NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF THE PH
JUDICIARY
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Libarios v. Dabalos
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286 | July 11, 1991 | J. Padilla
SUMMARY OF FACTS: An administrative complaint was
filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client
Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito
F. Dabalos for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the respondent
Judge against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr. and
Belarmino Alloco for the crime of murder fixing their bail
without any prior hearing.
DOCTRINE: A judge should not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as
to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity.
FACTS:
1. In relation to the frustrated murder of Mayor
Corvera, Sr. against accused Calo and Allocod,
the respondent Judge issued warrants of
arrest and, at the same time, fixed their bail for
temporary release -- both accomplished
without a hearing.
a. On 10 March 1988, former Mayor
Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by
Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge
Dabalos, after a hearing in a
frustrated murder case against said
Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the
private complainant in the aforesaid
criminal case, while Mayor
Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing
as counsel of Macapas. As a result
of the killing of Corvera Sr., a formal
charge of murder was filed with the
City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City
against Pablo Macapas, Mayor
Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-
bodyguard Belarmino Allocod, and
(2) other "John Does". Macapas was
a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
b. On scheduled date of raffle, Calo
and counsel personally filed an
opposition to the holding of raffle on
the ground of lack of notice to the
parties.
i. C o r v e r a , J r. a n d h i s
counsel, together with
sympathisers, staged a
rally demanding
immediate arrest of the
accused and they even
personally went to the
Respondent in his
chamber to reiterate their
demand
ii. In the meeting, the Judge
issued an order directing
the raffle of the case with
due notice to the parties
iii. Without conducting prior
hearing, Respondent
directed the issuance of
warrant of arrest against
the accused and fixed bail
for Calo at P50,000 but no
bail was recommended
for Macapas
2. In this administrative complaint, the
complainant claimed that the act of the
respondent Judge in granting bail to the
accused Calo and Allocod, without a hearing,
is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful,
malicious, and blatant disregard of the
provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The impartiality of
respondent Judge in issuing the questioned
warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also
questioned on the ground of his “close
association” with the accused Calo, since
respondent Judge was the former employee of
the accused.
3. As a defense, the respondent Judge:
a. Rules on Criminal Procedure
applicable only to cases where the
accused is already in custody for
the commission of a capital offense
- neither of the 3 accused was being
detained at the time application for
bail was acted upon by him
b. Merely followed precedent set by
predecessors in issuing warrants of
arrest before the raffle of a case in
order to avoid delay in the arrest of
the accused
c. Denied the allegation that he was a
law partner of accused Calo,
claiming that he was a mere
employee in the business of the said
accused.
4. The Court of Appeals declared null and void
the warrants of arrest issued by the
respondent Judge, as well as the bail fixed by
him, all accomplished without a hearing.
ISSUE w/ HOLDING: WON respondent Judge violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct - YES
- In every case, a Judge should endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan or
personal interests, public opinion, or fear of
criticism.
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 - In this case, he should not have allowed
himself to be swayed into issuing an order
fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a
hearing, contrary to established principles of
law. In cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense (such as murder), the trial
court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present all evidence to prove
that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. Failure to conduct such a hearing
violated the due process of the accused.
- The fact that the complainant and his
sympathizers had staged a rally demanding
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
accused is not a sufficient excuse for the
unjustified haste of respondent Judge’s act of
fixing bail without a hearing.
- Furthermore, in order to avoid any doubt as to
his judicial impartiality, the respondent Judge
should have exercised prudence and regard to
refrain from fixing the bail of the accused --
given their close association (he was the
former employee of the accused).
- Respondent Judge should have waited for the
raffle of the case and allowed the judge to
whom the case was actually raffled to resolve
the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if
he was bailable.
- A judge should not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision but should do so in a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to
his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby
imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and
diligence in the performance of his duties as a Judge,
and that the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severally.
TAN v. ROSETE
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 | September 8, 2004 | J. Puno
SUMMARY: Tan alleges that before the cases were
dismissed, the Judge sent a member of his staff to talk
to complainant. The staff told her that respondent was
asking for P 150,000 in exchange for the non-dismissal
of the cases. She was then shown copies of the Judge’s
decisions in both cases, dismissing the complaint, but
were still unsigned. The staff allowed complainant to
keep the copy of the draft of one of the cases. As the
petitioner did not accede to the demands of the judge,
believing that she had a strong case, the cases were
eventually dismissed by the respondent Judge. As
evidence, the complainant showed the copy of the
unsigned draft of the decision of the Judge.
The SC suspended Judge Rosete for 4
months. The Court found the complainant’s testimony
to be more credible than the respondent’s. The judge’s
witnesses contradicted each other. Additionally, the
draft decision was impossible to obtain if not through
the judge’s office.
FACTS:
● TAN was the private complainant in criminal
cases against Alfonso Pe Sy pending in the
branch presided by Judge Rosete.
● Before the cases were decided, JUDGE
ROSETE allegedly sent a member of his staff
to talk to complainant, asking for P150,000 in
exchange for non-dismissal of the cases. The
staff member gave Tan unsigned copies of
Judge Rosete’s decisions of the dismissal of
the cases.
● Tan did not pay the said amount believing that
she can win the case based on evidence, not
on bribery. However, the cases were eventually
dismissed by Judge Rosete.
● In DEFENSE, Judge Rosete countered that it
was Tan who attempted to bribe him. Tan
even boasted that she’s San Juan Mayor
Estrada is her neighbor and that Estrada can
promote Rosete to a higher position. Rosete
also claimed that Estrada talked to him about
the cases and even when he was in New
Zealand, Estrada would even call him about
the case.
○ According to Rosete, he declined
Estrada’s offer because Tan did not
have sufficient evidence for her
c a s e . M o r e o v e r, h e a l r e a d y
entrusted the decisions on the
cases with Judge Quilatan before he
left for New Zealand on study leave.
Since he was already in NZ, he could
not have instructed his staff to ask
for bribe money from Tan.
ISSUE w/ HOLDING:
W/N Respondent should be administratively liable. —
YES. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and
other benefits for 4 months.
● The SC gave more credence to Tan’s version
of the story because she was able to present
the unsigned copies of the decision
dismissing the cases as given to her by the
Judge Rosete’s staff. If it were not true that
Tan met with Rosete’s staff, it would have
been impossible for Tan to obtain a copy of
the judge’s draft decision, it being highly
confidential.
● The SC also observed that respondent was
inconsistent in his testimonies regarding the
dates when he went to NZ and when he came
back to the Philippines. He did not present all
the information as to when he left and came
back. Apparently, he was in the Philippines at
the time Tan met with his staff member.
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 ● The SC emphasized that judges must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. This is necessary to promote
public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the
people’s confidence in the judicial system is
founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members
of the bench, but also on the highest standard
of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess.
● When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of the law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself.
RAMIREZ V JUDGE ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG
September 26, 1986 | Per Curiam
FACTS:
These are 6 separate complaints of various forms of
misconduct against Judge Macandog of RTC Caloocan
City.
1. Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was ordered by Judge
Liwag of RTC Caloocan to demolish the
improvements of defendants in certain civil cases.
These same defendants were intervenors in a case
handled by Judge Macandog wherein she issued a
preliminary injunction. Thereafter, she gave a
handwritten note to the superintendent of the
Northern Police District, ordering the arrest of
Ramirez. Hence, Ramirez filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the SC which ordered his release.
Macandog explained that she ordered the arrest to
preserve justice in the case she was handling so
that it would not be rendered moot and academic.
She also claimed that it was Judge Liwag who
erred in ordering the demolition because she
should have just remanded the case to the court of
origin.
2. In another civil case, defendant Pasion did not file
any answer to the complaint against him by
Samson. Hence, Samson moved to declare Pasion
in default and set the case for pre-trial. Despite
repeated motions to declare Pasion in default,
Judge Macandog did not act on the motions.
Hence, Samson filed complaint with the SC against
Judge Macandog. In her comment, Judge
Macandog explained that she already resolved
Samson’s motion before the latter brought the
complaint to the SC. However, Samson countered
that her counsel only received the resolution of her
motion after she complained to the SC; hence,
Macandog merely antedated the said resolution to
make it appear that she was not acting maliciously.
3. In a sworn letter-complaint, Torres claimed that
Judge Macandog has been issuing TROs without
conducting hearings on applications for
preliminary injunctions. Worse, upon the expiration
of said TROs, she would extend those orders
without hearing. She would also issue TROs
against the enforcement of writs of execution
issued by other branches of RTC Caloocan. She
also cited for contempt lawyers who would offend
her. She also issued TROs in ejectment cases
involving the “Maysilo Estate” for suspicious
considerations. Judge Macandog merely denied
the allegations. Eventually, Torres, who was
attorney-in-fact in another demolition case, was
ordered arrested by Judge Macandog for contempt
of court.
4. In another case, Judge Macandog was accused of
failing to decide a civil case which has been
submitted for decision for more than 18 months.
Macandog denied this saying that it was the
defendant Lazaro in the said case who refused to
attend the hearings or the conferences in order to
reach an amicable settlement. Macandog also
claimed that the defendant’s friend who was
government official used to call her and threaten
her with removal from her office if she did not
decide in favor of the defendant Lazaro.
5. In a criminal case of frustrated murder, Macandog
acquitted the accused despite the insufficiency of
evidence to support the claim of self-defense.
Worse, the offended party in the said criminal case
and her counsel were not present during the
promulgation of the decision acquitting the
accused.
6. Another civil case was originally assigned to Judge
Baylen of another branch of RTC Caloocan. Judge
Baylen was reassigned to another RTC when said
case was already submitted for decision. Hence,
the defendants in said case moved for a re-raffle to
another judge. Said motion was referred to Judge
Macandog, who initially denied the motion, but
eventually recalled the denial and considered the
case submitted for decision to her. Macandog
rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.
Thus, the plaintiffs in said case filed an MR and
wrote the Court Administrator asking whether
Macandog had the authority to decide the case.
The SC resolved to declare null and void
Macandog’s decision for lack of authority. The SC
also required her to explain why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with.
RULING: Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog dismissed
from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of
the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities.
DISCUSSION: (per case as laid down above)
On case #5: This does not warrant administrative
liability because to hold a judge liable for every
erroneous ruling, assuming that he has erred, would
amount to harassment.
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On case #1 and #3: The handwritten note is highly
irregular and improper. Her overzealousness in
implementing the order of arrest creates the impression
that she has taken an interest far and beyond that
expected of judicial officers. Hence, her impartiality is
questioned.
On case #2 and #4: Delay in the administration of justice
is the most common cause of complaint and a judge
should endeavor to avoid it. It is incumbent upon a
judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt and
convenient disposition of its business and he should not
tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect of officers of
court.
On #6: the referral of the case to Judge Macandog was
solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to re-
raffle the case to another judge. Such referral did not in
any manner empower or authorize her to decide the
case on the merits, particularly in the light of the
vigorous objection by the plaintiff.
Judges are required to observe due care in the
performance of their official duties. They are likewise
charged with the knowledge of internal rules and
procedures, especially those which relate to the scope
of their authority. Judge Macandog showed herself
morally unfit to remain in her office.
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
IN RE COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA MARCOS AGAINST
JUDGE F. MARCOS
A.M. No. 97-2-53
July 6, 2001
(Take note that this case was decided in 2001, and the
New Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary
was only implemented in 2004.)
PROVISION:
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware.
SUMMARY:
Mrs. Marcos wrote a letter to CJ Narvasa
praying that Judge Marcos’ wages be directly released
to her lest his mistress receive them. Judge Marcos
denied the allegations. An investigation was then
conducted. Eventually, the Marcoses settled their
issues. However, CJ Davide subsequently saw Judge
Marcos with his mistress in one of the events the
judiciary hosted. Apparently, Judge Marcos has since
been living with his mistress for three years and was
already separated from his wife. CJ Davide then
recommended the referral of the case to the OCA.
The SC found Judge Marcos to be undeniably
guilty of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Numerous pieces of evidence were presented to support
the accusation that Judge Marcos was indeed living
with his mistress. He was dismissed from the service
with prejudice to reinstatement. The charge of
immorality proven against the Judge demonstrated his
unfitness to remain in office and continue to discharge
the functions and duties of a judge. The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is
also judged by his private morals.
FACTS:
! In a hand-written letter to Chief Justice (CJ)
Narvasa, Mrs. Rotilla Marcos and her children
complained against Judge Marcos, alleging that
they do not receive enough support for their
sustenance and education, and that they were
made to believe by Judge Marcos that he only
receive a meagre amount, when in fact, he receives
various allowances and bonuses.
! They prayed that all the remuneration due Judge
Marcos be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the
school where she has been serving for 20 years, to
prevent his mistress from getting them.
! Judge Marcos:
o Denied his failure to support his family,
and having a mistress.
o Prayed for the dismissal of the case, as
▪ His wife and children had
already signed a letter
withdrawing their complaint.
He had signed a letter of
▪
undertaking to give all the
checks due him from the
Supreme Court to his wife.
! Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).
! OCA, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Abesamis:
o Recommendation:
▪ That the complaint be
considered closed and
terminated.
o Bases:
▪ Letter-withdrawal submitted
by the complainants.
! Judge Marcos had
already signed an
undertaking.
! The allegation of a
mistress sprouted
only from
unconfirmed reports.
▪ Letter of undertaking by Judge
Marcos.
! Court Administrator:
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 o Did not approve of DCA Abesamis
recommendation.
o Did not report the matter to the Court.
! The case remained suspended until it was revived
by CJ Davide.
o In a Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine
Judges Association, CJ Davide saw
Judge Marcos with the latter’s alleged
mistress.
o Davide pulled Marcos to the side and
confronted the latter about the woman,
to which Marcos admitted that he had
been living with the woman, Mae
Tacaldo, for 3 years, and that he had
been separated from his wife.
! CJ Davide recommended the
o Referral of the case to OCA Consultant
Ramirez.
o Suspension of Judge Marcos from office.
! Court:
o Adopted the recommendation of CJ
Davide.
o The matter was referred to Justice
Quimbo of OCA, as Ramirez went to US.
! Complainant:
o When Judge Marcos was appointed as a
presiding judge, she noticed that he
became cold and refused to have sex
with her, with the reason that he was very
busy.
o She was later on informed by an
anonymous letter that her husband has a
mistress, and that he has been lying to
her regarding his whereabouts.
o In a Statement of Account from Islacom,
it was addressed to a different address,
and not to their family home address.
▪ Moreover, she has no
knowledge as to whether or not
Judge Marcos has a cell phone
or telephone line with Islacom,
as their family never employed
the services of Islacom.
▪ When she looked for the
location of the stated address,
she discovered that it was the
address of the residence of
Mae Tacaldo and her parents.
▪ When she confronted Judge
Marcos, the latter said that
they would go to Islacom to
declare that the cell phone was
lost.
▪ When she confronted Mae
Tacaldo as to why a cell phone
was named after Judge
Marcos but the billing address
was Tacaldo’s, the latter
replied that she was only
friends with Judge Marcos.
! But the latter failed
to provide a reason
to the question
posed by Mrs.
Marcos as to why
Judge Marcos would
pay P9,000 bill if they
were only truly
friends.
o She also discovered in Judge Marcos’
briefcase a bill for the payment of
P11,400 for “May’s Acct.”
o She also found a birthday card/social
telegram addressed to Judge Marcos
inserted between the pages of a law book
on a table in the latter's office.
▪ It read, among other things,
"MT cares a lot, you know," and
"It's wonderful to share my life
with you."
o Another proof of her husband’s infidelity
was the Statement of Account issued by
Bankard
▪ In which one of the credit
purchases was made at the
Agencia Nina and Jewelry, but
she never saw the item
purchased, neither did her
daughter.
▪ Another one was credited to a
dine-in meal in Café Laguna,
where she did not dine with her
husband.
▪ Another item was the groceries
bought, which is not for the
complainant’s family as the
respondent long left their
conjugal home at the time of
the purchase.
o When she went to the alleged residence
of respondent and Mae Tacaldo, she did
not saw Judge Marcos, but Mae Tacaldo,
who drove away using the Marcos’ family
car.
▪ She also saw respondent’s
slippers and his newly
laundered clothes outside, and
a water dispenser similar to the
one they are using in their
family home.
▪ The building administrator
confirmed that Judge Marcos
and Mae Tacaldo were the
tenants of the place, but the
two used aliases in the
registration of the room they
were renting.
▪ She obtained a Certification of
Tenant, but the general
manager of the compound
refused to sign it because she
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 does not want to be involved in
the trouble.
o Judge Marcos and Mae Tacaldo’s illicit
relationship was even published in the
newspaper.
o Judge Marcos revoked the authority that
he granted to them in the undertaking,
and therefore, they no longer receive
support from him.
▪ Complainant suspects that he
did this because she
discovered that he has a
mistress.
o Complainant left their family home
because Judge Marcos threatened to kill
her.
o She presented other witnesses to testify.
! Respondent:
o He was never remiss in giving support to
his family.
o The reason he stopped giving support is
because complainant left their family
home.
o He revoked his undertaking because he
discovered that complainant had a
paramour who is his cousin.
o He averred that the jewelry he bought
was given to his daughter as a birthday
gift, and that the groceries were bought
for his granddaughter.
o He never received a birthday card
because his Clerk of Court screened all
his communications.
▪ Moreover, Mae Tacaldo’s name
was not expressly stated in the
card, it was only her initials,
which could have stood for the
initials of his Clerk of Court
whose name was Monalila
Tecson.
o He denied living with Mae Tacaldo in a
compound and asserted that he does not
wear slippers at home and if he does, he
kept it inside the house, and that the
empty plastic water container found
outside the unit was a common container
used in the area.
o He denied to be the one referred to in the
newspaper.
o He allowed his name to be included in
the registration of the Tacaldo family’s
Toyota Revo because they are very close
family friends.
o He was not aware that it was made to
appear in the insurance policy papers
that he and Mae Tacaldo has the same
address in the compound.
o The plan to use the vehicle for public
transportation was aborted because it
was flashed in the television when he got
suspended.
o He claimed that it was his wife who had a
paramour and not him, as proven by the
13 adultery cases filed by him in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), and 21
counts of adultery before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor.
▪ (However, all these were only
filed after he was suspended,
including the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.)
o He was declared sexually impotent by his
doctor because of his diabetes, when he
was first appointed to the Judiciary.
o During the fun run, he was not with Mae
Tacaldo.
▪ When he was asked by CJ
Davide as to whether she has a
job and if he has a child with
her, he replied that he do not
know if Mae has a job and that
he does not have a child with
her.
▪ CJ Davide then said, “That is
bad for the judiciary,” to which
he was no longer able to
respond as the CJ went away.
o He claimed that he was a only a close
friend of Mae’s father, but he has not yet
visited their house.
o The Islacom Statement of Account was
mistakenly sent to him, as he did not
have an account with Islacom and that
he does not own a cell phone.
▪ When he went to Islacom, he
only executed an Affidavit of
Loss as per advice of Islacom,
and did not inquire as to who
the real account holder was.
o He admitted that the confrontation
between Mae and his wife occurred, but
he does not know whether Mae owns a
cellphone as he never saw her with one,
neither did her father.
ISSUE & RATIO: WoN Judge Marcos should be dismissed
from service because of his illicit relationship with Mae
Tacaldo. – YES.
! It was amply proven that Judge Marcos’
relationship with Mae Tacaldo started even before
he was separated from his wife.
o There is an improbability that Islacom
would send a phone bill to Judge Marcos
if he were not the real owner thereof, as
service providers like phone companies
rely on the information given by the
applicant desirous of its services;
▪ If he did not really own the cell
phone, he, being a judge,
should have stood his ground
that he does not own a cell
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 phone and that he has not lost
one.
▪ Moreover, having the erroneous
account of Islacom being the
subject of confrontation
between his wife and Mae, he
should have demanded to
know who the real account
owner was.
o The birthday card could not have been
possibly from the Clerk of Court, given
the “intimate” message.
▪ Moreover, it was inserted in his
book at the top of his table.
o Mrs. Marcos, her daughter, and her family
did not benefit from any of the Bankard
transactions Judge Marcos had, which
included the purchase of jewelry and
groceries, and a dinner in Café Laguna.
o Being married for 26 years, Mrs. Marcos
could have recognized her husband’s
personal items upon seeing them.
! The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s
denials.
o When the Toyota Revo was bought,
Judge Marcos and Mae were registered
as co-owners, and when the car was
later on sold, both of them also signed in
the Deed of Sale.
o If the Tacaldos and Judge Marcos were
indeed close friends, the latter should
have known where the Tacaldos’
residence is.
o CANON 2. A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
There is nothing in the records which
necessitates the registration of the
Toyota Revo under his name, together
with Mae, for the latter to obtain a slot in
the cooperative business of transporting
passengers, as only a phone call would
suffice.
! What happened in the fun run cannot be glossed
over, where Judge Marcos not only admitted his
relations with Mae, but also brought her in that
event to show to people that she was his wife when
in fact she was really not.
! Galang v. Santos:
o The personal behavior of a judge should
be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only in the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
! Leynes v. Veloso:
o If good moral character is required of a
lawyer, with more reason is the
requirement exacted of a member of the
judiciary who at all times is expected to
observe irreproachable behavior and is
bound not to outrage public decency.
! Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated
himself to be wanting of moral integrity.
o He has violated the code of Judicial
Conduct which requires every judge to be
the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence and to avoid the
appearance of impropriety in all activities
as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
! The charge of immorality proven against
respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to
remain in office and continue to discharge the
functions and duties of a judge.
RULING: Judge Marcos dismissed.
Dela Cruz v Bersamira
G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990, MELENCIO-
HERRERA, J.
Provisions applicable:
Summary of the Case:
Judge was fraternizing with the lawyers and litigants in
his cases. He was suspected to show favors to some
where in a single instance, he never issued a warrant of
arrest despite the absence of the accused. He permitted
a lawyer to enter his sala despite the prohibition against
litigants with pending cases to do so. The Supreme
Court found impropriety with his conduct, levied a 10k
fine and reprimanded him
Doctrine or Relevant info on the topic:
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Full FACTS (from c2021 here on out) :
1. A Verified Complaint was filed with the Office
of the Cour t Administrator (OCA) by
complainant who identified himself as a
concerned citizen
2. Respondent was charged with the Violation of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and the Code of Judicial Conduct
3. The complaint alleges that respondent is the
presiding judge 3 pending cases, and he
gravely abused his discretion and exhibited
evident partiality by:
a. socializing in posh restaurants
particularly in Marios Restaurant,
Quezon City and the Shangri-la
EDSA Plaza with then
Congresswoman Venice Agana,
mother of the accused Roberto
Agana, together with their counsel,
Atty. Narciso Cruz;
b. issuing unreasonable orders for
postponement which unjustly delay
the administration of justice; and
c. allowing the two accused, Roberto
Agana and his live-in partner, Sarah
Resula, to submit to a drug test
7
 thereby postponing the trial of the
cases indefinitely.
The Court’s investigation thru Associate Appellate Court
Justice Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis found that:
● The arraignment of both accused were
postponed for three (3) times, all upon motion
of the defense counsel, formerly Atty. Joel
Aguilar, the reason being:
○ unexplained absence of the accused
in Court
○ the intended attendance of Atty.
Aguilar at the 6th National
Convention for Lawyers
○ absence of both accused who were
reportedly in Tagbilaran City
● After the arraignment, the accused appeared
but once in the three (3) successive settings
for trial on the merits. Their counsel, now Ttty.
Narciso Cruz, never appeared at all, but only
filed motions for postponement which were
invariably granted even over the objection of
the prosecution.
● Despite the successive absences of the
accused, the respondent never issued a
warrant of arrest, nor even asked them to
explain their absences. According to the
respondent, he considered their absences as
waiver of appearance. Yet, in the two
instances that the prosecution was ready, he
(respondent) did not proceed with the hearing
which should have been done if there was a
waiver of appearance.
● When the respondent acted on the Voluntary
Submission to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation of both accused, he did not give
the prosecution an opportunity to file
comment or opposition thereto.
● The respondents order of January 26, 1998,
allowing the confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation of the accused was not officially
sent to the Dangerous Drugs Board. His
directive in the second paragraph of the order,
to wit: The pertinent report must be submitted
to the Court soonest is rather vague in that it
did not state who should make the report nor
the limit of the period given for its submission.
● The respondent never checked with the
Dangerous Drugs Board whether or not the
two accused had indeed submitted
themselves for confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation with said office. This gives the
impression that the respondents order of
January 26, 1998 was made merely to enable
him to suspend the proceedings, including the
case for violation of P.D. [No.] 1866, which is
not subject to such suspension under R.A.
[No.] 6425, as amended.
● When the respondent issued the order of
September 18, 1998, where he appears to
have motu proprio set the case anew for
hearing on November 12, 1998, there was
already a case filed against him in the Office
of the Ombudsman on January 30, 1998.
● Likewise, this administrative complaint was
already filed on February 2, 1998 with the
Office of the Court Administrator, and the
latter had already directed the respondent on
September 9, 1998, to file his comment to
such complaint. Obviously, he was stirred to
action by the filing of such complaints and not
because of his diligent performance of his
duties and responsibilities.
● The respondent denied that he knew of the
fact that accused Roberto Agana is the son of
then Congresswoman Venice Agana of Bohol.
According to him, he learned about it when
Atty. Narciso Cruz entered his appearance and
then he said it was pro bono basis and the
accused is the son of a congresswoman.
When asked by this investigator whether that
information was made in open court or in
chambers, he answered that he came to my
chambers.
● Subsequently, after realizing through the
statements of this investigator that a judge
should not allow lawyers and parties litigants
with pending cases to see him in chambers,
the respondent tried to redeem himself after
resting his case on May 9, 2000, by explaining
that when Atty. Cruz saw him in chambers, the
latter had not yet entered his appearance as
defense counsel. He did not, however, ask for
the correction of the transcript of
stenographic notes of April 7, 2000.
● The order of inhibition was issued by the
respondent long after this administrative case
had been filed against him. Hence, it could not
be taken as a voluntary inhibition to show lack
of interest on the criminal cases.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis found respondent failed to
exhibit probity and independence
ISSUES/RATIOS:
1. W/N respondent judge showed impropriety in
handling the above-mentioned case – YES
● The people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members
of the bench, but also on the highest standard
of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess
● By the very nature of the bench, judges, more
than the average man, are required to observe
an exacting standard of morality and decency.
● The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala as a private
individual.
● As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all his activities.
● A judge is not only required to be impartial; he
must also appear to be impartial.
● Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance. It was, thus, held that it is
improper for a judge to meet privately with the
accused without the presence of the
complainant.
Ruling:
JUDGMENT: Respondent Judge is FINED in the amount
of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00). Further, he is
8
REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Re: Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
September 9, 2008
Summary of the Case:
The present admin matter arose from the Letter of CA
Justice Vasquez, referring to the Court for appropriate
action the charges of impropriety among justices of the
CA.
Doctrine:
Case shows the application of Canon 2 through the
various cases.
Applicable Provision:
Canon 2 – Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so
in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen
to be done.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may have become aware.
Facts:
- April 15, 2008: Justice Reyes, Chairman of the 9th
Division of the CA filed for leave, and Justice
Mendoza was designated to take his place and to
act on all cases submitted to the 9th Division, until
Justice Reyes returns (June 5, 2008).
- May 29, 2008: Meralco filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and TRO against the Securities and
Exchange Commission and GSIS, in the CA.
o Justice Mendoza inhibited himself from the case
so Justice Sabio was assigned as Acting
Chairman of the 9th Div.
o Case was raffled to Justice Roxas to be the
ponente.
- Sabio’s brother, Chairman of PCGG, was the first to
inform him that he had been named as one of the
mems to decide the Meralco case.
o His brother then tried to persuade him to help
the GSIS and SEC as they represent the interests
of the poor, but Sabio said “he will vote
according to his conscience”
- GSIS lawyer received an anonymous call saying
that the Meralco lawyers had already been talking
to Justice Roxas about filing a TRO, and that he had
rigged the raffle in his favour
o So GSIS filed a motion to inhibit Roxas from the
case
- May 30, 2008: The Special 9th Division composed of
Roxas, Sabio, and Justice Vidal, granted the TRO
prayed for by Meralco.
o For Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an
implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed
against him.
o On the same day, GSIS filed a motion to lift the
TRO but Roxas did not act on it as he did not find
it meritorious.
- June 10, 2008: Justice Reyes reported back to work
and was given the cartilla (primer) of the Meralco
case to update him.
o However, Justice Sabio demanded the cartilla to
be returned to him as he was to preside over the
hearings.
- However, Justice Reyes believes he should again
sit as Chairman of the 9th Div and preside over the
hearings, according to Sec. 2, Rule VI of the Internal
Rules of CA (IRCA) because:
o The 9TH Div issued a TRO, which is not among
t h e i n s t a n c e s w h e re t h e j u s t i c e s w h o
participated in the case shall remain as
decision-makers; therefore the case reverted to
the regular Chairman, who is Reyes.
o Justice Cruz also opined that Justice Sabio had
no right to participate in the hearing itself, bec
his authority was only to act on the motion to lift
the TRO.
- Justice Sabio disagreed with this opinion, and
believed something fishy was going on about how
the case was transferred to the 9th Div
o In one of the hearings, Reyes’ nameplate was
even removed
o Presiding Justice Vasquez did not do anything
about the feud between Sabio and Reyes,
believing they could settle it between themselves
- July 1, 2008: Justice Sabio met with De Borja, a
businessman acquaintance. De Borja alluded that
he was doing business for the Lopezes (owners of
Meralco).
o He allegedly offered 10 million as a bribe for
Sabio to relinquish his chairmanship to Reyes.
Shocked and outraged, Sabio declined.
o However, De Borja denied he bribed him, saying it
was actually Justice Sabio who set up the
meeting and solicited 50 mil from De Borja in
exchange for a favourable ruling.
o Presiding Justice Vasquez again did nothing
about this, because he “could not advise a fellow
Justice on what to do”
- July 4: 2008: The CA was reorganized and brought
Reyes and Roxas to the 8th Div.
- Despite the move to 8th Div, Roxas believes the
Meralco case followed him as ponente, so he
brought “the final decision” he wrote of the Meralco
case to Justice Vidal (a mem of the Special 9th Div)
to have it signed.
o Justice Vidal signed the decision in good faith,
believing the Special 9th Div was still existing and
bec Roxas insisted on its urgency since the TRO
was about to lapse.
o However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision
he gave to her was the final decision, and that it
was only an unofficial draft.
- July 14, 2008: Upon Reyes’ return from Australia
(this is a separate trip from his first leave) the 8th
Div with Reyes and Roxas deliberated on the
Meralco case.
o The “transcript” of this final deliberation was
only prepared from Roxas’ memory to “lend
credence” to Justice Reyes’ certification at the
end of the decision, pursuant to Sec. 13, Art VIII.
9
 However, Reyes denied authorizing the
transcription.
- July 21, 2008: Justice Roxas personally filed with
Justice Vasquez an “Interpleader Petition” to have
Vasquez decide between Sabio and Reyes who
should sign the Decision.
o July 23, 2008: Before waiting for Vasquez’
opinion on who should sign, Reyes and Roxas
went ahead and signed the decision and the
certification, and promulgated the Meralco
Decision.
o July 24, 2008: Vasquez issued his opinion that it
was the Special 9th Div who should continue
resolving the petition as they issued the TRO and
set the hearing.
- July 24, 2008: Justice Vidal wrote a letter to
Vasquez bringing to his attention he irregularities
in the handling of the Meralco case, complaining
that Roxas’ lacked “judicial courtesy” in discarding
the decision he wrote which she signed, and
expressing surprise that the 8th Division chaired by
Reyes signed the Decision.
o This confidential letter was published in the
Inquirer without her knowing how it leaked.
- July 26, 2008: Justice Sabio demanded an
immediate investigation of how the Decision was
arrived at and promulgated.
- July 31, 2008: Presiding Justice Vasquez called the
CA to an emergency en banc session to discuss the
issues brought forward by the Justices.
o They decided to refer the propriety of the actions
of the justices to the SC, through the office of the
Court Administrator.
- August 4, 2008: The SC constituted a Panel to
investigate the actions of the Justices in the
Meralco case, as well as the bribery issue of Sabio.
o In their Report, the Panel found irregularities and
improprieties committed by the Justices.
- Pursuant to Sec. 13, Art VIII, this per curiam
decision was reached after deliberations of the
Court en banc of the findings of the Panel.
Issues/Ratio:
1. W/N Justice Roxas’ actions as ponente were
improper, warranting dismissal – YES.
A. He failed to act on a number of motions of the
parties prior to the promulgation of the
Decision.
- By ignoring/refusing to act on the GSIS’
motion for his inhibition he violated Rule V of
the IRCA which states that a motion for
voluntary inhibition shall (mandatorily) be
acted upon by him.
o The motion for his inhibition raised a
prejudicial question, and he should
have resolved it before issuing the TRO
sought by Meralco.
o The issuance of the TRO is not an
implied denial of his inhibition.
- His failure to act on other motions of the
parties violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
B. He is guilty of gross dishonesty.
- He fabricated the “transcript” of the final
delibs to deceive that there had been
compliance with the prerequisite that
deliberation must precede drafting of a
decision.
o In fact, he had already drafted a
decision before deliberating with the
other mems of the 8th Div.
- He also did not submit a “report” as ponente,
as required by the IRCA, for deliberation by the
Div.
- Also, what he gave to Justice Vidal to sign
was not just a draft, it was in fact a decision
he wrote and asked her to sign as a member
of the Special 9th Div (when he really was
already in the 8th Div).
C. He showed a lack of courtesy and respect for
his colleagues in the CA.
- He unceremoniously discarded a decision that
Justice Vidal had poured over for a whole
night and had signed, when she was actually
already “re-organized out of the Special 9th
Div” and out of the Meralco case.
o His thought process was that he
should bring his decision to the 8th Div
instead, of which he was a part of,
because Sabio who is in the 9th div
might dissent and he would lose his
ponencia.
o He chose to render the Decision with
his 8th Div “friends” which included
Reyes, with whom Meralco was
“comfortable”
- He was disrespectful to Vasquez as head of
the Court when he promulgated the Decision
without Vasquez’ ruling first.
D. His questionable handling of the case
demonstrates his undue interest.
- His “rush to judgement” in preparing the draft
of the decision before the parties’ memoranda
is indicative of undue interest and unseemly
haste.
o He cheated the parties’ counsel of
their effort in preparing the
memoranda, which the 8th Div didn’t
even bother to read.
E. IN SUM, the Court finds Justice Roxas’ multiple
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
warrants his DISMISSAL from the service.
2. W/N Sabio’s actions were improper, warranting
suspension – YES.
A. The call between Sabio and his brother showed
that Sabio failed to uphold the standard of
independence and propriety expected of him.
- The call was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers which
states that a lawyer shall refrain from
impropriety that gives the appearance of
influencing the Court.
- Sabio’s unusual interest in holding the case
shows he might have been influenced by his
brother to help the GSIS:
o He refused to yield the Chairmanship
to Reyes even if he was in fact the
Regular Chairman.
o His stubbornness and insistence on
his own interpretation of the IRCA to
keep the position is not proper
conduct and only “fanned the flames”
B. His conversations with De Borja were
improper and discreet.
- Sabio should not have met up with De Borja,
knowing his profession and connection with
the Lopezes, and the previous call he received
from De Borja thanking him for the issuance
of the TRO.
10
 - And if he really was shocked and outraged,
why did he continue communicating with De
Borja afterwards?
- Nonetheless, the Court finds De Borja’s bribery
more plausible than Sabio’s solicitation.
C. IN SUM, the Court finds Justice Sabio’s
indiscreet convos regarding the case
constitute simple misconduct, warranting 2
months suspension w/o pay.
3. W/N Justice Reyes’ promulgation of the Meralco
Decision before Justice Vasquez’s ruling was improper
– YES.
- Under Reyes’ 8th Division, they promulgated
the Decision without waiting for Vasquez’s
ruling on their Interpleader.
- Vasquez felt belittled and humiliated by this.
o Under the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are mandated to
show appropriate consideration and
respect for colleagues.
- Justice Reyes is guilty of simple misconduct
and is reprimanded for taking part in the
promulgation of the Decision.
4. W/N Justice Vidal should be admonished for allowing
herself to be rushed by Roxas to sign the Meralco case
– YES.
- She signed the decision without reading the
parties’ memoranda, and without deliberating
with members of the Division, as required by
the IRCA.
- She allowed herself to be rushed, knowing the
TRO would actually not yet expire.
- She allowed a fellow justice to induce her to
deviate from established procedure.
- She is admonished to be more circumspect in
the discharge of her duties.
5. W/N Presiding Justice Vasquez should be severely
reprimanded for his failure to act promptly on the
controversies presented to him – YES.
- He hesitated to assert his leadership of the
Court even when the Justices urged him to lay
down a rule to follow.
o He was indecisive in resolving the
impasse between Sabio and Reyes over
the chairmanship.
o He failed to take action on the bribery
issue.
- He should have convened the CA en banc as
soon as the bribery attempt was reported to
him because under the IRCA, an “attempt to
corrupt a member of the Court” calls for an en
banc session to adopt policies for the
“protection and preservation of the integrity of
the judicial process”.
WHEREFORE, COURT RESOLVES:
1) Roxas is DISMISSED from service with
FORFEITURE of all benefits.
2) Sabio is SUSPENDED for 2 months without
pay and a stern warning.
3) Vasquez is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED.
4) Reyes if REPRIMANDED.
5) Vidal is ADMONISHED.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC | FEBRUARY 24, 2009
PROVISION:
Canon 2: Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so
in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but also be seen to be
done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may have become aware.
FACTS
Justice Reyes, who was already retired at the time of
this decision, was assigned to write the ponente of the
case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles,
and Limkaichong v. Nograles. He supposedly was able
to make a ponente that has yet to be published (called
the Gilbert document). However, they had to put the
promulgation of the ponente on hold because 7 of the
13 justices only agreed on the final result (which
granted in favor of Biraogo), not the ratio of the ponente.
However, despite the non-publishing of the ponente,
Biraogo, one of the parties involved in the case, was able
to take hold of the Gilbert document and promulgated
the same to the media in a press conference held in
Barrio Fiesta Ermita. Biraogo said that the withholding
of the Gilbert document was imputable to ill-motives of
members of the SC.
Because of the leak of this internal and confidential
document, this case tackled the issue of administrative
responsibility of the person who supposedly leaked this
document to Biraogo. The court ordered a few
testimonies to be heard in the matter, the relevant ones
being that of Armado Del Rosario (Justice Reyes’ Court
Stenographer), Rodrigo Manabat (Justice Reyes’
personal aide), Rosando Evangelista (Court Personnel
Head of Justice Reyes), and Justice Reyes himself.
Testimony of Armado Del Rosario (Reyes’ Court
Stenographer) → He was the custodian of the Gilbert
document, as Justice Reyes asked him to make Justice
Nachura sign the document. After he made Justice
Nachura sign the document, Del Rosario heard about the
news of the ponente being withheld. In line with this, he
placed the Gilbert document in a brown envelope, and
sealed the same, and placed it in a drawer in his office.
When he checked the state of the Gilbert document after
Biraogo released the same to the public, he found the
Gilbert document still sealed in his drawer. Although, Del
Rosario also admits that he left the drawer unlocked and
11
that there was a possibility that someone sneaked into Just because Reyes has already resigned does not
the room to get the document and reseal the envelope, mean that the case is moot and academic. Justice
either after work hours or when Del Rosario would leave Reyes can be still held liable, which can take the form of
for smoking breaks. disqualification from office and cancellation of benefits.

Testimony of Rodrigo Manabat (Reyes’ personal aide) → Canon 2 of the New Judicial Code of Conduct actually
Del Rosario asked Manabat to be the one to give the devotes its content to making sure that court
Gilbert document to Judge Nachura for the latter to sign documents are not disclosed. Section 1 provides that
it. He claims that he gave it to Nachura’s receptionist “court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized
and waited outside. After the receptionist gabe the person any confidential information acquired by them
Gilbert document back to Manabat, the latter while employed in the judiciary, whether such
immidiately gave back the document to Del Rosario. information came from authorized or unauthorized
sources.”
Testimony of Rosando Evangelista (Reyes’ Court
Personnel Head) → He admitted that a few personnel As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of
had access to the xerox machine, but that he could not duty amounts to breach of public trust as the committee
impute to a specific person the reproduction of the believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest on
Gilbert document. Moreover, he also said that they did the basis of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself).
not lock drawers and that he did not know where exactly
the Gilbert document was because he assumed that Del For leaking a confidential internal document of the En
Rosario had custody of the same. Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyes
administratively liable for gross misconduct for violating
his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Testimony of Judge Reyes → He claims that Biraogo
Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or
never imputed the photocopying of the Gilbert document
suspended per Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
to him and that Biraogo claims that his informant was
Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
an SC employee. Moreover, when asked why he didn’t do
Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the
anything the moment he learned Biraogo had the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
papers, he claimed that he was on a sabbatical leave, as
respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise
he was taking his MCLE. Moreover, he also claims that
provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a
court personnel should be held liable because he
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
wouldn’t allow himself to do so.
or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel
or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
Thing is though, when Reyes was pressed, the court
lessening confidence in the legal system.
found out that there possibly could have been two
copies of the Gilbert decision. The court found out about
#2 - YES
this when the copy that Reyes submitted was different
Del Rosario’s act of not keeping the drawer locked as
from the copy that Biraogo had. When Reyes was
well as Evangelista’s act of not making sure documents
questioned as to the possibility of whether or not there
are secure warrant the finding that they are guilty of
could’ve been two copies (giving rise to the possibility
simple negligence.
that one copy could’ve slipped out of the office of
Reyes), Reyes remained evasive and avoided answering
REYES - P500k FINE + SHOW CAUSE WHY HE
the question.
SHOULDN’T BE HELD LIABLE
Eventually, investigation of the committee found that
DEL ROSARIO AND EVANGELISTA - P10k and P5k,
since Reyes was not ultimately able to tell Del Rosario
RESPECTIVELY
that the Gilbert document was on hold, Del Rosario went
to the Office of the Chief Justice and gave the Gilbert
document after he made Nachura sign it. The court
figures that the photocopying happened when the
Gilbert document was with the OCJ. Either way, the
reproduction of the Gilbert document was attributable to
the Office of Justice Reyes.

ISSUES
1. W/N Reyes should be held administratively
liable? - YES
2. W/N Del Rosario and Evangelista should be
held administratively liable? - YES

RATIO
#1 - YES

12
 RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013
against ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY ONG of the
Sandiganbayan
Per Curiam | September 23, 2014
SUMMARY
The case is about the Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong who was found to have
been meeting with Janet Lim Napoles during the
pendency of the proceedings for the Pork Barrel Scam
which the latter is involved. It was alleged that the
meeting between the two only involves their devotion for
the miraculous Black Nazarene.
The Court finds Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT,
DISHONESTY, and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from. In not
being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu
proprio, he is found guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of
Canon 2 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
His dubious acts tainted his integrity as an associate
justice and a member of the judiciary which are clearly
in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
FACTS
! When the Pork Barrel Scam broke news in 2013,
incriminating evidence surfaced implicating
Sandiganbayan AJ Gregory Ong.
o Marina Sula pointed him to have visited
the office of Napoles frequently.
o A photo published by Rappler showed
Sen. Estrada, Napoles, and Ong together
in a party.
▪ Ong explained to CJ Sereno
that the photo was taken in
one of Sen. Estrada’s birthday
parties and it would have been
rude for him not to pose with
other guests.
! Ong denied that he has attended any event hosted
by Napoles during or after she had the Kevlar
Cases in the Sandiganbayan where she was
acquitted.
! CJ Sereno requested the SC En Banc to investigate
Ong’s case.
o Ong commented that the testimony of
Sula was merely hearsay
o Regarding Sula’s testimony that he
visited Napoles’ office, Ong clarified that
he went there only to talk with Napoles
regarding the miraculous healing power
of the robe of the Black Nazarene of
Quiapo which he learned during Sen.
Estrada’s party.
▪ Ong claims that Napoles had a
way to help him access the
statute in order to help him
with his prostate cancer.
▪ Because of this, he wanted to
personally go to Napoles’
office to thank her. According
to Ong, Napoles no longer had
any pending case in the
Sandiganbayan as of this
moment.
! Upon the SC’s finding of possible transgressions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, they re-
docketed the case and assigned it to retired J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez.
o J. Sandoval-Gutierrez examined the
statements of Benhur Luy:
▪ Ong was Napoles’ contact in
the Sandiganbayan
▪ Napoles spent a total of 100M
in the Sandiganbayan to bribe.
▪ Napoles was confident of her
acquittal under Ong.
▪ There was a 25.5M transaction
between Napoles and Ong.
o J. Sandoval-Gutierrez also examined
Sula’s statements:
▪ Sula was an employee of
Napoles and in charge of
licenses
▪ Ong promised that a TRO
would be issued on the PDAF
case
▪ Ong will help her in the Kevlar
Cases
▪ Napoles would fix the PDAF
case in the Sandiganbayan
Ong’s Defense
! He never met Napoles prior or during the pendency
of the Kevlar Cases.
! He never received any money from Napoles.
! The Kevlar Cases were decided based on merits.
! He never had any transactions with Napoles.
! He visisted Napoles’ office to thank her regarding
the Black Nazarene.
! The whistle blowers’ testimonies were conflicting
and incredible.
ISSUE
WON Ong should be dismissed from service in the
judiciary YES.
The SC adopts the above findings of J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez.
Conclusion of J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
! The testimonies of Luy and Sula were not lies.
o Ong merely denied them and in no way
refuted them via an adverse separate
testimony.
! Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the
testimonies and he failed to consider that his
testimony is likewise hearsay.
13
 o He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez
and Napoles as witnesses to support his
claim regarding their role which enabled
him to wear the robe of the Black
Nazarene.
! His act of visiting Napoles’ office is disgraceful and
renders him morally unfit as member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law
confers to him.
! Dishonesty violates Canon 2 on Integrity of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
o Canon 2 provides in part that judges
must ensure that their conduct is above
reproach and must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
! His acts further constitute gross misconduct which
violates Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code.
o Section 1 provides that judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
! Finally, it is recommended that Ong be found guilty
of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety,
all in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
RULING
G U I LT Y O F M I S C O N D U C T, D I S H O N E S T Y, a n d
IMPROPRIETY DISMISSED from SERVICE with
FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
People vs. Veneracion
Oct. 12, 1995 | Kapunan, J.
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Hon. Lorenzo Veneracion (RTC Manila
Judge), Henry Lagarto, and Ernesto Cordero
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Doctrine:
A court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law
itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in
specific and well-defined instances.
Summary:
Respondent judge refused to impose death penalty to
several individuals convicted of Rape with Homicide of a
seven year old girl. The Court held that because RA 7659
is clear that penalty of such a crime is death, the judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
impose the proper penalty.
Facts:
! August 2, 1994 - the cadaver of a young girl,
later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a
sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon
cord with both feet and left hand protruding
from it was seen floating along Del Pan St.,
Binondo, Manila.
o When untied and removed from its
cover, the lifeless body of the victim
was seen clad only in a light colored
duster without her panties, with
gaping wounds on the left side of
the face, the left chin, left ear,
lacerations on her genitalia, and
with her head bashed in.
! Aug 8, 1994 - Abundio Lagunday aka Jeofrey,
and Henry Lagarto were charged with the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
o Subsequently, Ernesto Cordero,
Rolando Manlangit, Richard
Baltazar, and Catalino Yaon were
also charged with the same
information.
! The RTC of Manila found Lagarto and Cordero
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and were
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
! The City Prosecutor of Manila filed an MR,
seeking the modification of the sentence to
Death instead of Reclusion Perpetua.
o Refusing to act on the merits of the
said Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge denied the MR for
lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: W/N the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed
and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of
death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide
HELD: Yes
Ratio:
● RA 7659 (effective at the time), amending the
provision on Rape in the RPC, states that
“When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.”
○ The law leaves no room for
discretion of the judge. The penalty
has to be death.
● The Judge was not ignorant of the law, but
was aware of such law. Nevertheless, he
refused to impose death because of his
religious convictions.
○ While this Court sympathizes with
his predicament, it is its bounden
duty to emphasize that a court of
law is no place for a protracted
debate on the morality or propriety
of the sentence, where the law itself
provides for the sentence of death
as a penalty in specific and well-
defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to
impose the death penalty is an
14
 ancient one, but it is a matter upon cases.
which judges have no choice.
○ In this case, the respondent judge
Complainant Respondent Judge
acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of Respondent judge Wrong to arrest Miralles,
discretion amounting to a lack of disregarded his duties because the court was
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty and violated mandatory still in the process of
of Reclusion Perpetua where the law provisions of the Rules of determining whether
clearly imposes the penalty of Court when he did not there is sufficient
issue a warrant of arrest evidence to hold the
Death. against the accused accused for trial. He
● People vs. Limaco - As long as that penalty Miralles, who was explained that Miralles
remains in the statute books, and as long as charged with two (2) non had always made himself
our criminal law provides for its imposition in bailable criminal offenses. available during the
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers Even after respondent hearings for the
to respect and apply the law regardless of judge found probable determination of probable
cause to hold accused cause; thus, the court
their private opinions.. The only function of
Miralles for trial, he did already acquired
the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not not order the arrest of the jurisdiction over the
in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply accused. Instead, person of the accused.
them. respondent judge Claimed that there is no
● Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after summarily granted a more need for a petition
an adjudication of guilt, the judge should reduced bail in the for bail, because in the
impose "the proper penalty and civil liability absence of a motion to fix judicial determination of
bail and the prosecution probable cause the court
provided for by the law on the accused."
was not given the found that the evidence
opportunity to interpose against accused was
Ruling: Petition is granted. Case remanded so that the its objections. weak.
proper penalty may be imposed. Alleged that during the Contrary to complainant's
hearing on the Petition for allegation that it was her
Involuntary Commitment option to transfer to
JORDA v. BITAS of the minor victim Margie another court, it was he
A.M. No. RTJ142376 | March 5, 2014 | Peralta, J. Baldoza, to the DSWD, who caused her transfer.
respondent judge Explained that it was his
FACTS propounded a series of sister who was a
These are Consolidated Complaints filed against questions which classmate of one Nora
!
respondent Judge Crisologo Bitas for Grave Abuse appeared to mitigate Miralles
of Authority, Irregularity in the Performance of Miralles' role in the crime
Official Duties, Bias and Partiality.The complaint charged.
stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified
Trafficking and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, which were filed
against Danilo Miralles (Miralles), et al. before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City where ! Complainant filed a motion for inhibition on
respondent Judge Bitas presides December 14, 2009 against respondent judge.
! Complainant alleged that on January 15, 2010, Respondent judge denied the motion.
accused Miralles, through counsel, filed a Motion ! During the hearing on December 15, 2009,
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with complainant alleged that respondent judge
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of a publicly humiliated her and exhibited his
Warrant of Arrest. anger and animosity towards her for filing the
! On the same day, respondent Judge issued an motion for inhibition.
order taking cognizance of the same and directed o "I don’t want to see your face! Why
Prosecutor Anthea G. Macalalag to file her did you file the motion for inhibition
comment on the motion. when it should have been Attorney
! The prosecution then filed its comment/opposition Sionne Gaspay who should have
and moved for the issuance of the required warrant filed the same[?]"
for the arrest of Miralles. No warrant of arrest was o "You better transfer to another
issued against Miralles. court! You are being influenced by
! On February 2, 2011, respondent judge issued an politicians. I am not a close family
Order stating that the Court finds that there is friend of the Miralles(es), it is my
probable cause to hold the accused for trial for sister who is now in the United
Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208. States who was close to the
o therefore, the court orders Lynna Brito y Miralles(es)."
Obligar to file a bail bond of Forty o "So you are questioning the integrity
Thousand Pesos (Php₱40,000.00) for her of this court, you better transfer to
temporary liberty. another court." "I don’t want to see
o Danilo Miralles is, likewise, ordered to put your face."
up a bail bond of Forty Thousand Pesos o Complainant added that when she
was supposed to conduct the
(₱40,000.00) for each of the three (3)

15
 crossexamination, respondent judge
stated off therecord: "I don’t want
you to participate anymore," and
refused to allow her to do the cross-
examination.
! In support of her allegation, complainant
presented the Joint Affidavit9 of Carmela D.
Bastes and Marilou S. Nacilla, social workers
who were present during the December 15,
2009 hearing of the subject case
ISSUE: WoN Bitas guilty of grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law. YES
RATIO
As a matter of public policy, not every error or
!
mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. This does
not mean, however, that a judge need not
observe propriety, discreetness and due care
in the performance of his official functions.
! The hearing of the application for bail in
capital offenses is absolutely indispensable.
Bitas actions of deviating from the
requirement and granting bail by reason of not
finding probable cause denied the prosecution
of due process.
o This Court had said so in many
cases and had imposed sanctions
on judges who granted applications
for bail in capital offenses and in
offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment,
without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec 7
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure)
! Bitas' actions, including the utterance of
statements against the prosecution, are not
mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment on the part of respondent judge, but
a patent disregard of well-known rules and
constitute abuse of authority.
o When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the
judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law.
o Respondent Bitas' use of abusive
and insulting words, tending to
project complainant’s ignorance of
the laws and procedure, prompted
by h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e l a t t e r
mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive,
distasteful, and inexcusable.
! In pending or prospective litigations before
them, judges should be scrupulously careful
to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the
suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity. Not
only must judges possess proficiency in law,
they must also act and behave in such manner
that would assure litigants and their counsel
of the judges’ competence, integrity and
independence.
! Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01810SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge. Under Section
11 (A) of the same Rule, as amended, if
respondent judge is found guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations;
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.
! This is not the first time that respondent judge
was found guilty of the offense charged.
o In the case of Valmores Salinas v.
Judge Crisologo Bitas, the Court had
previously imposed a fine of
₱10,000.00 on respondent judge for
disregarding the basic procedural
requirements in instituting an
indirect contempt charge, with a
stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
! The use of intemperate language is included
in the proscription provided by Section 1,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This Court shall not countenance any conduct,
act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which
would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.

RULING: WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE CRISOLOGO
BITAS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City, is hereby SUSPENDED from the
service for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Marces, Sr. v. Arcangel
AM No. RTJ-91-712 | July 9, 1996 | Supreme Court |
Mendoza, J.
PETITIONERS: Ben D. Marces
RESPONDENTS: Judge Paul Arcangel
TOPIC: Canon 4: Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities a judge.


The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.
SUMMARY
16

Complainant Marces and his family had a very terrible
feud with their neighbors spouses Cañas. The spouses
Cañas were close friends with respondent RTC Judge
Arcangel. Eventually, an arrest warrant was issued
against complainant Marces for violation of the
bouncing check law. Complainant claimed that
respondent Arcangel was the one behind the issuance
of the warrant. Respondent also attended the barangay
mediation conference between the two feuding families
where respondent disturbed the proceedings and
attempted to influence the barangay officials against the
Marces family. Weeks later, armed men in military
uniform arrested the Marces spouses and their son for
the crime of attempted murder. Complainant alleged
that Arcangel was also behind the arrest and even tried
to prevent them from posting bail bonds.
When a complaint was filed against respondent, he
merely denied the claims and said that the charges were
done out of spite. The Office of the Court Administrator,
after investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
charges except for the incident where respondent
disturbed the barangay mediation conference. The Court
held that the totality of acts committed by respondent,
from intervening in the barangay proceedings as well as
for causing the issuance of arrest warrants, makes him
guilty of violating Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
However, instead of dismissal, the Court merely
reprimanded the respondent with a warning that similar
acts of impropriety in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Facts:
● Respondent was the Executive Judge of the
RTC Branch 12 of Davao City. He is charged
with serious misconduct, grave abuse of
authority, harassment, and immorality.
● In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza
C a ñ a s m ove d i n t o co m p l a i n a n t ’s
neighborhood. In that year, a helper of the
Cases sought complainant’s help for alleged
maltreatment she had received from her
employers. Complainant reported this to the
barangay authorities.
● On September 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas
had an exchange of words with Mrs. Marces.
This involved a fight between the turkeys
owned by the two families.
● The following day, Mrs. Cañas boarded a
jeepney because complainant was riding on
that vehicle. Mrs. Cañas asked the driver to
stop at the police station. She then had
Marces arrested. The warrants had been
issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia for
violations of BP Blg. 22. Judge Sarabia told
the complainant that he really did not know
anything about the cases and that he had only
been requested by respondent Judge Paul
Arcangel to issue the warrants.
● Although he had not been asked to,
resp o n d en t Ju d g e Arcan g el atten d ed
mediation conferences between the families.
It is alleged that he disturbed the proceedings
by walking in and out of the hall; introduced
himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence
the Barangay Officials; and accompanied Mrs.
Cañas. The judge allegedly confronted the
complainant, accusing him of sending the
judge a death threat by means of a letter
which purported to have been sent by the New
People’s Army.
● On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in
uniform arrested members of the
complainant’s family. In a resolution dated
May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor,
Albert Axalan, found probable cause and filed
charges of attempted murder against
complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his
son, Farley. Complainant alleges that
respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage
of his position, influenced the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.
● Subsequently, complainant’s son, Farley, was
arrested. It is alleged that respondent’s car
followed that of the policemen as if to make
sure that the evil plan allegedly authored by
Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed.
During the applications for bail bond of
complainant, respondent Judge Arcangel
arrived and questioned the validity of the bond
posted, saying “Hindi puwede ito, who gave
you the authority to issue?” He then removed
the receipts and arrogantly left with the
receipts.
Respondent’s arguments:
(1) that the charges against him are not only false and
malicious but utterly baseless;
(2) that the same were filed merely to gratify
complainant’s personal spite and animosity against
him; and
(3) that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the
cases which the respondent intends to file against the
complainant for slander and threats. Respondent
vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs.
Cañas and that he went to the house of the Cañas family
whenever Mr. Wilfredo Cañas was away. Finally, it is
alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from
justice.
● In his Report and Recommendation dated
Associate Justice Purisima recommends
dismissal of the charges against respondent
judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the
charge that respondent judge attended
mediation conferences between the feuding
families and tried to intervene. Justice
Purisima recommends that respondent judge
be admonished and sternly warned.
Issue: WON the respondent Judge is guilty of
impropriety therefore violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct — YES
Ruling: 

● The Court fines the conclusions of the
investigator that respondent judge is guilty of
improper conduct to be fully supported by the
evidence in the record. HOWEVER, the report
17
 of the investigating Justice fails to consider
other serious allegations in the complaint of
which there is also sufficient evidence in the
record, to wit:
 DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
1.) Caused the issuance of alias warrants of
arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the
case against the complainant was pending
2.) Arrest would have not been made without the
intervention of respondent judge.
● These charges were actually admitted by
respondent judge. The criminal cases against
complainants have been in archive since
1983. Its discovery and revival was made
possible upon the request for verification and
its status and information by Judge Arcangel.
● Respondent justifies his intervention on the
ground that complainant Marces has been
able to evade service of the warrants because
of connections with the warrant officers of
Davao City. Even if this had been the case, it
would not excuse respondent judge in using
his own influence.
● Clearly, respondent intervened in the feud
between the two families and such
interference was not limited to the barangay
mediation proceedings but extended to
various stages of the conflict. The Court finds
the actuations of the respondent judge
improper and censurable.
● Respondent is the visible representation of the
law, the intermediary between conflicting
interest, and the embodiment of the people’s
sense of justice. Unless it was a case filed
with his court, it was improper for him to
intervene in a dispute or controversy.
● Code of Judicial Conduct:
 !
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge. He should not
suffer his conduct to create the impression that any
person can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor.
Jurisprudence provides that there were other grounds
for cases wherein the judge was dismissed
> Ubarra v Mapalad:
- Judge pressured complainants to
drop criminal charges against the
accused,
- refused to inhibit herself when she
knew it was improper to decide the
case, and was guilty of delay in
deciding the case
> Sabitsana, Jr. v Villamor:
- Guilty of attempting to influence
another judge to acquit accused in a
criminal case
- Made untruthful statements in the
certificate of service
● WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED with WARNING that
commission of similar acts of impropriety on
his part in the future will be dealt with more
severely. All other charges are hereby
● The court believes that dismissal from service
is an excessive penalty. They took into
consideration the following:
- no other charge against respondent Judge
- first administrative case
- record as a judge is exemplary
Bellosillo, J., Dissenting

● Recommendation by the OCA should be
sustained
● Intervention in the barangay proceedings was
sufficiently proven by evidence and is a
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics
● However, other charges were not sufficiently
proven and should be dismissed for lack of
merit
● Nothing in the records could prove that
respondent judge caused the issuance of the
arrest warrants
● Penalty should only be admonition with a
stern warning
Antonio Lorenzana vs Judge Ma. Cecilia Austria
Apr 2 2014 | J Brion
Moral of the Story
! The power to grant permits to a meeting are
merely to specify the
Facts
! Arose from In Re: To have Steel Corporation placed
under corporate rehabilitation where respondent
was presiding judge while petitioner is VP and
Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corp.
Petitioner charges multiple violations of the Code
of Profesional Responsibility
o Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Gross misconduct, Grave
incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave bias and
partiality, Lack of circumspection,
conduct unbecoming of an officer etc.
! Because the respondent appointed lawyer with
grave conflict of interest, Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza
as receiver since he was also external legal counsel
for SCP’s creditors.
! Respondent conducted consultative meetings
outside her official jurisdiction where she arbitrarily
dictated terms of the rehab plan
! Usurpation of receiver’s exercise of functions.
! Supplemental complaint – posting personal details
and posing half naked in a shawl on a social
networking site.
! Comment – vehement denial, if error only an error
in judgment
! CA’s Report and Recommendation
o Complaints partly meritorious
o CA set aside rehab plan as SCP could not
implement it not because of the rulings
of Judge who is the respondent
o No grave bias and partiality – not enough
evidence
18
 o Judge has discretion when not under
mandatory inhibition as in this case
o Nothing irregular with meetings
o Bickering with SCP legal counsel was
reflective of arrogance and superiority.
o Judicial decorum requires judges to be
temperate in their language at all times.
Failure on this regard amounts to a
conduct unbecoming of a judge, for
which J. Austria should be held liable.
o Friendster account with details was an
act of impropriety.
o CA decision finding respondent guilty of
grave abuse of discretion in of a judge.
ordering creation of management
committee without evidentiary hearing is
tantamount to gross ignorance of the
law.
! Recommends find of 20,000. And admonished
! OCA:
o Noted and carry out the recommended
penalties of CA.
Issues
! WON respondent committed grave abuse of
authority, irregularity in the performance of
duty, grave bias and partialty and lack of
circumspection – No
! Won respondent had committed grave
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
– Yes with regard to lack of evidentiary
hearing
! WON responden has conduct unbecoming of a
judge? Yes
! WON respondent had violated impropriety?
Yes
Ruling
! Court agrees with both OCA and CA J. Sison
! Complainant failed to establish bad faith on
the part of respondent
! Not every error or mistake renders liability as
to gross ignorance.
! To constitute gorss ignorance of the law it is
not sufficient that the judicial act or actuation
be contrary to current law or jurisprudence. It
must be shown that he was moved by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or
had committed an error so egregious
amounting to bad faith.
! Lack of an evidentiary hearing is an error so
egregious that it amounts to bad faith
therefore for this act he is liable for gross
ignorance of the law. 108 of the RTC in Pasay City. Apparently, Ms.
! A judge must observe due care in the
performance of his duties and functions.
! Judges are required to always be temperate
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language. The court cannot allow displays of
arrogance and superiority which the coe
abhors..
! While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and taking part in
social networking activities, we remind them
that they do not shed their status as judges.
! In their exercise of freedom of expression,
they should always conduct themselves in a
manner that preserves the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
o Her postings on Friendster violated
propriety.
Dispositive
! Punished with 21K fine and stern warning.
OCA v. YU
14 March 2017 | En Banc
SUMMARY
Several administrative cases were filed against Judge
Eliza B. Yu. The respondent was found guilty of gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross
insubordination, oppression, and conduct unbecoming
DOCTRINE
A judge embodies the law; she cannot be above it.
PROVISION
Canon 4, Propriety. Propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
FACTS
● The following administrative cases were filed
against Judge Eliza B. Yu:
● A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813. On January 27, 2011,
the Cour t issued A.O. No. 19-20113
expeditiously hear and try cases involving
nighttime apprehensions, special cases under
the Rule on Summary Procedure, and criminal
cases involving tourists. Respondent Eliza Yu
was assigned to the duty, however, did not
desire to comply. The OCA submitted a
memorandum to the Court be docketed as an
administrative complaint against her. Judge
Yu denied the charges.
● A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836. On July 9, 2010,
Judge Yu requested to fill the position of Clerk
of Court III in her sala. s Ms. Tejero-Lopez's
appointment was approved. Judge Yu
expressed her protest against the
appointment. Judge Yu refused her request to
administer her oath and questioned the
integrity of the selection process. Ms. Tejero-
Lopez executed a “sinumpaang salaysay”
charging Judge Yu with refusal to obey court
order. The Court dismissed Judge Yu's
protest.
● A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815. The Court appointed
Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagmanas Clerk III of Branch
Lagman's appointment did not sit well with
Judge Yu. OCA received a letter of complaint
from Judge Yu. The OCA filed a memorandum
denouncing the misconduct and
insubordination of Judge Yu relative to the
appointments of Clerks. Judge Yu denied the
allegations.
● A.M. No. 12-109-METC;A.M. No. 11-2399-
MTJ; andA.M. No. 11-2378-MTJ. The
common issue in the three complaints
concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in relation
to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers
of the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the
Court's issuances, and her manner of
disposing cases.
● OCA iPI No. 12-2456-MTJ. This
administrative matter concerned the letter
dated January 12, 2012 charging Judge Yu
19
 with oppression in issuing the order dated
December 1, 2011 in Criminal Case No. M-
PSY-09-08592-CR.The Pasay City MeTCs, the
Court suspended Judge Yu from office
effective February 1, 2012. Judge Yu
maintains that she validly issued the subject
order by virtue of the inherent contempt
powers of the court, and that the
complainants should have availed of the
appropriate relief in questioning the order
instead of filing the administrative complaint;
and that the OCA could not rule on the
propriety of issuing the subject order because
doing so was beyond the OCA's power and
prerogative.
● OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ. This
administrative matter stemmed from the
complaint filed by Mrs. Josefina G. Labid
charging Judge Yu with oppression, gross
i g n o r a n c e o f t h e l a w, a n d c o n d u c t
unbecoming of a judge in connection with the
fate of her son, Noel, who had served as Utility
Worker at the MeTC Branch 47. Mrs. Labid
believed that Judge Yu's unjustified refusal to
sign Noel's application for leave had been
motivated by malice and ill-will, arising from
the administrative complaint against her that
Noel had signed and joined. In her comment,
Judge Yu denied the imputations of Mrs.
Labid.
● A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821. This administrative
matter emanated from the Letter-Complaint of
Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito of MeTC
Branch 20, whereby the latter imputed to
Judge Yu conduct unbecoming of a judge for
constantly sending alarming messages with
sexual under tones via Facebook and
electronic mail.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross
insubordination, oppression, and conduct unbecoming
of a judge - YES
HELD/RATIO
● A judge embodies the law; she cannot be
above it. She should not use it to advance her
personal convenience, or to oppress others.
She should be obedient to the rules and
directives enunciated by the Supreme Court
for the effective administration of justice;
otherwise, she becomes an arrogant tyrant.
● Being a magistrate of the law, she must
comport herself in a manner consistent with
the dignity of her judicial office, and must not
commit any act that erodes public confidence
in the Judiciary.
● In th e se c o n so lid ate d ad min istrative
proceedings, we resolve the several charges
of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law, gross insubordination, oppression, and
conduct unbecoming of a judge leveled by
various complainants, some of them her
fellow Judges, against. The court finds and
pronounces and dismisses her from the
service effective immediately.
RULING
The Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order with FINALITY;
DISBARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B.
YU pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics; and ORDERS the
striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the
Roll of Attorneys.


CANON 5
EQUALITY
Tan v. Pacuribot
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982
Consolidated-complaints against Judge Rexel M.
Pacuribot for sexual harassment:
1. December 4, 2005 and December 20, 2005:
Affidavit-complaint by Sherlita Tan, Court
Stenographer of RTC, Ginoong City, and
affidavit-complaint by Johanna Villafranca,
Clerk II, GInoong City Parole and Probation
Office
2. April 4, 2005: Letter from concerned citizens
asking for relief of the Judge on the grounds
of terrorizing and harassing most of the
employees of the Hall of Justice
3. Undated Letter from concerned citizens
asking OCA to investigate the illicit
relationship of Judge Pacuribot and Sheryl
Gamulo, who had accordingly bore two
acknowledged children of the Judge
FACTS:
TAN’S STORY:
! October 20, 2004: Tan filed a half-day leave to
attend a wedding in CDO (6pm, Pryce Plaza
Hotel). At around 8:00pm in the evening of the
wedding, she received a call from the Judge
asking her when she would be heading back
to Gingoog City, to which she answered that
she intends to head back right after the
wedding reception.
! Pacuribot offered to bring her to Agora Bus
Terminal, but Tan refused, saying that she
would be taking the taxi instead.
! Pacuribot got mad and ordered her to come
out, saying that he was already outside. To
show that it was urgent, he also told her that
he had left the Masonic Meeting he was
attending and will return after he brings her to
the terminal.
! Pacuribot is known for his short temper and
his tendency to humiliate anyone in public
when he is angry- so Tan complied.
! Pacuribot was alone in his car when Tan
entered it. Pacuribot then asked angrily “What
took you so long?” Tan saw that there was a
short firearm between their seats and was
immediately frightened.
! He did not take her to the terminal; instead he
drove in to a compound, and entered into a
small garage. She was brought to a motel
(City Lodge Motel in Carmen, CDO)
! Convo:
o Tan: “Why did you bring me here,
sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just
t a ke a t a x i c a b t o t h e A g o r a
Terminal?”
o Pacuribot: “Shut up! As if you are
still a virgin”
20
 ! Pacuribot ordered her to kiss him, which she
did half-heartedly. Pacuribot expressed: “You
don’t know how to kiss! How do you do it with
Ramon? Get into sex right away without any
preliminaries?” Ramon is Tan’s husband
! Pacuribot had a hard time stiffening. He
seemed to have an erection problem.
Penetration was slight. Tried several times,
but would get exhausted and would rest from
time to time. Tan would ask to be let go every
time Pacuribot rested, but he refused
! He gave up after many attempts, saying: It
won’t stiffen because I have been forbidden to
eat many kinds of food such as meat which
gives energy”
! The two left the motel, but instead of bringing
her to the bus terminal, Pacuribot brought Tan
to Discovery Hotel adjacent to Limketkai
Center, CDO, saying that it would be safer for
her to sleep there instead of travelling alone.
Tan was too spooked to escape, call for help,
or call her husband
! Pacuribot partially paid for the hotel room, and
told Tan not to leave until he comes back the
next day. Pacuribot then returned to the
meeting. Tan asked the bellboy if she could
leave the hotel, but was told that she should
settle the bill first.
! After this incident, Pacuribot would continue
to harass her- even doing so in front of
Placido Abellana, the court aid. Abellana
pretended to see nothing by turning his back.
! Pacuribot would shame her in front of her
officemates whenever she would resist his
advances. He also told her to send him text
messages of endearment. Non-compliance
will have an adverse effect on her
performance rating
! He also expressed interest in renting a room in
her house. Tan eventually yielded, but she
erected a wall between her house and the
room. Pacuribot also put up a calendar that
had Tan’s photo on the back of his office door.
! Whenever she would resist, she would be
humiliated in front of her officemates and
threatened as regards to her performance
rating (went down from Very Satisfactory to
Satisfactory)
! Tan suffered chronic fatigue syndrome and
was hospitalized as a result
VILLAFRANCA’S STORY:
! Villafranca met Pacuribot because he saw her
talking to Dondi Palugna, who was
Villafranca’s childhood friend and Pacuribot’s
driver
! She started receiving amorous messages
from him. And he soon started inviting her out
for dinner. She declined because she knew he
was married, and she herself was married. But
he continued his pursuit. One time he even
said:
o Why dont you come with me? I AM A
JUDGE! Why should you refuse me?
Why do you go with Dondi and not
with me when I AM A JUDGE?  husband saw it, he beat her up.
! In order to avoid him, she requested a transfer
from Probation Office, Gingoog to the office in
CDO. However, she failed to make a written
request due to a heavy work load.
! She continued to be polite to the respondent
for two reasons: his status as a judge and his
reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as terror
which caused most people to fear him.
! In the last week of February 2005, she got a
call from Judge Pacuribot who was furious. 
According to him, he was an honorable person
a n d y e t M s . V i l l a f r a n c a re f u s e d h i s
invitations.  Consumed by fear, she finally
relented and accepted a dinner invitation on
February 22, 2005.
! February 22, 2005: Villafranca chose The
Mansion restaurant because it was owned by
her relative. While inside his car, Judge
Pacuribot displayed his firearm, which was
allegedly for security purposes.  It
nevertheless intensified Ms. Villafranca's fear. 
Instead of going to a restaurant, Judge
Pacuribot drove to a drive-in motel in Butuan
City.
! He told her to exit the car, and when she was
uncooperative, he grabbed he and pushed her
into a room. He then started kissing her.
! Again, erection difficulties. Only slight
penetration. Forced her to do oral. Later on, he
took a picture of her on the bed, which he later
used as blackmail.
! From that day, Judge Pacuribot constantly
demanded that Ms. Villafranca send him text
messages and letters expressing sweet
nonsense to feed his ego and any failure or
refusal would be met by a threat to divulge the
incident in the motel.
! Then Judge Pacuribot started demanding
food from Ms. Villafranca, which the latter was
supposed to bring to his boarding house.  If
she refused, Judge Pacuribot would threaten
to tell damaging stories to her mother-in-law
with whom she had a strained relation and to
show the picture he took on the cell phone. 
Because of these threats, Ms. Villafranca was
forced to bring some food to Judge
Pacuribot. 
! He told her to leave her husband and
promised to help her file an annulment
complaint.
! Villafranca sent a text message to her
husband (who was a seaman), saying:
“Whatever will happen to me, you tae care of
the kids”. This frightened her husband, who
then terminated his employment contract and
rushed home.
! When Judge Pacuribot sensed that she was
not going to file an annulment case, he drafted
a document wherein it was stated that Ms.
Villafranca and her husband supposedly
agreed that they may freely co-habit with a
third person.  Judge Pacuribot, using threats
of physical and social harm, forced Ms.
Villafranca and her husband to sign the
document.
! When Ms. Villafranca still did not file the
annulment case, Judge Pacuribot slapped her
and hit her head with a clenched fist.  Again he
placed a kiss mark on her neck and when her
 
! When Judge Pacuribot knew of the beating, he
forced Ms. Villafranca to file a rape case but
she refused.
21
 ! July 2006: her transfer request was granted,
and she was finally able to tell her husband
what she went through
DEFENSE:
! Pacuribot denied all claims.
o Couldn’t not have sexually harassed
them in his sala because his court
aide, Abellana was always there.
And Abellana was not there, SPO1
Espejon would take over.
o The entire thing was part of a grand
plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan , a
radio commentator, to oust him
from office. Waniwan was then
facing four counts of libel in his sala
o Gave an alibi- Feb. 22, 2005: ate
dinner at Fil Sumaylo’s house. He
was accompanied by Espejon,
Abellana, and branch clerk court,
Atty. Bibera
o He would not go out at night
because he was targeted by the NPA
ISSUES:
1. W/N denial can prevail over positive testimony
of the witness – NO
2. W/N the delay in the filing of the charges
against him casted doubts to the truthfulness
of their claim – NO
3. W/N the repeated sexual harassments and
violence inside Judge Pacuribot’s chamber
was improbable – NO
4. W/N inconsistencies of the witness’ testimony
affects the credibility of the witness – NO
5. W/N absence of physical resistance from the
victims negates the commission of the crime
of rape – NO
RULING:
I. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like
alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
As between a categorical testimony that rings
the truth on one hand, and bare denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.
II. As held in People vs. Espino delay in the
commission of rape is not an indication of
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never
complain or file criminal charges against the
rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the
ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their
shame to the world or risk the offender’s
making good on his threats. This is
understandable, considering the inbred
modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the
public disclosure of matters affecting their
honor.  Delay in the filing of charges does not
necessarily undermine the credibility of
witnesses. The Supreme Court has deemed
delay justified when there is fear of reprisal,
social, humiliation, familial considerations and
economic reasons.
III. Judge Pacuribot’s defense of improbability
cannot be accepted. As held in People v.
Lavador, wherein the rapist argued that rape
was impossible due to the presence of the
victim’s son on her side, the Supreme Court
said that lust is no respecter of time and place
and rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate: in parks, along the
roadside, within the school premises, inside
the house where there are several occupants
and even in the same room where other
members of the family are sleeping.
IV. Minor and trivial discrepancies which might
have been caused by the natural fickleness
of  memory, even tend to strengthen, rather
than weaken the credibility of the witness, for
they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. As held in Simbajon v. Esteban the
Supreme Court said that No married woman
would cry sexual assault, subject herself and
her family to public scrutiny and humiliation,
and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate
a falsehood.
V. In the case of People v. Fernandez the
Supreme Court held that physical resistance
need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed, and the victim
submits herself to her attackers because of
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the
sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance
while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by
itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at
least intimidation, and threatening the victim
with a gun is sufficient to bring her into
submission. Thus, the law does not impose
upon the private complainant the burden of
proving resistance.
W H E R E F O R E :  J u d g e R e x e l M . P a c u r i b o t  i s
hereby  DISMISSED  from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best
interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations, except the money value of
accrued earned leave credits. Respondent judge is
hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from
rendering any order or decision; or from continuing any
proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent
judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not
be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.
GUANZON v. RUFON
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2028 | October 19, 2007 | Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.
SUMMARY
Respondent was charged with violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Rule on Gender Fair Language
for use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory language,
discrimination against women lawyers and litigants, and
unethical conduct. There were no hearings involved due
to distance but the Court adopted the finding of CA
Justice Salvador of sufficient cause to make respondent
judge administratively liable. The Court held that judicial
decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times
temperate in his language, refraining from inflammatory
or excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to language of
vilification.”
FACTS
Complainants: Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and Atty. Pearl
R. Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant
22
City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano, Bacolod City,
and Atty. Erfe del Castillo-Caldit
Complaint: violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or
obscene and discriminatory language, discrimination
against women lawyers and litigants and unethical
conduct against respondent Judge Anastacio
C. Rufon of the RTC
Incident (from affidavit of Cynthia Bagtas-Serios):
- In a hearing, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was
not assisting me but another counsel, Judge
Anastacio Rufon, inside the court with so
many people present, said to me next time
you see your husband, open your arms and
legs. I felt humiliated and insulted, and was
glad that the hearing did not proceed because
the respondent was not present.
Court referred the case to Justice Rebecca  De  Guia-
Salvador of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.
During the preliminary conference, only
complainant  Guanzon  and respondent judge appeared
because of the distance between Bacolod and Manila.  July 11, 1972: Romeo Tibay filed CAR Case No. 1822-
Justice Salvador: reprimand and an admonition to
respondent to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity
and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
ISSUES & RATIO
W/n Justice Salvador’s finding that respondent judge
uttered in open court intemperate and obscene
language injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of
complainants who are all women should be sustained.
YES
Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times
temperate in his language
- They should refrain from using inflammatory
or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to
language of vilification.
- It is very essential that they live up to the high
standards demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6.  Judges shall maintain
order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the
judge deals in an official
capacity.
- Although judges may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, their noble position
in the bench nevertheless demands from them
courteous speech in and out of the court.  October 7, 1977: SC Resolution referred the case to CA
- J u d g e s a re d e m a n d e d t o b e a l w ay s
temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and in language.
DISPOSITION
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio
C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming
conduct and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a
warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the
future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

CASTRO v. MALAZO
A.M. No. 1237-CAR| First Division | August 21, 1980
FELICIDAD CASTRO, complainant vs.
JUDGE ARTURO MALAZO, respondent
GUERRERO, J.:
SUMMARY:
Respondent Judge Malazo deferred the release of the
decision in Castro case until such time that Tibay case
is resolved since the two cases are interrelated and
there could have been a finding in the latter which would
call for a modification in the former case. SC held that
the delay of almost 170 days in the resolution of Castro
case is in violation of Sec. 151, RA 3844 w/c requires
cases to be decided w/in 30 days.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE:
Sec. 151, RA 3844 (see ratio)
Sec. 5, Judiciary Act of 1948 (see ratio)
FACTS:
TP'72 (Tibay case) with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Tayug. Pangasinan, a complaint for reliquidation,
leasehold, and fixing of rental with damages against
Felicidad Castro (complainant in the present case) and
Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz.
• Tibay alleges that he was an agricultural
lessee of the said landholding and prays that
Castro be restrained from dispossessing him
of his tenancy.
August 14, 1972: Spouses Felicidad and Bonifacio
Castro instituted CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (Castro
case) against Romeo Tibay, Alfonso Cruz and Enriqueta
Salcedo-Cruz also before the CAR.
• They allege that they were the lessees of
Enriqueta’s deceased mother Francisca
Quinto, and that Tibay had forcibly entered the
premises.
• They also pray for reinstatement as tenants or
lessees of the landholding, and for fixing of
rental and damages.
September 9, 1975: The cases were submitted for
decision.
January 29, 1976: Castro addressed a letter to SC
complaining Presiding Judge Arturo Malazo of the Court
of Agrarian Relations Tayug, Pangasinan for delay in
deciding the Castro case for a year.
• Judge Malazo’s Comment: His decision in
Castro case was not immediately released
because he wanted the same to be released
simultaneously with the decision in Tibay
case, a case closely interrelated with the
subject case.
Justice Corazon Agrava for Investigation, Report,
Recommendation.
August 9, 1978: Justice Agrava recommended that
Judge Malazo be exonerated despite not definitely
resolving Castro case within 30 days after its
submission for decision on September 9, 1975 because
said decision in Castro case was in fact prepared and
signed on September 15, 1975 but it was released
simultaneously on February, 26, 1976 with Tibay case
23
 • Technically, Castro case was decided on
September 15, 1975 although released
belatedly.
• There was justification for respondent's desire
to release the decision in Castro case
simultaneously with the decision in Tibay
case, as there was close relationship between
the two cases and there could have been a
finding in the latter which would call for a
modification in the former case.
• While it is true that the decision in the Tibay
case was promulgated tardily, the fact should
be considered that respondent had been made
to bear an overload of cases.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of delay- YES.
While the records prove that Judge Malazo signed the
decision on September 15, 1975 (6 days after the case
was submitted for decision), by his own admission he
did not file the decision with the Clerk of Court until
February of 1976 (around 170 days after the case was
submitted for decision).
• Filing is the essential act that constitutes
rendition of the decision and gives it validity
and binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge
can readily change, alter, revise, or modify his
decision while the same is under his personal
control and custody.
• The rule is well established that the filing of
the decision, judgment or order with the Clerk
of Court, not the date of the writing of the
decision or judgment, nor the signing thereof
or even the promulgation thereof, that
constitutes rendition thereof.
That the decisions were rendered only on February 26,
1976, is a clear violation of Sec.151, RA 3844 or The
Agricultural Land Reform Code which states that all
cases pending decision or resolution have to be
determined and decided within a period of thirty days;
otherwise, no leave shall be granted and no salary shall
be paid.
• Similar w/ what is provided in Sec. 5,
Judiciary Act of 1948, w/c mandates judges
to certify that all cases w/c have been under
submission for decision within a period of
ninety days should have been decided on or
before the date of making such certification,
otherwise, no leave shall be granted and no
salary shall be paid.
SC: We must once more impress upon the members of
the Judiciary their sworn duty of administering justice
without undue delay under the time-honored precept
that justice delayed, is justice denied.
• The present clogged condition of the courts'
docket in all levels of our judicial system
cannot be cleared unless each and every
judge earnestly and painstakingly takes it
upon himself to comply faithfully with the
mandate of the law.
• No less important than the speedy termination
of hearings and trials of cases is the
promptness and dispatch in the making of
decisions and judgment, the signing thereof
and filing the same with the Clerk of Court.
It may be true that Judge Malozo had an overload of
cases in two other branches he was servind, aside from
his regular duties as Presiding Judge in Branch III,
Tayug, Pangasinan, but this is no valid reason for him to
defer and delay the filing of the questioned decision, for
the act of filing is merely a ministerial act of delivering
the signed decision with the Clerk Of Court.
Neither can the Court excuse the respondent by reason
of the claim that the two cases share common issues
because as belied by Judge Malozo’s own admission,
although the two cases were closely interrelated with
each other, the cause of action in one case is different
from the other.
To absolve the respondent would render useless and
impotent the injunction of RA 3844 and allow the Court
to place obstacles to the speedy pace of justice which
this Court has always exhorted.
• This Court has always taken to task
respondent judges for failure to act with
dispatch on the cases assigned to their
respective salas.
RULING: 
Respondent Judge Malozo is hereby reprimanded for
having failed to comply with the provisions of Sec. 151,
RA 3844 or The Agricultural Land Reform Code. He is
admonished and enjoined to comply strictly with the law
and a repetition of the offense may be dealt with more
severely. 
SEPARATE OPINION: Melencio-Herrera, J.
What respondent Judge should have done was to issue
an Order stating that the Castro case would be decided
simultaneously with the Tibay case because of the
inter-relation between the two cases.
• But it was error and poor judgment on his part
to have held release to the Decision in the
Castro case beyond the statutory period.
• That gave the Castros valid reason to
complain.
OCA v FLORO
J. Chico-Nazario | 2006
The First Case
● Atty. Floro applied for judgeship twice. The
prerequisite psychological evaluation revealed that
he had “"(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and
"developing psychotic process" and that he had
problems with self-esteem, mood swings,
confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid
ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual
distortions.
● Both 1995 and 1998 reports stated that he was
unfit to be a judge.
● The JBC, however, allowed Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners.
● Ultimately, he was appointed as RTC Judge Branch
73, Malabon on November 4, 1998.
● Upon an audit of his sala, an administrative
complaint was filed against Judge Floro. The OCA
also recommended that he be suspended during
the investigation and be subjected to psychological
/ mental examination.
o The SC adopted recommendations
● The OCA found 13 charges against him (each is
discussed in the ratio)
● The matter was referred to Justice Ramirez
o Judge Floro filed a petition for inhibition/
d i s q u a l i fi c a t i o n a g a i n s t h i m a s
investigator > denied
● In his “partial report”, Justice Ramirez
recommended the dismissal of Judge Floro by
reason of “insanity which renders him incapable
and unfit to perform duties and fuctions”
● Note, throughout the investigation and even after
the report, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately
filing cases against those he perceived to have
connived to boot him out of office. (which he
24
 eventually moved to be dismissed)
SECOND CASE
● Luz Arriego, the complainant in this case is the
mother of a complainant in a criminal case
● She charges Judge Floro for using his moral
ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss the
criminal case for frustrated homicide in the guise
of settling the civil aspect
o Floro persuaded the complainant and
accused to sign settlement without the
presence of the trial prosecutor
THIRD CASE
● Judge Floro issued a resolution disposing the
motion for involuntary inhibition of Judge Floro and
the reconsideration of the order denying the
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that
case, Mary Ng Nei.
● OCA found that despite the resolution, he raffled
the case anew. When he denied the motion, he
should have continued hearing the case (violation
of Admin Circ. 1, where a special raffle of a case is
only allowed upon a verified application)
● In his resolution, he also mentioned that J.
Hermosisima Jr is his benefactor in his nomination
for judgeship, which is highly inappropriate.
● In his comment,
W/N the charges warrant the dismissal of Judge Floro –
NO. But mental state warrants his dismissal (skip to the
discussion on mental illness as I think that is the
relevant part)
1. Charge of circulating calling cards containing self
laudatory statements regarding qualifications and
announcing in open court his qualifications
● In the cards circulation, it was indicated that he is a
bar topnotcher (87.55%), with full second honors
from Ateneo
● Before the start of sessions, Judge Floro was
introduced as a topnotcher, honor student, etc.
● These are alleged violations of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 3.01 CPR
● Judge Floro contends that these were not improper
– “title” should be broad enough to include legal
standing, honors, etc.
● As to the announcements in open court, Floro
contends that it was his branch clerk who
suggested such.
The Court held that acts constituted simple misconduct
in violation of Canon 2, Rule 20.01
✓ Calling cards cannot be considered as simple and
ordinary, breaching the norms of simplicity and
modesty required of judges
✓ Announcement of qualifications (which happened
only for a week) amounted to unnecessary
publicity.
✓ Need for recognition is an all too human flaw
2. Charge of using chambers as sleeping quarters
● Audit team found a folding bed with cushion and
Floro’s driver sleeping
● Court held that there is nothing improper in having
another use his bed for short periods of time
(different if it was actually using as residential
quarters, the govt paying for electrical bill)
● At any rate, Judge Floro should have been aware
that the staff may feel uncomfortable allowing his
aide easy access to folding bed.
3. Charge of rendering resolution without written
orders (violation of rules of procedure) and charge
of proceeding with the hearing on the on the
Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the
accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor without presence of trial prosecutor and
propounding questions in the form of examination
of the custodian of the accused
Court held that Judge Floro violated PD 968 (Probation
Law), regardless if he acted in good faith – gross
ignorance of the law
4. Charge of partiality when he declared that he was
pro-accused in criminal cases
● Judge Floro allegedly said he was pro-accused
particularly concerning detention prisoners and
bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency
of their cases, especially that he had been accused
of so many unfounded offenses
● Judge Floro denies making such declarations
Court held that this was a violation of Canon 2.01, Code
of Judicial Conduct.
✓ Opened himself up to suspicion regarding
impartiality
✓ Puts serious doubt on his objectivity – eroding
public’s trust
5. Charge of taking advantage of moral ascendancy
(note, second case) and charge of issuing an Order
which varies from that he issued in open court
regarding the same criminal case case
● Employees stated that the order was revised
(stated that Floro reserved ruling pending comment
of prosecutor, when it was in fact settled)
● Judge Floro contends that the hearing was
beneficial to litigants
Charge must fail for lack of basis – controversial
settlement never came to pass, as it was not judicially
approved
6. C h a rg e o f o rd e r i n g m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l
examination of the accused (“mahina ang pick-up”)
over objection of trial prosecutor (as such,
arraignment was suspended)
Court held that order finds legal support as Court may
order such examination. Judge Floro cannot be faulted
for suspension of arraignment as the rule then allows
sushc suspension motu proprio based own assessment
of the judge of the situation.
7. Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in civil
cases pending before RTC (violation of Canon 5,
Rule 5.07) and charge of appearing in personal
cases w/o authority from SC
✓ While these allegations are violations of Section 35,
Rule 138 ROC and Canon 5, Rule 5.07, records do
not reveal any concrete proof of such
✓ What the proscription contemplates is more than
an isolated court appearance, but a succession of
acts
✓ What was proven was that appeared in just a
motion for entry of judgment (court found this as
an isolated case and that in such case he was
actually lawyering for himself)
✓ Guilty still of unbecoming conduct when he signed
a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City
25
 and for appending to the pleading a copy of his
oath with a picture of his oath-taking
o Act was to influence on a fellow judge
8. Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and
the Philippine justice system and charge of use of
highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings
● Tape recordings of criticisms were presented
● Court held that without proof that these were made
during a court proceeding, cannot be used against
him as the unauthorized recording of a private
conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No.
4200.
● Dizon, Clerk of Court, alleged that he said
“kabulukan ng hustisya” “sangkatutak ang corrupt
na Judges (sa Malolos), called a lady lawyer
“malandi, luka-luka”
● Court, however, held these testimonies of great
weight – ample proof of violation.
9. Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July
1987
● Discuss matters involving his personal life and
beliefs (against Canon 3, Rule 3.03 and Circular No.
13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice)
o Judge Floro, Jr.’s claimed that he is
endowed with psychic powers, that he
can inflict pain and sickness to people,
that he is the angel of death and that he
has unseen "little friends”
ON JUDGE FLORO’S ALLEGED MENTAL ILLNESS
All these arguments linked to charge of mental/
psychological illness. Court thus held that he should
undergo mental or psychological examination. If mental
illness is proved to be true, renders him unfit to perform
functions.
● Note, Judge Floro first refused to be examined. He
was held in contempt for this. Ultimately, the
examination was conducted where it was found to
be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge.
● Judge Floro then submitted earlier evaluations
which were all favorable to him.
● Justice Ramirez recommended that he be removed
and dismissed from office.
✓ Court agrees – findings of mental impairment
renders him unfit
✓ No indication that Judge Floro is anything but
honorable man, however the findings of psychosis
by mental health professional indicate gross
deficiency in competence and independence
o Floro admitted that he believes in psychic
visions, dwendes, and that he has dwarf
friends
o Floro believes that he can write while and
trance, conduct healing sessions etc.
This belief system is at odds with the
o
critical and impartial thinking required of
a judge under our judicial system.
✓ Judge Floro does not meet requirement of
objectivity (lapses in judgment)
o Judges administer justice judicially, not
according to some abstract ideas of right
and justice, but according to laws
✓ Lacks judicial temperament and fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity
✓ In retrospect, he should not have been appointed.
But no one is to blame
o JBC-009, Rules of the JBC” which
required psychological/psychiatric test
to be conducted by the SC was
promulgated only in 2000.
o At the time of his appointed, JBC could
rely on evaluation of private psychologist
not accredited by the JBC
✓ Given that Judge Floro was under preventive
suspension for 7 years, Judge Floro is entitled to
the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for a period corresponding to
three of his almost seven years suspension. (Court
noted that delay can be imputed to him, thus he is
entitled to three years only)
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount
of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of
the 13 charges against him
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions
as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the
service due to a medically disabling condition of the
mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of
his office, effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
(second case)
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
Automatic Conversion of Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the CA and Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 17 September 2002, N/A (SC
Admin Matter)
Summary of the Facts:
The SC noticed that some of the
administrative cases against judges, justices, and court
officials who are lawyers are the same grounds for
disciplinary action of the members of the bar (e.g.
Violation of Lawyer’s Oath, Violation of CPR, etc.).
The SC, in this resolution, rules that in these
instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered as a disciplinary proceeding against the
respondent official, and the official may be required to
comment or show cause as to why they should not be
disciplined as a member of the bar.
Provisions applicable:
CANON 6

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
26

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the
due performance of judicial office.
SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take
precedence over all other activities.
SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity
to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities
in court and the making of decisions, but also other
tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s
operations.
SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to
maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for
this purpose of the training and other facilities which
should be made available, under judicial control, to
judges.
SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about
relevant developments of international law, including
international conventions and other instruments
establishing human rights norms.
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff
and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.
SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct
incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial
duties.
Relevant info on the topic:
Admin cases against justices, judges, and
court officials who are lawyers are now also considered
as disciplinary proceedings.
Full FACTS:
• SC: Some admin cases against judges,
justices, and court officials who are lawyers
are based on the same grounds as those for
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.
• This resolution holds that administrative
cases against these judges are now
automatically considered as disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent official.
• The official may be required to comment on
the matter and/or show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the
bar.
• Judgement may be promulgated in a decision
or resolution.
• This resolution will supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court
• The resolution affects all administrative cases
where the respondent official has not
commented on the issue.
• The resolution is published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
SAMSON v. CABALLERO 

August 5, 2009 | Per Curiam | Administrative |
Dishonesty and Falsification of a Public Document
FACTS:
1. Olga Samson alleged that respondent Judge
Virgilio Caballero should not have been
appointed to the judiciary for
a. l a c k o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
q u a l i fi c a t i o n s o f p r o v e n
competence, integrity, probity, and
independence
b. violating JBC rules which disqualify
applicants for judgeship with a
pending administrative case
c. Deliberately concealing the fact that
he had administrative charges
against him
d. Allegedly committing improprieties
and exceeded his powers by
overruling the Sec. of Justice in a
reinvestigation
2. The said administrative charge was originally
filed in 2003
● Ombudsman: dismissed the
charges
● CA: reversed the decision and
directed Ombudsman to file and
p ro s e c u t e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i ve
charges
● While said charges were pending,
Caballero was interviewed by JBC
and subsequently appointed as RTC
judge in Nueva Ecija
3. Caballero: it’s true that there were charges but
these were dismissed and hence, during his
interview with the JBC, no charges were
pending against him
4. OCA (Office of the Court Administrator): found
Caballero guilty and administratively liable for
dishonesty and falsification of an official
document for his false statement in his PDS. It
recommended respondent’s dismissal
ISSUE:
WN Caballero is guilty of dishonesty and falsification —
YES
RULING:
Caballero is DISMISSED from service.
RATIO:
1. Both the complainant and Caballero were
unable to produce any concrete evidence
supporting their claims. Regardless of
whether he disclosed his pending cases
during his interviews, the fact remains that he
committed dishonesty when he checked the
box indicating “No” to the question “Have you
ever been formally charged?” in his March 21,
2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC
Personnel.
2. Respondent’s act of making an obviously
false statement in his PDS was reprehensible,
to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence
on his part when he answered “No” to that
very simple question posed in the PDS. He
knew exactly what the question called for and
what it meant, and that he was committing an
act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it
anyway. To make matters worse, he even
27
 sought to wriggle his way out of his
predicament by insisting that the charges
against him were already dismissed, thus, his
negative answer in the PDS.
3. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.
4. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the
most fundamental qualification of a member
of the judiciary.
5. Prior AM No 02-9-02-SC: administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar
and against members of the court were
treated separately
After AM No 02-9-02 SC: can be done in one
i.e. an administrative case against a judge of a
regular court based on grounds which are also
grounds for the disciplinary action against
members of the Bar shall be automatically
considered as disciplinary proceedings
against such judge as a member of the Bar.
6. The requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning.
7. Violations of Caballero:
a. C A N O N 1 — A L AW Y E R S H A L L
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
● Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
deceitful act
b. CANON 7—A LAWYER SHALL AT
ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION…
c. CANON 10—A L AWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
● Rule 10.01—a lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any
artifice.
d. CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO J U D I C I A L O F F I C E R S A N D
S HOULD IN S IS T ON S IMIL A R
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
e. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which strictly enjoins a
lawyer from committing acts of
deceit, otherwise, they may be
suspended or disbarred
RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL
COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1.  How instituted.  - Proceedings for the
discipline of judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or
upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of
person who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous
complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall
state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
SEC. 2.  Action on the complaint.  - If the complaint is
sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to
comment within ten (10) days from the date of service.
Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3.  By whom complaint investigated.  - Upon the
filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the
expiration of the time for filing the same and unless
other pleadings or documents are required, the Court
shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report, and
recommendation or assign the case for investigation,
report, and recommendation to a retired member of the
Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a
Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent
rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the
respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.
SEC. 4.  Hearing.  - the investigating Justice or Judge
shall set a day of the hearing and send notice thereof to
both parties. At such hearing the parties may present
oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the
investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the
Supreme Court may grant.
SEC. 5.  Report.  - Within thirty (30) days from the
termination of the investigation, the investigating
Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing findings of fact and recommendation.
The report shall be accompanied by the record
containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the
parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for
the exclusive use of the Court.
SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the
report as the facts and the law may warrant.
SEC. 7.  Classification of charges.  - Administrative
charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light.
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
28
2. Dishonesty and violations of the  Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as
determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the
decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to
the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court
Administrator.
These amendments to  Rule 140  shall take effect on
October 1, 2001 following their publication in two
newspapers of general circulation on or before
September 15, 2001.
September 11, 2001, Manila.

SEC. 9.  Less Serious Charges.  - Less serious charges

include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in
transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or
habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.

SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:

1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending
case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.

SEC. 11.  Sanctions.  - A. If the respondent is guilty of a

serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge,
any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.

SEC. 12.  Confidentiality of proceedings.  - Proceedings

against Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan

29