In Context
The hard problem of consciousness: understanding our reality
In the 17th century, the philosopher René Descartes
proposed that the very act of thinking about one’s existence
is evidence of the presence of a mind distinct from the
body. This notion came to be known as Cartesian dualism,
spawning the dictum “cognito ergo sum” (I think, therefore
I am). According to Descartes, consciousness is irrefutable—
even if everything else you think you know is an illusion—
because consciousness is observed from within. The
troubling aspect of consciousness is that it is very difficult
to describe scientifically. Thus, a longstanding debate on the
nature of conscious experience—how does consciousness
occur?—is still ongoing.
To attempt to address this epistemological question
interdisciplinary research in cognitive science, in particular
neuroscience, is chasing the tail of a dominantly held
position in philosophical thought (direct realism) with
the more evidence-based position of indirect realism.
The conflict lies in a seemingly basic question: do we
perceive the world around us as it really is (direct) or is
the world an internal perceptual copy that is generated
within our brains (indirect)? This question derives from
the “hard problem of consciousness” conceived by David
Chalmers in 1995. The problem is hard because, beyond
the scientific explanations concerning the properties
of the brain, the question “why is the brain conscious?”
remains unanswered.
In the spirit of such a debate comes a new book, Direct
versus Indirect Realism: a Neurophilosophical Debate on
Consciousness. The editors, the neuroscientist John
Smythies and the philosopher Robert French, have an
interconnecting interest in the relationships between
the mind, brain, and consciousness, and perception
epistemology. In this book, they bring together
neuroscientists and philosophers to explain and defend
their opposing theories. “We believe that the current state
of affairs in the philosophy of perception is not entirely
healthy”, Smythies and French state in the introduction,
which is a quirky way to open the conversation. Setting
up an opposing dialogue in this collection of essays is,
according to the editors, in the interest of seeking truth.
The book is organised into three sections: part one
includes six essays defending indirect realism, akin to
representative realism, which rejects the possibility of first-
hand knowledge, simply because knowledge has to have
come from somewhere. Indirect realism also draws from a
concept of perception that posits that we cannot observe
the external world as it really is; all we can discern are our
own ideas and interpretations derived from sensory input
acquired from the real, external world. Part two presents
five essays in defence of direct realism, also known as
naive realism or epistemological dualism. Contributors
to this section take the position that our conscious
www.thelancet.com/neurology Vol 17 May 2018 403
experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal
representation; what they describe as “a cloned miniature
of the world”. The final section, titled The Debate, is where
authors comment on each other’s work, closing with final
rebuttals of the critiques. The editors invite the reader to
decide which contributors have the stronger position, but
with convincing arguments on both sides, how do we get
to the truth?
Traditionally, philosophy addresses problems in the world
that are not yet explained by experimental science. Because
of the rate at which neuroscience has progressed, the brain
is less mysterious today than it was 50 years ago. Thus, Published Online
philosophy needs to be somehow aligned with science to February 26, 2018
stay relevant, to avoid being out of touch with the reality it http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S1474-4422(18)30080-2
seeks to understand. Direct versus Indirect Realism is aimed
Direct versus Indirect Realism:
at a readership of “advanced students and researchers in a Neurophilosophical Debate
cognitive neuroscience, neurophilosophy, neuropsychology, on Consciousness
and related areas studying perception, consciousness, John R Smythies, Robert French,
eds.
and theory of mind”. The essays assume the reader has
Academic Press, Cambridge, MA,
a pre-existing understanding of philosophical dialogue, USA, 2018.
because the arguments are wordy and non-linear. Although Pp 298. US$ 84·96.
concepts are contextualised, a lay person could find himself ISBN 9780128121412
getting lost with a slightly dizzy feeling, induced by the
arguments going round and round to try and prove what
is often posited as the “common sense” interpretation. So,
the reader must be interested in the argument, the debate,
to enjoy this highly academic book.
Each essay seeks to strengthen its own argument by
negating the possibility of the truth of the other viewpoint.
In the process, many questions are raised, providing plenty
to think about. Questions such as: what is the relationship
between the physical and the phenomenal, is the latter
a direct reflection of the former? Is the whole material
world nothing more than a dream? Are properties such as
shape, size, and velocity genuinely real or constructed from
experience? Does the thesis hold true that it is impressions
rather than objects that we perceive? Or is the awareness
of the object in itself the sensory experience? What about
the findings from optics, neurobiology, psychology, and
information technology: how does what we know to be
true, to be scientifically credible, affect our judgment and
understanding? Where do the lines cross between science
and philosophy?
For now, neuroscientists are trying to establish what
happens biologically and psychologically when our brains
interpret sensory input. Anything we are aware of at any
given moment in the world forms part of our consciousness.
Until we understand this so-called hard problem, the
reality is that the one thing the human mind is incapable of
comprehending is itself.
Jules Morgan