BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs.

BMG

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 7
2005.

G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG Records (Pilipinas) and
Jose Mari Chan, et al.)

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated December
14, 2004[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, upholding the
Order dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90,
which found no merit in petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a
contract with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan),
whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and
participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On
March 11, 1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other
musical composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".

On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was
granted by the National Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of
the two musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just
Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To
Fade."

Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan

authorized his co-respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and
distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released
album of singer Lea Salonga.

In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed

respondents Chan and BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject musical
compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands were
made on both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was
reached by the parties.

Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with
a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording and
distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever form of musical products,
and Chan from further granting any authority to record and distribute the same
musical compositions.
In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and
publication sought to be enjoined had already been consummated, thereby
rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and (2)
there is no clear showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by
the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. BMG also pleaded a
cross-claim against its co-respondent Chan for violation of his warranty that his
musical compositions are free from claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for
damages against petitioner Bayanihan.

Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging that:
(1) it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over the
musical compositions in question; (2) the contracts he entered into with Bayanihan
are mere music publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as assignee, the power
to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as the exclusive publisher
thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent
grant of copyrights to Bayanihan; and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations
under the contracts because it failed to effectively advertise his musical
compositions for almost twenty (20) years, hence, he caused the rescission of said
contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his answer a counterclaim for damages
against Bayanihan.

After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying
Bayanihan's prayer for TRO, saying, thus:

After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence presented by
counsels, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement
to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the
considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the
aforecited application is denied.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer for the issuance
of a TRO is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24, 2001,
[2]
likewise denied Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
cralaw

After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the records
insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court finds that
the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of preliminary
injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the considered and
humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the aforecited
application is denied, (see also Order dated July 16, 2001).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is denied.

SO ORDERED.
Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied by
the trial court in its next Order of January 10, 2002,[3] petitioner Bayanihan then
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went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 69626, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying its
prayers for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration,
respectively.

In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals
upheld the challenged orders of the trial court and accordingly dismissed Bayanihan
petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of

discretion in the issuance of the assailed Orders of the respondent court dated
August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.[4] cralaw

Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse.

It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error

when it dismissed its petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner insists that as assignee of
the copyrights over the musical compositions in question, it has a clear legal right
to a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan violated its
copyrights over the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by
respondent BMG of petitioner's copyrights over the said musical compositions, BMG
continues to record and distribute the same, to petitioner's great and irreparable
injury.

We DENY.

We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of which is
more delicate and requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or
which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. A
court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would effectively
dispose of the main case without trial.

Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the
extremely difficult balancing act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer
for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest
abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following requisites
provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is
to be directed is a violation of such right,[5] the trial court threaded the correct path
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in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a writ should only be granted if a
party is clearly entitled thereto.[6]
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Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary albeit
its existence need not be conclusively established,[7] as the evidence required
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therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner
Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he has the
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint.[8] Here, the trial court
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did not find ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.

Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of

the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the
creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:

172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their
mode or form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.

An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts

sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction, yields not the existence of the requisite right protectable by
the provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or there is no
such right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the musical
compositions subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:

7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the PUBLISHER
[petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner whatsoever within two (2) years any
of the compositions covered by this contract, then such composition may be
released in favor of the WRITER and excluded from this contract and the
PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the WRITER
upon request of the WRITER;

xxx xxx xxx

9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2) years at

the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the PUBLISHER by advising
the WRITER of such renewal in writing at least five (5) days before the expiration of
this contract.[9] cralaw

It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1,
1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much
less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the
two-year period agreed upon by the parties.

Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2)
contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to
subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property
Code,[10] because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
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It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on
July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of
complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/
recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love to
Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8,
2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that
petitioner had no more right that is protectable by injunction.
Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and
was rather skimpy in dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for provisional
injunctive relief, the same deserves scant consideration. For sure, the manner by
which the trial court crafted its challenged orders is quite understandable, lest it be
subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the main case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.