XLVI.
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE RTCs remedies, she having bypassed the Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office
G.R. No. 183616 June 29, 2010
JULIETA PANOLINO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPHINE L. TAJALA, respondent.
Facts:
The DENR Regional Executive Director Jim O. Sampulna (RD Sampulna), denied
for lack merit the application of Julieta Panolino (petitioner), which was
opposed by herein respondent Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a
parcel of land located in Sultan Kudarat, and directed petitioner to vacate the
contested property and remove at her expense whatever improvements she
may have introduced thereon.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007, of which she filed a
motion for reconsideration on July 11, 2007. Her motion was denied on
September 6, 2007, copy of which she received on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of
RD Sampulna, stating that she was appealing the decision and order to the
Office of the DENR Secretary. By Order of October 16, 2007, RD
Sampulna denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed beyond the
reglementary period. The RD explained that petitioner should have filed her
appeal on September 13, 2007 as she had only one day left of the 15-day
reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant to DENR Administrative Order
No. 87, Series of 1990 which provides that if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision/order of the Regional Office is filed and such motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his
appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of t
he resolution of denial.The administrative order also provides that “The Rules
of Court shall apply when not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.”
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the 2005 case of Neypes, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration of
RD Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order that she still had a fresh period of fifteen
days from her receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before the CA which, by Resolution,
dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
of the President before resorting to judicial action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that her petition for
certiorari raised a purely legal issue. The appellate court, holding that the issue
raised is clearly a question of fact, denied petitioners motion. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes applies to petitioner’s
case
Ruling: NO.
The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate court is one of law because it
can be resolved by merely determining what the law is under the
undisputed facts. The appellate court’s ruling that such issue raises a question
of fact which entails an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties is thus erroneous.
As reflected in the decision in Neypes, the fresh period rule shall apply
to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court
of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously,
these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from
the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such
appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of
1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the
remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
denial; whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified in Neypes, being inconsistent
with Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply
to the case of petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied.
WHEREFORE, the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED, not on the ground advanced therein but on the ground reflected
in the foregoing discussion. No costs.
G.R. No. 174373 October 15, 2007
EMELINDA V. ABEDES, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RELIA QUIZON ARCIGA and SHERIFF RONBERTO
B. VALINO, respondent.
Petition: Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Facts:
Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an action before the RTC of Pasig City
against Wilfredo P. Abedes (Wilfredo), husband of herein petitioner, seeking
support for her daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga (Danielle Ann). A Decision was
therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo
was similarly ordered by the RTC to support Danielle Ann.
Since no appeal was interposed by the parties, the judgment became final and
executory. Unfortunately, the Sheriffs Return showed that no personal property
of Wilfredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. The Writ of Execution
was returned unsatisfied. Later, a property covered by TCT No. 292139 was
discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo. Thus, the Sheriff
caused the registration of a Notice of Levy on Execution on TCT No. 292139, with
the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Upon notice of the same, petitioner filed a
Notice of Third Party Claim with the RTC of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that the
property covered by TCT No. 292139 belongs exclusively to her. Therefore, it
may not be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered against her husband
Wilfredo.
Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice of Sheriffs Sale was made
announcing the sale to the public and to the highest bidder of all the rights, claims,
and shares of Wilfredo in the property covered by TCT No. 292139. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and Damages before the RTC of
Tarlac City
After due hearing, the RTC of Tarlac City issued a TRO. Meanwhile, respondents
filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of petitioner. However, the RTC
of Tarlac City dismissed the motion for want of merit.
In their Answer, respondents Relia Quizon Arciga and Sheriff Ronberto B. Valino
principally contended that the property subject of the levy is presumed conjugal
property; and as such, liable for the judgment against Wilfredo.
In view of this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The
RTC of Tarlac City issued the assailed Order ruling that the property covered by
TCT No. 292139 is petitioner’s paraphernal property. As her exclusive property,
it may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo. Hence, the RTC enjoined
respondent Sheriff from conducting the public sale of the property covered by
TCT No.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing order was denied by
the RTC, prompting respondents to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision, reversing and setting aside the appealed
Order and Resolution of the RTC of Tarlac City.
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals said that the Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the property relations between petitioner and Wilfredo,
notwithstanding the fact that their marriage was celebrated prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Following the foregoing line of ratiocination, the
Court of Appeals held that the property covered by TCT No. 292139 may be levied
upon in execution for the support of Danielle Ann. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA denied the motion. Hence, the Petition before us filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the petitioner used the appropriate mode of appeal
Ruling: No.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy of petitioner from the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to
this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Rules
of Court, which governs the procedure in the Supreme Court, a wrong or
inappropriate mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright
dismissal. Patently, the petition must fail.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court elaborates on the modes of appeal:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the Court of Appeals on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal,
covered by Rule 42, is brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided for by
Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
In the case at bar, respondents utilized the first mode of appeal. Respondents
filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC of Tarlac City on 18 August 2004, giving
notice that they were appealing its Order and Resolution, dated 9 June
2004 and 3 August 2004, respectively, to the Court of Appeals. Indeed, Section
3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal to the Court of Appeals
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. The question now
arises whether respondents raised questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law before the Court of Appeals. A review of the records reveals that
respondents, in their appeal with the Court of Appeals, raised mixed questions of
fact and law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 137761. April 6, 2000]
GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA and EVA
VIERNES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses JOSE and ANITA
ALESNA, respondents.
Failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period is a
ground for the dismissal of an appeal. This rule cannot be suspended by the
mere invocation of "the interest of substantial justice." Procedural rules may be
relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.
Petition: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
Before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Spouses Jose and Anita Alesna,
private respondents herein, filed a civil action for annulment of title,
reconveyance and damages (with prayer for preliminary injunction) against
Petitioners Gabriel Lazaro and the heirs of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter,
the private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
The CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein private respondents to pay the
required docket fees within the prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued its first
assailed Resolution granting their Motion for Reconsideration and reinstating
the appeal.
Subsequently, the petitioners also filed their own Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the said Resolution. As earlier stated, the CA denied their Motion.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether the failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within the
prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
Ruling: Yes.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that appellate court
docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the period for taking an
appeal. Hence, Section 4 of Rule 41 reads:
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. --
Within the period for taking an appeal,[9] the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal."
Contrary to the submission of private respondents that the aforecited rule is
merely directory, the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court provides: "Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and
other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal. Indeed, it has been held that failure of the appellant to conform with
the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply
with the statute or the rule.[
In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the required docket
fees within the reglementary period. In fact, the Court notes that they paid the
fees only after the CA had dismissed the appeal, or six months after the filing of
the Notice of Appeal. Clearly, existing jurisprudence and the Rules mandate that
the appeal should be dismissed.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is
not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said
rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." In this case, the
CA and the private respondents failed to show that this case is one such
exception.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' assailed
Resolutions, dated July 31, 1998 and December 28, 1998, are SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 27)
in Civil Case No.4058 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. No pronouncement as
to costs.
[G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L.
MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
Facts:
In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente
P. Jomoc, RTC, granted the petition and accordingly declared the absentee
spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial
courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served as required
by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval
having been denied, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, contending that
the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals
requiring a record on appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and
substantive grounds stating that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to
attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order. However, despite
the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive
issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the
presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is,
the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a
notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal.
Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days
from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected
by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether a record on appeal shall be required in order to perfect an
appeal
Ruling: Yes.
This Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding
and not an ordinary action. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record
on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to
Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked
by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate
court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy
of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval
of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not
to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner,
what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply
with the rule.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate
action in light of the foregoing discussion.
G.R. No. 93559 April 26, 1991
MAJOR ROMEO G. ELEPANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, 1st Vice Executive Judge, Branch 145,
Makati, Metro Manila REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, and MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO
BIAZON, Commanding General, National Capital Region Defense
Command, respondents.
Petition: This is a petition for certiorari
Facts:
Major Romeo Elepante filed a petition for habeas corpus with this Court. The
Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Metro Manila. Also this Court directed the latter to hear and decide the
case.
In the hearing, Romeo Elepante testified that he is a Major in the Philippine
Navy (Marines) and the Executive Officer of the Metropolitan Citizens Military
Training Command; that on April 15, 1990, a platoon of armed soldiers led by
Captain Doctor brought him to the NCR Defense Command where he was
detained; that there was no warrant for his arrest; that he was confined as
prisoner at Fort Bonifacio; that no formal charges have been filed against him.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing for lack of merit the petition
for habeas corpus. The trial court opined that Major Elepante was arrested
because of his involvement in several coup attempts.
Major Elepante filed this petition for review on certiorari, alleging inter
alia, that there is no criminal complaint filed against him so that his continued
detention is a violation of the Constitution. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed its comment. In his comment the Solicitor General pointed out that counsel
for petitioner received on May 29, 1990, a copy of the trial court's decision
dated May 24, 1990, so that when he filed this petition on June 11, 1990, the
assailed decision had attained finality. Citing Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised
Rules of Court, appeal in habeas corpus should be filed within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of the judgment.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s appeal in habeas corpus was timely filed
Ruling: No.
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, explicitly provides, viz:
Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal
in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the
court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person
making it appeals therefrom.
As interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109 Phil. 379 [1960]),
which also involved a habeas corpuscase, this Court ruled that the requirement
under Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Old Rules of Court which provides that an
appeal in habeas corpus should be perfected within twenty-four (24) hours
(now forty-eight hours under Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court),
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Hence, this Court has no other
alternative but to dismiss the appeal filed out of time.
In computing the forty-eight (48) hour period of appeal, this Court in Kabigting
v. Director of Prisons (6 SCRA 281 [1962]), ruled that the date on which the
decision was promulgated and/or served is not counted and the period starts to
run the following day unless the same by a Sunday or legal holiday in which
case the period of appeal is to be considered from the succeeding day. To
perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal is required to be filed with the Clerk of
Court or Judge who rendered the judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules
of Court).
In the case at bar, counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990 a copy of the
trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990 (Rollo, p. 8). Clearly when he filed the
instant petition on June 11, 1990, thirteen (13) days had lapsed, so it was filed
outside the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary period. This being so, the
decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that this Court following the
Saulo ruling, has no alternative but to dismiss the instant petition.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is hereby DISMISSED for the decision
sought to be reviewed is already final and (b) General Rodolfo Biazon or his
successor is directed to take appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
L. RULE 45: APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
G.R. No. 207266 June 25, 2014
HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS CHAN, Petitioners,
vs.
PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK, Respondent.
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
The case traces its roots to the complaint for ownership and possession filed by
the Heirs of the late Paciano Yabao (Heirs of Yabao), represented by Remedios
Chan, before the MTCC of Calbayog City (MTCC),against Paz Lentejas Van der
Kolk (Van der Kolk).
Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. She contended that the
predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of Yabao had executed a joint affidavit,
wherein they renounced their hereditary rights over the subject lot and
declared that Faustina Yabao, mother of Van der Kolk, as its true owner.
The MTCC issued a Resolution denying the motion to dismiss and holding that
there was proper service of summons. Subsequently, the MTCC rendered its
Decision, declaring Van der Kolk in default giving the reason that her non-filing
of an answer within the fresh 10-day period
Aggrieved, Van der Kolk appealed the MTCC decision before the RTC, Branch 32,
Calbayog City. Counsel for Van der Kolk received the notice of the RTC Clerk of
Court requiring her to file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such
receipt. The RTC issued the Order dismissing the appeal for failure of Van de
Kolk to file the memorandum on appeal within the period mandated by the
Rules of Court. It added that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege and one
who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of the statute
or rules. Van der Kolk’s motion for reconsideration of the above order was
denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
Unfazed, Van der Kolk filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA.
The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the not raised petition “on
grounds not raised herein but disclosed by the records." It stated that the MTCC
erred in granting the reliefs prayed for by the Heirs of Yabao because they were
not warranted by their complaint.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Yabao was denied by the CA
in its Resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the appellate court can render a decision based on the grounds
not raised or assigned as errors
Ruling: Yes.
The Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or
assigned as errors in several instances. In the case of Manila International
Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association,
Incorporated,24the Court enumerated such instances. Thus:
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not
raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following instances: (1) grounds
not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision
and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on
appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the observation, analysis and
conclusion of the CA. The several errors committed by the MTCC, which when
taken collectively, justify the reversal of its December 4, 2006 Decision.
The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it granted the reliefs
prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because the same were not warranted by the
allegations in the complaint. In the case at bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs
in the MTCC, merely alleged that they are the heirs of Paciano Yabao without
presenting any proof why they are the latter’s heirs and in what degree or
capacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015
K & G MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ACOJE MINING COMPANY,
INCORPORATED AND ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
Petition: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court
Facts:
Petitioner KGMC and respondents Acoje Mining Company Incorporated (AMCI)
and Zambales Chromite Mining Company Incorporated (ZCMCI) are mining
corporations. ZCMCI acquired the 60 mining and thereafter filed its application
for patent and availment of rights and privileges over the mining claims which
was approved by the Bureau of Mines.
ZCMCI entered into an operating agreement with AMCI over the former’s 60
mining claims. Thereafter, a certain Dominador Ilagan registered with the DENR
his mining claims and assigned the same to KGMC.
The Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) informed ZCMCI that its application
for mining lease should be converted into a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) in accordance with E.O. No. 279.
KGMC filed its letter of intent to avail for itself an MPSA before the MGB of
Region III over its mining claims. Three months thereafter, ZCMCI submitted
documents in support of an MPSA application. The technical committee
submitted its Memorandum recommending that ZCMCI be allowed to apply for
an MPSA.
The DENR Secretary issued Department Administrative Order No. 82, series of
1990 (DAO 1990-82), providing the procedural guidelines on the award of
MPSA through negotiation. ZCMCI, AMCI and the government, represented by
the DENR Secretary, executed an MPSA covering ZCMCI’s 60 mining claims with
an approximate area of 540 ha. The MPSA was approved by the Office of the
President (OP).
Claiming that the issuance and approval of the above MPSA was highly
irregular, KGMC filed a letter/protest with the OP. KGMC claimed that the area
covered by the subject MPSA is not available since 540 ha thereof is in conflict
with KGMC’s Prospecting Permit Application covering a total area of 486
ha. KGMC claimed to have been denied of due process because no publication of
ZCMCI and AMCI’s MPSA was ever made thus depriving it an opportunity to file
an adverse claim.
KGMC sought the disapproval of the subject MPSA and its remand to the
concerned DENR Regional Office so that its protest and adverse claim can be
resolved. On the other hand, ZCMCI wrote to the DENR Secretary stating that
the MPSA has already become final and executory upon its approval by the
President.
KGMC’s letter-protest was eventually forwarded to the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators. The Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB ruled in favor of KGMC. They
found that ZCMCI’s failure to file its MPSA proposal with the MGB-DENR made
the approval of its MPSA highly irregular.
On appeal, however, the MAB reversed the ruling of the Panel of Arbitrators of
the MGB. According to the MAB, Article 3, paragraph 3.5(b) of DAO 1989-57 did
not expressly prohibit the direct filing of an MPSA proposal before the MGB
Central Office. Aggrieved, KGMC moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied in the MAB Resolution.
KGMC filed before the CA a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari. However, the CA denied extension for the reason that decisions of the
MAB are appealable via a petition for review under Rule 43 and not by way of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Even assuming that certiorari is an
available remedy, the reglementary period for its filing has already prescribed.
KGMC thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Petition. The CA
denied reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether herein petitioner failed to timely file an appeal
Ruling: Yes.

KGMC faults its previous counsel in failing to timely file the correct mode of
appeal from the MAB resolutions and submits that it should be excused from the
repercussions of his ensuing omissions as they amounted to gross negligence.
“It is settled rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client.” While there is a
recognized exception to the rule that is - where the lawyer’s negligence was so
gross that it results in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due
process of law51 - it is inapplicable to the present case.
First, a counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is
simple negligence. It is not one as gross, palpable, and reckless as to deprive a
party of its day in court.
Second, in cases where the counsel’s negligence consisted of his failure to timely
file an appeal, any alleged deprivation of due process is negated by the fact that
the client had the opportunity to be heard or was actually heard in the lower
tribunal. This was the ruling in Building Care Corporation/Leopard Security &
Investigation Agency v. Macaraeg53 where the Court found no deprivation of due
process because the client was able to fully present and argue her case before
the Labor Arbiter (LA). She was accorded the opportunity to be heard and thus
her failure to appeal the LA’s decision cannot be deemed as a deprivation of her
right to due process.
KGMC was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process. Records show that the case
took its regular course in lower tribunals. KGMC had the opportunity to be
heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the proceedings before the
Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB.
Moreover, it is an established doctrine that the perfection of an appeal within
the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated March 16, 2009 and June 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 107700 are AFFIRMED.
L1. RULE 46: ORIGINAL CASES
G.R. No. 148505, February 20, 2007
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MERCHANDISING INSPECTION COMPANY, LTD., Respondents.
Petition: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
Petitioner, alleged in his petition that he was employed as a checker by the
Overseas Merchandising Inspection Company Ltd., private
respondent. However, for a period of time, respondent company did not give him
any work assignment due to his union activities. Thus, he filed with the
Arbitration Branch, NLRC, a complaint for constructive dismissal and non-
payment of backwages.
For its part, respondent company denied the allegations in the complaint,
claiming that petitioner showed disinterest in his work and stopped reporting to
the office. Nonetheless, he received his salary and bonus.
Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda promulgated a Decision dismissing the charge for
unfair labor practice but finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Respondent company then interposed an appeal to the NLRC. In its Decision, the
NLRC set aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
NLRC.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The appellate
court promulgated its Resolution dismissing the petition for petitioners failure to
pay the docket and other legal fees.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner alleged that when he filed the
petition through registered mail, he enclosed P1,030.00 in cash as docket fee. He
thus prayed that he be allowed to pay once more the docketing fee so required.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it dismissed his petition for his failure to pay the required docket fees.
Ruling: No.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-
compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full
names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the
factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for
the relief prayed for.
 xxx
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the
petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case unless
the docket fees are paid. It is clear that non-compliance with any of the
requirements stated above warrants the dismissal of a petition.
While the Rules of Court must be faithfully followed, however, they may be
relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures. In the
instant case, however, petitioner has not shown any reason which justifies
relaxation of the Rules.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have prejudiced a partys substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these exceptions is
present here.
Moreover, petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy. What he should have filed
with this Court is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the same Rules.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 4266 (UDK) are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as MEDICAL CENTER
CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA
FUENTE, respondents.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action
of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of
damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer, is the chief issue
raised in the certiorari action at bar. Also put the issue is whether or not the
Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in
the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned, in light of
the Court's rulings in Urbano , et al. v. Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, et al. 1
Facts:
In 1987, a reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health
commenced. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was
the Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. Dr. de la Fuente
received notice from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed
"Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion, Dr. de la Fuente
filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was
ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission.
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a
Resolution wherein it was declared that the demotion/transfer of de la Fuente,
Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II is illegal.
De la Fuente thereupon sent letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief
of National Children's Hospital, however, no one in the DOH Legal Department
bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente.
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon, Dr. de la
Fuente repaired to the CSC and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was
however "told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that
the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of "mandamus and damages
with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative
Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and
executory resolution of the CSC.
The CA required the respondents to answer. However, no answer was filed.
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a
"Supplemental/Amended Petition". The second petition described as one for
"quo warranto" aside from "mandamus". The Appellate Court promulgated its
judgment and ordered that respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon,
to comply with the resolution. But de la Fuente's prayer for damages was
denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the petitions (for mandamus)
are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for claim of damages.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment. He insisted
that the Appellate Court had competence to award damages in
a mandamus action.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution, resolving de la Fuente's motion
for reconsideration, the Court ordered setting a date for reception of evidence
on de la Fuente’s claim for damages. It based its judgment on Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which allows the award of damages in a mandamus
petition.
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the CA, the Solicitor
General's Office had instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It
contends that the CA is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide
the question of damages in a mandamus suit.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil action
of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of
damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer
Ruling: Yes.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal
provision specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an
explicit and specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary
damages," and finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been
granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The
conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims
"for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word
"damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and
decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying
any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The
Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is
untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or
failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from
the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of
action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
G.R. No. 191694 December 3, 2014
NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND CLARITA
CAPULONG, Petitioners,
vs.
CO KING KI as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact WILLIAM
CO, Respondent.
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure
Facts:
Respondent Co King Ki (respondent), filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
petitioners, Ernesto, Marciano and one Lawrence Smith (defendants) before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Respondent alleged that he is
the owner of a parcel of land located at Lubao, Pampanga.
The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averring,
among others, that they are qualified farmer beneficiaries of the subject
property and that respondent was no longer the owner thereof as same was
already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans Bank.
The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered a Decision in
favor of respondent, declaring defendants as illegal occupants and not tenants
of the subject property, and directing them to vacate the same. Defendants filed
their Motion for Reconsideration which the RARAD denied.
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. The PARAD denied the notice of appeal filed
by defendants for having been filed out of time.
Defendants sought reconsideration of the September 18, 2008 Order while
respondent moved for the execution of the Decision. The PARAD denied the
defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and granted respondent’s Motion for
Execution.
Aggrieved, petitioners, together with Ernesto and Marciano, filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. The CA issued a Resolution, dismissing the petition for
certiorari because petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order in violation of Section
3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The CA denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
basis of a strict application of Section 3, Rule46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
Ruling: No.

Petitioners appeal for the liberal construction of the rules because they will
suffer insurmountably if the case would be dismissed based on a technicality.
We deny the petition.

While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a notice of appeal is
a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the decision, it is
required, however, that said appeal must have been filed on time.24 It bears
reiterating that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory
privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the
statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements
for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are
necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect
the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing
party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does
the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and
to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat
such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities.
They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law
ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or
complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors
may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public
order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated

November 20, 2009 and March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 106882 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.