WHEN THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE ₱195,155.

00 as actual
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE damages;
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
₱200,000.00 as moral
G.R. No. 139031 October 18, 2004 damages;

MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, petitioner, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary

vs. damages; and
FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
₱100,000.00 as attorney’s
DECISION fees, plus the costs of suit.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and
equitable in the premises."

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on

certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated February 8,
1999 and Resolution dated June 17, 1999, both issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946.
Records show that on May 20, 1994, Marie Antoinette
R. Soliven, petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 60, Makati City a complaint for sum of
money with damages against Fastforms Philippines,
Inc., respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1788.
Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim,5 denied
that it obtained a loan from petitioner; and that it did
not authorize its then president, Dr. Eduardo Escobar,
to secure any loan from petitioner or issue various
checks as payment for interests.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a
Decision dated July 3, 19956 in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

The complaint alleges that on June 2, 1993, respondent, "22. WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders
through its president Dr. Eduardo Escobar, obtained a judgment as follows:
loan from petitioner in the amount of One Hundred
Seventy Thousand Pesos (₱170,000.00), payable within 22.1. The defendant FASTFORMS
a period of twenty-one (21) days, with an interest of 3%, PHILS., INC. is ordered to pay the
as evidenced by a promissory note3 executed by Dr. plaintiff, MARIE ANTOINETTE R.
Escobar as president of respondent. The loan was to be SOLIVEN, the following amounts:
used to pay the salaries of respondent’s employees. On
the same day, respondent issued a postdated check
(dated June 25, 1993)4 in favor of petitioner in the 22.1.1. ₱175,000.00 – the
amount of ₱175,000.00 (representing the principal amount of the loan and its
amount of ₱170,000.00, plus ₱5,000.00 as interest). It interest covered by the
was signed by Dr. Escobar and Mr. Lorcan Harney, check (Exh. 3);
respondent's vice-president. About three weeks later,
respondent, through Dr. Escobar, advised petitioner not 22.1.2. Five (5%) percent
to deposit the postdated check as the account from of ₱175,000.00 – a month
where it was drawn has insufficient funds. Instead, from June 25, 1993 until
respondent proposed to petitioner that the ₱175,000.00 the ₱175,000.00 is fully
be "rolled-over," with a monthly interest of 5% (or paid – less the sum of
₱8,755.00). Petitioner agreed to the proposal. ₱76,250.00 – as interest;
Subsequently, respondent, through Dr. Escobar, Mr.
Harney and Mr. Steve Singson, the new president,
22.1.3. ₱50,000.00 – as
issued several checks in the total sum of ₱76,250.00 in
attorney’s fees.
favor of petitioner as payment for interests
corresponding to the months of June, August,
September, October and December, 1993. Later, despite 22.2. The COMPLAINT for MORAL
petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent refused to and EXEMPLARY damages is
pay its principal obligation and interests due. DISMISSED.

In her complaint, petitioner prays: 22.3. The COUNTERCLAIM is

DISMISSED; and
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court 22.4. Costs is taxed against the
that judgment be rendered: defendant."

(a) holding/declaring defendant (now Respondent then filed a motion for

respondent) guilty of breach of
contract x x x; and
(b) ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff (now petitioner) the
following sums:
reconsideration7 questioning for the first time the trial
court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of
petitioner’s principal demand (₱195,155.00) does not
exceed ₱200,000.00, the complaint should have been
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7691.8

1
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration,
stressing that respondent is barred from assailing the
jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the
latter’s jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its
answer to the complaint and actively participated in all
stages of the trial.9
In its Order dated October 11, 1995,10 the trial court
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration, holding
that it has jurisdiction over the case because the
totality of the claim therein exceeds ₱200,000.00. The
trial court also ruled that respondent, under the
principle of estoppel, has lost its right to question its
jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s Decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Appellate Court held that the case is within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, petitioner’s
claim being only ₱195,155.00; and that respondent may
assail the jurisdiction of the trial court anytime even for
the first time on appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
June 17, 1999.11
Hence, this petition.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the
trial court has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 94-1788.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on
April 15, 199412 or prior to the institution of Civil Case
No. 94-1788, provides inter alia that where the amount
of the demand in civil cases instituted in Metro Manila
exceeds ₱200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction thereof is
lodged with the Regional Trial Court.
Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of
the demand in the complaint instituted in Metro
Manila does not exceed ₱200,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14,
1994, we specified the guidelines in the implementation
of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
"2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of
whatever kind’ in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court." (underscoring ours)
2
Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum
of money amounting to only ₱195,155.00. The damages
being claimed by petitioner are merely the
consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they
are not included in determining the jurisdictional
amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the instant case. As correctly stated by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision:
"Conformably, since the action is principally
for the collection of a debt, and the prayer for
damages is not one of the main causes of
action but merely a consequence thereto, it
should not be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court."
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened."13 In the instant case, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the
trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially
when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,14 we held:
"Moreover, we note that petitioner did not
question at all the jurisdiction of the lower
court x x x in its answers to both the amended
complaint and the second amended complaint.
It did so only in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the lower court after it had
received an adverse decision. As this Court
held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5,
1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, that
included invoking its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner
by estoppel from challenging the court’s
jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its
answer to the second amended complaint on
April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the
lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on
December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the lower court’s decision
that petitioner raised the question of the
lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction."
(underscoring ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty
and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,15 we ruled:
"In the case at bar, it was found by the trial
court in its 30 September 1996 decision in
LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private
respondents (who filed the petition for
reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with
both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and
therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. However, private
respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution
throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93). On the contrary, private
 respondents actively participated in the
reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings
and presenting its evidence. They invoked the
trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain
affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their
titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by their own actions.
"The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine
that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of
the case before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs.
Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998];
Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating
in the proceedings and submitting his case for
decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of
the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517
[1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995])."
(underscoring ours)
SP No. 45480 which reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32
in Civil Case No. 4907 and ordered said case dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents show that petitioners were lay
members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC)
in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de
la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish
priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality.
Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the
transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de
la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the
records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to
a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the
animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de
la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for
transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.
Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte worsened when petitioner
Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated
by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town
fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la
Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from
pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a
member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his
credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. The Bishop
also appealed to petitioner Taruc to refrain from
committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best
interests of the PIC. He likewise advised petitioners to
air their complaints before the higher authorities of PIC
if they believed they had valid grievances against him,
the parish priest, the laws and canons of the PIC.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from
The assailed Decision dated February 8, 1999 and
carrying out his plans. On June 19, 1993, at around
Resolution dated June 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded to
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946 are REVERSED. The
hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.
Decision dated July 3, 1995 and Resolution dated
October 11, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
60, Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1788 are On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
hereby AFFIRMED. petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the
Philippine Independent Church for reasons of:
SO ORDERED.
(1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the
Church;
DO TRIAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
ECCLESIASTICAL MATTER
(2) inciting dissension, resulting in division in the
Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina
.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005 Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they
celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19, 1996;
and
DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA,
NICANOR GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY
CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO (3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church
ALCALA, LEONARDO DIZON, SALVADOR causing anxiety and fear among the general
GELSANO and BENITO LAUGO, Petitioners, membership.1
vs.
BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, REV. FR.
Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought
RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN
reconsideration of the above decision. In his letter to
BORDAS, Respondents.
Bishop de la Cruz, the Obispo Maximo opined that Fr.
Florano should step down voluntarily to avert the
DECISION hostility and enmity among the members of the PIC
parish in Socorro but stated that:
CORONA, J.:
… I do not intervene in your diocesan decision in asking
Fr. Florano to vacate Socorro parish….2
This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

3
In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to
the diocese of Odmoczan and was replaced by Bishop
Rhee M. Timbang. Like his predecessor, Bishop
Timbang did not find a valid reason for transferring Fr.
Florano to another parish. He issued a circular denying
petitioners’ persistent clamor for the transfer/re-
assignment of Fr. Florano. Petitioners were informed of
such denial but they continued to celebrate mass and
hold other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who
had been restrained from performing any priestly
functions in the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao del
Norte.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication,
petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before
the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32.
They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas
on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to
have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the
PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal
because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before
the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but
it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied so they elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision
of the court a quo and ordered the dismissal of the case
without prejudice to its being refiled before the proper
forum. It held:
… We find it unnecessary to deal on the validity of the
excommunication/expulsion of the private respondents
(Taruc, et al.), said acts being purely ecclesiastical
matters which this Court considers to be outside the
province of the civil courts.
…
"Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of
a religious organization except for the protection of civil
or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of
litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the
title, use, or possession of church property." (Ibid.,
p.466)
…
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the
present case.
…
Ergo, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
instant case does not involve a violation and/or
protection of a civil or property rights in order for the
court a quo to acquire jurisdiction in the instant case.3
Petitioners appealed from the above decision but their
petition was denied. Their motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied, hence, this appeal.
4
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or
not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving
the expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution.
We rule that the courts do not.
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution specifically provides that:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to
be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to
Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." We
have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:
upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily
apparent that cases involving questions relative to
ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because
of their inherent interest, but because of the far
reaching effects of the decisions in human society.
[However,] courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having
been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority
is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature.4 (italics ours)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of
said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official
functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller5:
… all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do
so with an implied consent to submit to the Church
government and they are bound to submit to it.
In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,6 we
enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving
religious institutions or organizations, there is one area
which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and
disciplinary differences.7 Thus,
The amendments of the constitution, restatement of
articles of religion and abandonment of faith or
abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church and having reference to
the power of excluding from the church those
allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts.(emphasis
ours)
We would, however, like to comment on petitioners’
claim that they were not heard before they were
expelled from their church. The records show that
Bishop de la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several
times not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of
PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of
their actions, among them their
expulsion/excommunication from PIC. Yet, these pleas
and warnings fell on deaf ears and petitioners went
ahead with their plans to defy their Bishop and foment
hostility and disunity among the members of PIC in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte. They should now take full
responsibility for the chaos and dissension they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is herby DENIED for lack
of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
Garcia, J., no part.
G.R. No. 27619. February 4, 1928.]
RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ, by his guardian ad
item Adelaida Gonzalez, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA, Defendant-Appellant.
Feria & La O and Araneta & Zaragoza,
for Appellant.
Gibbs & McDonough, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW; CHAPLAINCIES;
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE PRESCRIBING
ECCLESIASTICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR
CHAPLAIN. — The properly constituted authorities of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the power to
adopt an ordinance prescribing ecclesiastical
qualifications for chaplains to be appointed to collative
chaplaincies; and such ordinance will be effective as
regards an appointment to a benefice although at the
time when the particular chaplaincy was founded no
ecclesiastical qualifications were prerequisite to the
appointment.
DECISION
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila by Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, through his
guardian ad litem, Adelaida Gonzalez, against the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a corporation
sole, represented by His Grace, M. J. O’Doherty,
Apostolic Archbishop, for the purpose of obtaining a
5
writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to appoint
the plaintiff to a vacant chaplaincy, to enforce an
accounting for the income of the chaplaincy for the
period during which it. has been vacant, and to secure
other relief. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
entered judgment which, as subsequently amended,
embraces three features, namely: First, ordering the
defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
as a corporation sole, and His Grace, Michael J.
O’Doherty, Roman Catholic Apostolic Archbishop of
Manila, its sole representative, forthwith to appoint
plaintiff, Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, as chaplain of the said
chaplaincy founded by Doña Petronila de Guzman;
secondly, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff,
through his guardian ad litem, the sum of one hundred
seventy-three thousand, seven hundred and twenty-five
pesos (P173,725) as the rents and income of the
property of said chaplaincy from January 1, 1911, to
December 31, 1925, plus the rents and income accrued
since December 31, 1925, from the total of which should
be deducted the expenses allowed by the court as
legitimate charges against the fund, and requiring the
defendant, furthermore, to pay to the plaintiff, through
his guardian or guardian ad litem, from the date of
plaintiff’s appointment as chaplain, the net income of
said property from time to time as collected; thirdly,
reserving to plaintiff any legal rights that he may have
with reference to the cancellation of the transfer
certificate of title No. 17603 in a proper proceeding
before the fourth branch of this court, which branch has
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases relative to the
registration of real estate in the City of Manila (Act No.
2347, sec. 11). From this judgment the defendant
appealed.
On March 13, 1816, Doña Petronila de Guzman, a
resident of what is now the district of Binondo, in the
City of Manila, executed a will in which she instructed
her executor to take the steps necessary to the
foundation of a collative chaplaincy upon certain real
property adjacent to her residence in Binondo. The part
of the will pertinent to the foundation is found in three
paragraphs of the will which read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ninth Item: I declare and dispose that the new house
situated in this said town and bounded by this house of
my residence toward the right of its exit, which between
myself and my deceased sister Da. Vicenta de Guzman
we have constructed with our own money, at a cost of
one thousand six hundred pesos without including the
value of the lot on which it is erected, and I charge my
executor to constitute said house into a collative
chaplaincy, the foundation of which they shall effect
immediately after my death, choosing for chaplain D.
Esteban de Guzman, legitimate son of my grandson Dn.
Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and in his default, the
nearest relative, and in default of the latter, a collegian
of San Juan de Letran, who should be an orphan
mestizo, native of this said town, and I request the
father chaplain to celebrate sixty masses annually,
which should be said in the churches of the City of
Manila or in those outside of its walls, and in privileged
altars, in behalf of the souls of my father, Dn. Tomas de
Guzman, and of my mother, Dila. Sebastiana de Jesus,
and of my brothers and sisters, and for me, the
testatrix, after my days.
"Tenth Item: It is my will that for patron of said
chaplaincy my executors name the Father President of
the College of San Juan de Letran.
"Eleventh Item: I appoint my first executor as
administrator of the chaplaincy which shall be founded
on the house referred to, during the minority of said
chaplain."cralaw virtua1aw library
The property thus intended as the foundation of the
chaplaincy consists of the lots now known as Nos. 210-
212 and 214, Rosario Street, Manila, with the
improvements thereon.
After the death of the testatrix her executor, Don Jose
Telesforo de Guzman, on April 24, 1820, addressed a
petition to the Archbishop, informing him of the wishes
of the testatrix and praying that the property be
declared sufficient and that the chaplaincy be created,
with the petitioner’s son as chaplain and the petitioner
himself as administrator of the property during the
minority of the son. This petition, addressed by the
executor to the Archbishop, in the part material to be
here considered, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Sir—Don Jose
Telesforo de Guzman resident of the town of Binondo
with all due respect, before Your Illustrious Grace in
the best legal form, I present myself and say,—That the
annexed testimony which with due solemnity I enclose
shows that my deceased great grandmother Da.
Petronila de Guzman provided in her last will the
institution of a collative chaplaincy for one son of mine
named Esteban Sixto de Guzman, student of the Royal
College of San Juan de Letran, for the patronage of
which the Most Reverend Father President of said
college has been named, with a house of lime and stone
situated at Calle Rosario as capital, which, according to
the certificate hereto attached, nets a rent of one
hundred eighty pesos annually, it being located on the
Calle Real del Rosario; and I, being her testamentary
executor and appointed administrator of my above-
mentioned son, present myself before Your Most
Illustrious Grace, praying that you declare the living
sufficient and order that a title to said chaplaincy issue
to my said son and to me the administrator during his
minority."cralaw virtua1aw library
In support of this petition the executor of the will of the
foundress executed, on April 26, 1820, a formal
document of endowment, setting aside for pious uses
the property intended for the foundation and
transferring it to the spiritual properties of the
archbishopric. This document, omitting formal parts at
the end, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the City of Manila on the 26th day of April one
thousand eight hundred and twenty, before me the
Clerk of Court and the undersigned witnesses,
(appeared) D. Jose Telesforo, resident of the town of
Binondo, and testamentary executor of the deceased
Da. Petronila de Guzman, as shown by the certificate
which was shown me and which appears to have been
sealed and signed by the Public Clerk Dn. Francisco
Castro de Reyes, to me known, and said —
"That whereas the said Petronila de Guzman, deceased,
has ordered in the ninth clause of her will that after her
death a house of lime and stone belonging to her be
constituted into a chaplaincy, which house had been
constructed by her and her deceased sister Doña
Vicenta de Guzman who died single, at a cost of one
thousand six hundred pesos without including the value
of the lot whereon said house is erected, in said town of
Binondo, being bounded towards the right of its exit by
the house in which the said testatrix formerly lived,
6
which was her own; and to accomplish the foundation of
said chaplaincy in accordance with law, the said
executor appeared before the most Illustrious and Most
Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop, stating that (the
chaplaincy) was subject to the charge that the
incumbent was required to say sixty masses annually,
either in the churches of this City or in those without
its walls, and in privileged altars, for the benefit of the
souls of her deceased parents, Don Tomas de Guzman
and Doña Sebastiana de Jesus, of the testatrix and of
her brothers and sisters, electing as chaplain her great
grandson Don Esteban de Guzman, a student of the
Royal College of San Juan de Letran, and as
administrator during the minority of the said chaplain,
the executor himself, upon whom she has conferred
power to appoint as Patron of the chaplaincy the Father
President of the said Royal College of San Juan de
Letran, asking that the said living (congrua), the rents
of the property of which amount at present to P180 per
year, be declared sufficient, issuing the corresponding
title of chaplain to his said son (i. e., of the executor);
and as a consequence whereof he (i. e., the executor)
segregates said property from temporal properties and
transfers it to the spiritual properties of this
Archbishopric, with the restriction that, as a spiritual
property, it cannot be alienated or converted into any
other estate for any cause, even though of a more pious
character, (the grantor) protesting that if the contrary
should be done from now until then, he declares null
and without value or effect whatever may be done or
executed contrary to the tenor of these presents, and
the said executor affirms and ratifies said conditions
before me and the witnesses herein below named, so
that by virtue of this Deed of Foundation canonical
collation may be conferred on the said appointed
chaplain. And for its stability and greater validity he
renounces with all solemnity the laws that may favor
the said decedent, inserting and repeating herein all
the clauses that may be necessary with all the
requisites and conditions, so that the purpose which
actuated her to do this act of piety may be duly
accomplished, with the solemnities above set forth and
the conditions herein inserted, which he asks and
charges the above named chaplain and those who will
succeed him to respect, comply and execute ad
perpetuam rei memoriam amen."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The two documents from which we have just quoted
appear to have been passed to the procurator fiscal for
comment; and this official made indorsement to the
effect that no reason occurred to him for opposing the
project and that he accordingly recommended that the
establishment be effected. The matter was then brought
to the attention of the Archbishop who gave the
necessary formal approval to the foundation and an
appropriate decree to this effect was entered. According
to the note of this decree, His Grace declared that
"concurring entirely with what had been expressed by
the promotor fiscal, he was approving and approved the
foundation of said chaplaincy, with all the
circumstances and conditions specified in said clause (of
the will) and the deed of foundation, as also the charge
of P1,700 upon said house, erecting said sum into
spiritual property and making it, as he makes it, by
perpetual title, to be of the ecclesiastical forum and
jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since the foundation of this chaplaincy, five chaplains
have been appointed thereto by the Archbishop of
Manila. The first and second chaplains were great
grandsons of the foundress, the third was a great great
grandson, and the fourth and fifth great great great
grandsons. At the time of their appointments they were
respectively more than 13, 21, 22, 27 and 19 years old.
The fifth and last chaplain or beneficiary of the
chaplaincy in question was Angel Gonzalez, father of
the present plaintiff. This individual resigned the office
of chaplain, effective December 6, 1910, since which
date the chaplaincy has remained vacant. Though not of
decisive importance in the case, the document by which
Angel Gonzalez was appointed to the chaplaincy on
August 21, 1901, is perhaps instructive as indicating
the nature of the rights appurtenant to the office.
Omitting the formal conclusion, this document reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whereas, the Chaplaincy founded by Da. Petronila de
Guzman, the capital of which consists of a building of
brick and mortar erected on its own lot located on the
Calle de Rosario, District of Binondo, is now vacant
because of the renunciation by its last possessor D.
Fernando Maniquis y Guzman; now, therefore, the
necessary requisites and qualifications according to law
being found concurring in D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman,
tonsured, a boarding student in the College of San Juan
de Letran of this City, we order to issue and do issue
this present title by virtue of which we elect and
appoint the above-named D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman,
as chaplain of the benefice above referred to, and by the
manner and form which we best can do, we hereby give
him collation, canonical institution and real possession
vel quasi of the above-mentioned chaplaincy, which
shall be administered as heretofore by the
administrator of the funds of this Holy Archbishopric,
so that, as such chaplain he may possess and enjoy it as
an ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with the
obligation of ordering to be said, by means of a priest,
while he himself cannot say them, sixty masses
annually according to the will of the foundress, and
with the understanding that every year he has to show
to our Court of Chaplaincies wherein this shall be
recorded, that he has discharged said masses, without
which requisite the rent which for the purpose may be
necessary shall be withheld from him. And by virtue of
Holy Obedience we order those to whom these presents
may concern to have and treat the said D. Angel
Gonzalez y Guzman as the beneficiary and possessor of
said chaplaincy, and that they pay him well and
faithfully the income which in the future the capital
may produce and that which it has produced while
vacant, placing upon his conscience the duty of
complying with the annexed conditions and relieving us
thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
The function of administering the property pertaining
to the foundation appears to have been exercised, at
least since about 1863, by the Archbishop; and for this
service a commission has been charged against the
incumbent whenever a chaplain has been in office. In
September, 1914, a Torrens title in fee simple was
issued for the property in the name of the Archbishop.
During vacancies the duty of causing sixty masses to be
said per annum, as provided in the will, devolves upon
the Archbishop; and this obligation has been performed
by the present respondent, at an expense of not more
than P300 per year.
The trial judge found that, from January 1, 1911, to
December 31, 1925, the administrator had obtained, in
the way of rents of the property, a total of P153,600. In
addition to this there was collected, in the year 1912,
the sum of P20,125, as insurance, upon occasion of the
7
destruction by fire of the house belonging to the
chaplaincy. The expenses of rebuilding and repairs,
over the same period, is stated to have been P24,603.34.
All of the income thus received, less the expenses of
administration and cost of the masses, has been applied
to the purposes of education, beneficence, and charity,
under the directions of the Archbishop, with the
approval of His Holiness, the Pope.
Since the Council of Trent it has been the law of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church that no person who
has received the first tonsure or who has already been
ordained in minority is eligible to a benefice before his
14th year (Council of Trent, Chap. 6, sec. 23, July,
1563), that is to say, he must be at least 13 years and 1
day old. With this exception there seems to have been
no ecclesiastical law or ordinance of the Church in force
at the time the chaplaincy in question was founded,
prescribing ecclesiastical qualifications for incumbents
of the office of chaplain. However, in the year 1918 a
new canon law was promulgated by the Catholic
Church to the effect that "the chaplaincies, or simple
benefices, are conferred on clericals of the secular
clergy;" and in order to be a clerical, one must have
received the first tonsure. Also in order to take the first
tonsure, one must have begun the study of theology,
and in order to study theology, one must be a bachelor.
Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, the plaintiff in this action, was
born on September 16, 1912. He was therefore nearly
12 years of age when this action was instituted on July
31, 1924. He is a son of Angel Gonzalez, the last
incumbent of the chaplaincy in question. At the trial
the young man testified that he was then a student in
the sixth grade of the public school and that his
inclinations and desires are towards an ecclesiastical
career. More than two years prior to the institution of
this action he was presented to the Archbishop of
Manila, with the request that he be appointed to the
chaplaincy in question, he being at that time 10 years of
age. The application was turned down by the
Archbishop in a letter, addressed to the boy’s father,
and dated March 20, 1922, on the ground that the youth
did not have the necessary qualifications under existing
canon law. His Grace, the Archbishop of Manila,
testified that although he could not appoint plaintiff as
chaplain of the chaplaincy in question, he had made an
offer at his expense to educate the plaintiff so that he
might obtain the necessary preparations to qualify
himself as a cleric and might later be appointed as
chaplain. He added, however, that although he did not
consider himself in duty bound to make such an offer,
the same was made for equitable motives in view of the
claim of the child as the nearest relative of the
foundress of the said chaplaincy.
In the deed of foundation of April 26, 1820, the
Presiding Father of the Royal College of San Juan de
Letran is designated as patron of the chaplaincy; and
before this action was instituted, Father Calixto Prieto,
then rector of San Juan de Letran College, addressed a
letter to the Archbishop, presenting the plaintiff as
candidate for the chaplaincy. Father Prieto stated that,
prior to presenting the plaintiff for the chaplaincy, he
satisfied himself that the applicant was the heir to the
chaplaincy, but did not take account of his moral or
intellectual qualifications, leaving these matters to be
passed upon by his superior. The application of the
plaintiff was also indorsed by other priests of the
church.
We now pass to the consideration of the nature of the
chaplaincy, or office of chaplain, as understood in
Spanish and ecclesiastical law. In the first place, it is to
be noted that the collative chaplaincy is a form of
ecclesiastical benefice, in which the incumbent is
appointed and canonically installed by the Bishop, or
Archbishop, and given a living, constituting a charge
upon specified property, subject to the duty of saying
masses and performing other pious or religious duties.
The collative chaplaincy is said to be a simple benefice.
In the second place, the term "collative chaplaincy" is
used in contradistinction to "lay chaplaincy" ; and the
difference is that the collative chaplaincy can be
constituted only upon the intervention of ecclesiastical
authority, while the lay chaplaincy does not require
such intervention.
In the case before us it is undeniable, and admitted,
that the chaplaincy in question is of the sort known as
the collative chaplaincy. The documents of foundation
expressly provide that this chaplaincy shall be of a
collative character; and to this end the property which
was to serve as the foundation of the chaplaincy was
segregated by the executor of Doña Petronila de
Guzman from other property pertaining to her estate
and transferred to the Church, with the effect of its
being converted into spiritual property for the pious use
intended. Furthermore, in accepting the transfer, the
Archbishop declared that said property was raised to
the status of spiritual property and that it thereby
passed to the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction.
Speaking broadly, the substantial effect of the
conveyance of the property to the Church and the
acceptance of the transfer by the Archbishop in the
manner above stated was that the legal title of the
property became vested in the Archbishop, subject to
the ecclesiastical charge intended in the creation of the
chaplaincy.
The trial judge found that the plaintiff is next kin
(pariente mas cercano) to the foundress of the
chaplaincy, in the sense intended in the Ninth Item of
the will, and, therefore, that he is qualified for the
chaplaincy in point of relationship. Exception is taken
to this finding by the appellant, who maintains that
there is no evidence in the record to support it. We are
of the opinion, however, that the proof on this point is
sufficient, and we shall assume in what is to follow that
the necessary relationship on the part of the plaintiff to
the foundress exists.
As has been already stated, this action was instituted
shortly before the plaintiff had reached the age of 12
years; and upon this fact the appellant plants the
proposition that the plaintiff is not qualified for the
chaplaincy on point of his age. The appellee has
attempted to meet this criticism by the filing of an
amended complaint on April 5, 1926, when the plaintiff
was in his 15th year. We shall therefore assume, for the
purposes of this decision, that the immaturity of the
plaintiff in point of age is not a fatal obstacle to the
maintenance of the action; and at any rate in the view
we take of the case this question may be ignored.
Upon turning our attention more directly to the legal
aspects of the controversy, we discover that the case of
the plaintiff proceeds upon a train of reasoning which
may be expressed as follows, namely, that the
Archbishop, as representative of the Church, is the
holder of the empty legal title to the property on which
the chaplaincy is founded; that the beneficial interest
thereto is vested exclusively in the heirs of the
foundress; that the plaintiff, as her next of kin, has an
8
unqualified right to be appointed to the chaplaincy,
without regard to his lack of ecclesiastical
qualifications; that the plaintiff, having title to the
chaplaincy, is entitled to demand of the defendant the
entire net income received by the latter as
administrator of the property during the pending
vacancy, as well as the right to be paid the income that
may hereafter be produced by the property so long as
the plaintiff shall occupy the post of chaplain. In a
word, it is the contention of the plaintiff that the
foundation in question is a perfected trust, enforcible in
a court of equity, that the Archbishop is a mere trustee,
and that the plaintiff is the present rightful beneficiary
of the entire property.
On the other hand, the attorneys for the Archbishop
challenge practically every phase of the plaintiff’s
presentation of the case; and in this connection various
propositions are submitted by them, which may
perhaps be fairly condensed as follows: That the
transfer made by the executor of the foundress of the
property with which we are here concerned had the
effect of conveying it to the Archbishop, as
representative of the Church, in whom, upon his
acceptance of the same, the entire property became
vested, for the purpose of maintaining the chaplaincy in
question, and subject to all the circumstances and
conditions specified in the documents; that the collative
chaplaincy thus constituted is an ecclesiastical benefice,
the right of appointment to which is vested exclusively
in the Archbishop; that the Church, by lawful
ordinance, effective in 1918, has required that, in order
to be eligible to the office of chaplain, the candidate
must possess ecclesiastical qualifications, of the
sufficiency of which the Archbishop is constituted judge;
that the plaintiff in this action does not possess the
qualifications for chaplain which have thus been
prescribed, and the Archbishop has so found and
declared; that, by the laws of the Church, the plaintiff,
if aggrieved by the decision of the Archbishop, has a
right of appeal to His Holiness, the Pope, of which right
the plaintiff has not availed himself; that, as the owner
of the property which is the subject of this foundation,
the Archbishop has the free disposition, for charitable,
educational, and religious purposes, of the income
derived from the property during a vacancy in the office
of chaplain, subject only to the obligation of causing
masses to be said as required in the documents of
foundation; that the incumbent of the office of chaplain
is entitled, from the bounty of the Archbishop, to
receive the income derived from the property during his
incumbency in the office to the extent necessary to
secure a suitable living only, and that, as to the residue,
it is the duty of the chaplain to apply it to charitable
and religious purposes; that the subject matter of this
suit is not a proper matter of cognizance in any civil
court; and, finally, that the court of origin was without
jurisdiction to compel the Archbishop to perform a
canonical function, to wit, to appoint the plaintiff to an
ecclesiastical office.
While the field of controversy thus laid out is extensive,
it will be found, upon a careful survey of the ground,
that the decision must in the end turn upon one or two
vital points, which are concerned with the right of the
plaintiff to the chaplaincy and the right of the court to
compel the Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff to said
office.
At the outset of the discussion we may state that we see
no reason to question the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action. The complaint alleges
that the plaintiff is beneficiary of a trust, and that the
defendant, as trustee, has refused to recognize the
plaintiff’s right to the office of chaplain and is diverting
the income of the foundation to unlawful uses. As was
observed by Mr. Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the leading case of Watson v.
Jones (13 Wallace, 679, 723; 20 Law. ed., 666), it seems
hardly to admit of rational doubt that an individual
may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of
sustaining religious doctrines, provided that in so doing
he violates no law of morality and gives to the
instrument by which his purpose is to be accomplished
the formalities which the law requires. It also seems to
be the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly
made, to see that the property so dedicated is not
diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its
use; and so long as there is any one so interested in the
execution of the trust as to have a standing in court, it
must be that he can prevent the diversion of the
property or fund to other and different uses. This is the
general doctrine of courts of equity as to charities, and
it seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters (23
R. C. L., p. 451). But while it may be, and is, the duty of
the court to inquire into a case of the character stated
in this complaint, the rule to be applied in determining
the right to relief is to be sought in the principles
governing the courts in dealing with rights derived from
ecclesiastical sources.
The rule that appears to offer most assistance in the
solution of the case before us is that formulated by the
Court of Appeals of South Carolina in the case of
Harmon v. Dreher (Speers Eq., 87), to the effect that:
Where a civil right depends upon some matter
pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal
tries the civil right and nothing more, taking the
ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right has
arisen as it finds them, and accepting those decisions as
matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The
proposition thus stated in Harmon v. Dreher has
subsequently been considered from different points of
view by many able courts, and it has uniformly been
looked upon as a sound and correct statement of the law
in cases where it is of proper application. Among
decisions in which said rule has been quoted with
approval are Watson v. Jones (13 Wall., 679; 20 Law.
ed., 666); Lamb v. Cain (129 Ind., 486; 14 L. R. A., 518;
29 N. E., 13); and White Lick Quarterly Meeting of
Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends (89
Ind., 136).
Upon examination of the decisions it will be readily
apparent that cases involving questions relative to
ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because
of their inherent interest, but because of the far
reaching effects of the decisions in human society.
Moreover, courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having
been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority
is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature.
It will be noted that the first and principal relief sought
by the plaintiff in the case before us is to obtain from
the court an order, in the form of writ of mandamus or
injunction, requiring the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila to appoint the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical office,
for that the office of chaplain is of an ecclesiastical
nature is undeniable. It is a sinister omen for the
9
plaintiff’s case that no decision of any civil court
whatever can be pointed to as a precedent for such an
exercise of judicial power, and the mere novelty of the
proposition is an argument against the soundness of the
plaintiff’s case. It is true that there are decisions from
the Supreme Court of Spain wherein the right to the
possession of properties constituting the foundation of
chaplaincies has been debated, and numerous cases are
found in modern Spanish jurisprudence where actions
have been maintained by heirs of the founders to
recover property constituting the foundation of
chaplaincies; but such actions had their basis in the
Spanish legislation abolishing chaplaincies. But so far
as our investigations go, and as far as the industry of
counsel has revealed, no case has been discovered
where Bishop or Archbishop has been compelled to
appoint any person to the office of chaplain or other
ecclesiastical benefice. It is also true that there are a
few English and American decisions in which the rights
of rectors, or ministers, after the title to the
ecclesiastical office had once been acquired, have been
sustained in the courts in the face of attempts to
deprive them of their office. But so far as the American
courts are concerned, these cases proceed exclusively on
the idea of supplying redress for breach of contract; and
neither American nor English jurisprudence supplies
any precedent for compelling the ecclesiastical
authorities to appoint a person to an ecclesiastical
office.
In dealing with the subject of the conclusiveness of the
decisions of church authorities in ecclesiastical matters
the author of the monographic article on "Religious
Societies," in Ruling Case Law, has this to say: ". . .The
judgment of the constituted church tribunal is
absolutely conclusive upon the civil courts, whether, in
the opinion of the judges of such courts, the decision
appears to be right or wrong. Where a right of property
turns upon such a decision, the civil courts will allow
the property to go in that direction in which the
decision of the church tribunal carries it. According to
the rule broadly stated by some courts, when a civil
right depends upon some matter pertaining to
ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the right
and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions
out of which the civil right has arisen as it finds them,
and accepts such decisions as matters adjudicated by
another legally constituted jurisdiction."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In conformity with the ideas above set forth, it is
insisted, for the appellant, that it was erroneous on the
part of the trial court to order the defendant to perform
the canonical act of appointing the plaintiff chaplain of
the chaplaincy in question, and furthermore that the
trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive the
decision of the Archbishop in regard to the question
whether or not the plaintiff is ecclesiastically qualified
to be appointed chaplain. The authorities, we think,
strongly indicate that there is merit in this contention.
But in our opinion there is another proposition, still
more clear, upon which the decision can be safely
rested, and this is, that as a matter of fact the plaintiff
does not possess the qualifications necessary for
appointment to the office of chaplain and consequently
that the Archbishop was justified in refusing to appoint
the plaintiff to that office. We shall therefore
provisionally assume that it is proper for the court to
inquire into these qualifications and state our
conclusion with respect thereto.
Under the law of the Church as it stood when this
chaplaincy was created, no ecclesiastical qualifications
were required in a candidate for appointment to the
office of chaplain; but as we have already stated, a new
canon became effective in the Church in 1918 to the
effect that, in order to be appointed chaplain, the
candidate must be a clerical, and that in order to be a
clerical, one must have taken the first tonsure, as a
prerequisite to which he must also be a bachelor who
has begun the study of theology. It is admitted that the
plaintiff in this case does not possess these
qualifications, and it is abvious that if the new canon is
to be applied to the chaplaincy in question, the action of
the Archbishop in refusing to appoint the plaintiff was
correct and this court must recognize the validity of his
exclusion from the chaplaincy.
That the new canon is valid and applicable to
candidates for chaplaincies already created is, in our
opinion, obvious, since it is general in terms and
evidently intended to be applicable to all chaplains
appointed in the future. There is no reason discernible
why the court should read into it an exception in favor
of candidates to chaplaincies already created. But it is
said that, if interpreted in this sense, the ordinance will
be retroactive. This is in our opinion a mistake. If the
Church had attempted to make the ordinance
applicable to chaplains already appointed, thereby
depriving them of an office as to which title had been
previously acquired, the effect would be to make the
statute truly retroactive. But such is not the case now
before us.
When the foundress caused this property to be
originally conveyed to the Church as a foundation for
the chaplaincy in question, no restriction was imposed
with respect to the requirement of ecclesiastical
qualifications for the chaplains to be appointed to the
benefice; and in submitting the appointment of the
chaplains to the ecclesiastical authority, as resulted
from the creation of a collative chaplaincy, it must be
considered as an implied term of the agreement that
the ecclesiastical qualifications for the spiritual office
should be such as might be required by the Church. As
was said by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones (13
Wall., 679, 729), all who unite themselves to an
ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to
submit to the Church government and they are bound
to submit to it.
The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that
the new canon of 1918 cannot be given effect as regards
the chaplaincy in question for the reason that to do so
would impair the obligation of the trust involved in the
acceptance by the Archbishop of the provisions for the
establishment of the chaplaincy, with the result of
impairing the obligation of a contract in violation of our
Organic Act. This idea is in our opinion fallacious. It is
undeniable that under Spanish law an acclesiastical
canon such as we are now considering could have been
adopted regardless of its effect upon the foundation or
the persons interested therein, and it cannot be
admitted that an obligation which could be changed
under Spanish law has become immutable from the
promulgation by Congress of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of contracts by
legislative Acts. Under said constitutional provision
obligations are to be respected as they stand, and it was
not intended that, by virtue of this provision,
obligations should be made more onerous to either
party. If the proposition maintained by the plaintiff’s
attorneys be true, then we are confronted with the
spectacle of a chaplaincy which is a perpetual sinecure
10
for a chaplain without ecclesiastical qualifications.
Perpetuities of any sort are objectionable, but one of
this character would be intolerable. As is justly said by
the attorney for the appellant, "It is unthinkable that
qualifications for chaplains should remain stagnant and
the same forever." In passing upon a question of this
character the court is not at liberty to ignore the effects
upon human society which would result from adopting
the proposition upon which the case for the plaintiff
here rests.
It follows from what has been said that the plaintiff has
not the requisite qualifications for the office of chaplain
and the defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, acted within the limits of his proper
ecclesiastical authority in excluding the plaintiff from
the chaplaincy in question. The trial court was
therefore in error in ordering the said defendant to
appoint the plaintiff as chaplain of the chaplaincy
founded by Doña Petronila de Guzman. As corollary of
this, there was also error on the part of the trial court
in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff,
through his guardian ad litem, the amount awarded in
paragraph (b) of the dispositive part of the appealed
decision.
The appellant’s brief contains an elaborate discussion of
the rights of the respective parties to the income of the
property during the vacancy in the office of chaplain,
and of the extent of the rights of the plaintiff during the
time that he might occupy the chaplaincy, — all on the
supposition that the right of the plaintiff to the office
might be upheld by this court. But in view of the fact
that we are now to reverse the judgment in its principal
features, with the result that the plaintiff will not be
appointed chaplain, all discussion of his rights to the
income, based on the supposition of his appointment to
the chaplaincy, becomes in a measure academic. We
shall therefore not enter into any discussion of this
phase of the case, and shall content ourselves by
observing that if those who are interested in conserving
the income derived from the chaplaincy and in holding
the defendant responsible for alleged improper
diversion of funds should see fit to proceed judicially in
an independent proceeding, the action should be
brought as a class-suit in behalf of all the descendants
of Doña Petronila de Guzman, since under the present
decision the minor plaintiff in this action has no
particular title to relief.
In paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of the appealed
decision the trial court reserved to the plaintiff any
legal rights that he may have with reference to the
cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 17603, in
a proper proceeding before the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The plaintiff did not
appeal from this disposition, and the appellant has not
assigned error against said feature of the decision. We
shall therefore not interfere with the decision on this
point, but we should perhaps observe that if relief
should be sought in the direction indicated the
contention will probably in the end resolve itself into
the question whether the Torrens certificate of title now
held by the defendant should be annotated so as to
show that the property covered by the certificate is held
by the defendant subject to the conditions stated in the
documents constituting the chaplaincy in question; and
of course such proceeding ought also to be brought as a
class-suit.
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and
the defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, is hereby absolved from the complaint, without
prejudice to the right of proper persons in interest to
proceed for independent relief in either of the directions
above indicated. So ordered, without express
pronouncement as to costs.
Villamor, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
This is a most unusual case without a parallel in
American or Spanish jurisprudence. Involving as it does
the relations which should exist between the State and
the Church, and the status of the Church with reference
to the Judiciary, the court should enter upon
consideration of the questions involved reluctantly and
cautiously. This separate opinion is intended to
expound the mental processes which have passed
through the writer’s mind in arriving at a definite
decision.
The most logical method of approach is to write down
those statements of fact and those propositions of law
regarding which there can reasonably be no
controversy. Then with these admitted facts and law as
the basis, the issue will readily disclose itself, and can
be decided.
There can be no dispute on any material fact. The will
of Doña Petronila de Guzman executed on March 13,
1816, the document of endowment formulated by her
executor in 1820, and the acceptance of the endowment
by the Archbishop of Manila, established what is known
in canon law as a collative chaplaincy. The great
grandson of the testatrix was specifically named as the
first chaplain. Thereafter, it has been assumed that the
chaplaincy was to be occupied by the nearest relative in
succession of the first chaplain, and in default of the
latter, a collegian of San Juan de Letran, who should be
an orphan mestizo, native of Manila. Chaplains have
presented themselves for the office, and have been
approved by the church authorities without much
trouble until the resignation of the last chaplain on
December 6, 1910. Since that date, the chaplaincy has
remained vacant. It is the purpose of this action of
mandamus to require the Apostolic Archbishop to
appoint Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, the son of the last
chaplain, as chaplain, and to obtain an accounting of
the income of the chaplaincy from 1910 until the
present.
It is well to repeat that the trust was provided for
spiritual purposes. A collative chaplaincy was erected.
A chaplaincy, it has been said, "is an institution which
has the obligation to celebrate or cause to be celebrated
annually a certain number of masses in a determined
church or altar, conforming to the will of the founder. A
chaplaincy is either laical or collative. . . . A collative
chaplaincy is that instituted with the intervention of
the ecclesiastical authority, and requires a title of
ordination. It is called ecclesiastical because it is in the
form of ecclesiastical benefice, and it is proper for the
Bishop to confer it." (2 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la
Administracion, p. 118 II Gutierrez, Codigos o Estudios
Fundamentales sobre el Derecho Civil Español, pp. 341-
344.) The will of the founder of the collative chaplaincy
entailed the obligation on the part of "the father
chaplain to celebrate sixty masses annually." The
11
document of endowment contemplated that "the
incumbent was required to say sixty masses annually."
It transferred the parcel of land and building now 210,
212, and 214 Calle Rosario, Binondo, Manila, to "the
spiritual properties of the Archbishopric." The trust was
accepted by the Archbishop "as spiritual property ’ . . .
making it . . . to be of the ecclesiastic forum and
jurisdiction." The Supreme Court of Spain has held that
properties aggregated to a chaplaincy with the approval
of the competent ecclesiastical authority become
spiritualized, and form an integral part of its
endowment (Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, June 1,
1863; 8 Jurisprudencia Civil, p. 364).
When the endowment was created, there existed a
unity of Church and State in the Philippines. The
change to American sovereignty caused the complete
separation of Church and State. All special privileges of
the Roman Catholic Church were abolished. But the
property of the Church was protected since in the
Treaty of Paris it was declared that the relinquishment
or cession of the Philippine Islands "cannot in any
respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds
of . . .ecclesiastical or civil bodies."cralaw virtua1aw
library
With the Church and State standing apart in the
Philippines, the jurisdiction of the civil courts naturally
does not extend to certain matters connected with the
Church, but does extend to certain other matters which
can be taken under their purview. It is well settled that
the civil courts will take cognizance of cases involving
property rights, and in so doing will enforce the canons
of a church. (Evangelista v. Ver [1907], 8 Phil., 663.) It
is the duty of the courts to see that the property
dedicated to a church is not diverted from the trust.
(Watson v. Jones [1871], 13 Wall., 679.)
The Catholic Church has obtained a fee simple Torrens
title to the property, the source of income of the
chaplaincy. It has also been using the revenue of the
chaplaincy for educational purposes. Neither is
permissible pursuant to the trust agreement. Nor can
the Church keep the chaplaincy vacant indefinitely and
in the meantime appropriate the rental of the property
of the chaplaincy. To do any of these things would be to
violate the will of the foundress, for the foundation
prohibited the alienation or conversion of the property
"into any other estate for any cause, even though it be
of a more pious character," which would make the
foundation null and without value or effect. (See in this
connection Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Avila [1918], 38 Phil., 383.)
Up to this point, therefore, we find the following to be
the situation: A trust founded for spiritual purposes;
chaplains named in conformity with the foundation up
to the year 1910; the will of the testatrix the supreme
law which must govern; the Church without right to
obtain title in its own name to the property or to divert
the income from the purposes intended by the testatrix;
and the courts with jurisdiction to enforce property
rights. Under this admitted state of affairs, the plaintiff
would have a clear right to ask the courts to assist him
in getting into the chaplaincy and in securing the
income of the chaplaincy for himself. But further facts,
which will immediately be mentioned, alter the
situation, and at once disclose the troublesome crux of
the case.
When the trust was established, aside from the general
provisions of the Council of Trent, there were no
particular provisions applicable to chaplaincies. In
1918, the "Codex Juris Canonici" was promulgated by
the Pope. According to this new canon law, "The
chaplaincies or simple benefices are conferred on
clericals of the secular clergy" ; in order to be a "clerigo"
one must have "prima tonsura" ; in order to have
"prima tonsura" one must have begun the study of
theology; and in order to study theology one must be a
"bachiller." Broadly speaking, Raul Rogerio Gonzalez
met the requirements of the Church before the canon
law of 1918 went into effect. After that law was
provided, he did not meet the qualifications since he
was not a "clerigo," since he did not have "prima
tonsura," since he had not begun the study of theology,
and since he was not a "bachiller."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It was after the canon law of 1918 was decreed that
Raul Rogerio Gonzalez was presented for the chaplaincy
by the Rector of San Juan de Letran College, the patron
of the chaplaincy — to be exact on February 25, 1922.
The Archbishop of Manila considered the matter, and in
a letter to the father of the boy came to the conclusion
"that the child, Raul Gonzalez, does not unite the
qualifications of chaplain of the said chaplaincy." The
basis of the conclusion was mentioned as the new Code
of Canon Law, particularly canon 1442, in relation with
canons 108 and 976. His Grace closed his letter with
this statement: "By the canons above mentioned, as
well as other reasons which could be advanced, I believe
that the child Raul Gonzalez is not legally qualified to
enjoy a chaplaincy." No appeal from what amounted to
a decision by the Archbishop was taken to the Pope, but
instead the authority of the civil courts was invoked. In
this connection, it is the established doctrine that in
matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of proper
church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals.
(U. S. v. Cañete [1918], 38 Phil., 253; Fussell v. Hail
[1908], 233 Ill., 73.)
The vital question, on the answer to which will depend
a correct decision, then is if the church authorities in
giving application of the canon law of 1918 to the
spiritual trust, should be overruled by the civil courts.
The trial judge, in his learned decision, states the
matter as forcefully and graphically as may be when he
says: "The canon which the defendant now invokes in
support of the refusal to appoint plaintiff as chaplain
was only promulgated in the year 1918. The will was
executed in 1816 and the order of the Archbishop of
Manila, approving the foundation of the chaplaincy in
accordance with said will, was entered in the year
1820." His Honor continues, "The court is of the opinion
that the new canon law of 1918 cannot in this case be
given a retroactive effect, for to do so would impair the
obligation of the trust involved in the acceptance of the
provision of said will for the establishment of the
chaplaincy, and it would impair the obligation of a
contract in violation of the Organic Act, the Jones Law."
Much can be said in support of that position. In the first
place, the disposition of property in a will is governed
by the law existing at the time of execution — in this
instance by the law as it was to be found in 1816. In the
next place, the trust agreement was in the nature of a
civil contract, and as to contracts, existing statutes
enter into and become a part of them — in this instance
the law as existing in 1820. But the last principle is
here not literally true, for the executor of the will
renounced the laws which might favor the foundress.
12
The portion of the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, section 3, paragraph 5, providing
"That no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be enacted" is not applicable since the "law" there
mentioned is an Act of the Philippine Commission or
Legislature or an ordinance or resolution of a municipal
council, and does not include an ecclesiastical law
promulgated by the Pope for the Catholic world. The
legislative power of the state has not undertaken, as in
the Dartmouth College Case, to remodel the charter of
an institution in most important particulars without
the consent of the corporators. But following the theory
pertaining to the impairment of the obligation of
contracts, and by analogy applying the same principles
to the canon law, it yet remains to be said that there
are limitations on the application of the constitutional
provision. Thus, as significant restrictions, the state
cannot abridge or weaken any of the essential powers
inherent in government; the state cannot abdicate its
trust over property; and the Legislature cannot
withdraw from its successors the power to take
appropriate measures under the police power. Not only
this, but charter contracts are subject to state
regulation. A party operating under a charter must
conform to such rules as the state may establish. Added
conditions or duties may be imposed provided they do
not amount to a change in the obligations or in the
substantial rights of a party. Changes may be made in
the general laws even though incidental injury may
result.
Construing the canon law as we must if we are to
determine if it has retroactive and destroying effect, it
is apparent that the highest power in the Catholic
Church provided a law universal in character operative
on all chaplaincies after it went into effect. The Pope
did no more than did the civil authorities of Spain when
in 1841 they enacted a law regulating chaplaincies. As
a matter of internal discipline, the Church was
attempting to make certain that all persons filling
chaplaincies had the necessary training to perform
their duties. General regulations were prescribed to
secure the ends for which chaplaincies were erected. In
the particular case before us, the father chaplain, the
incumbent of a "collative chaplaincy," was expected by
the testatrix "to celebrate sixty masses annually," and it
would not be at all unreasonable for the canon law to
prescribe qualifications for the holder of the chaplaincy
sufficient to permit him to say the masses personally.
The will did not negative this in any manner when the
property was turned over for spiritual uses. As far as
the will went, it intended to create a collative rather
than a laical chaplaincy, thus subjecting the institution
to the authority and the laws of the Church, as every
collative chaplaincy is so subjected.
The Supreme Court of Porto Rico has found perfectly
applicable the principles of the canon law to a case
brought in the secular courts, for the reason that the
rights and relations in question "have been fixed by
rules issued, in the exercise of its powers to govern its
own institutions, by the Roman Catholic Church, the
personality of which has been fully recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States and by the
Supreme Court of Porto Rico, naturally within the
constitutional limitations and principles of
international law." (Jones, Catholic Bishop of Porto
Rico, v. Registrar of Property [1912], 18 Porto Rico, 124;
Jones, Catholic Bishop of Porto Rico, v. Registrar of
Property [1911], 17 Porto Rico, 211.)
When the case between the father of the applicant and
the Church was here before, this court took under view
the provision of the trust agreement relating to the
administration of the property. Mr. Justice Torres,
speaking for the court, said: "This provision must be
understood to be mandatory, except as otherwise
provided by the canonical laws and as, pursuant
therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority may order
for, after the latter had accepted the foundation of the
chaplaincy, the administration of its property
appertains to the authorities established by the Church,
pursuant to the latter’s own laws, and this rule has
been observed since 1863." (Gonzalez v. Harty and
Hartigan [1915], 32 Phil., 328.)
The parties seem much concerned with worldly
consideration, with obtaining control of the tidy sum
involved. Yet if we would place ourselves in the position
of the elderly lady who conceived the foundation, it
would be realized that what she desired was the saying
of masses for pious purposes by a descendant, and so
instituted a foundation to attain that purpose. The
wishes of the foundress of the spiritual trust should
govern and will rather be subserved than thwarted by
the application of the canon law of 1918 to the trust.
It is not for the courts to exercise control over the
dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church in the
performance of their discretionary and official duties.
Rather is it for the applicant to conform to just church
regulations. The courts should ponder long before
compelling the defendant Archbishop of Manila to
appoint a particular person to a chaplaincy, in
contravention of the mandatory provisions of existing
canon law.
The all controlling considerations in the disposition of
this case are the intention of the foundress of the
spiritual trust, which should be respected, and the
impropriety of the courts invading the religious realm
and their attempting to order things to be done, the
performance of which appertain exclusively to the
regularly constituted authorities of the Roman Catholic
Church.
Premises conceded, the issue should be resolved by
holding that the court will not sanction the expedition
of a writ of mandamus, directed to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, reversing him in his decision to
apply the canon law of 1918 to the foundation.
I concur in the disposition of the appeal.
JOHNS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In 1816 the Archbishop of Manila had not only
ecclesiastical but also civil and political powers in the
Philippine Islands.
In 1816 Petronila de Guzman was a resident of the City
of Manila and a devout Catholic and the owner therein
of "a house of lime and stone situated at Calle Rosario,"
from which she received an annual net rental of P180.
In accord with her religious belief, she wished to
perpetuate her family name and to found a chaplaincy
and provided for the saying of sixty masses annually by
the Father chaplain "in the churches of the City of
Manila or in those of its vicinities, and in privileged
altars, in behalf of the souls of my father, Dn. Tomas de
Guzman, and of my mother, Dña. Sebastiana de Jesus,
and my brothers and sisters, and for me, the testatrix
after my days," and to that end and for that purpose, on
March 13, 1816, she made and published her last will
13
and testament in which she charged that the executor
of her estate should "constitute said house into a
collative chaplaincy, the foundation of which they shall
effect immediately after my death, electing for chaplain
D. Esteban de Guzman, legitimate son of my grandson
Dn. Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and in his default, the
nearest relative, and in default of the latter, a collegian
(colegial) of San Juan de Letran, who should be an
orphan mestizo, native of this town," in which it was
further provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Tenth Item: It is my will that for patron of said
chaplaincy my executors name the Father President of
the College of San Juan de Letran.
"Eleventh Item: I appoint my first executor as
administrator of the chaplaincy which shall be founded
on the house referred to, during the minority of said
chaplain."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the death of Petronila de Guzman, and on April
24, 1820, her executor Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and
under the provisions of the will, petitioned the
Archbishop of Manila that the title to the chaplaincy be
issued to his son Esteban de Guzman and to him as
administrator during the minority of his son, which
petition, among other things,
recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the annexed testimony which with due solemnity
I enclose shows that my deceased great grandmother
Da. Petronila de Guzman provided in her last will the
institution of a collative chaplaincy for one son of mine
named Esteban Sixto de Guzman, student of the Royal
College of San Juan de Letran, for the patronage of
which the most Reverend Father President of said
College has been named, with a house of lime and stone
situated at Calle Rosario as capital, which, according to
the Certificate hereto attached, nets a rent of One
Hundred Eighty Pesos Annually, it being located on the
Calle Real del Rosario; and I, being her testamentary
executor and appointed administrator of my above
mentioned son, present myself before Your Most
Illustrious Grace, praying that you declare sufficient
the income (congrua) referred to and order that a title
to said chaplaincy issue to my said son and to me the
administrator during his minority. This is what I
beseech of Your Illustrious Grace, and to secure it to
Your Illustrious Grace I humbly ask and request that
you so decree and order as I pray for. I swear according
to form — FURTHER — the deed of ownership of the
house which I also attach, I request that after this
petition is terminated, said document be delivered to
me as above requested — JOSE TELESFORO DE
GUZMAN. Manila, April 24, 1820 — To the Promotor
Fiscal — Subscribed and sealed before me, Doctor
Rojas, Secretary."cralaw virtua1aw library
April 26, 1820, the executor of the will, pursuant to
such petition, executed a formal document for the
endowment of the chaplaincy, which, among other
things, recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . And to accomplish the foundation of said
chaplaincy in accordance with law, the said executor
(Telesforo de Guzman) appeared before the Most
Illustrious and Most Reverend Metropolitan
Archbishop, stating that he had the pension in
consideration of which the chaplain had to say sixty
masses annually in the churches of this City or in those
of its vicinities and in privileged altars for the benefit of
the souls of her deceased parents, Don Tomas de
Guzman and Doña Sebastiana de Jesus, of the testatrix
and of her brothers and sisters, electing as chaplain her
great grandson Don Esteban de Guzman, a student of
the Royal College of San Juan de Letran, and as
administrator (to act) during the minority of the said
chaplain, the executor himself, whom she has
empowered to appoint as Patron of the chaplaincy the
Father President of the said Royal College of San Juan
de Letran, asking that the said ’congrua’ (pension,
living or maintenance) the rents of the property of
which amount at present to P180 per year, be declared
sufficient. . . . And for its firmness and greater validity
he renounces with all solemnity the laws that may
favor the said decedent, inserting and repeating herein
all the clauses that may be necessary with all the
requisites and conditions, so that the purpose which
actuated her to do this act of piety may be duly
accomplished, with the solemnities above set forth and
the conditions herein inserted, which he asks and
charges the above named chaplain and those who will
succeed him to respect, comply and execute ad
perpetuam rei mee memoriam amen."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The "Promotor Fiscal" having first approved as legal
under the canonical law the proposed endowment, the
petition was granted by the Archbishop as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That in conformity with the representations of the
Promotor Fiscal, he was disposed to approve and did
approve the foundation of the chaplaincy with all the
circumstances and conditions provided for in said
clause (of the will) and in the deed of foundation, as
well as the imposition (charge) of seventeen hundred
pesos against said building, converting said sum into
spiritual property of a perpetual character subject to
the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction, etc."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The last chaplain, Angel Gonzalez, served until
December 6, 1910, between whom and the defendant
there was a full, complete and final settlement of all of
the accounts arising from, and growing out of, the
chaplaincy up to December 31, 1910. The defendant
after December 6, 1910, declared the chaplaincy in
question vacant, and at all times since, it has remained
and is now vacant. In this situation, the plaintiff minor,
Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, claiming to be the eldest son of
Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, and of his wife,
Adelaida Gonzalez, and the nearest relative in
succession to the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman,
and the legitimate successor to the said chaplaincy,
petitioned the defendant to be appointed chaplain, with
all of the rights, powers and duties as such, which
petition was denied.
The original complaint in this action and the one on
which the evidence was taken in the lower court was
filed on August 5, 1924. The answer of the defendant
was filed on October 13, 1924. The testimony was
completed on March 24, 1926, and on April 5, 1926, for
the purpose of making his pleadings conform to his
alleged proofs, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
to which objection was made by the defendant and
overruled by the trial court
Upon such pleadings, including the amended complaint,
the lower court in a learned, exhaustive and well
written opinion of ninety-five printed pages, found all of
the material facts for the plaintiff for whom it rendered
judgment against the defendant as substantially prayed
14
for in the original and amended complaints.
On appeal the defendant assigns the following
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant
forthwith to appoint plaintiff as chaplain of the
Chaplaincy in question notwithstanding the fact that
plaintiff is only twelve (12) years old and is not a cleric.
"II. The trial court erred in declaring that the defendant
was not duly and legally authorized to use the income of
said Chaplaincy for analogous charitable and pious
works during the time the Chaplaincy in question has
been vacant.
"III. The trial court erred in declaring that it had
jurisdiction to compel the defendant to do a canonical
function, to wit: that of appointing plaintiff as chaplain
of the Chaplaincy in question.
"IV. The trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive
the decision of the ecclesiastical authority concerned, in
regard to the question whether or not plaintiff is
ecclesiastically qualified to be appointed as chaplain.
"V. The trial court erred in not holding that there is no
evidence in record that plaintiff was the nearest
relative of the foundress, and therefore that plaintiff
has not shown that he is entitled to be appointed
chaplain.
"VI. The trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P173,720 less certain
liquidated as well as unliquidated amounts referred to
in the judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the final analysis, two important and decisive
questions are presented. First, the construction which
should be placed upon the will of the foundress and its
legal force and effect, and, second, whether or not under
the pleadings and upon the admitted facts, the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff can legally be
sustained.
In arriving at the solution of the first question, careful
thought and consideration should be given to the
purpose and intent with which Petronila de Guzman
executed the will in question so far as it can be
ascertained and determined from the instrument itself.
In truth and in fact the house in question was
constructed for the sole and specific purpose of
providing sufficient rental to insure the payment of the
amount required to pay for the specified number of
masses, and the will of the foundress recites that the
property had a net annual rental of P180, and it
specifically charged and enjoined upon the executor to
found a chaplaincy and to make all arrangements
necessary for the saying of such perpetual masses.
Upon her death such application was made to the
Archbishop, and the chaplaincy was founded and the
chaplain appointed in compliance with the terms and
provisions of the will. A chaplaincy having thus been
founded, it is important to know the meaning of that
word.
Alcubilla, in his work entitled "Diccionario de la
Administracion," published in 1886, vol. 2, p. 118,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A chaplaincy is an institution which has the obligation
to celebrate or cause to be celebrated annually a certain
number of masses in a determined church or altar,
conforming to the will of the founder. A chaplaincy is
either laical or collative.
"A laical chaplaincy is that instituted without the
intervention of the ecclesiastical authority; in does not
require a title in order to be ordained, and the possessor
is only obligated to cause to be celebrated, or to
celebrate, if he is a priest, a certain number of masses
in accordance with the foundation. The laical or
mercenary chaplaincies are not subject to the
ecclesiastical authority, which, with regard thereto, has
no other right than to investigate if the obligations are
fulfilled; and this is one of the characteristics which
most distinguish the said chaplaincies from the
collative chaplaincies; . . . .
"A collative chaplaincy is that instituted with the
intervention of the ecclesiastical authority and requires
a title of ordination. It is called ecclesiastical because it
is in the form of ecclesiastical benefice, and it is proper
for the Bishop to confer it. When the foundation calls
for relatives of the founder or of the persons whom he
designated as trunk, to enjoy the chaplaincy, the latter
is called colativa familiar; when individuals of a certain
family are not called to the possession but the patron is
authorized to appoint, then the chaplaincy is called
colativa simple or gentilicia."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is conceded that the purpose and intent of the
deceased was to found a "collative chaplaincy," and the
will provides that the position should be filled by
certain specified relatives. It will be noted that the deed
of endowment of the executor of April 26, 1820, recites
that he "appeared before the Most Illustrious and Most
Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop, stating that he had
the pension in consideration of which the chaplain had
to say sixty masses annually in the churches of this
City, etc.," and that "the rents of the property of which
amount at present to P180 per year, be declared
sufficient, issuing the corresponding title of chaplain to
his said son." That is to say, to found the chaplaincy
and to insure the saying of the masses in question, the
executor proposed to the Archbishop that the estate had
property which had a rental value of P180 per annum,
which he was ready and willing to pay for the founding
of a chaplaincy and the saying of such masses, and to
insure the payment of the P180 annually, he was ready,
able and willing to convey the property in trust to the
church for spiritual purposes. But it should be noted
that his proposition specifically provided that the
property should not be used for any other or different
purpose, and that, "if the contrary should be done from
now until then, he (the executor) declares null and
without value or effect whatever may be done or
executed contrary to the tenor of these presents." That
must be construed as a specific limitation upon the
rights, powers and duties of the trustee, which would
prohibit the use of the property by the trustee for any
other or different purpose than the one specified in the
will.
It will also be noted that the proposition of the executor
was accepted by the defendant upon the terms and
conditions therein stated as provided for in the will of
the foundress, and Esteban de Guzman, who was then
not 14 years of age, was duly appointed by the
defendant as the first chaplain in the chaplaincy as
thus founded and entered upon the discharge of his
duties.
15
The second chaplain was Vicente de Guzman, who was
a brother of the first, and was appointed by the
Archbishop on April 7, 1838.
The third chaplain was Mariano de Guzman, a nephew
of the first, and he was appointed October 11, 1867.
The fourth chaplain was Fernando Maniquis, who was
appointed May 23, 1890, and served until November 17,
1897.
The fifth and last chaplain was Angel Gonzalez, the
plaintiff’s father, and he was appointed on June 20,
1901, and served until December 6, 1910, and to whom
the defendant accounted for all of the rentals of the
property of the chaplaincy from the date of the
resignation of the preceding chaplain in November,
1897, and also the rentals of the property which were
collected during his chaplaincy, and when paid to him,
they were appropriated by Angel Gonzalez to his own
use.
Although the defendant held the title to the property in
trust, yet, apparently prior to ’863, the different
chaplains had the control and management of the
property, and collected the rentals, when in that year
for the first time the defendant took over the actual
management of the property and the collection of the
rentals.
As stated, Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, was
appointed by the defendant on June 20,1901, and
served until December 6, 1910, and to whom the
defendant not only accounted for all of the rentals of the
property of the chaplaincy from November, 1897, the
date of the resignation of the preceding chaplain, but
also for the rentals received from June 20, 1901, to
December 6, 1910, during the period of his own
chaplaincy. There is nothing in the record tending to
show what was done with the rentals collected from
1863 to 1897 or the amount of them, or to whom they
were paid. But in view of the fact that an accounting
was had and made to Angel Gonzalez for the rentals
from the year 1897 to December 6, 1910, it is fair to
assume that there must have been some kind of a
settlement or accounting between the defendant and
the former chaplains of the rentals collected from 1863
to 1897. In any event, the record is conclusive that
there was a full, final and complete settlement between
the defendant and Angel Gonzalez, as chaplain, for the
rentals collected from the year 1897 to December 6,
1910.
Upon this question, the recitals made in the original
appointment of Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, are
very important. After giving the history of the
foundation of the chaplaincy founded by Da. Petronila
de Guzman, his appointment
recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . So that, as such chaplain he may possess and enjoy
it as Ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with
the obligation of ordering to be said, by means of a
priest, while he himself cannot say them, sixty masses
annually according to the will of the foundress, and
with the understanding that every year he has to show
to our Court of Chaplaincies wherein this shall be
recorded, that he has discharged said masses, without
which requisite the rent which for the purpose may be
necessary shall be withheld from him. And by virtue of
Holy Obedience we order those to whom these presents
may concern to have and treat the said D. Angel
Gonzalez y Guzman as the beneficiary and possessor of
said chaplaincy, and that they pay him well and
faithfully the income which in the future the capital
may produce and that which it has produced while
vacant."cralaw virtua1aw library
This order was made on August 21, 1901, and remained
in full force and effect until Angel Gonzalez resigned,
and the final settlement was made with him on
December 6, 1910, at which time the chaplaincy was
declared vacant, and it has remained vacant ever since,
and clause ten of the will
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is my will that for patron of said chaplaincy my
executors name the Father President of the College of
San Juan de Letran."cralaw virtua1aw library
And clause eleven provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I appoint my first executor as administrator of the
chaplaincy which shall be founded on the house
referred to, during the minority of said chaplain."cralaw
virtua1aw library
That is to say, "the Father President of the College of
San Juan de Letran" was made Patron of the
chaplaincy, and the executor under the will was made
"administrator of the chaplaincy during the minority of
said chaplain," D. Esteban de Guzman, who was then a
minor less than 14 years of age.
Hence, we have this situation. On March 13, 1816,
Petronila de Guzman made her last will and testament
in which she sought to provide for the foundation of a
chaplaincy and the celebration of "sixty masses
annually" in behalf of her own soul and the souls of her
father and mother and brothers and sisters, and in
which she named the Father President of the College of
San Juan de Letran as Patron of the chaplaincy, and
appointed her executor as administrator of the
chaplaincy during the minority of her son, D. Esteban
de Guzman, whom she appointed the first chaplain,
whom she charged and enjoined to carry out the terms
and provisions of her will.
Pursuant to that charge and by the terms of the will,
the executor made a formal application to the defendant
to found the chaplaincy and to have D. Esteban de
Guzman, the minor, who was the "legitimate son of my
grandson Don Jose Telesforo de Guzman," appointed as
first chaplain under the will, and to provide for the
celebration of "sixty masses annually," and the
application was formally granted and the chaplaincy
was thus founded, and as provided in the will, the
minor was appointed as the first chaplain under the
chaplaincy, and to that end and for such use and
purpose, the property was then conveyed to the
defendant in trust. From that date to 1901, four other
chaplains have been appointed. In 1863, and for the
first time, the defendant took over the actual control
and management of the property and collected the
rents, and the record is conclusive that from 1897 to
December 6, 1910, the defendant accounted to Angel
Gonzalez, the last chaplain, for all of such rents and
profits, and that in the final settlement, the defendant
actually paid to Angel Gonzalez the sum of P12,500 for
and on account of such rentals and profits.
It will be noted that his order of appointment expressly
recites that "he may possess and enjoy it as
Ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with the
16
obligation of ordering to be said, by means of a priest,
while he himself cannot say them, sixty-masses
annually according to the will of the foundress," for
which he shall duly report, and "without which
requisite the rent which for the purpose may be
necessary shall be withheld from him," and that it was
further ordered that he should be recognized and
treated "as the beneficiary and possessor of said
chaplaincy, and that they pay him well and faithfully
the income which in the future the capital may produce
and that which it has produced while vacant." This is
an- express recognition of the foundation of the
chaplaincy and of its continued existence, and of the
right of the chaplain to enjoy it as "ecclesiastical
benefice and by perpetual title," and to collect and
receive the rents and profits of the chaplaincy not only
during its existence, but "while vacant."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Such are the actual facts evidenced by written
documents, about which there is not and cannot be any
dispute. In addition to which, His Grace Michael J.
O’Doherty testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Without reference to your having seen the
properties or not, your Grace acknowledges that these
properties belong to the chaplaincy in question?
"A. Yes, sir; there is no question about that."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And it appears that upon the foundation of the
chaplaincy in the year 1820, it was expressly agreed
with the executor of the foundress that any attempt to
use the funds of the property in question for any other
or different purpose than that provided in the will, no
matter how pious it might be, should be considered null
and void.
Upon such undisputed evidence, the trial court made an
express finding of fact that the defendant held the title
to the property in trust and as trustee under the terms
and provisions of the will of the foundress, and that
finding is well sustained by the evidence.
We are clearly of the opinion that by the terms and
provisions of the will and what has been done under it
and through its own actions and conduct covering a
period of almost a century, the defendant is now
estopped to claim or assert that it has a fee simple title
to the property or that it does not hold the title as
trustee under the will of the foundress.
The next and most serious question is whether or not
the defendant should be required to account to the
plaintiff and the judgment in his favor should be
sustained.
As stated, the chaplaincy in question is a collative
chaplaincy which required the title of ordination, and it
is called ecclesiastical because it is in the form of an
ecclesiastical benefice, and the foundation called for
relatives of the foundress whom she designated as a
trunk to enjoy the chaplaincy, and hence it is called
"colativa familiar."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant case, the trunk of the chaplaincy was D.
Esteban de Guzman, the legitimate son of D. Jose
Telesforo de Guzman, who was a grandson of the
foundress, who was born on August 4, 1806, who was
formally appointed chaplain by the ecclesiastical
authorities under the provisions of the will on the 16th
of June, 1820, and at the time of his appointment, he
was less then 14 years of age.
The second chaplain was Vicente de Guzman, also a son
of Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and a brother of the first
chaplain, and he was born on November 22, 1816, and
was appointed chaplain on April 7, 1838.
The third chaplain was Mariano de Guzman, a son of
Juan Bautista de Guzman and the grandson of Jose
Telesforo de Guzman, and he was born on January 20,
1845, and appointed on October 11, 1867.
The fourth chaplain was Fernando Maniquis, a son of
Eugenia de Guzman and grandson of Tomasa de
Guzman, who was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban
de Guzman, and he was born on May 3, 1870, and was
appointed on May 23, 1890.
The fifth and last chaplain was Angel Gonzalez, a son of
Escolastica de Guzman and grandson of Tomasa de
Guzman, who was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban
de Guzman, and he was born on August 18, 1882, and
was appointed on June 20, 1901.
It is stipulated that no one of the five chaplains above
mentioned was a "clerigo" at the time of his
appointment to the chaplaincy, and
also:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"9. That according to the new canon law promulgated in
the year 1918, ’las capellanias o beneficios simples se
confieren a clerigos del clero secular; that in order to be
a ’clerigo’ one must have ’prima tonsura’; that in order
to have ’prima tonsura’ one must have begun the study
of theology; and that in order to study theology one
must be a ’bachiller.’
"13. That the plaintiff Raul Rogerio Gonzalez is the
legitimate son of said Angel Gonzalez and Adelaida
Gonzalez, and was born on September 16, 1912."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is not alleged, and plaintiff does not claim, that he is
now a priest or that he has a "prima tonsura," but it is
alleged in the amended
complaint:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. That he is a minor residing in the municipality of
Baliwag, Province of Bulacan; that he will be 14 years
of age on the 16th day of September of the present year
(1926); that Adelaida Gonzalez is his mother and duly
appointed and authorized guardian ad litem for the
purposes of this action and that the defendant is a
corporation sole, domiciled in the City of Manila, P. I.,
and represented by His Grace, M. J. O’Doherty,
apostolic archbishop.
"IV. That it is provided in the said will that said
chaplaincy should be occupied by the nearest relative in
succession of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman.
"VI. That plaintiff is the eldest son of the said Angel
and Adelaida Gonzalez, and as such, the nearest
relative in succession to the first chaplain, Esteban de
Guzman, and the legitimate successor to said
chaplaincy; that plaintiff possesses the necessary
intelligence, aptitude and spiritual inclination for the
career of priesthood; that the testimonials of various
Roman Catholic priests as to plaintiff’s aptitude and
inclination for the priesthood marked Exhibits B, C, D
and E for identification are hereto attached and made a
17
part of this amended complaint, and that there is no
other person who has or claims to have the right to said
chaplaincy.
"IX. That subsequent to the settlement of accounts set
forth in the seventh paragraph of this amended
complaint, the defendant in the month of September,
1914, wrongfully obtained and caused to be registered
in its own name in the registry of property of the City of
Manila, a Torrens title in fee simple to said property
free and clear of the trust imposed upon it and upon the
defendant as its administrator for the maintenance of
said chaplaincy. That a description of the property as
thus wrongfully registered marked Exhibit F is hereto
attached and made a part of this amended complaint.
"XII. That the plaintiff through his parents and
attorneys has repeatedly made application to the
defendant for appointment to said chaplaincy; that at
first no objection was made to plaintiff’s right to or
fitness for said office, and defendant promised to
appoint him, but later refused to do so, alleging at first
that he was too young and later declining to state its
reasons for such refusal; that the language of the will
establishing said chaplaincy, and particularly the
eleventh paragraph thereof, expressly discloses the
intention of the foundress to fill said chaplaincy with
minors without limitation as to their youthfulness; that
Esteban de Guzman, the first chaplain chosen by the
foundress Petronila de Guzman, was less than 14 years
of age on the date of his appointment by the defendant
Archbishop of Manila."cralaw virtua1aw library
By the stipulation of facts, paragraphs 1, 9 and 12 are
admitted. Paragraph 4 is contested and disputed. As to
paragraph 6, there is no claim or pretense that any
other person has or claims to have a right to the
chaplaincy. Neither is it claimed that the plaintiff is not
the eldest son of Angel and Adelaida Gonzalez, and
there is no dispute as to the contents of Exhibits B, C, D
and E. But the defendant denies that the plaintiff is
"the nearest relative in succession to the first chaplain,
Esteban de Guzman, and the legitimate successor to the
said chaplaincy," or that he is now spiritually qualified
for a career of priesthood.
After an exhaustive analysis of all of the evidence pro
and con, the trial court made the following finding of
fact:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"8. So far as the records show, plaintiff is the nearest
relative of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman. The
fourth chaplain, Fernando Maniquis, has a son who is
of about the same age and in the same degree of
relationship from the first chaplain as the plaintiff, but
he is not a candidate for appointment to this
chaplaincy, and his father expressly renounced such
candidacy in open court while he was testifying as a
witness for plaintiff in this case. According to the
Archbishop of Manila himself, plaintiff is the only
applicant for appointment to the chaplaincy in question.
(Deposition, p. 14.)"
That finding is sustained by the evidence and is also
accepted by the majority opinion.
The evidence is also conclusive that the plaintiff in all
things and respects has the intellectual qualifications of
a chaplain which specially appears from Exhibits B, C,
D and E, and the evidence is also conclusive that the
plaintiff possesses even more learning and intelligence
than any previous chaplain at the time of his
appointment and that he was personally recommended
for the appointment by the Father President of the
College of San Juan de Letran, who, under the terms of
the will, was the "Patron of said chaplaincy,’ and that
exclusive of the canonical law above quoted, the
plaintiff has all of the requisite qualifications of a
chaplain, and that if it was not for that law, his
appointment would have been simply a matter of form
and not of substance. Hence, the question is squarely
presented whether the promulgation of the canonical
law in question in 1918 is a bar and can now be urged
against his appointment as chaplain.
It must be conceded that prior to 1918, there was no
law of the church which would prohibit the
appointment of the plaintiff as chaplain, and that upon
the showing made prior to the promulgation of the law
in question, the plaintiff would have been appointed
chaplain as a matter of course. It must also be conceded
that under the provisions of the existing canonical law,
plaintiff does not have the requisite qualifications to be
appointed chaplain. The question is thus squarely
presented whether after the defendant has accepted
and approved the will of the foundress and appointed
five different chaplains under its provisions and the
conditions then existing, to the last of whom it has
accounted for the rents and profits during his
chaplaincy, can it now ex parte and of its own volition
promulgate and enforce a canonical law which imposes
new and different terms and conditions and in legal
effect nullifies the will of the foundress, which it has
recognized and enforced for nearly a century? Whatever
may have been the rights, privileges and prerogatives of
the church while this country was under the dominion
of Spain, it was held by this court in United States v.
Balcorta (25 Phil., 273, 276), that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the
fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill
caused the complete separation of church and state, and
the abolition of all special privileges and all restrictions
theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular
religious sect."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Constitution of the United States prohibits the
passing of an ex post facto law or of any law impairing
the obligation of contracts.
In the celebrated case of Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward (4 Law. ed. [U. S. ], p. 629), in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court
of the United States held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The charter granted by the British crown to the
trustees of Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire, in
the year 1769, is a contract within the meaning of that
clause of the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, s.
10, which declares that no state shall make any law
impairing the obligation of contracts. The charter was
not dissolved by the revolution.
"An act of the state legislature of New Hampshire,
altering the charter, without the consent of the
corporations in a material respect, is an act impairing
the obligation of the charter, and is unconstitutional
and void.
"Under its charter, Dartmouth College was a private
and not a public corporation. That a corporation is
established for purposes of general charity, or for
education generally, does not, per se, make it a public
corporation, liable to the control of the
18
legislature."cralaw virtua1aw library
Commenting on this decision, Chancellor Kent, vol. 1, p.
418, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The argument of the Supreme Court in this celebrated
case contains one of the most full and elaborate
expositions of the constitutional sanctity of contracts to
be met with in any of the reports.’The decision in this
case did more than any other single act, proceeding
from the authority of the United States, to throw an
impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises
derived from the grant of the government; and to give
solidity and inviolability to the literary, charitable,
religious and commercial institutions of our country.’"
Since the rendition of that decision, no court of last
resort, under the jurisdiction of the United States Flag,
has ever declared any law valid, either legislative or
canonical, that impaired the obligation of a contract.
In substance, both of those provisions in the
Constitution of the United States are incorporated in,
and made a part of, the Organic Law of the Philippine
Islands.
Upon this question, the majority opinion
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is undeniable that under Spanish law an
ecclesiastical canon such as we are now considering
could have been adopted regardless of its effect upon
the foundation or the persons interested therein, and it
cannot be admitted that an obligation which could be
changed under Spanish law has become immutable
from the promulgation by congress of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of contracts by
legislative Acts."cralaw virtua1aw library
That is to say, because in 1918 there was no law in
Spain against impairing the obligation of a contract, the
defendant then had the legal right to promulgate a
canonical law which did impair the obligation of a
contract. Therein lies the fallacy of the majority
opinion. It overlooks the underlying, fundamental fact
that in 1918, and for a long time previous, this country
was no longer under the dominion of Spain, and that it
was then under the laws of the United States in which
neither the church nor state can enact a law which will
impair the obligation of a contract.
That statement is not good law, and is in direct conflict
with, and overlooks the provision of, article 3 of the
Civil Code which says that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein
otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
That is to say, the Federal Constitution prohibits the
law-making power from passing any law which impairs
the obligation of a contract, and the Spanish code
expressly provides that no law shall have a retroactive
effect "unless therein otherwise provided." If the
Legislature cannot enact a law which would impair the
obligation of a contract, how, in what manner and by
what authority can the defendant promulgate a
canonical law which in legal effect impairs the
obligation of a contract? Even under the Spanish code,
how and in what manner and by what authority can a
canonical law be made retroactive unless the canonical
law also provides that it shall be retroactive? Upon
what legal principle is the defendant church exempt
from the express language of the Constitution, or the
plain provisions of the statute? It must be conceded that
such provisions are binding upon private persons and
the legislative bodies of the government; hence, why are
not they binding upon the defendant? And why is it
exempt? The execution of the will by the foundress and
the acceptance of its terms and conditions by the
defendant and the conveyance to it of the property and
the appointment of the chaplain specified in the will
and of four other chaplains in accord with its terms and
provisions, covering almost a century of time, and the
admitted accounting to the last chaplain, makes a valid,
binding, executed contract between the foundress and
the defendant. Otherwise, the whole transaction from
its inception was null and void and of no legal force or
effect.
The deed of endowment recites that the expense of the
construction of the "house of lime and stone" was
P1,600, exclusive of the value of the lob on which it was
situated, and that the rental value of the house on April
26, 1820, was P180 per annum. It appears that its
rental value at present is P1,000 per month, and that
the amount of the rents and profits from December 6,
1910, to the rendition of the judgment on December 20,
1926, is P173,725, less certain enumerated costs and
expenses, from which the importance of this case
becomes very apparent.
The defendant vigorously contends that the property in
question became and is now spiritual property, and that
as such it is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Here,
again, we must look to the purpose and intent of the
foundress and what has been done by the defendant
under the terms and provisions of the will. The building
was constructed at a cost of P1,600, and at the time of
the execution of the will, it had a rental value of P180
per annum. The chaplaincy was founded and provision
was made for the saying of sixty masses annually, for
which the P180 annual rent was then deemed
sufficient. In its acceptance of 1820, the defendant
approved "the foundation of the chaplaincy, etc., as well
as the imposition (charge) of seventeen hundred pesos
against said building, converting said sum into spiritual
property of a perpetual character, etc.," and it was to
that extent, and to that extent only, that the property
was spiritualized. It was never the purpose or intent of
the foundress that it should be spiritualized above and
beyond the amount of the specified rental value at the
time of the execution of the will. By the acceptance of
the deed of endowment upon the terms and conditions
stated, and the founding of the chaplaincy, the
defendant declared itself satisfied with the P180 per
annum as a full and complete compensation for the
saying of the sixty annual masses, and for nearly a
century, it has taken and accepted that compensation in
full for those services, and it accounted to the last
chaplain for the amount of such rents and profits, less
costs and expenses, and the amount of such annual
masses. Those facts alone are conclusive evidence that
the defendant by its own actions and conduct is now
estopped to claim or assert that the property in
question was spiritualized above and beyond the
original amount of P180 per annum. Such a
construction is also in accord with, and gives full force
and effect to, the deed of the foundation in which it is
said that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Property is segregated from temporal properties and
transferred to the spiritual properties of this
Archbishopric, without its being possible to alienate or
convert the property as such into any other estate for
19
any cause, even though it be of a more pious character,
protesting that if the contrary should be done from now
until then, he (the executor) declares null and without
value or effect whatever may be done or executed
contrary to the tenor of these presents," which
immediately follow the words "the rents of the property
of which amount at present to P180 per year, be
declared sufficient, issuing the corresponding title of
chaplain to his said son."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is conceded that in September, 1914, the defendant
made an application to have the property registered in
its own name and to obtain a Torrens title, and that in
truth and in fact it did obtain and now holds a Torrens
title in fee simple in its own name, and for aught that
appears upon the official record, the defendant is the
sole and exclusive owner of the property in its own right
and name.
It is also conceded that at all times since December 6,
1910, the chaplaincy has been and is now vacant, and
that the defendant has refused to appoint the plaintiff
as chaplain or to account to him for the rents and
profits, and that, if the canonical law of 1918 is to be
applied and should be enforced, the plaintiff does not
have the requisite qualifications under the existing
laws of the church to be appointed chaplain.
Among other things, the purpose of this action is to
compel the defendant to appoint the plaintiff to the
vacant chaplaincy, and upon that point the lower court
sustained the plaintiff’s contention. We frankly concede
that the court should not interfere with the internal
affairs of the church upon any question of religion or
any matter of spiritual nature. That is a constitutional
right which is expressly reserved to the church. Even
so, when a church enters into a valid and binding
contract which involves temporal and property rights,
the construction and legal force of such a contract
devolves exclusively upon the courts, and while they do
not claim or exercise the power to interfere with the
spiritual matters of the church, they do claim and
exercise the power over the property rights of the
church and any right arising from, or growing out of, a
valid and binding contract over property to which the
church is a party.
We frankly concede that the courts do not exercise or
claim the power to say to the church whom it should or
should not appoint chaplain, to perform any spiritual
right or duty, or in the least to interfere with the
spiritual affairs of the church, its erred or religious
belief, or the spiritual duties of any officer or member of
the church. But the question involved in this case is one
of a property right founded upon a contract made
between the church and the foundress, and the purpose
of this action is not to procure the appointment of a
chaplain with authority under the laws of the church to
say the masses, for which the will provides, Or in any
manner to interfere with the spiritual affairs of the
church. The sole purpose is to have a chaplain
appointed with legal authority to receive and receipt for
the net income of the property.
If, as the defendant contends, it has the sole and
exclusive right at its option and in its discretion to
change, modify or enlarge the requisite qualifications
for a chaplain, and the sole and exclusive power in its
own discretion to appoint a chaplain, it is fair to assume
that in the instant case, no chaplain would ever be
appointed and that no accounting would ever be made,
for the simple reason that in no circumstances would
any church or any other person want to appoint a
chaplain to whom, when appointed, it would be
required to make an accounting of the rents and profits
of the property, as in the instant case, covering a period
of seventeen years, the rental value of which is now
P1,000 per month, and that would be especially true
where the chaplaincy has been vacant seventeen years.
If that is the law, the defendant would have the power
at its option and in its own discretion to impose new
terms and conditions for the appointment of a chaplain,
with which no member of the Guzman family could ever
comply, and thus defeat and prevent the appointment of
any chaplain at any time in the future. That is not the
law; neither should the original contract be so
construed.
The chaplaincy has been vacant for the last seventeen
years, and if, under the existing canonical law, the
defendant has the sole and exclusive power to appoint
and the appointee must be a "clerigo" with all of the
necessary qualifications, the question naturally arises
who, if any one, will ever be appointed chaplain, and
when, if ever, would he be appointed? The stubborn fact
remains that it has been vacant for the last seventeen
years, and that under the existing canonical law, no
member of the Guzman. family would ever be appointed
chaplain.
Upon this question, in its brief, appellant
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For argument’s sake, we shall admit that plaintiff has
a right to the income of the chaplaincy and that the
same is a civil right. Such a right, however, would
depend on whether plaintiff is appointed chaplain of the
said chaplaincy."cralaw virtua1aw library
In response to which, respondent
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I admit that you are the owner of the sum of over
P150,000 which I have collected as rents of the property
of the chaplaincy, but you can only take and enjoy it if I
give you the key, which I do not propose to do."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And
"That its refusal to give the plaintiff that key is a
judicial decision final and conclusive against plaintiff’s
right to recover that money."cralaw virtua1aw library
That is a statement of the whole case in a nutshell.
Previous to the promulgation of the canon law of 1918,
any male descendant of the first chaplain over 13 years
of age was eligible to the position, and the will provides
that for the failure of such descendant, a student of San
Juan de Letran School should be appointed. Yet, that is
nothing more than a high school, or one of secondary
education, and there is no claim or pretense that any of
its students is a "clerigo" or possesses the necessary
qualifications to be appointed chaplain under the canon
law of 1918. That is to say, if that law is to be enforced,
the provisions of the will for the appointment of a
chaplain, which were then valid under the laws of the
church, are wholly nullified, and for such reason, the
chaplaincy would remain forever vacant, against the
clear intention and the express will of the foundress. By
that construction and defendant’s course of conduct,
there is no longer any beneficiary under the will of the
foundress, for the simple reason that there is no person
20
to whom the defendant should account. It is elementary
that you cannot have a trust without a beneficiary.
Under all of the definitions of an express trust, there
must be a trustee who holds the legal title to the
property for the use and benefit of some third person;
otherwise, it is not a trust. Having accepted the trust
and having recognized it and performed the duties of
trustee for nearly a century, the defendant cannot now
defeat or impair the trust by neglecting or refusing to
appoint a beneficiary to whom it should account for the
net income of the property.
It appears by its own evidence that the defendant has
been using the funds arising from the rents and profits
"for religious purposes, education, benefices, charity,
etc.," and "I have done nothing more than follow the
custom which I found had been followed by my
predecessor Mons. Harty." In addition to which, under
the Torrens System, it has applied for and obtained a
title in fee simple in its own name. If the will is to be so
construed, then by and through the actions and conduct
of the defendant, it becomes void for want of a
beneficiary.
That question was squarely decided in an exhaustive
opinion by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, April
6, 1926, 45 A. L. R., p. 1433, in which, among other
things, the syllabus says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Wills, Sec. 201 — requisites of bequest.
"2. To create a valid bequest there must be a
beneficiary, or class of beneficiaries, indicated in the
will, capable of coming into court and claiming the
benefit of the bequest.
"(See 28 R. C. L., 339; 3 R. C. L. Sup., 1572.)
"Trusts, Sec. 21 — necessity of definite beneficiary.
"3. To effect an enforceable private trust by will there
must be a beneficiary, or class of beneficiaries,
indicated in the will, capable of coming into court and
claiming the benefit of the bequest.
"(See 26 R. C. L., 1189; 4 R. C. L. Sup., 1701; 5 R. C. L.
Sup., 1444.)
"Trusts, Sec. 20 — indefiniteness — effect.
"5. A gift to trustees to dispose of the same as they
think fit is too uncertain to be carried out by the courts.
"(See 26 R. C. L., 1184.)
"Wills, Sec. 198 — ascertainment of beneficiaries.
"9. The identity of a beneficiary in a will is a question of
fact to be found from the language of the will, construed
in the light of all the competent evidence, rather than
by the application of arbitrary rules of law.
"Trusts, Sec. 21 — designation of beneficiaries.
"10. Beneficiaries under a trust may be designated by
class.
"Trusts, Sec. 44 — failure — effect.
"12. Where a gift is impressed with a trust, ineffectively
declared, and incapable of taking effect because of the
indefiniteness of the cestui que trust, the donee will
hold the property in trust for the next taker under the
will, for the next of kin by way of a resulting trusts.
"(See 26 R. C. L., 1216; 5 R. C. L. Sup., 1446.)"
That same legal principle is laid down by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in Festorazzi v. St. Joseph Roman
Catholic Church (25 L. R. A., 360, 362 and 363), and by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in McHugh v. McCole
(72 N. W., 630, 632, 634-637). In legal effect, those
decisions support the contention of the plaintiff that, if
the appointment of a chaplain is a matter which is left
to the sole discretion of the defendant, it must follow
that in the instant case, the beneficiary is not made
definite and certain, and that the foundation is void for
want of any person who is qualified to enforce it, and,
for such reason, the legal title to the property must
revert to, and become vested in, the heirs of the
foundress.
If the contention of the defendant is to prevail in the
instant case, the very fact that the chaplaincy has been
vacant for the last seventeen years, and that no
member of the Guzman family or student of the San
Juan de Letran College is qualified to fill the position
under the canonical law of 1918, and that under such
conditions, a chaplain may never be appointed under
the provisions of the will in the future, would leave the
whole question in the realm of doubt, uncertainty and
speculation as to when if ever there would be a
beneficiary under the will of the foundress. If there ever
was any doubt as to how the deed of the foundation
should be construed, it has been forever removed by the
course of conduct and the long, continuous construction
which has been placed upon it by all of the parties in
interest, including the legal descendants of the
foundress and the defendant, in particular, in the
appointment of the five previous chaplains, the manner
of their appointment, and the terms and conditions
upon which they were appointed, the conduct of the
defendant, and the accounting which it made to the last
chaplain. All of such parties by their actions and
conduct, having approved and followed that
construction for nearly a century, cannot at this time
contend for any other or different construction, in
particular, where the contention would defeat and
destroy the will of the foundress.
This case is one of first impression in this court, and we
doubt very much whether a similar case has ever been
decided by any court. On page 17, the majority opinion
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is a sinister omen for the plaintiff’s case that no
decision of any civil court whatever can be pointed to as
a precedent for such an exercise of judicial power, and
the mere novelty of the proposition is an argument
against the soundness of the plaintiff’s case. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Our answer is that each case is decided upon its own
facts, and that no case will ever be found with the same
peculiar facts shown to exist in the record, and it is for
that reason that no case can be found either pro or con
upon this particular question.
Be that as it may, the primary purpose of this action is
to obtain an accounting, for which the appointment of a
chaplain is only an incident and not one of substance,
and, as stated, it is not sought to have a chaplain
appointed for the saying of masses. We frankly concede
that is a matter peculiarly within the province of the
21
defendant and over which this court does not have any
control. The purpose here is confined and limited to the
appointment of a chaplain for administrative purposes
only, to whom the defendant should account for the net
income of the property. Therein lies the distinction. In
other words, the plaintiff seeks to have a chaplain
appointed for the sole and specific purpose of carrying
out the will of the foundress and to comply with the
legal obligation arising out of the original contract.
The majority opinion suggests that the proper remedy,
if any, would be an independent action "brought as a
class suit in behalf of all the descendants of Doña
Petronila de Guzman, since under the present decision
the minor plaintiff in this action has no particular title
to relief."cralaw virtua1aw library
The plaintiff here is a son of the last chaplain, Angel
Gonzalez, who is a son of Escolastica de Guzman, and
grandson of Tomasa de Guzman, who was a sister of the
first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and this action is
prosecuted by Adelaida Gonzalez, who is the wife of
Angel Gonzalez, the former chaplain and the mother of
the plaintiff. It also appears that Fernando Maniquis,
who was the fourth chaplain, is a son of Eugenia de
Guzman and the grandson of Tomasa de Guzman, who
was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman,
and who appeared and testified as a witness for the
plaintiff, and in open court waived any right that his
minor son might have to be appointed chaplain. In
other words, it appears from the record that a number
of the immediate descendants of the foundress
appeared in court and testified as witnesses on behalf of
the plaintiff, and not one of them appeared to contest
his claim from the date of the filing of the original
complaint on August 5, 1924, and there is no claim or
pretense that any descendant of the foundress is
contesting plaintiff’s right to prosecute this action or to
be appointed chaplain.
Even from that point of view, under the allegations of
the amended complaint and its broad prayer for relief,
there is much force in the contention that the instant
case could be construed as "a class-suit in behalf of all
of the descendants of Doña Petronila de
Guzman."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no dispute about any material fact, and in the
final analysis, the only questions involved are those of
law and as to how they should be construed and applied
to the undisputed facts, and those questions are of vast
importance to both the litigants, the profession and the
public in general, and in the orderly administration of
justice, they should be squarely met and decided as
they now appear in this record.
If, under the law, the defendant should be required to
make an accounting, it would not make any legal
difference to it whether such an accounting should be
made in this action or in the so-called "class-suit." This
proceeding being equitable in its nature, if the
judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff
should be affirmed, it would have full and ample power
to protect the legal rights of all parties having or
claiming an interest in the fund, by reason of which and
upon the facts in the record, the judgment would be a
legal bar to any other action against the defendant. In
that situation and in the interest of justice, it is the
duty of this court to decide this case on its merits.
We are clearly of the opinion that the defendant holds
the legal title to the property in trust, and that under
the terms and provisions of the will of the foundress, it
should make an accounting of the net income from its
rents and profits, the receipt of which it admits, and
that whether this action should be construed as
prosecuted by the plaintiff under his right to be
appointed chaplain for administrative purposes or in
the nature of a "class-suit," the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed, and for such reasons, I dissent
from the learned and well written majority opinion.
2. CRIMINAL CASES
G.R. No. 171855 October 15, 2012
FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and
ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR
AP AREJADO,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-
Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL,
CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA
GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA
LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE
ROM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie
Aparejado, · as represented by Edgar Aparejado,
seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6,
20051 and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 47,
in Criminal Case No. 11846.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA
Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores,
CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are
members of the Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry
Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at
Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of
Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin
Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by
the respondents.
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1
o'clock in the afternoon, they received information
about the presence of armed elements reputed to be
New People’s Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio Gaway-
gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on
the information, they coordinated with the Philippine
National Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat,
they encountered armed elements which resulted in an
intense firefight. When the battle ceased, seven (7)
persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo
Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva,
Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo,
Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y
22
Cordova were found sprawled on the ground lifeless.
The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states
that a legitimate military operation was conducted and
in the course of which, the victims, armed with high-
powered firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the
military.
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there
was no encounter that ensued and that the victims were
summarily executed in cold blood by respondents.
Hence, they requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After
investigation, the NBI recommended to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Masbate City that a preliminary
investigation be conducted against respondents for the
crime of multiple murder. In reaching its
recommendation, the NBI relied on the statements of
witnesses who claim that the military massacred
helpless and unarmed civilians.
On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a
Resolution3 recommending the filing of an Information
for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were
charged with multiple murder in an Information4 dated
February 15, 2005, which reads:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA
Morie Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores,
CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom,
stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion,
9th Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as follows:
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of
Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping with one another, taking advantage of their
superior strength as elements of the Philippine Army,
armed with their government issued firearms, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Teogenes
Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado,
Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y
Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y
Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them
on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting
upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
deaths.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate City, February 15, 2005.
On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of
respondents was issued by the RTC of Masbate City,
Branch 47, but before respondents could be arrested,
the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an
Omnibus Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial
court seeking the cases against respondents be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the motion
filed by the JAGO on the ground that respondents have
not been arrested. The JAGO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,8and in an Order9 dated December 6,
2005, the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and
the entire records of the case were turned over to the
Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but
was denied by the trial court in an Order11 dated
January 11, 2006.
Hence, the present petition with the following
arguments:
I deaths."16 Murder is a crime punishable under Article
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT
CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER
TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS THE
SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND
IN LAW, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
II
IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN
JURISDICTION IF NOT GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON THE PART
OF HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMINO
ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER
DATED DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD ONLY
BE REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS
THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT YET
ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12
Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when
it transferred the criminal case filed against the
respondents to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal,
as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil
courts by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the
other hand, the respondents and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the acts
complained of are service connected and falls within the
jurisdiction of the military court.
The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely
abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the
case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.14 As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
23
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
matters to be consulted.15
In the case at bar, the information states that
respondents, "conspiring together and mutually helping
with one another, taking advantage of their superior
strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed
with their government-issued firearms with intent to
kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on
different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon
them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and
is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence,
irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified
or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the
respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law.
Respondents, however, contend that the military
tribunal has jurisdiction over the case at bar because
the crime charged was a service-connected offense
allegedly committed by members of the AFP. To support
their position, respondents cite the senate deliberations
on R.A. 7055.
Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by
Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a service-
connected offense as those committed by military
personnel pursuant to the lawful order of their superior
officer or within the context of a valid military exercise
or mission.18 Respondents maintain that the foregoing
definition is deemed part of the statute.1âwphi1
However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that
the proposed definition was not included as part of the
statute. The proposed definition made by Senator
Shahani was not adopted due to the amendment made
by Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, to wit:
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want
to propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to
consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related
offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so, I
would submit for her consideration the following
amendment to her amendment which would read as
follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, SERVICE-
CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE
LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO
70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND
ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97,
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.
This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these
service-related or connected offenses or crimes would
be. (Emphasis supplied.)
The President. What will happen to the definition of
"service-connected offense" already put forward by
Senator Shahani?
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in
the specification of the Article I have mentioned in the
Articles of War.
SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
out between the two of you? I will suspend the session
for a minute, if there is no objection. There was none.
Art. 56. False Muster.

It was 5:02 p.m.

Art. 57. False Returns.

RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.

Art. 59. Desertion.

The President. The session is resumed.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment,
subject to refinement and style.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
The President. Is there any objection? Silence There
being none, the amendment is approved.19 Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-
President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of
National Defense.
In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes
of offenses committed by persons subject to military law
... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior
are service-related or connected. And we specified Officer.
which would be considered service-related or connected
under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-
408.20 (Emphasis supplied.) Commissioned Officer.

The said amendment was later on reflected in the final Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
version of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1.
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in full:
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law, Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special
penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless
of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or Articles 72 to 92
offended parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
when the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the
offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper
civil courts.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or

offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54
to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. (Emphasis
supplied)
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to
Surrender.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
explicitly specifies what are considered "service-
connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
No. 408 (CA 408), as amended,21 to wit:

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public

Articles 54 to 70:
Service.

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

24
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the
Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss,
Damage or Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military
Property Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs
Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman.
Art. 97 General Article.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military
tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents'
case since the offense for which they were charged is
not included in the enumeration of "service-connected
offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1
thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction
to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or
offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-
connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to
see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room
for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the
RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the
alleged crime of multiple murder.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 47, dated
December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively,
in Criminal Case No. 11846 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate
City, is DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal Case No.
11846 to its docket and conduct further proceedings
thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the foregoing
disquisition.
SO ORDERED.
25
3. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN OTHER CASES
CERTIORARI,PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
.R. No. 164242 November 28, 2008
DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. and
CONVOY MARKETING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the
Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard) to
require its clearance prior to commercial advertising
and to impose sanctions on its members who broadcast
advertisements without its clearance.
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit
corporation created in 19741 composed of several
national organizations in the advertising industry,
including: Advertising Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited
Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As),Cinema
Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP),
Independent Blocktimers Association of the Philippines
(IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), Outer Advertising Association of the
Philippines (OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research
Society of the Philippines (MORES), Philippine
Association of National Advertisers (PANA) and the
Print Media Organization (PRIMO).
Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was
formerly a member of PANA.
In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing
Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency,
SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied
with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio
advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba
ng Kinse Anyos)."
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not
long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept
with complaints from the public. This prompted
AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no
response. With the continued complaints from the
public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its
advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to
recall the clearance previously issued, effective
immediately.2 Said decision to recall was conveyed to
SLG and AdBoard's members-organizations.3
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after
which, they filed a Complaint which was later on
amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and
Application for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
277.4 The Amended Complaint sought the
revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and its
dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was
usurping the functions of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting
that it has the power to screen, review and approve all
radio and television advertisements. Petitioners seek
the nullity of AdBoard's "Code of Ethics for Advertising"
and "ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and
Filing of Complaints and Appeals."5
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No.
2004-02, reminding its members-organizations of
Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which
prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it.
Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint
for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service against AdBoard's officers.
On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition
for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a
constitutionally protected right, as well as a property
right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance
from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired
amounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's
regulation is an exercise of police power which must be
subject to constitutional proscriptions.
On the other hand, AdBoard seeks the dismissal of the
petition for failure to observe the rule on hierarchy of
courts and for failure to comply with certain
requirements for the filing of the petition, namely:
statement of material dates, attachment of certified
true copy of ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and defect in
the certification of non-forum shopping.
As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard
counters that it derives its authority from the voluntary
submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According
to AdBoard, there is no law that prohibits it from
assuming self-regulatory functions or from issuing
clearances prior to advertising.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for
prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from
requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and
imposing sanctions on any agency that will air,
broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such
clearance.6
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for
petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its/his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
26
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function
by which he has the power to determine what the law is
and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is
a term which applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies, which are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context
of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.8
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the
acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.9 What
is at contest here is the power and authority of a
private organization, composed of several members-
organizations, which power and authority were vested
to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will
not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ
of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any
person or group of persons acting in a purely private
capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private
individuals or corporations so acting.10
Moreover, it appears that petitioners already filed Civil
Case No. 04-277, wherein they sought the
revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and
dissolution and the nullity of AdBoard's Code of Ethics
for Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures for
Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals (ACRC
Manual), with the RTC. Although dubbed differently,
the present petition is obviously an attempt on
petitioners' part to have AdBoard's authority
challenged in yet another forum. This is a clear act of
forum shopping on petitioners' part.
Forum shopping has been defined as the "institution of
two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition" or "the act of
a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly
favorable) opinion in another forum other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari."11 The test
in determining the presence of forum shopping is
whether in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of action; and
(c) reliefs sought,12 such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.13
Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition both
involve the same parties. The petitioners in this case
are Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and Convoy
Marketing Corp., while the respondent is AdBoard. On
the other hand, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 04-277
also are petitioners, while the defendant is still
AdBoard, only with the addition of Oscar T. Valenzuela,
who is the Executive Director of AdBoard.
Both cases also raise practically the same basic causes
of action/issues and seek the same relief.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain
both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent
action.14 The principle applies even if the reliefs sought
in the two cases may be different.15 Otherwise, a party
could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought.16
There is identity in the causes of action in Civil Case
No. 04-277 and the present petition for prohibition
inasmuch as there is identity in the facts and evidence
essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised
in these cases. Both cases were instituted after
AdBoard recalled the clearance for
petitioners' Ginagabi advertisement, and its members
refused to air the same. Also, the main issue raised in
the present petition and one of the issues raised in Civil
Case No. 04-277 refer to AdBoard's authority and the
legality of the AdBoard Code of Ethics and ACRC
Manual. The determination of this issue in either case
would clearly amount to res judicata in regard to the
other. Consequently, the present petition should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSEDfor lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167743 November 22, 2006
HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, HON.
PLARIDEL OSCAR J. BOHOL, Graft
Investigation Officer II, and RAMON R.
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85319 dated January 20, 2005 and its
Resolution2 dated April 12, 2005 which denied the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
On July 9, 2001, Hilario P. Soriano, the President of
Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM), filed a criminal
complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
against Norberto Nazareno, Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) President and Chief
Executive, charging the latter, among others, with
illegal pre-termination of RBSM’s lease contracts over
certain lots while under receivership. Nazareno filed his
counter-affidavit appending thereto the affidavit of
Teodoro Jose B. Hirang, the Department Manager of
the Takeover Center of the PDIC. Nazareno claimed
that the notices of termination of the lease contracts
27
were without prejudice to the claim for reimbursement
for the remaining value of the bank buildings
constructed on the leased lot with a book value of
₱5,728,000.70.3
Soriano filed a complaint for perjury against Hirang
with the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor. Soriano
claimed that the statement of Hirang in his affidavit is
totally untrue and a deliberate falsehood because PDIC,
or any of its authorized representatives, made no
reservation whatsoever concerning the claim for
reimbursement when the lease contracts were pre-
terminated. Soriano relied on the letter of Deputy
Receiver Mauricia Manzanares to one of the lessors,
attached to the complaint as Annex "D" thereof. The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 01J-43460.4The case
was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Joel
Lucasan.
Soriano likewise filed a complaint for libel against
Nazareno. He alleged therein that Nazareno uttered
malicious and libelous statements when he was
interviewed by a reporter of Business World on July 16,
2001. Nazareno declared in the interview that a case for
estafa filed in the Department of Justice (DOJ) against
Soriano for alleged self-dealing after a ₱10.5 million
RBSM loan was used by affiliate Coconut Rural Bank in
Batangas, and that some other estafa cases for ₱100
million were also filed by the DOJ in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila.5 The case was docketed as I.S.
No. 01H-32904.
Thereafter, Soriano filed a third criminal complaint in
the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor for violation of
Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code against
Zenaida A. Cabais, the comptroller appointed by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the
operations of RBSM, particularly the proper utilization
of emergency loans extended to it by the BSP. The
complaint alleged that Cabais submitted an affidavit in
support of the Monetary Board in the petition filed by
RBSM against BSP with the CA. It further alleged that
Cabais made a false statement in the said affidavit
when she stated that, before RBSM declared a bank
holiday, it paid Force Collect Professional Solution, Inc.
and Sure Collect Professional Solution, Inc., which are
allegedly owned by Soriano and other RBSM officers,
₱5.3 million and ₱5.75 million, respectively, without
any supporting documents as payment of 25% collection
fee. Soriano averred that this statement is not correct
as the manager’s checks for the said amounts were, in
fact, withheld and no payment was made to the two
corporations.6 The case, docketed as I.S. No. 00D-18089,
was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Anabel
Magabilin.
On January 14, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Joel A.
Lucasan recommended the dismissal of the criminal
complaint against Hirang in I.S. No. 01J-43460 for lack
of probable cause. He noted that the Office of the
Ombudsman had not yet made a finding that Hirang
made a deliberate and willful assertion of falsehood in
the affidavit submitted to it. He opined that without
such finding, it cannot be concluded that Hirang had
made such alleged falsehood which would constitute the
crime of perjury.7 First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla approved this recommendation for
City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia.8 The criminal
complaint was consequently dismissed. Soriano filed a
petition for review of the resolution with the DOJ on
March 21, 2002.9
On January 24, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Yvonne
G. Corpuz also recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for libel against Nazareno for lack of
probable cause. Prosecutor Corpuz made the following
findings:
A perusal of the subject article shows that they are true
and fair reports on a matter of public interest. It must
be noted that when respondent Nazareno was
interviewed by the reporter, Ms. Yap, he just mentioned
facts which the public was entitled to know because
complainant Soriano headed a bank that dealt with the
public. These are matters of public interests and
concerns of which the citizenry has the right to be
informed especially when it affects the integrity of the
banking system. Being a matter of public interest, the
alleged defamatory articles are protected by the mantle
of privilege communication, which does away with
presumption of malice. The privilege character of the
news article in question stems from constitutional
guarantee of free speech and free press.
Moreover, malice in fact has not been shown in the case
at bar. Respondent was not prompted by ill will or spite.
He merely makes a disclosure of facts and not an
imputation affecting character.10
City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia approved the
recommendation of Prosecutor Corpuz and the criminal
complaint was therefore dismissed.11 Soriano filed a
petition for review of the resolution with the DOJ.
On the other hand, in I.S. No. 00D-18089, Assistant
City Prosecutor Anabel D. Magabilin recommended that
the complaint against Cabais be dismissed for lack of
probable cause. However, City Prosecutor Garcia
merely recommended to the Ombudsman the approval
of Prosecutor Magabilin’s findings. In a March 4, 2002
Indorsement,12 he forwarded the records of the said
complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman upon his
finding that Cabais was a public officer and that the
complaint imputed against her was related to the
performance of her duties.
On July 2, 2002, Soriano filed an Affidavit-
Complaint13 charging City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia
with gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality
in the performance of his duties as City Prosecutor
which resulted in unwarranted benefits to Hirang and
Nazareno, compromising public interest and injuring
complainant’s private rights, and violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Soriano alleged in his affidavit-
complaint that respondent erred in forwarding the
records of I.S. No. 00D-18089 for perjury to the
Ombudsman because in perjury, public office is not an
essential ingredient. Soriano averred that if public
office was an ingredient for perjury, then respondent
should have forwarded his complaints against Hirang
and Nazareno to the Office of the Ombudsman together
with his recommendations thereon for final resolution,
conformably with paragraph 1 of OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995. The Circular
states that preliminary investigation and prosecution of
offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to office whether cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed
with the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor shall
be under the control and supervision of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Soriano likewise relied on Section 4(8), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
which provides that, upon the termination of the
preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall
forward the records of the case together with his
resolution to the designated authorities for appropriate
action; and that no information may be filed and no
complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or
of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other
cases.14Soriano alleged that Hirang and Nazareno
committed the crime charged against them in relation
to their office; hence, respondent Garcia should not
have dismissed the Hirang and Nazareno complaints
without the written authority or approval of the Deputy
Ombudsman.
Soriano averred that respondent acted unlawfully in
authorizing the dismissal of the complaints against
Hirang and Nazareno instead of endorsing the
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman, together
with the recommendations for dismissal, in the same
way that the Cabais case was endorsed. He insisted
that the special treatment of the Nazareno and Hirang
cases, which resulted in their dismissal without having
been reviewed by the Office of the Ombudsman, was
uncalled for.15
The Office of the Ombudsman docketed the criminal
aspect of the complaint as OMB-C-C-02-0416-G, and
the administrative aspect as OMB-C-A-02-0287-G.
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 respondent declared that
although Nazareno was a public officer (being the
President and Chief Executive Officer of PDIC, a
government-owned or controlled corporation), since the
offense of libel for which he was charged does not
appear to have been committed in relation to his office,
it is the regular courts, particularly the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan, that has jurisdiction over the case. The
Business World interview was his personal and private
undertaking which was not related to the performance
of his duty as PDIC President and Chief Executive
Officer. Hence, respondent retained the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of a complaint
conformably with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001,
Series of 1995 which reads, thus:
(2) Unless the OMBUDSMAN under his constitutional
mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses
NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the
REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and
prosecuted by the OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall rule
thereon with finality.17
He cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the Hirang
case because the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor was approved by First Assistant City
Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla. Under Office Order No.
24 which he issued on February 5, 1996 and which
remained in effect, only those cases involving offenses
which are within the trial jurisdiction of the RTCs shall
be forwarded to him for final disposition. Those cases

28
for offenses cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs) are forwarded to then First Assistant City
Prosecutor Vicenta Ofilada, whose functions were
performed by incumbent First Assistant City
Prosecutor Sulla upon Ofilada’s retirement from the
service.18
Respondent further averred that perjury is within the
trial jurisdiction of the MeTC. The final disposition of
the said case, which includes the determination of
whether or not it should be endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman, is vested with Prosecutor Sulla. He
explained that he ordered the indorsement of the case
against Cabais to the Ombudsman for final disposition
because Cabais, being the comptroller appointed by the
BSP to oversee the operations of the RBSM while the
latter was under receivership, was a public officer.
Hence, his actions in the Hirang, Nazareno and Cabais
cases cannot be considered as unlawful, irregular or
inconsistent or in total disregard of established
procedure. Respondent averred that even if he erred in
his actions on said cases, said error cannot be made the
basis of a criminal or administrative action especially in
the absence of any allegation, much less any evidence,
showing that such disposition was done out of certain
extraneous consideration other than plain appreciation
of the evidence on hand. The remedy of complainant
was to file a motion for the reconsideration of his
resolutions in the said cases and/or appeal to the DOJ
which he, in fact, did. Respondent pointed out that, on
March 13, 2002, complainant, through counsel, filed a
20-page petition for review with the DOJ in the
Nazareno case. On March 21, 2002, he appealed the
Hirang case to the DOJ.19
After due proceedings, the Ombudsman, through Graft
Investigator Plaridel Oscar J. Bohol, dismissed the
administrative complaint against respondent Garcia on
October 25, 2002.20 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
instant administrative case against RAMON R.
GARCIA, City Prosecutor of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila, with address at Room 208, City
Hall Building, Manila, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
The Ombudsman held that Soriano’s complaint was
premature. It is not within the province of its
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction to review the
quasi-judicial findings and decisions of government
officials such as the City Prosecutor of Manila. If
complainant was dissatisfied with such findings of the
City Prosecutor, his remedy was to move for
reconsideration or file a petition for review with the
DOJ, the proper office mandated by law to review the
resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. The Ombudsman noted that, on March 13,
2002 and March 21, 2002, complainant had, in fact,
filed the appropriate petition with the DOJ seeking the
review of the Nazareno and Hirang cases.
Moreover, Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that the complainant has an
29
adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body. The Ombudsman opined that, unless there is a
final determination by the appropriate office that,
indeed, respondent Garcia abused his position and/or
violated pertinent rules in issuing the questioned
resolution, any administrative complaint against
respondent was premature.22
Soriano filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 which was
likewise denied on February 16, 2004.24 Thereafter, he
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
submitting the sole issue –
Whether or not public respondents gravely abused their
discretion in rendering the impugned Order
exonerating respondent Ramon Garcia from any
administrative liability and the Order denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.25
On January 20, 2005, the CA dismissed the
petition.26 It stressed that under Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, the public officer complained of should have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. The appellate court held that
the assailed orders of the Ombudsman dismissing the
complaint against respondent were justified considering
that there was no evident bad faith on his part nor was
there any act of irregularity from which an inference of
malice or bad faith could be made. The CA found
satisfactory respondent Garcia’s explanation on why he
could not be made liable. He explained that, in
Nazareno’s case, the alleged libelous act appears not to
have been committed in relation to the performance of
his duty as PDIC Chief but as a personal remark based
on existing records. As for the Hirang case, he had no
participation thereon, as the same was not forwarded to
his office for final disposition.271âwphi1
On April 12, 2005, the CA resolved to deny Soriano’s
motion for reconsideration of its decision.28 Dissatisfied,
Soriano filed this petition for review.
In this petition, Soriano as petitioner avers that he is
not asking the Office of the Ombudsman to review or
reverse or do any act relative to the resolutions of the
Hirang and Nazareno complaints. He avers that what
he is questioning is respondent Garcia’s failure to
comply with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
00129 which calls for the endorsement of said
resolutions to the Office of the Ombudsman for final
action.30
Petitioner contends that respondent acted in bad faith,
or, at the very least, committed acts of irregularity from
which an inference of malice or bad faith could be made.
He points out that Nazareno could not have had access
to said information and would not have disclosed such
information against Soriano if he was not the PDIC
President. He, therefore, concludes that the impugned
remarks were made in relation to office or in the
performance of public duties.31
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, point out that the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent is final
and immediately executory, and unappealable.
Nonetheless, they aver that the ruling of the CA, that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman when he dismissed the administrative
case, was correct. They maintain that the factual
findings of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary proceedings are entitled to great respect
and finality.32
The petition is without merit.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following
requirements are set out in the petition and
established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.33
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of
discretion" as follows:
x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,
the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common
law traditions.34
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.35 The only
question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only
when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a
30
remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.36 An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only
by an appeal.37
We quote with approval the following discussion of the
Ombudsman on its finding that petitioner’s complaint
was premature:
After a careful study of the records, we find no
sufficient cause to warrant further proceeding in the
instant administrative case. The complainant, by filing
the instant administrative case, in effect, would like
this Office to, among others, rule on the legality of the
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
in I.S. No. 01J-43460 entitled "Soriano v. Hirang" and
I.S. No. 01H-32904 entitled "Soriano v. Nazareno."
It must be emphasized that it is not within the province
of this Office’s administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
to review the quasi-judicial findings and decisions of
government officials. If the complainant is dissatisfied
with the said findings, his remedy is to move for
reconsideration, and/or file a Petition for Review with
the Department of Justice, the proper office mandated
by law to review the resolutions of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. In fact, on March 13, 2002 and
March 21, 2002, the herein complainant, through
counsel, filed the appropriate Petition for Review in the
Nazareno and Hirang cases, respectively.
Besides, it may be pointed out that Section 20(1) of
Republic Act 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides, thus:
"Section 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body x x x"
This is not to say, however, that the herein complainant
totally has no recourse to this Office. Should there be a
final determination by the appropriate office that,
indeed, the herein respondent abused his position
and/or violated pertinent rules in issuing the
questioned resolutions, the complainant may very well
file before this Office the appropriate complaint against
the latter. Until then, therefore, the instant
administrative complaint is premature.38
It appears on record that, on January 27, 2003, the DOJ
had dismissed the petition for review of respondent in
I.S. No. 01H-32904 (for libel) for lack of merit. The DOJ
ruled as follows:
Verily, we are not inclined to impute any form of malice
on the part of respondent. There is no sufficient overt
acts performed by him from which we can deduce that
he, in providing the information that became the basis
of the subject news item, was motivated by personal ill-
will, hatred, animosity, vengeance, resentment and
aversion against complainant (see People v. Quemel,
CA 02583-CR, March 18, 1964; People v. Dianelan, 13
CAR 34). These would have shown his malice or, at
least, his intention to inflict ulterior and unjustifiable
injury on complainant’s reputation, honor and credit
(see People v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253). What constitutes
libel is not only the defamatory matter but also the
malicious attitude of the accused (Esteban v.
Veneracion, et al., 16 CAR 1171).
On the basis of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official function and on evidence extant
on record, it readily appears that respondent narrated
the information to the reporter exactly as they are
reflected on the records of PDIC. Even then, he relayed
the information merely in response to questions in an
interview made by a reporter of a newspaper. Besides,
respondent, as head of the PDIC, merely performed his
legal duty to fully disclose to the public all the
transactions of his office involving public interest.
Certainly, the information disclosed by respondent is a
matter of public concern where everyone has an
interest. Since respondent merely discharged a legal
duty, the presumption of malice in a defamatory
statement is necessarily negated. His statements in this
regard are well within the mantle of protection of
privileged communication. It now behooves upon
complainant to show that respondent had, in fact, acted
with malice. As stated above, it has not been shown
that respondent had acted with ill-motive in the
publication of the subject news item.39
Earlier on July 26, 2002, the DOJ had, motu proprio,
resolved to dismiss the petition for review of petitioner
in I.S. No. 01J-43460, thus:
This resolves the petition for review of the resolution of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in the above-
captioned case dismissing the complaint against
Teodoro Jose D. Hirang for perjury.
Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July
3, 2000 provides that the Secretary of Justice
may, motu proprio, dismiss the petition if there is no
showing of any reversible error in the appealed
resolution.
We considered the arguments raised and discussed in
the petition, as well as respondent’s comment thereon,
but found no cogent reason to justify a reversal of the
assailed resolution. The evidence on record, by and
large, does not engender enough faith that respondent
is guilty of the charge. Here, respondent, at least,
believes that the facts stated in his affidavit are true at
the time he subscribes the same, not to mention that,
through the footnote on the affidavit, respondent did,
likewise, explain why no claim for reimbursement was
made in some of the notices.
In passing, the date September 13, 2001 therein cited
was just a typographical error in the light of the
attendant circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DISMISS the instant
petition.40
Patently, petitioner filed his complaint against
respondent with the Ombudsman despite the pendency
of his petition for review in the DOJ. It turned out that
the DOJ would sustain the rulings of First Assistant
Sulla and respondent, respectively. There was thus no
31
factual and legal basis to file any administrative
complaint against respondent.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish his claim that
the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
his complaint. Indeed, the Ombudsman was justified in
dismissing the administrative case against respondent.
The latter cannot be held administratively liable for the
dismissal of the complaint of petitioner against
Nazareno and Hirang without the authority or approval
of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasizing that the
Ombudsman and the City Prosecutor have concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public
officers and employees. It is only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has the
primary jurisdiction to investigate; hence, in such cases,
it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases.41
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure likewise provides:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review. – If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and information. He shall certify under oath
in the information that he, or as shown by the record,
an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall
forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution
within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor of the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the
dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on
the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may,
by himself file the information against the respondent,
or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as
the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu
proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies
the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation,
or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same Rule
shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by
the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, in cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor has the duty to forward
the case to the Ombudsman for proper disposition. In
such cases, Section 4 provides that no complaint may be
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the
prior written authority or approval of the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
However, the impugned dismissals in the present case
involve complaints over offenses which were found to be
committed not in relation to office and within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts (I.S. No. 01J-43460 is
a complaint for perjury while I.S. No. 01H-32904 is a
complaint for libel). When the case involves an offense
not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular
courts, the investigating prosecutor is under no
obligation to forward his recommendations together
with the records of the case to the Ombudsman for a
final disposition.
Petitioner ascribes administrative liability to
respondent for allegedly not following OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 when he dismissed the Nazareno
and Hirang cases. We are not convinced.
For one, respondent did not actually ignore OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001. In fact, respondent dismissed
the Nazareno case on the honest belief that he was
complying with the guidelines set forth in said circular.
The Nazareno case was dismissed by respondent based
on the finding that the offense committed by respondent
therein was not in relation to office. Paragraph 2 of
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 provides that
offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the
regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by
the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor, which shall
rule thereon with finality. Respondent is not obliged to
forward cases involving offenses not in relation to office
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
An offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the
accused’s office when such office is an element of the
crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of the official function of
the accused.42 Respondent found that the interview
Nazareno had given to Business World was his personal
and private undertaking, and not related to the
performance of his duty as a PDIC officer. Whether or
not such finding is correct is beyond the reach of the
administrative case filed against him; such question
should be properly resolved in the petition for review of
the City Prosecutor’s resolution with the DOJ.
Neither can respondent be made administratively liable
for the dismissal of the Hirang case in which he had no
participation.1âwphi1 The negligence of the
subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the
absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence.43
32
Finally, it has been declared that OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 is just an internal agreement
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 20, 2005 and its Resolution
dated April 12, 2005 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175049 November 27, 2008
HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY, namely,
MANUEL N. LONOY, OSCAR N. LONOY,
WARREN N. LONOY, EXCELINO N. LONOY,
EDGAR N. LONOY, VICTOR N. LONOY, APOLLO
N. LONOY, GEMMA N. LONOY-SAMSON, HEIRS
OF RODOLFO N. LONOY (ISABEL A. LONOY,
ISABELITA A. LONOY-YOUNG, WINONA A.
LONOY, RODERICK A. LONOY, NANCY A.
LONOY-PAYNAEN, ROBERT LONOY, ROMMEL
A. LONOY, RAFAEL A. LONOY, ZENAIDA
LONOY-OPADA, HONEYLYN A. LONOY,
MARITES LONOY CABURNAY, and RODOLFO
LONOY, JR.), HEIRS OF CORNELIA NANAMAN
ADIS/ASEQUIA, namely, HEIRS OF ELSA N.
ADIS, BRICCIO N. ADIS, TOMAS N. ADIS, ROMY
N. ADIS, JUSTINO N. ADIS, MERCITA N.
ASEQUIA, and TOMASITA N. ASEQUIA, HEIRS
OF VICENTE NANAMAN (LUDEM NANAMAN, ET
AL.), HEIRS OF MANUELA NANAMAN AMARGA,
namely, HEIRS OF CLARITA AMARGA-UBGUIA
(VERLITO A. UBGUIA, DANILO A. UBGUIA,
ASTERIO A. UBGUIA, and CARLO A. UBGUIA),
HEIRS OF ACOLON AMARGA (ALMIRANTE
AMARGA, SPARTACUS AMARGA, MELVIN
AMARGA, and RODRIGO AMARGA), ALONSO N.
AMARGA, HERDA N. AMARGA, DELOS MIMBA
AMARGA-TOGONON, HEIRS OF ASCONA
AMARGA UBAGAN (DEMOSTHENES A.
UBAGAN, ET AL.), HEIRS OF NICODEMO N.
AMARGA (JIMMY AMARGA, MARIETTA
AMARGA, BENIGNO AMARGA, NICODEMO
AMARGA, JR., ALMA AMARGA, FELIX AMARGA,
ADOR AMARGA, LYDIA AMARGA, JUDY
AMARGA, LOLOT AMARGA, and MADONNA
AMARGA), HEIRS OF ATANACIO NANAMAN
AMARGA (GLORIOSA A. APOR, NESTOR
AMARGA, NORVILLA AMARGA, GENITA
AMARGA, and GILMA AMARGA), HEIRS OF
OLIVA AMARGA-BADELLES (JOSE I.
BADELLES, JIMBO BADELLES, JOHNSON
BADELLES, ALITA BADELLES-JALAGAT,
NINIAN BADELLES, JONA A. BADELLES,
CEFERINO A. BADELLES, OLIVER BADELLES,
OHARA A. BADELLES, MARIA BADELLES,
SARAH A. BADELLES, JEBA A. BADELLES, and
MICHAELA A. BADELLES), and HEIRS OF
MANSUETO N. AMARGA (EDNA AMARGA –
surviving spouse of JESSE AMARGA, DEÑA
AMARGA-MAGHINAY, and MARLON AMARGA),
HEIRS OF GENARA NANAMAN SAKALL, namely,
AMPARO SAKALL-DURANO, BENEDICTO N.
SAKALL, ISABELITA N. SAKALL, FRANCISCA
SAKALL MARQUINA, HONORIO N. SAKALL,
VIRGINIA SAKALL ESTANISLAO, and NORMA N.
SAKALL, HEIRS OF JULIETA NANAMAN,
namely, HEIRS OF JAIME NANAMAN/RIVERA
(ANASTASIA LAUGAM NANAMAN – surviving
spouse, DULSORA NANAMAN, and GUILLERMO
NANAMAN), HEIRS OF PIO NANAMAN/ROA
(WILMA NANAMAN, ALFREDO NANAMAN,
DELIA NANAMAN, SALVADOR NANAMAN,
HEIRS OF RAUL NANAMAN, EVELYN
NANAMAN, VIOLA NANAMAN, EDITHA
NANAMAN, PINKY NANAMAN, and ALEXANDER
NANAMAN), HEIRS OF GREGORIO
NANAMAN/DACAMPO (VICTOR NANAMAN,
VICENTE NANAMAN, GREGORIO NANAMAN,
JR., and VIRGIE NANAMAN), and HEIRS OF
ORLANDO NANAMAN (EMILIA G. NANAMAN –
surviving spouse, ALEX NANAMAN, EMMA
NANAMAN, HEIRS OF GEORGINA NANAMAN,
GEORGE NANAMAN, RAMIL NANAMAN, and
CAROLYN NANAMAN), HEIRS OF ROSARIO
NANAMAN RUEDAS, namely, HEIRS OF
BERNARDO N. RUEDAS (JULIA RUEDAS,
JONATHAN RUEDAS, MARLON RUEDAS,
MARIVIC RUEDAS, EDITHA RUEDAS, and
MARGIE RUEDAS-POGOY), and HEIRS OF JOSE
"FEBE" NANAMAN (SOCORRO NANAMAN, AIDA
NANAMAN, LERMA NANAMAN-MORALES,
EDUARDO NANAMAN, JOSEFA NANAMAN,
MARISA NANAMAN, ARTURO NANAMAN, and
MARYFLOR NANAMAN), and ATTY. ELPEDIO
CABASAN as Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Gregorio Nanaman, petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF ILIGAN, HEIRS OF JUAN NANAMAN,
HEIRS OF LIMBANIA CABILI MERCADO, HEIRS
OF MARIANO ANDRES
CABILI, respondents/unwilling co-petitioners.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking (a) the reversal of the
Resolution1dated 13 July 2005 of the Twenty-Second
(22nd) Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00365, which dismissed the Special Civil Action for
Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation
Patents, Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order; and (b) the reversal of
the Resolution2 of the Twenty-First (21st) Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 dated 22
September 2006, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are
set forth hereunder.
Action for Reversion of Title
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria
Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land situated in Tambo, Iligan City,
consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property), upon
which they likewise erected their residence. Living with
them on the subject property were Virgilio Nanaman
33
(Virgilio), Gregorio’s son by another woman, and fifteen
tenants.
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria administered the
subject property with Virgilio. On 16 February 1954,
Hilaria and Virgilio executed a Deed of Sale3 over the
subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste (Deleste).
Upon Hilaria’s death on 15 May 1954, Juan Nanaman
(Juan), Gregorio’s brother, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses
Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate). On 16 June 1956,
Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate.
The subject property was included in the list of assets of
the joint estate. However, Noel could not take
possession of the subject property since it was already
in Deleste’s possession. Thus, on 30 April 1963, Noel
filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch II,
Lanao del Norte, an action against Deleste for the
reversion of title over the subject property to the Estate,
docketed as Civil Case No. 698.
Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard,
decided, and appealed all the way to this Court in Noel
v. Court of Appeals. On 11 January 1995, the Court
rendered its Decision4 in Noel, affirming the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that the subject property was the
conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and
Hilaria, such that the latter could only sell her one-half
(1/2) share therein to Deleste. Consequently, the
intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held to be
the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-
half (1/2) interest in the same.
Operation Land Transfer Program
While Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the
CFI, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued on 21
October 1972, which mandated that tenanted rice and
corn lands be brought under the Operation Land
Transfer Program and be awarded to farmer
beneficiaries. In accordance therewith, the subject
property was placed under the Operation Land
Transfer Program.
On 12 February 1984, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) in the names of herein private respondents, the
tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.
The CLTs were registered on 15 July 1986.
Subsequently, on 1 August 2001, Original Certificates
of Title (OCTs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) were
issued in favor of the private respondents over their
respective portions of the subject property. Private
respondents’ OCTs, EP numbers, and dates of
registration with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City
are presented in the table below:
Private Respondents OCT/ EP No
1. Heirs of Neciforo A. Cabaluna OCT No. P-01 (a.f.)/
EP No. 190251
 2. Heirs of Abdon P. Manreal On (a.f.)/
OCT No. P-02 appeal, docketed as DARAB 2.5799Case No. 12486, the2001
21 Sept
DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
EP No. 00032029
3. Tranquilina C. Manreal Decision10 dated 15 March 1.3612
OCT No. P-03(a.f.)/ 2004. The DARAB held, inter
1 October 2001
alia, that the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of
EP No. 190253
4. Tito L. Baller Deleste
OCT No. P-04 (a.f.)/who should have informed
.4409 the DAR1 of the 2001
October
pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject
EP No. 190254
property was placed under the coverage of the
5. Heirs of Herculano Balorio OCT No. P-05 (a.f.)/ 1.7937 1 October 2001
Operation Land Transfer Program. It further found
EP No. 190255
that the question of exemption from the Operation
6. Alicia B. Manreal OCT No. P-06
Land(a.f.)/
Transfer Program lay1.5233 1 October
within the jurisdiction of 2001
EP No. 190256
the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative.
7. Felipe D. Manreal OCT No. P-07
The(a.f.)/
Heirs of Deleste filed a .9760
Motion for 1 October 2001
EP No. 190257
Reconsideration11 of the aforementioned Decision, but
8. Salvacion Manreal the (a.f.)/
OCT No. P-08 Motion was denied by the DARAB in its1 Resolution
.5502 October 2001
dated 8 July 2004.
EP No. 190258
9. Heirs of Domingo N. Rico OCT No. P-09 (a.f.)/ 2.7850 1 October 2001
EP No. 190261
The Heirs of Deleste thereafter filed a Petition for
10. Macario Veloria OCT No. P-10 (a.f.)/
Review .5778
12 with the Court of Appeals, docketed1 October
as CA- 2001
EP No. 190262
G.R. SP No. 85471, challenging the Decision and
11. Heirs of Custodio M. Rico Resolution
OCT No. P-11 (a.f.)/ in DARAB Case1.4499 No. 12486. The1Petition
Octoberwas
2001
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution13 dated
EP No. 190263
12. Heirs of Clemente M. Rico 28 October
OCT No. P-12 (a.f.)/ 2004 as material.7320portions of the1record and
October 2001
other supporting papers were not attached thereto, in
EP No. 190264
13. Martillano D. Obeso accordance
OCT No. P-13 (a.f.)/ with Section 6 of Rule 43. The1Motion
2.0492
14
Octoberfor2001
Reconsideration15 of the Heirs of Deleste was likewise
EP No. 190265
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution16 dated 13
14. Heirs of Pablo F. Rico OCT No. P-14 (a.f.)/ .2608 1 October 2001
September 2005 for being pro forma.17
EP No. 190266
15. Heirs of Domingo V. Rico OCT No. P-15 (a.f.)/ 1.8036 1 October 20016
Petition for Prohibition
EP No. 190267

Expropriation Case During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 before

Deleste passed away sometime in 1992.
About a year earlier, in 1991, the subject property was
surveyed. The survey of a portion of the land consisting
of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was
approved on 8 January 1999.
On 22 November 1999, the City of Iligan filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
4, Iligan City, for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as Civil Case No.
4979. On 11 December 2000, RTC Branch 4 issued a
Decision7 granting the expropriation. Since the true
owner of the expropriated portion could not be
determined, as the subject property had not yet been
partitioned and distributed to any of the Heirs of
Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the
expropriated portion of the subject property in the
amount of P27,343,000.00 was deposited with the
Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in
trust for RTC Branch 4.
Petition for Nullification of the Emancipation
Patents (Heirs of Deleste)
the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Prohibition,
Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued
by DAR and the Corresponding [Original Certificates of
Title] Issued by the [Land Registration Authority],
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)18 was filed on 7 June 2005 by herein
petitioners Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, et al. with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
00365.
Petitioners are more than one hundred twenty (120)
individuals who claim to be the descendants of
Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorio’s brother, and who
collectively assert their right to a share in Gregorio’s
estate. Arguing that they were deprived of their
inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the
EPs to private respondents without notice to them,
petitioners prayed that a TRO be forthwith issued,
prohibiting the DAR Secretary, the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), the DARAB, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), as well as the RTC, Branch 4 of
Iligan City, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in the
names of private respondents until CA-G.R. SP No.
00365 was resolved. Petitioners further prayed that
judgment be subsequently rendered declaring the said
EPs and the OCTs null and void.

In a Resolution19 dated 13 July 2005, the Court of

On 28 January 2002, the Heirs of Deleste,8 filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents’ EPs. The petition was docketed as Reg.
Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
rendered a Decision9 on 21 July 2003 declaring that the
EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
ownership and the subsequent reclassification of the
subject property into a residential/commercial land.
Appeals dismissed the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
00365 on the following grounds:
A perusal, however, of the instant petition
disclose the following defects and/or
infirmities which constrain us to dismiss the
petition:
(a.) Annexes "V", "W", "HH", "LL", "NN",
"QQ", "UU" and "VV" are not duplicate

34
 originals or certified true copies in violation to rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, followed except only for compelling reasons.
hence, sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is
(b.) There is no explanation why personal hereby DENIED and Our July 13, 2005
service was not resorted to by petitioner in Resolution is MAINTAINED.
serving copies of the petition to adverse
parties contrary to the provision of Section 11,
Aggrieved, petitioners now come to this Court via the
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides:
present Petition for Review, raising the following
issues:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of
service and filing. – Whenever
I.
practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be
done personally. Except with respect WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
to papers emanating from the APPEALS ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW
court, a resort to other modes AND JURISPRUDENCE OR COMMITTED
must be accompanied by a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
written explanation why the AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
service or filing was not done JURISDICTION IN HASTILY DISMISSING
personally. A violation of this Rule THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR
may be cause to consider the paper PROHIBITION, ETC. IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
as not filed. 00365 ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS
SOME OF WHICH ARE PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS OR UNTRUE.
(c.) Petitioners in the instant case are not
parties to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) case who’s (sic) II.
Decision they now seek to be nullified in this
present petition for prohibition. IN THE EVENT THAT THE OUTRIGHT
AND HASTY DISMISSAL OF CA-G.R. SP
(d.) Although a Special Power of Attorney NO. 00365 WILL BE SET ASIDE,
(SPA) was obtained in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER ISSUES
who signed in the verification and SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS
certification of non-forum shopping, it can be HONORABLE COURT INSTEAD OF
gleaned, however, that other heirs whose REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT
names appeared in the SPA have not signed OF APPEALS.
therein. It is also apparent that there was
only one person who signed for the first four III.
(4) heirs of Donny Ruedas and only one person
who signed in some of the heirs of Jose Febe
Nanaman in the Special Power of Attorney WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
executed in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PLACING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the THE RESIDENTIAL-COMMERCIAL LOT
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. OF PETITIONERS UNDER THE
COVERAGE OF AGRARIAN REFORM.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the
afore-quoted Resolution, but the said Motion was IV.
denied by the appellate court in another
Resolution21 dated 22 September 2006, which reads:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
After a careful evaluation of petitioners’ LRA, AND DARAB VIOLATED
arguments vis-à-vis public respondents’ PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
comment, We resolve to deny the instant TO DUE PROCESS BY DEPRIVING THEM
motion. OF THEIR INHERITANCE SHARES IN LOT
1407 WITHOUT IMPLEADING THEM AS
While litigation is not a game of INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AND
technicalities, and the rules should not be WITHOUT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON
enforced strictly at the cost of substantial THEM.
justice, still it does not follow that the Rules of
Court may be ignored at will and at random V.
to the prejudice of the orderly presentation,
assessment and just resolution of the issues.
Procedural rules should not be belittled or WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS
dismissed simply because they may have SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial LRA, AND DARAB VIOLATED SECTION 6,
RA 6657 – COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW, BY PLACING THE

35
 INDIVIDUAL INHERITANCE SHARES OF
PETITIONERS IN LOT 1407 WHEN THE
SAME IS WAY BELOW THE
LANDOWNER’S RETENTION LIMIT OF
FIVE (5) HECTARES [OR SEVEN (7)
HECTARES UNDER PD 27].
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
MAKING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTABLE ABSENCE
OF CONSENT, AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION, SHARING OF HARVESTS,
AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF A
LEGITIMATE TENANCY RELATIONSHIP.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REVIEWING [AND] OVERRULING
JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSIDERING
THAT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OVER ACTS OF THE EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BELONGS TO
THE JUDICIARY AND NOT VICE VERSA.
[VIII.]
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN REVIEWING AND
OVERRULING THE EARLIER JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION BY RTC BRANCH 4,
ILIGAN CITY, RE LOT 1407 PORTION
AFFECTED BY THE INTEGRATED BUS
TERMINAL [AND] BAGSAKAN MARKET.
[IX.]
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
EXPROPRIATING THROUGH AGRARIAN
REFORM LAND ALREADY JUDICIALLY
EXPROPRIATED FOR THE INTEGRATED
BUS TERMINAL AND BAGSAKAN
MARKET.22
The primary issue for resolution of this Court is
whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing outright petitioners’ Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00365, without considering the merits thereof.
In its assailed Resolution dated 13 July 2005, the
appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 on
several procedural grounds, among which was
petitioner’s failure to attach to their Petition the
duplicate originals or certified true copies of some of
36
their annexes, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals was mistaken in this regard.
It should be recalled that petitioners initiated before
the Court of Appeals, in its original jurisdiction, CA-
G.R. SP No. 00365, a Petition for Prohibition.
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court states the
requirements for a petition originally filed before the
Court of Appeals, relevant portions of which are
reproduced below:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of
non-compliance with requirements. –
xxxx
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible
copies together with proof of service thereof on
the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution,
or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto. The certification shall be
accomplished by the proper clerk of court or
by his duly authorized representative, or by
the proper officer of the court, tribunal,
agency or office involved or by his duly
authorized representative. The other requisite
number of copies of the petition shall be
accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of
all documents attached to the original.
Reference is also made to Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, particularly governing petitions for
prohibition, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. –
xxxx
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting
papers and documents accompanying a petition be
duplicate originals or certified true copies. What it
explicitly directs is that all petitions originally filed
before the Court of Appeals shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of
the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject
thereof. Similarly, under Rule 65, governing the
remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
petitions for the same need to be accompanied only by
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
questioned judgment, order or resolution.23Other
relevant documents and pleadings attached to such
petitions may be mere machine copies thereof.24 As to
petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No.
00365, the attached annexes that were not duplicate
originals or certified true copies, namely, Annexes
"V,"25 "W,"26 "HH,"27 "LL,"28 "NN,"29 "QQ,"30 "UU"31 and
"VV,"32 were mere supporting documents and pleadings
referred to in the petition and were not themselves the
judgments, orders or resolutions being challenged in
said Petition. At any rate, petitioners were able to
attach certified true copies of these annexes to their
Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their
Petition.
Another ground for which CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals was the alleged
failure by petitioners to provide an explanation as to
why the Petition therein was served upon adverse
parties by registered mail instead of personal service,
as required by Section 11, Rule 1333 of the Rules of
Court. To the contrary, petitioners provided such an
explanation,34 except that it was incorporated into the
main body of the Petition, right before the statement of
the Relief prayed for. It was clearly stated therein that:
EXPLANATION FOR SERVICE BY MAIL
Copies of this petition were served upon
respondents SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, LRA, DARAB, LBP, and counsels
of other respondents to save time and costs
considering the number of parties to be served
and the far distance of [the] LBP Office in
Cagayan de Oro City, the DAR/DARAB offices
in Diliman, Quezon City, and the LRA office
in East Ave. corner NIA Road, Diliman,
Quezon City.
The Court, however, agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy,
authorizing him to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping on their behalf,
was fatal to their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.
Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. –
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
37
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative sanctions.
In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition,
since the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by the company’s vice president
for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any
showing that he was authorized to do so.
Indeed, ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that
subsequent and substantial compliance of a petitioner
may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in
the interest of justice. But to merit the Court's liberal
consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause
justifying non-compliance with the rules and must
convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of
justice.36 Hence, deviation from the requirements of
verification and certification against forum shopping
may only be allowed in special circumstances.
In the present case, petitioners failed to provide the
Court with sufficient justification for the suspension or
relaxation of the rules in their favor. In their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 13 July 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, petitioners merely claimed that some
of them signed for their co-petitioners, while others
were at work so that they could not sign the SPA in
favor of Rodolfo Lonoy. Needless to say, the reason is
flimsy and unsatisfactory. That other petitioners were
at work does not make it impossible to secure their
signatures, only a little more inconvenient. It is not,
therefore, unreasonable for the Court to demand in this
case compliance with the requirements for proper
verification of the Petition and execution of the
certificate against shopping.
Furthermore, the Court takes note of another
procedural lapse committed by petitioners justifying the
dismissal of their Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00365, for it was the wrong remedy for them to
pursue.
According to Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
a petition for prohibition may be availed of under the
following circumstances:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. –
When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess
 of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the common
law, extraordinary in the sense that it is ordinarily
available only when the usual and ordinary proceedings
at law or in equity are inadequate to afford redress,
prerogative in character to the extent that it is not
always demandable of right, to prevent courts, or other
tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been
vested by law.37
The writ of prohibition, as the name imports, is one
which commands the person to whom it is directed not
to do something which, by suggestion of the relator, the
court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be
already done, it is manifest the writ of prohibition
cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative
act; and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to
suspend all action and to prevent any further
proceeding in the prohibited direction.38 Prohibition, as
a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already
a fait accompli.39
In this case, a close reading of the Petition for
Prohibition filed by the petitioners before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 would reveal that the
same is essentially more of an action for the
nullification of the allegedly invalid EPs and OCTs
issued in the names of private respondents. The writ of
prohibition is only sought by petitioners to prevent the
implementation of the EPs and OCTs. Considering that
such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had
become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time
petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005,
and may no longer be judicially reviewed.
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree
unequivocally provides:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value.
The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by such adjudication
or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a
petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one
38
year from and after the date of the entry
of such decree of registration, but in no
case shall such petition be entertained by the
court where an innocent purchaser for value
has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever
the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it
shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value. Upon the expiration of said period
of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant
or any other persons responsible for the
fraud.
In Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,40 the
Court affirmed the long-settled doctrine that
certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings
are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
judicial proceedings. In the case at bar, the DAR had
already issued the corresponding OCTs after granting
EPs to the tenant-beneficiaries in compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Section 10541 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. Hence, the OCTs issued
to petitioners pursuant to their EPs have already
acquired the same protection accorded to other
certificates of title issued judicially or administratively.
A certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of
the patent. Land covered by such title may no longer be
the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it
be decreed to another person.42
Private respondents’ EPs were issued in their favor on 1
August 2001 and their OCTs were correspondingly
issued and subsequently registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City on 21 September 2001 and 1
October 2001. Petitioners directly went to the Court of
Appeals, instead to the Regional Trial Court as
mandated by Section 32 of the Property Registration
Decree, to seek the nullification of the said EPs and
OCTs and only on 7 June 2005, or almost four (4) years
after the issuance and registration thereof. Petitioners
failed to vindicate their rights within the one-year
period from issuance of the certificates of title as the
law requires.
After the expiration of the one-year period, a person
whose property has been wrongly or erroneously
registered in another’s name may bring an ordinary
action for reconveyance,43 or if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives
petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action
for damages against those responsible for the
fraudulent registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION
(PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO
PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN
RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ,
JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO,
EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D.
FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES,
CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P.
NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and
GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN,
ELNORA R. RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON,
LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D.
SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA
ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO,
MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T.
MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A.
GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA,
HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B.
BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H.
PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S.
ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO,
VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS,
ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ,
LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA
S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C.
HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M.
USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY,
CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO,
FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO,
SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY,
GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D.
FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR.,
HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG,
DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H.
CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D.
CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA,
DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING,
VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V.
FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M.
LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B.
LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ.
NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN,
ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ,
MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P.
UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,1 dated
May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case
No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents
to take their physician’s oath and to register as duly
licensed physicians. Equally challenged is
the Resolution3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
39
The respondents are all graduates of the
Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila. They passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in
February 1993 by the Board of Medicine
(Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) then released their names
as successful examinees in the medical
licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that
the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two
most difficult subjects in the medical licensure
exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and
Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were
unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem
and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven
got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored
99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed
that many of those who passed from Fatima
got marks of 95% or better in both subjects,
and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A
comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The
Board observed that strangely, the unusually
high ratings were true only for Fatima
College examinees. It was a record-breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician
Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19,
withholding the registration as physicians of all the
examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine.4 The
PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity
marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure
Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr.
Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician
and authority in statistics, and later president of the
Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical
analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the
said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He
reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem
and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with
those of examinees from De La Salle University and
Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the
scores of Fatima College examinees were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each
other. He concluded that there must be some unusual
reason creating the clustering of scores in the two
subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate
the normal variations that one should expect from the
examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc."5
For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable
passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the
Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions."6
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman,
Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose
Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine
Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al.,
for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition
was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated
July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality,
dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with
the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It
recommended that the test results of the Fatima
examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm.
Case No. 1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil
Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory
injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the
petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene
V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls
of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of
the Decision ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the lower
court against petitioners is hereby nullified
and set aside.
SO ORDERED.7
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the
foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In
our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the
petition for failure to show reversible error on the part
of the appellate court.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the
pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial
conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then,
the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their
respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers.
This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to
appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial
was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that
petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the
witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed
a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her
non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination
of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The
trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to
adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration that followed on the ground that
40
adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days
prior to the hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from
proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents
herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order,
which the lower court granted in its Order dated April
4, 1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul
the Orders of the trial court dated November 13, 1993,
February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-
G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for
certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction is
GRANTED and the Orders of December 13,
1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994,
and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila, Branch
52, and all further proceedings taken by it in
Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The said RTC-
Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’ counsel
to cross-examine the respondents’ witnesses,
to allow petitioners to present their evidence
in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide
the case on the merits on the basis of the
evidence of the parties. Costs against
respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the
parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994,
the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of
the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,
and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-
66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the
proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court
granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled
hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21
and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals
denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R.
No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners
failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530.
Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court
ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-
examine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to
November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for
the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged
partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to
Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear.
Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and
declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for
decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its
judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
ordering the respondents to allow the
petitioners and intervenors (except those with
asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this
decision) [sic],9 to take the physician’s oath
and to register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is
without prejudice to any administrative
disciplinary action which may be taken
against any of the petitioners for such causes
and in the manner provided by law and
consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with
this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter
alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R.
No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be
nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-
66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and
Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed
their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals,
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and
118437 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The
petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise
DISMISSED on the ground that there is a
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M.
Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more
circumspect in her dealings with the courts as
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.12
41
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition
by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the
original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined
by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F.
Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza,
Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R.
Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat,
Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M.
Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo,
Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur
N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B.
Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula,
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita
Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos,
Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and
Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were
no longer interested in proceeding with the case and
moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and
motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I.
Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla,
Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P.
Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma.
Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A.
Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D.
Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo,
Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D.
Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C.
Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled
that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not
apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in
the decision appealed from, We hereby
AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant
appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate
court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with
all the statutory requirements for admission into the
licensure examination for physicians in February 1993.
They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled
the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,14 they
should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and
be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE
A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN
THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO.
112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF
APPEALS’ DECISION DECLARING THAT
IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO
THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES,
THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT
 AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE
SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE
THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY
LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL
FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME
DOCTORS.15
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals
commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the
judgment of the trial court that respondents are
entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will
not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ of
mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be
availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is
a ministerial and not a discretionary one. The
petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its
own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The
Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of
medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there
exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not
fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners
stress that this Court’s Resolution dated May 24, 1994
in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no showing
"that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment"
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that
our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final
and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993
licensure examinations for physicians, the petitioners
have the obligation to administer to them the oath as
physicians and to issue their certificates of registration
as physicians pursuant to Section 2016 of Rep. Act No.
2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
found that respondents complied with all the
requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore,
respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the
licensure examinations and had passed the same.
Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the
petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths
as physicians and register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of
law.17 Section 3 of Rule 6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of
mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
42
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or
(2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine
To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under
Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing
that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear
legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there
must be statutory authority for the performance of the
act,20 and the performance of the duty has been
refused.21 Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did
petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic
Oath and register respondents as physicians under the
Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on
the basis of the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-
appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully
complied with all the statutory requirements
for admission into the licensure examinations
for physicians conducted and administered by
the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14,
20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must be made of
the fact that all of them successfully passed
the same examinations.22
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that petitioners should allow the
respondents to take their oaths as physicians and
register them, steps which would enable respondents to
practice the medical profession23 pursuant to Section 20
of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section
20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the
petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer
the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them
as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory
construction that each part of a statute should be
construed in connection with every other part to
produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction
to only one section.24 The intent or meaning of the
statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as
a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision.
Accordingly, Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended should be read in conjunction with the other
provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the
petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer
the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them
as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of
the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of
1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration.
Thus, the petitioners "shall sign and issue certificates
of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied
with the requirements of the Board." In statutory
construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It
is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee
satisfies the requirements for the grant of his
physician’s license, the Board is obliged to administer to
him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant
to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical
Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case
call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements by the
respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most
difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr.
Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and
raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity,
of the tests. These doubts have to be appropriately
resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is
vested with the power to conduct administrative
investigations and "disapprove applications for
examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives
of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof.
In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed
before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the
respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness
to practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of Rep.
Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the
Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby
CANCELS the respondents[’] examination
papers in the Physician Licensure
Examinations given in February 1993 and
further DEBARS them from taking any
licensure examination for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR from the date of the promulgation of
this DECISION. They may, if they so desire,
apply for the scheduled examinations for
physicians after the lapse of the period
imposed by the BOARD.
SO ORDERED.28
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents
could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board
has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of
the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the
certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie
to compel performance of an act which is not duly
authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section
20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of registration
only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who
has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction
of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or
has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable
conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has
been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that
none of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are
informed that in Board Resolution No. 26,29 dated July
21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the
examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for
"immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the
Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations."
It likewise sought to cancel the examination results
obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College.
43
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among
others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine
in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn,
provides that the oath may only be administered "to
physicians who qualified in the examinations." The
operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as
"sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable
of dispelling doubt or ignorance."31 Gleaned from Board
Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently
did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed"
the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought
to nullify the examination results obtained by the
respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As
Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right
but to enforce one that has been established by law. If
no legal right has been violated, there can be no
application of a legal remedy, and the writ of
mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.32 There
must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the thing demanded.33 It is long established rule that a
license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise
granted by the government.34
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional
right35 of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.36 But like all
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police
power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the
people.37 Thus, persons who desire to engage in the
learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This
regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of
medicine, to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among
those who would practice medicine. In a previous case,
it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of
Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and
certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the
degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the
University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in
the Philippines, without first passing the examination
required by the Philippine Medical Act.38 In another
case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to
upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools
through admission tests.39
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to
regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its
agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner.
A political body that regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and
grant such privilege in accordance with certain
conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require
giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to
acquiring the license.40 Under the view that the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to
grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer,
courts will generally strike down license legislation that
vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business,
profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules
and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power.41
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are
provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which
prescribes the requirements for admission to the
practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for
the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a
physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied
with all the conditions and requirements imposed by
the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint
or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory,
then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be
demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing
that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have
been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the
writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of
Appeals should have dismissed the petition for
mandamus below for being premature. They argue that
the administrative remedies had not been exhausted.
The records show that this is not the first time that
petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No.
93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704,
which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals,
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,
the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order
of the trial court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-
66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not
order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our
consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos.
117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice
Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of
Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved
in the instant petition has been rendered
meaningless by an event taking place prior to
the filing of this petition and denial thereof
should follow as a logical consequence.42 There
is no longer any justiciable controversy so that
any declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.43 It should be recalled
that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the
trial court granted the writ of mandamus
prayed for by private respondents, which
decision was received by petitioners on 20
December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23
December 1994, petitioners filed the instant
petition. By then, the remedy available to
them was to appeal the decision to the Court
of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a
notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.44
44
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to
reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance
upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the
administrative and judicial remedies that respondents
herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the
Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable
judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be
unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the
Office of the President; and (c) should they still be
unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring
the case to court viaa special civil action of certiorari.
Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when
administrative remedies are still available.46 However,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of
law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may,
thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil
Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V.
Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo,
Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando
T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-
Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette
H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M.
Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa,
Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D.
Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario
Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-
Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla,
Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio,
Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P.
Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no
longer interested in proceeding with the case and
moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned.
A similar manifestation and motion were later filed by
intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L.
Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador,
Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G.
Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez,
Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C.
Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V.
Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas,
Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A.
Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M.
Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that
its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as
the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate
court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision
which is inapplicable to the aforementioned
respondents will similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B.
Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr.,
Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M.
Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe,
Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel
B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to
the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the
remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman,
Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B.
Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J.
Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr.,
Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana,
as well as the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision
dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated
December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering
petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to herein
respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25,
2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166097 July 14, 2008
BOARD OF MEDICINE, DR. RAUL FLORES (now
DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ), in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board, PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION, through its
Chairman, HERMOGENES POBRE (now DR.
ALCESTIS M. GUIANG), Petitioners,
vs.
YASUYUKI OTA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 849452 dated
November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated
October 19, 2003.4
The facts are as follows:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national,
married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in
the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated
from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21,
1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine.5 After
successfully completing a one-year post graduate
internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, he filed an application to take the medical
board examinations in order to obtain a medical license.
He was required by the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of
undertaking, stating among others that should he
successfully pass the same, he would not practice
medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists
between Japan and the Philippines in admitting
foreigners into the practice of medicine.6
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English
translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan
duly authenticated by the Consul General of the
45
Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes;7 thus, he
was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in
August 1992, which he subsequently passed.8
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of
the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied
respondent's request for a license to
practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that
the Board "believes that no genuine reciprocity can be
found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or
foreigner who can possibly practice there."9
Respondent then filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before
the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was
amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC
through its Chairman.10
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that
the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor
a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice
medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention
of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his
legitimate right to practice his profession in the
Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.11
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision
finding that respondent had adequately proved that the
medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to
be granted license and be admitted into the practice of
medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the
Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate
of Registration and license to respondent, as it was
shown that he had substantially complied with the
requirements under the law.12 The RTC then ordered
the Board to issue in favor of respondent the
corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license
to practice medicine in the Philippines.13
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case
to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted
documents showing that foreigners are allowed to
practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the
conditions for the practice of medicine there are
practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence,
reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the
PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice
of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence,
not compellable by a writ of mandamus.14
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC.15
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF
RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES
AND JAPAN.16
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established
by competent and conclusive evidence that reciprocity
in the practice of medicine exists between the
Philippines and Japan. While documents state that
foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan,
they do not similarly show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and
attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity
in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine in
Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply
with. There are also ambiguities in the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by
respondent, i.e., what are the provisions of the School
Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister
of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether
the academic and technical capability of foreign medical
graduates are the same or better than graduates of
medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify
to take the preparatory test for the National Medical
Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that
there had not been a single Filipino who was issued a
license to practice medicine by the Japanese
Government. The publication showing that there were
foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which
respondent presented before the Court, also did not
specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed
as practicing said profession.17 Furthermore, under
Professional Regulation Commission v. De
Guzman,18the power of the PRC and the Board to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, which power is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not
compellable by a writ of mandamus.19
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November
16, 2004 be reversed and set aside, that a new one be
rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8,
1993 which disallows respondent to practice medicine
in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before
the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit.20
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and
11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and
Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show
that reciprocity exists between the Philippines and
Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws
clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to
practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions as
long as the applicant meets the educational
requirements, training or residency in hospitals and
pass the licensure examination given by either country.
Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January 28,
1992 stated that "the Japanese Government allows a
foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after complying
with the local requirements." The fact that there is no
reported Filipino who has successfully penetrated the
medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is
no reciprocity between the two countries, since it does
not follow that no Filipino will ever be granted a
medical license by the Japanese Government. It is not
the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one of
the contracting countries can demand its application, it
is necessary that the interested citizen’s country has
previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of
the other contracting country.21 Respondent further
argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of
195922 indicates the mandatory character of the statute
and an imperative obligation on the part of the Board
inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, a
foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who successfully
passes the examination and has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter
of right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or
46
a physician’s license, which right is enforceable
by mandamus.23
Petitioners filed a Reply24 and both parties filed their
respective memoranda25 reiterating their
arguments.1avvphi1
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine
is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.26 It is a right that is earned through years
of education and training, and which requires that one
must first secure a license from the state through
professional board examinations.27
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to
the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements – i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school – for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state."28
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate
the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation
cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an
arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political
body which regulates the exercise of a particular
privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As
the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary
power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or
officer, courts will generally strike down license
legislation that vests in public officials discretion to
grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily
lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.29
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of
1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.-
Candidates for Board examinations shall have the
following qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of
any foreign country who has submitted competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his
country’s existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules
and regulations governing citizens thereof;
xxxx
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 22330 also provides in
Section (j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon
the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve
the registration of and authorize the issuance of a
certificate of registration with or without examination
to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his
country: Provided, That the requirement for the
registration or licensing in said foreign state or country
are substantially the same as those required and
contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that
the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on
the same basis and grant the same privileges as the
subject or citizens of such foreign state or country:
Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit
competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens
of the Philippines to practice the profession under the
rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. The
Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe
additional requirements or grant certain privileges to
foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the
same privileges are granted to or some additional
requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines
in acquiring the same certificates in his country;
xxxx
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a
copy of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of
the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2
and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner
must pass the national examination for medical
practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health
and Welfare.
xxxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical
Examination except persons who conform to one of the
following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical
courses at a university based on the School
Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and
graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for
the National Medical Examination and
practiced clinics and public sanitation more
than one year after passing the said test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign
medical school or acquired medical
practitioner license in a foreign country, and
also are recognized to have the same or more
academic ability and techniques as persons
stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article.31
Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners
Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine
therein, said document does not show that conditions
47
for the practice of medicine in said country are practical
and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the
requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to
comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two
countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license
to practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates
for the medical board examinations, merely requires a
foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to
practice medicine under the same rules and regulations
governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of
PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon
recommendation of the board, approve the registration
and authorize the issuance of a certificate of
registration with or without examination to a foreigner
who is registered under the laws of his country,
provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the
requirement for the registration or licensing in said
foreign state or country are substantially the same as
those required and contemplated by the laws of the
Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or
country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice
the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state
or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit
competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to
practice the profession under the rules and regulations
governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is
authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking
registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are
granted to or some additional requirements are
required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the
same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign
applicant must show that the conditions for the practice
of medicine in said country are practical and attainable
by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be
proven that a Filipino has been granted license and
allowed to practice his profession in said country before
a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in
the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A.
No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing
laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit
a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring
respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already
been granted license and is actually practicing therein
unduly expands the requirements provided for under
R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as
to the conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners
Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School
Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of Health
and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the
academic and technical capability of foreign medical
graduates are the same as or better than that of
graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can
actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the
National Medical Examination – respondent, however,
presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing
in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from
getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese
Government publication, Physician-Dentist-
Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a
number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in
Japan.32 He also presented a letter dated January 28,
1992 from Consul General Yabes,33 which states:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993,
concerning your request for a Certificate of
Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a
reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical
profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a
Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to inform you
that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare as well as
Bureau of Immigration yielded the following
information:
1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician
who was granted a license by the Japanese
Government to practice medicine in Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows
a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after
complying with the local requirements such as
holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking
the medical board exam, checking the
applicant's qualifications to take the
examination, taking the national board
examination in Japanese and filing an
application for the issuance of the medical
license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single
Filipino physician who was issued by the Japanese
Government a license to practice medicine, because it is
extremely difficult to pass the medical board
examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors
here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as
trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On
certain occasions, they are allowed to show their
medical skills during seminars for demonstration
purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
48
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese
Government allows foreigners to practice medicine
therein provided that the local requirements are
complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the
prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the
absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses and
practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of
passing the board examination in the Japanese
language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who
has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it
does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be
given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its
power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not
compellable by mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De
Guzman are different from those of the case at bar;
hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed
differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were
doubts about the integrity and validity of the test
results of the examinees from a particular school which
garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry
concerning the applicants’ satisfactory compliance with
the Board requirements.34 And as there was no definite
showing that the requirements and conditions to be
granted license to practice medicine had been
satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ
of mandamus may not be granted to secure said
privilege without thwarting the legislative will.35
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must
also appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and
the licensing authority.36
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 2037 of the Medical Act of
1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration.
Thus, the petitioners [PRC] "shall sign and issue
certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the
Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a
word of command. It is given imperative meaning.
Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for
the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged
to administer to him his oath and register him as a
physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section
22 of the Medical Act of 1959.38
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and
qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical
degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He
completed a one-year post graduate internship training
at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a
government hospital. Then he passed the Medical
Board Examinations which was given on August 8,
1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores
higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners
is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there
is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the
Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of
medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with
the said requirement and the CA has not committed
any reversible error in rendering its Decision dated
November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19,
2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
HABEAS CORPUS
G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIETTA NERI
ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all persons holding
the subject child ARABELA SOMBONG in their
custody, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Every so often two women claim to be the legitimate
parent of the same child. One or the other, whether for
financial gain or for sheer cupidity, should be an
impostor. The court is consequently called upon to
decide as to which of them should have the child's
lawful custody. This is the very nature of this case. The
child herein had considerably grown through the years
that this controversy had unbearably lagged. The
wisdom of the ages should be of some help, delicate as
the case considerably is. The earliest recorded decision
on the matter is extant in the Bible, I Kings 3. As it
appears, King Solomon in all his glory resolved the
controversy posed by two women claiming the same
child:
And the King said, Bring me a sword. And
they brought a sword before the King.
And the King said, Divide the living child in
two, and give half to the one, and half to the
other.
Then spoke the woman whose the living child
was unto the King, for her bowels yearned
upon her son, and she said, O my Lord, give
her the living child, and in no wise slay it. But
the other said, Let it be neither mine nor
thine, but divide it.
Then the King answered and said, Give her
the living child, and in no wise slay it: she is
the mother thereof. (1 Kings, Chapter 3,
Verses 25-27)
King Solomon's wisdom, was inspired by God:
And all Israel heard of the judgment which
the King had judged; and they feared the
49
King: for they saw that the wisdom of God
was in him, to do judgment. (Ibid, Verse 28)
We do resolve the herein controversy inspired by God's
own beloved King.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us seeks
the reversal of the decision1 of respondent Court of
Appeals2which had reversed the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court4 which granted the Petition
for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner.
The following facts were developed by the evidence
presented by the opposing parties:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who
was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal Village, Taguig,
Metro Manila.5 Some time in November, 1987, Arabella,
then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John
Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue, Kaloocan City, for
relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds.
Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the
hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Arabella could
not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner's
failure to pay the bill. Petitioner surprisingly gave
testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the
private respondents by installments in the total amount
of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that the sum payable
was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the
owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband,
Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella
to her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a
refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with
Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave
Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her, making it difficult
for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing
allegations, petitioner testified that she visited Arabella
at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This
time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for
their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years
thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to
lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf
ears.
Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged therein that Arabella was being
unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No. 121, First
Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. The petition was
denied due course and summarily dismissed,6 without
prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan
City.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City
against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit,
admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for some
time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from
the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in the presence of her
clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly
identified to be the child's guardian.
In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over
Arabella to her, she had sought the help of Barangay
Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan City, Mayor
Asistio of the same city, and even Congresswoman
Hortensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their efforts
to help availed her nothing.
On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner's complaint,
filed an information8 against the spouses Ty for
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City.9 On September
16, 1992, an order for the arrest of the spouses Ty was
issued in the criminal case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty
disclosed the possibility that the child, Arabella, may be
found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. The agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation went to said address and there found a
female child who answered to the name of Cristina
Grace Neri. Quite significantly, the evidence disclosed
that the child, Cristina, had been living with
respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When she
was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents
at the Sir John Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe
Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic and niece of
both Dra. Ty and respondent Alviar, called the latter up
to discuss the possibility of turning over to her care one
of the several abandoned babies at the said clinic.
Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose name
was unknown had long been abandoned by her parents
and appeared to be very small, very thin, and full of
scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and
her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care
of her. This baby was baptized at the Good Samaritan
Church on April 30, 1988. Her Certificate of
Baptism10 indicates her name to be Cristina Grace S.
Neri; her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her birthplace
to be Quezon City; and her foster father and foster
mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura Salacup,
respectively. Respondent Alviar was invited by the
National Bureau of Investigation for questioning on
September 22, 1992 in the presence of Dra. Ty and
petitioner. Cristina was also brought along by said
respondent. At that confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be
sure that Cristina was indeed petitioner's child,
Arabella. Neither could petitioner with all certainty say
that Cristina was her long lost daughter.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional
Trial Court11 of Quezon City. The trial court conducted
a total of eight (8) hearings, for the period, from October
28, 1992 to December 11, 1992. On January 15, 1993, it
rendered a decision granting the Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordering respondent Alviar to immediately
deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the
petitioner, the court having found Cristina to be the
petitioner's long lost child, Arabella.
The trial court, in justification of its conclusions,
discussed that:
On the issue of whether or not the minor
child, in question, is the daughter of the
petitioner, there seems to be no question, to
the mind of this Court, that the petitioner, is,
indeed, the mother of the child, registered by
the name of Arabella O. Sombong, per her
Certificate of Birth . . . and later caused to be
baptized as Cristina Grace S. Nery (sic) . . .
For, this child is the same child which was
delivered by the Sir John Clinic at Kalookan
50
City, owned by Dra. Carmen Ty, to Dra. Fe
Mallonga and later given to the custody of the
respondents. In fact, Dra. Carmen Ty, in her
testimony admitted that the petitioner is the
mother of Arabella . . .
On the question of whether or not the
petitioner has the rightful custody of the
minor child, in question, which is being
withheld by the respondents from her, as will
authorize the granting of the petition
for habeas corpus . . . there is no question that
the minor . . . is only about five (5) years old . .
. it follows that the child must not be
separated from the mother, who is the
petitioner, unless, of course, this Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Heretofore, under the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, the compelling reasons which
may deprive the parents of their authority or
suspend exercise thereof are stated. It was
then provided in Article 332, supra, that:
The courts may deprive the parents
of their authority . . . if they should
treat their children with excessive
harshness . . . or abandon them. . . .
(Emphasis supplied by the RTC)
Unfortunately, the foregoing article, which
was under Title XI, parental authority, was
expressly repealed by Article 254 of the
Family Code of the Philippines . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It can be seen, therefore, that the words "or
abandoned them" mentioned in Article 332 of
the New Civil Code . . . is (sic) no longer
mentioned in the amending (of) Art. 231 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
It is clear . . . that under the law presently
controlling, abandonment is no longer
considered a compelling reason upon the basis
of which the Court may separate the child
below seven (7) years old from the mother.
Conceivably, however, in paragraph 6 of
Article 231, supra, the effects of culpable
negligence on the part of the parent may be
considered by this Court in suspending
petitioner's parental authority over her
daughter, in question . . .
The question, therefore, is whether there is
culpable negligence on the part of the
petitioner so that her parental authority over
her child, in question, may at least be
suspended by this Court.
This Court is not persuaded that the
petitioner is guilty of culpable negligence vis-
a-vis her daughter, in question, upon the
bases of the facts adduced. For, there is no
question that from April, 1988 she kept on
demanding from Dra. Carmen Ty . . . the
 return of her child to her but the latter
refused even to see her or to talk to her.
Neither did Vicente Ty, the husband of Dra.
Carmen Ty, respond to her entreaties to
return her daughter.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, in the interim, while petitioner was
looking for her daughter, she made
representations for her recovery with
Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista, and
Mayor Asistio, all of Kalookan City, as well as
with Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke to
intervene in her behalf.
It cannot be said, therefore, no matter how
remotely, that the petitioner was negligent,
nay culpably, in her efforts for the recovery of
her daughter.
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the respondents have no right to
the parental authority of the child, superior to
that of the petitioner as they are not her
parents. They have, therefore, no right to the
custody of petitioner's daughter. The Sir John
Clinic, or Dra. Carmen Ty, have (sic) no right
to deliver the child, in question, to Dra. Fe
Mallonga. Neither had the latter the right
and the authority to gave (sic) the child to the
respondents, whose custody of petitioner's
daughter is, consequently, illegal.12
Herein private respondents filed an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the
following issues: (1) The propriety of the habeas
corpus proceeding vis-a-visthe problem respecting the
identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If
indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question,
what the effect would proof of abandonment be under
the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question
of the child's welfare be the paramount consideration in
this case which involves child custody.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court, ruling as it did that:
. . . the lower court erred in sweepingly
concluding that petitioner's child Arabella
Sombong and respondents' foster child
Cristina Neri are one and the same person to
warrant the issuance of the writ. . . .
As clearly stated in the facts of this case, not
even petitioner herself could recognize her
own child when respondents' foster child
Cristina Neri was presented to her before the
NBI and respondent court. Dr. Carmen Ty at
the NBI investigation could not also ascertain
whether or not Cristina Neri and petitioner's
missing child are one and the same person.
Before the lower court, petitioner-appellee
presented two physicians from the Sir John
Clinic, namely, Dr. Carmen Ty and Dr.
51
Angelina Trono to identify the child in
question. But both witnesses could not
positively declare that Cristina Neri is the
same missing child Arabella Sombong of
petitioner. Dr. Trono even declared in court
that there were other babies left in the clinic
and that she could not be certain which baby
was given to respondents (pp. 48-49, tsn, Nov.
10, 1992). . . . Petitioner, herself, could not
identify her own child, prompting the
respondent court to call for child Cristina Neri
to come forward near the bench for
comparison of her physical features with that
of her alleged mother, the petitioner (p. 32,
tsn, Nov. 5, 1992). After a comparison of
petitioner and Cristina Neri's physical
features, the lower court found no similarity
and to which petitioner agreed claiming that
said child looked like her sister-in-law (p.
33, id.). When the lower court instructed
petitioner to bring said sister-in-law in the
next hearing, petitioner stated they were not
on good terms (p. 34, id.) No one, therefore, up
to this time has come forward to testify as a
witness in order to positively identify
respondents' child Cristina Neri to be one and
the same as petitioner's missing child,
Arabella Sombong.
xxx xxx xxx
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus does
not lie in this case considering that petitioner
is not entitled to the custody of Cristina Neri
because she is not the mother of the said
child, and does not have the right to have
custody over said child.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not agree with the lower court that the
ground of abandonment of a child has been
repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for
abandonment can also be included under the
phrase "cases which have resulted from
culpable negligence of the parent" (par. 2, Art.
231 of the Family Code). What can be the
worst culpable negligence of a parent than
abandoning her own child. This court does not
believe petitioner-appellee's explanation that
she had been negotiating for the discharge of
her child for the past five years. That was too
long a time for negotiation when she could
have filed immediately a complaint with the
authorities or the courts . . .
As to the issue of the welfare of the child,
petitioner-appellee's capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life
appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower court
petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as
pauper as she had no fixed income. She also
admitted that she had no stable job, and she
had been separated from a man previously
married to another woman. She also confessed
that she planned to go abroad and leave her
other child Johannes to the care of the nuns.
The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is
certainly does not face a bright prospect with
petitioner-appellee.13
This prompted the petitioner to file this petition.
We do not find the petition to be meritorious.
While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who
has been separated from her daughter for more than
eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is
seeking, because the evidence in this case does not
support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth
and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there
sufficient evidence to support the finding that private
respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to
warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In
general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
"The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient."14
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ
of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that "except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty."
In the second part of the same provision,
however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where "the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." Thus, although the
writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again
that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own
free will.15
It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint
of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ
of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child.
The controversy does not involve the question of
personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to be
in the custody of someone until he attains majority age.
In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court
deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound
by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court
gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due
weight as a claim founded on human nature and
considered generally equitable and just. Therefore,
these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the
52
petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or
detention, as in the case of adults, but on the court's
view of the best interests of those whose welfare
requires that they be in custody of one person or
another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child
into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but
should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such
custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In
short, the child's welfare is the supreme consideration.
Considering that the child's welfare is an all-important
factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code16unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.17 In the same vein, the Family Code
authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so
demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental
authority over the child or adopt such measures as may
be proper under the circumstances.18
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the
writ in the instant case will all depend on the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2)
that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld
from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is
to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the
custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The
dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.
I
As to the question
of identity.
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the
minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed before
the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be
petitioner's daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced
before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion
that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be
remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the
question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to identity of
person.19 These presumptions may yield, however, to
the evidence proffered by the parties.
Identity may be thought of as a quality of a
person or thing, — the quality of sameness
with another person or thing. The essential
assumption is that two persons or things are
first thought of as existing, and that then the
one is alleged, because of common features, to
be the same as the other.20
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two
persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate
from each other, are indeed one and the same. The
process is both logical and analytical.
. . . it operates by comparing common marks
found to exist in the two supposed separate
objects of thought, with reference to the
possibility of their being the same. It follows
that its force depends on the necessariness of
 the association between the mark and a single
object. Where a certain circumstance, feature,
or mark, may commonly be found associated
with a large number of objects, the presence of
that feature or mark in two supposed objects
is little indication of their identity, because . .
. the other conceivable hypotheses are so
numerous, i.e., the objects that possess that
mark are numerous and therefore any two of
them possessing it may well be different. But
where the objects possessing the mark are
only one or a few, and the mark is found in
two supposed instances, the chances of two
being different are "nil" or are comparatively
small.
Hence, in the process of identification of two
supposed objects, by a common mark, the
force of the inference depends on the degree of
necessariness of association of that mark with
a single object.
For simplicity's sake, the evidential
circumstance may thus be spoken of as "a
mark." But in practice it rarely occurs that
the evidential mark is a single circumstance.
The evidencing feature is usually a group of
circumstances, which as a whole constitute a
feature capable of being associated with a
single object. Rarely can one circumstance
alone be so inherently peculiar to a single
object. It is by adding circumstance to
circumstance that we obtain a composite
feature or mark which as a whole cannot be
supposed to be associated with more than a
single object.
The process of constructing an inference of
identity thus consists usually in adding
together a number of circumstances, each of
which by itself might be a feature of many
objects, but all of which together make it more
probable that they co-exist in a single object
only. Each additional circumstance reduces
the chances of there being more than one
object so associated.21
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial
proof establishes the individual and separate existence
of petitioner's child, Arabella, from that of private
respondents' foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is
petitioner's own witness, testified in court that,
together with Arabella, there were several babies left in
the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was
Arabella or some other baby that was given to private
respondents. Petitioner's own evidence shows that,
after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987,
she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she
visited the clinic. This corroborates the testimony of
petitioner's own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was
physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to
April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in
her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in
the custody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this,
when juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of
private respondents that they obtained custody of
Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the
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Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the
conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself
a mother and the ponente of the herein assailed
decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993
primarily for the purpose of observing petitioner's
demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the
following personal but relevant manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself
of four children, wanted to see how petitioner
as an alleged mother of a missing child
supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri
would react on seeing again her long lost
child. The petitioner appeared in the
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she
walked inside the courtroom looking for a seat
without even stopping at her alleged
daughter's seat; without even casting a glance
on said child, and without even that tearful
embrace which characterizes the reunion of a
loving mother with her missing dear child.
Throughout the proceedings, the
undersigned ponente noticed no signs of
endearment and affection expected of a
mother who had been deprived of the embrace
of her little child for many years. The
conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself,
that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by
aforestated observation . . .22
The process of constructing an inference of identity
having earlier been explained to consist of adding one
circumstance to another in order to obtain a composite
feature or mark which as a whole cannot be supposed to
be associated with more than a single object, the
reverse is also true, i.e., when one circumstance is
added to another, and the result is a fortification of the
corporeality of each of the two objects the identity of
which is being sought to be established, the nexus of
circumstances correspondingly multiply the chances of
there being more than one object so associated. This is
the situation that confronts us in this case, and so the
inevitable but sad conclusion that we must make is that
petitioner has no right of custody over the minor
Cristina, because Cristina is not identical with her
missing daughter Arabella.
II
Private respondents
not unlawfully
withholding custody.
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established
by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be
said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over
Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the
validity of the mode by which private respondents
acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina. This
matter is not ripe for adjudication in this instant
petition for habeas corpus.
III
 Private respondents
have the interest of
the child Cristina at
heart.

We find that private respondents are financially,

physically and spiritually in a better position to take
case of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest
of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the
best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the
custody of petitioner, had the petitioner's custody rights
over Cristina been established. The Court of Appeals
gave the reason:

As to the issue of the welfare of the child,

petitioner-appellee's capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life
appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower court
petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as
pauper as she had no fixed income. She also
admitted that she had no stable job, and she
had been separated from a man previously
married to another woman. She also confessed
that she planned to go abroad and leave her
other child Johannes to the care of the nuns.
The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is
certainly does not face a bright prospect with
petitioner-appellee.23

In the light of the aforegoing premises, we are

constrained to rule that Habeas Corpus does not lie to
afford petitioner the relief she seeks.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30574 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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