PEOPLE VS CHAN FOOK

Facts:
Chan Fook is a chinese passenger of the United States Military Transport South Bend. Immigration
authorities allowed him to land in the Philippines and he left the boat on the same day. The following day
he went to pier no. 1 to get his baggage. After the search of the baggage in which postcards of an indecent
character were found, a customs agent, Eugenio M. Cruz, attempted to search the body of the accused, to
which the latter apparently objected. A dispute took place between the two, which terminated in the
secret agent seizing the Chinaman by the arm with intent to search his body, after showing him his police
badge. The accused resisted and struck the secret agent on the stomach. The latter in turn struck him on
the neck. Here the customs inspector, Anastacio Jacinto, intervened, and explained to the accused that
Cruz was a customs secret service agent and had the right to search him in order to find whether he had
on his person any contraband. Then the appellant made no further resistance and allowed himself to be
searched.

The prosecution alleges that under section 1338 of the Administrative Code all persons coming
into the Philippine Islands from Foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by the customs
authorities under such regulations as may be prescribed relative thereto. The defense, however, contends
that once the accused has arrived at the point of his destination by being allowed to leave the boat and to
land he was beyond the jurisdiction of the customs authorities, and, therefore, not liable to search without
judicial warrant.

Issue: Whether the search is valid

Held: The SC held that that after the customs authorities have permitted the accused to land in Manila, the
terminus of his voyage, he ceased to be a passenger within the meaning of said section 1338 of the
Administrative Code. The fact that the accused returned to pier No. 1 to get the baggage that he had left
there the day before does not subject him to the operation of said section. He could have gone back there
several weeks or months after his arrival, and in such case, if the contention of the prosecution is
sustained, all foreigners arriving in the Philippines would be in the highly anomalous situation of being
liable to detention of the right to be secured against unreasonable searches guaranteed by section 3 of the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as Jones Law, which provides that the right to be secured
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated..
In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying his hands on the agent Cruz is, in our opinion,
an adequate defense to repel the aggression of the latter, who had seized him by the arm for the purpose
of searching him. In accordance with the repeated decisions of the supreme court of Spain, the gravity of a
disobedience to an order of a person in public authority is measured and graded by the circumstances
surrounding the act, the motives prompting it, and the real importance of the transgression rather than
by the source of the order disobeyed. And, taking into consideration the circumstances of the present
case, wherein the agent Cruz had exceeded his functions, and wherein the accused acted in defense of the
most highly esteemed of individual rights, the constitutional right to be secured against unreasonable
searches, The SC held that there is no ground for finding the accused guilty of the crime defined in article
252 of the Penal Code.
That foreigners in the Philippines are entitled to the benefits of the individual rights secured by the
Philippine Bill is undeniable. In the case of Kepner vs. U. S. (195 U. S., 100), the Supreme Court said:

When Congress came to pass the Act of July 1, 1902, it enacted, almost in the language of the President's
instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In view of the expressed declarations of the President,
followed by the action of Congress, both adopting, with little alternation, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument that in this form it was intended to carry to the
Philippine Islands those principles of our government which the President declared to be established as
rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom, at the same time expressing regret that the
inhabitants of the Islands had not therefore enjoyed their benefit. And according to the principles
underlying the Constitution, as extended to the Philippine Islands by the President's instructions to the
Commission and by the Philippine Bill, foreigners are entitled to the protection of their life, liberty, and
property. In the case of Yick Wo vs. Hopkins (118 U. S., 356, 369), Justice Matthews says:

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or properly without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." These provisions are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.