction on the ground that the mortgage
was void. It affirmed the validity of the mortgage and declared
Oakland liable to Genato. The separate Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Oakland were denied by the CA
through a Resolution dated July 21, 1994. For its nonpayment
of the prescribed docket fees, its appeal to this Court was
likewise denied. Also denied with finality on December 12,
1994 was the Motion for Reconsideration. Due to the finality of
the Resolution dated December 12, 1994, Genato filed before
the RTC an Ex Parte Motion for Execution of Judgment. Both
Oakland and herein petitioners based their opposition on a
Decision dated March 20, 1995 issued by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLRC Case No. REM
A-940322-0060. This case, entitled Cristilyn Castilla et al. v.
Oakland Development Resources Corporation, Prater Espana
& William Ong Genato, declared the mortgage between
Genato and Oakland void insofar as third parties were
concerned.RTC declared the mortgage between Oakland and
Genato null and void insofar as third parties were concerned. It
further ruled that the buyers herein petitioners -- had a superior
right thereto. Court of Appeals stated that it had already ruled
upon the validity of the mortgage. Since validity was the
primary issue raised in a previous case filed before it, the said
ruling is already conclusive upon the same issue raised by the
same parties before the HLURB. The CA Decision cannot be
contravened by a subsequent ruling of the HLURB. It was
therefore erroneous for the trial court to ignore the Decision of
a higher court. RULING: CA did not err in taking cognizance of
the case. under Section 1(f) of Rule 41, an order of execution
issued by a trial court is not appealable. However, In this case,
the RTC Resolution dated July 1, 1997 resolved, among
others, to grant in part, as well as deny in part, the Motion for
an Alias Writ of Execution filed by respondent. The net result of
the trial courts Resolution was that Genato was precluded from
foreclosing the mortgage on the property covered by TCT No.
356315. Note, however, that he was allowed to foreclose the
lot covered by TCT No. 366380, which consisted of around
4,334 square meters, but not the portions already purchased
by petitioners pursuant to the Agreement he had entered into
with petitioners. It must, at this point, be stressed that the
Resolution to grant partial execution was based on the HLURB
Decision involving the same parties and subject matter. In fact,
the trial court itself stated that its Resolution was anchored on
a supervening event, the said HLURB ruling. It is clear
therefore, that the trial court did not merely grant execution.
Rather, it also resolved matters that delved on the merits of the
claims of both parties. It did not merely order something to be
done pursuant to a previous final decision, but resolved issues
determinative of the final outcome of the case. As such, the
Resolution is in effect a final order that may be appealed to the
CA under the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
William Ong Genato filed a complaint before RTC to foreclose
a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land owned by
Oakland. RTC ruled in favor of Genato. Oakland sought relief
from the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the trial
court on July 28, 1992. When the CA Decision became final
and executory on August 27, 1992, Genato filed a Motion for
Execution, which was granted by the RTC on December 7,
1992. Pursuant thereto, the branch clerk of court issued an
Execution Foreclosing Mortgage dated December 9, 1992, and
scheduled the auction sale of the foreclosed properties on
January 14, 1993. However, a Petition for Prohibition with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction was filed before the Supreme Court. Through this
Petition, the alleged owners/buyers of the mortgaged
properties sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding
with the auction on the ground that the mortgage was void.
The former Special First Division of the CA subsequently
dissolved the Supreme Courts TRO and dismissed the Petition
in a Decision dated February 3, 1994. It affirmed the validity of
the mortgage and declared Oakland liable to Genato. The
separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by Oakland were
denied by the CA through a Resolution dated July 21, 1994.
For its nonpayment of the prescribed docket fees, its appeal to
this Court was likewise denied. Also denied with finality on
December 12, 1994 was the Motion for Reconsideration.
Due to the finality of the Resolution dated December 12, 1994,
Genato filed before the RTC an Ex Parte Motion for Execution
of Judgment. Oakland opposed the Motion, while the
intervenors in the case (herein petitioners) filed an Urgent
Manifestation with Motion to Intervene and an Opposition to
Herein Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for Execution. Both Oakland
and herein petitioners based their opposition on a Decision
dated March 20, 1995 issued by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLRC Case No. REM A-
940322-0060. This case, entitled Cristilyn Castilla et al. v.
Oakland Development Resources Corporation, Prater Espana
& William Ong Genato, declared the mortgage between
Genato and Oakland void insofar as third parties were
concerned.
Citing the HLURB Decision, the trial judge denied Genatos Ex
Parte Motion for Execution of Judgment on August 18, 1995.
However, on reconsideration and upon manifestation that he
Page 16 of 64
would respect the Deeds of Absolute Sale/Contracts to Sell
executed by Oakland in favor of the intervenors/petitioners, the
RTC issued a Resolution dated 14 May 1996 allowing
execution to proceed, but limited the auction sale to the lot
covered by TCT No. 366380, except those portions that had
been bought and occupied by the intervenors.
Oakland filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 14, 1996 and for Accounting, in order to identify the
obligations satisfied by the proceeds of the auction sale.
Furthermore, Genato filed two separate Motions -- one for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution of the deficiency
judgment to foreclose the other parcel covered by TCT No.
356315/PR-10397; and second, for the confirmation of sale.
RTC declared the mortgage between Oakland and Genato null
and void insofar as third parties were concerned. It further
ruled that the buyers herein petitioners -- had a superior right
thereto.
Court of Appeals stated that it had already ruled upon the
validity of the mortgage. Since validity was the primary issue
raised in a previous case filed before it, the said ruling is
already conclusive upon the same issue raised by the same
parties before the HLURB. The CA Decision cannot be
contravened by a subsequent ruling of the HLURB. It was
therefore erroneous for the trial court to ignore the Decision of
a higher court.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue:
whether the appeal to the CA of the July 1, 1997 RTC
Resolution is proper, considering that the Resolution purports
to be merely an order of execution which is allegedly
interlocutory in nature.
Ruling:
Yes. Normally, decisions and final orders of regional trial courts
are appealable to the Court of Appeals. Section 1 of Rule 41,
however, enumerates the following RTC orders that may not
be appealed:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from
a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, under Section 1(f) of Rule 41, an order of execution
issued by a trial court is not appealable.
In this case, the RTC Resolution dated July 1, 1997 resolved,
among others, to grant in part, as well as deny in part, the
Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution filed by respondent. The
net result of the trial courts Resolution was that Genato was
precluded from foreclosing the mortgage on the property
covered by TCT No. 356315. Note, however, that he was
allowed to foreclose the lot covered by TCT No. 366380, which
consisted of around 4,334 square meters, but not the portions
already purchased by petitioners pursuant to the Agreement he
had entered into with petitioners.
It must, at this point, be stressed that the Resolution to grant
partial execution was based on the HLURB Decision involving
the same parties and subject matter. In fact, the trial court itself
stated that its Resolution was anchored on a supervening
event, the said HLURB ruling. The RTC Resolution stated thus:
This court would like to impress upon the parties that [in]
consonance to its Resolution issued on August 18, 1995 in
relation to its Resolution issued on May 14, 1995, vis--vis the
Decision rendered by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board in HLRB Case No. REM A-940322-0060, promulgated
on March 20, 1995 [--] which has become final and executory
on June 27, 1995 after William Ong Genatos motion for
reconsideration was denied [--] the sheriff shall confine the sale
to the parcel of land covered and embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 366380 and shall see to it that no portion
or lots bought and occupied by the intervenors shall be
included nor shall be the subject of the auction sale.
It is clear therefore, that the trial court did not merely grant
execution. Rather, it also resolved matters that delved on the
merits of the claims of both parties. It did not merely order
something to be done pursuant to a previous final decision, but
resolved issues determinative of the final outcome of the case.
As such, the Resolution is in effect a final order that may be
appealed to the CA under the Rules of Court.
Cosmos Bottling v Nagrama
GR 164404 March 4, 2008
Summary of facts with ruling:
Respondent filed a complaint before LA on the ground that he
was illegally dismiss by Cosmos Bottling and that it committed
unfair labor practices. LA dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit of which NLRC affirmed. CA reversed the NLRC ruling
and granted the reliefs sought. Petitioner filed an appeal via
Page 17 of 64
rule 45 before SC of which petitioner raised not only question
of law but question of fact. RULING: As a general rule,
conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.48 Our power of
review is limited to questions of law. It is well established that
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. However, as an
exception, SC may entertain question of law and fact when the
findings of fact are conflicting. Hence, petitioner did not err in
filing the appeal before SC via rule 45.
FACTS:
Respondent was instructed to attend the seminar. However, he
failed to attend the first two (2) days of the seminar. In a letter
by his immediate supervisor, Josephine D. Calacien, dated
September 29, 1999, respondent was informed that charges of
abandonment of duty and gross insubordination had been
lodged against him. He was required to submit his written
explanation.
He contended that he had to attend to an administrative
hearing for fellow unionists which were held at Santiago,
Isabela; that before he went, he first secured permission from
the plant controller.
Hearing was held on the twin charges against him.
Respondent and officers of petitioner corporation testified. On
October 29, 1999, he was formally terminated from service.
Respondent filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter,
contending that he was illegally dismissed and that petitioner
had committed unfair labor practices.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC affirmed LA’s decision.
CA reversed the NLRC ruling and granted the reliefs sought.
Petitioner filed an appeal via rule 45 before SC.
ISSUE:
whether or not the petition is violative of Rule 45 in that only
questions of law should be raised.
RULING:
NO. The findings of facts of the CA are as a general rule,
conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court. Our power of
review is limited to questions of law. It is well established that
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case.
The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases
or controversies under specific circumstances, as follows:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
andcralawlibrary
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.49
The fifth cited circumstance is pertinent to the case at bar, in
that petitioner asserts that the CA made findings of fact in
conflict with those of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. In Philippine
American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje,50 the
Court, speaking through Justice Chico-Nazario, held:
As borne by the records, it appears that there is a divergence
between the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed
by the NLRC, and that of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, for
the purpose of clarity and intelligibility, this Court will make an
infinitesimal scrutiny of the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC.51
Hence, despite petitioner raising a question of fact, We opt to
take cognizance of the questions brought to Us by petitioner.
Madrigal Transport v Lapanday
GR 156067 August 11, 2004
Summary of Facts with Ruling:
A complaint for damages was filed against respondents
Lapanday. Motion to dismiss was filed of which RTC granted
for failure to state cause of action. Petition for certiorari was
filed before CA of which CA dismissed held that the issues
raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that should
be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: The proper remedy should be ordinary appeal and
not petition for certiorari. The dismissal being a final order is
subject of an ordinary appeal. Certiorari will not lie on dismissal
of case being a final order. Section 1(h) does not apply,
because the trial courts Order did not dismiss the action
without prejudice. Even assuming that the Order of the RTC
was erroneous, its error did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not have
dismissed the Complaint or should have at least allowed the
Page 18 of 64
substitution of the assignee in petitioners stead. These alleged
errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary,
petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within
which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule
that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of
appeal. As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was
the correct remedy to elevate the RTCs Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have involved a
pure question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 2 (c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of
Rule 50,[67] Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Madrigal filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents
Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and
Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the
RTC.
Madrigal alleged that it had entered into a joint venture
agreement with Lapanday.
The insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner
insolvent. On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents
Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective
Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch
36.
Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to
state a cause of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the
Insolvency Law, the trial court opined that upon the filing by
Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost
the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC
ruled that the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged
to the court-appointed assignee.
MR was filed but was later denied. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant
case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for
review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was
not proper when appeal was available.
Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzo challenged this ruling
through a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 10, 2000.
The appellate court issued the assailed Decision granting
Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzos Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals Petition for
Certiorari. The appellate court held that the issues raised by
petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be
brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper remedy
under Rule 41.
RULING:
NO. The proper remedy is ordinary appeal.
The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is
also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of
law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely,
but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the
latter.
Certiorari v Ordinary appeal
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises
its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari,
the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with
its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts. [39] An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of.
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and
those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since
the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior
to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed
within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not
later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or
Page 19 of 64
resolution.] If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted
from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this
motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available
under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Parel v Prudencio
GR 192217 March 2, 2011
Summary of facts with Ruling:
The decision for the recovery of possession of property has
attained finality. Simeon sought to enforce the decision which
RTC granted. Danilo filed comment on Simeon’s Motion for
issuance of writ of execution. He alleged that he should be
liable to pay only for period of April 1988 to March 1994 since
he vacated by April 1994. However, RTC order issuance of writ
of execution. MR was filed but was later on denied. RULING:
Though issuance of writ of execution is a matter of right such is
not without exception. A writ of execution may still be
appealed. One of the exceptions wherein a writ of execution
may be appealed is when there is a change in situation of the
parties making the execution unjust. The fact that Danilo has
left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of
the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take
into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification
of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the
execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the
parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the
period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before
issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo
be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the
premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals
should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA
that he had already left the premises
FACTS:
A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed
by Simeon Prudencio (Simeon) against Danilo Parel (Danilo)
with the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. CA reversed RTC’s decision.
Danilo was ordered to pay from April 1988 until the former
actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
Danilo challenged the CA Decision before this Court via an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
SC affirmed CA.
Simeon sought to enforce this Court’s April 19, 2006 Decision
and thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.
Danilo filed his Comment on Simeon’s Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution. He prayed that the PhP 2,000 monthly rental
he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March
1994 only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994.
RTC order issuance of writ of execution. MR was filed but was
later on denied.
Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the
judgment against Danilo for him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly
rentals from April 1994 onwards.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed an error of law in upholding the
RTC Orders.
RULING:
Yes. It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court’s
attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an
earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment
involved was already final and executory. However, it would be
inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals "until he
actually vacates" when it has not been determined when he
actually vacated the ground floor of Simeon’s house. He would
be paying monthly rentals indefinitely.
The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo’s
allegation were true and accordingly modified the period Danilo
is to be held accountable for monthly rentals.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies
with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all
the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid
to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which
is a matter of right.
Banaga v. Majaducon, however, enumerates the instances
where a writ of execution may be appealed:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt
from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to
the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there
remains room for interpretation thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice
and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the
party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court.
That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or
Page 20 of 64
certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above.
The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a
change in the situation of the parties that would make
execution inequitable or unjust.
Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously
considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in
order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.20 We find that Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation of
the rules since special circumstances are involved; to
determine if his allegation were true would allow a final
resolution of the case.
Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court
states as one of the powers of a court:
Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.3/4 Every court shall
have power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice.
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take
into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification
of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the
execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the
parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the
period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before
issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo
be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the
premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals
should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA
that he had already left the premises.
Sibayan vs. Costales
G.R. No. 191492, July 4, 2016, Perez, J
Summary: Petitioner filed an action for recovery of possession
and ownership of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan.
Respondent, opposed claiming that they were in possession of
such property for 80 years. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for failure to file
appellants brief. The SC affirmed. It ruled that the simple
negligence of the counsel in failing to file an appellant’s brief
binds the counsel and that the failure to file an appellant’s brief
results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the
cause for its dismissal.
Facts: Petitioner initiated an action for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages against respondents Emilio
Costales, Susana Isidro, Rodolfo Isidro, Marcelo Isidro, and
Roberto Cerane before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 45. She alleged that she is the
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan
under a TCT and due to respondent’s encroachment she was
compelled to file a case against them to protect her rights
thereon. To support her claims, petitioner appended in her
complaint a copy of the relocation survey. Respondents
assailed the ownership of the petitioner on the disputed
property. They asserted that they, together with their
predecessors-in-interest, were in possession of the subject
property for over 80 years already. They likewise denied
having knowledge of any relocation survey conducted on the
property which was made the basis of the petitioner in filing her
complaint.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the case. It ruled that
respondents were occupying the disputed portion for 52 years
already and the action of the petitioner to remove them from
the said lot is already barred by laches. The MR was denied.
On appeal, the CA to consider the appeal abandoned and
dismissed since petitioner was able to file her Appellant's Brief
only on 19 June 2009 or 139 days after the lapse of the
reglementary period.
Issue: WON the CA erred erred in dismissing the appeal for
petitioner's failure to file the appellant's brief
seasonably.1âwphi1
Decision:
No. Expounding on the discretion of the appellate court to
dismiss or allow the appeal to proceed despite belated service
and filing of the required brief, the Court in Diaz v. People, 691
SCRA 139 (2013), held: The usage of the word may in Section
1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal upon
failure to file the appellant’s brief is not mandatory, but
discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the required
number of copies of the appellant’s brief within the time
provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate
effect of causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. This
means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is
lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the
appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the appellant’s brief,
when the circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to
dismiss the appeal, then, the CA is bound to exercise its sound
discretion upon taking all the pertinent circumstances into due
consideration.
We find no reason to disturb the appellate court’s exercise of
discretion in dismissing the appeal. We perused the
explanation proffered by petitioner and we found nothing that
would compel us to reverse the appellate court. The attribution
of negligence to the counsel does not automatically shield the
client from adverse consequence of her own negligence and
relieve her from the unfavorable result of such lapse. Truly, a
litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his
case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in
the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in contact
with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely
on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough.
The failure to file Appellant’s Brief, though not jurisdictional,
results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the
Page 21 of 64
cause for its dismissal. We must emphasize that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost. In the present case, petitioner
failed to file the required brief within the period prescribed
under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules. Thus, the appellate
court rightly considered her appeal abandoned and
consequently dismissed the same.
Development Bank of the Philippine vs. Carpio
G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017, Mendoza, J:
Summary: Abad, et al represented by Te filed a complaint for
delivery of certificates of title against DBP and GFSME
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into. The RTC
granted the writ of seizure. DBP filed a MTD and Quash the
writ of seizure, which was granted by the RTC. DBP filed a
motion for writ of execution for the return of the titles, which
was granted by the RTC. Due to Abad,et. al’s non-delivery,
DVP filed a motion to call on plaintiff’s surety bond. The RTC
denied the motion. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petitition,
applying Section 20, Rule 57. The SC denied the petition. It
ruled that pertinent positive rules being present here, they
should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity
Facts: Dabay Abad, Hatab Abad, Omar Abas, Hanapi
Abdullah, Rojea Ab Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex Abedin, et
al.( (Abad, et al.), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Manuel
L. Te, filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title,
damages, and attorney's fees against petitioner Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Guarantee Fund for Small
and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. They
alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for
safekeeping pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into
with DBP and prayed for the issuance of a writ of seizure. The
RTC granted the writ of seizure. DBP filed its Omnibus Motion
to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure 8 on the
ground of improper venue, among others. The RTC granted
the MTD. DBP and GFSME filed their Joint Motion to Order
Plaintiffs to Return Titles to Defendants. The RTC granted the
motion.
Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court praying, among others, for the nullification and reversal
of the January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC. The Court
dismissed the petition. DBP filed its Motion for Writ of
Execution16 of the January 27, 2003 Order before the RTC. On
December 16, 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of
Execution
Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of title by Abad, et
al., DBP filed its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety
Bond,19 dated February 3, 2004, praying for the release of the
bond issued by CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained
as a result of the failure to return the 228 certificates of title.
RTC denied the subject motion explaining that the resolution of
the motion was no longer part of its residual power. On appeal,
the CA dismissed the petition. It considered the RTC decision
as final and executory. It added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court provided that the claim for damages against the
bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected
or before the judgment became executory.
Issue: WON the CA erred in its blind adherence to and strict
application of Section 20, Rule 57 of the ROC.
Decision
No. Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court
to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent
litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal,
provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already
been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal
or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42, before the CA
gives due course to the petition. The “residual jurisdiction” of
the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of
the original records or the records on appeal. In eitherinstance,
the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow
the withdrawal of the appeal.
Before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction
over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted;
the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party
appealed therefrom. In this case, there was no trial on the
merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and
respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as
the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that no appeal
may be taken from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of
where no appeal has even been filed. In Strongworld
Construction Court elucidated on the difference between a
dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice: We
distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without
prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the
complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal
without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal
with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal. x x x Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
enumerates the grounds for which a motion to dismiss may be
filed, viz.: Section 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is
improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to
sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g)
That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading
has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
Page 22 of 64
and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with.
DBP must be reminded that equity, “which has been aptly
described as a ‘justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity.” As the Court has stated in
Lim Tupas v. CA, 193 SCRA 597 (1991), “[e]motional appeals
for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot
justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains
in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient
days of the Roman jurists — and is now still reverently
observed — is ‘aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.’”
RULE 42: PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Sibayan vs. Costales
G.R. No. 191492, July 4, 2016, Perez, J
Summary: Petitioner filed an action for recovery of possession
and ownership of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan.
Respondent, opposed claiming that they were in possession of
such property for 80 years. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for failure to file
appellants brief. The SC affirmed. It ruled that the simple
negligence of the counsel in failing to file an appellant’s brief
binds the counsel and that the failure to file an appellant’s brief
results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the
cause for its dismissal.
Facts: Petitioner initiated an action for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages against respondents Emilio
Costales, Susana Isidro, Rodolfo Isidro, Marcelo Isidro, and
Roberto Cerane before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 45. She alleged that she is the
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan
under a TCT and due to respondent’s encroachment she was
compelled to file a case against them to protect her rights
thereon. To support her claims, petitioner appended in her
complaint a copy of the relocation survey. Respondents
assailed the ownership of the petitioner on the disputed
property. They asserted that they, together with their
predecessors-in-interest, were in possession of the subject
property for over 80 years already. They likewise denied
having knowledge of any relocation survey conducted on the
property which was made the basis of the petitioner in filing her
complaint.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the case. It ruled that
respondents were occupying the disputed portion for 52 years
already and the action of the petitioner to remove them from
the said lot is already barred by laches. The MR was denied.
On appeal, the CA to consider the appeal abandoned and
dismissed since petitioner was able to file her Appellant's Brief
only on 19 June 2009 or 139 days after the lapse of the
reglementary period.
Issue: WON the CA erred erred in dismissing the appeal for
petitioner's failure to file the appellant's brief
seasonably.1âwphi1
Decision:
No. Expounding on the discretion of the appellate court to
dismiss or allow the appeal to proceed despite belated service
and filing of the required brief, the Court in Diaz v. People, 691
SCRA 139 (2013), held: The usage of the word may in Section
1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal upon
failure to file the appellant’s brief is not mandatory, but
discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the required
number of copies of the appellant’s brief within the time
provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate
effect of causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. This
means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is
lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the
appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the appellant’s brief,
when the circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to
dismiss the appeal, then, the CA is bound to exercise its sound
discretion upon taking all the pertinent circumstances into due
consideration.
We find no reason to disturb the appellate court’s exercise of
discretion in dismissing the appeal. We perused the
explanation proffered by petitioner and we found nothing that
would compel us to reverse the appellate court. The attribution
of negligence to the counsel does not automatically shield the
client from adverse consequence of her own negligence and
relieve her from the unfavorable result of such lapse. Truly, a
litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his
case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in
the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in contact
with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely
on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough.
The failure to file Appellant’s Brief, though not jurisdictional,
results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the
cause for its dismissal. We must emphasize that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost. In the present case, petitioner
failed to file the required brief within the period prescribed
under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules. Thus, the appellate
court rightly considered her appeal abandoned and
consequently dismissed the same.
Development Bank of the Philippine vs. Carpio
G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017, Mendoza, J:
Summary: Abad, et al represented by Te filed a complaint for
delivery of certificates of title against DBP and GFSME
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into. The RTC
granted the writ of seizure. DBP filed a MTD and Quash the
writ of seizure, which was granted by the RTC. DBP filed a
motion for writ of execution for the return of the titles, which
was granted by the RTC. Due to Abad,et. al’s non-delivery,
DVP filed a motion to call on plaintiff’s surety bond. The RTC
denied the motion. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petitition,
applying Section 20, Rule 57. The SC denied the petition. It
Page 23 of 64
ruled that pertinent positive rules being present here, they
should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity
Facts: Dabay Abad, Hatab Abad, Omar Abas, Hanapi
Abdullah, Rojea Ab Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex Abedin, et
al.( (Abad, et al.), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Manuel
L. Te, filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title,
damages, and attorney's fees against petitioner Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Guarantee Fund for Small
and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. They
alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for
safekeeping pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into
with DBP and prayed for the issuance of a writ of seizure. The
RTC granted the writ of seizure. DBP filed its Omnibus Motion
to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure8 on the
ground of improper venue, among others. The RTC granted
the MTD. DBP and GFSME filed their Joint Motion to Order
Plaintiffs to Return Titles to Defendants. The RTC granted the
motion.
Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court praying, among others, for the nullification and reversal
of the January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC. The Court
dismissed the petition. DBP filed its Motion for Writ of
Execution16 of the January 27, 2003 Order before the RTC. On
December 16, 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of
Execution
Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of title by Abad, et
al., DBP filed its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety
Bond,19 dated February 3, 2004, praying for the release of the
bond issued by CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained
as a result of the failure to return the 228 certificates of title.
RTC denied the subject motion explaining that the resolution of
the motion was no longer part of its residual power. On appeal,
the CA dismissed the petition. It considered the RTC decision
as final and executory. It added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court provided that the claim for damages against the
bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected
or before the judgment became executory.
Issue: WON the CA erred in its blind adherence to and strict
application of Section 20, Rule 57 of the ROC.
Decision
No. Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court
to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent
litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal,
provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already
been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal
or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42, before the CA
gives due course to the petition. The “residual jurisdiction” of
the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of
the original records or the records on appeal. In eitherinstance,
the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow
the withdrawal of the appeal.
Before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction
over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted;
the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party
appealed therefrom. In this case, there was no trial on the
merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and
respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as
the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that no appeal
may be taken from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of
where no appeal has even been filed. In Strongworld
Construction Court elucidated on the difference between a
dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice: We
distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without
prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the
complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal
without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal
with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal. x x x Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
enumerates the grounds for which a motion to dismiss may be
filed, viz.: Section 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is
improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to
sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g)
That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading
has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with.
DBP must be reminded that equity, “which has been aptly
described as a ‘justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity.” As the Court has stated in
Lim Tupas v. CA, 193 SCRA 597 (1991), “[e]motional appeals
for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot
justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains
in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient
days of the Roman jurists — and is now still reverently
observed — is ‘aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.’”
Canton vs. City of Cebu and/or Metro Cebu Development
Project
G.R. No. 152898, February 12, 2007, Carpio, J:
Summary: Petitioner filed a case of forcible entry against
respondent. Respondent averred that petitioners have no claim
of ownership and possession of such land because the
disputed area is a foreshore land. The MTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. The RTC reversed the MTC. It ruled that the area
is a foreshore land is not subject of any foreshore lease
Page 24 of 64
agreement between the government and any private individual.
The CA issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for failure
to comply with Sec. 3, Rule 42. The SC affirmed the CA. It
ruled that the right to appeal, not being a natural right, parties
must comply with the law’s requirement.
Facts: Petitioners filed a case for forcible entry, against MCDP
and the City of Cebu before the MTC. Petitioners alleged that
respondents’ agents unlawfully entered their property and
demolished their fence. Petitioners stated that their property is
in San Roque, Talisay, Cebu and is outside the South Cebu
Reclamation Project. Petitioners showed tax declarations to
prove their ownership of the disputed area. Respondents, on
the other hand, argued that petitioners have no right of
ownership and of possession over the disputed area. The
disputed area is foreshore land which was reclaimed and
developed by respondents as part of the South Cebu
Reclamation Project.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It ruled that the only
issue raised before it is prior physical possession and not the
right to ownership or possession. Thus, respondents’ removal
of the fence on the ground of lack of a construction permit may
be legally proper but they should have secured the aid of the
court prior to entering into possession of the disputed property.
The RTC reversed the MTC. It ruled that area is foreshore land
that is not subject of any foreshore lease agreement between
the government and any private individual. Hence, the disputed
area should be considered as part of the public domain
belonging to the State irrespective of its location, whether it be
in the Municipality of Talisay or the City of Cebu.
The CA issued a resolution which dismissed the petition
outright for failure of the petitioners to attach to their petition
copies of the complaint, answer, parties’ position papers filed
with the Municipal Trial Court, and parties’ appeal memoranda
filed with the Regional Trial Court, in violation of Section 2,
Rule 42.
Issue: WON the CA erred in its application of Sec. 2, Rule 42
in outright dismissing the petition because copies of the
complaint, answer, parties’ position papers filed with the
Municipal Trial Court and parties’ appeal memoranda filed with
the Regional Trial Court were not attached.
Decision
No. Rules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not to
frustrate, justice. However, petitioners and their counsel should
bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a natural right. The
right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and it may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. A party who seeks to appeal must comply with the law’s
requirements; otherwise, he forfeits his privilege. Rules of
procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an
injustice which is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.
[I]t is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what
pleadings or material portions of the record of the case would
support the allegations in the petition. Petitioner’s discretion in
choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is
however not unbridled. The [Court of Appeals] has the duty to
check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the
submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory.
The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the [Court of
Appeals] to determine at the earliest possible time the
existence of prima facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section
3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner
fails to comply with petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioners’ counsel, instead
of submitting the pleadings required by the Court of Appeals,
continued to assert that "the complaint, or answer, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court and parties’ appeal memoranda filed
with the Regional Trial Court are not indispensable to support
the allegations in view of the clear and concise statement of
the matters in dispute by both court of origin and appellate and
the parties’ position paper."10
Our ruling in Atillo v. Bombay11 should serve as a guide to all
practitioners who ignore the Court of Appeals’ directive and
insist on their own interpretation of the Rules of Court:
[I]t is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what
pleadings or material portions of the record of the case would
support the allegations in the petition. Petitioner’s discretion in
choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is
however not unbridled. The [Court of Appeals] has the duty to
check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the
submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory.
The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the [Court of
Appeals] to determine at the earliest possible time the
existence of prima facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section
3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner
fails to comply with the submission of "documents which
should accompany the petition," it "shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof." In this case, the insufficiency of the
supporting documents combined with the unjustified refusal of
petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the
attachment requirement justified the dismissal of her petition.
Yu vs Samson-Tatad
G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, Brion, J:
Summary: The RTC convicted petitioner of estafa. Petitioner
filed MNT. Respondent denied the MNT. Petitioner filed a NOA
with the RTC alleging that she had a “fresh period” of 15 days
to appeal upon the receipt of the denial of her MNT.
Prosecution filed a MTD the appeal for being filed 10 days late
arguing that the Neypes ruling is inapplicable in criminal cases.
RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO and
a WPI to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s MTD
and execution of the decision. The SC ruled that the Neypes
ruling is applicable in criminal cases.
Facts: Sps. Casaclang filed an information for estafa against
petitioner. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. The
petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that
she discovered new and material evidence that would
exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
Page 25 of 64
Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial
for lack of merit. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days the from
November 3, 2005, receipt of the denial of her motion for new
trial. The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to
appeals in criminal cases. Prosecution filed a motion for
execution of the decision. RTC considered the twin motions
submitted for resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision. He argues that the RTC lost
jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she filed
her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule"
enunciated in Neypes.
Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of
comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since
the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a
uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. In their comment,
the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek
refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal
cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the
Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in
civil cases
Issue: WON the fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes
applies to appeals in criminal cases.
Decision:
Yes. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly
Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time,
based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file
their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh
period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.16
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes
and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil
cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd
situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right
to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that
gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates
against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard
of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests
are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be
prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and
unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time,
courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that
what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est
inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.
RULE 43: APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Santos vs. Go
G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005, Quisumbing, J:
Summary: Go filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners
as officers of FEPI for offering a property for sale knowing fully
well that the issuance of its title is impossible. Petitioners
denied that FEPI ever made any oral or written representation
to Go that it is the owner. After PI, the City Prosecutor
dismissed the case. On appeal, the DOJ reversed the City
Prosecutor. An information for estafa was filed in court.
Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the
trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for review. Accordingly, the trial court
deferred the arraignment. The CA denied the petition. The SC
affirmed the CA. It ruled that since DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal to the
CA.
Facts: Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI) entered into a Project
Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation
(MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels
of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. The
said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market
and sell the subdivision lots to the public. Go offered to buy Lot
17, Block 38 from FEPI. Go fully complied with the terms of the
Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property.
Neither did it release the TCT to Go. In several letters to its
clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the
project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who
opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject
properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate
Complaint-Affidavit for estafa before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI.
Go averred that FEPI committed estafa since it offered the
subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the
Page 26 of 64
development of the property and issuance of its corresponding
title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title
thereto had not yet been acquired and registered under the
name of FEPI at the time of sale.
Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the
contract was not executed nor were the payments made in
Pasig City. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the
project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint
venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. They further
denied that FEPI ever made any written nor oral representation
to Go that it is the owner, pointing out that Go failed to
positively identify who made such misrepresentation to him nor
did Go say where the misrepresentation was made. According
to petitioner, there being neither deceit nor misrepresentation,
there could be no damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no
probable cause exists to indict the petitioners.
In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City
had jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the Contract to
Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI’s
office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City
address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of
the project since the contract described FEPI as owner without
mentioning MSDC.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved
to dismiss the complaint for estafa. The City Prosecutor found
no misrepresentation.
Go appealed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City
Prosecutor’s findings. It ruled that under the Contract, the
petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that
FEPI was not its owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not
deny the due execution of the contract and had accepted
payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts.
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against
petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before
the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred
since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the
trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for review. Accordingly, the trial court
deferred the arraignment. The CA denied the petition. It ruled
that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed
of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of
Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers
exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper
mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case
Decision
No. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows
that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions
and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or
quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
functions. The Department of Justice is not among the
agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius. We cannot agree with petitioners’
submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of
those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to
indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners’ petition for review.
Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public
prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss
the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in
form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed
with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient
and in proper form. The decision whether to dismiss a
complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the
prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of
Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to
review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. In this
case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing
reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence.
Gonzales vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 139131, September 27, 2002, Quisumbing, J
Summary: PCMC was dropped from the rolls on account of
his failure to report to work despite written notice. Gonzales
filed a complaint with the CSC. The CSC dismissed the
complaint. The CA denied the appeal for failure to comply with
Section 6(c), Rule 43. The SC reversed the CA. It ruled that
there was substantial compliance of the rules since petitioner
had attached certified true copies of the documents supporting
his Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance
Facts: Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility
Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent
Philippine Children’s Medical Center (PCMC). Petitioner
started absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL)
and without explaining the reason for his absence to his
superiors. Ms. Jara Corazon O. Ehera, Human Resources
Management Officer III, wrote a letter-notice dated March 5,
1998 to petitioner directing him to report for work within three
(3) days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be
dropped from the rolls. Dr. Corazon D. Rivera, officer-in-charge
of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioner’s irresponsibility
and lack of concern for his work to Dr. Lillian V. Lee, Executive
Director of PCMC, recommending that petitioner be dropped
from the rolls. Despite the written letter-notice sent to him,
petitioner failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to
drop him from the rolls. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC dismissed the complaint. The decision, however,
stated that considering that the separation of petitioner was not
disciplinary in character, he may be re-employed in the same
agency at the discretion of the appointing authority.
Page 27 of 64
The CA denied the appeal for failure to comply with Section 6
(c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, 10 particularly for
failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of the
records and supporting papers.
Issue: WON the committed grave error in dismissing the
appeal of herein petitioner based on pure technicality.
Decision
Yes. In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, however, we already
held that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is
not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all
supporting papers accompanying the petition should be
certified true copies. We compared this provision with its
counterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from
the RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the
judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be certified
true copies or duplicate originals. In numerous resolutions
issued by this Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and
56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of
the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. We see no
reason why a stricter requirement should be made for petitions
under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the CA. This could not
have been intended by the framers of the rules. A contrary
ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the
underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified true
copies of the documents supporting his Motion for
Reconsideration and Compliance. As previously held,
submission of a required document with the Motion for
Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with
Section 3, Rule 46.
Jaro vs. CA, G.R. No. 127536
February 19, 2002, Carpio, J:
Summary: De Pelaez filed a complaint for prohibition against
petitioner who wants to reject them from the land alleging that
they are the tenants of the land. Petitioner countered that
respondent is not a tenant of the land for respondent never
shared in the harvests nor was respondent given any share as
payment for her work. PA ruled in favor of petitioners. DARAB
reversed the PA. The CA dismissed the petition outright since
it did not follow the form of a petition for review. The SC
granted the Jaro’s petition for review by reason of his amended
petition which amounted to substantial compliance of the rules.
Facts: De Pelaez ("respondent" for brevity) filed a complaint
for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
against petitioner before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, Provincial Adjudicator Board, Lucena City,
Quezon. Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late
Rosenda Reyes y Padua ("Rosenda" for brevity) was the
original owner of a parcel of coconut land. Rosenda allegedly
instituted respondent and her husband, the late Igmedio
Pelaez, as tenants of the land. In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes
("Ricardo" for brevity), the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to
petitioner who, respondent alleged, now wants to eject
respondent from the land. Petitioner countered that respondent
is not and had never been a tenant of the land for respondent
never shared in the harvests nor was respondent given any
share as payment for her work.
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the Provincial
Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as evidence
were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were material
to the resolution of the case
DARAB issued its decision reversing the decision 5 of the
Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB ruled that the land in
question is agricultural and the applicable agrarian law is
Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and not
Presidential Decree No. 27 which applies only to tenanted rice
or corn lands covered by Operation Land Transfer. DARAB
nonetheless found substantial evidence to show that
respondent is indeed a tenant of the land in question.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing outright
the petition. It ruled that (a) it should be in the form of a petition
for review as required by Supreme Court Revised Adm. Circ.
No. 1-95; and (b) the annexes to the petition are certified as
true xerox copy by counsel for the petitioner, and not by the
proper public official who has custody of the records, in
violation of the same Circular and Adm. Circ. No. 3-96.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission
of Amended Petition. The Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of Amended Petition of petitioner. It ruled that
considering further that non-compliance in the original petition
is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly
justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced for us to
depart from the mandatory requirements of the Circular, we
RESOLVED to DENY the motion for lack of merit.
Issue: WON the petitioner is entitled to an annulment of the
impugned decision and resolutions of the DARAB and the CA
Decision
Yes. A perusal of the decision of the DARAB does not show
that its rulings are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion. The term “grave abuse of
discretion” has a technical and settled meaning. Grave abuse
of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
power amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or the
exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive legal duty or a virtual refusal to perform such duty.
The perceived errors committed by the DARAB, if at all, merely
amount to errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. The
errors that a court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
differ from errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Such an
error does not make the court’s decision void and it may serve
only as a ground for reversal if it is shown that prejudice has
been caused by it. An error of judgment can be reviewed only
by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or
a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
Page 28 of 64
excess of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders a
judgment void or at least void-able and which error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two
reasons. First, the appeal was not in the form of a petition for
review as required by Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95. Second, the annexes attached to the petition
were neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true
copies. The annexes were only certified as true xerox copies
by the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in
contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. While we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition
deserved to be dismissed, the amended petition filed by
petitioner should have been given due course. Petitioner filed
the amended petition, now in proper form, accompanied by
annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the DARAB.
This is more than substantial compliance
In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 6 of
Rule 43 does not require that all of the supporting papers or
annexes accompanying the petition should be certified true
copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory is to attach
the clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of
the judgment or final orders of the lower courts. Not only did
petitioner attach to his amended petition and motion for
reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed DARAB
decision and resolution, petitioner also attached certified true
copies of other supporting documents. Petitioner on his own
initiative complied with the required attachments when he filed
the amended petition.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz and PiglasKamao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the
missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the
failure of the petitioners in these two cases to comply with the
required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we
found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners
therein substantially complied with the formal requirements.
We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the
Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately
dismissing the petitions “the appellate court clearly put a
premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of
the case.”
If we were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and
technical sense, as what the Court of Appeals would have it in
this case, the ends of justice would be defeated. In Cusi-
Hernandez vs. Diaz, where the formal requirements were
liberally construed and substantial compliance was recognized,
we explained that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid application of
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided. We further declared that:
“Cases should be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served
better.” In the similar case of Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we stressed the policy of the courts to
encourage the full adjudication of the merits of an appeal.
Zaragoza vs. Nobleza
G.R. No. 144560, April 13, 2004, Carpio-Morales, J:
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint,5 for Termination of Leasehold
Relationship with Damages, against respondent before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of
Iloilo City. PARAD found for respondent and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. DARAB) which affirmed
the PARAD decision.
The CA granted petitioner an "absolutely non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days, reckoned from March 15, 2000, or until
March 30, 2000" within which to file the petition for review.
Petitioner appears to have filed via registered mail his petition
for review,14 however, on April 12, 2000. The CA dismissed the
petition for being procedurally flawed, it noting that an
examination of the envelope bearing the petition15 showed that
it was mailed on April 12, 2000 or thirteen (13) days beyond
the extended period of appeal and that two of the annexes to
the petition were "mere plain copies," in violation of Section
6(c) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Issue:
WON the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal by the CA was based
on technicality thereby denying the rights of petitioner to
prosecute his case before said appellate court so that it can be
decided on the merits and not on its technicality aspect.
Decision
Petition for review is denied. Since the perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of petitioner to so
perfect his appeal rendered the questioned decision final and
executory.29 This rule is founded upon the principle that the
right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of a factual setting
which warrants a liberal application of the rules on the period of
appeal. Having been extended an additional fifteen (15) day
period within which to file his petition for review, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to strictly comply with such deadline.
That he paid the appropriate docket fee upon filing his Motion
for Extension of Time with the appellate court does not help his
cause any. The inevitable consequence of his grave
inadvertence is to render the DARAB’s decision dismissing the
case final and executory.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
Page 29 of 64
commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido
Aricayos
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, Regalado, J:
Summary: Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner. Petitioner opposed claiming that Aricayos is
not its employee. The LA declared that no ee-er relationship
exists. The NLRC rendered a decision setting aside and
remanding the case back to the LA. The SC ruled that all
references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions
should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as
the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Facts:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondent
alleges that on January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which
was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax
(VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on
the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home
The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October
25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.
Issue:
WON the SC may the petition for certiorari
Decision
No. Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at
bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to
reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of
the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows
with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number
of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the
legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor
Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently
call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P.
No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial
Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, “those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.” This would necessarily
contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal
does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such
excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC
cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by
declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those
specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
However, because of the aforementioned amendment by
transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and
impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that
procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code
the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other
court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A.
No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight
in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an
imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress
did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of
the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was
an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of
review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but
prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations
extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate
Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No.
1495/H. No. 10452.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever
since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal”
in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and
the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is
particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are
allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate
Bill No. 1495.
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere
on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the
further observations that there is a growing number of labor
cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of
fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the
Page 30 of 64
NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings;
that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component
divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor. Therefore, all references in
the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Santos vs. Committee on Claims Settlement
G.R. No. 158071. April 2, 2009
SUMMARY
This case involves a determination of whether the petitioner
government employee must retire under RA 660 or under RA
8291. GSIS was of the opinion that he should retire under 8291
as he had already retired under RA 660. When the dispute was
appealed to the CA under Rule 43, the case was dismissed.
Since the case involved a pure question of law, the CA
maintained only the SC has jurisdiction over it. The SC ruled
that CA can review on appeal even cases involving pure
questions of law.
FACTS
Petitioner was a government employee. After 21 years he
retired from DAR pursuant to RA 1616. Shortly after, he was
reemployed in the office of the deputy ombudsman. Here,
petitioner initiated the availment of early retirement under RA
660.
GSIS Operating Unit advised that petitioner could no longer
retire under RA 660, but instead could retire under RA 8291,
under which, his previous 21 years of service would no longer
be considered. Petitioner appealed to GSIS Committee on
Claims, which affirmed GSIS Operating Unit. The GSIS Board
of Trustees also maintained the same decision.
Hence, the petitioner appealed to the CA under Rule 43. The
CA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled
that the issue being what law must be applied for the
petitioner’s retirement is a pure question of law, and thus
cognizable directly by the SC.
ISSUE
Whether a case involving pure questions of law may be
reviewed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. Rule 43 is an exception to the Constitutional provision
that cases involving pure questions of law are to be brought to
the Supreme Court. Hence, Rule 43 as it stands now, gives
power to the CA to review on appeal cases involving mixed
questions of law and fact, questions of fact alone, or questions
of law alone.
Long Answer
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are
brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII of the
Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its
jurisdiction “all cases in which only an error or question of law
is involved.” It should not be overlooked, however, that the
same provision vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases
enumerated therein is prefaced by the statement that it may
“review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,”
the judgments or final orders of lower courts in the cases
therein enumerated. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid general
rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance where an
appellate review solely on a question of law may be sought in
the CA instead of this Court.
Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the
reglementary period to appeal whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As
such, a question of fact or question of law alone or a mix
question of fact and law may be appealed to the CA via Rule
43.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valencerina
G.R. No. 178343. July 14, 2014
SUMMARY
In this case, the respondent was found guilty of gross neglect
of duty due to approval of a surety bond despite not meeting
the requirements therefor. The execution of the Ombudsman
order terminating the respondent’s employment was stayed by
the CA on appeal contending that it is empowered by the rules.
The Ombudsman argues however that its rules clearly state
that no appeal can stay the execution of its orders. The SC
ruled in favor of Ombudsman.
FACTS
The respondent was one of several officers of GSIS who was
found administratively liable for gross neglect of duty. This was
because Escobel Land applied for a surety bond with GSIS so
it could secure a loan from Bear Stearns. The surety bond was
initially granted upon the endorsement of the officers of GSIS,
including respondent, however, GSIS President declared the
bond invalid and unenforceable due to irregularities. The
respondent then sent a cancellation notice to Escobel but
despite the same, Escobel was already able to secure a loan
from Bear Stearns. Escobel defaulted on its loan, hence Bear
Stearns advised GSIS of its intention to collect payment.
The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of gross neglect
of duty. Respondent appealed to the CA via Rule 43. During
the pendency of the appeal, Ombudsman ordered the GSIS
President to execute the order dismissing the respondent. The
respondent countered with a motion for injunction which the
CA granted. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Page 31 of 64
Whether the CA may by way of injunction, stay the execution
of Ombudsman order.
RULING
Short Answer
No. While the Rules of Court state that appeals cannot stay the
execution of the decision appealed unless otherwise ordered
by the CA, the Ombudsman procedures clearly state that
appeals shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Between the Rules of Court and the Ombudsman procedures,
the latter must necessarily prevail, it being in the nature of a
special law.
Long Answer
Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Procedures:
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
Based on the aforequoted provision, it is clear that the OMB’s
June 8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty of removal on
Valencerina was immediately executory, notwithstanding the
pendency of his appeal.
Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules — which provides that “[t]he
appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals
shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just” —
would not apply in this case for the following reasons:
First, Section 3,50 Rule V of the OMB Rules of Procedure
provides that the Rules may apply suppletorily or by analogy
only when the procedural matter is not governed by any
specific provision in the said rules
Second, it is a fundamental legal principle that when two rules
apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed
for the said case must prevail over the other.
Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. As such, the CA cannot stay the
execution of decisions rendered by the said office when the
rules the latter so promulgates categorically and specifically
warrant their enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making
authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and
statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded.
Moran, Jr. vs. Office of the President of the Philippines
G.R. No. 192957. September 29, 2014
SUMMARY
A decision of the DTI Sec under the Consumer Act, which was
in favor of the petitioner, was appealed to the OP. In the OP,
the decision was adverse to the petitioner. Hence, the
petitioner filed a certiorari case arguing that the OP did not
have appellate jurisdiction over the DTI Sec decision as under
the Consumer Act, such decision was to be reviewed by the
proper court thru certiorari, and not by the OP. The SC ruled
that the OP did not have appellate jurisdiction over the case
and the proper remedy was certiorari petition to the CA.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent PGA
Cars for refund of the purchase price of his BMW car due to
the latter’s imperfections. The complaint was filed in the
Consumer’s Arbitration Office (CAO) pursuant to the
Consumer Act of PH. CAO decided in favor of petitioner. The
case was appealed to the DTI Secretary, which dismissed the
appeal. The case was further appealed to the Office of the
President (OP), which ruled in favor of private respondent PGA
Cars.
The petitioner filed a certiorari petition with the CA questioning
the appellate jurisdiction of the OP to review the decision of the
DTI Sec. The CA dismissed the petition for being an improper
remedy. Hence, this present petition.
Petitioner argued that the Consumer Act provides that
decisions of the DTI Sec may be reviewed thru a petition for
certiorari by the “proper court”. In view thereof, the OP is not
the proper court referred to in the law.
ISSUE
Whether the OP does not have appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of the DTI Sec under the Consumer Act.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, the law clearly states that decisions of the DTI Sec
can be reviewed only by the proper court thru a certiorari
petition, and such court is not the OP. Second, the
administrative control of the OP over administrative bodies by
way of appellate jurisdiction is not availing when there is a
special law that specifically indicates a mode of appeal.
Long Answer
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by
Administrative Order No. 18,14 Series of 1987. Section 1
thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an
appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty
(30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from…
We interpreted the above provision and declared that “a
decision or order issued by a department or agency need not
be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a
special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly
provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI
Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the “proper
court.” Hence, private respondent should have elevated the
case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.
Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Keppel Philippines Marine,
Inc.
G.R. No. 177382. February 17, 2016
Page 32 of 64

SUMMARY
The petitioner filed a case for corporate rehabilitation in the
RTC, which was denied. The petitioner’s appeal involving did
not implead the creditors of the company, which is required by
Rule 43. In view thereof, the CA dismissed the appeal, which
was affirmed by the SC because noncompliance with the rules
of appeal laid out under Rule 43 is a ground for dismissal of
the appeal.
FACTS
Petitioner Viva Shipping filed a petition for Corporate
Rehabilitation before the RTC. The RTC denied the petition as
it found that the petition failed to show the company’s viability
and feasibility for rehabilitation.
The petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA under Rule 43.
In the appeal, only the judge of the RTC was impleaded as
appellee and did not include the creditors of the company, as
required by Rule 43. However, the petitioner did serve copies
of the petition to some but not all of its creditors. In view
thereof, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence this present
petition. Petitioner prayed for the relaxation of rules to allow the
appeal to proceed.
ISSUE
Whether the rules on appeal may be relaxed to allow the
appeal of the rehabilitation case despite the creditors not being
impleaded.
RULING
Short Answer.
No. First, failure to comply with the rules of appeal under Rule
43 is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Second, in a
rehabilitation case, the creditors are all indispensable parties.
In their absence, no determination of the case can be had.
There can be no substantial justice to speak of allowing the
relaxation of rules when petitioner continues to fail to implead
all its creditors even in its amended complaint.
Long Answer
Rule 43 prescribes the mode of appeal for corporate
rehabilitation cases:
Sec. 5. How appeal taken.—Appeal shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with
the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy
thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a
quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of
Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. . . . .
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall
(a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and
issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c)
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of
such material portions of the record referred to therein and
other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material
dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.
Petitioner did not comply with some of these requirements.
First, it did not implead its creditors as respondents. Instead,
petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule 43. Second, it did
not serve a copy of the Petition on some of its creditors,
specifically, its former employees. Finally, it did not serve a
copy of the Petition on the Regional Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s Rule 43
Petition as a consequence of noncompliance with procedural
rules. Rule 43, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit of costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
The Rules of Court requires petitioner to implead respondents
as a matter of due process. Under the Constitution, “[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of the law.” An appeal to a corporate rehabilitation
case may deprive creditor stakeholders of property. Due
process dictates that these creditors be impleaded to give
them an opportunity to protect the property owed to them.
Creditors are indispensable parties to a rehabilitation case,
even if a rehabilitation case is non-adversarial
RULE 44: ORDINARY APPEALED CASES
Mendoza vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc.
G.R. No. 165575. February 2, 2011
SUMMARY
This case involves an annulment of foreclosure proceedings.
Since the case was dismissed in the RTC for failure to
prosecute within reasonable time, the case was appealed.
However, the appeal was dismissed for the appellant’s brief did
not comply with the requirements of Rule 44. The SC affirmed
the decision of the CA.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure
proceedings initiated by respondent for lack of the required
notice. However, in the RTC, the case was dismissed for
failure of the petitioner to prosecute within reasonable time.
The petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.
On appeal, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that appellant’s brief did not comply with the rules. The
following were lacking in the appellant’s brief:
(1) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the
arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
references to the pages where they are cited; (2) an
assignment of errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references to
the page of the report at which the case begins and page of
Page 33 of 64
the report on which the citation is found; (4) page references to
the record in the Statement of Facts and Statement of the
Case.
The CA dismissed the appeal in view thereof.
ISSUE
Whether failure to include subject index, assignment of errors,
and page references to the record in the Statement of Facts is
a ground to dismiss the appeal.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. As the right to appeal is not a natural right, but merely a
statutory right, it must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down by the rules. Failure to comply with the requirements is a
ground to dismiss the appeal.
Long Answer
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.28 An appeal being a purely statutory right,
an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court.
The Appellants’ Brief of petitioners did not have a subject
index. The subject index functions like a table of contents,
facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready reference.
The subject index makes readily available at one’s fingertips
the subject of the contents of the brief so that the need to
thumb through the brief page after page to locate a party’s
arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to
be found and considered, is obviated.
The Appellants’ Brief had no assignment of errors, but
petitioners insist that it is embodied in the “Issues” of the brief.
The requirement under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure for an “assignment of errors” in paragraph
(b) thereof is different from a “statement of the issues of fact or
law” in paragraph (e) thereof. The statement of issues is not to
be confused with the assignment of errors, since they are not
one and the same; otherwise, the rules would not require a
separate statement for each.
The Statement of Facts was not supported by page references
to the record. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a
page reference to the record, it may be presumed to be
without support in the record and may be stricken or
disregarded altogether. The assignment of errors and page
references to the record in the statement of facts are important
in an Appellant’s Brief as the absence thereof is a basis for the
dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Mercado vs. Espina
G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013
SUMMARY
This case involves a dispute on who was the true owner of the
subject property. Petitioners argued that they were the true
owners being the lawful heirs of the previous owner. The
respondent argued he was the true owner on the force of a
valid sale. The controversy arose when the motion to dismiss
filed by the respondents against the amended complaint of the
petitioners was denied by the RTC but on certiorari was
granted by the CA. The petitioners did not oppose the filing of
the motion for being filed out of time, however, when they
appealed the certiorari decision, they raised the argument. The
SC denied the petition for being barred by estoppel.
FACTS
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of
property on the ground that they were the heirs of the lawful
owner. On the other hand, the respondents claimed that they
were the owners as they bought the same as well as registered
them under Torrens system.
In the RTC, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction as the complaint did not allege the assessed
value of the property. The motion was denied. Respondents
filed a certiorari petition with the CA, which was also denied.
Meanwhile, by leave of court, the petitioners were able to
amend the complaint to include allegation of assessed value of
the property.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss amended complaint on
the grounds of prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title, and
failure to state cause of action. RTC denied the motion. On
certiorari, the CA granted the petition of the respondents.
Hence this present petition for with the SC.
In the petition for review, the petitioners alleged for the first
time that the motion to dismiss amended complaint was filed
out of time.
ISSUE
Whether an argument not raised in the lower courts may be
raised for the first time on appeal.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Arguments not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised
on appeal because they are barred by estoppel.
Long Answer
There is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents’
Motion to dismiss petitioners’ Amended Complaint was not
raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue
raised in their Comment to respondents’ petition for certiorari
filed with the CA. It was only this matter was raised. It is well
established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by
estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process
impel the adoption of this rule.
Del Rosario vs. Bonga
G.R. No. 136308. January 23, 2001
SUMMARY
This case involves an action for rescission of the contract of
sale. In the RTC proceedings, the petitioner argued that the
respondent alone cannot rescind the contract, it must both her
and her spouse. On appeal, petitioner changed theory and
argued that the respondent did not have the right to rescind
because she was not the owner of the property in the first
place, the property being illegally acquired from an NHA
Page 34 of 64
awardee. The CA dismissed the appeal which was affirmed by
the SC due to changing of theory is not allowed.
FACTS
Petitioner purchased the apartment unit owned by respondent.
The payment arrangement was a down payment or 130k was
to be paid upfront and the remaining 200k shall be paid within
12 months. The down payment was paid but the balance was
not, while the apartment was already in the possession of the
petitioner.
Respondent filed an action to rescind contract in the RTC. In
this action, the theory of the petitioner was that the respondent
alone did not have the right to rescind, but that rescission must
be done both by her and her spouse. The RTC ruled in favor of
the respondent.
On appeal, the petitioner changed his theory. He alleged that
the respondent did not have the right to rescind because
respondent’s husband acquired the property illegally from an
awardee of the National Housing Authority. The CA dismissed
the appeal as the theory was being raised for the first time.
ISSUE
Whether a theory may be raised for the first time on appeal.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Basic considerations of due process impel that theories not
raised in the proceedings of the lower court cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. There are exceptions to the rule
such as lack of jurisdiction, plain error, or developments in
jurisprudence. This case is not covered by any of the
exceptions.
Long Answer
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it
has been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at
that late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this
rule.
Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no
question may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not
raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be
raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue
not properly raised during trial when there is plain error.10
Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are
jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the
issues raised present a matter of public policy. The case does
not fall into any of the exceptions.
Lianga Lumber Company vs. Lianga Timber Co., Inc.
No. L-38685. March 31, 1977
SUMMARY
This case involves determination on which has the authority to
conduct logging activities on the municipality of Tagabaca,
which is the border between Surigao and Agusan. Petitioner is
the licensee of Agusan while respondent on Surigao. In the
lower court, the argument of respondent was that it is
authorized by his license. On appeal, he changed his theory
and argued that based on forestry map, Tagabaca is part of
Surigao, and not of Agusan. The SC ruled that respondent is
barred from changing his argument.
FACTS
Petitioner was the licensee of a timber concession in Agusan.
Respondent was the licensee of another timber concession in
Surigao, which includes the municipality of Tagabaca.
Tagabaca is the border between Agusan and Surigao.
Respondent’s agents entered Tagabaca and prevented the
laborers of the petitioner from entering the same. Thus, the
petitioners filed an injunction in the RTC. The respondent
claimed that the disputed area was part of their concession.
In the RTC proceedings, the respondent’s argument was that
Tagabaca had always been part of their concession because it
was part of their timber license. The court granted the
injunction on the ground that Tagabaca as fixed by law (Act
1693) was part of Agusan, hence part of petitioner’s
concession.
On appeal, the respondent maintained the same argument.
The CA affirmed the RTC and denied the appeal. Interestingly,
the CA allowed 4 MRs to be filed here, in each motion deciding
differently.
On the first MR filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the
RTC. On the second MR filed by petitioner, the CA again
affirmed the RTC. On the third MR filed by respondents, the
CA reversed the RTC. On the final MR filed by petitioner, the
CA decided to remand the case to the RTC.
Hence this present petition with the SC. In the petition for
review with the SC, the respondent had a change of theory.
Accordingly, based on the forestry map, Tagabaca is part of
Surigao and therefore part of its concession license.
ISSUE
Whether parties may be allowed to change their theories on
appeal.
HELD
Short Answer
No. For the parties to raise an issue for the first time on appeal,
it is necessary that it be within the issue made by the parties in
their pleadings.
Long Answer
Since the issue raised in the court a quo, on the basis of the
evidence presented and upon which the court rendered its
judgment, is whether or not the contested area is located within
the province of Surigao, such question could not now be
changed by private respondent on appeal. Well settled is the
rule that questions which were not raised in the lower court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In order that the
question may be raised on appeal, it is essential that it be
within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings.
Consequently, when a party deliberately adopts a certain
theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the
lower court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal because to permit him to do so will be unfair to the
adverse party.
Indeed, the petitioners would have no more opportunity to
present further evidence, material to the new theory, which
Page 35 of 64
they could have done had they been aware earlier of the new
theory at the time of the hearing before the trial court, since a
reopening for that purpose would be out of the question after
the appeal. In other words, in the interest of justice and within
the sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may change
his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.
Sy vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
SUMMARY
In an action for declaration of nullity, the ground raised by the
petitioner was psychological incapacity, however on appeal,
she changed it to lack of marriage license. The SC allowed the
same since substantial justice requires.
FACTS
Filipina, herein petitioner, first filed an action for separation of
properties on the ground of abandonment by his husband. The
RTC granted the petition. Subsequently, an action for legal
separation was filed by Filipina, which was also granted by the
RTC. Now, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage due to psychological incapacity. The RTC
denied the petition. Filipina appealed, but the CA affirmed the
RTC decision.
Filipina further appealed to the SC, but with a different ground
this time. She now alleged that the marriage was void because
there was no marriage license at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
ISSUE
Whether the party may be allowed to raise for the first time on
appeal an issue not raised in the lower court.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. As an exception to the general rule that no issues may be
raised for the first time on appeal, the court may allow such
when substantial justice plainly requires.
Long Answer
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise
an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules,
noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist
to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said
that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and
rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would
be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities
should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the case at bar
requires that we address the issue of the validity of the
marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner
claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license,
in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and
violent conflict between the parties.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was
issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without
a marriage license.
Maricalum Mining Corporation vs. Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation
G.R. No. 158332. February 11, 2008
SUMMARY
Petitioner who was impleaded in the collection suit filed by
respondent, on the allegation that it is merely an alter ego of
Marinduque Mining was not able to appeal due to procedural
infirmities. However, its co-defendants PNB and DBP were
able to secure judgment from the SC that the allegation of alter
ego has no basis as the defendants have separate
personalities. The SC said such benefit must also inure to
petitioner even if it failed to appeal, as among the parties, they
have commonality of interest.
FACTS
Remington filed a complaint for payment against Marinduque
Mining. However, all of the assets of the Marinduque Mining
have already been foreclosed by PNB and DBP which were all
transferred to Maricalum, herein petitioner. In view thereof,
Remington impleaded PNB, DBP, and the petitioner.
Remington’s theory was that the doctrine of piercing the veil
must be applied as the petitioner, PNB, and DBP were merely
alter egos of Marinduque Mining.
The RTC ruled in favor of Remington. Petitioner Maricalum,
PNB, and DBP filed a consolidated appeal which the CA
dismissed. Subsequently, PNB and DBP on separate actions
for review with the SC, appealed the decision of the CA. The
petitioner also attempted to file an appeal with the SC but was
denied due to procedural infirmities.
Meanwhile, the petitions for review of PNB and DBP were
separately granted by the SC, and dismissed the complaint of
Remington. While as to the petitioner, a writ of execution was
issued by the RTC. This prompted the petitioner to file a
petition for certiorari arguing that the dismissal of the cases
against PNB and DBP must inure to it.
ISSUE
Whether the benefit of judgement appealed may inure to the
party who did not appeal.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. By way of exception, the benefit of judgment may inure to
the party who did not appeal, if between or among the parties,
there is commonality of interest.
Long Answer
Indeed, one party’s appeal from a judgment will not inure to the
benefit of a co-party who failed to appeal; and as against the
latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however,
one exception stands out: where both parties have a
commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be
the vicarious appeal of the other.
The Court identified the circumstances indicative of a
commonality in the interests of the parties, such as when: a)
their rights and liabilities originate from only one source or title;
Page 36 of 64
b) homogeneous evidence establishes the existence of their
rights and liabilities; and c) whatever judgment is rendered in
the case or appeal, their rights and liabilities will be affected,
even if to varying extents.
The adjudication rendered in DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA is
plain: private respondent has no cause of action against DBP,
PNB and their transferees, including petitioner, for they are
corporate entities separate and distinct from Marinduque
Mining, and cannot be held liable for the latter’s obligations to
private respondent
RULE 45: APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT
TERESITA PACAÑA CONEJOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and EUTIQUIO PLANIA
[G.R. No. 149473. August 9, 2002. BELLOSILLO, J.]
FACTS:
Respondent Plania and petitioner Conejos agreed to purchase
a particular lot where each of them would pay half its price then
divide the lot equally between them. After compliance with his
obligation in the deal, respondent Plania authorized petitioner
Conejos to sell his part of the land to one Gavan but Plania
never received the proceeds of the sale. Hence, respondent
Plania filed Complaint for specific performance/rescission with
damages with the MTCC.
The MTCC dismissed the complaint ruling that Plania had
failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegations. The court noted that the official receipts offered in
evidence by Plania were not issued in his name but in the
name of Conejos. It lent more credence to the testimony of
Conejos that the Memorandum of Agreement had been
mutually abandoned by the parties
The RTC reversed the MTCC
Petitioner Conejos filed a MR but the same was denied, hence
she filed a Petition for Review with the CA. Finding no merit in
her arguments, CA affirmed the RTC concluding that there was
dearth of evidence that the MOA had been mutually
abandoned by the parties. Petitioner's MR having been denied,
she filed special civil action of certiorari before SC
ISSUE: W/N a special civil action of certiorari is the proper
remedy availed by petitioner
RULING: NO. Special civil action of certiorari is not the proper
remedy availed by petitioner
Petitioner's remedy would have been to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court counting 15 days
from receipt of the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner had until 28 June 2001 to file a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court. However, petitioner filed on 13
August 2001 a special civil action of certiorari 1 month and 25
days after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period.
Apparently, petitioner resorted to this special civil action after
failing to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. This
cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner
already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
In the case, there is no reason why the question being raised
by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not
have been raised on appeal.
In addition, the arguments she cited are without merit and are
in fact mere rehash of the issues raised before and judiciously
resolved by the courts a quo. The issues require a review of
the
factual findings which, verily, could not be done because this
Court is not a trier of facts.
More importantly, a reading of the records of the case
strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate
courts did not abuse their discretion in assessing their factual
findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by the
records of the case and grounded in law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and MA. MILAGROS G.
WILSON, vs. CA, MA. LOURDES DEUTSCH, NERCY
DEMETERIO and EXCEL MANGUBAT
[G.R. No. 132396. September 23, 2002. QUISUMBING, J.]
FACTS:
The RTC convicted Respondents Nercy Demeterio, Excel
Mangubat and Ma. Lourdes Deutsch of the crime of estafa for
convincing Milagros G. Wilson to buy a portion of beach
property, assuring her that the said property is free from all
liens, encumbrances and the documents or papers thereto
were all in order, when in truth and in fact the said property
was under the coverage of the CARP Law.
Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat interposed a timely appeal
to the Court of Appeals
The CA modified the trial court's judgment affirming that
Demetrio and Mangubat acted in conspiracy and is guilty of
estafa, but it acquitted Deutsch whose crime has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Milagros Wilson filed a MR which was denied by the CA. On
the other hand, Demeterio and Mangubat filed their MR which
was denied by the CA as well. Hence, this petition on certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Rule 45 is the proper remedy filed by
Milagros Wilson
2. Whether or not the petition filed by Demeterio and
Mangubat is filed on time
RULING:
Page 37 of 64

1. NO. Rule 45 is not the proper remedy. (In this case, SC
brushed aside technicalities and treated this petition as
one under Rule 65. However, despite such, the petition is
still unmeritorious.)
Petitioner Wilson alleges abuse of discretion by the Court of
Appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court when it acquitted
Ma. Lourdes Deutsch. At the outset, it should be recalled that
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 are two separate and
distinct remedies.
Under Rule 45, a petition brings up for review errors of
judgment while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 concerns
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under
Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 may be considered as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, where it is alleged that the respondents
have abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in
this case.
Generally, it is the OSG who can bring actions on behalf of the
state in criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and/or
the Court of Appeals.
In People vs. Santiago, however, we said the action must be
filed in the name of the private complainant and not of the
People of the Philippines.
For the purpose of expeditious but inexpensive disposition of
the case, and granting that Wilson has sufficient interest as a
"person aggrieved" to file the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65, we shall consider the allegations in her petition,
pursuant to the underlying spirit of liberal construction of the
rules. Brushing technicalities aside, however, even if we treat
this petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
conclusion in our view is the same: the petition is without merit.
2. NO. The petition filed by Demeterio and Mangubat is not
filed on time
A perusal of the statement of material dates in the said petition
indicates that the petitioners received a copy of the CA
decision as early as November 25, 1997. However, they filed
their Motion, for Reconsideration 4 months from the receipt of
the decision, way beyond 15 days' period within which to file a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45.
Comparatively, a party is given 60 days to petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. It is clear, therefore, that the decision of the
Court of Appeals has long become final and executory as
against Demetrio Mangubat. For they allowed 120 days to
lapse before they filed their motion for reconsideration. Thus,
denial of their petition is in order. Clearly, they have lost their
remedy of appeal. Moreover, after going over the
HENRY S. OAMINAL vs. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA
S. CASTILLO
[G.R. No. 152776. October 8, 2003. PANGANIBAN, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection
against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC of
Ozamis City. The complaint prayed that respondents be
ordered to pay P1,500,000.00 by way of liquidated damages
and P150,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Acting upon the merits of the case, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to pay
P1,500,000 by way of liquidated damages and P20,000 by way
of attorney’s fees
Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main,
they raised the issue of whether the trial court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over them.
The CA issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from issuing a writ of
execution. CA also set aside trial court’s decision, as it did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the
summons had been improperly served on them.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner Oaminal contends that the certiorari Petition filed by
respondents before the CA was improper, because other
remedies in the ordinary course of law were available to them.
Thus, he argues that the CA erred when it took cognizance of
and granted the Petition
ISSUE: Whether respondents' recourse to a Petition for
Certiorari was appropriate when the remedy of appeal was
available?
RULING: YES. In this case, recourse to a Petition for Certiorari
was appropriate when the remedy of appeal was available.
Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a court
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. As a condition for the filing of a petition for
certiorari, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
additionally requires that "no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" must be
available. It is axiomatic that the availability of the right of
appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for
certiorari
Here, the trial court's judgment was a final Decision that
disposed of the case. It was therefore a fit subject of an
appeal. However, instead of appealing the Decision,
respondents filed a Petition for certiorari
Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a
petition for review under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition was
filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Besides, it
is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the
relief sought.
The present case satisfies all the above requisites. The
Petition for certiorari before the CA was filed within the
reglementary period of appeal. A review of the records shows
that respondents filed their Petition, four days after they had
Page 38 of 64
received the RTC Decision. Verily, there were still 11 days to
go before the lapse of the period for filing an appeal. Aside
from charging grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction,
they likewise assigned as errors of the RTC's allegedly
unconscionable and iniquitous award of liquidated damages.
We find the latter issue particularly significant, considering that
the trial court awarded P1,500,000 as liquidated damages
without the benefit of a hearing and out of an obligation
impugned by respondents because of petitioner's failure to
pay. Hence, there are enough reasons to treat the Petition for
certiorari as a petition for review
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. vs. CA, Robert Peuker and Ma.
Luz Trumpeta Esmeralda
[G.R. No. 119393. April 26, 2000]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the RTC a petition entitled, "In
the Matter of the Petition for Correction of entry in the Birth
Certificate of the Minor Child Michael Esmeralda Peuker,
Robert Peuker and Maria Luz Trumpeta Esmeralda,
petitioners"
The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong to correct the record of birth of
Michael Esmeralda Pueker by deleting the entry which states:
“May 1, 1980 - Pres. Roxas, Capiz'” under "Date and Place of
Marriage of Parents".
Believing that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law and
evidence, the OSG filed a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner contended that the trial court committed
serious error and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
the petition for correction of entry for lack of merit and want of
jurisdiction. It averred that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition as it is defective in form and
substance for failure to implead the local civil registrar, and for
lack of publication.
The CA dismissed petitioner's appeal. The appellate court
ruled that the appeal should have been addressed to the
Supreme Court, considering that what was being raised was
only a question of law.
Undaunted, OSG filed the instant petition, alleging that the
appellate court gravely erred in dismissing its appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not OSG erred in filing a notice of appeal
before the Court of Appeals
RULING: YES. OSG erred in filing a notice of appeal before
the CA
The resolution of said issue does not require an evaluation of
proof but on a consideration of the applicable legal provisions
and case law.
We agree with the appellate court's ruling that if an appeal is
taken from the RTC to the CA and appellant raises only a
question of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The reason is that issues purely of law are
exclusively reviewable by this Court.
In the case at bar, the procedure resorted to by petitioner is
incorrect. Petitioner merely filed a notice of appeal which is
directed to the CA, and raised therein only a question of law.
But, to reiterate, the CA does not exercise jurisdiction over
appeals from the RTC which raise purely a question of law.
Appeals of this nature should be elevated to the Supreme
Court. Petitioner should have filed directly with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. But it chose to file its notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, the appellate court did not err in
dismissing petitioner's appeal.
IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ACADEMY/ DR. JOSE
PAULO E. CAMPOS vs. EVELYN E. CAMILON
[G.R. No. 188035. July 2, 2014. VILLARAMA, JR., J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA) is an
educational corporation where respondent Evelyn Camilon was
an employee of ICA for 12 years
The ICA's Treasurer, Shirley Enobal, received a complaint from
the father of one student who claimed that his son was denied
issuance of an examination permit for nonpayment of tuition
fees despite the fact that the said fees had already been paid
Petitioner Campos placed respondent under suspension
pending investigation of the case in light of her duties and
responsibilities as Chief Accountant of ICA
Respondent Camilon denied any involvement in the
irregularities committed and claimed that she had no intention
of profiting at the expense of the school or of betraying the
trust reposed on her by the corporation.
Petitioners terminated the services of respondent after finding
that respondent was negligent and remiss in her duties as the
superior officer
Respondent Camilon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
other money claims against petitioners
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring ICA guilty of illegal
dismissal since petitioners failed to present substantial
evidence to prove that respondent has been negligent in her
duties as Chief Accountant.
Petitioners appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA finding
respondent's dismissal and preventive suspension legal
Respondent Camilon appealed to the CA
The CA rendered a Decision affirming the ruling of the NLRC
but with the modification that petitioners are held liable to pay
separation pay to respondent.
Not agreeing with the ruling, petitioners filed the present
petition claiming that the CA erred in awarding separation pay
to respondent who was dismissed because of her gross and
habitual negligence, a more serious offense than mere
inefficiency at work. Petitioners assert that respondent is not
entitled to separation pay since her negligence resulted in a
substantial amount of loss and destruction of official receipts
and schools records. Petitioners also claim that separation pay
cannot be justified on the basis of respondent's length of
service considering the gravity of the offense committed.
Page 39 of 64
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Evelyn Camilon is entitled
to affirmative relief.
RULING: NO. Evelyn Camilon is not entitled to affirmative
relief.
Prefatorily, we note that respondent Evelyn Camilon did not
appeal or file a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of
the CA which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding her
grossly and habitually negligent in her duties for failing to
regularly pre-audit the school cashier's report, check the
entries therein and keep the custody of the petty cash fund
which negligence resulted in the school cashier's
misappropriation of school funds and students' tuition fees.
It is axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition
for certiorari is not entitled to any affirmative relief. An appellee
who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek
modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative
relief unless he has also appealed. Thus, for failure of
respondent to assail the validity of her dismissal, such ruling is
no longer in issue.
Regarding the main issue, whether or not a validly dismissed
employee is entitled to separation pay, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of ICA. Separation pay should not be conceded
to the dismissed employee based on gross and habitual
neglect of duty.
HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS
CHAN vs. PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK
G.R. No. 207266 June 25, 2014
QUICK SUMMARY:
A complaint for ownership and possession was filed by
petitioner against the respondent before the MTCC. MTCC
declared the respondent in default. Thereafter, respondent
appealed the MTCC decision before the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the appeal. Respondent filed a petition for
review under Rule 42 before the CA. The CA granted the
petition on grounds not raised by the respondent. SC ruled that
the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not
raised or assigned as errors in several instances. In the
present case, the several errors committed by the MTCC,
justify the reversal of its decision.
Facts:
The case traces its roots to the complaint for ownership and
possession filed by the Heirs of the late Paciano Yabao (Heirs
of Yabao), represented by Remedios Chan, before the MTCC
of Calbayog City (MTCC),against Paz Lentejas Van der Kolk
(Van der Kolk).
Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. She
contended that the predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of
Yabao had executed a joint affidavit, wherein they renounced
their hereditary rights over the subject lot and declared that
Faustina Yabao, mother of Van der Kolk, as its true owner.
The MTCC issued a Resolution denying the motion to dismiss
and holding that there was proper service of summons.
Subsequently, the MTCC rendered its Decision, declaring Van
der Kolk in default giving the reason that her non-filing of an
answer within the fresh 10-day period
Aggrieved, Van der Kolk appealed the MTCC decision before
the RTC, Branch 32, Calbayog City. Counsel for Van der Kolk
received the notice of the RTC Clerk of Court requiring her to
file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such
receipt. The RTC issued the Order dismissing the appeal for
failure of Van de Kolk to file the memorandum on appeal within
the period mandated by the Rules of Court. It added that the
right to appeal is a statutory privilege and one who seeks to
avail the same must comply with the requirements of the
statute or rules. Van der Kolk’s motion for reconsideration of
the above order was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
Unfazed, Van der Kolk filed a petition for review under Rule 42
before the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting
the not raised petition “on grounds not raised herein but
disclosed by the records." It stated that the MTCC erred in
granting the reliefs prayed for by the Heirs of Yabao because
they were not warranted by their complaint.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Yabao was
denied by the CA in its Resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the appellate court can render a decision
based on the grounds not raised or assigned as errors
Ruling: Yes.
The Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not
raised or assigned as errors in several instances. In the case
of Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village
Lessee Homeowners Association, Incorporated, the Court
enumerated such instances. Thus:
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other
grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the
following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution
of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and
are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned is dependent.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the observation,
analysis and conclusion of the CA. The several errors
committed by the MTCC, which when taken collectively, justify
the reversal of its December 4, 2006 Decision.
The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it
granted the reliefs prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because the
same were not warranted by the allegations in the complaint.
In the case at bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the
MTCC, merely alleged that they are the heirs of Paciano
Yabao without presenting any proof why they are the latter’s
heirs and in what degree or capacity.
Page 40 of 64
K & G MINING CORPORATION vs. AMCI AND ZCMCI
G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015
QUICK SUMMARY:
Claiming that the issuance and approval of Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement in favour of respondent was highly
irregular, petitioner filed a letter/protest with the Office of the
President. The Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB-DENR ruled in
favor of petitioner. On appeal, however, the MAB reversed the
ruling of the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB. Petitioner filed
before the CA a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Certiorari. However, the CA denied extension for its filing
has already prescribed. SC ruled that the perfection of an
appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements
is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory.
Facts:
Petitioner KGMC and respondents Acoje Mining Company
Incorporated (AMCI) and Zambales Chromite Mining Company
Incorporated (ZCMCI) are mining corporations. ZCMCI
acquired the 60 mining and thereafter filed its application for
patent and availment of rights and privileges over the mining
claims which was approved by the Bureau of Mines.
ZCMCI entered into an operating agreement with AMCI over
the former’s 60 mining claims. Thereafter, a certain Dominador
Ilagan registered with the DENR his mining claims and
assigned the same to KGMC.
The Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) informed ZCMCI
that its application for mining lease should be converted into a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) in accordance
with E.O. No. 279.
KGMC filed its letter of intent to avail for itself an MPSA before
the MGB of Region III over its mining claims. Three months
thereafter, ZCMCI submitted documents in support of an
MPSA application. The technical committee submitted its
Memorandum recommending that ZCMCI be allowed to apply
for an MPSA.
The DENR Secretary issued Department Administrative Order
No. 82, series of 1990 (DAO 1990-82), providing the
procedural guidelines on the award of MPSA through
negotiation. ZCMCI, AMCI and the government, represented
by the DENR Secretary, executed an MPSA covering ZCMCI’s
60 mining claims with an approximate area of 540 ha. The
MPSA was approved by the Office of the President (OP).
Claiming that the issuance and approval of the above MPSA
was highly irregular, KGMC filed a letter/protest with the OP.
KGMC claimed that the area covered by the subject MPSA is
not available since 540 ha thereof is in conflict with KGMC’s
Prospecting Permit Application covering a total area of 486
ha. KGMC claimed to have been denied of due process
because no publication of ZCMCI and AMCI’s MPSA was ever
made thus depriving it an opportunity to file an adverse claim.
KGMC sought the disapproval of the subject MPSA and its
remand to the concerned DENR Regional Office so that its
protest and adverse claim can be resolved. On the other hand,
ZCMCI wrote to the DENR Secretary stating that the MPSA
has already become final and executory upon its approval by
the President.
KGMC’s letter-protest was eventually forwarded to the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators. The Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB ruled
in favor of KGMC. They found that ZCMCI’s failure to file its
MPSA proposal with the MGB-DENR made the approval of its
MPSA highly irregular.
On appeal, however, the MAB reversed the ruling of the Panel
of Arbitrators of the MGB. According to the MAB, Article 3,
paragraph 3.5(b) of DAO 1989-57 did not expressly prohibit the
direct filing of an MPSA proposal before the MGB Central
Office. Aggrieved, KGMC moved for reconsideration but its
motion was denied in the MAB Resolution.
KGMC filed before the CA a Petition for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Certiorari. However, the CA denied extension
for the reason that decisions of the MAB are appealable via a
petition for review under Rule 43 and not by way of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Even assuming that certiorari is
an available remedy, the reglementary period for its filing has
already prescribed.
KGMC thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Petition. The CA denied reconsideration. Hence, the
present recourse.
Issue: Whether herein petitioner failed to timely file an appeal
Ruling: Yes.
KGMC faults its previous counsel in failing to timely file the
correct mode of appeal from the MAB resolutions and submits
that it should be excused from the repercussions of his ensuing
omissions as they amounted to gross negligence.
“It is settled rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client.”
While there is a recognized exception to the rule that is - where
the lawyer’s negligence was so gross that it results in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law51 - it is
inapplicable to the present case.
First, a counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is simple negligence. It is not one as
gross, palpable, and reckless as to deprive a party of its day in
court.
Second, in cases where the counsel’s negligence consisted of
his failure to timely file an appeal, any alleged deprivation of
due process is negated by the fact that the client had the
opportunity to be heard or was actually heard in the lower
tribunal. This was the ruling in Building Care
Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v.
Macaraeg53 where the Court found no deprivation of due
process because the client was able to fully present and argue
her case before the Labor Arbiter (LA). She was accorded the
opportunity to be heard and thus her failure to appeal the LA’s
decision cannot be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due
process.
KGMC was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her
interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial
of due process. Records show that the case took its regular
course in lower tribunals. KGMC had the opportunity to be
heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the
proceedings before the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB.
Page 41 of 64

Moreover, it is an established doctrine that the perfection of an
appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements
is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory.
RULE 46: ORIGINAL CASES
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA v. CA and MERCHANDISING
INSPECTION COMPANY, LTD.
G.R. No. 148505, February 20, 2007
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for constructive
dismissal and non-payment of backwages against respondent.
LA found that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC set
aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition for petitioner’s failure
to pay the docket and other legal fees. SC ruled that a court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
unless the docket fees are paid and non-compliance warrants
the dismissal of a petition.
Facts:
Petitioner, alleged in his petition that he was employed as a
checker by the Overseas Merchandising Inspection Company
Ltd., private respondent. However, for a period of time,
respondent company did not give him any work assignment
due to his union activities. Thus, he filed with the Arbitration
Branch, NLRC, a complaint for constructive dismissal and non-
payment of backwages.
For its part, respondent company denied the allegations in the
complaint, claiming that petitioner showed disinterest in his
work and stopped reporting to the office. Nonetheless, he
received his salary and bonus.
Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda promulgated a Decision
dismissing the charge for unfair labor practice but finding
that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Respondent company then interposed an appeal to the
NLRC. In its Decision, the NLRC set aside the judgment of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
NLRC.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari.
The appellate court promulgated its Resolution dismissing the
petition for petitioner’s failure to pay the docket and other legal
fees.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner alleged that when
he filed the petition through registered mail, he
enclosed P1,030.00 in cash as docket fee. He thus prayed that
he be allowed to pay once more the docketing fee so required.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed his petition for his failure to pay
the required docket fees.
Ruling: No.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of
petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the
full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.
xxx
The petitioner shall pay the
corresponding docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of
the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid. It is clear that
non-compliance with any of the requirements stated above
warrants the dismissal of a petition.
While the Rules of Court must be faithfully followed, however,
they may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to
relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedures. In the instant
case, however, petitioner has not shown any reason which
justifies relaxation of the Rules.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these
exceptions is present here.
Moreover, petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy. What he
should have filed with this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the same Rules.
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as
MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL vs.CA and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE.
G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent, considering his re-appointment as a demotion,
filed a protest to DOH which was ignored. Thereafter, he
brought his case to the CSC. CSC ruled in favour of
respondent and decided that his transfer is illegal. The
judgment was not enforced hence, respondent instituted in the
CA an action of mandamus to compel petitioner to comply with
the final and executory resolution of the CSC. The CA ordered
petitioners to comply with the resolution. The Solicitor
General's Office had instituted the special civil action
of certiorari at bar. It contends that the CA is not legally
competent to take cognizance of and decide the question of
damages in a mandamus suit. SC ruled that the courts have
power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other
Page 42 of 64
classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
cases falling within their specified jurisdiction.
Facts:
In 1987, a reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry
of Health commenced. At the time of the reorganization, Dr.
Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the Clinics of the
National Children's Hospital. Dr. de la Fuente received notice
from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed
"Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion, Dr.
de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization
Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to
the Civil Service Commission.
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service
Commission in a Resolution wherein it was declared that the
demotion/transfer of de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to
Medical Specialists II is illegal.
De la Fuente thereupon sent letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the
Medical Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, however,
no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr.
de la Fuente.
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-
Gozon, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the CSC and asked it to
enforce its judgment. He was however "told to file in court a
petition for mandamus because of the belief that the
Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to
enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of
"mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to
compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget
Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and
executory resolution of the CSC.
The CA required the respondents to answer. However, no
answer was filed. About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed
with the same Court a "Supplemental/Amended Petition". The
second petition described as one for "quo warranto" aside from
"mandamus". The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment
and ordered that petitioners, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-
Gozon, to comply with the resolution. But de la Fuente's prayer
for damages was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle
nor is the Court the forum for claim of damages.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the
judgment. He insisted that the Appellate Court had
competence to award damages in a mandamus action.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution, resolving de
la Fuente's motion for reconsideration, the Court ordered
setting a date for reception of evidence on de la Fuente’s claim
for damages. It based its judgment on Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which allows the award of damages in a
mandamus petition.
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the CA, the
Solicitor General's Office had instituted the special civil action
of certiorari at bar. It contends that the CA is not legally
competent to take cognizance of and decide the question of
damages in a mandamus suit.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil
action of mandamus against a public officer, to take
cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered
from the defendant officer
Ruling: Yes.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9,
B.P. 129 as the legal provision specifying the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor
General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an
explicit and specific statement regarding "actions for moral and
exemplary damages," and finding none, concluded that the
Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume
cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is
incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no
reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary
damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all;
yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and
decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of
damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases
falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's
theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for
damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages
arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of
a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter,
the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the
cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND
CLARITA CAPULONG vs.CO KING KI
G.R. No. 191694 December 3, 2014
QUICK SUMMARY
Respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioners.
The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered
a Decision in favour of respondent, declaring petitioners as
illegal occupants and not tenants of the subject property. The
PARAD denied the notice of appeal filed by petitioners for
having been filed out of time. Aggrieved, petitioners, filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed
because petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order. SC
ruled that the requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a
rule, be strictly followed. Failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory.
Facts:
Respondent Co King Ki (respondent), filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against petitioners, Ernesto, Marciano and one
Lawrence Smith (defendants) before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Respondent alleged that he is
the owner of a parcel of land located at Lubao, Pampanga.
The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, averring, among others, that they are qualified
farmer beneficiaries of the subject property and that
Page 43 of 64
respondent was no longer the owner thereof as same was
already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans Bank.
The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered
a Decision in favor of respondent, declaring defendants as
illegal occupants and not tenants of the subject property, and
directing them to vacate the same. Defendants filed their
Motion for Reconsideration which the RARAD denied.
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. The PARAD denied the
notice of appeal filed by defendants for having been filed out of
time.
Defendants sought reconsideration of the September 18, 2008
Order while respondent moved for the execution of the
Decision. The PARAD denied the defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration and granted respondent’s Motion for
Execution.
Aggrieved, petitioners, together with Ernesto and Marciano,
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA issued a
Resolution, dismissing the petition for certiorari because
petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the basis of a strict application of Section 3,
Rule46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Ruling: No.
Petitioners appeal for the liberal construction of the rules
because they will suffer insurmountably if the case would be
dismissed based on a technicality. We deny the petition.
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a
notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal
which rendered the decision, it is required, however, that said
appeal must have been filed on time. It bears reiterating that
appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory
privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must
comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting
an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a
losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision.
Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a
noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of
liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities.
They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where
suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the
correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well
served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the
procedural rules.
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORP. vs. DIAMOND
DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
[G.R. No. 204796. Feb. 4, 2015. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.]
FACTS:
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land whereby it leased the
subject property to Diamond Dragon for a 20 years pursuant to
a lease contract.
Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due. This prompted
Reicon to demand the payment of the accrued rentals and
terminate the lease contract.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages
against Reicon alleging that the Contract did not provide for its
unilateral termination by either of the parties.
Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and (2)
that Diamond lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person
having its certificate of registration revoked by the SEC
Diamond argued that improper service is not a ground to
dismiss its complaint. And, it has legal capacity to sue.
Moreover, it claimed that its legal existence cannot be attacked
except in a quo warranto petition.
The RTC ruled that Diamond's legal existence can only be
impugned in aquo warranto proceeding.
Reicon filed its MR which was denied
Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for
certiorari taken under Rule 65 of the Rules, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion upon Presiding Judge Quinagoran of the
RTC in not dismissing Diamond's complaint on the grounds
discussed in Reicon's motion to dismiss, particularly the issue
respecting Diamond's lack of legal capacity to sue.
The CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition
for certiorari should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, as private respondent,
as required under Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules.
In its Compliance, Reicon stated that the address "Suite 305,
AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet
Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City" was Diamond's address on
record in the civil case from which the certiorari petition
originated. From the institution thereof up to the filing of
Reicon's petition before the CA, Diamond has not submitted
any paper or pleading notifying the RTC of any change in its
address. As such, Reicon maintained that the service of its
petition to Diamond's address as above-indicated should be
deemed effective.
The CA dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition without passing
upon its merits based on the grounds of non-compliance with
the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
Page 44 of 64

ISSUE: Whether or not Reicon's certiorari petition before the
CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.
RULING: YES. Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was
properly served upon the person of Diamond.
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari
petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains
the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts as
well as the affidavit of service and/or filing of the person who
filed and served the petition via registered mail on behalf of
Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon's certiorari petition
had been served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its
address at "Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB
Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City," in
compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of
service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-
quote
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the
aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint
before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show
that it had since changed its address or had moved out.
Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address
in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of
the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules
as above-cited, which merely entails service of the petition
upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari
proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action,
and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari
petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that
an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari
petition outright for noncompliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through
counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of
said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon
his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.
RULE 47: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL
ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
FLORENCIA ANURAN vs. ANA AQUINO and RUFINA
ORTIZ
[G.R. No. 12397. April 2, 1918.CARSON, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino.
Defendant Ana Aquino, on the other hand, is the natural child
of the sister of deceased Ambrosio Aquino
On the death of Ambrosio Aquino, one Norberto Capina was
appointed administrator of his intestate estate. In the course of
the administration proceedings the sister of the deceased, Ana
Aquino, acted in collusion with the administrator, fraudulently
represented to the court that Ambrosio Aquino had died
intestate, leaving no heirs other than herself.
At that time, Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that
the petitioner, Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of
Ambrosio Aquino.
The court authorized and approved the delivery of all property
of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino
Florencia only knew of the intestate proceeding sometime
after. She entered her appearance in the administration
proceedings and moved that the order be set aside, and that
she be declared the sole heir of the deceased.
Motion to set aside judgment has been denied by the probate
court on the ground that the alleged fraudulent order had been
entered more than six months prior to the date of the motion.
Hence, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion to
set it aside
Florencia promptly instituted this separate action, wherein the
trial court after declaring the order null and void, in that it had
been procured by fraudulent
Respondent opposed to the separate action on the ground of
res judicata and prescription
ISSUE: Whether or not the separate action is barred by res
judicata and prescription
RULING: YES. The separate action is not barred by res
judicata and prescription
As to the contention of the Ana Aquino on prescription of this
action, it is a sufficient answer to say that the evidence clearly
discloses that it was instituted promptly and without
unreasonable delay after the discovery of the fraud perpetrated
by the defendant, acting in collusion with the administrator, and
within less than three years from the date of the entry of the
order. Section 3 of Rule 47 provides that "An action for relief on
the ground of fraud" must be brought within four years after the
right of action accrues, "but the right of action in such cases
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the
fraud."
On the contention of res judicata, the court finds that the
dismissal of the motion cannot be relied upon to sustain a
contention that the question of the validity and legality of the
original order is res ad judicata.
The courts have inherent plenary power over their own
judgments until they become final in the sense that they are
unappealable and subject to execution as of right at the
instance of the prevailing party; but that thereafter no court has
inherent power to alter, amend or vacate such a judgment in
order to correct errors of law or fact, other than mere clerical
errors.
Other apparent exceptions were limited to cases wherein
judgments were vacated on the ground that they were void
because of lack of jurisdiction or irregularity in their entry
apparent on the face of the record, or because vitiated by
fraud.
Page 45 of 64
It is well settled that equity will enjoin a party from enforcing a
judgment which he has obtained by means of fraud. Fraud will
vitiate a judgment, and a court of equity may declare it a nullity.
This form of relief is expressly recognized in section 2, Rule 47
of Rules of Court
There is no other means whereby the defeated party may
procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a
view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or
(b) it has been obtained by fraud. Lack of due process and
fraud are the grounds, which justify the decision of the probate
court a nullity.
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, ET AL. vs. CA, HON. JUDGE
RHODIE A. NIDEA, and HILDA RALLA-ALMINE
[G.R. No. 115595. Nov. 14, 1994. MENDOZA, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioners are the co-owners of the disputed property. They
acquired two-thirds of the Property from Miriam Catherine
Ralla by virtue of two deeds of absolute sale.
That at the time of the sale of the Property to the petitioners,
there was a ten-year lease contract over the property which
was scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for this reason, the
petitioners decided to await the termination of the lease before
registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name
After the expiration of the lease contract, father of petitioner
learned from the Register of Deeds that by an order of Judge
Rhodie A. Nidea, the owner's duplicate copy in the possession
of the petitioner had been declared of no further force and
effect and that a new second owner's duplicate copy of said
title has been issued to the private respondent where she
falsely and fraudulently alleged that "the owner's duplicate
copy was lost and/or destroyed during the devastation brought
by typhoon "Sisang" but in reality was in the possession of
petitioners
The RTC issued an order ordering the Register of Deeds to
issue a second owner's duplicate copy of transfer certificate.
Register of Deeds issued a new second owner's duplicate copy
to the private respondent. This decision became final and
executory
Despite repeated demands by petitioners and despite
protracted attempts at settlement, private respondent refused
to deliver or turn over to the petitioners the second owner's
duplicate copy
The CA ruled that the fraud alleged was, if at all, only intrinsic
and not extrinsic in character. An action to annul a final
judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. CA dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment of the petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fraud alleged was extrinsic to
warrant the invalidation of a final judgment
2. Whether or not a judgment otherwise final may be
annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but
also of lack of jurisdiction
RULING:
1. NO. Fraud alleged was not extrinsic to warrant the
invalidation of a final judgment
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent
Intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial such as the use of forged or false document or
perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case"
The use of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private
respondent is similar to the use during trial or forged
instruments or perjured testimony.
The use of a forged instrument constituted only intrinsic fraud
for while perhaps it prevented a fair and just determination of a
case, the use of such instrument or testimony did not prevent
the adverse party from presenting his case fully and fairly. In
the case at bar, petitioners were not really kept out of the
proceedings because of the fraudulent acts of the private
respondent. They could have rebutted or opposed the use of
the affidavit and shown its falsity since they were theoretically
parties in the case to whom notice had been duly given.
2. YES. A judgment otherwise final may be annulled not
only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also of lack of
jurisdiction
A judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the
ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction
of the court which rendered it.
If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction
In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be
found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the
reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for the
Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of
judgment of the petitioners.
MARCELINO ARCELONA, TOMASA ARCELONA-CHIANG
and RUTH ARCELONA vs. CA and MOISES FARNACIO
[G.R. No. 102900. Oct.2, 1997. PANGANIBAN, J]
FACTS
Page 46 of 64
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and
Ruth Arcelona are natural-born Filipinos who are now
naturalized Americans residing in California, U.S.A. Together
with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria
Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) are co-owners pro-
indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased
parents.
A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between
Cipriano Tandoc and the Olanday, et.al. Private Respondent
Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker
tenant of the same fishpond. After the termination of the lease
contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the
leased premises to the lessors Olanday.
Private Respondent Farnacio instituted civil case "peaceful
possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages”
against Olanday, et al., before the RTC RTC ruled in favor of
Respondent Farnacio. The Olanday et.al. elevated the case to
IAC which affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioners then filed with CA a petition for annulment of the
aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the
implementing sheriff. CA ruled in favor of Farnacio. Hence, this
petition for review
Petitioners contend that CA erred in decreeing that the sole
and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud,
and in thereby ignoring various Supreme Court rulings that a
final judgment may also be annulled. Petitioners also argue
that, being co-owners of the subject property, they are
indispensable parties. Inasmuch as they were not impleaded in
the civil case, the questioned judgment of the lower court is
void insofar as the petitioners are concerned for want of
jurisdiction over their persons and for lack of due process.
Petitioners do not see any reason why a person who was not
made a party at all could not assail the same proceedings
involving his property and affecting his rights and interests.
ISSUE: May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person
of indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside from
extrinsic fraud?
RULING: YES. A final judgment may be annulled on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process.
In the case of Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, the court held that to set aside a final and
executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a
litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court 25 on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake
and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the
time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six
(6) months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to
annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third a
direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a
judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own
recitals.
As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal
judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void. A
decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law
and, hence, it can never become final and executory
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent
does not deny this fact, and the CA did not make any contrary
finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint
which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et
al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not
possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of
private respondent has been established and ruled upon in civil
case. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded
as indispensable parties
A tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must
implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there
can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a
tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish
with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land
Clearly, the decision of the RTC cannot bind petitioners and
cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that
portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property
being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the failure to implead
petitioners barred the lower court from making a final
adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to
a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.
Ergo, res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicarium
faciunt. A person who was not impleaded in the complaint
cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man
shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
In American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from
lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the
case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only. We
believe that this rule should be applied to this case,
considering that in the assailed trial court's decision, referrals
were made to crucial evidence which if scrutinized would
readily reveal that there were indispensable parties omitted.
In sum, we hold that the nullity of a judgment grounded on lack
of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what patently appears
on the face of such decision but also by documentary and
testimonial evidence found in the records of the case and upon
which such judgment is based.
Equally important, the finding of estoppel and laches by CA is
not supported by the evidence on record. The silence of
petitioners can easily be explained by the fact that they were
not in the country during the pendency of the subject civil case.
Such absence from the country was never rebutted by private
respondent. Even in the proceedings antecedent to this case
before us now, petitioners were merely represented by their
attorney-in-fact. Moreover, they were not at all impleaded as
parties in the judgment sought to be voided. Neither were they
properly served summons. The indelible fact is that they were
completely ignored.
Page 47 of 64
There is no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since
the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Petitioners are not estopped from instituting this case.
Requisites of estoppel: a) lack of knowledge and of the means
of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question; (b) reliance,
in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be
estopped; and (c) action or inaction based thereon of such
character as to change the position or status of the party
claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
The herein facts ineluctably show the absence of the first
element in this case. Inasmuch as there is no proof that
petitioners had knowledge of the pending tenancy case filed by
private respondent, it is only fair that they should not be held in
estoppel for failing to intervene in and to question the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Lastly, We hold that intervention is not the only remedy to
assail a void final judgment. There is no procedural rule
prescribing that petitioners' intervention in the hearing for the
issuance of a writ is the only way to question a void final
judgment. As already stated, petitioners were not aware of
such hearing. Besides, as already discussed, a direct action is
available in assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic
fraud, while a direct or a collateral action may be used to show
lack of jurisdiction.
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA
[G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004. CALLEJO, SR., J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are married couple. In the
meantime, the respondent Rodolfo Ancheta intended to marry
again. Respondent filed a petition with the RTC declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent well knew that the petitioner was already residing
at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he,
nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.”
The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the
address stated in the petition. The sheriff served the summons
and a copy of the petition by substituted service on the
petitioner's son.
The trial court granted the motion filed by respondent and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent
to adduce evidence ex-parte. The trial court issued an Order
granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties
void ab initio.
Sometime after, respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were
married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang,
Cavite
Petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with
the CA under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for
the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special
Proceedings
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent
committed gross misrepresentations in her address hence,
deprived her of her right to be heard in the said case Thus,
according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of
the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over
her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by
the respondent.
The CA issued a Resolution dismissing stating that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation
that the present petition is based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said
resolution, appending thereto an amended petition, which was
denied by the CA. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
amended petition
RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
original petition and denying admission of the amended
petition.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or
final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is
null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order
in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in
the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein,
were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner
because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the
summons and a copy of the complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the
original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie
meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by
the Court of Appeals.
Ramos vs. Combong, Jr., 473 SCRA 499
Page 48 of 64
G.R. No. 144273 October 20, 2005
Quick summary: The first case (11085) declared Ramos et.al
as owners of half portion of a property. The decision was
affirmed by CA. The second case (402) involved revival and
enforcement of judgment of the first case. RTC granted such
motion and declared the title of Ramos et.al to the property null
and void. Petitioners Ramos et.al appealed to CA but it denied
their petition for their failure to state the material dates showing
that it was filed on time and to attach an affidavit of merit. SC
affirmed CA. Rule 47 does not explicitly require that a
statement of material dates should accompany the petition,
nevertheless, there must be a manifest showing in the petition
that it was filed within the four-year period.
FACTS
A decision in Civil Case No. 11085 declared petitioners
Rodolfo Ramos, Emma R. Millado and Norma R. Erie as
owners pro indiviso of one-half portion of the western side of
Lot 196, while private respondents Teresita Medina, Teodoro
Medina and Jesus Medina were declared owners of the other
half on the eastern portion.
The foregoing decision was affirmed by the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 62059, which decision
became final and executory per Entry of Judgment.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 402, which is an action for
“revival and enforcement of judgment and for cancellation of
titles and reconveyance with damages,” the trial court granted
private respondents’ Motion for Partial Judgment Based on the
Pleadings with Reservation of Right to Present Evidence on
Damages. The trial court ordered the enforcement and revival
of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 62059, and declared
petitioners’ titles over the property null and void. The trial court
also ordered the reconveyance of the one-half portion of the
property to private respondents and the issuance of a new title
in their names.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s order. Petitioners elevated the
CA’s decision to this Court but the petition was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgments in Civil
Case Nos. 11085 and 402 before the CA. CA dismissed the
petition for their failure to state the material dates showing that
it was filed on time and to attach an affidavit of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not in a petition for annulment of judgment
under rule 47 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure there is still a
need to state the material dates to show timeliness of the filing
thereof
HELD: YES. Section 3 of Rule 47 lays down the period within
which to bring an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud, to wit: SEC. 3. Period for filing action.—If based
on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years
from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it
is barred by laches or estoppel. Based on the foregoing
provision, petitioners should have filed an annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud within four years from
discovery of the alleged fraudulent acts committed by private
respondents.
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that there is
no indication of the dates or time from whence petitioners
discovered private respondents’ alleged fraudulent acts. While
Rule 47 does not explicitly require that a statement of material
dates should accompany the petition, nevertheless, there must
be a manifest showing in the petition that it was filed within the
four-year period. Consequently, the CA was right in dismissing
the petition, as it had no basis for determining the timeliness of
the filing of the petition.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed
by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side
of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the
prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which
it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and
HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT vs. HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE
G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition for annulment of the
DARAB Decision which ordered them to pay the farmer-
beneficiaries the value of their properties. The petition was
dismissed by the RTC. CA affirmed RTC’s decision and ruled
that RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB
Decision. SC ruled that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the
RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC’s control.
FACTS:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned a parcel of
land. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. also bought
parcels of land and developed these properties into a
subdivision project.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), placed the properties
under the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, a case
was filed before DARAB. DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator rendered a decision declaring the nature of the
property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The
Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed. The decision became final
and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the
property.
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from
judgment of the DARAB Decision. DARAB granted the
petition. The DARAB also ordered the heirs of Piit and
Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount
corresponding to the value of the property since the property
has already been developed into a subdivision.
Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City a petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision. Petitioners contend that the DARAB decision was
rendered without affording petitioners any notice and
hearing. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
Page 49 of 64
restraining order. According to petitioners, what it sought
before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and
not certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling
that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB
Decision because it is a co-equal body.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final
judgment of the DARAB.
RULING: NO.
Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the
DARAB decision was filed with the RTC before the advent of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the applicable law is
B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
enacted on August 10, 1981.
Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any
power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial
bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that
the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the
decisions of the National Water Resources Council, which is a
quasi-judicial body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation
to acts or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the
conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in
B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for
annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in
harmony with the pre-B.P. Blg. 129 rulings of the Court
recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to
annul final judgments. Hence, while it is true, as petitioners
contend, that the RTC had the authority to annul final
judgments, such authority pertained only to final judgments
rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal
ranking with such inferior courts.
The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether
the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an
inferior court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an
action for the annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive
Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its
adjudicatory powers and functions. Further, the prevailing 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for
an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body
with the RTC and its decisions are beyond
the RTCs control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining
the RTCs dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have
any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for
annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the
CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested
in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by
the RTCs. The silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the
CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-
judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such
authority.
Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian vs. Philippine
National Bank
G.R. No. 168882. January 31, 2007
SUMMARY
Respondent PNB filed a petition for annulment of judgment of
the RTC on the ground of denial of due process as the
mortgage liens were cancelled without oral arguments, and
without granting its motion for substitution. The CA granted the
petition for annulment which was affirmed by the SC as denial
of due process is another ground for annulment recognized by
jurisprudence even though not expressly mentioned by the
Rules.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a case for cancellation of mortgage liens on 3
titled properties against Maybank. PNB filed a motion for
substitution and motion to dismiss as the properties involved
here were already transferred from Maybank to PNB by virtue
of a dacion en pago between the banks. In one resolution, the
RTC made the following pronouncements: (1) the motion for
substitution by PNB is denied; (2) the motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of certification against forum shopping is denied;
(3) noting that the parties by joint manifestation agreed to
submit the petition for resolution, granted the cancellation of
mortgage liens without oral arguments.
PNB filed a petition to annul judgment of the RTC as it was
denied due process. The CA granted the petition. Hence, this
present petition.
Petitioner argued that deprivation of due process is not a
ground for petition for annulment of judgment.
ISSUE
Whether petition for annulment may be granted on the ground
of deprivation of due process.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. While the Rules of Court only state lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud as the grounds for petition for annulment of
judgment, jurisprudence adds another one, which is denial of
due process.
Long Answer
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides
that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be
based “only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction,” jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground
therefor denial of due process.
Arcelona v. Court of Appeals teaches:
There is no question that a final judgment may be annulled.
There are, however, certain requisites which must be
established before a judgment can be the subject of an action
for annulment. Under the present procedure, aside from the
reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38),
there is no other means whereby the defeated party may
procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a
Page 50 of 64
view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud.
On the one hand, extrinsic fraud is the ground to annul a
voidable judgment; the declaration of nullity of a patently void
final judgment, on the other, is based on grounds other than
extrinsic fraud. To say, then, that petitioners can avail
themselves only of the ground of extrinsic fraud and no other is
to fail to appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of
annulment/nullity
Llamas vs. CA
G.R. No. 149588, September 29, 2009, Nachura, J:
Facts: Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati with, the crime of "other forms of
swindling" in the Information. That on or about the 20th day of
November, 1978, in the municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot
No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036,
Cadastral Survey of Parañaque, LRC Record No. N-26926,
Case No. 4869, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of
Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the
same to be free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever,
and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property
for the sum of ₱12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to
the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the
aforementioned amount of ₱12,895.00.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 3 on
June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners filed before
this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review. The
Court, however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for
petitioners’ failure to state the material dates.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19,
2001 Warrant of Arrest,8 the police arrested, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail
term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner
Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.
Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the
warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There being
no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners
instituted, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial
and the appellate courts’ decisions. The Court initially
dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September
24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON the petition for annulment of judgement and
certiorari with injuction must be granted.
Decision
No. In People v. Bitanga (525 SCRA 623 [2007]), the Court
explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be
availed of in criminal cases, thus—Section 1, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
judgment to the following: Section 1. Coverage.— This Rule
shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The
remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such
recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the
provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule
124 thereof, provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in
civil procedure to criminal cases.—The provisions of Rules 42,
44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed
civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they
are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established
rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the information,
the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved
on August 14, 1981.
Republic vs. Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest
Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, INC.)
612 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 165333 February 9, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent TAFPA and DENR entered into a contract for
community organizing activities, social investigation, and
information education campaign at the San Isidro Tinago
Reforestation Sub-Project in Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent later submitted its Accomplishment Reports and
Requests for Billing. However, DENR informed respondent that
by reason of the latter’s delay in the submission of its reports, it
owed the DENR, the amount of P1,192,611.00 as penalty for
delay, as stated in the contract, deductible from its collectibles
of P802,350.64. Thus, respondent was still liable to the DENR
in the sum of P390,260.36.
Respondent filed with the RTC a special civil action for
Mandamus praying that a writ be issued commanding the
DENR to pay respondent’s unpaid claims.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of TAFPA. Thereafter,
RTC made an Entry of Final Judgment stating that the decision
had become final and executory, there being no appeal filed by
any party before any appellate court.
Respondent thus filed an urgent motion for execution with the
RTC which was granted.
The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion asking the RTC to
set aside the Decision on the ground of lack of due process.
The RTC denied the motion.
Undeterred, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal but the RTC
disapproved it.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA via a
petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
Page 51 of 64
of Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of the RTC
based on the following grounds: (1) That the action lies within
the jurisdiction of the COA and not before the courts; (2) That
private respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies
against petitioner, hence, no cause of action against petitioner;
and (3) Respondent is not entitled to be paid its money claim
against petitioner.
CA denied the petition opining that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction. The CA added that the rule on due process was
not violated as petitioner was given all the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings before the RTC, which it in fact
did, and was duly notified of all court processes, orders, and
decision. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment on the ground that notice to the
deputized counsel was notice to the OSG
RULING: NO. In this recourse, petitioner is no longer
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC based on the above
arguments. Petitioner now questions the propriety of the notice
sent to the deputized counsel of the OSG, arguing that notice
to its deputized counsel is not notice to the OSG. Hence,
absent such notice, the decision of the RTC did not become
final and executory. Moreover, the failure of the RTC to serve
the OSG copies of legal notices, orders, and judicial processes
constitutes lack of due process.
What petitioner is seeking is for this Court to nullify the
decision and orders of the RTC via the present petition after
petitioner has effectively lost its right to question the said
decision and orders, the same having become final and
executory.
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy,
which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the court.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
the claim. It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the
law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute
lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the CA has put to rest
the issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction over
respondent’s cause of action.
The petitioner’s contention that service of the questioned
Orders to deputized special attorneys of the OSG would not
bind the OSG so that the Orders did not attain their finality
when the Motion was filed, does not have a leg to stand on. It
is a well-settled principle that the acts of the authorized Deputy
bind the principal counsel. Thus, service on the Deputy is
service to the OSG.
SPOUSES OSCAR ARCENAS AND DOLORES ARCENAS
VS. QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK & CA
G.R. No. 166819 June 16, 2010
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Arcenas filed in the RTC a case against
respondent bank for breach of contract of lease.
The RTC set the case for pre-trial.
After numerous postponements, the pre-trial was finally
scheduled. However, despite due notice, petitioner-spouses
Arcenas and their counsel failed to appear. Thus, respondent
bank presented evidence on its counterclaim, rested its case
and submitted the same for decision. On the same day, the
RTC issued an Order submitting the case for decision.
Petitioner-spouses filed a Manifestation with Motion stating
therein their reasons for failure to attend the pretrial and
hearing. However, the RTC denied petitioner’s manifestation
and motion.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for
annulment of order under Rule 47 seeking to annul the Order
of non-suit issued by the RTC on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
CA: The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioners, failed to avail of the appropriate remedies without
sufficient justification before resorting to the petition for
annulment of order. The CA ruled that assuming that
petitioners were able to substantiate their allegations of fraud,
they could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court and prayed that the assailed Order be set
aside, but they did not. Thus, they cannot benefit from their
inaction.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
annulment of order filed by petitioners.
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for annulment
of order filed by petitioners.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose the conditions for the
availment of the remedy of annulment of judgment.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct
recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new
trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of
these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot
resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47,
for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.
Petitioners were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the
pre-trial conference, and respondent bank was allowed to
present evidence on its counterclaim. Such Order was
received by the secretary of petitioner's counsel. Petitioner did
not move to set aside the RTC's order of non-suit.
While petitioner’s counsel claimed that he belatedly learned of
such Order of non-suit, yet no motion to lift the order of non-
suit was filed. Petitioner did not take any remedial action to lift
the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so.
Page 52 of 64

It was only 2 months after the RTC Order when petitioner and
her husband filed a pleading captioned as Manifestation and
Motion, wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of the RTC
and for further pre-trial conference. The RTC denied such
Manifestation and Motion as the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period. Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition
for annulment of order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA denied the
petition as petitioner failed to avail of the appropriate remedies
provided by the Rules to which the SC agree.
Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic
fraud committed by respondent bank's counsel, she could have
filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the period
provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2,
Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have been
raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate
remedies on a promise of settlement. However, such promise
was not an excuse for petitioner's counsel not to lift the order of
non-suit and to file a petition for relief.
GENATO INVESTMENTS, INC. Vs. Barrientos
G.R. No. 207443 July 23, 2014
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
A TCT is registered under the name of petitioner and covers
two adjacent parcels of land, Lot No. 1-A and Lot No. 13-B-1.
Due to alleged deficiency in real property taxes due, the Office
of the City Treasurer of Caloocan sold at public auction Lot No.
13-B-1, in which private respondent Laverne Realty & Dev.
Corp. emerged as the highest bidder.
The Office of the City Treasurer, through the City Treasurer of
Caloocan, issued a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property
to Purchaser and eventually a Final Deed of Conveyance over
Lot 13-B-1 in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner was not made aware of any of the proceedings
before the Office of the City Treasurer, as the Notice of Levy
and Warrant of Levy issued by the Office of the City Treasurer
were sent to petitioner at an inexistent office in Tondo and
were, thus, returned unserved.
Private respondent filed with the RTC of Caloocan for the
consolidation of the ownership of the property covered by
petitioner’s TCT and the issuance of a new TCT in private
respondent’s name notwithstanding the fact that the
delinquency sale only involved Lot No. 13-B-1.
The RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing on the
Petition, and directing that copies of the said order be posted
at the subject premises and furnished petitioner. However, the
records of the case, particularly the Certificate of Posting and
the Process Server's Returns will show that the order was not
posted at the subject premises, and that petitioner did not
receive any copies of the Order because the orders were serve
at inexistent offices.
Eventually, the RTC granted private respondent’s petition.
Inasmuch as petitioner was unaware of the proceedings, the
same order became final and executory. Thereafter, the RTC
Caloocan issued another Order directing the issuance of a Writ
of Possession in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner learned of the auction sale when the Sheriff of the
RTC Caloocan left a Notice to Vacate in the subject premises.
Petitioner claimed that it was very much surprised at the
auction sale of Lot 13-B-1 because it had been religiously
paying its real property taxes. In fact, it had in its possession a
Certification issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of
Caloocan stating that the real property taxes due on the Lots
have been duly paid by petitioner.
Notwithstanding the representations made by petitioner with
the RTC of Caloocan and Office of the City Treasurer, the RTC
proceeded to implement the Writ of Possession over both the
Lots.
After withdrawing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment praying, among others, for the annulment and
setting aside of the Orders and the Writ of Possession issued
by the RTC of Caloocan.
CA: The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment that petitioner filed is not
the proper remedy, as it had other available remedies to
question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan. The CA, stated that
where the land subject of the case was already registered in
the name of the buyer in the auction sale, the proper remedy to
annul said transfer was to file an action for reconveyance on
the ground of fraud. The CA added that the Petition
for Certiorari petitioner had earlier filed but later withdrew
showed that other remedies were available to petitioner. MR
was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for annulment of judgment is the proper
remedy.
HELD:
Yes. Petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy.
It is undisputed that the Order of the RTC became final and
executory. The general rule is that a final and executory
judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in
any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to
execute it. A final and executory decision may, however, be
invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition to Annul the
same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of Court.
Under Rule 38, the verified petition must be filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order,
or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered.
However, it is uncontested that petitioner learned about the
proceedings in more than six (6) months after the Order had
become final and executory. Thus, the remedy under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court was clearly unavailing.
Page 53 of 64
The only remedy left to petitioner in this case is a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which it, in fact, filed.
The SC disagrees with the reasoning of the CA and
respondents that petitioner in this particular case should have
filed either an action for reconveyance or annulment of the
auction sale, because to do so would have required the court
hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or
order of another co-equal court, especially in this case where
the said judgment or order had attained finality. Well-
entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no
power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and
seriously hinder the administration of justice.
The SC have repeatedly ruled that a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. The same petition is not available as a
substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own
neglect in promptly availing of the same.
There is here no attempted substitution; annulment of
judgment is the only remedy available to petitioner.
Regarding the previous filing of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 such is of no moment as petitioner timely withdrew the
same before any relief could be afforded by the CA.
ESTRELLA MEJIA-ESPINOZA AND NORMA MEJIA
DELLOSA VS. NENA A. CARIÑO
G.R. No. 193397January 25, 2017
Jardeleza, J.:
FACTS:
Two consolidated ejectment case filed before the MTC was
decided in favor of petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza against
private respondents Nena Carino. The case went all the way to
the SC and eventually an entry of judgment was rendered in
favor of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution before the MTC, which
respondent opposed.
The MTC granted the order. The writ was served on
respondent and the writ was executed by the Sheriff.
Respondent Nena voluntarily vacated the subject property.
Thus, the subject property was peacefully turned over to
petitioner.
Nena filed a complaint captioned as "Annulment of Court's
Processes with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Preliminary
Injunction and/or Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC.
Nena argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask
for reconsideration of the order granting Espinoza's motion for
issuance of writ of execution because she was not furnished a
copy of the order.
RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action. The RTC held, among others, that Nena availed of the
wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for annulment under Rule
47, Nena should have filed a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38.
CA: On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. It held that Nena
correctly filed the petition for annulment with the RTC in
accordance with Section 10 of Rule 47. It brushed aside the
RTC’s ruling that Nena availed of the wrong remedy because
according to the CA, regardless of the caption of the pleading,
Nena had a cause of action accruing from the violations of her
rights.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for annulment of judgement under Rule
47 is the proper remedy.
HELD:
No. Petition for annulment of judgement under Rule 47 is not
the proper remedy.
The averments of respondent Nena's complaint a quo do not
make out an action for annulment of judgment or final order. It
was inaccurate for both the CA and the RTC to characterize it
as a Rule 47 petition.
While the non-compliance with the requisites laid down in Rule
47 is glaring - there is neither any averment in the complaint
showing prima facie compliance with the aforementioned
requisites nor even a reference to Rule 47 - the first thing the
lower courts should have considered is the subject of the
complaint.
Nena is challenging the MTC's order granting the issuance of
the writ of execution, the writ of execution itself, as well as the
sheriffs notice of levy and notice of sale on her real property.
Clearly, these are not the judgments or final orders
contemplated by Rule 47.
A final order or resolution is one which is issued by a court
which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
detem1ined by the court. Rule 47 does not apply to an action to
annul the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply
to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of
execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to
carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final
order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final
order or judgment against the losing party.
The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the
writ of execution and notices of levy and sale before the MTC,
instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC. This is
because the execution of a decision is merely incidental to the
jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court. Ostensibly, Nena's
complaint before the RTC may be viewed as one for prohibition
and damages insofar as it also prayed for the issuance of a
permanent injunction and award of damages. While a petition
for prohibition may be an available remedy to assail the actions
of a sheriff who performs purely ministerial functions, in excess
or without jurisdiction, the filing of the aforementioned motion
with the MTC is still a precondition to such action. This is
because the motion is the "plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Therefore, while the RTC is partially correct in dismissing the
complaint for being the wrong remedy, it incorrectly identified a
petition for relief under Rule 38 as the proper recourse. The
Page 54 of 64
correct remedy is a motion to nullify court processes filed with
the MTC.
MATEO ENCARNACION Vs. THOMAS JOHNSON
G.R. No. 192285 July 11, 2018
Jardeleza, J.:
FACTS:
A default judgment for breach of contract was rendered by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia against petitioners Narvin
and Mary and in favor of respondent Thomas. Thereafter,
respondent filed an action for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment before the RTC of Olongapo City. The RTC
ordered the service of summonses by publication upon
Respondents Narvin and Mary. Despite publication, Narvin and
Mary still failed to file their answer. Accordingly, the RTC
declared them in default, and subsequently rendered a
judgment in default in accordance with the judgment of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia.
Properties of petitioner petitioner Mateo, Mary’s father, were
levied and sold at public auction wherein respondent placed as
the highest bidder for 10M. Petitioner Mateo filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim before the RTC claiming that he is the owner
of the parcels of land which were being levied upon. The
records, however, are not clear as to what action was taken by
the RTC on Mateo's third party claim.
More than two years after the RTC Order (February 17, 2005
Order) clarifying the Writ of Execution authorizing the levy of
properties of petitioner Mateo, Mateo filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the CA. He alleged that he is the
owner of the properties being levied; that he was not made a
party to the case; and that the inclusion of his properties in the
levy and execution sale were made without notice to him.
Mateo, nonetheless, admitted before the CA that he has no
standing to question the proceedings on the action for
recognition and enforcement of judgment. He asserts that he is
only questioning Order which deprived him of his properties.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the CA, Mateo
died and was substituted by his heirs (petitioners), including his
daughter Mary. In their Memorandum, petitioners amended
their argument to aver that all the proceedings should be
annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud.
CA: The CA denied the petition. It upheld the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the action of recognition of foreign judgment. The CA
ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment is not proper
because the February 17, 2005 Order is not a final order as it
merely seeks to clarify the RTC's further amended writ of
execution; the proper remedy is to move to quash the writ of
execution and if unsuccessful, to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. MR was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for annulment of judgment is the
proper remedy of a third-party claimant of properties levied and
sold under execution sale
HELD:
No. An action for annulment of judgment is not the proper
remedy of a third-party claimant of properties levied and sold
under execution sale.
Petitioners failed to comply with the first requirement for
petition for annulment of judgment, that is, the remedy is only
available when petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may only be availed of when the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law are
wanting without fault or neglect on the petitioner's part. It is a
condition sine qua non that one must have availed of the
proper remedies before resorting to the action for annulment of
judgment.
The SC notes that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
and petition for relief were not available to Mateo for the
reason that he was not a party to Civil Case selling his
property. Mateo was neither able to participate in the original
proceedings nor resort to the other remedies because he was
not a real party in interest or an indispensable party thereto.
There are, however, other appropriate remedies available to
him that he could have resorted to.
Section 16, Rule 39 provides for the remedies of a third-party
claimant of an alleged wrongfully levied property. Based on this
section, a third-party claimant has the following cumulative
remedies: (a) he may avail of "terceria" by serving on the
levying officer making the levy an affidavit of his title, and
serving also a copy to the judgment creditor; (b) he may file a
case for damages against the bond issued by the judgment
debtor within 120 days from the date of the filing of the bond;
and (c) he may file "any proper action" to vindicate his claim to
the property.
In this case, the proper recourse for petitioners is to vindicate
and prove their ownership over the properties in a separate
action as allowed under Section 16, Rule 39.
RULES 48, 49, AND 50
D. M. WENCESLAO AND ASSOCIATES, INC. VS. CITY OF
PARAÑAQUE, PARAÑAQUE CITY ASSESSOR,
PARAÑAQUE CITY TREASURER AND PARAÑAQUE CITY
COUNCIL
G.R. No. 170728 August 31, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint for collection of
excess real property taxes and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to
restrain respondents from enforcing the foreclosure sale. The
RTC denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, to prevent its properties from
being auctioned, petitioner paid under protest.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground,
among others, that the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations.
Page 55 of 64
The RTC issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss. It
found that petitioner's cause of action was really based on
Section 253 of the LGC. As such, petitioner's cause of action
had already prescribed inasmuch as the allegations in the
complaint show that the alleged overpayment of real property
tax occurred in 1995-1999 and 2001-2002 while the complaint
was only filed in February 4, 2003.
CA: On appeal to the CA, the CA dismissed the petition in a
resolution stating that petitioner failed to pay the required
docketing fees. The CA considered that the appeal is deemed
abandoned. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal
for late payment of docket fees.
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in dismissing petitioner's appeal for late
payment of docket fees.
The rule that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must
be paid within the period for taking an appeal is stated in
Section 4, Rule 41 …
Likewise, Section 3, Rule 41, of the same Rules state …
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order
on May 14, 2004. Thus, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 22, it had until May 31, 2004 within
which to perfect its appeal by filing within that period the notice
of appeal and paying the appellate docket and other legal
fees. On May 17, 2004, petitioner filed its notice of appeal
within the reglementary period. The SC notes, however, that it
paid the required docket fees only on October 20, 2004, or late
by almost five months.
It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within
this period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal.
Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a
court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees
regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The
payment of appellate docket fees is not a mere technicality of
law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which
the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and
executory as if no appeal was filed.
Here the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the
reglementary period, the decision of the trial court becomes
final and no longer susceptible to an appeal. For once a
decision becomes final, the appellate court is without
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50, the CA, on its own
motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the
ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful
fees. Section 1(c), Rule 50 provides that …
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure
to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. CA, RTC,
TRAYELLER KIDS INC., CELY L. GABALDON-CO &
JEANNIE L. LUGMOC
G.R. No. 218901 February 15, 2017
Caguioa, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint for sum of money was filed by petitioner PBCOM
against private respondents.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint
alleging, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket
fees.
On September 29, 2010, the RTC issued an Order directing
PBCOM to pay additional docket fees within fifteen days from
receipt.
PBCOM paid the additional docket fees but filed its
Compliance with the RTC only on November 11, 2010.
The RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint for failing to comply
with the September 29, 2010 Order. MR was denied.
Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal.
RTC: The RTC issued an Order (Assailed Order), denying due
course to petitioner PBCOM's Notice of Appeal on the ground
that said appeal is not the proper remedy.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, PBCOM filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA.
CA: The CA denied PBCOM's Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus and affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA
reasoned that, apart from availing itself of a wrong mode of
appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC based on the ground
of improper remedy is proper.
HELD:
No. The dismissal of the RTC based on the ground of improper
remedy is not proper.
In Salvan v. People, the SC held that the power of the RTC to
dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in the
Rule 41, Sec. 13. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to
deny a notice of appeal on an entirely different ground - such
as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy."
The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper
remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC.
Rule 50, Section 1 (i) states that …
The Court's pronouncement Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco is apropos:
Page 56 of 64

“… Dismissals of appeal may also be had upon the grounds
specified by Rule 50; but it is the Court of Appeals, not the trial
court, which is explicitly authorized to dismiss appeals on said
grounds. Generally, these grounds do not include matters
which go into the merits of the cause or to the right of the
plaintiff or defendant to recover. …”
In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to
PBCOM's notice of appeal on the ground that it was a wrong
remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction.
On the issue of no MR was filed before resorting to Rule 65:
While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is
filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined
exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction.
RULE 51: JUDGMENT
LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 178831-32 July 30, 2009
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Biraogo observed that the the Supreme Court Decision dated
April 1, 2009 which reversed COMELEC Second Division’s
decision disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a
congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental
due to lack of citizenship requirement is a complete turn-
around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by
Justice Ruben Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was
nonetheless signed by fourteen Associate Justices and
approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. Biraogo
decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated
April 1, 2009 for the said departure or turn-around.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an unpromulgated decision is considered a
decision of the Court.
HELD:
No. An unpromulgated decision is not considered a decision of
the Court.
The Court in Belac vs. Commision on Elections, held that a
decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took part
in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be
considered a Decision, to wit:
“A true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the
Justices and duly promulgated.
... In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed
and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during
and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of
the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices
themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what
the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a
member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is
that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.”
The SC adds that at any time before promulgation,
the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any
member of the court who may have already signed it so
desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a
qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet
been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it
was made the judge or judges who signed the decision
continued to support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the
very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the
public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
promulgated. Until such operative act occurs, there is really no
decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening
period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the
decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's
vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
AKLAN COLLEGE INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN
CASTAGADOR, NUENA SERMON & JOCELYN ZOLINA
G.R. No. 178309
January 27, 2009
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
A case for illegal dismissal was filed by respondents against
petitioners before the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Arbiter (LA): The LA rendered a decision holding
petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered petitioner to
pay respondents backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave (SIL) pay, moral damages and exemplary damages.
NLRC: On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA holding that
respondents were validly dismissed from service. However, it
ordered petitioner to pay respondents 13th month pay and SIL
pay. Both petitioner and respondent filed their respective MRs
but these were denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
seeking to partially annul the Decision of the NLRC insofar as it
held petitioner liable to pay respondents' 13th month pay and
SIL pay despite the finding that respondents were validly
dismissed from service. Respondents did not file an appeal
from the decision of the NLRC.
CA: The CA rendered the assailed Decision holding that, for
failure of the dismissed teachers to question the NLRC's denial
of the MR, the Decision and the Resolution became final and
executory as to them, thus, limiting the issue to be resolved to
that presented by petitioner, i.e., the propriety of the award of
13th month pay and SIL pay to the dismissed teachers.
The CA held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in awarding respondents 13th month pay and SIL
pay. However, it modified the award to conform to the
dismissed teachers' employment history. Petitioner’s MR was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
Page 57 of 64

Petitioner avers that it was improper for the CA to increase the
monetary award on the subject benefits in favor of respondents
who did not file an appeal from the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly modified the subject benefits
(13th month pay and SIL).
HELD:
Yes. The CA correctly modified the subject benefits (13th
month pay and SIL).
As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision may
not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other
than what he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if any,
whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due process prevents
the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal. As
an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to
maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek
modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief
unless he has also appealed or filed a separate petition.
In this case, the CA is not precluded from affirming, reversing
or modifying the decision of the NLRC on the propriety of
payment of 13th month pay and SIL pay to the respondents. It
is the propriety of the award of these benefits which were
precisely the issues raised by petitioner in its appeal before the
said appellate court.
Section 8, Rule 51 provides that only those issues assigned as
errors will be considered in the appealed decision …
The appealing party is legally required to indicate in his brief an
assignment of errors, and only those assigned shall be
considered by the appellate court in deciding the case.
However, this is not without qualification, for the appellate court
is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of
proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. The CA may reverse the decision of the lower
tribunal on the basis of grounds other than those raised as
errors on appeal.
The CA committed no reversible error in increasing the
amounts of the 13th month pay and the SIL pay in order to
correct the error committed by the NLRC in the computation.
The instant controversy falls squarely under the third exception
wherein the CA may reverse the decision of the lower tribunal
on the basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on
appeal, that is, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.
A just, fair and complete resolution of the case necessarily
entails the correct computation of these benefits. To avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice, the full period of employment of
respondents was rightfully considered by the CA in the
computation of the 13th month pay and the SIL pay.
Moreover, the CA sufficiently explained the need to increase
the award of 13th month pay and SIL pay. It modified the award
after finding that the computation of the amount given by the
NLRC in its Decision does not conform to the dismissed
employees' employment history.
DICK GO vs. CA and SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 112550 February 05, 2001
FACTS:
The National Steel Corporation issued two checks as payment
for customs duties and taxes. Both checks bore the notation:
"For Payee's Account" and were made payable to the Collector
of Customs. These checks were subsequently deposited in the
Security Bank and Trust Company in the account of a certain
Robert Santos. Thus, the NSC was required to pay customs
duties a second time.
When SBTC discovered the anomaly, SBTC conducted an
internal investigation, which revealed the participation of
petitioner Dick Go, Assistant Manager in the accounting
department, and co-accused Lauchengco and Fermin in the
opening of the Robert Santos accounts, the deposit in said
accounts of the two checks and the siphoning of the proceeds
of the checks.
Two criminal informations for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against petitioner, Eduardo
Lauchengco and Generoso Fermin. At the same time, a
complaint for sum of money was filed against petitioner
together with Spouses Herminio and Clara Lauchengco, Luisito
Honorio, Danilo Fiesta, B.S. Santos and Eugene Gan. The two
criminal cases were tried jointly with the civil case.
RTC: The lower court rendered judgment acquitting petitioner
Dick Go and his co-accused of the crime of estafa for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The court likewise dismissed SBTC's complaint for recovery of
sum of money against petitioner and his co-defendants, as well
as petitioner's counterclaim.
CA: On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court.
In reversing and setting aside the decision of the lower court,
the CA affirmed the lower court's factual findings but made
"corrections and deletions" therein. In addition to the
corrections and deletions in the lower court's factual findings,
the CA added "additional facts to complete the story.”
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA made additional findings not
supported by the evidence on record and that it abused its
discretion in disregarding the factual findings of the lower court.
He argues that the CA’s reversal of the decision of the lower
court was based on unsupported conclusions and despite the
absence of contrary evidence; and that it misappreciated the
facts, thereby necessitating a review of factual matters by the
SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the factual findings of the lower court.
HELD:
Yes. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the factual findings of the lower court.
Page 58 of 64
 Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal; except: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
While the CA characterized the lower court's factual findings as
"accurate" and observed that the antecedent facts as found by
the lower court were "not disputed" by the parties, it reached a
different conclusion as regards petitioner's civil liability.
The issue, therefore, is whether, on the basis of the same
factual findings, petitioner can be held civilly liable. Stated
differently, the issue is whether from the evidence adduced
before the lower court, there is sufficient proof as to the
indispensable participation of petitioner in the opening of the
accounts in the name of one allegedly inexistent and fictitious
Robert Santos, the depositing of the PNB checks in said
accounts, and the siphoning of the proceeds of said checks as
charged in private respondent's complaint.
Go is not civilly liable, because Go's role in the opening of the
Robert Santos account was in line with his duties as assistant
manager of the accounting department.
Oral testimonies, based on documentary evidence validates
the trial court's finding that bank tellers were negligent in
depositing the checks made payable to the Collector of
Customs into the Robert Santos account
Finally, that testimonies pointing to Go as the one who
appropriated the proceeds of the checks were hearsay.
Natalia Realty vs. CA and Antonio Martinez et al
G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002
FACTS
Natalia Realty filed an action for recovery of possession of two
parcels of land against private respondents before the RTC of
Rizal. The RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and
ordered petitioner to surrender possession of portions of the
property. Natalia Realty filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Natalia Realty filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition and an entry of judgment was issued stating
that the dismissal has become final and executory.
Felipe Navarro, claiming to be the original counsel of private
respondents filed with the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution. The RTC denied the motion ruling that to place private
respondents in possession of the property would violate the
decision of the SC in Natalia Realty vs. DAR. Private respondents
then filed another motion for execution before the RTC. Judge
Querubin, instead of acting on the motion, wrote a letter to the CA
inquiring as to what final orders and decisions he should enforce
and held in abeyance the resolution of the motion for execution.
The CA in response declared that the RTC should execute the
decision dismissing the complaint and ordering petitioner to
surrender possession of the property. Judge Querubin thus issued
two orders. The first order granted the motion for execution of
private respondents. The second order denied the Motion for
Execution by counsel for private respondents.
Natalia Realty, perceiving an inconsistency between the two orders,
filed a motion for reconsideration urging the RTC to reconcile the
first order granting the motion for execution of private respondents
with the second order denying the two motion of Navarro. Judge
Caballes granted the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents thus filed an urgent manifestation with prayer
for issuance of Writ of Execution with the CA claiming that the order
of Judge Caballes was a complete reversal of the orders and
decisions of the CA. The CA issued a resolution reiterating its order
for the execution of the decision dismissing the complaint and
ordering petitioner to surrender possession of the property.
Natalia Realty thus filed the present petition for certiorari
questioning the jurisdiction of of the CA to set aside the order of
Judge Caballes granting the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner. Natalia Realty contends that the jurisdiction of CA had
already been terminated when its resolution dismissing the appeal
of Navarro became final.
ISSUE
Whether the CA had jurisdiction to set aside the order of Judge
Cabilles granting the MR filed by petitioner.
RULING
YES. There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a court
to modify its judgment and its jurisdiction to enforce its
judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its
judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the
principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few
exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other
hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues
even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment.
Judge Caballes’ refusal to enforce the final orders and decision was
not only in total disregard of his ministerial duty, it was also in
blatant defiance of the resolution of the CA that has also long been
final and executory. Judge Caballes also disobeyed the resolution
of the CA directing Judge Querubin to enforce the orders listed in
the Resolution. Well settled is the rule that the RTC cannot
impede the execution of the decision of a higher court. For the
sole purpose of enforcing its final order, the CA still had
jurisdiction to command Judge Caballes to comply with its
order and to cite him in contempt in case he refused to do so.
The CA retained the jurisdiction to enforce its final orders.
People vs. Melchor Cabalquinto
G.R. NO. 167693, September 19, 2006
FACTS
The RTC of QC convicted Melchor Cabalquinto on two counts for
the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA. The CA affirmed the
Page 59 of 64
decision of the trial court. The SC found no reason to disturb the
CA and RTC findings. The mother of AAA then wrote a letter to the
Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text
decisions of the SC on its Web Page. The mother submitted that
confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over
public access to information and pleaded that her daughter's case,
as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web
Page.
ISSUE
Whether it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases
on the SC Web Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.
RULING
NO. The OSG submits that the posting of the full text of decisions in
cases involving child abuse on the SC Web Page violates the right
to privacy of the aggrieved parties. The fact that the aggrieved child
may have consented, through a parent or guardian, to a public
hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy
which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be
presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond
the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached
by the Court on the Web Page.
The OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could
include the use of pseudonyms in sexual assult cases and other
cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of
decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes
that the Court instead replace the material information, such as the
name of the child-victim, in its decisions.
Taking these opinions into account and in view of recent
enactments which unequivocally express the intention to maintain
the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against
women and their children, in this case and henceforth, the SC shall
withhold the real name of the victim- survivor and shall use fictitious
initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal
circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of
their immediate family or household members, shall not be
disclosed.
Mercury Group of Companies vs. Home Development Mutual
Fund
G.R. No. 171438, December 19, 2007
FACTS
The Home Development Mutual Fund Law which created the Pag-
IBIG Fund System mandates coverage in the fund for all
employees covered by the SSS and the GSIS and their employers.
The law however provides for a waiver or suspension from
coverage in the fund to employers who have their own retirement
AND/OR employee-housing plans. Upon the effectivity of the law in
1980 up to 1995, Mercury Group of Companies was annually
granted waiver from coverage because it has a superior
retirement/provident plan.
In 1995, the guidelines and procedure for applications for waiver of
fund Coverage was amended. In 1996, Mercury applied for renewal
of waiver from fund but the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF) disapproved Mercury’s application on the ground that its
retirement/provident and housing plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG
Fund‘s. The amended IRR provides that to qualify for waiver, a
company must have retirement/provident AND housing plans. In
1996, the HDMF had once again amended the law’s IRR, this time
limiting waiver from Fund coverage only to “distressed employers”.
Mercury filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC to
declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the IRR. The RTC
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Mercury assailed the dismissal of its petition before the
SC via petition for review on certiorari. The SC likewise denied the
petition.
The following year, the SC, in Chinabank v. HDMF, nullified the
1995 Amendment. On the strength of the ruling in Chinabank,
Mercury applied anew for a waiver from fund coverage for the years
1996 up to 2000. But HDMF again denied the application. Mercury
filed before the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus but the same was dismissed. Mercury then filed an
original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against
HDMF before the CA.
The CA ordered HDMF to entertain Mercury’s application but only
for the years 1997 up to present. The CA held that the law of the
case doctrine applies but only to the application for exemption for
fund coverage for the year 1996 and not to the applications for the
succeeding years in view of the subsequent ruling of the SC in the
China Bank. Hence, the CA thus HDMF’s denial of the request for
waiver from fund coverage for the year 1996 contending that the
SC’s decision in the petition for review on certiorari can no longer
be disturbed as the law of the case between the parties.
Hence this present petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the law of the case doctrine applies to Mercury’s
application for exemption from fund coverage for the year 1996.
RULING
NO. The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the
present case vis a vis the decision of the SC in the petition for
review on certiorari filed by petitioner. The present case is not a
subsequent proceeding of the previous decision. This is an entirely
new one which was commenced by Mercury’s filing of an original
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the CA
against HDMF.
At all events, the doctrine “is merely a rule of procedure and does
not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where
its application will result in an unjust decision.” To sustain
respondent’s refusal to grant a waiver of Fund coverage to
petitioner on the basis of amendments to implementing rules which
had previously been declared null and void by the SC would
certainly be unjust.
Even assuming that the present proceeding may be considered a
subsequent proceeding of the petition for certiorari before the SC,
the doctrine of the law of the case will still not apply because the
said case was not resolved on the merits. The order of the SC
denying petitioner’s petition for review found no reversible error in
the order of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s case primarily on
a procedural ground that is failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan Lee
G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010
FACTS
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Vivian Tan Lee filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against Philippine Hawk Corporation. The case arose from a
vehicular accident involving a bus owned by petitioner which
collided with a motorcycle driven by respondent’s husband with
respondent on board. The accident caused the death of
respondent's husband and caused respondent physical injuries.
The RTC held petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and its driver
solidarily liable for the sum of P745,575 representing loss of
earnings and actual damages plus P50,000 as moral damages.
Petitioner on appeal to the CA, assigned as error the award of
damages by the trial court on the ground that it was based merely
on suppositions and surmises.
The CA however affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modifications, awarding P168,019 as actual damages, P10,000 as
temperate damages, P100,000 as moral damages, P590,000 as
unearned income, and P50,000 as civil indemnity.
Petitioner filed the present petition for review arguing that since it
was the only one that appealed the decision of the RTC, the CA
erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in awarding other kinds of damages since it
was petitioner that appealed the decision of the RTC.
RULING
NO. Section 8, Rule 51 of provides that “no error which does not
affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued
in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical
errors.”
The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned
by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings therein. Also, even if the error complained of by a
party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the
same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by
the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
The procedure in the SC being generally the same as that in the
CA, unless otherwise, it has been held that the CA is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error
closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the
appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error, although it
was not specifically assigned by the appellant, otherwise it would
be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
RULES 52 AND 53
Heirs of the late Matilde Montinola-Sanson vs. CA and Eduardo
Hernandez
G.R. No. 76648, February 26, 1988
FACTS
Atty. Hernandez filed a petition seeking the probate of the
holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola. Matilde Sanson, the
only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in the
said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging that the
testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions and that undue influence was exerted
upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries
named in the will.
The probate court rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will. Matilde appealed the decision to the CA which
affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Petitioner then filed
with the CA a motion for new trial attaching the Affidavit of Merit of
her son Gregorio Sanson, alleging that witnesses have been
located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of
testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.
The CA denied the motion for new trial on the ground that the
Affidavit of Merit attached to the Motion for New Trial alleged that
efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the
court's decision was handed down, and the testimony of the
unnamed witnesses are merely corroborative since the fact of
grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted
were already brought to light during the trial.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners filed a valid motion for new trial.
RULING
NO. The motion for new trial is pro-forma for non-compliance with
Section 1, Rule 53 which provides that "… a motion for new trial
may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below
by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such a character as
would probably change the result...”
It could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new
having been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the
allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the witnesses were
exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed
down. The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had
ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were admittedly
known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to
present could have been discovered and presented during the
hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for concluding
that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not
have been able to discover said evidence.
In addition, the SC agrees with the CA that since the alleged illness
of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue influence exerted
upon her had been brought to light during the trial, any new
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which
is generally not a ground for new trial.
Jorge Bernardo et al vs. CA and Planters Development Bank
G.R. No. 86237, December 17, 1991
FACTS
Petitioners executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Planters
Development Bank to secure the payment of a loan in the sum of
P1.2M. When the petitioners failed to pay their obligation, Planters
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage and an auction
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sale was conducted with Planters as the highest bidder. The one-
year period having expired without the petitioners exercising their
right of redemption, ownership of the five parcels of land was
transferred to Planters.
Thereafter, Planters sent a letter of demand to the petitioners to
vacate the premises, but the demand was rejected. It then filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The RTC granted the petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
before the CA but the CA dismissed the petition. Hence, petitioners
filed this petition for review under Rule 45 submitting that the writ of
possession should not have been issued alleging that they had
already repurchased the property from Planters. To prove their
claim, they presented to the CA an exchange of letters which they
insist has established a meeting of minds between them and
Planters relative to their repurchase of the subject properties.
The petitioners ask the SC to consider four letters which they have
attached to this petition, claiming these to be newly-discovered
evidence that would substantiate their allegation that they made a
down payment of P300k to the private respondent for the
repurchase of the subject properties.
ISSUE
Whether the letters may be considered as newly-discovered
evidence which would warrant a new trial.
RULING
NO. As defined, newly-discovered evidence is evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below
by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such character as
would probably change the result.
The decision of the CA was promulgated on September 12, 1988
while the letters are dated October 24, 1988, and November 12,
1988. As they were not existing at the time the CA rendered its
decision, and indeed prior to the trial, they could not by any kind of
diligence have been discovered at all during that period. It is clear
that they do not qualify as newly-discovered evidence under the
definition as they came into existence only after the trial.
A no less important consideration is that the Rules of Court allow
only two occasions when a party may file a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence. That motion may be filed
only with the trial court under Rule 37 or with the CA under Rule 53
but never with the SC.
Edilberto Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109870, December 01, 1995
FACTS
Edilberto Cuenca was convicted for violation of the Trust Receipts
Law. After the CA affirmed his conviction, he filed a petition for
review before the SC which was denied.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Leave to file Motion for New
Trial alleging that “the motion for new trial shall be grounded on
newly discovered evidence and shall be supported by affidavits of
an officer of complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner.”
Petitioner also filed a "motion to admit attached motion for new
trial". The SC required the SolGen to comment on the motion.
In its comment, the SolGen recommended that Edilberto Cuenca
be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the impression that the
sworn statement a certain Rodolfo Cuenca (brother of petitioner
and president of complainant corporation) is an admission against
interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal
liability. SolGen had this to say: "Ordinarily, it is too late at this
stage to ask for a new trial. However, the sworn statement of
Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests which
casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca.
Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look
by the Court. The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish
the genuineness and due execution of his brother's affidavit in the
interest of justice and fair play.”
ISSUE
Whether the SC may entertain a Motion for New Trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence.
RULING
YES. Although in Goduco v. CA decided in 1965, the SC ruled that
it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence, the
rationale of which being "the judgment of the CA is conclusive as to
the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the SC…for only questions of
fact are involved therein", the rule now appears to have been
relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like Helmuth v.
People and People v. Amparado.
In both cases, the SC, opting to brush aside technicalities, granted
new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of
proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court
considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced,
there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied
the same benefit.
Emilio Gonzales III vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014
FACTS
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales was dismissed from service
by the Office of the President (OP) which found him guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Inefficiency. Gonzales filed a Petition for
Certiorari before SC seeking to declare as unconstitutional Sec 8(2)
of RA 6770 which grants the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The SC in its decision upheld the constitutionality of Sec 8(2) of RA
6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The SC however
reversed the OP ruling that found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect
of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust.
The SC thus ordered the reinstatement of Gonzales.
The Office of the President filed a motion for reconsideration of the
2012 decision of the SC insofar as reinstatement of Gonzales is
concerned.
ISSUE
Whether the SC may, on a motion for reconsideration filed by the
Office of the President for the purpose of challenging the order of
the SC reinstating Gonzales, likewise rule on the constitutionality of
Sec 8(2) of RA 6770.
Page 62 of 64
RULING
YES. At the outset, the SC notes that Gonzales did not file a motion
for reconsideration of the SC’s 2012 decision; only the OP, through
the OSG, moved for the reconsideration. This omission, however,
poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole
case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is
one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the
presidential action. If the President does not have any
constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a
Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal
correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty
one.
Since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal
is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the
constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional
issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for
reconsideration.
The SC votes to grant Gonzales’ petition to declare Section 8(2) of
RA 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
RULE 56: ORIGINAL AND APPEALED CASES
Firestone Ceramics vs CA
334 SCRA 465 (2000)
FACTS:
This case involves a 99-hectare land presumptively belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been
adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be
without jurisdiction.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the
land in question, when the herein private respondents obtained
their decree of registration thereover.
Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate
of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it
was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the
disposition thereof is in order.
Petitioner filed Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases
ISSUE:
WON the SC should hear the case en banc
HELD:
YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by
the Resolution of November 18, 1993: the following are
considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes
the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and
Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal
of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment
of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a
period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding
P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the
court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at
least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the
court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the
actual membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to
merit its attention.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
conceded that it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be
perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the
parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from
seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration.
In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything
else, is of paramount importance.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny
petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on
March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and
thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass
upon in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of
sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action
of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid
exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of
paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993,
which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority
of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to
merit its attention."
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief
Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat
these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any
cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering that
paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18,
1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is
decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found
to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and
disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer
of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for
the Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for
reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the
Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to
warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act
upon and decide petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the
Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and
disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin
is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of
the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded
that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting
Page 63 of 64
strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and
sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership —
that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting
the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course,
beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the
land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in
interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law,
jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court — to the end
that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be
observed.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the

Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the
Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and
unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the

issues raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in
litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is
merit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and

treated as en banc cases

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