10. Sibal vs. Valdez G.R. No.

L-26278 ; August 4, 1927

TOPIC A. Classification of Things

(SYLLABUS): (1) Immovable or Real Property (415); Movable or Personal Property (416- 417)

PETITIONER: Leon Sibal LAWYER: J. E. Blanco

RESPONDENT : 1. Emiliano J. Valdez Et Al., LAWYER: Felix B. Bautista and Santos and Benitez
2. Emiliano J. Valdez,
PONENTE: JOHNSON, J.:
DISUPTED
PROPERTY:

FACTS: property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal,
deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar
cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels
of land described in the complaint in the third paragraph of
the first cause of action; that within one year from the date of
the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said
sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount
sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest
thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid
thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding
thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money and to
return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
that paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of CC has been modified by Sec.
450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that
“ungathered products” as mentioned in said article of the Civil
Code have the nature of personal property. In other words, the
phrase “personal property” should be understood to include
“ungathered products”.
The court therefore concluded that for the purpose of
attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, “ungathered products” have the nature or
personal property.
DOCTRINE/ LEGAL BASIS:

As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the

defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was attempting to harvest the
palay planted in four of the seven parcels mentioned in the
first cause of action; that he had harvested and taken
possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in
another parcel described in the second cause of action,
amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay belonged to
the plaintiff.

The judge rendered a judgment against the plaintiff and in

facor of te defendants holding that the sugar cane in question
was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the sugar cane in question is a personal or real

property.

RULING:

The sugarcane in question is a personal property. Act No.

1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing
crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides:
“All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably
to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in
pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage.” Section
7 in part provides: “If growing crops can be mortgaged the
mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the
mortgagor binds himself properly to tend, care for and protect
the crop while growing.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was
enacted on an assumption that “growigncrops” are personal