PEOPLE v RESABAL
Jerny beamed his flashlight and the
Facts:
There was an altercation between Primo Ordiz and
Resabal since the carabao of the latter went to the
coconut plantation of the former which caused damage to
the same. When Resabal asked Ordiz to return the
carabao to him, the latter refused until the former pay to
him the amount of damages. Few days after, Resabal
went to the house of Glicerio Orit and invited him to go to
the house of Ordiz to kill him. When they went, Resabal
went to a window and through it, looked inside. At that
moment, Glicerio went away, and afterwards heard an
explosion. Resabal shot Ordiz at his left chest.
An information was eventually filed against Resabal,
where the RTC convicted him of murder. Resabal
contended, among others, that the RTC should not have
considered the testimony of Glicerio for: first, he was not
included in the information as witnesses for the
prosecution; and second, there are inconsistencies in his
statements made during the preliminary investigation
and during the trial itself.
Issue:
WON Glicerio’s testimony should be considered.
Ruling:
Yes. The court said that the mere non-inclusion in the
information as witness for the prosecution does not
prevent Glicerio from telling the truth of what happened
to the court. Further, going to the main issue, the court
said that the apparent contradiction of such statements is
not enough to discredit the testimony of Glicerio for he
was not given ample opportunity to give explanation
thereof, by reading to him of the discrepancies noted by
the counsel of Resabal. Mere presentation to him of the
document containing such testimony WITHOUT reading
to him the contents and the declaration he made, is not
sufficient and not a ground for impeaching his testimony.
PEOPLE v CORTEZANO
Facts:
Siblings Roderick and Jerny Valentin was on the bangca
on their way to fetch water from a well, when suddenly a
flashlight beam was placed on Roderick’s and later on
was shot. The light was placed afterwards on Jerny, but
the assailant missed to shoot him. The assailant then
went near them.
siblings recognized the assailant who is Job Cortezano.
The latter immediately ran away. Roderick, while on their
to hospital with Jerny and their father, uttered to them
that it was Job who shot him. He later on expired before
arriving to the hospital. Job was charged for murder.
During the trial, the barangay captain Alonzo testified
that Jimmy, Job’s father, told him that his son wanted to
surrender. Job admitted to Alonzo having shot Roderick.
The police investigator also testified of the surrender and
detention of Job.
In defense, Job denied the allegations and contended
that he was nowhere in the crime scene as he went to his
parent’s house alone and was sleeping, for being drunk
from the fiesta. He further said that a certain Pelicia, a
relative of his mother, went to their house and told him
that Pelicia shot someone. He said that his father went to
see Alonzo for him to be escorted to the police station as
they were afraid of the threats of Pelicia. But during the
cross-examination, he admitted having confessed of
shooting Job because of the threats of Pelicia. Jimmy
however testified that on the day of the commission of
the crime, his son Job was at their house who arrived
with a certain Pelicia, (a CAFGU member according to the
prosecution), for a drinking session, who exhibited a gun
and told them that he shot someone. A certain witness
also testified having heard this statement of Pelicia.
The trial court convicted Job on the basis of the
straightforward, unshaken and convincing testimony of
Jerny.
The defense is now contending to discredit the testimony
of Jerny for being inconsistent. They said that there is a
discrepancy since in the sworn statement executed by
Jerny, he stated that he recognized the assailant when he
beamed his flashlight on the latter while the assailant was
running away. However, during the trial, he testified that
he recognized the assailant hen the latter went near him
and was beamed by the flashlight of Jerny.
Issue:
WON the testimony of Jerny should be discredited.
Ruling:
NO. It is a well-established rule that inconsistencies
between the testimony given in open court and sworn
statements given to investigators do not necessarily
discredit the witness since ex-parte affidavits are seldom
complete. While the inconsistency was pointed out to
Jerny during his cross-examination, however, it appears
from the records that Jerny was not given and
opportunity to explain such in order to elicit a response
from him. Further, the sworn statement was written in
English, a language that Jerny could not understand.
Well-settled is the rule that previous extrajudicial
statement cannot be employed to impeach the credibility
of a witness unless his attention is first directed to the
discrepancies, and he must then be given an opportunity
to explain them. It is only when the witness fails to give a
reasonable explanation that he shall be deemed impeach.
There may not be even a conflict at all. Such statements
just shows the chronological sequence of the events. Job
went near them, and when they beamed their flashlight
to him, thereby recognizing that it was Job, the latter ran
away.
BARTOLOME v IAC
Facts:
A lot which was previously owned by Epitacio is under
dispute. He has a wife and two children, Catalina and
Pedro. The latter died single. Catalina had five children,
including herein petitioner Resurreccion. Epitacio and his
wife Maria Gonzales entrusted the lot to Epitacio’s cousin,
Doroteo Bartolome and they went to Isabela. Epitacio
then died and so Maria G and their children went back to
Laoag who found out that their house on the disputed
land was razed by fire. Maria G later on died, and later on
Doroteo. A cadastral proceeding was instituted by the
Director of Lands over the lot where Ursula Cid, the wife
of the deceased Bernabe Bartolome, son of Doroteo, filed
an answer claiming ownership thereof. She contended
that Bernabe inherited the lot from his father Doroteo,
and when Bernabe died, she inherited the same.
Resurreccion, petitioner herein and grandchild of Epitacio
and Maria G, claimed ownership over the portion of said
lot, contending that she inherited the same from her
grandparents. Later on, Resurreccion verbally entrusted
the lot to Maria Bartolome, daughter of Doroteo. Maria B
filed an answer in intervention alleging that she has been
excluded in Ursula Cid’s answer to the petition. He claim
co-ownership over the disputed land, for having inherited,
together with her siblings, the lot from their deceased
father.
In an amended aswer, Ursula Cid changed her contention.
She contended that the lot was brought by her and his
husband Bernabe. Said lot was formerly three lots, thus,
she presented three deeds of sale. Trial court did not rule
in favor of Ursula since according to them, the Exhibits
presented were defective since the vendors were not the
real owner. Specifically as to Exhibit 4, the same is
incomplete and unsigned. The CA however reversed the
same contending that the deeds are ancient documents.
Resurreccion is now arguing that they are not ancient
documents. The Exhibit 4 presented to the court consists
of 3 pieces of paper. However, according to Dominador,
the son of Ursula when the said deed (Alleged Sale by
Maria Gonzales to Ursula and Bernabe of the Lot) was
shown to him by her mother Ursula, they were 4, the
fourth document containing the signature of Maria
Gonzales.
Issue:
WON the Exhibit 4 (Deed of Sale) should be considered
as ancient document.
Ruling:
NO. Although it satisfies the first 2 requisites: deed was
executed in 1917 and was more than 30 yers old when
presented on 1983; it was presented by the proper
custodian thereof who is the heir Dominador who would
naturally keep it, there was the absence of the third
requisite: that no alterations or circumstances of
suspicion are present.
The missing page affected its authenticity since it bears
the signature of the vendor, a vital proof of the voluntary
transfer of rights over the lot, without which, the
document is incomplete. An incomplete document is akin
to if not worse than a document with altered contents.
Since it cannot be considered as ancient document, proof
of its due execution and authenticity should be presented
either: by anyone who saw the writing executed;
evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker; or by a subscribing witness. The respondents
failed to this, who only presented the testimony of
Dominador, which testimony does not fall to any of the 3
above-mentioned.
AZNAR v CTIBANK
Facts:
Aznar is a well known businessman in Cebu and is a
holder of a Mastercard with Citibank with credit card limit
of 150k. He and his wife decided to take their
grandchildren to an Asian tour and made an advanced
deposit of 485k with the intention of increasing his credit
limit to 635k. They purchased a ticket to KL using the
card worth 237k. When he used the same to different
establishments abroad, it was not honored. Specifically at
Ingtan Agency in Indonesia, it was again dishonored and
he presumed that his card was blacklisted by the Citibank.
When they returned to the Philippines, he filed damages
against Citibank. He presented a computer print-out
denominated as “On-line Authorization Foreign Account
Activity Report issued by the said Agency with the
signature of a certain Nubi to show that his card was
Declared Over the Limit. To prove that he was not
blacklisted, the Citibank, through Flores, the Credit Card
Department Head, presented a Warning Cancellation
Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards,
and which does not include that of Aznar. RTC gave
weight to the evidence of Citibank. On MR, RTC reversed
its own decision and ave credence to the evidence of
Aznar. CA however ruled in favor of Citibank.
Aznar arues that he saw Nubi signed the print-out
document, thus, such testimony constitutes the “other
evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the
print-ou to the satisfaction of the jude.” Citibank however
argues that Aznar never had personal knowledge that his
credit card was blacklisted as he merely presumed such
fact from the dishonor of his card; that he never declared
that it was Nubi who printed the the print-out in his
presence as he merely testified that it was provided for
him by the agency.
Issue:
WON the print-out document was properly authenticated.
Ruling:
NO. It should be noted that Azanar never had personal
knowledge of the blacklisting of his card as he merely
presumed the same. He even admitted that it was
accepted in some establishments. The print-out
document is inadmissible as its execution and
authenticity were not sufficiently proven.
ROC requires a private document’s execution and
authenticity must be proven either: by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Nubi was never presented to authenticate the said
document. Aznar, who testified to its authenticity, did not
actually see the document executed or written, neither
was he able to provide evidence to the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of Nubi.
Under Rules on Electronic Evidence, authenticity may be
proved eithery by: evidence that it had been digitally
signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
evidence that other appropriate security procedures or
devices as may be authorized by SC or by law were
applied; or other evidence showing the integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar’s testimony that the Agency merely handed him
such and requested Nubi to signed the same does not fall
on any of these three. On the face of such document, it
does not show that it was issued by the Ingtan Agency.
There was even no specific business address of the
Agency.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ARCILLA v TEODORO
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro applied for registration of two
parcels of land. He alleged that he acquired the same
through sale by his father Pacifico, evidenced by a Deed
of Sale; that Pacifico acquired such lots from his father,
as evidenced by an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate;
and he also presented an Affidavit of Quit-claim executed
by the petitioners, heirs of Vicente who is the brother of
Pacifico, in favor of the latter. Petitioners contended that
they are owners pro-indiviso since they inherited the
same from their parents, Vicente and Josefa, where such
lot, owned by Vicente, was purchased from someone.
Such ownership according to the Heirs is evidenced by
tax declaration.
Respondent filed a Motion for Admission for failure to
attach certification against forum shopping. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on this ground. The courts ruled
in favor of the respondent. Petitioner now contends that
the belated filing of the certification is not a substantial
compliance of the rules. And even assuming that it is, it
requires a certification from an officer of the foreign
service of the Philippines as provided under Section 24,
Rule 132 of the ROC, and it does not state the country or
city where the notary public exercised her notarial
functions.
Issue:
WON the verification and certification against forum
shopping executed abroad (USA) requires a certification
from an officer.
Ruling:
NO. It should be noted that the belated filing of such is a
substantial compliance of the rules since there is no
intention on the part of the respondent to violate the
same. Further, rules are promulgated to aid and uphold
justice, not to defeat them.
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a
foreign country is not covered by Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the
ROC, as it does not include documents which are
acknowledged before a notary public. It only pertain to
paragraph (a) of Sec. 19, Rule 132, which pertains to
written official acts or records of the official of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign
country. Thus, certification is not required. What is
important is the fact that the respondent-applicant
certified before a commissioned officer that she has not
and will not commit forum shopping.
Further, tax declaration are not proof of ownership, as
compared to the evidence of Teodoro which is sufficient
to establish his ownership. And since such evidence were
all notarized, it enjoys the presumption of regularity.
KUMMER v PEOPLE
Facts:
Mallo, with Malana, went to the house of the petitioner
and identified himself that he is Boy Mallo. When
petitioner opened the door, her son and co-accused
Johan, shoe Mallo twice. Malana immediately ran away,
and when he turned back, he saw petitioner shootin
Mallo’s back. As it was 10pm, they used a flashlight to see
if Mallo is already dead. Upon confirming that he is, they
pulled Mallo’s body away from the house and went back
inside and turned off the lights. When police went to their
house the following day, they denied knowledge of the
same. They were charged with homicide.
Petitioner contended that when they were already asleep,
they were awakened by the stones thrown at their house.
Believing that it was caused by the NPA prevalent at their
area, Johan got a gun and fired outside. Since it did not
stopped, he got their shotgun and fired it outside. The
noise stopped.
RTC convicted both the accused and gave credence to
the testimony of Malana and a certain Cuntapay having
positively identified the accused. Johan however was
release on the cognizance of his father and left the
country. Petitioner contends that the testimony of the
witnesses should be discredited for having discrepancies
between the sworn statements and the direct testimony.
She contended that Malana’s affidavit stated that she
dived into the ground and heard 2 shots, inconsistent
with his testimony that he saw petitioner shot Mallo. She
also contended that Cuntapay’s affidavit declared that he
heard the gunshots but during his direct testimony, he
said that he saw petitioner shooting Mallo.
Issue:
WON the testimony of the witnesses should be
discredited.
Ruling:
NO. Inconsistencies between the testimony of the
witness in open court and the statements in his sworn
affidavit which pertains only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect the veracity and credibility and
weight of the testimony as they do not touch upon the
commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions may
even be considered as badges of truth as they prove that
the testimony was not rehearsed. Ex parte affidavits are
generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and
the testimony given in an open court, the latter should
prevail because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in an
open court.
Further, there is no standard human behavioral response
when one is confronted with an unusual, strange,
startling or frightful experience. Lastly, public documents
are admissible in court without further proof of their due
execution and authenticity. The chemistry report showing
the paraffin test is a public document since it was
executed by a public officer made in the performance of
his public function. The police officer was even presented
in the court to identify the same.
HEIRS OF LACSA v CA and HEIRS OF INOCENCIO
SONGCO
Facts:
Petitioners filed to petitions against the respondents. First
one is an action for recovery of possession and the
second one is for the cancellation of title of ownership.
They contended that by stealth, fraud and other forms of
machinations, the respondents succeeded in possessing a
certain parcel of land with a fishpond and partly an
uncultivated space. They contended that the respondents
also succeeded in having the property registered in the
name of their predecessor. They alleged that these were
done through the simulated and fictitious execution of
documents, namely: Extrajudicial Partition, and Deed of
Absolute Sale. The presented an OCT evidencing the
ownership of their Mother Lacsa.
Respondents on the other hand contended that they
legally own the property by virtue of inheritance from
their predecessor, Inocencio. They alleged that deceased
Lacsa originally owned the property, which was
succeeded by her daughters, where later on the OCT was
canceled and a TCT was issued in favor of them by virtue
of the Extrajudicial Partition. Later on, such TCT was
eventually superseded by another TCT in favor of
Inocencio by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus,
when the latter died, they inherited the property. They
further filed a counterclaim for an unrealized profits and
damages over their fingerlings. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents, which was affirmed by the CA, where they
ruled that the documents are ancient documents, and
thus should be afforded credibility.
Petitioners now contend that the 2 documents do not
satisfy the requirements of the ancient document rule
since there is an absence of signature in the first pages of
said documents, thus, not satisfying the third and last
requisite of the rule.
Issue:
WON the Extrajudicial Partition and the Deed of Absolute
Sale are ancient documents.
Ruling:
Yes. For a document to fall under the ancient document
rule, it must not only be more than 30 years old, but it
also must be produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and that it is unblemished
by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Both the
Extrajudicial Partition and the Deed of Absolute sale are
more than 30 years old which was executed on 1923 and
1924 respectively, and was presented on evidence on or
around 1985. It was also produced from the Register of
Deeds who had the custody of the same in which it would
naturally be found which certified as exact copies of the
original. As to the last requirement, the document must
on its face appear to be genuine, to which the petitioners
failed to present evidence for the alleged falsification of
the documents. It should be noted that a contract
apparently honest and lawful on its face should be
treated as such and the one who assails the same has the
burden of proving otherwise. Such last requirement
refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The
lack of signatures on the first pages, absent any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held
to detract from the fact that theses documents are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of
suspicion.
VICTORIA MILLING COMPANY INC. v ONG SU
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic company engaged in the
manufacture and sale of sugar with trademark VITORIAS
and diamond design. It petitioned to cancel the
registration of the trademark of respondent “VALENTINE”
with diamond design. It contended that the trademark of
the respondent is confusingly similar and deceptive to
that of the petitioner which caused confusion to the
buyers who might think that the respondent is one and
the same or in any way connected with petitioner. It
further contended that it has used such trademark since
1947 as testified by its only witness, the VP.
On the other hand, the respondent contended that they
have been using the trademark since prior to the World
War II and there was even no similarity between the two.
They presented one of their agent which testified that on
his capacity as such over a period of long time, he has not
encountered any buyer or consumer which have been
confused between the identity of the 2 trademarks.
Petitioner now contends that it was denied due process
when the court sustained the objection of the respondent
when the former tried to offer as evidence and present
witness Duran to prove confusion. The respondent
objected to the same on the ground that such testimony
does not directly contradict the testimony of the agent of
respondent. This was sustained by the court.
Issue:
WON the court erred in sustaining the objection of
respondent.
Ruling:
NO. The petitioner cannot contend that it was denied due
process with the court sustaining the objection of
respondent as the latter objected when the petitioner
formally offered the evidence from the testimony sought
to be elicited from Duran, thus, a timely objection.
Further, the court also said that there was no similarity
between the trademarks used by the two. They were
different in spelling and the petitioner failed to prove that
there was already a secondary meaning by the use of the
diamond design. Such design is even considered as
having a common meaning. The design of respondent
also is different since its diamond has a protruding line at
the corners. Thus, it denied the petition for cancellation
of trademark.
PHILIP YU v CA AND VIVICA YU
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent are husband and wife.
PR filed a legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
property against petitioner on the ground of marital
infidelity and physical abuse. She moved for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum of
certain officers of Insurance Life to compel production of
insurance policy and application of a person suspected to
be an illegitimate child of petitioner. Petitioner objected
to the production of said documents. The RTC sustained
the objection and denied the motion on the ground that
such is a privilege communication by virtue of a Circular
Letter issued by the Insurance commission making it as
such, and it would violate the Civil Code on the
prohibition to divulge the identity of the parents of the
illegitimate child. Thus, PR filed a motion to attach
excluded evidence to the record. This was also denied.
On appeal to CA, it ruled in favor of PR.
Issue:
WON the RTC erred in sustaining the objection of
petitioner and denying the motion of PR.
Ruling:
YES. The PR was merely seeking for the production of the
insurance policy and other documents and was not ye
making a formal offer of the same as its evidence. Thus,
the objection by the petitioner was premature. Further,
the contents of such documents cannot be considered
privilege as the Circular Letter by the Commission was
never intended to be a legal impediment in complying
with the lawful orders of the court. The trial court does
not have the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to
tender excluded evidence as this privilege allows said
party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence.
While the trial court have discretion to admit or exclude
evidence, such power should be exercised only when the
evidence has been formally offered. During the early
stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a
trial court judge to know with certainty whether the
evidence is relevant or not, thus, the practice of excluding
the same on doubtful objections to its materiality should
be avoided. A judge of first instance may possibly fall into
error in judging the relevancy of the proof where a fair
and logical connection is shown. In such case, the SC
would have difficulty to correct such error. On the other
hand, the admission of proof in CFI, even if the question
as to its materiality or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result to the same because the trial judge is supposed to
know. In such case, the SC would not have difficulty in
correcting the error as it has all the material before it
necessary in doing so. Even assuming that the
documents would be declared eventually as inadmissible,
the RTC was not then in a position to make a declaration
to that effect as it was not yet formally offered. It barred
the production of the subject documents prior to the
assessment of its probable worth.
Before a tender of excluded evidence is made, the
evidence must have been formally offered, and prior to
such offer, it must have been identified and presented
before the court. While the PR made a Tender of
Excluded Evidence, such is not the one contemplated by
the Rule as there was no formal offer yet of the same. At
most, such was a manifestation that the subject
documents were declared inadmissible by the RTC even
before presentation during the trial. This is not the kind of
plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated, and
does not in any way render the said petition moot.
ABARQUEZ v PEOPLE
Facts:
Abarquez was charged and convicted by the RTC of as an
accomplice to homicide and attempted homicide. Based
on the side of prosecution, Paz and Quejong were at the
house of Boyet for the birthday of the latter’s son, having
drinking session. When they decided to go home and was
on their way, the group of Almojuela and Abarquez was
also drinking. The latter tried to block the path of the
former and Almojuela asked Paz if he was brave, and the
latter answered why? The former then stabbed the latter,
where Paz parried, but nevertheless sustained injury.
Almojuela then had a quarrel with Quejong, and they
grappled on the ground. Paz was held by Abarquez in
order for him not to help Quejong. When he freed himself,
he saw Quejong stabbed by Almojuela. He went away to
ask for help, he heard Abarquez shouted that “you left
your companion wounded.” Quejong eventually died.
In defense, Abarquez said that at the time he was at his
residence, Almojuela’s wife went to him to ask for help
for being a Kagawad, because Paz challenged Almojuela
to a fistfight. When he went to the scene, he shouted to
them to stop. Since they did not, he fired a warning shot
which made them stop. Almojuela also said that his
daughter told him that the group of Paz was smoking
marijuana near their house. He requested them to go
away as there were children, which made them angry at
him. A quarrel eventually occurred. During the altercation,
Abarquez was holding Paz telling the latter “Tumigil na
kayo.”
Abarquez now contends that he should not be convicted
since the evidence of the prosecution does not satisfy the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his
conviction as an accomplice.
Issue:
WON the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to convict
Abarquez.
Ruling:
NO. Abarquez was merely trying to tell them to stop, and
was not restraining Paz in order for him not to help his
companion. His act of holding Paz was not in anyway an
outward indication that he is trying to help Almojuela
commit the crime and kill Quejong. As such, the
equipoise rule. The rule provides that when an
inculpatory facts and circumstances are sufficient of two
or more interpretations or explanations, one is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, the accused should be acquitted
for then the evidence required to convict him is not met
and is not sufficient to fulfill the test of moral certainty.
The quantum of proof required is found lacking. Thus,
the constitutional guarantee that a person should be
presumed innocent.
HEIRS OF REYES v CA and REYES and
REYES-PAULINO
Facts:
Eustaquia originally owned the subject property of this
case as his paraphernal property. He leased the same to
ACME where they agreed that the latter can introduce
improvements thereon but will be automatically
transferred to the lessor without further reimbursement
at the end of the lease period. A contract of lease was
then execute where bot Eustaquia and Magno, her
husband, affixed their signature thereon. During the
lease period, she sold the same to herein private
respondents, her nieces, with only his signature and
stipulating in the Notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that
the property was her paraphernal property. She later on
died.
Petitioners, children of siblings of Eustaquia now filed a
petition for partition and receivership against Magno and
PR on the ground that they have not repudiated their
inheritance from Eustaquia, thus, they are deemed to be
co-owner. As such, they should also receive the profits
from the rentals from the market stalls on such property.
That the property was acquire to fictitious and simulated
conveyances since the signature of Magno was not
acquired and affixed in the Deed, and indispensable
factor for the transfer of rights considering that the
property is conjugal. Since the improvements thereon
came from the civil fruits of the conjugal partnership, said
property was converted to become part of the
partnership. They presented a carpenter who was
engaged before Eustaquia and Magno who testified that
there were 10 houses and buildings in the property
including that occupied by a knitting company.
PR on the other hand contended that such property was
paraphernal property of Eustaquia when it was sold to
them. Thus, there was a valid sale and transfer of
ownership rights. They presented a lessee (I think
Reyes-Paulino) of Eustaquia who leased one of the
latter’s house, and who testified that theses houses and
building were erected on a separate property.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but was reversed by
the CA.
Issue:
WON the petitioner’s evidence should be afforded greater
weight to sustain an invalidity of the sale.
Ruling:
NO. PR’s evidence should be given more weight and
credence. Pursuant to the actor’s rule, a well-known test
of credibility, it is the witness whose action is more
closely connected to the point at issue should be given
more credence. As between the carpenter and the lessee,
it should be the latter who should be given more
credence. For while a carpenter would not concern
himself of the title of the property, the lessee would
normally look into the title and ownership covering the
property to which he is leasing, including its precise
location and boundaries. It is the lessee’s act of renting
which is the action closely connected to the point in issue,
the ownership of the property. When the carpenter
testified as to the houses erected, he may have been
referring to other houses erected on a separate property,
since it should be noted that the complaint only
mentioned market stalls.
Lastly, the improvements made on the subject property
was never financed from the civil fruits of the partnership,
as it should be noted that the improvements will inure
only to the lessor upon the termination of the lease
period. Such improvements was financed solely by ACME.
Thus, when it was sold to the PR prior to the termination
of the lease period, it was still a paraphernal property of
Eustaquia. Thus, there was a valid sale.
PEOPLE v ESTIBAL y CALUNGASAG
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged for the crime of rape
against his own 13 year-old daughter. He entered a plea
of not guilty. However, during pre-trial, an affidavit of
desistance was executed by the mother and the daughter
as the daughter have already forgiven her father.
It appears that on the date of the incident, the victim AAA
confessed to her cousin DDD that her father raped her in
that morning and for several years since she was Grade
III. DDD convinced her to tell BBB, the mother, and so
she did. Outraged of what she learned, BBB went to the
barangay security force (BSF) to ask for help. When
accused was on his way home, he was then arrested.
AAA confessed to the BSF of what her father did to him.
She also did the same to a police investigator (PI).
However, during trial, both AAA and BBB cannot be
presented as they were unable to be found despite
several subpoenas. And so, the BSF and the PI were
presented as witnesses and the prosecution claimed that
despite being hearsay, the testimony falls under res
gestae, and since it was heard by the BSF and PI, it
should be admissible.
The accused’s defense consisted merely of denial. He
said that he and his wife often quarrel about the latter’s
brothers, whom he suspects to have convinced AAA to
file the case for rape against him. RTC however convicted
him and admitted the testimony of AAA, as relayed by the
BSF and PI, as part of the res gestae.
Issue:
WON the testimony should be admitted as part of the res
gestae and thus convict the accused.
Ruling:
NO. Three requisites must concur before a testimony
should be admitted as part of the res gestae: (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurence; (2)
that there was no opportunity on the part of declarant to
concoct or contrive or deliberate, as to devise falsehood;
and (3) that the statements made must concern the
occurrence and its immediate attending circumstances.
In this case, there was no spontaneous statement made
by AAA as it, in fact, has been relayed to several persons
already prior to the BSF and PI. When it was relayed to
BBB, AAA already had a clear mind and motive, which is
to convict her father, through the encouragement made
by DDD. When it was relayed to the BSF and PI, there
was already an opportunity to deliberate, as they did,
when her mother took the necessary steps to relay the
same to the BSF and PI. Thus, it cannot be said that there
was spontaneity, and it s there not part of the res gestae.
Not being part of the res gestae, and since the
prosecution was not able to present AAA, the testimony
of BSF and PI as to the incident, is considered hearsay, as
they even admitted that they do not have personal
knowledge of the same, and therefore, their testimonies
are inadmissible.
Lastly, we apply here the equipoise rule. When
inculpatory facts or circumstances are susceptible of two
or more interpretations or explanations, one which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, it does not fulfill the
requirement of proof to satisfy the test of moral certainty
for conviction. As the constitution provides that an
accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence, it
is upon the prosecution who has the burden to prove his
guild on the crime. The prosecution’s evidence must
stand or fall based on his own evidence, and can never
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
accused. The latter may even choose not to present
evidence as what is only required of him is to cast doubt
in order to be acquitted. Thus, it is imperative for the
prosecution to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt.
It should satisfy the test of moral certainty, or that which
is sufficient to convict through an unprejudiced mind. In
this case, without condoning the beastiality made by the
accused, he is nevertheless acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guild beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE v VICTOR PADIT
Facts:
AAA was a 4 year-old child; she was playing inside their
house at the date of the incident. After a while, she went
outside to buy some bread. While outside, she was seen
by accused, the uncle of her mother, who she calls Lolo
Victor, and she was called to go their house being
neighbors. She was then allowed to play therein. The
accused afterwards brought AAA upstairs and forced her
to lie down and rubbed his penis in the vagina of AAA.
She threatened her not to tell anyone. When the mother
was about to serve lunch, she observed that AAA is
missing. And so she went to her neighbors and called for
AAA. Accused answered that AAA is inside his house
watching him weave basket, and he then brought her
outside. AAA eventually told her mother of what
happened. AAA felt pain in her private part when she was
bathe by her mother. The following day a complaint was
filed against the accused for rape in Samar.
The accused denied the allegations and alleged that he
could not have done it since his wife was with him when
the alleged incident happened. RTC convicted him relying
on the testimony of AAA and her mother, affirmed by the
CA. Accused now contends that the testimony of AAA
should be discredited for having inconsistencies and
loopholes, and that of her mother for being hearsay. He
alleged that if he really did the crime, why of is it that of
all times that AAA went to his house, it was only during
the alleged time that he decided to commit the alleged
crime.
Issue:
WON the testimony of AAA and her mother should be
discredited.
Ruling:
NO. Testimony of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credence since when a girl, particularly if
she’s a minor, says that she has been raped, she say all
that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity. With her age, AAA could not have
fabricated the story of rape as it is beyond her mental
capacity to do so, being only 4 when the crime happened,
and 5 when she took the witness stand. The fact the she
is a minor does not mean that she is incapable of
perceiving and making known what she perceived.
Children of sound mind are likely to be observant of
incidents which took place within their view as compared
to older persons, and their testimonies are likely more
correct in detail. AAA had consistently, positively, and
categorically identified the accused as the one who raped
her. Her testimony was direct, candid and replete with
details of rape.
Even if the testimony of her mother be considered
hearsay, such would not have bearing in the case since
the testimony of AAA is more than sufficient to convict
the accused, who was even cross-examined by the
counsel for the accused. In any case, the testimony of the
mother can be considered as to corroborate the
testimony of AAA, and to prove the acts of the latter after
the crime was committed against her.
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a
witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the
significant facts indispensable to the guilt or innocence of
the accused for the crime charged. The last argument of
the accused has no bearing to the case as it is not even
part of the elements of the crime charged.
CRUZ v CA and SPOUSES MALOLOS
Facts:
Petitioners are the wife and children of Delfin. When the
latter died, petitioners executed a notarized Deed of
Partial Partition (DPP) by virtue of which they were given
each part of their share in property of Delfin. Eventually,
a MOA was executed where it stipulated that they are
co-owner pro-indiviso and that any proceeds from the
sale of such properties will be shared by all of them. The
subject property of this case is that of petitioner Nerissa
Tamayo, registered in her own name. Spouses Malolos
filed a recovery for sum of money against Spouses
Tamayo. RTC ruled in their favor and so the subject
property was levied and was eventually sold to the
highest bidder who were the Spouses Malolos. Spouses
Tamayo failed to redeem the same during the
redemption period, so RP requested that the TCT be
surrendered to them, but SPS Tamayo refused. RTC
ordered the latter, but still refused, so RP petition to
cancel such TCT. Petitioners opposed the same
contending that they are co-owners of the subject
property. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed
the same. Petitioners now contend that several deeds of
sale and real estate mortgage executed by them when
they conveyed some parcels of the adjudicated property
to them by virtue of the DPP which contained the
statement that they are the absolute owner of the same,
cannot be deemed as an estoppel, and in ruling so, the
CA violated the res inter alios acta rule that prohibits
evidence which tends to show that what a person has
done at one time is probative of the contention that he
has done the same at other time.

Issue:

WON res inter alios acta should apply.

Ruling:

NO. An exception to the rule is that collateral facts may

be received when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the
fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the fact
or issue to be proved, as when it tends to prove fraud,
deceit, state of mind or knowledge of person, motive or
intent, scheme, design or plan. Petitioners act of entering
into transactions with the their property (part of the DPP)
in the concept of absolute owner is relevant to the iss in
this case as it tends to corroborate the issue of ownership
of the subject property. Ownership of the said property
should be the same to all properties which are subject of
the DPP and MOA. Since the properties owned by the
petitioner were entered into transaction in the concept of
absolute ownership, then the subject property of this
case should also be treated as absolutely owned by
Nerissa Tamayo. Thus, it is the common purpose and
design of the petitioners to treat all properties subject of
the MOA as absolutely owned by the persons to whom
they have been adjudicated.

Lastly, there is neither inconsistency nor act of

superseding between the DPP and MOA. The DPP
conferred to the petitioners the right of absolute
ownership over the subject properties. The MOA did not
novate the same as to confer co-ownership, since it
merely imposed an obligation among them to share the
proceeds of the sale of the properties subject of the DPP.