!

I.

On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Xerxes was cruising in a Colt Galant sedan
along Quezon Avenue. Upon reaching the intersection his car collided with a Toyota Corona owned and driven
by Gregorio who was then executing a U-turn when the accident occurred.

The collision flung the Corona twenty (20) meters southward from the point of impact causing it to land atop
the center island Quezon Avenue. The Galant stopped in the middle of Quezon Avenue, facing the direction of
Quiapo, leaving its left rear about four (4) meter past the Corona's right front side. The principal points of
contact between the two (2) cars were the Galant's left front side and the Corona's right front door including
its right front fender.

Prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property, Xerxes argued that it is a rule that
motorist crossing a thru-stop street has a right of way over the one making U-turn and so Gregorio has to
stop and allow him to pass. Xerxes admitted that he saw the car of Gregorio making a U-turn but could not
avoid collision by the mere application of the brakes but still the same, Gregorio is guilty of contributory
negligence in making a swift U-turn. Is Xerxes contention correct?

G.R. No. 125134 January 22, 1999

XERXES ADZUARA y DOTIMAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

No, Xerxes contention is not correct.

It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner's post-collision behavior serves only as means to emphasize the
finding of negligence which is readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the
car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes. Negligence is the
want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require.

It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn. But if the person
making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the
person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen
the Martinez car. He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance
to avoid the accident which he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the assumption that he was
negligent, the other party was also guilty of contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. The negligence of
Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.

II.

On May 14, 1972, a storm hit the town of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing on
an elevated ground along the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission line
of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire
was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the
fallen banana plants.

The following morning, barrio captain Luciano saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the people in
the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He then saw Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala
Electric Plant near the place and notified him of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter said he
could not do it and instead, he is going to look for a linesman.

After the 2 men left the area, a 3 year old boy, whose house was just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken wire was and got in contact with it. He was electrocuted and subsequently
died. The broken wore was only fixed after the electrocution incident. Suud for damages, the power plant
interposed the defense that the proximate cause of the boy’s death is the parents’ negligence in not properly
taking care of their son.

G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI and FIDEL H. SAYNES

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the
Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there
were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high
and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who,
with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered
by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the
electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the
storm of May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they
did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection
of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident
because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same
posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of
the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.

It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly
taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby
place cut wire was very near the house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might
mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the
proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to
 !2

life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees
and which could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the
child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning
where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner
but does not exempt him from liability.

Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180. The negligence
of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise
supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper defense
for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of
the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their
work.

III.

Vivencio Sto. Domingo died in 1971 and was buried in a lot in the North Cemetery. The lot was leased to his
widow Irene Sto. Domingo until 2021. However, apart from the receipt issued by the City for the rental of the
lot, there were no other records stating the term of the lease. In 1978, the Mayor of Manila, believed in good
faith that the lease in favor of Irene Sto. Domingo was covered by Administrative Order NO. 5, Series of 1975
which provided for the lease of the burial lots only for a period of 5 years. Thinking that the lease in favor of
Sto. Domingo had already terminated by this time, the mayor certified that the lot in which Vivencio was
buried was ready for exhumation. In accordance with this certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery
exhumed the remains of Vivencio and put them in a bag which was then stored in a bodega. The lot was then
leased to another party. During All Saints Day, Irene Sto. Domingo and her family were shocked to find that
the lot no longer had the stone marker which they placed in the tomb. When she asked what happened to the
remains of her husband, she was told to look for them in the bodega. Aggrieved, Irene Sto. Domingo filed a
claim for damages against the City of Manila, the city health officer, and the person in charge of the cemetery.
Is the City of Manila liable? Explain.

G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA and EVANGELINE SUVA vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO

Yes, the City of Manila is liable.

The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board
of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health
Officer, the order and police of the, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification
of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore
prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery
through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore,
there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee
remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if
no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for
50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer
of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner City of
Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of
lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated
March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the
lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.

IV.

Aquilino drove C.O.L. Realty Corporation’s Toyota Latis, crossing Katipunan Ave. towards Rajah Matanda St.,
Quezon City, is prohibited by the MMDA. While thus crossing, a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert and driven
by Rodel rammed into the sedan, damaging its right rear door and fender, including a passenger Estela.

Rodel was indicted for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. The company then demanded
reimbursement from Lamberto for the repair of the sedan and hospitalization of Estela. Demand remained
unheeded, a case was filed in the MTCC for damages based on quasi-delict. Lamberto argued that he is not
liable since it was the negligence of Aquilino in crossing the intersection which is the proximate cause of the
accident. Aquiline crossed the street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon. Can the corporation claim
damages against Lamberto?

LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

NO. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:

Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
 !3

proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his
own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the
third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which
complaint is made.

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah
Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident,
and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident
would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a
prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-
Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome
or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory
negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he
may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondents’
liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.

V.

On July 9, 1989 at around 7:00 P.M. along the Olongapo-Gapan Road in the vicinity of barangay Cabetican,
Bacolor, Pampanga, Alberto was driving his Ford Fiera with ten (10) passengers. They came from the Manila
International Airport bound to Dinalupihan, Bataan.

One of the vehicles tire suddenly hit a stone lying in the road, while thus cruising, which caused the appellant
to lose control and collide with the rear of an improperly parked cargo truck trailer driven by Rolando. As a
result of the collision, five (5) passengers suffered varying degrees of injuries.

In his direct examination, Alberto admitted that he saw the trailer at a distance of about 6 meters but at the
same time stated that the distance of the focus of the vehicle’s headlight in dim position was 20 meters. On
cross-examination, he said that he saw the trailer only when he bumped it. What is the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision? Explain.

G.R. No. 133323. March 9, 2000

ALBERTO AUSTRIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Alberto’s negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.

Petitioner faults respondent court for its failure to appreciate and give credence to his testimony that when the accident
occurred, the petitioner was driving along the Olongapo-Gapan road on the lane properly belonging to him and driving at a
moderate speed. Petitioner cites the case of Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
353 (1987), which he alleges, contains a set of almost identical facts. Further, he claims that the other driver's negligence
in parking his vehicle caused the collision. He asserts that the truck driver, Rolando Flores, negligently parked his trailer
truck with the rear end protruding onto road, without any warning device. This being so, he should not be held responsible
for Flores' negligence.

In his direct examination, the Alberto admitted that he saw the trailer at a distance of about six (6) meters but at the
same time stated that the distance of the focus of the vehicle's headlight in dim position was twenty (20) meters. These
inconsistent statements, taken together with his claim on cross-examination that he saw the trailer only when he bumped
it, only show that he was driving much faster than thirty (30) kilometers per hour. Assuming that he was driving his
vehicle at that speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour, Alberto would have not lost control of the vehicle after it hit the
stone before the collision. Under these circumstances, Alberto did not exercise the necessary precaution required of him.
He was negligent.

While we note similarities of the factual milieu of Phoenix to that of the present case, we are unable to agree with
petitioner that the truck driver should be held solely liable while the petitioner should be exempted from liability.
In Phoenix, we ruled that the driver of the improperly parked vehicle was liable and the driver of the colliding car
contributorily liable. We agree with the respondent court in its observation on the petitioners culpability: "That he had no
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opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and [this] should not relieve him of liability." Patently, the
negligence of the petitioner as driver of the Ford Fiera is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.

VI.

On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a
motorcycle traveling the East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him
at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two
(2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts
each, on both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was not well lighted.

At some point on the road, Reynaldo crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer,
which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, he sustained head injuries and upon arrival at the hospital,
Reynaldo was declared dead on arrival.

During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights or license plates. Instead, what were
installed were two pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and one pair of lights in front of the truck. But,
despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, the truck was visible in the highway and it was travelling
at approximately 20 to 30kph. What is the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo? Explain.

[G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999]

EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA vs. FREDDIE
HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA

Reynaldo’s negligence was the proximate cause of his own death.

We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the Reynaldo. Traveling behind the truck, he had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the
prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.

It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle
has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the
driver of the rear vehicle.

Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle
into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.

VII.

In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, Noe was going home

to Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney driven by
Geminiano, owned by Cecilia, and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera.
From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full,
Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Nio, San
Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and 14, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the
right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned by petitioner and
driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where
Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed Noe against the Fiera crushing his
legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. He was brought to the hospital where his lower left leg was
amputated.

Police investigation reports showed that Noe was one of the 11 passengers of the Fiera who suffered
injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to pick up a passenger, the cargo truck bumped the rear left portion of
the Fiera; that only one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the road. A sketch
of the accident was drawn by investigator Mateo Rubia showing the relative positions of the two vehicles,
their distances from the shoulder of the road and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck
measuring about 48 feet.

a. What is the proximate cause of the incident? Why?

b. Who is/are guilty of contributory negligence, if any? Explain.

LARRY ESTACION vs. NOE BERNARDO

GR No. 144723

a. The trial court and the appellate court had made a finding of fact that the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by respondent Noe was the negligent and careless driving of petitioner’s driver, Gerosano, who was driving at a
fast speed with a faulty brake when the accident happened.

The truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was really driving at a speed of 40 kilometers per
hour and considering that the distance between the truck and the Fiera in front was about 10 meters, he had
more than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to avoid hitting the Fiera. However, from the
way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it showed that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed
because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch of police investigator Rubia of the tire marks
visibly printed on the road.
 !5

The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on the sketch report, there was only one
tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during the incident which meant that the brakes of the truck were
not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. Indeed, it is the negligent act of
petitioners driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate
cause of respondent Noe’s injury.

b. Noe, Geminiano, Cecilia, Gerosano and Larry.

Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. It has been established by the testimony of respondent Noe that he
was with four or five other persons standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. Noe’s act of
standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act
could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. Noe’s act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his
life and limb.

Geminiano, the Fiera driver, was also negligent. There is merit to petitioners claim that there was overloading
which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Noe himself had testified that he was standing at the rear
portion of the Fiera because the Fiera was already full. Geminiano should not have taken more passengers than
what the Fiera can accommodate. If the Fiera was not overloaded, respondent Noe would not have been standing
on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury. Geminiano was also negligent in allowing
respondent Noe to stand on the Fiera’s rear portion. The act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear
portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates undue risk of harm to Noe.

Since respondent Geminiano is negligent, there arises a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer,
Cecilia, in supervising her employees properly. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Cecilia. Thus, third
party complaint filed by petitioner against respondents Geminiano and Cecilia should be granted.

As the employer of Gerosano, Larry is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Larry is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law
and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who at the time was acting within the
scope of his assigned task, only if he can show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. We find that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees. Moreover, there was also no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining his
cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition.

Turning now to the award of damages, since there was contributory negligence on the part of Noe, the liability of
Geminiano, Cecilia, Larry and Gerosan should be mitigated since Noe is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be
held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

VIII.

Noble worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. A trail leading to Sangilo,
Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. Sagging and
dangling high-tensioned electronic transmission lines of the NPC traversed the trail, reducing their distance
from the ground to only about eight to ten feet.

The leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety
measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. In a letter, NPC said that
it had installed nine additional poles and identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from
its deteriorating lines to the ground.

On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo
poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried
one pole horizontally on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer
pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission
lines on their way to their work place.

As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he
heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter
was already dead.

After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging transmission lines and put
up warning signs around the area.

NPC contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the
victim’s death especially because the victim did not suffer extensive burns. Instead, it was Noble’s negligent
carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the
bamboo pole he was carrying touch the high tension wires. This is especially true because other people
traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted. NPC also faults the people in engaging in pocket
mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.

Who is negligent in this case? Why?

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN

 !6

G.R. No. 165969

NPC is negligent.

NPC contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the victim’s death. Instead, it
was Noble’s negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he
allowed the bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is especially true because other people
traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted.

The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by
petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted. NPC
cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim.

We find no contributory negligence on Nobles part. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used
by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives
should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.

A violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the
very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. That the pocket miners were
unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling.

IX.
Define the following terms:

a. Res Ipsa Loquitor literally means that the thing speaks for itself. It means that where the thing which
causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose form want
of care.

b. Damnum absque injuria means that a person may have suffered physical hurt or injury, but for as long as
no legal injury or wrong has been done, there is no liability. The legitimate exercise of a person’s right, even
if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury.

c. Emergency Rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, If he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his negligence.

d. Volenti Non Fit Injuria means that one is not legally injured if he has consented to the act complained of
or was willing that it should occur.

X.

Diego, driver of BLT Bus Co., drove the bus recklessly and injured Dora, a pedestrian. Dora then sued BLT Bus
Co. for damages. The bus company is liable either under the RPC or the New Civil Code. Explain and
distinguish the liability and the defenses that may be interposed.

Answer: Under the RPC, the bus company is merely subsidiarily liable to Dora. Dora mist therefore proceed against Diego
criminally. She may allow the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the criminal case or she may reserve her right to
institute a civil action separately. If Diego is convicted but is insolvent, the bus company is subsidiarily liable. The defense
of the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not
available to the bus company.

Under the NCC, the bus company is directly and primary liable to Dora. The negligence of Diego is disputably
presumed to be the negligence of the bus company. Dora, therefore, may proceed against the company alone. The basis
will be quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The defense of the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is available to the bus company. In such a case, the presumption of negligence
on the part of the company has been overcome.

XI.
Fernando and Herminia Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Ronald Mark and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin
(Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners. In view of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties,
the property owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sp s.
Vergara (Vergara Property).
When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they raised the height of the partition wall
and caused the construction of their house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such
that a portion thereof became part of the wall of the master’s bedroom and bathroom.6
Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by filling it with gravel,
earth, and soil. As a result, the level of the Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin
Property by a third of a meter. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara
Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the
paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining
wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the same went
unheeded.7 Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed a complaint for damages
 !7

Taking into consideration the law on easement and the provision of the National Building Code:
a. What is the proximate cause of the damage to the bedroom of the Sps. Sonkin? Why?
b. Who is liable for said damage?
G.R. No. 193659 June 15, 2015
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is
legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision
refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the
higher estates water which naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected
artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters.
In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments
to their property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the
easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby
violating the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof which reads:
Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to
the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the
act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall back and causing
cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former (Sps. Sonkin) is nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for
not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for disregarding the
legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in
their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code,38 they are only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
XII.
On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers figured in a mishap along the
National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from
the accident, while his companions Allan Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma suffered injuries.
Complainant Allan alleged that while they were traversing the national highway at around 9:00 in the
evening, when they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire dangling from one of the electric
posts owned by Cagayan Elec. Co. (CAGELCO). He claimed that because of a strong wind that blew, they got
wound by said dangling wire. He contended that the mishap was due to CAGELCO’s negligence when it failed
to fix and change said live tension wire despite being immediately informed by residents in the area that it
might pose an immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along the national highway.
The doctor who attended to the victims testified that the abrasions of Allan were caused by pressure when
the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but she is uncertain as to whether a live electric wire could
have caused them. She further said that she did not find any electrical burns on Allan. As with Camilo, she
found abrasions and hematoma on his body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to strangulation." She also opined that the strangulation could have been caused by an electric
wire entangled around Camilo’s neck.
It was also established during the trial that the electric poles along the highways, including the one where
the mishap took place, were erected about four to five meters from the shoulder of the road and that after the
typhoons hit Cagayan, employees of CAGELCO, after checking the damage to electric lines, rolled the fallen
electric wires and placed them at the foot of the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to pedestrians and
vehicles passing by.
The Police Blotter stated, among others:
ACCIDENTALLY TRAPPED BY A PROTRUDING CAGELCO WIRE AT THE SHOULDER OF THE ROAD WHILE THEY
WERE BOUND TO STA TERESITA FROM APARRITHIS PROVINCE DUE TO THE OVER SPEED OF MOTOR VEHICLE
THE WIRE STRANGLED THE NECK OF THE VICTIMS WHICH CAUSED THE INSTANTANEOUS DEATH OF THE
DRIVER, CAMILOTANGONAN AND ABRASIONS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY OF THE TWO OTHER
VICTIMS
The lower court dismissed the complaint against CAGELCO. Was the dismissal proper?
G.R. No. 199886 December 3, 2014
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE TANGONAN
YES. CAGELCO IS NOT NEGLIGENT.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Article 2176
of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages
to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
 !8

The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate incident brought about the death of Camilo and
physical injuries to Rapanan. This Court, however, finds that the second and third elements are lacking thus precluding the
award of damages in favor of respondents. Adviento, petitioner’s employee testified that their electric poles along the
highways, including the one where the mishap took place, were erected about four to five meters from the shoulder of the
road. Another employee of petitioner, Rasos, testified that after the typhoons hit Cagayan, he together with his co-
employees, after checking the damage to the electric lines, rolled the fallen electric wires and placed them at the foot of
the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to pedestrians and vehicles passing by. Their testimonies were corroborated by
what was recorded in the Police Blotter of the Buguey Police Station, Buguey, Cagayan after SPO2 Tactac investigated on
the incident.
Thus, there is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was allegedly the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and
Rapanan’s injuries. From the testimonies of petitioner’s employees and the excerpt from the police blotter, this Court can
reasonably conclude that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far
enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if
the victims of the mishap were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle careened towards the
shoulder or even more likely, since the police found the motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the three
passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and caught up with the wires. As to how that
happened cannot be blamed on petitioner but should be attributed to Camilo’s over speeding as concluded by the police
after it investigated the mishap.
The motorcycle was probably running too fast that it lost control and started tilting and sliding eventually which made its
foot rest cause the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the mishap already occurred even while they were on the road and
away from petitioner's electric wires and was not caused by the latter as alleged by respondents. It just so happened that
after the motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers were thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires were. This
Court hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo
driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers would not have been thrown off from the vehicle
towards the shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of
Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them when the maximum number of
passengers of a motorcycle is two including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the
motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to drive and control. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
XIII.

Enumerate 5 defenses which can be invoked by the defendant in negligence cases.

1. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.

2. Under the principle of assumption of risk, one who voluntarily assumes the risk may not later on ask for
damages.

3. Doctrine of last clear chance which provides that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.

4. For persons held vicariously liable, the proper defense is the exercise of diligence of a good father of the family.

5. Prescription. An action for quasi-delict must be instituted within four years.

NOTE: Not an exclusive enumeration.

XIV.

On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The check, post-
dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Despite the check being presented one year early, Allied accepted
it and sent the check for clearing to BPI through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
The check was cleared by BPI and Allied credited the account of MMGI with ₱1,000,000.00. On October 22,
2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered
the debit of ₱1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, BPI credited his account with
the aforesaid sum.4
On March 21, 2003, BPI returned a photocopy of the check to Allied for the reason: "Postdated." Allied,
however, refused to accept and sent back to BPI a photocopy of the check. Allied filed a complaint6 before the
Arbitration Committee of PCHC, asserting that BPI should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to
its negligence in failing to return the check to Allied within the 24-hour reglementary period as provided in
the Clearing House Rules and Regulations.
In its Answer with Counterclaims,9 BPI charged Allied with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated
check in the first place. It contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause
of the loss.
It is admitted that the post-dated check was encashed 1 year before its supposed presentment.
a. What is the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of said check?
b. Do you agree with the contention of BPI that Allied is guilty of contributory negligence in accepting
the check?
G.R. No. 188363 February 27, 2013
 !9

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

A collecting bank is guilty of contributory negligence when it accepted for deposit a post-dated check notwithstanding that
said check had been cleared by the drawee bank which failed to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period.
As well established by the records, both petitioner and respondent were admittedly negligent in the encashment of a
check post-dated one year from its presentment.
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.22The doctrine necessarily
assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not
apply except upon that assumption.23 Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.24Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was
defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the
proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.25
A. The proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of BPI who cleared
a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure. As
correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only BPI exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it
could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003".
BPI could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, Allied would have not
credited the amount thereof to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the
Allied in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from BPI the amount credited to
the payee’s account covering the check.

B. YES. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection."34 Admittedly, Allied’s acceptance of the subject check for deposit despite the one year postdate
written on its face was a clear violation of established banking regulations and practices. In such instances,
payment should be refused by the drawee bank and returned through the PCHC within the 24-hour reglementary
period. As aptly observed by the CA, Allied’s failure to comply with this basic policy regarding post-dated checks
was "a telling sign of its lack of due diligence in handling checks coursed through it."
It bears stressing that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman paterfamilias or a good father of a
family. The highest degree of diligence is expected," considering the nature of the banking business that is imbued with
public interest. While it is true that BPI's liability for its negligent clearing of the check is greater, Allied cannot take lightly
its own violation of the long-standing rule against encashment of post-dated checks and the injurious consequences of
allowing such checks into the clearing system.
XV.

a. Assuming that there is an existing contractual relations between the plaintiff and the defendant
(employer-employee, passenger-carrier), shall that preclude the institution of an action for recovery
of damages predicated on quasi-delict? Explain.

No, such fact shall not preclude or bar the institution of an action by the plaintiff against the defendant
for recovery of damages predicated on a quasi-delict or tort. The existence of a contract between the parties
constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recover of damages.
An action for recovery of damages may even be predicated on both breach of contract (culpa contractual) and a
tort at the same time.

b. What is the doctrine of discovered peril?

Also referred to as doctrine of "last clear chance" or as "supervening negligence" provides that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

c. Torts is broader than culpa aquilana. True or false? Explain.

TRUE. Torts is broader than culpa aquilana because it includes not only negligence but intentional criminal acts as
well.

d. From the point of view of torts and damages, “injury” and “damages” is the same. True or false?
Explain.

FALSE. Injury is the illegal invasion of a right while damage is the loss, hur or harm which results from the injury.
Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be no damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

XVI.

At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, Norman was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road
where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. His
jeepney was filled to seating capacity. At the time several students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael, was seen by eyewitness Artman sitting near a store on the
left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Michael raised his left hand to flag down
Norman’s jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the
conductor, Dennis, saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.
 !10

The next thing Arman saw Michael’s feet were pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which,
he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Another witness, Usaffe, heard a strong impact coming from
the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle. Michael was then seen
lying on the ground and caught in between the rear tires. Norman felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney
had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.

Dennis heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the
victim. Norman stopped and saw Dennis carrying the body of the victim. Dennis then loaded Michael on a
motorcycle and brought him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Is Norman responsible
for the death of Michael? Why or why not?

G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009

NORMAN A. GAID vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

NO, Norman is not responsible for the death of Michael.

The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death
of Micahel which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Michael flagged down the
jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage
covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the
jeepney to a halt.

During the first stage, Norman was not shown to be negligent.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act.[27]

It appears from the evidence Michael came from the left side of the street. Norman, who was driving the jeepney
on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, Norman was focused on the road ahead. In Michael’s haste to board the jeep which was then running, his
feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and
the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.

In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of
the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.

Second stage:

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.[34]

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In order to
establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal
connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.

The head injuries sustained by Michael at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as
indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately
stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.

The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over by the
jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is the other way
around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw Michael left behind the jeepney. Actub saw Michael in a prone
position and bleeding within seconds after impact. Right after the impact, Dennis immediately jumped out of the jeepney
and saw the victim lying on the ground. The distance of 5.70 meters is the length of space between the spot where the
victim fell to the ground and the spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular
inspection at the scene of the accident.

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victims death was
petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

DAMAGES

I.
 !11

Carmen has a current account with Solidbank Corp. On March 1990, Carmen issued SBC Check in the amount
of P330.00 in the name of Lopues Department Store in payment of her purchases from said store. When the
check was deposited by the store to its account, the same was dishonored due to Account Closed despite the
fact that at the time the check was presented for payment, Carmens checking account was still active and
backed up by a deposit of P1,275.20.
As a consequence of the check’s dishonor, Lopues Department Store sent a demand letter to Carmen
threatening her with criminal prosecution unless she redeemed the check within five (5) days. To avoid
criminal prosecution, Carmen paid P330.00 in cash to the store, plus a surcharge of P33.00 for the bouncing
check, or a total of P363.00 (Exh. F).
Thereupon, Carmen filed a complaint against Solidbank Corporation for damages alleging that the bank, by its
carelessness and recklessness in certifying that her account was closed despite the fact that it was still very
much active and sufficiently funded, had destroyed her good name and reputation and prejudiced not only
herself but also her family in the form of mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. She prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
In its answer, the bank claimed that Carmen, contrary to her undertaking as a depositor, failed to maintain
the required balance of at least P1,000.00 on any day of the month. Moreover, she did not handle her account
in a manner satisfactory to the bank. In view of her violations of the general terms and conditions governing
the establishment and operation of a current account, Carmen’s account was recommended for closure. In
any event, the bank claimed good faith in declaring her account closed since one of the clerks, who
substituted for the regular clerk, committed an honest mistake when he thought that the subject account was
already closed when the ledger containing the said account could not be found.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision holding that Solidbank Corporation was grossly negligent in
failing to check whether or not Carmen’s account was still open and viable at the time the transaction in
question was made. Hence, the bank was liable to Carmen for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees. It held that the bank was remiss in its duty to treat Carmen’s account with the highest degree
of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. Is the trial court correct?
[G.R. No. 152720. February 17, 2005]
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION vs. Spouses TEODULFO and CARMEN ARRIETA

A bank’s gross negligence in dishonoring a well-funded check, aggravated by its unreasonable delay in repairing the
error, calls for an award of moral and exemplary damages. The resulting injury to the check writers reputation and peace
of mind needs to be recognized and compensated.

SolidBank’s negligence here was so gross as to amount to a wilful injury to Carmen. Article 21 of the Civil Code
states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Further, Article 2219 provides for the recovery of moral
damages for acts referred to in the aforementioned Article 21. Hence, the bank is liable for moral damages to Carmen.

It is undisputed that the subject check was adequately funded, but that petitioner wrongfully dishonored it.

Treating Carmen’s account as closed, merely because the ledger could not be found was a reckless act that could not
simply be brushed off as an honest mistake. We have repeatedly emphasized that the banking industry is impressed with
public interest. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance
are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them.

The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. The business of a bank is
affected with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable
service. For this reason, the bank should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The
banking sector must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is justified by
the initial carelessness of petitioner, aggravated by its lack of promptness in repairing its error.

II.

Manuel owned approximately 172 hectares of tenanted agricultural land devoted to the planting of palay.
The Property allegedly yielded between 132 to 200 cavans of palay per hectare every year.

In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) bulldozed about ten (10) hectares of the Property
to build two irrigation canals (canals). Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion of the 10
hectares, the entire area became prone to flooding two months out of every year because of the side-burrow
method NIA used in the construction of the canals. NIA completed the canals without instituting
expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the Property owner.

On 20 August 1993, an action for damages and just compensation was filed against NIA, complainant
seeking among others, 3 Million as unrealized profits or lucro cessante, attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages. You are the judge? Should you award the foregoing damages?

G.R. No. 147245. March 31, 2005]

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO DIAZ, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE MANUEL DIAZ

Award of Temperate and Exemplary Damages

We find it proper to award temperate and exemplary damages in light of NIA’s misuse of its power of eminent
domain. A government instrumentality that fails to observe the constitutional guarantees of just compensation and due
process abuses the authority delegated to it, and is liable to the property owner for damages.

Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered if pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be
proved with certainty from the nature of the case. Here, the trial and appellate courts found that the owners were unable
 !12

to plant palay on 96,655 square meters of the Property for an unspecified period during and after NIAs construction of the
canals. NIA also deprived the owner of the Property of possession of a substantial portion of their land by reason of the
construction of the canals.

Manuel is also entitled to actual damages because he suffered pecuniary loss in the form of unrealized profits for the
expropriation of his land and due to the flooding which affected his crops.

NOTE: Please read the fulltext. The SC ruled that attorney’s fees should not be awarded but the facts that would support
the denial of award are not stated in the facts in the past exam.

III.

Jose applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card (Visa card for brevity). The said Visa card
can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the
peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is
required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account
shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for
business and pleasure trips. Jose accompanied by his friend, Ed, went to Gucci Department Store where Jose
purchased several Gucci items which amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of
paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. However, the
saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his
Visa card was blacklisted. Jose sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but
the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Jose paid cash for the Gucci
goods and items that he bought.

Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on
account of EBC’s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in
Hongkong, Jose filed with the RTC a complaint for damages[2] against EBC.

In its Answer,[3] EBC denied any liability to Jose, alleging that the latter’s credit card privileges for dollar
transactions were earlier placed under suspension on account of Jose’s prior use of the same card in excess
of his credit limit, adding that Jose failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his
obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Jose also failed to maintain the required minimum
deposit of $3,000.00.

The trial court awarded actual, moral, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit in favor of
Jose. Are these awards proper?

[G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004]

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE T. CALDERON

No.

In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.[8] However, to be entitled to the award thereof it would require,
firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.

Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant
has acted fraudulently or in bad faith,[11] or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligations.[12] Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.[13] EBC could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.

Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material
distinction between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
[19]

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.

We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a
contract of adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to
prospective credit card holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that
such a contract is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to
reject it entirely.[21]

NOTE: The Credit Card Agreement provides an express provision on automatic suspension without notice. There is
simply no basis for holding EBC negligent for not notifying Jose of the suspended status of his credit card privileges. Wala
ni gimention sa facts sa exam.
 !13

IV.

The spouses Lelisa Seña and Arturo Seña and their four children went to the Tropical Palace Hotel,
Parañaque, Metro Manila in the evening of December 20, 1976 to see the Reycard Duet Show they occupied a
table and ordered drinks before the show the hall was crowded and as anyone who attended such show can
attest, excitement and confusion prevailed.
Lelisa's version was that when a waiter named Baez was going to serve the tray containing the drinks was
overturned and fell on her. She was drenched. Later, she felt some chill. The drinks and the splinters from the
broken glasses allegedly destroyed her dress which, with her handbag and shoes, cost one thousand
pesos.She was shocked. She sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her.
A waitress took Lelisa to the ladies' room. She had to remove her dress and underwear which were wet She
was not given any towel to cover herself. She remained standing as there was no chair. Two of her daughters
followed her to the ladies' room. She returned to the hag after about thirty minutes later when the show had
started
Lelisa testified that she was claiming moral damages of P100,000 for herself and her husband due
to embarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer any apology on that night. She was
claiming exemplary damages in the same amount to teach the management a lesson. The husband, Arturo
Seta, testified that the incident infuriated him. There was no apology from the management. Are the spouses
entitled to said damages?
G.R. No. L-66274 September 30, 1984
BAGUMBAYAN CORPORATION vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, LELISA SEÑA and ARTURO SEÑA
NO.
The grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of the
cases enumerated in the Civil Code. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article, in the order named.
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The instant case is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The
Appellate Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without indicating what specific case
the instant case resembles or is analogous to. For example, an unfounded complaint with a baseless imputation of forgery
is analogous to defamation mentioned in article 2219 (7). It justified an award of P2,000 as moral damages.
Generally, there can be no recovery of moral damages if the case is not mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220.
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain
and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.
"Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation. Mental anguish is
intense mental suffering".
"Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal physical injury or where
the defendant wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the mental anguish." Nor will damages generally be
awarded for mental anguish which is not accompanied by a physical injury, at least where maliciousness, wantonness, or
intentional conduct is not involved".
"Damages for mental anguish and suffering have been held recoverable where the act complained of was done with such
gross carelessness or recklessness as to show an utter indifference to the consequences"
"Under Ohio law, damages for emotional distress consisting of embarrassment and mental suffering and dire threats, are
not recoverable unless intentionally caused"
 !14

In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry Co. vs. Caple, 179 S.W. 2nd 151, it was held that where the act is wanton or willful there may be
a recovery for humiliation and mental suffering without any physical injury. It was further held that in negligence cases,
where there is no willful or wanton wrong, there can be no recovery for mental suffering unless there is also physical
injury.
We hold that the "embarrassment" to which Mrs. Seña was exposed by the incident is not the mental anguish
contemplated in article 2217 for which moral damages can be recovered.
In this case, it would not be just and proper to include moral damages in the corporation's vicarious liability as employer.
The award of P5,000 as exemplary or corrective damages cannot also be sustained because there was no gross negligence
in this case.
V.
Adana and Ido are prominent members of the frequent fliers club of Cathay Pacific. In HongKong, they were
assigned seats in the Business class for which they had bought tickets. However, upon checking in, they were
told that they have been upgraded to First Class for the Manila flight by computer because the Business
Section is fully booked.
Both refused the upgrade despite better accommodation because they have guests in the Business Class they
have to attend to. They felt humiliated, embarrassed, and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly
threatened to offload them if they did not vail of the upgrade. Thus, they gave in but during the transfer of
luggage, Pido suffered pain in his arm and writ. Arriving in Manila, they demanded an apology from the
airline. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for actual and moral damages. Are Adana and Pido
entitled to said damages?
ANSWER(Credit given by Atty. Cayetano for this answer: 8.5pts)
In the instant case, what has transpired is that there was a change of assigned seats of Adana and Pido from
business class to first class which dismayed them considering that they have guests in the business class.
However, the change of seats was not done in bad faith nor with fraud or malice that would justify the grant
of moral damages.
They are likewise not entitled to actual damages because the services offered to them was even upgraded
which has better accommodation. Therefore, there could be no pecuniary loss suffered by them.
Consequently, actual damages is not proper.
VI.
It was established that Sexy became pregnant by her husband Macho prior to their marriage. To conceal her
pregnancy, she had herself aborted by Mang Kepweng, a physician. After getting married, she became
pregnant twice and in both cases, finding her pregnancy inconvenient, she had herself aborted by the same
physician. Macho was aware of the first and second abortions. After the third abortion, Macho sued Mang
Kepweng for damages on the ground that he suffered mental anguish attendant to the loss of the foetus and
the frustration of his parental expectation. Will Macho’s action prosper?
No, Macho’s action will not prosper. The abortions were performed with the knowledge of Macho. See page 1205-1206 of
Jurado reviewer and also read Geluz vs. CA.

VII.

A. When death occurs as a result of a crime, what then would be the different damages to which the
heirs of the deceased are entitled and why?

When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of
damages:

1. Indemnity for the death of the victim;

2. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased according to the deceased actual income at
the time of death and his probable life expectancy;

3. Moral damages for mental anguish may be recovered;

4. Exemplary damages when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances;

5. Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and

6. Interests in the proper cases.

B. May moral damages be recoverable in civil cases founded on immorality and dishonesty?

No. Immorality and d i s h o n e s t y, per se,

are not among those cases enumerated in Article 2219 as basis of an action for moral damages. The law
specifically mentions adultery or concubinage but not dishonesty and immorality.

C. Identify and discuss briefly the two kinds of actual damages.

Dano Emergente is the loss of what a person already possesses.

Lucro Cessante is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him such as loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury or an injury to the plaintiff’s
business standing or commercial credit.
 !15

VIII.

Give 5 instances when attorney’s fees may be recoverable.

1. When exemplary damages are awarded;

2. In criminal cases, of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

3. In case of clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

4. In actions for legal support; and

5. When at least double judicial costs are awarded.

IX.

ACCION IN REM VERSO: Action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground,
and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that
action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.9