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Francesco Biondo, Palermo
Abstract: This paper puts under scrutiny Martha Nussbaum's turn to political liberalism. In
this paper, I intend to shed light on two problems that Nussbaum must face when she try to
follow Rawls' ¡dea of political liberalism. First of all, I would like to show the limits of applica
tion of the technique of "overlapping consensus". I try to argue that Nussbaum fails to prove
that we can attain a universal list of political values (such as a list of primary goods) through
an "overlapping consensus". By contrast she cannot avoid Rawls' limitation of "overlapping
consensus" to communities already ruled by liberal institutions. Secondly, I question Nuss
baum's "political liberal attitude" when she faces difficult issues such as non-discrimination
inside religious institutions. I try to show that in this case Nussbaum's arguments are weak
because they are based on a clear-cut distinction between public and private realms. Yet,
such a clear-cut distinction is practically impossible in liberal political communities. We can
not but argue about the boundaries between public spheres and private domains.
For many years Martha Nussbaum has tried to elabórate a form of Aristotelian political
philosophy compatible with liberalism. According to her, the idea of human flourishing
as development of people's powers to choose a conception of the good is consistent
with J. Rawls' theory. In particular, both théories reject formai accounts of liberties
that limit governmental actions to the guarantee of property rights and other claims to
non-interference. Both her form of Aristotelianism and Rawlsian Justice as Faimess
dwell on economic and social circumstances that can "prevent people from availing
themselves of liberties and opportunities that are formally open to them".1 As it is well
known, Nussbaum has provided a particular interprétation of the capabilities approach
depicted by A. Sen to issues of distributive justice. According to her, it is possible to
elabórate a universal list of basic capabilities by individuating some constituent features
of human beings.2 By taking account of human needs and powers, we can formúlate
a vague conception of the good that could be universally accepted. Moreover, this
conception is also consistent with a liberal theory of justice.
In 1998, she clarifies that her account of justice is neither comprehensive nor
metaphysical, but simply "political liberal".
"I now understand the list of central human capabilities as the core of a specifically politi
cal form of liberalism, in the Rawlsian sense. (...) It is neither an exhaustive account of the
good nor a metaphysically grounded account. Each citizen will interpret its metaphysics
differently, in the manner of a Rawlsian «overlapping consensus», understanding the core
values in terms of the rest of her comprehensive conception."3
I am ¡ndebted to Martha Nussbaum and Francesco Belvisi for their helpfu! and encouraging com
ments.
Martha Nussbaum, The Good as Discipline, the Good as Freedom, in: Ethics of Consumption. The
Good Life Justice and Global Stewardship, eds. D. Crocker, T. Linden, Boston, Rowman and Lit
tlefield Publ., 1998, 324. See also Nussbaum, Nature, Function and Capability, Aristotle on Political
Distribution, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1988,145-184; Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social
Democracy, in: Liberalism and the Good, eds. R.B. Douglass, G. R. Mara, H.S. Richardson, London,
Routledge, 1990, 203-252.
Nussbaum, Human Functionings and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, in: Polit
ical Theory, vol. 20, n. 2,1992,202-246; Nussbaum, Non Relative Virtues, an Aristotelian Approach,
in: The Quaiity of Life, eds. M. Nussbaum, A. K. Sen, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1993, 242-269
Nussbaum, Political Animais: Luck, Love, and Dignity, in: Metaphilosophy, vol. 29, 4,1998, 284
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312 Francesco Biondo
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 313
John Rawls, PoHtical Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press 1993, (Hereinafter PL)
18-19
Rawls PL, 35
To see how a well-ordered society can be unified and stable, we introduce another basic idea of p
litical liberalism to go with the idea of political conception of justice, namely the idea of an overlappi
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrin
endorse the political conception, each from its own point of view". Rawls PL, 134
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge, Cam
bridge University Press, 2000, (Hereinafter, WHD) 76.
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314 Francesco Biondo
Overlapping consen
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 315
13 Nussbaum WHD, 76
14 "Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible
comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework
of the free institutions of a constitutional démocratie regime." Rawls PL, XVIII
15 Nussbaum WHD, 67. She refers to Rawls PL, 4-11.
16 "People don't need Western philosophers to teil them that they don't like to be pushed around by
the world or to live in a condition of helplessness"; Nussbaum WHD, 68, 104. See also Nussbaum,
Women and the Law of Peopies, in: Politics, Philosophy and Economies, vol. 1, 3, 2002, 283-306.
17 Nussbaum WHD, 67
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316 Francesco Biondo
Loe. cit.
"When [Citizens] believe that institutions and social practises are just, or fair (as these conceptions
specify), they are ready and Willing to do their part in those arrangements, provided they have reason
able assurance that others will do their part; if other persons with evident intention strive to do their
part in just or fair arrangements, Citizens tend to develop trust and confidence in them; this trust and
confidence becomes stronger and more complete as the success of coopérative arrangements is
sustained over a long time; the same is true as the basic institutions framed to secure our fundamental
interests (the basic rights and liberties) are more firmly and willingly recognised"; Rawls PL, 86.
Rawls PL, 158-168
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 317
NussbaumWHD, 105
Nussbaum (note 16), 287-289
Micheal Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York, Basic Books,
1983, 311-316. This point becomes clear when we try to identify the notion of "social bases of self
respect". In this case, Rawls himseif refers to the "public political culture". Rawls PL, 181.
Stephen Mulhall, Adam Swift, Rawls and Communitarianism, in: The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls, ed. S. Freeman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 470
Rawls PL, 44-46. The fact that a contingent agreement on meaning, scope, significance of the notion
of primary goods is necessary in order to reduce disputes on political debate may be considered, to
some extent, a partial reply to Waldron's thesis of the irrelevance in Rawls's theory of disagreement
in matters of justice. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999,
151-154.
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318 Francesco Biondo
agreement that ¡s hi
institutions. These in
as autonomy, individ
conflicts among righ
Nussbaum thinks tha
such as primary good
This is possible; but
on how to attain "un
Nussbaum tries to pr
universal values, sin
accept diverse metap
are presupposed in d
and in which politica
weak, however, becau
point is clear when N
capabilities.28 What w
in order to find possi
the contrary, is mor
relativism in moral th
believes that it is pos
of justice, but he thin
political Community,
This agreement is a r
this seems exactly w
One can argue that I
since I confuse his "kantian constructivism" for a form of conventionalism. I consider
Rawls' theory a weak form of conventionalism insofar as his constructivism relies on
a series of ideas (the conception of the person and of society) that can be accepted
by diverse comprehensive doctrines, doctrines that can be all reasonable but not all
true. The acceptance of these ideas is then a matter of reasonableness, not of truth;
it is a matter of a correct inference from a particular conception of person as free and
equal member of society that is conventionally accepted.29 An "overlapping consen
sus", then, provides a stable agreement because diverse ethical doctrines accept the
same conception of the person and the same ¡dea of the society for différent reasons.
Moreover, this agreement explains why people tend to trust political institutions that
make this consensus stable over time.These doctrines, however, are deeply influenced
by the working of démocratie political institutions. We overlap our political ideas through
a debate within what Rawls calis "free institutions".
This dependency of "overlapping consensus" on démocratie institutions doesn't
seem to be part of Nussbaum's theory. In her account of morality, these intuitions that
should overlap seem not to be the resuit of an intersection of diverse comprehensive
doctrines through the working of political institutions. In fact, these intuitions are, ac
cording to Nussbaum, objective, presupposed in our argumentations, even though they
It is not a case that Rawls affirms, 'The suprême court is the branch of government that serves as
the exemplar of public reason". Rawls PL, 231
This point seems clear to me when Nussbaum argues that there is already a cross-cultural consen
sus on many capabilities. Nussbaum WHD, 104. See also Nussbaum (note 16), 288.
Nussbaum WHD, 77, 105
The distinction between reasonableness and truth is provided by Rawls, PL pp. 126-129.
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 319
It may be argued that Nussbaum tries to follow Rawls' line of thought while maintaining her A
telian roots; therefore she is elaborating a particular version of political liberalism. This versio
for an universal list of basic rights on the basis of a "objectively true" conception of the person. R
himself The Idea of Public Reason revisited, in: idem, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Mass.,
vard University Press, 1999,143-144 présents three features of the "family of liberal conceptio
might be the case that Nussbaum's is one of those conceptions. The question whether an "obje
account" of political liberalism is acceptable is extremely interesting, but it won't be tackled here.
I must make clear that I am not taking part for Nussbaum's or for Rawls' general theory of politi
tification. I try only to show that their metaethical outlooks, their "third ways" between objectivis
conventionalism, are différent and, sometimes, conflictive. Therefore, it is possible, as an anonym
referee wrote to me, 'lo give a generous interprétation of her project". In other words, even th
their conceptions of "overlapping consensus" are différent, their théories can agree on the same "t
theory of the good", or on the same "political virtues".
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320 Francesco Biondo
to recognise the do
comprehensive doc
Nussbaum's polit
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 321
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322 Francesco Biondo
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Is Martha Nussbaum really political liberal? 323
Concluding Remarks
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324 Francesco Biondo
Author's adress: Dr. Francesco Biondo, University of Palermo, Dipartimento Studi su Politica, Diritto e
Società, Piazza Boiogni 8, 90134 Palermo, Italy, biondo@unipa.it
41 This conflict is epitomised by James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal opportunity, and the family, Yale Uni
versity Press, New Häven-London, 1983.
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