272 Sandstrom v.
Supreme Court of Montana 442 US 510 A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from
No. 78-5384 June 18, 1979 Justice Brennan
Topic: Burden of Proof and Presumptions – Presumptions
Doctrine/s: The effect of a presumption in a jury instruction is determined by the way
in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted it, not by a state court's
interpretation of its legal import.
ER: Accused was charged with deliberate homicide. At trial, he argued that, although
he killed the victim, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and therefore was not
guilty of deliberate homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. The
SC held that such presumption is in conflict with the overriding presumption of
innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every
element of the crime, and should be struck down. The SC in effect said that it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the mental element of a crime.
Facts:
 18-year-old David Sandstrom confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen.
Based upon the confession and corroborating evidence, he was charged
with deliberate homicide.
 At trial, Sandstrom's attorney informed the jury that, although his client
admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and was
therefore not guilty of "deliberate homicide," but of a lesser crime.
o That based on the two court-appointed mental health expert,
Sandstrom, due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol
consumption, could not have killed the victim purposely.
 The prosecution requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts."
 Sandstrom’s counsel objected, arguing that "the instruction has the effect
of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of" purpose or knowledge to the
defense, and that "that is impermissible under the Federal Constitution, due
process of law. It was overruled.
 Sandstrom was found guilty. Montana Supreme Court affirmed
Issue: WoN the jury instruction, "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts," violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt -Yes
Held:
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action or
proceeding."The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis
applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the
presumption it describes. Whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional
rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the
instruction.
Montana argues that it was merely a permissive inference. It allowed, but did not
require, the jury to draw conclusions about the intent of the accused. Hence, it was
constitutional. From the language of the instruction, they were not simply told that
they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that
the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed
such an instruction as mandatory.
Montana argued that even if viewed as a mandatory presumption, it could have been
rebutted. On this view, the instruction required the jury, if satisfied as to the facts
which trigger the presumption, to find intent unless the defendant offered evidence
to the contrary.
If Montana intended its presumption to have only the effect described by its Supreme
Court, then we are convinced that a reasonable juror could well have been misled by
the instruction given, and could have believed that the presumption was not limited
to requiring the defendant to satisfy only a burden of production.
While the Court has upheld conclusive presumptions in the past, particularly the
element of intent to gain from theft of government property, presumptive intent has
no place in this case. A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow
would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption
which would permit, but not require, the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact
would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. A
presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the
evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact
an artificial and fictional effect. In either case, this presumption would conflict with
the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused
and which extends to every element of the crime."
Dispositive Portion: Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.