F.

PERSON ACTIONS

CASE#1: ESPANOL v. CSC

G. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

CASE#2: BALASBAS v. MANAYAO

“[D]ishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course

of the performance of duty” by the public officer, for it “inevitably reflects on the
fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and
morale of the service.”

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an administrative offense

which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.

While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers
and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must
protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather
than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.

Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact

relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty.

CASE#3: VILLANUEVA v. CA

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.

In the present case, Villanueva’s offense was in no way connected with the performance
of his functions and duties as a public officer. Sure, his office was used as a venue for the
commission of the offense and definitely, his offense speaks despicably of his character
as a man but it in no way evinced any failure on his part to discharge his duties as a
public officer. Yes, Villanuevas offense is gravely immoral and reprehensible but it falls
short of grave misconduct as defined by law.

To determine whether a public officer committed misconduct, it is necessary to separate

the character of the man from the character of the officer. Here, Villanueva’s
transgression laid bare the values of his inner being but did not expose any of his
shortcoming as a public officer.

CASE#4: FLORIA v. SUNGA

Administrative offenses do not prescribe. It bears stressing that it is not in accordance

with the norms of morality for a woman, even if single, to maintain an illicit relationship
with a married man. Even if such relationship had ended, the stigma of immorality still
attaches to the parties, especially the woman. This is specially so when the persons
concerned are public employees who are supposed to maintain a high standard of
morality in order to live up to their role as models in society. The fact that the illicit
relationship between Floria and Rodrigo Abadilla has ceased will only mitigate her
culpability.

CASE#5: TEVES v. FELICIANO

In Villordon v. Avila, 678 SCRA 247 (2012), the Court defined dishonesty as
“intentionally making a false statement on any material fact” and “a disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray

In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally forced his way
into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court
procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders
and decisions of the courts.

CASE#6: GUPILAN-AGUILAR v. OMBUDSMAN

No, they are not guilty of grave misconduct.

we cannot see our way clear how the fact of non-declarations would have a bearing on
the performance of functions by petitioner Aguilar, as Customs Chief of the
Miscellaneous Division, and by petitioner Hernandez, as Customs Operations Officer. It is
non- sequitur to assume that the omission to declare has served, in some way, to hinder
the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection between
the two. Without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the
charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.

The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and would
normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere mis-
declaration in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty
requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements; otherwise, the
government employee may only liable for negligence, not for dishonesty.

H. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP

1. DEATH OR PERMANENT DISABILITY

2. ABOLITION OF OFFICE

CASE#7: BAUTISTA v. CSC

CASE#8: BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

 The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office
is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished
by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant
him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes

the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure.

The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under

the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize.

Reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or

to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides
for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a)
where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office
is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms
of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a
classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except

constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary.

3. EXPIRATION OF TERM OR TENURE

CASE#9: ASTRAQUILLO v. MANGLAPUS

Yes, they can be terminated. It seems plain that all three (3) petitioners: Astraquillo,
Glang, and Melchor, Jr., pertained to the Non-Career Service. Their appointments to the
Foreign Service were made on "bases other than those of the usual test of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service;" their entrance was not based on merit and fitness
determined by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications.
This being so, their "tenure was coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasures.
 Obviously, however, this aspect of their appointments has no effect on the
essential character of their position as pertaining to the non- career service.
Consequently the termination of their connection with the Foreign Service was not
dependent on proof of some legally recognized cause therefor, after due notice
and hearing as in the case of career officers and employees but lay entirely
within the will of the President, in the exercise of her discretion, and her
determination of the wisdom, necessity or convenience of such a step in the
national interest, actually a political decision. In making this determination, the
President may take account of the recommendation of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs who, as the President's alter ego, heads and controls the Department of
Foreign Affairs and supervises and directs all officials and employees assigned
abroad.

CASE#10: ACHACOSO v. MACARAIG

CASE#11: LECAROZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, supra

The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the
office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding
term

Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the

contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified.

4. RETIREMENT

CASE#12: IN RE: GREGORIO PINEDA

No, benefits under Rep. Act No.910 cannot be extended to them.

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee.
However, when in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions
to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each
grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of
required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to
case basis.

More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under
the Plana or Britanico rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up or
compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the
retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service; it
was only a bowing to policy considerations and an acceptance of the realities of
political will which brought him or her to premature retirement. The Court has carefully
gone over the history of the petitioners/movants in these cases. On the basis of one or
more of the reasons given above, it finds them not entitled to unqualifiedly avail of the
privileges given under the Plana and Britanico rulings.

CASE#13: CSC v. PILILIA WATER DISTRICT

 5. RESIGNATION

CASE#14: ORTIZ v. COMELEC

Petitioner’s separation from government service as a result of the

reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not
be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law.
Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a
complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must
show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied
by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful
authority.

Petitioner’s “resignation” lacks the element of clear intention to surrender

his position.

Verily, a “courtesy resignation” cannot properly be interpreted as

resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public
official’s intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to
the will of the political authority and the appointing power.

The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part
of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to
have completed his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his
appointment paper. Petitioner’s case should be placed in the same category as
that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon
his superior’s loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no
removal but an expiration of his term.

CASE#15: COLLANTES v. CA

There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The
mere fact that the President, by himself or through another, requested for someone’s
resignation does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another
position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be
no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of
courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void,
because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing power, and
because its object is outside the commerce of man.

CASE#16: JOSON v. NARION

CASE#17: GAMBOA v. CA

One of the ways of terminating official relations is by resignation. To constitute a

complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an
 intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of
relinquishment and a resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in
some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
In Our jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer
to be operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.

A public officer cannot abandon his office or position before his resignation is
accepted but the incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the
acceptance of his resignation unless he has been duly notified therefor.

CASE#18: QUINTO v. COMELEC

Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter,
could wield the same influence as the Vice President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior
and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both
file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the

functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling.
The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a
greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position
aspired for.

Mancuso v. Taft, cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation,
which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for office—a right inextricably linked
to their freedom of expression and association, is not reasonably necessary to the
satisfaction of the state interest.

CASE#19: ESTRADA v. ARROYO

CASE#20: OCA v. AMOR

It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or

an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative
sanction.

6. ABANDONMENT
 CASE#21: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES v. CA

No, he cannot resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

The Court held that Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished his
membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.

Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of

an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and
control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while
resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary
relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a
right or to exercise an easement or an office

CASE#22: CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE

CASE#23: QUEZON v. BORROMEO

failure to give such notice by the appropriate government office does not
prevent the dropping of the employee concerned from the government
service. In the nature of things, staying away from one's regular employment
in the government or remaining on leave without pay is something that an
employee can scarcely be unaware of.

Here, as in Isberto and Ramo, there is not only violation of Rule XVI,
Section 33 but also abandonment of her position on the part of petitioner.

Petitioner completely disregarded the fact that her requests for extensions
and for detail to Zamboanga were never approved by the Department of
Health authorities, and continued to stay away until it suited her to return
and demand reinstatement at the Iligan City Hospital.

CASE#24: IN RE: AWOL OF DARLENE JACOBA

Yes, she has abandoned her office

There is no doubt that Jacoba has been remiss in her duties as court stenographer, to the
detriment of the service. This falls within the purview of Section 35, Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules on Civil Service, which provides: „Officers and employees who are absent
for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without
Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice. x x x Under the
present Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Person Actions, an employee who is
absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendar days shall be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls even without prior notice.

[Requisites of Abandonment were present as follows:

 Intention: present
 Overt Act: AWOL for 30 days
Note that employee with atleast 30 days Absence Without Leave can be removed
without hearing]
 CASE#25: PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY v. GARRIDO

CASE#26: ADIONG v. CA

FACTS:

Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such

office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right
or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of
an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance
results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform.
Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his
wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an
unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to
vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office.

In this case, respondent Nuska’s failure to perform her duties was

involuntary and cannot be considered as acquiescence. In her letter to
petitioner, she claimed that she did not resign and she considered her
termination from the service as illegal. She insisted on her reinstatement.
Clearly, there was no abandonment of office.

7. ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE

CASE#27: PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER v. ELMA, supra

Yes, it constitute incompatible office

Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other
such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the
law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the
word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other,
of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety
and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The
offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to
interfere, one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law.

An incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The
duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions
of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC.
 8. RECALL

CASE#28: ANGOBUNG v. COMELEC

9. CRIMINAL CONVICTION

CASE#29: GARCIA v. COA

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this

innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been
found guilty of the offense charged.

Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of

executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations
for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

Petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment,

he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

The right to back wages is afforded to those who have been illegally
dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them.

The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from
administrative liability.

10. IMPEACHMENT
11. PRESCRIPTION OF RIGHT TO OFFICE

CASE#30: TUMULAK v. EGAY

Yes, it has already prescribed.

inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as a waiver, i. e., a
renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent.

It is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued
uncertainty, and the people’s interest requires that such right should be
determined as speedily as practicable.

CASE#31: REPUBLIC v. SERENO, supra

12. REMOVAL THROUGH QUO WARRANTO

CASE#32: REPUBLIC v. SERENO, supra

13. DISMISSAL AS PENALTY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION

 CASE#33: CSC v. CLAVE

Yes, the dismissal is proper

Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear that
length of service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending on
the circumstances of the case. Here, it was shown that Clave was previously found guilty
by the GSIS of simple neglect of duty in Adm. Case No. 05-027 in its Decision dated 12
February 2007 for unauthorized cancellation of the loan and header of one Benitez. In
that case, the GSIS suspended Clave for three months. Earlier, in another Decision dated
10 November 2005, the GSIS found Clave guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service for her participation in a mass action that resulted in the disruption of GSIS
operations, for which she was meted the penalty of suspension for six months and one
day. Hence, Clave’s length of service in the government could not mitigate her liability
considering that the present offense is not her first offense but her third offense. Applying
Section 52(B) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty
of dismissal imposed by the GSIS and affirmed by the CSC should instead be imposed on
Clave.

CASE#34: FERNANDEZ v. OMBUDSMAN

CASE#35: OCA v. AMPONG

Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking

the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of
Decir.

This Court has defined dishonesty as the “(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.”

[Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial

employee. Indeed, we take note that [Ampong] should not have been
appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the
cheating that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it
may, [Ampong’s] present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her
getting the penalty she deserves.

Despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should

nevertheless be entitled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to
the aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the
forfeiture of the same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from
the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that
they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of
fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they
have earned prior to their dismissal.

CASE#36: LAGOC v. MATAGA

Yes, the dismissal is valid.

Misconduct is defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." Misconduct
becomes grave if it "involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence."

Section 52 (A) (3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service,
which was correctly imposed by the Ombudsman on petitioners.
 CASE#37: GLORIA v. CA

CASE#38: CSC v. MAGNAYE

Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during

their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause
or for failure to qualify as regular employees.

The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended

to both those in the career and noncareer service positions; Well-
entrenched is the rule on security of tenure that such an appointment is
issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution.

I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC OFFICERS

CASE#39: MAGLALANG v. PAGCOR

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should
therefore be set aside.

CASE#40: CSC v. DACOYCOY, supra

CASE#41: MONTOYA v. POLICE DIRECTOR

the government party appealing must be the one prosecuting the case and not the
disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case.

It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the investigating and
disciplining authority when he rendered his Decision dated 23 June 2000 dismissing
Montoya from the service. The pronouncement in Mamauag, that the disciplining
authority or tribunal which heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal should not be the one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the
public officer or employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director.
The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the RAB-
NCR and DILG Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative
charges against him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau. It
was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement internal discipline among its
members, which instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya, so it may be
deemed the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which stands to suffer as a
result of the purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it would be compelled to
take back to its fold a delinquent member.