Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations

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What Is Conflict?

H. H. A. Tony Cooper PhD

To cite this article: H. H. A. Tony Cooper PhD (2003) What Is Conflict?, Journal of Police Crisis
Negotiations, 3:1, 85-100, DOI: 10.1300/J173v03n01_06

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 What Is Conflict?
How Are Conflicts Resolved?
H. H. A. Tony Cooper, PhD

KEYWORDS. Conflict, fighting, resolution, police, negotiation

“There’s got to be a better way than fighting,” said Mr. Saveloy.

–Terry Pratchett 1

INTRODUCTION

Conflict is a collision of opposing interests. The collision may be relatively

mild in nature as when two vehicles traveling in the same direction veer into
each other’s path, striking only a glancing blow as each tries to recover, inde-
pendently, and return appropriately to unoccupied space. Or the collision may
be exceedingly violent as in the case of two speeding vehicles proceeding from
opposite directions meeting each other unrestrained head-on. Conflict occurs
when the interests of one party come by accident or design into engagement
with those of another or others. The collision can involve intangible as well as
tangible items of interest; some of the most serious collisions involve conflict-
ing ideas, sentiments, attitudes, feelings. Conflict can be seen, described, and
analyzed in many ways, but it is useful from the perspectives of management
and resolution to view it by reference to simple geometric principles. Conflict
develops when something is propelled into the space already occupied by
something else that cannot readily accommodate this new presence. Conflict,

H. H. A. Tony Cooper is affiliated with the University of Texas at Dallas, Richard-

son, TX.
Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, Vol. 3(1) 2003
http://www.haworthpress.com/store/product.asp?sku=J173
 2003 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
10.1300/J173v03n01_06 85
86 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

however otherwise it is described, is, essentially, an attempt to secure accom-

modation by force, intimidation, deceit, or other politically less reprehensible
means. The opposite of conflict is the avoidance of collision, that each party’s
interest in its own orbit runs. Each pursues its own course without seeking to
occupy or usurp that of others. Such avoidance does not create negative com-
petition for disparate interests can co-exist on tracks of their own. Only when
these tracks converge so as to obstruct the path of the other does the possibility
of conflict arise. Yet competition can, and often does, generate conflict where
competition turns into a struggle for the faster or better track. Confrontation is
transformed into conflict when opposing interests actually collide.2 Conflict
is, therefore, a dynamic concept involving the notions of energy and move-
ment. It is these attributes that give conflict its destructive potential. The
avoidance of conflict requires a keen appreciation of the interests of others; the
path upon which they are set; their speed and direction of travel; and a respect
for those interests tantamount to a recognition of their right to co-exist with
others without let or interference. Anything less than this carries within itself
the possibility of confrontation, which is the threshold of conflict.

MANAGING CONFLICT

Conflict management or resolution implies a situation, in which, however

modestly, that threshold has been crossed. There has been a collision of inter-
ests with actual damage, or the potential for damage to the interests of one or
both parties. The immediate requirement, from the perspective of manage-
ment, is the safe containment of the energy generated by the collision leading
to its least harmful dispersal and a disengagement of the parties in conflict.
Thus in a stylized conflict such as a boxing match, the conflict manager, the
referee, steps in to separate the contestants where there is a breach of the rules
or where one would suffer unacceptable harm at the hands of the other were the
contest allowed to proceed. Such a humane result can only be achieved where
the conditions for effective management are in place and are, in every practical
sense, enforceable and enforced. Much real conflict is only regulated ex post
facto. The degree of harm suffered by one or both of the parties is markedly in-
fluenced by the delay in responding to the conflict by others assuming some re-
sponsibility for managing or resolving it. Management assumes a willingness
to desist or disengage so that the energy produced by the conflict can be appro-
priately dissipated. Again, the analogy of the boxing match is instructive. If the
contest is to be fairly mediated, and the conflict kept within its properly regu-
lated bounds, the conflict manager, the referee, must ensure compliance with
his orders so that one combatant does not secure an advantage over the other by
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 87

throwing a telling punch after being required to desist. Thus conflict man-
agement and resolution presume the existence of rules governing the mat-
ter and an effective mechanism for the enforcement of those rules.
Otherwise, management and resolution of the conflict are determined
only by the respective strengths and the will of the parties to it.
All conflict has the potential to harm after some fashion the interests of
those who are, strictly, strangers to it, but some conflicts have a greater
propensity to do so than others. War is the ultimate in human conflict on
account of its scale, its ferocity, the means employed by the belligerents,
and the sentiments that fuel the clash. War is like a virulent disease. It has
an incubation period, during which tensions are rising, and a stage at
which confrontation is reached. This is the crisis point of the sickness
from a management perspective. If conflict is to be avoided, the tempera-
ture must be reduced, the combatants must be persuaded to step back and
refrain from actual hostility. Once the threshold is crossed and actual vio-
lence takes place, the conflict that ensues has the capacity to metastasize,
to spread and involve others. In our era of development, given the potency
of certain classes of weaponry, all conflict of this kind has to be regarded
with the utmost seriousness for it has the capacity to involve interests on a
global scale. When conflict on the level of war is engendered, the underly-
ing factors build into a kind of critical mass. At a certain point, what is
then produced can elude the capacity of the parties involved to control
matters. Moreover, once such a conflict has erupted it often takes on an
autonomic quality, becoming seemingly independent of those who engi-
neered it. Theoretically, this is possible in conflicts of any magnitude but
in those of lesser grade and intensity, outside forces can usually be
brought to bear so as to moderate the energies released. Every conflict has
the inherent potential to generate damaging side effects as well as propa-
gating collateral conflicts as other interests are wittingly or unwittingly
sucked in. Like a raging conflagration a point is reached where a particu-
lar conflict becomes unmanageable. All that can be practiced is damage
control and containment until a stage of exhaustion is reached allowing
for some kind of resolution. Conflict has in it the element of that which
Philip Roth has called “The Uncontrollability of Real Things.” 3 Only by
understanding conflict, its constituent parts, and its dynamics can a true
appreciation of the term “Police Power” be attained. The call for the
United States of America to take on the role of the world’s police officer is
a sad recognition of the failure of international collective action to moder-
ate and mediate serious conflict. 4
88 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

THE MEANING OF CONFLICT

Conflict is an ineradicable part of the human condition. The elements of

conflict are deeply embedded in the human psyche. It is probably no exaggera-
tion to suggest that it is part of the condition of virtually all life forms. Evolu-
tion encourages competition; every thing encroaches upon everything else.
The clash of interests is inevitable in any state of social Darwinism; how else is
it possible to conceive of the survival of the fittest? Human ambition, in partic-
ular, and the dissatisfactions it gives rise to, force those who entertain it onto
the paths of others equally unwilling to tamely accept the hand that destiny has
dealt them. Even the simplest desire for betterment carries with it the seeds of
conflict as these wants are found to be attainable only at the expense of others.
The modern world has exponentially expanded the range and scale of even the
most normal of human ambitions while, at the same time, limiting practically
the possibilities for withdrawal. In the modern, civilized state the hermit is a
truly endangered species. The ambitions of one must ineluctably contend with
the ambitions of others if they are to achieve realization. The alternatives are
the abandonment of the desired objectives or their modification through com-
promise, or submission to the direction of the more powerful contending
forces standing in the way of fulfillment. It is in the analysis of these eternal
verities that we are able to perceive the principles upon which the mechanisms
of conflict resolution rest. However much the fact, unpalatable to many, is dis-
guised, it must be frankly recognized that all conflict resolution is dependent
upon the existence of an effective enforcement mechanism. Without it, the
parties whose interests are in collision are left to their own devices. The out-
come, in such a case, depends how well-matched they are and which has the
greater fortitude and will to prevail. The Rule of Law is promulgated and en-
forced by the power of the nation state, alone, or in concert with others of like
mind in international affairs. It is pure sophistry to pretend pace seventeenth
century jurisprudence that Lex is Rex. Rex is always Rex, whomsoever for the
time being occupies the regal role, be it an elected executive or a junta. Any-
thing else is simply an acknowledgement of the balance of forces. Any scheme
of conflict resolution resting on other than this is doomed to failure.

WHAT IS CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

By conflict resolution is meant any process by means of which the clash of

interests is halted; the parties to the conflict are suitably restrained; 5 ensuing
damage is mitigated; and an adjustment of the interests in dispute is effected by
agreement or force. Few conflicts are ever resolved to the absolute satisfaction
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 89

of all parties involved in a dispute. Whether on the macro or micro level most
dispute resolution is based on expediency; an armistice rather than a perma-
nent settlement is effected. Conflicts tend to linger, sometimes for generations,
awaiting a re-adjustment or re-alignment of forces. Some conflicts are fueled
by implacable hatred extending back over the centuries. Like some volcanoes
that remain quiescent over long periods of time, they are yet capable of cata-
strophic eruption and a destructive release of pent-up energies. Nevertheless,
even in these cases, conflict resolution is more propitious at some times than at
others.6 Even the most bellicose are on occasion inclined to favor peace over
continued strife. Those who would mediate conflict need to develop a nose for
these often fleeting opportunities. At any level, there are few really single-is-
sue conflicts. Most conflicts are complex in their causes and development.
Sometimes the causes are concealed or disguised and often in the run-up to the
conflict there are extraneous accretions which, deliberately or otherwise,
muddy the waters. There is not always a central issue, but among the accumu-
lation of issues careful analysis will usually reveal those that are more impor-
tant than others. Some are calculatedly introduced purely for bargaining
purposes, while others have a sentimental or symbolic tokenism rather than a
practical character which are yet dangerous to discount or ignore. Those who
would seek to resolve any particular conflict would do well to engage in a care-
ful, preliminary sorting-through of the issues, with especial reference to their
history so as to assign, in the eyes of the parties, a proper level of importance to
each. Sometimes the emotional content of a certain issue is so out of all propor-
tion to its real worth to outsiders that it threatens to derail any otherwise sensi-
ble settlement.7 This holds true in personal as well as international conflicts of
the gravest character. The piece-meal approach, while superficially attractive,
often founders on account of this issue problem. Thus while substantial prog-
ress towards settlement of most outstanding issues in the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict has been made, the status of Jerusalem remains a seemingly, at least
for the moment, irresolvable issue.

A FORMULA TO GUIDE THE PROCESS

With appropriate attention to the foregoing, the following formulation for

the resolution of conflicts generally is suggested: 8

• Who are the parties to the conflict?

• What seem to be the issues involved?
• What does each of the parties hope to gain from the conflict?
• What is each party prepared to concede to the other?
• What concessions is each party prepared to accept?
90 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

• What is it worth to other parties in terms of a contribution to settle the

conflict?
• What are the alternatives to conflict in the particular case?
• What is the likely outcome if the conflict is not resolved?
• Can that outcome sensibly be tolerated?

While each of the above is clearly worthy of extended treatment in its own
right, only the briefest, explanatory commentary will be essayed here. It is in the
application of this formulary that the success and failure of the attempt at resolving
any particular conflict is founded. The principal difficulty always resides in ob-
taining and properly evaluating the information falling under each heading. The
parties sometimes play their respective cards very close to the chest. At other
times they engage in deliberate obfuscation to keep their adversaries, and others,
off balance. What can be prudently presumed is that everyone engaged in conflict
wants to win, although their hopes of winning may not match up to their desires.
More difficult to measure is the willingness to compromise. It is here that the
scheme suggested above is helpful in establishing what information is needed to
evaluate that possibility.

WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?

Every conflict is driven by a human individual or individuals with all the pecu-
liar, personal characteristics, prejudices, attitudes, experience, and history that
pertain in the instant case. The possible variations are near infinite. In extreme
cases, hatred or contempt for the adversary may make compromise of any kind
virtually impossible; “Victory or Death” is the Order of the Day. There is almost
always a personal agenda driving every conflict. It is important, then, to identify
who is in the driver’s seat and why that person is, for the moment, dictating the di-
rection in which matters are proceeding. How secure is that person’s control of the
situation? Does his or her position depend upon the outcome? Is there any lack of
cohesion in the ranks? Are other more malleable candidates waiting in the wings?
Those who drive conflict must be ever mindful of the need for success for their
personal survival. This is true in even the most stylized of conflict. Is there a point
in some conflicts where they are capable of progressing independently of the
agency of those driving them? Would World War II not have broken out had Hit-
ler died early in 1939? Was World War III averted, for the time being, by the death
of Stalin in 1957? Of such notions assassinations are set in train. Even the state of
health, physical and mental, of those driving conflict is material to those having an
interest in resolving it.9 The primacy of the “Who Factor” is stressed for, if you do
not know with whom you are dealing, how can you know what they want?
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 91

SO WHAT DO THEY REALLY WANT?

A proper appraisal of the issues is a prerequisite to their being placed in a

useful order. Major wars have been started on the flimsiest of pretexts. These
are a mere cloak for the real issues driving the conflict. In modern times, these
issues are masked by the “spinmeisters,” whose propaganda is an important
part of the war effort. Every combatant advertises his or her cause as just, wor-
thy, even noble. Those engaged in conflict resolution often have to make Her-
culean efforts to avoid being caught up in the spin. Is there an apparent central
issue? What is its relative importance to the parties? Is it old or relatively new?
How long has it gone unresolved? Why has this issue caused conflict now?
Such issues must be sensitively viewed through the eyes of the parties. Matters
of slight import to strangers may have life or death meaning for the adversar-
ies. In complex situations there is an understandable tendency to seek to sepa-
rate out the issues and to postpone dealing with the difficult ones until some
later point in time. Attractive though this may appear it seldom leads to satis-
factory resolution of the conflict for it is usually the central, most contentious
issues that are postponed. However difficult, the central issue or issues should
be quickly identified and addressed.
What the parties themselves hope for is, again, rarely articulated in straight-
forward fashion. A playful kind of political correctness informs much that is
said about what is hoped for from the conflict. “We would like to settle this un-
helpful strike soon and fairly in the interests of all our employees, sharehold-
ers, and the public at large.” The real hope? “We’d like to destroy this union
once and for all and we’re going to lock them out for as long as it takes.” “All
we want out of this conflict is recognition, secure borders, and to live in peace
with our neighbors.” The real hope? “Yes, of course we’d like that. And if it
takes killing every one of them to do it, so be it.” Even Hitler announced, from
time to time, that he had no further territorial demands–before he went on to
the next conquest.10 Surely the truth regarding what is hoped for would hardly
serve the interests of the aggressor. Ascertaining the truth of the matter re-
quires diligent searching and not a little cynicism. Most parties to a conflict
hope for more than they can gain by it.

WHAT CONCESSIONS ARE POSSIBLE?

It is often easier to determine what each party cannot realistically concede,

willingly, to the other than it is to establish, in the course of a conflict, that
which can be given up. Few will surrender voluntarily what they had latterly
been prepared to die for in order to gain or retain. Concessions are intimately
92 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

related to the central issues of the conflict. One concedes objects of collateral
importance, and the value, if any, to the adversary has to be assessed accord-
ingly. Conflicts are not resolved on the basis of such valueless concessions. At
best, they might serve to secure a temporary abandonment of hostilities. This is
not conflict resolution in the proper sense of the term. This is very different
from concessions of real worth, which while they are offered collaterally are
nevertheless sufficiently attractive to warrant acceptance on their own ac-
count. Many bitter labor disputes are settled along these lines; half a loaf is
better in most cases than nothing. Proper conflict resolution demands reciproc-
ity. The giving of concessions to end a conflict calls for receiving something
desirable in return.
Conflict is an undesirable disturbance of social harmony. In some cases, it
may have, as in the case of war, a most serious unsettling effect on others be-
sides the immediate parties embroiled in the conflict. A strike in, say, the pub-
lic health services sector or the airline industry can cause economic loss and
hardship as well as posing a threat to life and a disruption of reasonable expec-
tations. All conflict has the potential to harm other parties than those directly
engaged in it and put other interests in jeopardy. The desirability on the part of
these others in putting a speedy end to the ensuing strife is often more marked
than is the willingness of the actual adversaries engaged in the conflict to de-
sist. This factor is a large contributory to any resolution of the matter, and it is
rarely overlooked in the more serious cases by the actual parties to the conflict.
What they cannot hope to force out of each other is often more than made up by
what they can obtain by way of compensation from affected third parties desir-
ous of seeing an end to the conflict. This is very marked in the many attempts
to secure a satisfactory resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict.11

AND THE ALTERNATIVES?

The alternatives to all-out conflict vary widely from case to case. War is
sometimes followed by a sullen truce, in which the parties seek to regroup, re-
plenish their resources, and prepare for a renewal of hostilities in the future.
There has been no true resolution of the conflict, only an expedient abatement
of it. Occasionally, conflicts continue, seemingly pointlessly to outside ob-
servers, because the parties or one of them is unwilling to face the conse-
quences of disengagement, the shame of defeat, a disappointed constituency, a
loss of power internally as well as externally. “Going down in flames” is seen
as more redeeming, more glorious, than coming to terms. Much depends upon
the relative strengths of the parties, in intangible as well as material terms, but
sometimes it is the stronger party that is persuaded to withdraw from the con-
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 93

flict either because its purposes are seen to have been served or because the
pursuit of final victory is judged too costly in military, political, and economic
terms. The United States’ experience in Vietnam may be usefully evaluated af-
ter this fashion. The chosen alternatives bear a logic of their own.12

PREDICTING OUTCOMES

It is difficult to predict, accurately, the outcome of any conflict; there are

simply too many imponderables. History is full of examples where one party
has literally snatched victory out of the jaws of defeat. The conflict will con-
tinue as long as one party retains the hope of securing some greater advantage
by not resolving it. These are human calculations and could quite easily be
wrong.13 Clearly, from the perspective of conflict resolution, experience
shows that there are times when it is more favorable to seek a settlement than at
others. Again, history is replete with lost opportunities to end what turn out to
have been costly, fruitless struggles. Success does seem to favor those who
never give up however dim the prospects of victory. These have something of
the gambler’s dementia and are hard to persuade that more is to be gained from
quitting than in persisting in the pursuit, against all odds, of the “Big One.”
These principles hold good whether by reference to a single battle, a major
war, an industrial dispute, a civil suit, or a family feud. It is precisely because
outcomes, by their nature, are uncertain that conflict appears so attractive over
the alternative to some.14 Nevertheless, most conflicts, however settled, end
with compromise of some sort; neither party secures all its objectives. Many
fight on simply to the point where they can claim some sort of victory, how-
ever hollow. Conflict resolution, in an artificial sense, depends on the fine an-
ticipation of that point and persuading the parties of the most expeditious and
least expensive way of reaching it.

THE SPILLOVER EFFECT

Some conflict is of such a magnitude that it adversely affects the interests of

a wide range of parties, which have nothing positive to gain from its eruption
or continuance. It must be readily acknowledged, too, that some otherwise un-
involved parties profit greatly from certain kinds of conflict and actively en-
courage it or fuel its continuation. Examples can be found at all levels. Sweden
and Switzerland benefited considerably from their neutrality in both world
wars. Israel, as well as international arms dealers, benefited substantially from
the punishing, eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq. At the outset of
94 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

World War II, Stalin hoped that Britain and France would so weaken Nazi Ger-
many, and vice versa, that the security of the Soviet Union would be enhanced
for at least a while.15 The Microsoft anti-trust litigation is also instructive in
this respect. Oracle and Sun Micro-systems encouraged the U.S. Department
of Justice in its conflict with Microsoft seemingly in the belief that the out-
come of a gravely weakened rival would enhance their own business pros-
pects. Others were less enthusiastic. Some family feuds have clearly been
exacerbated by the efforts of “advisers” and others hoping to benefit from ex-
tending the conflict.16 Such conflicts tend to abate when there is a perception
that the parties to it are simply being exploited by others with little or no bene-
fit to themselves. Another Terry Pratchett truism has it “that any bunch of men
who were paid to put out fires would naturally see to it that there was a plentiful
supply of fires to put out.”17 There is a tolerance threshold to all things affect-
ing human life and the common weal. A catastrophic collision of interests be-
tween two nuclear powers of secondary standing is increasingly likely in our
day and age and is probably beyond the tolerance level of the rest of the world
community. But how to stop it once the conflict has begun? The nuclear bomb
has long been seen as the ultimate equalizer for the “little guy.” What if the big
guy has it also and has no hesitation in using it? The outcome at best would be
death and destruction for millions; it could, at worst mean extinction of one of
the parties. While this might not be unwelcome to some, can it sensibly be tol-
erated?

THERE MAY BE A SILVER (OR GOLDEN) LINING

Japan is the only nation, at the time of writing, to have suffered a nuclear as-
sault. It is indeed a fortunate circumstance of history for that country and its
people that this attack upon it was launched, autonomously, by the United
States of America and was motivated not in a vengeful spirit nor out of a mor-
bid curiosity as to its possible effects, but rather out of a healthy desire to bring
the conflict to a rapid conclusion and thus save further lives, Japanese as well
as allied, and the predictable destruction that prolonging the struggle would
have brought in its train. This is not argued chauvinistically; history speaks for
itself in this matter. Japan’s later unparalleled prosperity and its economic
challenge to the rest of the world are a direct consequence of the benign treat-
ment received at the hands of the conqueror and the sensible way in which the
conflict was brought to a close. While anything other than this might well have
been incompatible with the American way, we might usefully indulge in a lit-
tle, not-too-fanciful speculation. Suppose after dropping its bombs on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki and rendering its opponent impotent, the United States
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 95

had seen its best interest served by an immediate withdrawal into isolation.
And suppose further that in so doing it had sent back, forthwith, to the Islands,
all Americans of Japanese descent, the only substantial Nisei community out-
side its native land, save, perhaps, those in Korea, in even greater peril. Let us
conjecture that instead of a U.S. occupation, the Chinese, who had suffered
cruelly from the barbarism of Japanese militarism, and Stalin’s Soviet Union
had moved in, unconstrained, to fill the vacuum. The defeated peoples, com-
pressed in the smallest of spaces, would have been at the mercy of those who
could have, and might well have dispatched in short order the entire race. The
Japanese, the Nihon-jin, would have been no more than a memory, an unpleas-
ant memory for many, extinguished, removed from humankind so thoroughly
that they could never again have risen to perturb the world scene.18 On a mate-
rial level, we should never have enjoyed the contributions of Sony, Toyota,
Canon et al. There is little to suggest a rebirth of Japanese militarism or desire
for a reprise. Is this, then, a useful model for conflict resolution with applica-
tion elsewhere?

HOW, THEN, ARE CONFLICTS RESOLVED?

Conflicts are resolved, at least for the time being, by reason of one or more
of the following circumstances:

• The appropriate application of overwhelming force resulting in the de-

struction of the adversary or that party’s capacity to continue to resist.
• Submission or surrender by one of the parties.
• Voluntary disengagement by each party acting independently on its own
account.
• Voluntary withdrawal by one of the parties through exhaustion of re-
sources or the will to continue the conflict.
• Through attrition. Both parties are so worn down by the struggle that
they lack the means and/or the fortitude to continue.
• Disappearance, dissipation, disintegration, or destruction of the thing in
contention.
• As a consequence of the intervention of a third party or parties.
• Through an agreement arrived at between the parties themselves or ar-
ranged by others.

Again, each point will receive a brief comment here, but clearly an extended
discussion of each would be more appropriate in a different place.
96 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

CRUSHING DEFEAT

While it might not be thought politically correct to express such sentiments,

in all honesty they represent the preferred position of a majority engaged in se-
rious conflict. If one party has the capacity to bring the other to its knees there
is very little that can act upon this save countervailing force from some other
quarter. Yet the application of overwhelming force does not necessarily imply
the intent or the desire to achieve total destruction of the adversary. This may be
neither practical nor desirable. It is the adversary’s power to continue the con-
flict that is sought to be destroyed. Nowadays, even in the gravest of conflicts,
the power of nations to wreak havoc on others is circumscribed by the interests
of the other members of the community nations. In an interdependent world
where even the exercise of sovereign power internally is suspiciously regarded
by others, viz the carrying out of a duly pronounced sentence of death, the utter
destruction of an adversary people in war is unthinkable. As a practical matter, it
is probably impossible.19 Conflict resolution by force, therefore, comes down to
rendering the adversary incapable of further resistance so as to be able to impose
terms on the vanquished party and secure compliance. From a conflict resolution
perspective, in this regard, it is instructive to consider the case of Iraq following
the close of the brief Gulf War in 1991. Iraq’s aggression was halted by the mas-
sive force brought to bear against it, but its capacity for future mischief was not
brought under effective control. What were the real issues involved in the con-
flict, and why were they not, at the time, effectively resolved?

GIVE UP?

Submission or surrender can be brought about by a variety of circumstances.

The recent usurpation of power in Venezuela against the Chavez regime col-
lapsed precipitately, humiliatingly even, with the realization that the means to
attain it were simply not there. Many a just cause is withdrawn from litigation in
the courts in favor of settlement to avoid a punishing, economically destructive
experience that seems to promise, in the end, too little by way of satisfaction.
Plea bargaining rests on a similar foundation. Submission in the face of a power-
ful, manifestly superior adversary is sometimes a wise course rather than having
it imposed after a damaging conflict when the terms of surrender might be much
harsher. Yet, in the matter of conflict resolution, it should be recognized that
even the most abject and unconditional of surrenders is but the first step in the
process. All too often, one party wins the war only to lose the peace.
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 97

SO LET’S DESIST

Sometimes the parties, having embarked upon a course of conflict, come to

a realization that it is not in their interests to continue in that vein. The true na-
ture of the conflict dawns upon the parties in such a way that they become anx-
ious to terminate it before any great harm is done to what they conceive as
their vital interests. Many situations lead to threats and posturing that, if not
brought under control, can develop into serious conflict for which the par-
ties are really unprepared. At this point, disengagement being the prefera-
ble course, face-saving mechanisms of one kind or another are sought. In
national and international matters a suitable solution is often found through
scapegoating and the removal of those who, usually for personal reasons,
are driving the conflict. A change of leadership is sometimes a salutary pre-
lude to measures designed to resolve the conflict.

ONE PARTY DROPS OUT

Protracted conflict often has a way of resolving itself. One or other of the
parties runs out of the means to continue it advantageously and withdraws
as conveniently as possible before staring defeat in the face.20 This kind of
stratagem rarely resolves the conflict definitively but it does provide a
pause, a kind of breathing space allowing for innovative approaches to the
problem of serious, lasting resolution. Time may not heal in these cases, but
it does allow for the emergence of different criteria and different personali-
ties. From the perspective of conflict resolution, a danger resides in mistak-
ing the lull for a true change of heart. It is, rather, a circumstance to be taken
advantage of in a positive way so as to move towards a permanent end to the
conflict.

ATTRITION: BOTH ARE WORN OUT BY THE STRUGGLE

This is the extreme case prefigured by the two earlier examples consid-
ered. Here, both parties go the full course without reaching any conclusion
in their respective favor. They are totally exhausted by the struggle and the
conflict in effect fizzles out, ending without a definite result with respect to
the issues in contention.21 Many family feuds follow this pattern, being
passed on from generation to generation, the fruitless struggle being fueled
and refueled by the half-forgotten slights and grievances having little pres-
ent-day relevance for the actual adversaries. Among nations, these de-
98 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

bilitating struggles only cease when the wastage becomes so apparent that
continuation threatens the very existence of the contending parties and
opens the door to their acquisition or absorption by others.

NOTHING LEFT OVER WHICH TO FIGHT

The conflict is sometimes terminated by the disappearance of the cause of

action. A substantial estate, for example, is consumed over the years in the cost
of litigation; there are no winners among the contending parties, for there is
nothing left to win. A rich enterprise which, if left to flourish, might have satis-
fied the claims of all who depended in some way upon it, is destroyed in the
conflict so that all are brought down with it. Conflict has a way of consuming
men and fortunes. In very long conflicts, the issues are prone to change over
time. A study of the Cold War is an example worthy of close study in this re-
gard. The original issues became so attenuated towards the end that it would
have been hard for many on either side to have identified them with any degree
of specificity.

POLICE ACTIONS

On all levels, third party intervention is often called for to terminate and re-
solve a conflict. The police called in to break up a barroom brawl is an example
at the more mundane level. The underlying issues may not be resolved or even
addressed in subsequent judicial disposition, but the conflict is for the time be-
ing halted and the propensity for individual and social harm mitigated. On the
international scene, there are many ongoing conflicts around the world that at-
tract major intervention efforts by organizations such as the United Nations,
with varying degrees of success. By way of analogy with the barroom brawl,
many of these efforts are directed at halting the conflict so as to allow for im-
mediate reduction in the harm certain to be occasioned by its continuance and
to allow for mediation to address the outstanding substantive issues. Such in-
tervention can be a very protracted affair and of considerable complexity. The
record of success in this regard is not encouraging in terms of permanent reso-
lution of the conflict to the satisfaction of all parties, primarily due to the lack of
real police power on the part of international bodies. The more serious issues
that have attracted international intervention efforts, such as Serbia/Kosovo
have, however, been helpful not only in saving lives and limiting damage in
the instant case, but have served as useful precedents and warning to other
like-minded belligerents.
 H. H. A. Tony Cooper 99

AND, SAVING THE BEST FOR LAST–NEGOTIATION

Lastly, conflicts may be resolved through agreement between or among the

contending parties either before or during the outbreak of actual hostilities.
This, for obvious reasons, is the preferred method of conflict resolution, which
takes place through a process called negotiation. And this, as they say, is a whole
other story.22

NOTES
1. Interesting Times, New York: Harper Prism (1996), page 339. For those desir-
ous for real enlightenment on this topic, a careful reading of this delightful text is
highly recommended.
2. This is like stating that an assault becomes a battery when the force is actually
applied.
3. Operation Skylock: A Confession, New York: Simon & Schuster (1993), page
239 et seq.
4. For some interesting, controversial perspectives on this, see Give War a
Chance, P. J. O’Rourke: New York; The Atlantic Monthly Press (1992). Some of this
author’s observations have taken on a new, poignant relevance since September 11,
2001.
5. That great statesman, theorist, and practitioner Henry Kissinger observed, “If
history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no jus-
tice without restraint.” White House Years, Boston, MA: Little, Brown (1979), page 55.
6. Conflict managers would do well to reflect on the wise words of Leon Jaworski.
“In his great plan, the Lord has his own timetable, which far surpasses our feeble un-
derstanding.” Crossroads, Elgin, IL: David Cook (1981), page 215.
7. This is particularly true in family feuds. Daddy’s old six-shooter may be worth
more than a billion dollar fortune. This is a triumph of emotion over common sense.
8. This is an expansion on an earlier formula suggested in a special context. See,
The Hostage Takers, H. H. A. Cooper, Boulder: Paladin Press (1981), page 2.
9. The removal of an obdurate leader on the grounds of ill-health is a common
enough face-saving device. See, for example, the resignation of Sir Anthony Eden, the
Then British Prime Minister, as a consequence of the Suez debacle in 1956.
10. “. . . the Court flatly rejected the idea that attacking another country could ever
be a legitimate application of the right of self-defense under international law.”
Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, Bradley F. Smith, New York: Basic Books (1977),
page 151. Does this principle still hold firm?
11. This may be cynically expressed but, in practical terms, it comes down to “What
is Uncle Sam paying for us to stop fighting each other?” In terms of hard cash, the deal
that President Clinton was offering in the waning days of his presidency is worthy of
careful study in the regard.
12. See, on this, again, Henry Kissinger, op. cit. supra note 5, at pages 234 et seq.
13. Prediction in any field is dangerous to the reputation of those who essay it. See,
for example, “Doom, Incorporated,” James Surowiecki, The New Yorker, May 20,
2002, page 40.
100 JOURNAL OF POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

14. “Yet there is always a danger in saying that the outcome of any war was ‘inevi-
table’ after a certain point.” “Hitler’s Last Stand,” Niall Fergusson, The Sunday Tele-
graph, 22 May 1994, page 31.
15. See, Stalin: The Man and His Era, Adam B. Ulam, Boston, MA: Beacon Press
(1973), pages 504 et seq.
16. This is exemplified by the trajectory of the Koch family feuds. See, “Wild Bill
Koch,” Bryan Burrough, Vanity Fair, June 1994, pages 114 et seq. Both sides of this
protracted conflict seem to have suffered in this regard.
17. The Truth. New York: Harper Torch (2000), page 208.
18. In war and its aftermath, many extreme ideas are bruited about: “. . . for example
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s plan, in various versions, for converting
Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character. These ideas (in-
fluenced by his senior official, Harry Dexter White), interested Roosevelt, who had ear-
lier told Morgenthau ‘we either have to castrate the German people or . . . treat them in
such a manner . . . that they just can’t go on reproducing people who want to continue in
the way they have in the past.’ (The President had said much the same once about Ja-
pan).” Armed Truce, Hugh Thomas, New York: Atheneum (1987), page 327.
19. While genocide is clearly looked upon with the utmost disfavor by the interna-
tional community, “ethnic cleansing” has been widespread and ineffectively punished.
This is a foolish and ineffectual proceeding, which its practitioners must come to re-
gret, as witness the Shoah, for there will be survivors, who will carry with them not
only the scars of the experience but a desire for vengeance.
20. While the other party is in a condition to remain in the fight, it is disinclined, at
that point, to pursue its advantage, preferring to accept the respite.
21. In these cases, there are no winners, only losers. When the final account is pre-
sented it is seen that the costs outweigh any benefits, tangible or intangible.
22. Those interested in viewing this from a somewhat specialized angle may wish to
refer to the following:

• Hostage Negotiations: Options and Alternatives, H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg,

MD: IACP (1997).
• Special Problems in Negotiating with Terrorists, H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg,
MD: IACP (1982).
• The Skyjacking of Kuwait Airways KU422: Reflections on the Algerian Media-
tion, H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg, MD: IACP (1989).
• Establishing a Hostage Negotiation Capability: Conceptual and Pragmatic
Groundwork, H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg, MD: IACP (1988).
• Establishing a Hostage Negotiation Capability: Operation Precepts, H. H. A.
Cooper, Gaithersburg, MD: IACP (1988).
• “Hostage Negotiation,” H. H. A. Cooper, 27 Chitty’s Law Journal, No. 8, 1979,
pages 253-264.
• “Negotiating with Terrorists,” H. H. A. Cooper, 1 Journal of Police Crisis Nego-
tiations, No. 2, 2001.

RECEIVED: 6/05/02
ACCEPTED: 7/13/02