1. SLDC v.
DSWD (2017) proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
FACTS:
The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner)
against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the
implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction. which
dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the
Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the
Bureau of: Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the
implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction due to the
reason that claiming it affects the profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation in the
Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their
effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring establishments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a law;
2. Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
3. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the petitioner’s
right to equal
protection of the law
4. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and violates the petitioners right
to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a law. Generally, the office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by the law. This is, however, not the lone
office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was also
recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation
of legislative authority. And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action
to assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the
instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission of financial statements which were wanting in
the first case, but because it had the good sense of including questions that had not been raised or
deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to PWDs,
the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal protection
clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based
upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An
Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as
amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined
as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for human being.
Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2)
a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
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 2. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS ATIENZA (2008)
FACTS:
Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al. filed a petition against Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, reclassifying the Oil Depot in Pandacan
Terminal, from industrial to commercial area and to cease and desist from operating their businesses
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron as well as DOE sought to intervene and asked for the
nullification of said ordinance. The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case
because the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property
rights. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate.
On the other hand, the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of
Manila who recommended the approval of the ordinance cited:
The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil
among others;
The depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and
In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.
ISSUE:
Whether the enactment of the ordinance a legitimate exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And
to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
SC reiterated the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
3. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs DSWD ET.AL. (2007)
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating pharmacies in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically
tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.
On 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act states
that:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assail the said Act because it allegedly constitutes deprivation of private property and
compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and
capital.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 4(a) of the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” is constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object.The State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government
program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens
to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as
the State considers them an integral part of our society.
Page 2 of 30
Police power has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
4. MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC vs. SECRETARY OF DSWD
FACTS:
RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control
or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments
from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all
customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree
material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
5. DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NCDA

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own
Rules and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power.

ISSUE:
Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain.

RULING:
The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the
challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely
to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy
in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives
on contributing to the development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment.

Page 3 of 30
 6. MERALCO vs Sps Ramos
7. MMDA vs VIRON
FACTS:
To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive
Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System.
As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus
terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport
terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting
public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖
(Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro
Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the
project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial
bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the
constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O.,
insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without
due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and
maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that
Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus
terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the Court that
there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O.
179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and
as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project
pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.
RULING:
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra
vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her
exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the
DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications.
The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who
is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and
authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for
transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive
departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and
not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport
system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence
of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of
existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring
and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion
Page 4 of 30
has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police
power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is
no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was
delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power
measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized
that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the
felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined,
is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient
connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro
Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along
the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus
terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the
prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic
congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth
the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking
areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus
terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the
maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary
service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or
lease of suitable terminal sites.
8. ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS v. GCC APPROVED
MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2001[5] (AO 5-01) which
directed the decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among the several clinics who are
members of GAMCA.
It required an OFW applicant to first go to a GAMCA Center which, in turn, will refer the applicant to a
GAMCA clinic or hospital.
Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of 2002[6] holding in abeyance the implementation
of the referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its directive suspending the referral decking system
in AO No. 159, Series of 2004
In... n 2004, the DOH issued AO No. 167, Series of 2004[8] repealing AO 5-01, reasoning that the
referral decking system did not guarantee the migrant workers' right to safe and quality health service...
then DOH Secretary Francisco T. Duque III expressed his concern about the continued implementation
of the referral decking system despite the DOH's prior suspension directives.
GAMCA questioned the DOH's Memorandum No. 2008-0210 before the Office of the President (OP)
Republic Act (RA) No. 10022[12] lapsed into law without the President's signature
Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its August 23, 2010 letter-order,[14]
directed GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the referral decking system and to wrap up
their operations within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
On August 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the RTC of Pasig City a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (GAMCA's
petition).[15] It assailed: (1) the DOH's August 23, 2010 letter-order on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion; and (2) paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No. 10022, as well as Section 1 (c) and
(d), Rule XI of the IRR, as unconstitutional.
AMCOW filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene and to file an opposition-in-intervention, attaching
its opposition--in-intervention to its motion.[17] In the hearing conducted the following day, November
24, 2010, the RTC granted AMCOW's intervention; DOH and GAMCA did not oppose AMCOW's
motion.
RTC granted GAMCA's certiorari petition and declared null and void ab initio the DOH CDO letters. It
also issued a writ of prohibition directing "the DOH Secretary and all persons acting on his behalf to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed Orders against the [GAMCA]."
The RTC upheld the constitutionality of Section 16 of RA No. 10022
The RTC reasoned out that the prohibition against the referral decking system under Section 16 of RA
No. 10022 must be interpreted as applying only to clinics that conduct health examination on migrant
workers bound for countries that do not require the referral decking system for the issuance of visas
to job applicants.
It noted that the referral decking system is part of the application procedure in obtaining visas to enter
the GCC States, a procedure made in the exercise of the sovereign power of the GCC States to protect
their nationals from health hazards, and of their diplomatic power to regulate and screen entrants to
their territories. Under the principle of sovereign equality and independence of States, the Philippines
cannot interfere with this system and, in fact, must respect the visa-granting procedures of foreign
states in the same way that they respect our immigration procedures.
The DOH and AMCOW separately sought reconsideration of the RTC's August 10, 2012 decision,
which motions the RTC denied.[23] The DOH and AMCOW separately filed the present Rule 45
Page 5 of 30
petitions... the Court denied: (1) GAMCA's most urgent motion for issuance of temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction/status quo ante order (with request for immediate inclusion in the
Honorable Court's agenda of March 3, 2015, its motion dated March 2, 2015);[27] and (2) the most
urgent reiterating motion for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction/status quo ante order dated March 11, 2015
The Court also suspended the implementation of the permanent injunction issued by the RTC
ISSUES:
First, whether the Regional Trial Court legally erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters;Second, whether the DOH CDO letters prohibiting
GAMCA from implementing the referral decking system embodied under Section 16 of Republic Act
No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution for being an undue taking of
property;Third, whether the application of Section 16 of Republic Act No.10022 to the GAMCA violates
the international customary principles of sovereign independence and equality.
RULING:
The present case reached us through an appeal by certiorari (pursuant to Rule 45) of an RTC ruling,
assailing the decision based solely on questions of law. The RTC decision, on the other hand, involves
the grant of the petitions for certiorari and prohibition (pursuant to Rule 65) assailing the DOH CDO
letters for grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari under Rules of Court and under the courts' expanded jurisdiction under Art VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution, as recognized by jurisprudence.
The use of petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is a remedy that judiciaries have used
long before our Rules of Court existed.
We confirmed this characterization in Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[30] when
we held that a writ is founded on the supervisory jurisdiction of appellate courts over inferior courts,
and is issued to keep the latter within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Thus, the writ corrects only errors
of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and cannot be used to correct errors of law or fact.
For these mistakes of judgment, the appropriate remedy is an appeal.
This situation changed after 1987 when the new Constitution "expanded" the scope of judicial power
by providing that -Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
The Basic Distinctions
Basic in the exercise of judicial power whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the
presence of an actual case or controversy. For a dispute to be justiciable, a legally demandable and
enforceable right must exist as basis, and must be shown to have been violated
A basic feature of the expanded jurisdiction under the constitutional definition of judicial power, is the
authority and command for the courts to act on petitions involving the commission by any branch or
instrumentality of government of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Another distinction, a seeming one as explained below, relates to the cited ground of a certiorari
petition under Rule 65 which speaks of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as against the remedy under the courts' expanded
jurisdiction which expressly only mentions grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Where grave abuse of discretion is alleged to be involved, the expanded jurisdiction is brought into
play based on the express wording of the Constitution and constitutional implications may be involved
(such as grave abuse of discretion because of plain oppression or discrimination), but this must
likewise be filed with the lowest court of concurrent jurisdiction, unless the court highest in the hierarchy
grants exemption. Note that in the absence of express rules, it is only the highest court, the Supreme
Court, that can only grant exemptions.
A basic requirement under Rule 65 is that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found
in law,"[44] which requirement the expanded jurisdiction provision does not expressly carry.
Nevertheless, this requirement is not a significant distinction in using the remedy of certiorari under the
traditional and the expanded modes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to
a petition for certiorari, regardless of the act of the administrative agency concerned, i.e., whether the
act concerns a quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative function, or is purely regulatory.
In every case, remedies within the agency's administrative process must be exhausted before external
remedies can be applied. Thus, even if a governmental entity may have committed a grave abuse of
discretion, litigants should, as a rule, first ask reconsideration from the body itself, or a review thereof
before the agency concerned. This step ensures that by the time the grave abuse of discretion issue
reaches the court, the administrative agency concerned would have fully exercised its jurisdiction and
the court can focus its attention on the questions of law presented before it.
Page 6 of 30
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies affects the ripeness to adjudicate the constitutionality of
a governmental act, which in turn affects the existence of the need for an actual case or controversy
for the courts to exercise their power of judicial review.
Situations Where a Petition for Certiorari May Be Used
The first is the constitutional situation where the constitutionality of acts are questioned. The second
is the non-constitutional situation where acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion are challenged
without raising constitutional questions or violations.
Under the traditional mode, plaintiffs question the constitutionality of a governmental action through
the cases they file before the lower courts; the defendants may likewise do so when they interpose the
defense of unconstitutionality of the law under which they are being sued. A petition for declaratory
relief may also be used to question the constitutionality or application of a legislative (or quasi-
legislative) act before the court
In the non-constitutional situation, the same requirements essentially apply, less the requirements
specific to the constitutional issues. In particular, there must be an actual case or controversy and the
compliance with requirements of standing, as affected by the hierarchy of courts, exhaustion of
remedies, ripeness, prematurity, and the moot and academic principles.
Under both situations, the party bringing suit must have the necessary "standing." This means that this
party has, in its favor, the demandable and enforceable right or interest giving rise to a justiciable
controversy after the right is violated by the offending party.
A case or controversy exists when there is an actual dispute between parties over their legal rights,
which remains in conflict at the time the dispute is presented before the court.[65] Standing, on the
other hand, involves a personal and substantial interest in the case because the petitioner has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its right.
Another requirement that a certiorari petition carries, springs from the principle of "hierarchy of courts"
which recognizes the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under the
Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one another, and how
these different levels of court interact with one another.
As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trial court and rules only on questions of law, in contrast with the
Court of Appeals and other intermediate courts[72] which rule on both questions of law and of fact. At
the lowest level of courts are the municipal and the regional trial courts which handle questions of fact
and law at the first instance according to the jurisdiction granted to them by law.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH Letter was filed before the wrong court.
In the present case, the act alleged to be unconstitutional refers to the cease and desist order that the
DOH issued against GAMCA's referral decking system. Its constitutionality was questioned through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC. The case reached this Court through a Rule 45
appeal by certiorari under the traditional route.
In using a petition for certiorari and prohibition to assail the DOH-CDO letters, GAMCA committed
several procedural lapses that rendered its petition readily dismissible by the RTC. Not only did the
petitioner present a premature challenge against an administrative act; it also committed the grave
jurisdictional error of filing the petition before the wrong court.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOH's issuance
of the DOH CDO letters.
On the merits, we find that the RTC of Pasay reversibly erred in law when it held that the DOH acted
with grave abuse of discretion m prohibiting GAMCA from implementing the referral decking system.
police power includes (1) the imposition of restraint on liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good.[90] The exercise of police power involves the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
By its very nature, the exercise of the State's police power limits individual rights and liberties, and
subjects them to the "far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."[92]
Though vast and plenary, this State power also carries limitations, specifically, it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, the
advancement of the public good.
he government's exercise of police power must satisfy the "valid object and valid means" method of
analysis: first, the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the
objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The prohibition against the referral decking system against GAMCA does not violate the principle of
sovereign equality and independence.
we find that the RTC's decision misapplied the principle of sovereign independence and equality to the
present case. While the principles of sovereign independence and equality have been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence, our recogmtmn of this principle does not extend to the exemption of States
and their affiliates from compliance with Philippine regulatory laws.
In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon,[103] we recognized the principle of sovereign independence and
equality as part of the law of the land. We used this principle to justify the recognition of the principle
of sovereign immunity which exempts the State - both our Government and foreign governments - from
suit.
Our recognition of sovereign immunity, however, has never been unqualified. While we recognized the
principles of independence and equality of States to justify a State's sovereign immunity from suit, we
also restricted state immunity to acts jus imperii, or public acts. We said that once a State enters into
commercial transactions (jus gestionis), then it descends to the level of a private individual, and is thus
not immune from the resulting liability and consequences of its actions.
By this recognition, we acknowledge that a foreign government acting in its jus imperii function cannot
be held liable in a Philippine court. Philippine courts, as part of the Philippine government, cannot and
Page 7 of 30
should not take jurisdiction over cases involving the public acts of a foreign government. Taking
jurisdiction would amount to authority over a foreign government, and would thus violate the principle
of sovereign independence and equality.
The regulation applies to Philippine hospitals and clinics, as well as to employers of OFWs. It does not
apply to the GCCs and their visa processes. That the regulation could affect the OFWs' compliance
with the visa requirements imposed by GCCs does not place it outside the regulatory powers of the
Philippine government.
Lastly, the effect of the prohibition against the referral decking system is beyond the authority of this
Court to consider.
The wisdom of this prohibition has been decided by Congress, through the enactment of RA No. 10022.
Our role in this case is merely to determine whether our government has the authority to enact the
law's prohibition against the referral decking system, and whether this prohibition is being implemented
legally. Beyond these lies the realm of policy that, under our Constitution's separation of powers, this
Court cannot cross.
9. ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE’S FOUNDATION AFW vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act of
1992.” Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray
technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology. Petitioner Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the
Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC).
Pursuant to RA 7431 the assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private
respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the
requirement otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require
a license to practice if a slot is available.
The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of
Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and
pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC
shall be constrained to take action which may include her separation from employment. On November
23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
informing the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in
lieu of separation pay. SLMC issued a “Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner Maribel
S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter’s refusal to accept private respondent
SLMC’s offer for early retirement.
Petitioner Maribel Santos files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and non-
payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She
further contends that her failure to pass the board licensure exam for exam for X-ray
technicians did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her
constitutional right to security of tenure. The appellate court finds this contention
untenable, hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431
exercising police power of the State?
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate
of registration from Board of Radiologic Technology.
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The state is justified in
prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with
the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent being engaged in the hospital and health care
business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these
laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and complainant private interest override public interest. The law
is clear that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a
person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist.
10. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Page 8 of 30
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
RULING:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
RULING:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public
as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
11. GMA NETWORK, INC. VS. MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD
Doctrine: Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP law Center are ineffective and may not be enforced (Sec.3,
1987 Administrative Code)
FACTS:
Respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension, and impost penalty based on Memorandum
Circular 98-17, against the petitioner (GMA Network, Inc.) for airing Muro Ami: The Making without first
securing a permit from it as provided in section 7 of PD 1986. Petitioner move for the reconsideration
of the suspension and informed the respondent that it had complied with the suspension order by going
off the air. Respondent deny the motion, likewise, the CA also dismissed the complaint upon petitioners
appeal to them.
ISSUE:
Page 9 of 30
 a. Whether or not the MTRCB has the authority to review the show Muro Ami: The Making prior
to its broadcast by television;
b. Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on the
petitioners.
RULING:
a. YES, Sec. 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, and examine all motion
pictures, television programs, including publicity materials. The only exceptions from it are
(1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or other
departments, and (2) newsreels. Muro Ami: The Making was a publicity for the movie Muro
Ami, therefore it did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power
of review of the MTRCB.
b. NO, Memorandum Circular no. 98-17 has not been registered with the ONAR, as of January
27, 2000. Hence, the sameis yet to be effective, it is just unenforceable since it has not been
filed in the ONAR. The 1987 Administrative Code, section 3, expressly requires each agency
to file with the Office of the National Administrative Remedies (ONAR) of the UP Law Center
three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not
published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
12. KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI (2017)
FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of Manila. The said lot was earmarked for the
construction of Torre de Manila Condominium project. After having acquired all the necessary permits
and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to commence the intended project. However, the City of
Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the Building Permit until such time that
issues had been cleared. Consultations after consultations had he been initiated both by the City of
Manila and DMCI-PDI. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution
ratifying and confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City for
Torre de Manila.
Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of the project. The KOR argued that the building, if completed,
would be a sore to the view of the monument, an endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and
a construction borne out of bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila.
RULING:
No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was not even
considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order. The project was way well from the Park
where the monument was located. The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City
of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed
upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.” In the case at bar, such factors
were wanting. Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule that the construction of
such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building was within the background sightline
or vision of the Rizal Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus dismissed.
13. HON. LEONCIO EVASCO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS OIG CITY ENGINEER OF DAVAO
CITY AND HON. WENDEL AVISADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR
OF DAVAO CITY, Petitioners, v. ALEX P. MONTANEZ, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
NAME AND STYLE APM OR AD AND PROMO MANAGEMENT, Respondents,
DAVAO BILLBOARD AND SIGNMAKERS ASSOCIATION (DABASA), INC., Respondent-
Intervenor.
G.R. No. 199172, February 21, 2018
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated June 14, 2011 and Amended Decision2 dated
October 13, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02281-MIN, where it declared null and
void Sections 7, 8, 37 and 45 of the Davao City Ordinance No. 092, Series of 2000 (hereinafter referred
to as "Ordinance No. 092-2000" or "the Ordinance").3
The FACTS are as follows:
On August 8, 2000, the city government of Davao (City Government), through its Sangguniang
Panlungsod, approved Ordinance No. 092-2000 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Construction,
Repair, Renovation, Erection, Installation and Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and For
Related Purposes." Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of the ordinance provided as follows:
CHAPTER 5 SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS
Article 1
Advertising Sign
SECTION 7 - BILLBOARD - Outdoor advertising signs shall not be allowed in a residential zone as
designated in the Official Zoning Map. Adjacent billboards shall be erected in such a way as to maintain
150.00 meters unobstructed line of sight.
Page 10 of 30
Billboards and other self-supporting outdoor signs along highways shall be located within a minimum
of 10.00 meters away from the property lines abutting the road right-of-way. Erection of support for any signboard, billboard and the like shall be charged a fee as follows:

SECTION 8 - REGULATED AREAS - Bridge approach areas within 200 meters of the following bridges 1) up to 4 square meter of signboard.......................................................... P 100.00
shall be designated as "regulated areas" in order to preserve, among others, the natural view and 2) in every square meter or fraction thereof.................................................. P 50.00
beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline and the view of Samal Island, to wit:
1. Generoso Bridge I and II; III. RENEWAL FEE
2. Bolton Bridge I and II;
3. Lasang Bridge Renewal of sign permit shall include among others the corresponding payment for the display surface
and support structure of the sign as determined in accordance with this Section and Section 35 of this
xxxx Ordinance.
CHAPTER 10
FEES IV. OTHER FEES

SECTION 37 - FEES - Fees for the application of Sign Permits to be paid at the Office of the City Sign fees paid under this Ordinance shall be without prejudice to an additional payment of electrical
Treasurer shall be as follows: permit fee for signs with electrical devices as required in accordance with the provisions of the National
Building Code.
I. DISPLAY SURFACE
xxxx
a) Sign fee shall be collected per square meter of the display surface of billboards, business signs,
electrical signs, ground signs, projecting signs, roof signs, signboards and wall signs for such amount CHAPTER 14
as follows: REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL MATERIALS

a.1 outdoor video screen....................... P150.00 SECTION 45 - REMOVAL. The City Engineer or his duly authorized representative shall remove, upon
recommendation of the Building Official, the following at the expense of the displaying party:
a.2 tri-wind billboard............................. P100.00 Those displayed without permit from the Local Building Official, provided that the displaying party shall
be given a reasonable period of sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice to comply with the sign permit
a. 3 neon................................................ P75.00 requirement provided hereof;

a.4 illuminated....................................... P50.00 Those displayed with a permit but without bearing the necessary permit marking requirement as
provided in Section 39 hereof, provided that the displaying party shall be given a reasonable period of
a.5 painted-on....................................... P30.00 sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice to comply with the marking permit requirement provided
hereof;
a.6 others............................................. P15.00
Those displayed beyond the expiry date as provided in Section 34 hereof, however, if the displaying
party intends to renew such permit even beyond the period sought to be extended, the same shall be
b) Posters (per piece)................................................................................... P 5.00 given a reasonable period of sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice to comply with the renewal
requirement provided hereof without prejudice to the payment of surcharge of 25% of the total fees for
c) Temporary signs (per square meter).......................................................... P 5.00 such delay.

d) Other advertising and/or propaganda Materials (per square meter)......... .. P 10.00 Those displayed in public places and/or structures as stated in section 41;

e) Building lines/staking line and Grade (fixed amount)........................... ..... P 200.00 Those billboards, business signs, electrical signs, ground signs, projecting signs, roof signs or wall
signs which are installed or constructed in violation of this Ordinance or other applicable statues and
II. STRUCTURE ordinances.

Page 11 of 30
As early as 2003, the City Engineer of Davao City (City Engineer) started sending notices of illegal
construction to various outdoor advertising businesses, including Ad & Promo Management (APM),
owned by herein respondent Alex P. Montanez, that constructed the billboards in different areas within
the city. The City Engineer reminded the entities to secure a sign permit or apply for a renewal for each
billboard structure as required by Ordinance No. 092-2000.
In February4 and March 2006, the City Engineer issued orders5 of demolition directing erring outdoor
advertising businesses, including APM, to "voluntarily dismantle" their billboards that violate Ordinance
No. 092-2000 within three days from receipt of the order. Otherwise, the city government shall
summarily remove these structures without further notice. In the orders of demolition dated March 17,
2006, the summary removal was scheduled on March 30, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.
With the impending demolition of APM's billboard structures, respondent Montanez sought recourse
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City on March 28, 2006 and filed a petition
for injunction and declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 and order of demolition dated March
17, 2006 with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order docketed
as Sp. Civil Case No. 31,346-06.
In his petition,6 respondent Montanez claimed that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is unconstitutional for
being overbreadth in its application, vague, and inconsistent with Presidential Decree No. 1096 or the
National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code).
In an Order7 dated April 17, 2006, the RTC granted respondent Montafiez's application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, the instant prayer for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED. The respondents, namely, OIC Leoncio Evasco, Jr. of the
Davao City Engineer's Office and Davao City Administrator Wendel Avisado are hereby restrained
from implementing the Order of demolition dated March 17, 2006 and from actually demolishing the
advertising structures of petitioner Alex P. Montañez along Bolton Bridge and Bankerohan Bridge until
the main case is decided and tried on the merits or until further orders from this Court.
Meanwhile, in response to the damage caused by typhoon Milenyo in September 2006 especially to
various billboard structures within Metro Manila, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo) issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 1608 directing the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) to conduct nationwide field inspections, evaluations, and assessments of billboards
and to abate and dismantle those: (a) posing imminent danger or threat to the life, health, safety and
property of the public; (b) violating applicable laws, rules and regulations; (c) constructed within the
easement of road right-of-way; and/or, (d) constructed without the necessary permits. President Arroyo
also issued AO No. 160-A9 specifying the legal grounds and procedures in the abatement of billboards
and signboards constituting public nuisance or other violations of law.
Assuming the role given by AO No. 160, Acting DPWH Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr. issued
National Building Code Development Office (NBCDO) Memorandum Circular No. 310 directing all local
government Building Officials to cease and desist from processing application for and issuing and
renewing billboard permits.
Pursuant to this directive, the city government suspended all pending applications for billboard permits.
While petitioner Montafiez's case was still pending before the RTC, the city government issued another
order of demolition dated September 25, 2008, this time directed against Prime Advertisements &
Signs (Prime), on the ground that the latter's billboards had no sign permits and encroached a portion
of the road right of way. The city government gave Prime until October 8, 2008 to voluntarily trim its
structures. Otherwise, the same shall be removed by the city demolition team.
The directive against Prime prompted herein respondent Davao Billboards and Signmakers
Association, Inc. (DABASA) to intervene11 in Sp. Civil Case No. 31,346-06 in behalf of its members
consisting of outdoor advertising and signmaker businesses in Davao City such as APM and Prime.
The RTC Decision
In its Decision12 dated January 19, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents Montanez and
DABASA, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered declaring as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of City Ordinance No. 092-2000 as follows:
(a) Sections 7, 8 and 41
for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the National Building Code of the Philippines.
The injunction previously issued base (sic) on the aforesaid provisions of the ordinance is hereby made
permanent.13
Both parties moved for reconsideration. Thus, in its Joint Order dated April 1, 2009, the RTC modified
its original decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner is GRANTED modifying the court's decision dated JANUARY 19, 2009 as follows:
(a) declaring as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of City Ordinance No. 092-2000, as
follows:
aa) Sections 7, 8 and 37, for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the National Building Code of the
Philippines;
[bb] declaring herein Section 41 of City Ordinance No. 092-2000 as deleted; and
[cc] declaring the injunction previously issued by the Court based on the aforesaid provisions of the
Ordinance, permanent.
Respondents' (sic) motion for reconsideration is DENIED.14
Aggrieved, the petitioner City Engineer sought recourse before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the City Engineer's appeal, to wit:
Page 12 of 30
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the January 19, 2009 Decision
and April 1, 2009 Joint Order of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No.
31,346-06 the Regional Trial Court (sic) AFFIRMED with modification.
The appealed Decision and Joint Order are affirmed insofar as it declares Section 7 and 8 of City
Ordinance of Davao No. 092 series of 2002 (sic) null and void. Section 45 of the challenged Order (sic)
is likewise declared null and void. We, however, reinstate Section 41 of the challenged Ordinance.15
Again, both parties moved for reconsideration. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Amended Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, respondent-appellant City of Davao's Motion for Reconsideration
is hereby DENIED. Petitioner-appellee's prayer for the categorical declaration of the nullity of Section
37 of the challenged Ordinance and rectification of the dispositive portion of our June 14, 2011 Decision
are GRANTED. The fallo of said decision should now read:
"WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the January 19, 2009 Decision
and April 1, 2009 Joint Order of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No.
31,346-06 are AFFIRMED with modification.
The appealed Decision and Joint Order are affirmed insofar as it declares Section 7, 8 and 37 of City
Ordinance of Davao No. 092 series of 2002 (sic) null and void. Section 45 of the challenged Ordinance
is likewise declared null and void. We however, reinstate Section 41 of the challenged Ordinance."16
Hence, the present petition.
On the basis of City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,17 the appellate court held that Ordinance No. 092-2000
is not consistent with the National Building Code and, thus, invalid. It cited the following
inconsistencies: First, Section 7 of Ordinance No. 092-2000 requires that signs and signboards must
be constructed at least 10 meters away from the property line while the National Building Code allows
projection of not more than 300 millimeters over alleys and roads. The Ordinance unduly interferes
with proprietary rights inasmuch as it requires a larger setback distance. Second, Section 8 of the
Ordinance regulates building and construction of signs and signboards within certain areas to preserve
the natural beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island.
Upholding People v. Fajardo,18 the local government cannot rely solely on aesthetics in justifying its
exercise of police power. Third, Section 45 of the Ordinance authorizes the City Engineer, upon the
Building Official's recommendation, to demolish advertising materials that have been found to be
illegally constructed. In effect, the Ordinance expanded the Building Official's authority, which, under
the National Building Code, was limited to determining ruinous and dangerous buildings or structures
and to recommending its repair or demolition. Further, the National Building Code does not allow the
demolition of signs based on a supposed lack of permit. Instead, it allows these structures to continue
to operate so long as a duly accredited engineer certifies the structures' structural integrity.19
The ISSUES
The petitioner City Engineer now comes before this Court raising the following issues:
I fees required by Section 37 of the ordinance are excessive, confiscatory, and oppressive. Fourth,
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE, WHICH IS LIFTED/COPIED FROM
UNCHALLENGED PROVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION (SIC) OF
NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RUNS CONTRA[R]Y TO THE NATIONAL
BUILDING CODE ITSELF?
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING SECTION 8 OF SIGNAGE
ORDINANCE NULL AND VOID
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING SECTION 37 OF SIGNAGE
ORDINANCE NULL AND VOID
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING SECTION 45 OF SIGNAGE
ORDINANCE NULL AND VOID20
The petitioner City Engineer argues that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is not inconsistent with the National
Building Code as follows: as to Section 7, it cannot be held to be inconsistent with Section 1002,21
which is under Chapter 10, of the National Building Code because said provision applies to all building
projections, in general. Signs and billboards are specifically governed by Chapter 20 thereof. As to
Section ff, Section 458(a)(3)(iv)22 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of the
Philippines (LGC), the city government has the power to regulate the display of signs for the purpose
of preserving the natural view and beauty of the surroundings. Aesthetic considerations do not
constitute undue interference on property rights because it merely sets a limitation and, in fact, still
allows construction of property provided it is done beyond the setback. As to Section 37, when it
nullified the same, the Court of Appeals did not state the specific legal findings and bases supporting
its nullity. Thus, the assailed decision violated Section 14, Article VIII23 of the Constitution. As to
Section 45, the Court of Appeals went beyond its authority when it invalidated the said Section because
the parties, both petitioners and respondents, did not raise any issue as to the validity of said section.
Moreover, the city engineer is mandated to act as the local building official. In turn, under the LGC, the
city engineer is empowered to perform duties and functions prescribed by ordinances, such as
Ordinance No. 092-2000. Thus, the city engineer has the authority to cause the removal of structures
found to have violated the ordinance.
On the other hand, herein respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is invalid for the
following reasons: first. Section 7 thereof contradicts the National Building Code because while the
latter does not impose a minimum setback from the property lines abutting the road right-of-way, the
said provision requires a 10-meter setback. Second, Section 8's establishment of "regulated areas" in
keeping with aesthetic purposes of the surroundings is not a valid exercise of police power. Third, the
Section 45, insofar as it empowers the building official to cause the removal of erring billboards, is an
Page 13 of 30
undue delegation of derivative power. Under the National Building Code, the building official's authority
is limited to the determination of ruinous and dangerous buildings and structures.24
The RULING of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals when it declared Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of Ordinance No.
092-2000 as unconstitutional, thus, null and void for being inconsistent with the National Building Code.
However, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 is being upheld for reasons different from those
espoused by the petitioners.
It is settled that an ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the following requisites are present: First, the
local government unit must possess the power to enact an ordinance covering a particular subject
matter and according to the procedure prescribed by law. Second, the ordinance must not contravene
the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or must not be against public policy or
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.25
The power to regulate billboards was validly delegated to the local city council via Davao 's charter
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of building and other
structures such as billboards within Davao City, is an exercise of police power.26 It has been stressed
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association27 that while police power
is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, Congress may delegate this power to local government
units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.
Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao City
Charter),28 enacted on June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative
power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of
billboards and similar structures.
With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly granted the Davao City government, through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, police power to regulate billboard structures within its territorial
jurisdiction.29
Petitioners failed to allege the specific constitutional provision violated
The records reveal that while petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is unconstitutional, they
have not pointed to any specific constitutional provision it allegedly violated. The settled rule is that an
ordinance is presumed constitutional and valid.30 This presumption may only be overcome by a
showing of the ordinance's clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.31
To invalidate an ordinance based on a bare and unilateral declaration that it is unconstitutional is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved
it.32
Consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 and the National Building Code is irrelevant
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is invalid because it contradicts the provisions
of the National Building Code, i.e., the Ordinance imposes additional requirements not provided in the
National Building Code and even expanded the authority of the city building official in the removal of
erring billboard structures.
We disagree.
As stated earlier, the power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has been delegated
by Congress to the city government via the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific grant takes
precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general application,33 in this case the
National Building Code. Stated differently, the city government does not need to refer to the procedures
laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power.
Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with the National Building Code is irrelevant
to the validity of the former.
To be clear, even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements as to the construction
and regulation of billboards, the city government may impose stricter limitations because its police
power to do so originates from its charter and not from the National Building Code. The ordinance
specifically governs billboards and other similar structures situated within Davao City, independent of
the provisions of the National Building Code.
Ordinance No. 092-2000 is a valid exercise of police power
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful subject such that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must be reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.34
First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures based on prescribed
standards as to its location, design, size, quality of materials, construction and maintenance35 to: (a)
safeguard the life and property of Davao City's inhabitants; (b) keep the surroundings clean and
orderly; (c) ensure public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious aesthetic
relationship of these structures as against the general surroundings.36
Second, the ordinance employs the following rules in implementing its policy, viz.: (a) Minimum
distances must be observed in installing and constructing outdoor billboards (i.e., 150 meters
unobstructed line of sight, 10 meters away from the property lines abutting the right-of-way);37 (b)
Additional requirements shall be observed (i.e., billboards shall have a maximum total height of 17
Page 14 of 30
meters, the top and bottom lines of billboards shall follow a common base)38 in locations designated
as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao
City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island;39 (c) Sign permits must be secured from and proper fees
paid to the city government;40 and (d) Billboards without permits, without the required marking signs,
or otherwise violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing the owner 60 days from
receipt of notice to correct and address its violation.41
1Rollo, pp. 63-82; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Pamela
Ann Abella Maxino and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles concurring.
2 Id. at 108-111.
3 Available at http://ordinances.davaocity.gov.ph/Download.aspx. (Last visited on May 5, 2017.)

The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules imposed are 4 According to the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 14, 2011.
so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.42 It must be
remembered that the local legislative authority has a wide discretion to determine not only what the 5See rollo, pp. 194-196.
interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests.43 We accord high respect to the Sanggunian's issuance because the local council is in the 6 Id. at 112-128.
best position to determine the needs of its constituents.44
7 Id. at 165-167.
In the same vein, Ordinance No. 092-2000 reflects the wisdom of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as
elected representatives of the people of Davao City. In local affairs, acts of local officials must be 8 Dated October 4, 2006 and entitled, "Directing The Department Of Public Works And Highways
upheld when it is clear that these were performed squarely within the statutory authority granted to (DPWH) To Conduct Field Inspections, Evaluations And Assessments Of All Billboards And Determine
them and in the exercise of their sound discretion.45 Those That Are Hazardous And Pose Imminent Danger To Life, Health, Safety And Property Of The
General Public And To Abate And Dismantle The Same."
For the foregoing reasons, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000, including the provisions at issue in
the present petition, viz.: Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 must be upheld. 9 Dated October 10, 2006.

By way of an observation, We note that petitioner City Engineer issued orders of demolition that 10 Dated October 6, 2006, rollo, p. 146, Annex "3."
required erring outdoor advertising businesses to correct the defects of their structures within three
days from receipt of notice. Otherwise, the billboard will be summarily removed. In said orders dated 11Rollo, pp. 129-145.
March 17, 200646 and September 25, 2008,47 the summary removal operations were March 30, 2006
and October 8, 2008, respectively. These orders of demolition, however, violate Section 45 of the 12 Id. at 282-290.
ordinance inasmuch as the orders do not observe the reglementary periods granted to erring billboard
owners. Section 45 clearly gives the owners at least 60 days to correct any defect suffered by their 13 Id. at 289-290.
structures and altogether comply with the ordinance requirements.
14 Id. at 293.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 2011 and October 13, 2011, respectively, 15 Id. at 82.
in CA-G.R. CV No. 02281-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
16 Id. at 110.
SO ORDERED.
17 495 Phil. 289 (2005).
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), on official leave.
Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. 18 104 Phil. 443 (1958).
Tijam, J., on official leave.
Endnotes: 19Rollo, pp. 71-80.

** Per Special Order No. 2536 dated February 20, 2018. 20 Id. at 38-39.

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21 SECTION 1002. Projection into Alleys or Streets. — (a) No part of any structure or its appendage
shall project into any alley or street, national road or public highway except as provided in this Code.
(b) Footings located at least 2.40 meters below grade along national roads or public highway may
project not more than 300 millimeters beyond the property line.
(c) Foundations may be permitted to encroach into public sidewalk areas to a width not exceeding 500
millimeters; provided, that the top of the said foundations is not less than 600 millimeters below the
established grade; And provided, further, that said projections does not obstruct any existing utility
such as power, communication, gas, water, or sewer lines, unless the owner concerned shall pay the
corresponding entities for the rerouting of the parts of the affected utilities.
31Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality ofMalvar, Batangas, 727 Phil. 430, 447 (2014).
32 Id., citing Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 686
Phil. 357, 373 (2012).
33See Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Davao City, 122 Phil. 478 (1965).
34See Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 25; Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, supra note
30.
35 Ordinance No. 092-2000, Section 3.

22 SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall: x x x (3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting franchises
and authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such conditions and for such purposes
intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this legislative
authority shall: x x x (iv) Regulate the display of and fix the license fees for signs, signboards, or
billboards at the place or places where the profession or business advertised thereby is, in whole or in
part, conducted[.]
23 Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
36 Id., Section 2 states, STATEMENT OF POLICY. It is the policy of the City Government of Davao
to: (1) safeguard its people's life and property by providing all signs and sign structures prescribed
standards relative to their site, design, load and stresses, anchorage, quality of materials, construction
and maintenance; (2) keep its premises clean and orderly by imposing basic discipline and regulation
in the location of signs and sign structures both in public and private places; (3) display or convey only
messages or visuals that conform to public decency and good taste; and (4) install or display all kinds
of signs in a manner that the harmonious aesthetic relationship of all units therein is presented.
37 Id., Section 7.
38 Id., Section 9.
39 Id., Section 8.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due 40 Id., Section 37.
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
41 Id., Section 45.
24Rollo, pp. 421-426.
42Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, supra note 30, citing Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, 134
25See Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 699-700 (2008); City of Manila v. Phil. 180 (1968).
Laguio, Jr., supra note 17 at 307-308.
43Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, supra note 30.
26See Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 674 Phil. 637 (2011).
44Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 25.
27 385 Phil. 586, 601-602.
45 Id.
28 Section 16(hh), Davao City Charter.
46Rollo, pp. 194-196.
29See Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, supra note 26.
47 Id. at 146.
30See Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 262 (2015); Legaspi v. City of Cebu, 723 Phil. 90 (2013);
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, id.

Page 16 of 30
 14. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, GR No. 161107,
2013-03-12
FACTS:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters,
located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within
the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other... improvements.[3]
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,[4] entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217[5] and 200[6] were enacted to amend Sections 7
and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1)
Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1)
meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.[7]
ISSUES:
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
RULING:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking
space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the
respondents as it would also be available for use by the general... public. Section 9 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 is... invalid.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to
ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners,... however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private
rights.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80%
see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be... argued that such
exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence
would be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that the respondents' concrete wall has served
as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years.
`
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may not,
under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic
appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a... see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus,
a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how
best to protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see- thru fence is violative of their
right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the
property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental... right guaranteed by the
Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the
right to be let alone,[37] as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of its... citizens
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of
their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 1 92 against the respondents. The CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The... petitioners must permanently
Page 17 of 30
desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in
Marikina City.
Principles:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:[28]
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2)... the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
15. WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from
other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health
risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and
could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22]
It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable
and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
ISSUES:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban
on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring
the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
RULING:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers...
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for
the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined
line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police
power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly
Page 18 of 30
exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance
must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial
distinction?We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose
or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
16. NESTLE v. PUEDAN (2017)
FACTS:
On July 6, 2012, the respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and
demanding for separation pay, nominal damages and attorney’s fees. The respondents alleged that
Ocho de Setiembre Inc. (ODSI) and Nestle Philippines Inc. (NPI) hired them to sell various products
of NPI in the assigned covered area. After sometime, the respondents demanded that they be
considered regular employees of NPI but they were directed to sign contracts of employment with
ODSI instead. However, the respondents refused to comply with such directives resulting from their
dismissal from their position. The contention of the respondents is that ODSI is a labor-only contractor
and, thus, they should be deemed regular employees of NPI and there was no just or authorized cause
for their dismissal. The ODSI averred that it is a company engaged in the business of buying, selling,
distributing, and marketing of goods and commodities of every kind and it enters into all kinds of
contracts for the acquisition thereof. According to ODSI the respondents were hired as its employees
to execute the Distributorship Agreement with the NPI. Unfortunately, the business relationship
Page 19 of 30
between the NPI and ODSI turned sour and eventually NPI downsized its marketing and promotional
support from ODSI and termination of the Distributorship Agreement. Meanwhile, ODSI argues with
the respondents that they were not dismissed but merely on floating status. However, the NPI did not
file any position paper or appear in the scheduled conferences.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that all the impleaded respondents therein (i.e. including NPI)
should be held liable for the payment of nominal damages plus attorney’s fees.
The aggrieved respondents appealed to National Labor Relation Commission (NLRC) and the
NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter ruling. The NLRC ordered ODSI and NPI to pay each
of the respondents and entitled to separation pay and to nominal damages. The respondents moved
for a partial reconsideration arguing since it was ODSI that closed down operations and not the NPI,
therefore NPI should reinstate them. However, the NLRC denied the motion.
Moreover, the NPI was dissatisfied hence filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA) which the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestle Philippines Inc. (NPI) and Ocho de Setiembre Inc. (ODSI) are deemed jointly
and severely liable for the respondent’s monetary claims.
RULING:
No. The Distributorship Agreement between the Nestle Philippines inc. (NPI) and Ocho de Setiembre
Inc. (ODSI) is not that of a principal and a contractor, but that of a seller and a buyer/re-seller. Based
on the stipulated in the Distributorship Agreement NPI agreed to sell its products to ODSI at discounted
prices. According to NPI the goods it manufactures are distributed to the market through various
distributor including ODSI, that in turn, re-sell the same to the designated outlets through its own
employees as the respondents. Therefore, the reselling activities allegedly performed by the
respondents properly pertain to ODSI only.
In effect, ODSI was not a labor-only contractor of NPI hence the NPI cannot be deemed the true
employer of the respondents. Therefore, NPI cannot be held jointly and severely liable to ODSI’s
monetary obligation towards the respondents.
17. TURKS SHAWARMA v. PAJARON (2017)
FACTS:
Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larey A. Carbonilla
(Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or
authorized cause for their dismissal and petitioners also failed to comply with the requirements of due
process. On April 15, 2010, they filed their respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated.
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually
abandoned their work. They likewise failed to substantiate their claims that they were not paid labor
standards benefits.
The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and
illegally dismissed. Then, petitioners appealed before the NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in
full the required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners' appeal was dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection.
They filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-
perfection
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-
perfection.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."
It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Sections 4 and 6
of Rule VI) that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond
requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention."21
The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this
requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,]
the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further
meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations
to the employees.
Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if we are to allow their appeal to be
given due course. After scrupulously examining the contracting positions and arguments of the parties,
Page 20 of 30
we find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was
supported by substantial evidence. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the
NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection due to
noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
18. ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS v. REPUBLIC (2017)
FACTS:
The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil Case No. 0141, when the Republic
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009 with respect to another property
listed in the 1991 Petition. The Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring the
pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacanang Collection and specifically mentioned under paragraph 9
(6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten; and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared
forfeited in favor of the Republic.
In support of the motion, the Republic cited the letter dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by Imelda
Marcos, through counsel, demanding "the immediate return of all her pieces of jewelry (i) taken by
PCGG from Malacanang Palace and (ii) those turned over to PCGG by the U.S. Government." The
Republic argued that the letter proved the claim of the Marcoses that they owned the Malacanang
Collection, including the Hawaii Collection. It contended that "the lawful income of the Marcoses during
their incumbencies as public officials was grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry."
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta stated that the Republic's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was filed to justify the possession by the PCGG of the pieces of jewelry, even if these were
not part of the forfeiture case -Civil Case No. 0141.
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion to Expunge
dated 25 July 2009. In their Manifestation and Motion to Expunge, Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos
Araneta claimed that the filing of the Request for Admission was to an abdication of the earlier position
of the Republic that the case was ripe for summary judgment. They argued that the Request for
Admission entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a material fact, which was needed for the grant
of the motion for summary judgment.
The Republic filed its Opposition dated 24 August 2009, in which it said that the Manifestation and
Motion to Expunge of Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta argued on trivial matters, raised puerile
arguments, and failed to refute the contention that the collection was ill-gotten and subject to forfeiture.
The Republic claimed that by operation of law, the failure of the Marcoses to respond resulted in their
admission of the matters contained in the request.
In a Resolution dated 2 August 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied the Marcoses' Manifestation and
Preliminary Comments and Manifestation and Motion to Expunge. After the submission of the parties
of their respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan issued a Partial Summary Judgment dated 13
January 2014 ruling that (1) the Malacanang Collection was part and subject of the forfeiture petition;
(2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the forfeiture of the Malacanang Collection
was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.
In a Resolution dated 11 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for Reconsideration for
being mere rehashes of the arguments of the Marcoses in their Comments and Opposition to the
Republic's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Malacanang Collection can be subject of the forfeiture case.
RULING:
Yes. The Malacanang Collection is subject to forfeiture.
The Court stated that “whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency
an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."
In the present case, petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired;
hence, the prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired prevails.
19. ARMANDO LAGON v. DENNIS A. VELASCO (2014)
FACTS:
Sometime in December 2000, Lagon obtained a cash loan from private respondent Gabriel Dizon
(Dizon), in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00). In payment thereof,
Lagon issued PCIBank Check No. 0064914, postdated January 12, 2001, in an equal amount.
However, when Dizon presented the check for payment, it was dishonored for being Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds.[3]
Consequently, Dizon sent a Letter dated May 6, 2011 to Lagon, demanding the payment Php
300,000.00. However, Lagon refused to pay.[4]
On June 6, 2011, Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees against
Lagon.[5]
On October 8, 2011, Lagon filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription.
In response, Dizon filed an Opposition with Motion to Amend Complaint.[6] In his Amended Complaint,
Dizon averred that he sent two demand letters, one dated March 23, 2010 and another dated May 6,
2011. Both letters were sent through JRS Express.[7]
On February 29, 2012, Lagon filed his Answer asserting that he has paid the loan.[8]
Meanwhile, during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective pre-trial
briefs within five (5) days from receipt of the trial court's order.
Page 21 of 30

Thereafter, on August 9, 2012, Judge Velasco issued a Pre-Trial Conference Order.[9]... t the initial
trial on June 6, 2013, neither of the parties submitted their judicial affidavits or those of their witnesses.
Hence, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order[10] requiring the parties to submit their respective
judicial affidavits five (5) days before the trial.
Lagon received a copy of the same Order on June 26, 2013.[13]
On June 27, 2013, Lagon filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.[14] In his Motion, Lagon requested
that he be allowed to submit the judicial affidavit of his witnesses after the plaintiff shall have adduced
his evidence. Lagon claimed that Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which mandates the
submission by both parties of their judicial affidavits before the pre-trial conference is violative of his
right to due process, hence unconstitutional.[15]
On July 10, 2013, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order[16] denying Lagon's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.[17] Judge Velasco opined that "the requirement of the submission of judicial
affidavits of witnesses, not later than 5 days before the pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing, under Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule is not violative of Lagon's right to due
process.[18]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Lagon sought direct recourse to this Court by filing the instant Petition for
Certiorari[19] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
whether or not Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which requires a defendant to adduce his
testimony and that of his witnesses by judicial affidavits, and submit his documentary evidence before
the pre-trial or preliminary conference, offends his right to due process of law.
RULING:
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
in all proceedings before the aforementioned tribunals, the parties are required to file the Judicial
Affidavits of their witnesses, in lieu of their direct testimonies. Specifically, Section 2 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule ordains that: Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct
testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by
licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following: The judicial affidavits of their
witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and The parties'
documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked
as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed
by existing rules.
Despite the noble purpose of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, Lagon comes to this Court bewailing the same
procedural regulation as violative of his right to due process of law, in that it "forces" him to present
evidence even before the plaintiff has rested his case, apparently in violation of the rule on demurrer
to evidence.
All told, the Court has always emphasized that "procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect
and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice."[41] It cannot be
overemphasized that when the rules are clear, magistrates are mandated to apply them.
20. REPUBLIC vs. SERENO (2018)
https://www.ateneo.edu/sites/default/files/attached-files/Quo%20Warranto%20Decision.pdf
21. BORLONGAN v. BDO (2017)
Carmelita Borlongan, Petitioner, vs. Banco de Oro, Respondent
FACTS:
In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title. In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the
TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained
an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in a Civil Case
pending before Branch 134 of Makati RTC. Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records and
found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum
of money against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank.
Likewise impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4)
security agreements totaling ₱13, 500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.
On July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order directing the service of summons to all the
defendants at the business address of Tancho Corporation and IT appears that respondent BDO
already foreclosed the said Fumakilla Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following Tancho
Corporation's failure to pay its obligation. BDO already consolidated its ownership of the property on
November 16, 2001. On July 31, 2003, the process server filed an Officer's Return stating that
summons remained unserved as the "defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla
Compound]."
After the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her co-defendants, BDO moved for leave
to serve the summons by publication and the RTC granted the motion. BDO filed an ex-parte Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the defendants, including Carmelita. During the
hearing on the motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of the subject property. The Makati RTC
thereafter granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment was issued against the defendants
effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of BDO.
Page 22 of 30

On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying, among others, that the summons and
the complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject property. The Makati RTC granted the motion.
On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return stating that no actual personal service was made as
Carmelita "is no longer residing at the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per
information gathered from the security guard on duty." BDO filed a manifestation stating that it had
complied with the October 28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the publication of the alias
summons and the complaint in People's Taliba on May 15, 2006. Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the
Makati RTC declared the defendants including Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to
present its evidence ex-parte. On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding
the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from the time of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees.
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale
and Other Documents with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City alleging in his Complaint that the
subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he established with
his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment of the
property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did not redound to benefit their
family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements and all other documents and processes, including
the ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale, based thereon be nullified.
BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear
Eliseo's complaint and the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Pasig RTC dismissed the
case citing lack of jurisdiction and held that it could not pass upon matters already brought before the
RTC Makati and, citing Spouses Ching v.Court of Appeals, the husband of a judgment debtor is not a
stranger to a case who can file a separate and independent action to determine the validity of the levy
and sale of a property.
On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification.
Relying on Buado v. Court of Appeals, the Pasig RTC held that since majority of Eliseo's causes of
action were premised on a claim that the obligation contracted by his wife has not redounded to their
family, and, thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in
the first place. The Pasig RTC clarified, however, that it cannot annul the surety agreements
supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements and the validity and
efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati RTC. Both Eliseo and BDO referred
the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he elevated the
matter to the SC via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 218540. The Court issued a Resolution denying Eliseo's petition. Meanwhile, on an ex-
parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and
the issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Arguing that
the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of the summons and the
other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With
Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) which
was denied by the appellate court. Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration
of the CA's November 12, 2014 Resolution but was again denied. Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita
filed a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 217617 ascribing to the appellate court the
commission of serious reversible errors. Hence, Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration
urging the Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and reconsider its stance.
Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and involved interrelated issues, on
January 25, 2016, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 218540 with G.R. No. 217617.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the consolidation of
BDO’s ownership over the subject property.
2. Whether or not Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case filed by the non-debtor husband
to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property ordered by the Makati RTC against his
wife.
RULING:
Yes. It is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an
established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a
WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The
primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate court is the declaration of the nullity
of the proceedings in the RTC and its Decision dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely confined to
the prevention of the issuance of the writ of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the
subject property in BDO's name-the concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI. Indeed, the
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve the status quo ante,
and not to pre-empt the appellate court's decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it
was a grievous error on the part of the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy.
As to the question of the Pasig RTC’s jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint, Section 16, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of properties under execution to vindicate their claims
to the property in a separate action with another court. The officer shall not be liable for damages for
the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action,
or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a
third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. The availability of the remedy
provided under the foregoing provision requires only that that the claim is a third-party or a "stranger"
to the case. The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property was executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a "stranger" to the suit? In Buado v.
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must
Page 23 of 30
first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file an independent separate action,
distinct from the action in which the writ was issued. A third-party claim must be filed [by] a person
other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-
party claim.
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. By no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction
is thus vested on Branch 21. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the attachment
made by the RTC Makati in a separate and independent action will be to, again, refuse him the due
process of law before their property is taken. As the Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce
Constitutional rights, this it will not allow. Hence the petitions are granted.
22. ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) ET.AL. vs. HON.
GARIN (2017)
FACTS:
Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) on re-certifying the
contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon NXT; the basis of their opposition hinges on the
fact that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they should have been given notice
of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence that indeed such drugs are
abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice and hearing because
the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory power, not quasi-judicial power; also,
they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due
to the same reason.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not said controversy is outside the scope of Judicial Review;
(b) Whether or not petitioners were deprived of substantial and procedural due process of law;
RULING:
It is quite fascinating that the Supreme Court again reminded us the two fundamental powers of an
administrative body, in the words of the Honorable Court:
“The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation,
has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt
rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. A
legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power
through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and
hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the
regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two
elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance
of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.”
To answer (a) above, the Supreme Court has this to say, viz:
“On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its
“regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power to
review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than
the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that “no
person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.” The Court’s power cannot
be curtailed by the FDA’s invocation of its regulatory power.”
With regard to (b), the Supreme Court ruled that petitioners were deprived of their Right to Due
Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of the instant agency reveals the need of an
issuance of notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the contraceptive products for public
comments. These, respondents failed to do.
This was thoroughly explained by the Court, to wit:
“Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may
not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the
substantive and procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic
validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on
the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the
statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who
are called upon to administer it. xxx
xxx To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power need
Page 24 of 30
not comply with the requirements of due process would render the issuance of notices to concerned
MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives for public comment a meaningless exercise.
Concerned MAHs and the public in general will be deprived of any significant participation if what they
will submit will not be considered.
Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the respondents in support of
their claims, expressly allows the consideration of conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by the
petitioners in support of their opposition to the approval of certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In
fact, the said provision mandated that the FDA utilize the “best evidence available” to ensure that no
abortifacient is approved as family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning that the same provision
even allows an independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the
certification of a contraceptive drug or device is duly considered.”
23. AGABON vs NLRC
FACTS:
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged
in thebusiness of selling ornamental construction materials.They were employed from January 2, 1992
until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for abandonmentof work.The Agabons filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on
appeal.The CA sustained the NLRC’s decision. The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the
finding of abandonment, and claiming that the company did notcomply with the twin requirements of
notice and hearing.
ISSUE:
WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed
RULING:
NO. SC upheld the finding of abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment
elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to severe the ER-EE relationship. Procedural due process
(for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a hearing or
opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination stating the grounds therefore): There was no
due process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER
only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there.
This is not a valid excuse, they should have still sent a notice as mandated by law. For not sending the
requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of
due process.
24. Republic vs. Cagandahan (2008)
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[In her petition, she
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she
has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent
to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the
age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force
his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead
taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of
a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the
one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action
to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as
Page 25 of 30
a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
25. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed
by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their
business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may
be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No
Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
RULING:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
26. ERMITA MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
(1967)
FACTS:
On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila and
approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila.
The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel,
motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle
name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified,
with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with
a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration
forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police,
or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each
room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are required to have a dining
room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to
lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain
Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is
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charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for
the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the
submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and
rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance.
The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting the
freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as
there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests.
The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating
for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction
on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common
inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a
proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against
the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being
devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.
State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
27. VICENTE DE LA CRUZ vs EDGARDO PARAS
FACTS:
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No.
84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that
the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close
out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out
with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”•. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
RULING:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
28. CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(2005)
FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City
of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES
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IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable
and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of
all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance,
as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional
and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of
its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation
of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
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It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.”
The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private
property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them.
The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of
the community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing
a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights
of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
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Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop,
gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for
an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power
to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

29. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent. (2009)

FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise
of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

RULING:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It
also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed
rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance
is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may
be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.

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