SANJAN Arms Transfers Military Balances IR

Arms Transfers, Military Balances, and Interstate Relations: Modeling Power Balance versus
Power Transition Linkages

Author(s): Gregory S. Sanjian
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 6 (Dec., 2003), pp. 711-727
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Arms Transfers,Military Balances,and
InterstateRelations
MODELING POWER BALANCE VERSUS
POWER TRANSITION LINKAGES
GREGORYS. SANJIAN
Departmentof Political Science
BucknellUniversity
Do arms transfersthat widen (or narrow)gaps in militarycapabilitiesbetween rival importerslead to

cooperationor conflict?Threefuzzy systems models are developedandtested to assess the impactof U.S.,
USSR, andthird-countryarmstransferson the political relationshipbetween IndiaandPakistanduringthe
yearsfrom 1950 to 1991. The armstrademodels areinfluencedby the competingpowerbalanceandpower
transitiontheoriesof internationalconflict, and the tests reveal thatthe best model combines the effects of
boththeories.A second set of analyses(involvingthe same models) on the roles of the armsexportersis less
conclusive.Armsshipmentsfromthe USSR to the India-Pakistandyadwereconsistentwith the principlesof
powertransitiontheory,whereastheUnitedStatesandthirdpartiesbehavedgenerallyas powerbalancers.
Keywords: arms transfers;power transitiontheory;balance-of-powertheory;fuzzy set modeling
This study extends recent researchon the impact of arms transferson subsystem
political relationships.One of its aims is to determinewhether arms transfersthat
widen or narrowthe gap in militarycapabilitiesbetween rivalimporterslead to coop-
erationor conflict. It is the linkage between these variablesthat separatesthis work
from otherempiricalinquirieson the armstradesubject.Researchinto the effects of
arms transferson subsystem political or militaryrelationshipshas been conducted
before (cf. Kinsella 1995; Sanjian1999, 2001); whathas not been exploredis whether
and how the political, military,and armstradeelements interact.Also lacking within
recentstudiesis a thoroughassessmentof the role of armsexporters.The workto date
(cf. Sanjian 1999, 2001) identifies the exporters that contribute to balanced or
imbalancedmilitaryrelations and cooperativeor conflictual political relations, but
connectionsbetween the political and militaryoutcomes and armstransfershave not
AUTHOR'SNOTE:An earlierversionof this articlewas presentedat the annualmeetingof the Interna-

tional StudiesAssociationin New Orleans,Louisiana,March2002. The dataused for the analysesareavail-
able at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNAL OFCONFLICT RESOLUTION, 2003711-727
V1. 47 No.6, December
DOI:10.1177/0022002703258801
? 2003SagePublications
711
712 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
been learned;whethera particularexportergenerally delivers arms in a mannerthat

simultaneouslywidens (or narrows)gaps in militarycapabilitiesandinducescoopera-
tion (or conflict) is unknown. The present study deals also with this second issue,
which means thattwo analyses are conducted:the firstevaluateswhat happenswhen
armsenter a subsystem;the second considers who is responsiblefor what happens.
Fuzzy systems analysis is used to model both the impactof armstransferson sub-
system relationsand the roles of variousexporters.The armstrademodels developed
by means of this approachare influenced by the competing balance-of-powerand
powertransitiontheoriesof internationalconflict. One of the models-the balance-of-
power model-stipulates that subsystemic conflict will be lessened when exported
armsnarrowthe gap in militarycapabilitiesbetweenrivalimporters,whereasanother
one-the power transitionmodel-associates widening gaps with reducedlevels of
conflict. Essentiallythe same models arealso used to evaluatethe behaviorof the arms
exporters,althoughthe focus here is on whetherparticularstates-the United States,
the USSR, and third parties-supplied arms in ways that engendered balance-of-
power or power transitioneffects. If, say, armstransfersresultin narrowinggaps and
less conflict between importers,might the United States be one of the exporters
responsiblefor thatbalance-of-poweroutcome?Tests of the models cover the period
from 1950 to 1991, the yearsfor which dataon all the variablesareavailable,andcen-
ter specifically on the impactof armstransferson India-Pakistanrelations.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS,
FUZZY SETS, AND ARMS TRANSFERS
THE ARMS TRADE SYSTEM
As indicatedabove, all of the models are developedaccordingto the mathematics

of systems analysis. The method is used in this study as it has been used profitably
beforein the armstradecontext(Sanjian1998, 1999, 2001). Stipulatedfirstis the exis-
tence of a systemic state-in this case, the political relationshipbetween regional
rivals-which maybe describedas eithercooperativeor conflictual.Conceptuallyand
(as alreadynoted) empirically,the presentwork focuses on relationsbetween India
and Pakistan,two states that have been studied extensively in priorresearchon the
impactof armstransfers(Kinsella 1995; Sanjian1998, 1999, 2001). The goal of sys-
tems analysisis to explaintransformationsof the systemovertime, fromeach t to each
t + 1. Here,too, as in previousresearch,t is designatedas a calendaryear.Classic sys-
tems analysis proposes that a systemic transformationdepends on the natureof the
systemic stateat the time the transformationprocessbegins andinputsinto the system
duringthe same time period.This study'sgeneric inputsare armstransfers-specifi-
cally, each of the rivals'armsimportsduringt. Of interestis whetherthese weaponry
widen or narrowthe gap in militarycapabilitiesbetween the two states.Froma struc-
Sanjian/ARMS TRANSFERS,MILITARY
BALANCES,AND INTERSTATE
RELATIONS 713
turalstandpoint,the evolutionaryprocessdescribedheremay be expressedin termsof

the following state transformationequation:
Xt+1 =f(xt, ), (1)
where x, is the political relationshipbetween importersI and II at t, u, is I's and II's

armsimportsat t, andf is a mappingfrom X x U to X.1Actors I and II are, of course,
India and Pakistan.
The analyses pertainingto the effects of armstransferson the importers'political
relationsrevolve aroundequation(1), which is the standardstatetransformationfunc-
tion of systems analysis;those concerningtheroles of the exportersaredepictedby the
technique's typical output function. Systems influenced by certain inputs, such as
arms transfers,in turn generate outputs. The outputs in this work indicate which
exportersare responsible for the political relationshipthat is observed between the
importers.Three exporters are considered in this research:the United States, the
USSR, and the unit, "allthirdparties"(ATP).Because in classic systems analysis,the
outputat t is a function of both the state of the system and the inputs at t, the output
functionin this studyseeks to determineeach arms-exportingactor'sresponsibilityat t
for both the politicalrelationshipbetweenthe importersandthe impactof armstrans-
fers on militaryrelationsat thattime period.Are, say,ATPresponsiblefor cooperative
relationsand armstransfersthatwiden the gap in militarycapabilitiesbetween India
and Pakistanat t? The outputfunction may be defined as follows:
Yt= g(xt,ut), (2)

whereYtarethe responsiblearmsexportersat t, x, andu,aredefinedas above,andg is a
mappingfrom X x U to Y.
FUZZINESS IN THE SYSTEM
Appreciationof the arms tradesystem representedby (1) and (2) depends on the
furtherdevelopmentof its variables.Recall thatthe system was characterizedas fuzzy.
Thatis because the variablesin (1) and (2) (i.e., x,, u,, andy) areactuallyplace holders
for fuzzy sets. The concept of a fuzzy set was devised by Zadeh (1965, 1968) and is
essentiallya generalizationof an ordinaryset. LetA representan ordinaryset of N ele-
ments,al, a2, ..., an,takenfrom a universeof discourse,D. The membershipfunction,
gA, covering all of the elements in A is 1, and the set is normallywrittenas A = {a,,
a2, ..., an}. Assume now thatfrom the same universeof discourse,D, the fuzzy set Af
has been defined.The membershipfunction,gA,for this set assigns to each element,ai,
in D a numberin the closed interval[0,1] representingthe degreeto which the element
possibly belongs in the fuzzy set. Formally,gA:D -> [0,1], and the fuzzy set is often
writtenas Af= {(4A(ai), ai)}, where (A(ai)is usuallyreferredto as thegrade ofmember-
1. The simple mathematicalsystem definedhere has its originsin the physical sciences. The earliest,
thoughnonmathematical,extensionof these ideas to political science is reflectedin the workof Easton(cf.
Easton 1965), and early mathematicalapproachesand applications appear in Cortes, Przeworski,and
Sprague(1974) and Gillespie and Zinnes (1977).
ship of ai in A. Note thatthe nearer,tA(ai)is to unity,the largerthe membershipgrade

of ai inAf.Note also thatif gA(ai)= 1 for all of the elementsin A, the fuzzy set becomes
an ordinaryset. (Fuzzy variableswill henceforthbe capitalizedwithout thef super-
script.2)
The purposeof a fuzzy set is to contend with objects, options, outcomes, and the
like that are understoodonly imprecisely.There are generally two types of impreci-
sion: probabilisticimprecision, which pertainsto whether something, say a certain
outcome,will transpire,andfuzzy imprecision,which concernsthe meaningof a phe-
nomenon and how it should be treatedonce it has occurred.This study focuses on
imprecisionof the fuzzy type. A certainoutcome may occur at a particulartime, but
what does thatoutcome mean, and whatis the extentto which thatoutcome andother
outcomes (occurringeitherat the same time or at some pastor futuretime) aresimilar
and belong together?If the outcomes are wholly similar (or wholly dissimilar)and
meet (or fail to meet) some ideal-typicclass standard,then thereis no fuzzy impreci-
sion abouteithertheirmeaning (which is defined by the class standard)or theirrela-
tionship(they areeitheridenticalor different).However,if the outcomes areonly sort
of similarand do not meet the class standardcompletely,thenfuzzy imprecisiondoes
exist. In this situation,which is commonplaceamid social systems, the phenomena
under consideration may be modeled effectively by a fuzzy set. One could, for
instance,arraythe outcomesin a single fuzzy set andassignto each of thema member-
ship gradereflectingthe degreeto which it belongs in the set andis similarto the other
outcomes.3
It is not difficultto recognizethe presenceof fuzzy imprecisionin (1) and(2). Vari-
ablesx, andu,arefuzzy because,first,(1) and(2) focus on the meaningsof certainout-
comes thatoccur(say,the meaningof cooperativerelations)ratherthanon whetherthe
outcomes will occur (which is a matterof probabilisticimprecision) and, second,
becausetwo or moresimilaroutcomesmay not be wholly alike.The politicalrelation-
ship betweencompetingimportersmay be cooperativeat t andalso t + 1, butthatdoes
not mean thatthe relationshipis completelycooperativeat both times or, for thatmat-
ter,cooperativeto the same degree.The same is truefor the impactof armstransferson
the importers'militarycapabilities.Armsacquiredby I andII may havethe cumulative
effects of widening the capabilitygaps at both t and t + 1, but it is also possible, even
likely,thatthe gap widens moreatone time periodthanat the other.Forboth variables,
then, the outcomes at the two time periodsmay be similar(relationsare cooperative,
capabilitygaps widen), but they would not be the same;the correspondingoutcomes
would have differentmeanings.
2. The use of fuzzy sets for social model buildinghas become common in recentyears and has pro-
ducednoteworthyadvancesin multiple-objectiveprogramming(Driankov1987), utilitytheory(Jain 1976),
controltheory(BellmanandZadeh 1970;Kacprzyk1978), andgametheory(Butnariu1979;Buckley 1984).
The list of researchthatis exclusively on politicalmattersincludesCioffi-Revilla's(1981) seminalreviewof
the utilityof fuzzy sets as modeling-buildingdevices in internationalrelations,as well as the worksof Nurmi
(1981) on voting coalitions, Seitz (1985) on conflict management,and Sanjian(1998, 1999,2001) on arms
transfers.
3. This discussionof the differencesbetweenprobabilisticimprecisionandfuzzy imprecisionandthe
generalcircumstancesunderwhich fuzzy sets are applicableis consistent with the views of Bellman and
Zadeh (1970), Jain (1976), Kickert(1978), and Zimmermann(1987).
RELATIONS 715
The fuzzy sets depicting both x, and u, consist of two elements with membership
gradesthat are inverselyrelated:as the value of the membershipgrade for one of the
elements in a set increases, the grade for the other element decreases. Consider,for
example, variablex,. As a fuzzy set, x, is defined as X, = the political relationship
betweenimportersI andII at t = {(gx(xl),x ), (gx(x2),x2)}, wherex, = cooperativerela-
tions, x2 = conflictual relations, and gx.(x,) and gx(x2) are the membershipgrades
describingthe extentto which relationsbetweenI andII are,respectively,cooperative
and conflictual.Because X, is a summaryof the politicalrelationshipbetween I and II
at t, as the value of ,x(xl) increases,the value of ,x(x2) decreases.Similarly,the vari-
able u, is denotedby the fuzzy set U, = the armsimportsof I and II at t = {(gu(u1),ul),
([u(u2), u2)}, where u, = widens the gap in I's and II's militarycapabilities, u2= nar-
rowsthe gap in capabilities,andgu(u() andgtu(u2)arethe membershipgradesdescrib-
ing the extent to which arms importswiden and narrowthe gap, respectively.Here,
too, as above, gu(u2) = 1 - (Ul).4
The armstransferoutputsare also designatedas fuzzy. The variablerepresenting
this aspectof the model is definedas Y,= responsiblearmsexportersat t = {(Ly(yl),Yl),
(ir(Y2), Y2), (r(Y3), Y3) , where yl, Y2, and y3 are the United States, the USSR, and ATP,
respectively, and uy(yi) is the membership grade describing the extent to which
exporterYiis responsible for the observed outcomes in political relations (i.e., the
degreeto which relationsarecooperativeor conflictual)andmilitarycapabilities(i.e.,
the degreeto which the capabilitygap widens or narrows).TreatingY,as a fuzzy vari-
able is consistentwith BellmanandZadeh's(1970, B 141) argumentthatfuzzy sets are
a propermeans of dealing with phenomena"characterizedby such commonly used
adjectives as large, small, substantial,significant, important,etc." Under consider-
ationhereis not whetherthe UnitedStates,the USSR, andATParearmsexportersbut
ratherthe extent to which each of those actorsis responsiblefor certainpolitical and
militaryoutcomes.Thatis indisputablya fuzzy question.One countrymay be deemed
particularlyresponsible,a second somewhatless so, and the like.
MEASURING VARIABLES
The testingon (1) and(2) requiresempiricalvaluationof the membershipfunctions

for Ut,Xt,and Yt.In the case of Ut,whose membershipfunctionis ku(u,),the index and
datamustrevealthe degree to which I's and II's armsimportsat t widen (u,) and nar-
row (u2)the gap in militarycapabilitiesbetweenthe two states.(Of course,becausethe
membershipgrades associated with the elements of U, are inversely related, really
only one index is needed to computeboth gu(ul) and iu(u2).) Two sources of dollar-
value data are used to estimate the membershipgrades of U,: the annual military
expendituresof I andII, as reportedin variousvolumes of the StockholmInternational
Peace Research Institute(SIPRI) yearbook (SIPRI 1972, 1975, 1982, 1984, 1988,
1992), andSIPRI'supdated(as of summer1997) dyadicarmstradedata.5The military
4. Defining the membershipgradesof the elementsof fuzzy sets as inverserelationsis not unusualin
fuzzy models. See Kickert(1978), Sanjian(1992), and Zimmermann(1987) for examples.
5. Manythanksto IanAnthony,formerdirectorof the StockholmInternationalPeace ResearchInsti-
tute (SIPRI)armstransferproject,for supplyingthe data.
expendituredataareinterpretedhere as (admittedlycrudebut) sufficientindicatorsof

the country(eitherI or II) havingthe overallmilitaryadvantageat t, whereasthe arms
tradedata reveal the degree to which arms importswiden or narrowthe gap. If, for
example, I has the militarylead at t and importsmore armsthan II at the same time
period,then armstransfersto I andII areassessed as havingwidenedthe gap between
them.Computingg,u(ul)thusbecomes a matterof determiningthe statethatis aheadin
capabilityandthen of dividingthe dollarvalue of thatstate'stotal armsimportsat t by
the dollarvalue of the totalimportsto both states.Also, becausegL(u2) = 1 - gu(ul), as
the strongerstate's proportionof armsimportsincreases (or decreases), the value of
tu(u2)declines (or rises).
Estimatesof the membershipgradesfor the elements of X, dependon information
from both the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)andthe WorldEvents Inter-
action Survey (WEIS). Both data sets have been described thoroughly elsewhere
(Azar 1982; Goldstein 1992; Reuvenyand Kang 1996; Tomlinson1993); suffice it to
say, the COPDAB data used here are all scaled and weighted (see Azar 1982 for
COPDAB scales and weights) cooperativeand conflictualinteractionsbetween dyad
partnersat a given t (throughthe series'end pointin 1978), whereasthe WEISdataare
the categorized and weighted interactions(WEIS event categories with Goldstein
[1992] conflict and cooperationweights applied)between the same parties,also at t
(from 1979 onward).6Valuesof gx(xl)-the degreeof cooperationbetween I andII-
areobtainedat anyparticulart by computingthe proportionof all scaled andweighted
actsbetweenthe importersatthattimeperiodthatarecooperative,whereas,x(x2) = 1-
gx(xi) = the proportionof acts thatareconflictual.Obviously,then,the morecoopera-
tive the relationshipbetweenI andII at t, the greaterthe value of gx(xl) andthe smaller
the value of Ilx(X2).
The membershipgrades for the elements of Ytare also estimatedwith the SIPRI
armstradedata.This variablemeasuresthe degree of responsibilityof each of three
exporters-the United States,the USSR, and ATP-for the observedeffects of arms
transferson the importers'political and militaryrelations.Using the armstradedata
for this purposeimplies thatresponsibilityis linkedto levels of activity.Exportersthat
deliverlittle or no armsat t may be less responsiblefor the political and militaryout-
comes thanexportersthatsupplymanyarms.The gradefor Ly(Y,i)at any particulart is
determinedby first summingthe dollar values of all exports to I and II at t and then
dividing the dollar value of exporteryi's arms by that total. Note that if a certain
exporterprovidesmost of the armsto I andII at t (andso dominatesexportsto the sys-
tem), its membershipgradeat t will approachunity (indicatingthatit bearsmost of the
responsibilityfor the political and militaryoutcome at t), whereasthe grades for the
otherexporterswill be nearzero. Note also thatif all the exporterssupplyroughlythe
same amount of arms, the membershipgrades for all three will be about the same
(indicatingsharedresponsibility).
6. Splicing Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)andWorldEvents InteractionSurvey(WEIS)
datais supportedby ReuvenyandKang(1996), providedthatthe datacorrespondfor the period(1966-1978)
in which the sets overlap.Kinsella(1995) reportsthatfor those years,the correlationsbetween the two time
series were r = .90 for Iranand Iraq,r = .99 for India and Pakistan,and r = .97 for Ethiopiaand Somalia.
ReuvenyandKangalso obtainstrongpositivecorrelationsfor the India-Pakistandyad:r = .97 forconflictual
events and r = .83 for cooperativeevents.
RELATIONS 717
MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS
AND TEST PROCEDURES
DERIVING MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS
Accordingto Zadeh(1971, 1973), when fuzzy variablesexist in a system, as is the

case in this project, the entire system becomes fuzzy. Systems of this type may be
expressedin termsof theirmembershipfunctions.Assume, for example,thatthe state
transitionfunctionof a fuzzy system is defined as follows:
Xt +i =(t, ), (3)
wherefis a mappingfromX x U to X, andX, +, is a fuzzy set in X thatis dependenton

the nonfuzzy variablesx, and ut. In this example, Xt + I is a conditionalfuzzy set. A
fuzzy setA in Z is said to be conditionalon x if its membershipfunctionincludesx as a
parameter.As an indicatorof the dependencyof z on x, the membershipfunction is
normallywrittenuz(zlx).In (3), the fuzzy setX, + is dependenton the parametersxt and
u,, meaning that X, + is a conditional fuzzy set whose membership function is
gx( t + lIxt,Ut).
The parametersx, and u, in the above example are nonfuzzy.In the systems equa-
tions examinedin this study,however,x,, ut,andy, areall fuzzy. Forinstance,equation
(1) in the fuzzy system becomes
Xt + = F(X,, U,), (4)
whereX, and U, arefuzzy sets in X and U, respectively,with the membershipfunctions

gIx(x,)for X, and gLpu,)for U,. In this conceptualization,the membershipfunctionfor
X,t+ would be
x(x +l)= V V [X(Xt) IiIX,, u)1, (5)

AgU(U)AX(Xt+
xt ut
where v and Aconnote,respectively,the operationsof takingthe maximumandmini-

mumof the membershipfunctions.Note thatin (5), the functiongx(x,+lIx,,u,)defines a
mappingfrom X x U to the space of fuzzy sets in X, and throughthis mapping,the
fuzzy set X, in X has been used to inducethe fuzzy set X, + in X.7Repeatingthis appli-
cation for the fuzzy version of equation(2) yields the membershipfunctionfor Y,:
gy(yt)= V [jx(xt) AJl(U)Agly(Y,|Xt, (6)

U,)].
xt Ut
These two membershipfunctions-(5) and (6)-become the centerpiecesof the test-

ing process.
7. Membershipfunctionsof the type definedin (10) are basedon the Cartesianproductof fuzzy sets.
See Cioffi-Revilla(1981) for example computations.
TEST PROCEDURES
The aim of the testing process is to predictboth the political relationshipbetween

the importersand each exporter'sresponsibilityfor thatrelationshipat each t or t + 1
(dependingon the analysis)of the periodfrom 1950 to 1991. Equations(5) and(6) are
used to makethe predictions.Empiricalestimatesof gx(xt), glu(u), and[1y(yt) in (5) and
(6) areobtainedvia the dataand indices discussed in the previoussection. The condi-
tionalmembershipfunctions-gx(x, +lx,, u,) andgiy,t,, u,)-in the two equationsare
also valuated,but this is accomplishedtheoretically(i.e., the values areassigned),not
empirically.In fact, it is throughthese membershipfunctionsthatargumentsaboutthe
impact of armstransfersand the roles of the exportersmay be incorporatedinto the
system. Consider,for instance,the conditionalmembershipfunctiongx(t+1xtx,, u,) and
assume,for the moment,thatx, + = x,, x, = xl, and ut= u,. This function,so defined,is
actually a membershipgrade, denoted gx(xllxl, ul), indicating the extent to which
politicalrelationsbetween I andII at t + 1 will be cooperative,given cooperativerela-
tions betweenthose actorsat t andarmsimportsthatwiden the capabilitygap at t. The
value assigned to this membershipgrademay be either large or small, dependingon
the hypothesizedimpactof a widening gap in capabilities.A large value for tx(xllxl,
U,) implies thata widening gap relieves tensions (i.e., more cooperation,less conflict
between I and II); smallervalues suggest the opposite effect.
It shouldbe evidentthatnumerousmodels of the effects of armstransferson politi-
cal relationscan easily be constructedby simply adjustingthe values of Lg(xt+1lxt,u,)
in (5). Each model would consist of four uniquely valuatedconditionalmembership
grades:one for igx(xi Kx,u ) andthreemorecoveringthe othercombinationsof political
relationsand armsimportoutcomes at t (i.e., for xl, u2;x2, ul; andx2,u2).Models can
also be developedto examinethe roles of the exporters,althoughthese would be fash-
ioned aroundhypothesizedvalues of p(y,ylx,u,) in (6). Once all of these models have
been constructed-as they are below-the testing process begins. Equation(5), with
its conditionalmembershipfunction defined accordingto a certainmodel, is used to
predictvalues of gx(xl) at t + 1 (i.e., the degreeof cooperationbetweenI andII);equa-
tion (6) is used to predictuy(y,)at t (i.e., the degreeto which exportery was responsible
for the observedpolitical relationshipbetween the importers).Of course, the testing
on (6) is performedindividuallyfor the United States,the USSR, and ATP.All of the
models corresponding to each equation are evaluated in this fashion, and then
Pearson'sr is used to ascertainthe best models. These arethe ones yielding the largest
correlationsbetween the predictedvalues of Rx(xl)and y(y,i)andempiricalmeasure-
ments of the same variables.
POWER BALANCE AND POWER

TRANSITION MODELS OF ARMS TRANSFERS
POWER BALANCES VERSUS POWER TRANSITIONS
The models pertainingto both (5) and(6) areinfluencedby the competingbalance-

of-powerandpowertransitiontheoriesof internationalconflict. Of primaryconcernis
RELATIONS 719
whetherarmsimportsthatwiden or narrowthe gap in militarycapabilitiescontribute

to cooperativeor conflictualrelationsbetween the importers.The two theoriesdiffer
significantlyon issues of this nature(cf. Kaplan 1976; Morgenthau1948; Organski
and Kugler 1980; Tammenet al. 2000; Waltz 1979). According to the balance-of-
power theory,movementtowardparityshould reducethe chances of at least violent
conflict; neither party will attack the other because each lacks a clear advantage.
Power transitiontheory,on the otherhand, maintainsthat narrowingpower gaps are
actuallyvery volatile; conflict, even the possibility of war,rises in this circumstance
due to fear or perhapsmisperception.A weakerstate,engaged in the process of over-
takingits once dominantrival,mightdecide thatthe time to acthas arrived;it therefore
attacks, likely on the mistakenbelief that it now has the power to achieve victory.
Another scenario has the dominantpower striking first. Recognizing that the gap
between itself and its challengeris diminishing,the strongerstate calculatesthatit is
betterto engage its enemy while it still has an advantagethanto allow the gap to close
any further.
Power transitiontheoryarguesthatthe prospectsfor violent conflict are enhanced
when the distributionof power between rivals becomes ambiguous.Relatively large
discrepanciesin power,which worrybalance-of-powertheorists,aresubstantiallyless
riskythanpower transitions.A strongerstateneed not attacka discerniblyweakerfoe
to accomplish its goals; a weaker state will not attacka strongerone because it will
lose. Of course, balance-of-powertheoristssee the world differently.Because states
seek to dominateotherstates,when theyhavethe meansto do so, theywill act;the con-
flict between statesis thus a consequenceof the unequaldistributionof power within
the system. Whenpoweris distributedevenly,conflict naturallydiminishes:each state
lacks the means to challenge any of the others,and so the system becomes relatively
stable.If, on the otherhand,power shifts in favorof a certainstate,conflict withinthe
system increases:the advantagedactornow has the resourcesit needs to try to domi-
nate the system. In the worst of all possible worlds, warfareoccurs as the dominant
state behaves aggressively.
Do eitherbalance-of-poweror power transitionprinciplesapply in the armstrade
context?The thinkinghere is thatthey might, at least in a generalsense. Thereare, of
course, substantialdifferencesbetween the researchproblemas it has been developed
to this pointandthe balance-of-powerandpowertransitiontheoriesof conflict. One of
these differences is suggested by the dependentvariablein equation(5). This study
examines shifts in the political relationshipbetween I and II-that is, the degree to
which relationsbecome more or less cooperativeor conflictual over time-whereas
boththebalance-of-powerandpowertransitiontheoriescommonlyaimto explainwar
andpeace. This distinctionis importantbecauseneitherof the conflict theoriesneces-
sarilydenies the possibility thatnonviolenthostile relationscan occur between states
when the principlesof the theoryobtain.Powertransitiontheory,for instance,asserts
thatthe probabilityof warfareincreasesas the power gap between statescloses, but it
does not claim that unequaldistributionsof power correspondto friendly relations.
Because this researchseeks to determinewhetherarmstransfersactuallycontributeto
cooperationor conflict, it eitheramplifiesor contradicts(dependingon one's perspec-
tive) the traditionaltheories of conflict.
Anotherimportantdifferencebetween this study and the conflict theoriesis high-

lighted by one of the measurementdevices. The armstradeinputin both (5) and (6)
analyzes the effects of importedarmson I's and II's militarycapabilities;in essence,
"militarycapability"is how "power"is conceptualized.This is arguably(thoughnot
wholly) consistentwith the balance-of-powertheory(which at least stressesthe mili-
taryaspectsof power),butit is clearlyinadequatefromthe powertransitionviewpoint.
For transitiontheory,power is some functionof populationpotential,economic pro-
ductivity,andpoliticalcapacity,andwhetherits dynamisminducesor reducescooper-
ationor conflict (actually,peace or war)is linkedto factors-such as an actor'slevel of
satisfactionwith the existing stateof affairs-that areunexaminedin this research.All
of this (andsurelymore)impliesthatthe models developedaccordingto (5) and(6) are
only loosely fashionedaroundthe balance-of-powerandpower transitiontheoriesof
conflict; they cover one very importantaspect of the differences between them, but
they do not take into accountall potentiallyrelevantfactors.
MODELS OF ARMS TRANSFERS
Threemodels are defined for each of equations(5) and (6), and each turnson the
study's centralissue: whetherarms transfersthat widen or narrowgaps in military
capabilitiescorrespondto cooperativeor conflictualrelations.The firstmodel is influ-
encedby the powertransitionperspective:wideninggaps areassociatedwith coopera-
tion, narrowing gaps with conflict. The second model reverses the relationship
between the variables and is therefore nearer to the balance-of-powerviewpoint,
whereasthe thirdmodel proposesmixed outcomes:armstransfersthatwiden or nar-
row gaps sometimes induce cooperationand at othertimes conflict. The mixed-out-
come model considers the possibility that the power balance or power transition
effects of armstransfersare linked to the natureof the political relationshipbetween
the importersat the time the transferstakeplace. Armsthatwiden gaps (at t) may have
powertransitioneffects (at t + 1) if the relationshipbetween the importersis coopera-
tive (at t) but power-balancingeffects (at t + 1) if relationsare conflictual (at t). The
threemodels are formallydefined in Table 1; the table gives the theoreticalvalues of
the conditionalmembershipfunctionsin (5) and (6).
PT and PB in Table 1 are, respectively,the power transitionand power balance
models, whereas the mixed-outcome model is PT/PB. Of obvious and immediate
interestis the link between the two conditionalmembershipfunctions, 1x(x,+Ilx,,u,)
and Ly(y|lX,u,). This means thatthe models coveringboth the changes in the political
relationshipbetween the importersand the roles of the exportersare the same. Con-
necting the models in this way correspondsto the substantivegoals of this study.
Defining and analyzing ix(xt+ |xt, ut) accordingto PT, PB, and PT/PB will reveal
whether arms transfers had power transition,power-balancing,or mixed effects.
When ty(yt|xt,ut)is defined and analyzedaccordingto the same models, information
will havebeen obtainedon the patterns-power transition,powerbalance,or mixed-
of U.S., USSR, and ATParmsexports(remember:each Yiis examinedindividually).
The roles of the exporters will have been determined; so, also, would be each
exporter's responsibility for the observed outcomes on political relations and the
RELATIONS 721
TABLE 1
Definitions of MembershipFunctions,gx(x, + lxt, ut)and
gr(ytlxt,u)),for Power Transition(PT), Power Balance (PB),
and Mixed (PT/PB) Models of Arms Transfers
MembershipFunctions Models of Arms Transfers
+ iXt, ut)
IXx(Xt gy(YtIXt,Ut) PT PB PT/PB
i|X(XxilX,Ul) Luy(yiOX,Ul) .75 .33 .75

LX(XIIXI,U2) ly(YilX1, U2) .33 .75 .33
9lx(xII2, U1) Ly(yilx2,U1) .67 .25 .25
[X(XIlx2,u2) Ry(yilx2,u2) .25 .67 .67
NOTE:xl = cooperativerelations,x2 = conflictual relations, ul = widening gap in militaryrelations,u2=
narrowinggap in militaryrelations,andyi = armsexporter,for i = 1 (the U.S.), 2 (the USSR), and3 (all third
parties).
effects of armstransfersat t. Assume, for example,thatthe best model-that is, the one
yielding the largestr value-in the analysispertainingto the role of the United States
is PB. This wouldmeanthatthe UnitedStatesbehavedas a powerbalancer;it will have
been at least one of the exportersresponsiblefor armstransfersthatnarrowedthe gap
in militarycapabilitieswhen relationsbetweenIndiaandPakistanwere eithercooper-
ative or conflictual.
Of course, the othermodels suggest differentroles and types of responsibility.If,
say,the best modelfor ATPis PT/PB,thenthirdpartieswill haveactedaccordingto the
principlesof powertransitiontheorywhenrelationsbetweenthe importerswere coop-
erative(i.e., they will have suppliedarmsin ways thatwidenedthe capabilitygap) and
the balance-of-powertheorywhenrelationswere conflictual(i.e., theirarmsnarrowed
gaps). Thirdpartieswould thereforebe among the responsibleactorswheneverthose
political relationsand armstransferoutcomes occurred.Notice thatthe threemodels
use the same membershipgradevalues (.75, .67, .33, and .25); the conditionalmem-
bership functions differ, in other words, only in the way the values are mixed and
matched.This places the emphasiswhere it shouldbe-on the patternsthemselves-
ratherthanon the values. Appreciabledifferencesin the performancesof the models
will be due to how the values arearrangedratherthanto whatthey are.Notice also that
the gradesare slightly largerfor cooperationat t thanthey are for conflict at t (.75 vs.
.67 and .33 vs. .25). In the case of gx(x,l1x,,
+ u,),this meansthatarmsimportsthateither
widen or narrowgaps at t will lead to morecooperationat t + 1 when thereis coopera-
tion at t than when there is conflict at t, whereasfor gr(yO,x,,
u,), it suggests thateach
exporterwill find it easierto sustaincooperativerelationsthrougha certainarmstrade
strategythan to convertconflictualrelationsinto cooperativeones.
Finally, the values of the membershipgrades in Table 1 (i.e., the numbersthem-
selves) underscoreanotherimportantassumptionof this research:they emphasizethe
potentialpower balance or power transitionimpact of arms transferson futurerela-
tions over and above that of the importers'existing relationship.The grades for
gx(xilxl, u2)andCx(xlx2, ul) for PT (.33 and .67, respectively)indicate,for example,
thatcooperationbetweenthe importersat t + 1 may be greaterwhen therewas conflict

at t thanwhen therewas cooperationat t. A similardevelopmentoccurs for the mixed
model; compare the values (again, .33 and .67, respectively) for gLx(xilx,u2) and
u2)for PT/PB. Assignmentsof this naturereflect the study'sview thatpoliti-
xI(XIIX2,
cal relationsbetween deeply entrenchedsubsystemrivals are extremelyvolatile and
that each state's arms tradebehavior is critical to the course of those relations.For
countriessuch as IndiaandPakistan,armstransfersareindeedsignificantevents;they
can rapidlytransforma cooperativerelationshipinto conflict, or vice versa,depending
on the choices made by the parties.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES: INDIA-PAKISTAN

RELATIONS AND ARMS EXPORTER ROLES
INDIA-PAKISTAN POLITICAL RELATIONS
All of the test results are presentedin Table2 and are, needless to say, intriguing.
Clearly,the best predictorof the impactof armstransferson the political relationship
betweenIndiaandPakistanis PT/PB.Powertransitioneffects seem to obtainwhen the
importers'relationshipis cooperative;when relations are conflictual, however, the
impact of armstransfersis nearerto the claims of the balance-of-powertheory.The
consequences of arms transferson future relations are thereforeinfluenced by the
natureof the political environmentinto which the weaponry arrives.Also, because
neitherthe powertransitionnor powerbalancemodel (PT andPB, respectively)takes
environmentalfactorsinto account(i.e., they do not differentiatebetweencooperative
and conflictual arenas),they both performpoorly. There is, in short, nothing at all
ambiguousaboutthe firsttest results.Arms transfersthatwidened the gap in military
capabilitiesbetween India and Pakistansustainedcooperativerelationsbetween the
importers;those thatnarrowedthe gap helped convertrelationsthat were conflictual
into ones that were cooperative.
Relationswere cooperative(or,at least, morecooperativethanconflictual)between
IndiaandPakistanin 18 of the 41 years of the empiricaltime frame,meaningthatPT/
PB has not been used to forecast broadlypredictableoutcomes. Indeed, the empiri-
cally diversenatureof the India-Pakistanpoliticalenvironmentis criticalto appreciat-
ing the strengthof PT/PB andthe weaknessesof the othermodels. PT performedwell
for the 18 cases in which relationswere cooperativebut very poorly for the 23 conflict
situations.The r value for PT is thus depressedby its inabilityto capturethe impactof
armstransfersin circumstancesof conflict. PB is, of course, similarlyencumbered.It
operatesslightly betterthanPT, but thatis because thereare 5 more cases of conflict
than cooperation.Note what this discussion implies: had the political environment
been less diverse-had the overwhelmingmajorityof the cases been morecooperative
than conflictual or vice versa-then either PT (for cooperation)or PB (for conflict)
would have generatedresultsequivalentto those of PT/PB.The effects of armstrans-
fers, in otherwords,would not have been unmaskedwere it not for the diversityof the
India-Pakistanpolitical environment.
RELATIONS 723
TABLE2
The Impactof Arms Transferson India-Pakistan
Political Relations and the Roles of the Arms Exporters
Models of Arms Transfers
Analysis PT PB PT/PB
India-Pakistanpolitical relations .07 .21 .74

Roles of armsexporters
United States -.32 .47 .11
USSR .58 -.57 -.06
ATP -.50 .42 .02
NOTE:Entriesfor India-PakistanpoliticalrelationsarePearson'sr betweenestimatedandpredictedvalues

of cooperativerelations(i.e., Lx(xl)) at t + 1;for the armsexporters,entriesarePearson'sr betweenthe esti-
matedandpredicteddegreeof responsibilityof each exporter(i.e., ly(yi)) for the political andmilitaryout-
comes at t. PT = powertransition;PB = powerbalance(PB); PT/PB= mixed modelof armstransfers;ATP=
all thirdparties.
Havethese findingsanyparticularpolicy relevance?One is temptedto say thatthey

do. Armsthatwidenedgaps clearlyadvancedrelationsthatwere cooperative,whereas
those that closed differences eased the level of conflict; therefore, arms exporters
endeavoringto relax tensions or strengthenrelations between India and Pakistan
maybe should behave accordingto the PT/PB framework.India, the strongerof the
two states duringthe period from 1950 to 1991, possibly should be the recipientof
most of the arms sent to the subsystem when the political relationshipbetween the
importersis mainly cooperative,whereasPakistanought to be the primarycustomer
when relationsare essentially conflictual.The empiricalresultscertainlysuggest this
kind of activity,but prospectiveexportersmust approachthe South Asian situation
cautiously. Relations between India and Pakistan remain turbulent.The nuclear
dimension that developed in the late 1990s has to be considered; recent political
upheavalsin the regionmay have alteredeach state'sattitudetowardarmstransfers.In
short, what may have applied to the empiricaltime frame possibly no longer does,
indicatingthatit would be wiser to interpretthe findingsreportedhere as information
abouthistoryratherthanprescriptionsfor policy making.
There is, of course, anotherquestion to ponder.Why does PT/PB performbest?
Neitherthe powertransitionnorpowerbalancetheoriescan fully accountfor this out-
come, althoughboth obviously have some relevance(otherwise,PT/PB would not be
the best model);the natureof the militaryrelationshipbetweenIndiaandPakistandur-
ing the empiricaltime framewas probablyalso critical.The thinkinghereis thatdevel-
opments between the two states hinged on Pakistan'sfluctuatingresponse to India's
militarysupremacy.CooperativerelationsmanifestedPakistan'sacceptanceof India's
armaments-inducedposition atop (what power transitiontheoristscall) the "regional
hierarchy"and possibly its submissionto India'sdecision to strengthenitself further.
Thatwould explainwhy wideninggaps became stabilizingduringperiodsof coopera-
tion. On the otherhand,when relationswere conflictual(for whateverreasons:Kash-
mir,Bangladesh,etc.), Pakistan'sattitudetowardIndia'smilitarylead was less accept-
ing. The presenceof conflict itself suggestsPakistan'sdissatisfactionwith manyfacets

of the status quo, and as tensions increased, traditionalbalance-of-power forces
obtained.Arms transfersthatnarrowedthe gap between the two partieslikely helped
stabilizea relationshipheadedtowardwar,andthey mighthavebeen even moreeffec-
tive had they happened more often. One wonders, for example, whether the arms
embargolevied by the United States againstboth states at the outset of the 1965 war
was a mistake.WithPakistaneffectively deniedthe U.S. weaponrymarketplace,India
rode its armstraderelationshipwith the USSR to an importantbattlefieldvictory.
THE ROLES OF THE EXPORTERS
The discussionto this point has centeredon the aggregateeffects of armstransfers.

Did armsthatwidened or narrowedgaps in the militarycapabilitiesof the importers
lead to cooperativeor conflictualrelations?Here,in the second set of analyses, atten-
tion turnsto the roles of the exporters.What were those actors'armstradecontribu-
tions to the evolutionof the India-Pakistanpolitical system?Table2 revealsthatnone
of the exporterssuppliedarmsin a mannerconsistentwith the PT/PBframework:the
United Statesand ATPoperatedmostly as powerbalancers,whereasthe USSR acted
accordingto the rules of power transitiontheory.Thus, althoughthe systemic effects
of arms transferswere nearestto PT/PB, the realizationof those effects was due to
each exporter'spursuitof anotherpattern.On one level, these resultsare not surpris-
ing. Most of the arms dispatchedto the subsystem by the USSR arrivedin India,
whereasPakistanobtainednearlyall of its weaponryfrom the United Statesandthird
parties.Because Indiawas consistentlythe strongerof the SouthAsian rivals,the arms
the USSR deliveredto thatstategenerallyhad the effect of widening capabilitygaps,
whereasU.S. and ATP supplies to Pakistanusually narrowedthem.
Yetthereis also thisto consider:the r valuesfor the modelspertainingto theroles of
the exportersareappreciablysmallerthanthe one obtainedfor PT/PBin the firstanal-
ysis, which meansthateach exporter'scommitmentto eitherPT or PB was not nearly
as definiteas the overallimpactof armstransferson the importers'relations.This point
is highlightedby ATP itself, which combines many third-partyexportersand hence
possibly numerousarmstraderoles, but it appliesto the United Statesand the USSR,
too. U.S. arms transfersoften narrowedgaps, whereas the USSR acted typically to
widen them, but each exporterevidently also deliveredweapons for reasons separate
fromthe weaponry'spotentialimpacton systemicrelations.Once again,the best mod-
els-specifically, PB for the United StatesandPT for the USSR-would have yielded
largerr values were that not so. In fact, it is likely even a stretchto suggest that the
superpowersconsciously behavedin eithera power transitionor powerbalancefash-
ion. Why did the United Statesdeliverweaponryto Indiain 15 of the 41 years exam-
ined in this study if it were truly a power balancer?Those arms should have gone to
Pakistan,the countrythatwas militarilydisadvantaged.Similarly,why did the USSR
compensatefor the aforementionedU.S. armsembargoby exportingmodest amounts
of weaponryto Pakistan?If it were following the principlesof powertransitiontheory,
the USSR would have suppliedonly India.
RELATIONS 725
The most likely explanationis that the superpowerswere endeavoringto accom-

plish objectivesrelatedto the cold warcompetitionbetween them and thattheirarms
traderoles were simplyreflectionsof theirwiderinterestsratherthandeliberatestrate-
gies for South Asian stability.The nearesteitherof these exporterscame to PT/PB-
the stability-inducingstrategy-was the United States at r = .11, which is virtually
inconsequential.It is interestingthatthird-partyarmstransferswere even less stabiliz-
ing at r = .02 for PT/PB.It seems thatnone of the exporterssuppliedarmsin a manner
thatroutinelyeased conflict orgave momentumto relationsthatwere alreadycoopera-
tive. None of the exporters,in otherwords,stood out as particularlyresponsiblefor the
desirablePT/PBoutcomewhen thatoutcomeoccurred.Indeed,insofaras the USSR is
concerned, it sometimes delivered arms in the one way that was shown to be
destabilizing.Its r = -.06 for PT/PBis not large,butit is also not in the preferreddirec-
tion. There are, in short, no obvious heroes on the export side of the India-Pakistan
armstradeledger.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This researchhas accomplishedits two mainobjectives.It has exploredthe connec-

tion between the political and militaryeffects of armstransferson the India-Pakistan
subsystem,andit has analyzedboththe roles of the exportersandtheirresponsibilities
for various outcomes. Arms transfersto India and Pakistanduring the period from
1950 to 1991 evidently had mixed power transitionand balance-of-powereffects.
Relationsthatwere morecooperativethanconflictualgenerallystayedthatway when
weapons supplies widened the gap in military capabilities between the importers,
whereas conflictual relationstended to improveonly when exportedarms narrowed
the gap. Apparently,none of the exporterswas singularlyresponsiblefor outcomes of
thatnature.The United States and ATPacted more as power balancersthananything
else; theirarmstransferstypically narrowedthe gap in militarycapabilitieswhen the
importers'political relationshipwas eithercooperativeor conflictual.Those were the
exportersthatwere responsiblefor situationsin which narrowinggaps lessened con-
flict, but they were also the ones thatthwartedcooperativerelationsby continuingto
supply Pakistanduringmore tranquilperiods. Virtuallythe opposite occurredwhen-
ever the USSR suppliedarms.Thatstateemergesas this study's sole power transition
actor;its arms,destinedmainlyfor India,usuallywidenedthe gapbetweenthe import-
ers, meaning that it was the exporterthat sustainedcooperativerelations,when such
relationsexisted, but likewise exacerbatedconflict at particularlyhostile times.
It must be stressed, however,that the contributionof arms transfersto the India-
Pakistanpolitical environmentmay be as much a functionof happenstanceas of any
deliberatestrategyof achievingwhatis best for the importers.The India-Pakistansub-
system is a regionalhierarchy,and the literaturein the power transitionfield reveals
that leaders of the global system-great powers, such as the United States and the
USSR duringthe cold war-seldom intervenein disputesbetween adversariesat the
regionallevel (cf. Lemke 1996;Tammenet al. 2000). Unless theirinterestsareat stake,
we aretold, greatpowersarelikely to "ignoreminorpowers"(Tammenet al. 2000, 70;

see also Lemke 1995). A reckoningof thatsortmay be the case here also, even in the
face of persistentarmstransferactivity:IndiaandPakistanwere certainlynot ignored
by the superpowers,but the arms supply patternsto those states demonstratelittle if
any commitmenton the partof the exportersto stabilizingthe subsystemor adjusting
the regionalhierarchy.In the end, the United Statesandthe USSR, as well as probably
even the ATP states, likely delivered weaponryto South Asia to advance their own
interests.
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Arms Transfers, Military Balances, and Interstate Relations: Modeling Power Balance versus

Power Transition Linkages

Do arms transfersthat widen (or narrow)gaps in militarycapabilitiesbetween rival importerslead to

Keywords: arms transfers;power transitiontheory;balance-of-powertheory;fuzzy set modeling

AUTHOR'SNOTE:An earlierversionof this articlewas presentedat the annualmeetingof the Interna-

been learned;whethera particularexportergenerally delivers arms in a mannerthat

THE ARMS TRADE SYSTEM

As indicatedabove, all of the models are developedaccordingto the mathematics

turalstandpoint,the evolutionaryprocessdescribedheremay be expressedin termsof

Xt+1 =f(xt, ), (1)

where x, is the political relationshipbetween importersI and II at t, u, is I's and II's

Yt= g(xt,ut), (2)

FUZZINESS IN THE SYSTEM

ship of ai in A. Note thatthe nearer,tA(ai)is to unity,the largerthe membershipgrade

The testingon (1) and(2) requiresempiricalvaluationof the membershipfunctions

expendituredataareinterpretedhere as (admittedlycrudebut) sufficientindicatorsof

DERIVING MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS

Accordingto Zadeh(1971, 1973), when fuzzy variablesexist in a system, as is the

wherefis a mappingfromX x U to X, andX, +, is a fuzzy set in X thatis dependenton

whereX, and U, arefuzzy sets in X and U, respectively,with the membershipfunctions

x(x +l)= V V [X(Xt) IiIX,, u)1, (5)

where v and Aconnote,respectively,the operationsof takingthe maximumandmini-

gy(yt)= V [jx(xt) AJl(U)Agly(Y,|Xt, (6)

These two membershipfunctions-(5) and (6)-become the centerpiecesof the test-

The aim of the testing process is to predictboth the political relationshipbetween

POWER BALANCE AND POWER

POWER BALANCES VERSUS POWER TRANSITIONS

The models pertainingto both (5) and(6) areinfluencedby the competingbalance-

whetherarmsimportsthatwiden or narrowthe gap in militarycapabilitiescontribute

Anotherimportantdifferencebetween this study and the conflict theoriesis high-

MODELS OF ARMS TRANSFERS

MembershipFunctions Models of Arms Transfers

i|X(XxilX,Ul) Luy(yiOX,Ul) .75 .33 .75

thatcooperationbetweenthe importersat t + 1 may be greaterwhen therewas conflict

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES: INDIA-PAKISTAN

INDIA-PAKISTAN POLITICAL RELATIONS

Models of Arms Transfers

India-Pakistanpolitical relations .07 .21 .74

NOTE:Entriesfor India-PakistanpoliticalrelationsarePearson'sr betweenestimatedandpredictedvalues

Havethese findingsanyparticularpolicy relevance?One is temptedto say thatthey

ing. The presenceof conflict itself suggestsPakistan'sdissatisfactionwith manyfacets

THE ROLES OF THE EXPORTERS

The discussionto this point has centeredon the aggregateeffects of armstransfers.

The most likely explanationis that the superpowerswere endeavoringto accom-

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This researchhas accomplishedits two mainobjectives.It has exploredthe connec-

we aretold, greatpowersarelikely to "ignoreminorpowers"(Tammenet al. 2000, 70;

Sanjian,G. S. 1992. A fuzzy set model of NATOdecision-making:The case of short-rangenuclearforces in

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