FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 7927. August 8, 1913.]

JUAN BARRAMEDA , petitioner, vs . PERCY M. MOIR (Judge of the First

Instance), ET AL. , respondents.

Rafael de la Sierra for petitioner.

Thos. L. Hartigan, W.A. Kincaid, and Jose Robles Lahesa for respondent Judge
Moir.
Facundo Salazar in his own behalf.
Manly & McMahon for respondent Valera Basmayor.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL

JURISDICTION TO TRY REAL ESTATE ACTIONS BELOW A SPECIFIED SUM HELD VOID.
— Acts No. 2041 and 2131, in so far as they attempt to confer exclusive jurisdiction or
exclusive original jurisdiction upon courts of justices of the peace to try to real-estate
actions where the amount involve does not exceed P200, are void because they conflict
with section 9 of the Philippine Bill, which confirms the original jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance in "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property,
or of any interest therein." as provided in Act No. 136, section 56, paragraph 2 of the
Philippine Commission.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION TO TRY REAL-ESTATE ACTIONS WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS VOID. — For
the reason that the incidental causes in the same Acts, providing the justice of peace
shall have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance to try real-estate actions
where the amount involved exceeds P200 but is less than P600, are supplemental and
ancillary to those void provisions which attempt to confer exclusive original jurisdiction
upon justices of the peace where the amount involved is less than P200, the said
clauses are also void.
3. ID.; STATUTE IN PART; EFFECT UPON THE REMAINDER. — The general rule
is that where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that if the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if
they has supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must
remain to make a complete intelligible, and valid statute, which carries our the
legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results
affecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or
efficacy for any purpose whatever, and, what remains must express the legislative will
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 independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.

DECISION

TRENT , J : p

This is an original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner relates that he

was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to parcel of
land; that a case was decided adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court of First
Instance; and that the judge of that court, on motion of the appellee, dismissed the
appeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of
the judgment. At the request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was issued by
this court to stay the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent
judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to
the complaint on the ground that it does not state the facts suf cient to constitute a
cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts No. 2041 and 2131, conferring
original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate, are inconsistent
with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No. 2041, section 3, it
was provided:

"Justice of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate

questions for title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the
property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value
exceeds two hundred pesos but is less that six hundred pesos the justice of the
peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance."
By Act No. 2131, section 1, the above provision was amended by substituting
"exclusive original jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction."
In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster (11 Phil. Rep., 340) it was held that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, as xed by section 9 of
the Philippine Bill, may be added to but not diminished by the Philippine Legislature.
This holding has never been questioned, and it seems unnecessary now to discuss the
grounds upon which it was based. Therefore, there will be suf cient reason for
declaring the disputed provisions of Acts No. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the
Philippine Bill and, consequently, void, if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts
of First Instance where the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those
courts extends to "all civil actions which involves the title to or possession of real
property, or of any interest therein." except in forcible entry and detainer cases. (Act No.
136, sec. 56, par. 2) Some one has said that there is no more comprehensive word in
the English language than the word "all." If this word is given its natural and unrestricted
meaning, there is no case involving the title to real estate which Courts of First Instance
are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being
supreme, any Act of the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to curtail
such jurisdiction must be held void. Acts No. 2041 and 2131 confer the original
jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try to real estate and provide that it shall be
exclusive in cases where the value of property in litigation does not exceed P200. It is
the word "exclusive" susceptible of a construction that would still give Courts of First
Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate where the value of the property in
litigation does not exceed P200? By no possible means can exclusive jurisdiction to try
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 a speci c class of cases be construed so as to permit of another court entertaining
jurisdiction over such cases. To give grant of unrestricted exclusive over a speci c
class of litigation to one court its only proper sense, all other courts must be barred
from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. To hold that another court has jurisdiction
also in such cases is to destroy the grant of exclusive jurisdiction given to the rst. It is
no longer exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent. Were the
disputed provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 allowed to stand therefore, the
necessary result would be to deprived Courts of First Instance of their original
jurisdiction to try cases where the title to realty valued at not more than P200 was
involved. This applies, whether the phrase, "exclusive jurisdiction" or "exclusive original
jurisdiction" be used. The Philippine Legislature can not deprived Courts of First
Instance of any of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Organic Law. Upon this
ground alone, then, Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, in so far as they attempt to confer
exclusive original jurisdiction upon courts of justice of the peace to try cases involving
title to realty valued at not more than P200, must be declared void.
There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon
justices of the peace by the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the
amount in controversy exceeds P200, but is less than P600.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would
have enacted it by itself it they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact
the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200, Mass., 482; 86 N.E., 916; 128 A.S.R., 446;
Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou.,
963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S.E., 798.) The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of
the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A.C.L.R. Co.,
56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26
L.R.A.N.S., 794; Cannolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565; People vs.
Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N.E., 821; 22 L.R.A.N.S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich 124
La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no
legal force or ef cacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
(State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N.W., 473; 23 L.R.A.N.S., 839.)
Courts of justices of the peace are courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction. They
are most inferior courts in our judicial system. Where they have jurisdiction at all, it has
never been limited by the signi cance of the particular case. On the contrary, the
province of those courts, as is well known, is to handle precisely such cases. If litigation
be divided into important and unimportant cases, then assuredly, to justice of the peace
fall only the unimportant. And when the division of jurisdiction in a particular class of
cases is based upon the amount in controversy, as is the case with the provisions of
Acts No. 2041 and 2131 in question, a law providing that because of the inferior
amount in controversy a case should go to the Court of First Instance, while another
case of the same nature, because of its greater amount, could be tried before a justice
of the peace, would be a anomaly and at war with the only logical distribution of
jurisdiction. In other words, the case of A vs. B is too small and inconsequential to be
tried before a justice of the peace, and must be tried in the Court of First Instance; while
the case of C vs. D, being of a larger amount, may be tried by a justice of the peace.
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 Such reasoning has never heretofore been used by the Legislature in distributing
jurisdiction over litigation between Courts of First Instance and justice of the peace
courts. It seems clear that the concurrent jurisdiction in cases were the amount
involved is more than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and
ancillary to exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent
jurisdiction must therefore be considered as inseparable from and absolutely
dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction which has already been
declared void. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be declared void also.

Other additional jurisdiction granted to justice of the peace by Acts No. 2041 and
2131 is not before the court. We need only say that such other additional jurisdiction
bears no relation whatever to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for
jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and applying the same rules to the rest of the Act
which we have applied to the clause conferring concurrent jurisdiction in real-estate
actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, we are clearly of the opinion that the
validity of the remainder of this Act is not in any case dependent upon the said void
provision.
In conclusion, it seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the
respondent judge is based upon the a priori assumption that the original jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance in real-estate actions is, by the Organic Law, made exclusive.
We have found it quite unnecessary to postulate any such theory in disposing of the
case. Nor has it been necessary to rely upon the second point made by counsel to the
effect that jurisdiction in real-estate actions had never been conferred upon justices of
the peace in the United States or England.
The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the
respondent judge in this action review in absolute nullity. The respondent judge
acquired jurisdiction of the cause only for purpose of dismissing the appeal, and in
further directing the justice of the peace to proceed with the execution of the void
judgment, the respondent judge was in error.
The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the
judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be
denied. The petitioner will pay the costs of the cause. This opinion will be substituted
for the one handed down by this court in the same case at the close of the last term. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

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