Digests Midterms Consti

Araullo v.
President Aquino GR 209287 (July 01, 2014)
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
―Butch‖ Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year‘s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as ―savings‖ by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera People‘s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that ―no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.‖
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle ―no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law‖ (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
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III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending.
As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would
have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President‘s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there‘s no impoundment in the case at bar because
what‘s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made ―within their respective offices‖. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
Further, transfers ―within their respective offices‖ also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are ―savings‖
These DAP transfers are not ―savings‖ contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of ―savings‖ in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to ―savings‖ as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as ―savings‖ by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that
the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
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the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
Vinuya V. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230; April 28, 2010)
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the ―comfort women‖ stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan‘s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women‘s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners‘ claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
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RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners‘ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer ―to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.‖
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that ―the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‗the political‘–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.‖ are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners‘ cause would be inimical to our
country‘s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department‘s determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treaty‘s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be
given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim
on the individual‘s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
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or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural
or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they
have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of
municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an
erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term ―jus cogens‖ (literally, ―compelling law‖) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms
of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.

G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted
as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be
violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the
LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
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Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act
of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation. It is
undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA
Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning
other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the
Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or
theories arising from the various acts of the people.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for
specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present,
there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the
use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for
Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense,
military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or
simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement.
FACTS:
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandum to the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB), in compliance with the
verbal order of President Duterte to fulfill his election campaign promise to that effect.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the corresponding directives to the
Philippine Army Commanding General.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, various parties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, essentially arguing that the decision to have the remains of former President Marcos interred at
the LNMB violated various laws; that Marcos is not entitled to be interred at the LNMB; and that the Marcos
family has already waived such burial.
ISSUES:
1. Did the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws?
2. Have historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and
the decisions of the Court on the Marcos regime nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President
to internment at the LNMB?
3. Has the Marcos family waived the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB by virtue of their
agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as regards the return and internment of
his remains in the Philippines?
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RULINGS:
1. NO, the assailed memorandum and directive, being the President‘s decision, to bury Marcos at the
LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
1987 Constitution
Ocampo, et al. invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of
Art. XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted
as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing.
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade ―into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.‖
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision. The Court also found
the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution to be misplaced, with such
provisions bearing no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos‘ interment at the LNMB. The Court also found
no violation of President Duterte‘s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution to take necessary
and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
RA No. 289 (An Act Providing For the Construction of A National Pantheon for Presidents of the
Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the Country)
Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 289, which authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial
place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots, as well as
a Board on National Pantheon to implement the said law.
Ocampo, et al. are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to
provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one
and the same. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction
or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at
the moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, Ocampo, et al.'s allegations must fail. To
apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be
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violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the
LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
RA No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013)
Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 10368, modifiying AFP Regulations G-161-375, which they interpreted as
implicitly disqualifying Marcos‘ burial at the LNMB because the legislature, a co-equal branch of the
government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and
sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs).
International Human Rights Laws
Ocampo, et al. argued that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to ―full‖
and ―effective‖ reparation, provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
Combat Impunity.
When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution that
culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair share to
respect, protect and fulfill the country's human rights obligations.
The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect human rights and social justice. As to
judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo, and habeas data, the Supreme Court
promulgated AO No. 25-2007, which provides rules on cases involving extra-judicial killings of political
ideologists and members of the media. On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of
administrative and executive orders. Congress has passed several laws affecting human rights.
Contrary to Ocampo, et al.‘s postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve
of President Duterte, acting through the Enriquez, et al., to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether Ocampo, et
al. admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts
and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
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2. NO, Marcos remains to be qualified to be interred at the LNMB.
Under AFP Regulations G-161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to
include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary
(CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who
laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII
and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinternment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense; and g) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G-161-375 remains
to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB.
Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word
"bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the
LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a
military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein.
Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order
to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since
it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
Ocampo, et al. did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee.
For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, the Court may disregard Marcos as a President
and Commander-in-Chief, but the Court cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other
positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, the Court agreed with the proposition that
Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure
evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in
AFP Regulations G-161-375. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral
turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service. Despite ostensibly
persuasive arguments as to gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious
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military records, the 1986 popular uprising as a clear sign of Marcos‘ discharge from the AFP, the fact
remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. The
various cases cited by Ocampo, et al., which were decided with finality by courts here and abroad, have no
bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral
turpitude.
To the Court‘s mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a military person in the
AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting,
up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and
retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G-161-375. Hence, it
cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.
Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be
deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP
Regulations G-161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional
and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere
administrative regulation. It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the
people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically
given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To
do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people.
3. NO, the Marcoses are not deemed to have waived the former President‘s burial at the LNMB.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of
the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement
between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac,
Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements
entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for
specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present,
there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the
use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for
Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense,
military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or
simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement.
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Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over Ocampo, et al.'s highly disputed
factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses
Conclusion
In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check
and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's discretion is not
totally unfettered. "Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is
reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but
'canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."' At bar, President Duterte, through Enriquez, et al.,
acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates,
the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the
LNMB. For even the framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any
stage of a person's development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves
this earth.
There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do
so much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the
people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the
passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this issue rest.
Pork barrel case: Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa case digest
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term ―pork barrel‖, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative‘s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions
of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved in
project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (―GAA‖) called ―Support for Local
Development Projects‖ (―SLDP‖). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or ―hard projects‖ but also
covered ―soft projects‖ such as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was revived
through the ―Mindanao Development Fund‖ and the ―Visayas Development Fund‖.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed ―Countrywide Development Fund‖ (―CDF‖). The CDF was meant to
cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify
any kind of project from ―hard projects‖ such as roads, buildings and bridges to ―soft projects‖ such as
textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first
time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (―CIs‖) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the
CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the representative of
the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members of
Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (―PDAF‖) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior
consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental organizations in
the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also
allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of
funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (―PSF‖).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (―PD‖) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (―PAGCOR‖), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed
and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the government
in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly went
into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation detailing
the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization are
currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or
annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The ―moot and academic principle‖ cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system
presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the ―Pork Barrel System‖ is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was
a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that the
authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by individual members of
Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the ―
regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They
even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines (a)
how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‗s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation.
This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President‗s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‗s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for
local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various
Local Development Councils (―LDCs‖) which are already legally mandated to―assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development
efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that ―No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law‖, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and
all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount:
[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.
 The phrase ―and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President‖ under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‗s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of ―priority infrastructure development projects‖ and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of ―infrastructure‖ is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility.
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita
655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the
third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February
1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as ―archipelagic‖ waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country‘s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a ―regime of islands‖ pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or
lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty‘s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended
by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it
covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as ―archipelagic waters‖ and that we may term it as our ―internal waters‖,
but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself
recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of
their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly‘s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of
islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines
of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be
enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation
should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al .
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‗s policy of pursuing peace negotiations
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the
MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and
decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were
held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect;
and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of
the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The
latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and
finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as
mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the
Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.
HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a
―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure
under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section
28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people‗s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the
effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot
revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say
that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until
there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as
an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people‗s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information
and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a
species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for
the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and
process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is
a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people‗s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive
peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles
important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different
contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes
―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‗s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O.
No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate ―continuing‖ consultations, contrary to
respondents‘ position that plebiscite is ―more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates
the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the
National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal
forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the
peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners‘ right to be
consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the
BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government
under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the
specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a
general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in
paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in
the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative
relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD
– by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context,
that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative in
the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‗s capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‗s
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‗s right to participate in
Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and
sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted
by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‗s provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as
it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD
on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section
18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of
the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned
earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the
BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is
to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
he MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that
the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
Tanada v. Angara
Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent
authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14,
1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII, providing for the ―Filipino first‖ policy.
Issue
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a ―self-
reliant and independent national economy‖ does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither ―economic seclusion‖ nor ―mendicancy in the international
community.‖
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it ―a part
of the law of the land‖. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It
presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive
agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the
absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out
the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor
"mendicancy in the international community." The WTO reliance on "most favored nation", "national
treatment", and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity, that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy
based on "equality and reciprocal", the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the
best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire
When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its
sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." Under Article 2 of the UN Charter,
"(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action." Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many
other international pacts — both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine
sovereignty the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is
the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to
the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments
under WTO-GATT. The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations."
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil
exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration
well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two
individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed
by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual
representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed
their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of
the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme
Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was
moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is ―not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.‖ Id., p. 12. Due to the
alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that
the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case
even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1)
whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether
the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical persons,
even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence ―moves towards simplification of
procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.‖ Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained,
―the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.‖ Id., p.
16-17.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the
contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and
reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not
reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In
order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an
environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before
any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is
a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law
passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon
Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel ―to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.‖ On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is ―a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.‖ Specifically, it is ―a party‘s
personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result‖ of
the act being challenged, and ―calls for more than just a generalized grievance.‖ However, the rule on
standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of
the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the ―public right‖ of citizens to ―a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.‖ We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only
do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so
in representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against
the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over
the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception
to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter‘s internal waters and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the
provisions of this Conventionor other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. A foreign warship‘s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage
to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the ―traditional uses of the
oceans‖ as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that ―the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS‖ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and
deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,‖ pointing out that such ―has nothing to do with its the
US‘ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.‖
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio‘s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear ―international responsibility‖ under Art. 31 in connection with
the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country‘s efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by
its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to
cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of
UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the
said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the
latter‘s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or
any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection
Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule
Facts: Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-
intervention. The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise
on involuntary servitude. its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection Power of Judicial Review
of the law. Actual Case or Controversy
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. Facial Challenge
The RH Law is ―void-for-vagueness‖ in violation Locus Standi
of the due process clause of the Constitution. Declaratory Relief
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of One Subject/One Title Rule
one‘s family protected by the Constitution
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive
Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the: PROCEDURAL:
Right to life Whether the Court can exercise its power of
Right to health judicial review over the controversy.
Freedom of religion and right to free speech Actual Case or Controversy
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Facial Challenge
Freedom of expression and academic freedom Locus Standi
Due process clause Declaratory Relief
Equal protection clause One Subject/One Title Rule
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched
to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one‘s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one‘s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that ―the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.‖
One Subject-One Title: The ―one title-one subject‖ rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule ―so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.‖ The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be
―so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act.‖
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question
of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But
certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s),
usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed
that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: ―The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.‖
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of ―conception‖
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources
also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) ―conception‖ to refer to the moment of ―fertilization‖
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word ―or‖ in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother‘s womb. The RH Law recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term ―primarily‖. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that ―primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother‘s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother‘s womb‖ (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term ―primarily‖, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of
a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered ―mandatory‖ only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are ―safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective‖.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one‘s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section
3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of
families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: ―The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.‖ In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads ―in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures‖ is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is ―non-surgical procedures.‖
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be
made in life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated
a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development
of their children with the use of the term ―primary‖. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of ―private health care service provider‖ must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a ―public health service provider‖. The ―private health care institution‖ cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to ―private health care service provider.
The terms ―service‖ and ―methods‖ are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering
of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH
service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines ―incorrect information‖. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
―incorrect‖ and ―knowingly‖ connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government‘s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the
poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section
14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides
the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine
if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient
that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an ―as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after
all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both ―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖ are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between ―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖ which bears to
the attainment of the goal of achieving ―sustainable human development‖ as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier ―primarily‖ in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines)
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 & 209430 (December 8, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines
The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating an administrative order
governing import and release of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court
addressed a range of issues, from standing and mootness to application of the precautionary principle. On
the procedural claims by the petitioners that the case was moot and ―academic‖ because all field trials had
been suspended, the Supreme Court found the paramount public interest in the case and the fact that the
legal issues were capable of repetition yet evading review justified the Court‘s review of the case. Page
38. The Court also noted the petitioners were warranted in seeking judicial review because the
biotechnology administrative framework does not provide ―a speedy, or adequate remedy.‖ Page 40.
The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular, genetically-modified food crops
for human consumption. Drawing on research and case studies from around the world, and the testimony
of expert witnesses, the Supreme Court found there to be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to
humans and the environment, stating ―[t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the continuing
international debate on GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of GM technology by states . . . .‖
Page 69. The Court also cautioned that the ―uncertainties generated by conflicting scientific findings or
limited research [are] not diminished by extensive use at present of GM technology in agriculture.‖ Page
70.
Turning to the existing biosafety regulation in the Philippines, the Supreme Court found Administrative
Order (DAO) 08-2002 deficient because it lacks provisions for meaningful, participatory, and transparent
public consultation prior to field trials and contains no mechanisms requiring applicants seeking to import or
release GMOs to comply with international biosafety standards. Pages 89-91. The Court also found that
officials should have complied with environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures prior to approving
release of Bt talong. Pages 91-92.
Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field trials of Bt talong until
regulatory systems governing the import and release of GMOs are strengthened. ―When these features -
uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for
the precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.‖ Page 100. The Court proceeded to nullify DAO
08-2002 and enjoined applications for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and
importation of any GMOs until a new administrative order is adopted. Page 102.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System
FACTS: This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ or lacking in ―well-
defined political constituencies.‖ It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack ―well-defined political constituencies‖ include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ―marginalized and
underrepresented‖ must belong to the ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack ―well-defined political
constituencies‖ must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the ―marginalized and underrepresented,‖ or that represent those who lack ―well-defined
political constituencies,‖ either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there‘s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory
prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ and to
those who ―lack well-defined political constituencies.‖
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that
the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
―marginalized and underrepresented‖ or for parties who lack ―well-defined political constituencies‖. It is also
for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack ―well-
defined political constituencies‖. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not
have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts
but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as ―marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies‖ as they
are ideologically marginalized.
Veterans Federation Party Vs. Comelec

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list
representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to
promote ―proportional representation‖ in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system
to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have ―additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes.‖
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise ―twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list.‖ We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by
law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the
number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
——– x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under
all circumstances? Our short answer is ―No.‖
Gamboa Vs. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
WILSON P. GAMBOA Vs. FINANCE SECRETARY TEVES
I. THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific
Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a
shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares
(or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the
this sale, First Pacific‘s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the
petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
II. THE ISSUE
Does the term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only,
or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, or in
the instant case, to the total common shares of PLDT.]
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
The term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares [of PLDT].
xxx xxx xxx
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of
directors that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as
common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of
the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. xxx.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term ―capital‖ shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
directors. In short, the term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock that can vote in the election of directors.
xxx xxx xxx
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned ―capital‖ required in the Constitution.
Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the
voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock
must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the
corporation is ―considered as non-Philippine national[s].‖
xxx xxx xxx
To construe broadly the term ―capital‖ as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common
and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the ―State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.‖ A broad
definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to
control of the public utility.
We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term ―capital.‖ Let us assume that a
corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares
owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso (P1.00) per share. Under the
broad definition of the term ―capital,‖ such corporation would be considered compliant with the 40 percent
constitutional limit on foreign equity of public utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999
percent, of the total outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.
In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the election of
directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001
percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999
percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence, have no control over the public
utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of
the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the
State policy of an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in the present
case.
xxx xxx xxx
[O]nly holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors [of PLDT], meaning only common
shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no voting
rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDT‘s Articles of
Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred
shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares
of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT‘s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to
be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common
shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold
64.27% of the total number of PLDT‘s common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a
majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT.
Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public
utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
As shown in PLDT‘s 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00
per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares
have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends
of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own
only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the
authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that
beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares,
blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership in a public utility.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the
State‘s grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares
earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership of a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the
dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution that ―[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.‖
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises
the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only
35.73% of PLDT‘s common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise
control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred
shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par
value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of
PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery
of the Constitution.
Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock market
value of P2,328.00 per share, while PLDT preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per share have a
current stock market value ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share, is a glaring confirmation by the
market that control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the common shares, not with the preferred
shares.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term ―capital‖ in Section 11, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in
the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-
voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission
is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term ―capital‖ in determining the extent of allowable foreign
ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

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Araullo v.

President Aquino GR 209287 (July 01, 2014)

Vinuya V. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230; April 28, 2010)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

International Human Rights Laws

HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

PORK BARREL MISUSE

(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy

(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated

(c) Checks and balances

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Second issue: YES.

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

Third issue: NO.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

Veterans Federation Party Vs. Comelec

II. THE ISSUE

III. THE RULING

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