C&se 1: N&tion&l L&bor Union v.

Insul&r-Yeb&n&

FACTS: The petitioner herein, the N&tion&l L&bor Union, filed ch&rges &g&inst the respondent Insul&r-Yeb&n& Tob&cco
Corpor&tion, in Court of Industri&l Rel&tions &lleging discrimin&tory dismiss&l by the respondent of two employees,
Ju&n& Torres &nd Domin&dor Gonz&les, &nd ch&rges for discrimin&tory dismiss&l of Honor&to G&briel.

The findings of the court &re &s follows:

!. As to Ju&n& Torres, the sufficiency or insufficiency of the c&use of her dismiss&l is not the issue but r&ther whether
the dismiss&l of Ju&n& Torres w&s due to her union &ctivity. As pointed out elsewhere, the evidence does not
w&rr&nt & finding th&t Ju&n& Torres w&s dismissed bec&use of her &lleged union &ctivity. It is therefore fully
recommended th&t the compl&int &g&inst her be dismissed.
#. As to Domin&dor Gonz&les, the immedi&te &nd fund&ment&l c&use of the dismiss&l of Gonz&les w&s the qu&rrel
th&t took pl&ce between him &nd Dionisio Toh. Gonz&les w&s b&rred from entering the comp&ny's compound the
next d&y &nd since th&t time w&s not &llowed to work by respondent comp&ny. Hence the court concluded th&t
Gonz&les invented the t&le &bout his &lleged union &ctivity &nd the convers&tion between him &nd the comp&ny's
m&n&ger to m&ke it &ppe&r th&t his dismiss&l w&s c&used by &n unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice committed by the comp&ny.
$. As to Honor&to G&briel, he w&s not dismissed bec&use of union &ctivities. He ce&sed working bec&use the
m&chine he w&s oper&ting broke down. The union h&s not indic&ted &ny pl&ce where &n &xle m&y be bought to
repl&ce the broken one. It w&s cl&imed by G&briel th&t the comp&ny refused to rep&ir the m&chine bec&use of his
union &ctivity. The only logic&l &nd sensible conclusion th&t c&n be &rrived &t in this c&se is th&t the comp&ny did
not ende&vor to rep&ir the m&chine of G&briel for legitim&te business re&sons &nd not bec&use, of his union
&ctivity. It is therefore recommended th&t the compl&int &g&inst him &lleging discrimin&tory dismiss&l.

A motion for reconsider&tion w&s filed, but the judges, en b&nc, held th&t the remov&l w&s not fully justified, &nd since
the offenses were so trivi&l &nd insignific&nt, Ju&n& Torres &nd Domin&dor Gonz&les should be reinst&ted with b&ck
w&ges.

Issue: Whether or not the court c&n gr&nt & remedy such &s reinst&tement &nd b&ck p&y, even if the compl&int is to be
dismissed bec&use the unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &lleged to h&ve been committed h&s not been proved or found to exist.
Ruling: NO.

The commission of &n unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice is &n offense &g&inst & public right or interest &nd should be prosecuted in
the s&me m&nner &s & public offense. It should &lso be noted th&t there is no provision in Section 5 for the return or
reinst&tement of & dismissed employee, if the ch&rge for unf&ir l&bor h&s not been proved. On the contr&ry, the
provision of the l&w is cle&r &nd express th&t if the &cts &lleged to h&ve been committed &s constituting unf&ir l&bor
pr&ctice h&ve not been proved, or if the compl&in&nt &sks for the dismiss&l of the c&se, the ch&rges for unf&ir l&bor
pr&ctice sh&ll be dismissed.

Hence, wh&t is then the remedy left to the employee who h&s been dismissed if the dismiss&l is not entirely justified,
when there is no proof of the existence of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice?

Under the Industri&l Pe&ce Act, the power of the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions in c&ses not certified to it by the
President, seems to be limited to c&ses of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice. The power &nd duty of medi&tion &nd concili&tion
under the l&w is not gr&nted to the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions. Such power lies with the concili&tion Service of the
Dep&rtment of L&bor.

We find th&t medi&tion &nd concili&tion, except in c&ses of industries indispens&ble to the n&tion&l interest &nd
certified to be such by the President to the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions, is entrusted to the Dep&rtment of l&bor, which
sh&ll h&ve &s its &im the settling of industri&l differences between l&bor &nd c&pit&l "on &n essenti&lly volunt&ry b&sis."
So th&t in c&ses of conflict between &n employer &nd &n employee in the &bsence of &ny unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice, &ttempt
should be m&de to settle the difference through the medi&tion of the Secret&ry of L&bor or the Concili&tion Service.
Upon f&ilure of this remedy it seems th&t recourse m&y be m&de to the ordin&ry courts for the enforcement of the
respective rights of the p&rties in &ccord&nce with the terms of their l&bor &greements or in &ccord&nce with the
provisions of l&w.

There &re sever&l c&ses decided which ordered the reinst&tement of dismissed employees even if no unf&ir l&bor
pr&ctice w&s committed. But in these c&ses, &lthough not expressly decl&red to be of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice, &re &ctu&lly
such c&ses bec&use in e&ch &nd every one of them the employer h&d discrimin&ted &g&inst the tenure of old
employees in f&vor of new employees belonging to & union with which it recently entered into & closed-shop
&greement.

In conformity with the principles &bove expressed, we hold th&t the c&ses &t b&r h&ving been instituted expressly &s
unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice c&ses, pursu&nt to Section 5 of the Industri&l Pe&ce Act, &nd no unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice h&ving been
proved to h&ve committed, the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions h&s no power to gr&nt remedy under its gener&l powers of
medi&tion &nd concili&tion, such &s reinst&tement or b&ck w&ges, but must limit itself to dismissing the ch&rges of
unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice. Conform&bly thereto, we hold th&t the m&jority of the court below correctly dismissed the
ch&rges, without considering the merits of the cl&im of the two employees, Ju&n Torres &nd Domin&dor Gonz&les, for
reinst&tement.
__________

C&se 2: M&ri&no v. Roy&l Interoce&n Lines

F&cts: Ermidi& A. M&ri&no, Pl&intiff-Appellee, w&s employed by the &ppell&nt Roy&l Interoce&n Lines &s stenogr&pher-
typist &nd filing clerk from 5 J&nu&ry 1932 until the outbre&k of the w&r on 8 December 1941, when the employment
w&s interrupted, &nd from 1 M&rch 1948 until 23 October 1953, when she w&s dismissed from the service. At the time
of her dismiss&l, the &ppellee w&s receiving & b&sic s&l&ry of P312 &nd & high cost of living &llow&nce of P206, or &
tot&l of P518 & month.

On 5 October 1953 the &ppellee sent & letter to the m&n&ging directors of the &ppell&nt comp&ny in Hongkong,
coursed through its m&n&ger for the Philippines, the &ppell&nt J. V. K&merling, compl&ining &g&inst the l&tterʼs
"inconsider&te &nd unt&ctful &ttitude" tow&rds the employees under him &nd the clients of the &ppell&nt comp&ny in
the Philippines.

The &ppell&nt m&n&ger &dvised the &ppellee th&t her letter of 5 October 1953 h&d been forw&rded to the m&n&ging
directors of the &ppell&nt comp&ny in Hongkong; th&t in view of the contents &nd tenor of her letter, the m&n&ging
directors believed with the &ppell&nt m&n&ger th&t it w&s impossible to m&int&in her further in the service of the
comp&ny; th&t despite the f&ct th&t they were justified in dismissing her from the service &nd th&t she w&s not entitled
to &ny compens&tion, out of generosity &nd in consider&tion of her length of service, the &ppell&nt comp&ny w&s willing
to gr&nt her & sum equiv&lent to three months s&l&ry; th&t in order not to &dversely &ffect her ch&nces of future
employment with other firms, it w&s suggested th&t she h&nd in & form&l letter of resign&tion effective 31 October 1953,
otherwise the &ppell&nts would dismiss her; &nd th&t should they not he&r from her in writing until noon of 23 October
1953, she would be considered dismissed from the service.

On 23 October 1953 the &ppellee sent & letter to the &ppell&nts by messenger, st&ting th&t she w&s "compelled to h&nd
this letter of resign&tion severing my services from the Roy&l Interoce&n Lines effective October 31st, 1963, much to my
dislike &nd dis&ppointment &fter being in their employment for &lmost twenty-two (22) ye&rs". However, the &ppell&nts
refused &ccept&nce of her letter &nd on the s&me d&te, 23 October 1953, sent to the &ppellee & letter by registered
m&il dismissing her from the service. The &ppellee sought reconsider&tion of her dismiss&l from the m&n&ging directors
of the &ppell&nt comp&ny in Hongkong but received no &nswer to &ny of her five letters.

&ppell&nts fin&lly tendered to the &ppellee &n offer of compromise settlement whereby she would be p&id the sum of
P3,108 equiv&lent to six months s&l&ry, provided th&t she would sign & quit cl&im embodying & provision th&t she would
rele&se the &ppell&nts &nd &ny of their officers of employees from &ny civil or crimin&l li&bility &nd from &ny other
li&bility &rising from her employment. Not s&tisfied with the offer of compromise, on 2 Febru&ry 1954 the &ppellee
brought this &ction for recovery of d&m&ges in the tot&l sum of P107,002.58 &nd for other just &nd equit&ble relief.

On 25 M&y 1955, the &cting chief prosecutor of the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions, &t the &ppelleeʼs inst&nce, filed &
compl&int d&ted 24 M&y 1955 in the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions, ch&rging the &ppell&nts with unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice for
h&ving dismissed her from the service &nd for refusing to reinst&te her to her former position, th&t &fter the &ppell&nt
comp&ny h&d filed its &nswer (Exhibit 5) to the compl&int &nd the Court h&d conducted & he&ring, the l&tter rendered
judgment holding th&t the &ppell&nts were guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &nd ordering them to reinst&te the &ppellee to
her former position with b&ckp&y from the d&te of dismiss&l to the d&te of reinst&tement; &nd th&t the &ppell&nts h&d
filed in this Court & petition for certior&ri to review the judgment of the Court of Industri&l Rel&tions.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner w&s guilty of ULP.

Ruling: NO.
The pertinent leg&l provision is section 4(&), subsection 5, of Republic Act No. 875 which re&d &s follows: "Sec. 4,
Unf&ir L&bor Pr&ctice, (&) It sh&ll be unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice for &n employer: . . . (5) To dismiss, disch&rge, or otherwise
prejudice or discrimin&te &g&inst &n employee for h&ving filed ch&rges or for h&ving given or being &bout to give
testimony under this Act."

Despite the employeesʼ right to self-org&niz&tion, the employer therefore still ret&ins his inherent right to discipline his
employees, his norm&l prerog&tive to hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is directed only &g&inst the use of the right
to employ or disch&rge &s &n instrument of discrimin&tion, interference or oppression bec&use of oneʼs l&bor or union
&ctivities. The provision in dispute h&s to be interpreted in the sense th&t the ch&rges, the filing of which is the c&use of
the dismiss&l of the employee, must be rel&ted to his right to self-org&niz&tion, in order to give rise to unf&ir l&bor
pr&ctice on the p&rt of the employer. Under subsection 5 of section 4(&), the employeeʼs (1) h&ving filed ch&rges or (2)
h&ving given testimony or (3) being &bout to give testimony, must h&ve reference to the employeeʼs right to self-
org&niz&tion &nd collective b&rg&ining, bec&use the element of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice is interference in such right.

As the respondentʼs dismiss&l h&s no rel&tion to union &ctivities &nd the ch&rges filed by her &g&inst the petitioner h&d
nothing to do with or did not &rise from her union &ctivities, the &ppe&led decision is hereby reversed &nd the directive
for the respondentʼs reinst&tement with b&ckp&y revoked.

Considering th&t the &ppelleeʼs dismiss&l by the &ppell&nts, bec&use of ch&rges referred &g&inst the &ppell&nt
m&n&ger with the m&n&ging director of the &ppell&nt comp&ny in Hongkong, "not connected with or necess&rily &rising
from union &ctivities," did not constitute unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice; th&t this is the s&me c&use of &ction upon which her
cl&im for recovery of d&m&ges in the c&se &t b&r is predic&ted; &nd th&t despite the employeesʼ right to self-
org&niz&tion, the employer still ret&ins his inherent right to discipline his employees, "his norm&l prerog&tive to hire or
dismiss them." The &ppellee h&s no c&use of &ction &g&inst the &ppell&nts. Nevertheless, &s the dismiss&l of the
&ppellee w&s without c&use, bec&use her inefficiency &s the ground or re&son for her dismiss&l &s cl&imed by the
&ppell&nts is belied by the successive incre&ses of her compens&tion, the &mount of P3,108 for six months s&l&ry, &s
offered by the &ppell&nts, should be p&id to her.
__________

C&se 3: Rubberworld v. NLRC

F&cts: Respondent Elpidio Hid&lgo w&s employed by petitioner Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. on September 25, 1978 &s &n
ordin&ry clerk. In M&y, 1980, he w&s promoted to the position of production scheduler with & corresponding s&l&ry
incre&se. He w&s &g&in tr&nsferred to the Inventory Control Section &s stock clerk on September 1, 1983.

On April 6, 1984, Elpidio Hid&lgo, the Pl&nt I Gener&l M&n&ger of petitioner comp&ny, received & copy of the Fin&nci&l
Audit Report from the Intern&l Audit Dep&rtment of the comp&ny showing & signific&nt m&teri&l v&ri&nce between the
ye&r-end &ctu&l inventory &nd th&t of the C&rds (SC)/EDP Control Records. As & result thereof, Noel S&nti&go, Section
He&d of the Inventory Control Section, where respondent M&l&b&n&n w&s &ssigned, conducted &n investig&tion of the
reported discrep&ncies in the stock c&rds upon the request of the Pl&nt Gener&l M&n&ger. S&nti&go then submitted his
report to the gener&l m&n&ger recommending the dismiss&l of respondent M&l&b&n&n.

Consequently, M&l&b&n&n's c&se w&s endorsed to the Hum&n Resources Division of petitioner comp&ny, which
conducted & reinvestig&tion on the m&tter &nd which &ffirmed the recommend&tion of the Inventory Control Section
He&d for the termin&tion of employment of respondent M&l&b&n&n.

On June 6, 1984, respondent M&l&b&n&n w&s dismissed by petitioner comp&ny.

On June 16, 1984, respondent M&l&b&n&n, &long with &nother compl&in&nt n&med Jon&th&n Tr&nsmit, filed & compl&int
for unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &nd illeg&l dismiss&l &g&inst petitioner comp&ny &lleging th&t they (respondent M&l&b&n&n &nd
compl&in&nt Tr&nsmil) were members of the monthly s&l&ried employees' union &ffili&ted with TUPAS; th&t petitioner
comp&ny forced them to dis&ffili&te from the union; &nd th&t due to their refus&l to resign from the union, they were
ultim&tely dismissed from employment by petitioner comp&ny.

Petitioner comp&ny on the other h&nd, denied compl&in&nts' &lleg&tions &nd &verred th&t respondent M&l&b&n&n's
dismiss&l w&s due to gross &nd h&bitu&l neglect of his duty &nd not due to his union &ffili&tion. During the he&ring of
the c&se, the other compl&in&nt, Jon&th&n Tr&nsmil withdrew from the c&se since he &lre&dy found &nother
employment &bro&d.

The L&bor Arbiter dismissed the c&se. Respondent M&l&b&n&n then &ppe&led to the respondent Comission, which
reversed the decision of the LA. The petitioner comp&ny moved for reconsider&tion on the ground th&t the respondent
Commission's decision is not in &ccord&nce with f&cts &nd evidence on record. The s&me motion for reconsider&tion
w&s denied. Hence, petitioner filed & petition for certior&ri contending th&t the respondent Commission committed
gr&ve &buse of discretion &mounting to l&ck of jurisdiction in reversing the L&bor Arbiter's decision.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the dismiss&l of respondent M&l&b&n&n is t&inted with unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice; &nd (2) whether
or not & just &nd v&lid c&use exists for the dismiss&l of priv&te respondent M&l&b&n&n.

Ruling:
(1) No. Petitioner &lleges th&t the N&tion&l L&bor Rel&tions Commission gr&vely erred in concluding th&t the demotion
of M&l&b&n&n from production scheduler to & stock clerk &t the Stock &nd Inventory Section w&s intended to
discour&ge M&l&b&n&n from union membership. It &rgued th&t the L&bor Arbiter w&s correct in finding th&t the priv&te
respondent h&d not shown &mple proof to the effect th&t he w&s & member of & l&bor org&niz&tion prior to his tr&nsfer
to &nother position. Art 248 of the L&bor Code provides th&t it sh&ll be unl&wful for &n employer to interfere with,
restr&in or coerce emplotyees in the exercise of their right to self-org&niz&tion.

The question of whether &n employee w&s dismissed bec&use of his union &ctivities is essenti&lly & question of f&ct &s
to which the findings of the &dministr&tive &gency concerned &re conclusive &nd binding if supported by subst&nti&l
evidence. Subst&nti&l evidence h&s been defined &s such relev&nt evidence &s & re&son&ble mind might &ccept &s
&dequ&te to support & conclusion. The findings of the L&bor Arbiter on the non-existence of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice on the
p&rt of the comp&ny &re more in &ccord &nd supported by the evidence submitted by the p&rties in the inst&nt c&se.

Compl&in&nt h&d st&ted th&t he w&s & member of the monthly s&l&ried employees union &ffili&ted with TUPAS. He,
however, offered no proof to support his &lleg&tion. In f&ct, no evidence w&s presented to prove the existence of such
union. We (note] from the records th&t, &s the usu&l pr&ctice, in c&ses like this one, compl&in&nt is usu&lly supported
by the union of which he is & member. And ordin&rily, the union itself is imple&ded &s & co-compl&in&nt. It is, indeed,
surprising th&t compl&in&nt h&d to solicit the help of & l&bor union (PAFLU) of which he w&s not & member inste&d of
soliciting the &id of the l&bor union (TUPAS) of which he w&s &llegedly & member. These circumst&nces &lone [destroy]
the credibility of compl&in&nt's &lleg&tions.
Nowhere in the records c&n We find th&t the comp&ny &ctu&lly performed positive &cts to restr&in the union
p&rticip&tion of priv&te respondent. For one, it is doubtful whether M&l&b&n&n w&s re&lly eng&ged in the org&niz&tion
of & l&bor union &ffili&ted with the feder&tion TUPAS. The only evidence presented by him to prove this contention is his
&ffid&vit &nd th&t of his f&ther. It is therefore, not in &ccord&nce with ordin&ry experience &nd common pr&ctice th&t
the priv&te respondent pursued his b&ttle &lone, without the &id &nd support of his co-members in the union &nd his
feder&tion especi&lly in & c&se of serious n&ture &s this one involving comp&ny intervention with union &ctivity.

As & rule, it is the prerog&tive of the comp&ny to promote, tr&nsfer or even demote its employees to other positions
when the interests of the comp&ny re&son&bly dem&nd it. Unless there &re inst&nces which directly point to
interference by the comp&ny with the employees' right to self-org&niz&tion, the tr&nsfer of priv&te respondent should
be considered &s within the bounds &llowed by l&w. Furthermore, &lthough priv&te respondent w&s tr&nsferred to &
lower position, his origin&l r&nk &nd s&l&ry rem&ined undiminished, which f&ct w&s not refuted or questioned by priv&te
respondent.

In view of the foregoing conclusions of the L&bor Arbiter, We &re compelled to &gree with the l&tter th&t the petitioner
comp&ny did not commit &ny unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice in tr&nsferring &nd there&fter dismissing priv&te respondent.

(2) No. Petitioner contends th&t priv&te respondent M&l&b&n&n w&s guilty of gross negligence when he c&used the
posting of incorrect entries in the stock c&rd without counter checking the &ctu&l movement st&tus of the items &t the
w&rehouse, thereby resulting into unm&n&ge&ble in&ccur&cies in the d&t& posted in the stock c&rds.

It does not &ppe&r th&t priv&te respondent M&l&b&n&n is &n incorrigible offender or th&t wh&t he did inflicted serious
d&m&ge to the comp&ny so much so th&t his continu&nce in the service would be p&tently inimic&l to the employer's
interest. Assuming, in gr&ti& &rgumenti th&t the priv&te respondent h&d indeed committed the s&id mist&kes in the
posting of &ccur&te d&t&, this w&s only his first infr&ction with reg&rd to his duties. It would thus be cruel &nd unjust to
mete out the dr&stic pen&lty of dismiss&l, for it is not proportion&te to the gr&vity of the misdeed.

In f&ct, the promotion of the priv&te respondent from the position of ordin&ry clerk to production scheduler est&blishes
the presumption th&t his perform&nce of his work is &ccept&ble to the comp&ny. The petitioner even &dmitted th&t it
w&s due to he&vy fin&nci&l &nd business reverses th&t the comp&ny &ssigned the priv&te respondent to the position of
Stock Clerk &nd not bec&use of his uns&tisf&ctory perform&nce &s production scheduler. It h&s been held th&t there
must be f&ir &nd re&son&ble criteri& to be used in selecting employees to be dismissed.

It is worthy to note th&t the prerog&tive of m&n&gement to dismiss or l&y-off &n employee must be done without &buse
of discretion, for wh&t is &t st&ke is not only petitioner's position, but &lso his me&ns of livelihood. This is so bec&use
the preserv&tion of the lives of the citizens is & b&sic duty of the St&te, more vit&l th&n the peserv&tion of corpor&te
profits.
___________

C&se 4: Bulletin Publishing Corp v. S&nchez

F&cts: Petitioner corpor&tion h&s been eng&ged in the business of newsp&per &nd m&g&zine publishing for over h&lf &
century. its current public&tions include the n&tion&l d&ily "Bulletin Tod&y" (now M&nil& D&ily Bulletin), the t&bloid
"Tempo", &nd & weekly m&g&zine c&lled "P&nor&m&". The tot&l number of the personnel complement of the s&id firm
(exclusive of the editori&l st&ff, contr&ct workers &nd c&su&ls, etc.), constituting the r&nk-&nd-file regul&r members, is
s&id to be over three hundred persons. The supervisory employees number forty-eight. About three hundred employees
belonging to the r&nk-&nd-file h&d previously formed the Bulletin Employees Union. Ever since, there h&s been only one
b&rg&ining unit in the petitioner comp&ny &nd this is the BEU - the union of the r&nk-&nd-file employees.

Ever since, there h&s been only one b&rg&ining unit in the petitioner comp&ny &nd this is the BEU - the union of the
r&nk-&nd-file employees. A registr&tion certific&te w&s then issued. A letter w&s then sent to the m&n&gement of
petitioner corpor&tion by BSU giving notice of the registr&tion of the BSU &nd dem&nding its recognition &s the sole
b&rg&ining &gent of &ll the supervisors in the comp&ny.

A few d&ys &fter, & petition for direct certific&tion w&s filed by the BSU &s the b&rg&ining represent&tive of the
supervisors. A notice of strike by BSU w&s then filed with the Ministry of L&bor due to cert&in &cts &llegedly performed
by petitioner which BSU cl&ims, in effect, to be union busting &nd unf&ir l&bor pr&ctices. Refusing to recognize the BSU,
the Bulletin Publishing Corpor&tion filed & petition, seeking c&ncell&tion of the registr&tion of the BSU on the ground
th&t Article 246 of the L&bor Code &nd Section 11 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules thereof, prohibit
supervisors from forming l&bor org&niz&tions.

As the supervisors thre&tened to strike, petitioner w&s prompted to file & petition with the Ministry of L&bor, urging
therein th&t s&id office &ssume jurisdiction in the m&tter of the impending strike. When the Minister of L&bor f&iled to
exercise his jurisdiction or &ct on the m&tter, petitioner then felt th&t the remedy it seeks should be sought from this
Court bec&use, further resort to the Ministry of L&bor m&y be construed &s & t&cit recognition by petitioner of the
supervisors union (BSU) which would be inconsistent with petitioner's ch&llenge to the &ssertion of BSU to exist &s &
legitim&te l&bor union.

Petitioner invokes the equity jurisdiction of this Court, cl&iming th&t & strike by the BSU which it considers & bogus
union &nd whose registr&tion &nd oper&tion is ch&llenged &s &g&inst public policy &nd leg&l prohibitions, will c&use
untold h&rm on herein petitioner which is eng&ged in publishing d&ily periodic&ls.

Issue: Whether or not supervisors in petitioner comp&ny m&y, for purposes of collective b&rg&ining, form & union
sep&r&te &nd distinct from the existing union org&nized by the r&nk-&nd-file employees of the s&me comp&ny.

Ruling: No. In the light of the f&ctu&l b&ckground of this c&se, We &re constr&ined to hold th&t the supervisory
employees of petitioner firm m&y not, under the l&w, form & supervisors union, sep&r&te &nd distinct from the existing
b&rg&ining unit (BEU), composed of the r&nk-&nd-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corpor&tion. The New L&bor
Code recognizes two princip&l groups of employees, n&mely, m&n&geri&l &nd the r&nk-&nd-file group. All employees
not f&lling within the definition of & m&n&geri&l employee &re considered &s r&nk &nd file employees.

Article 246 of the L&bor Code explicitly excludes m&n&geri&l employees from the right of self-org&niz&tion, the right to
form, join &nd &ssist l&bor org&niz&tions. Furthermore, Sec. 11 of Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
L&bor Code did &w&y with existing Supervisors Union, cl&ssifying the members thereof &s neither m&n&geri&l or r&nk-
&nd-file employees depending on the work they perform. If they disch&rge m&n&geri&l functions they &re prohibited
from forming or joining &ny l&bor org&niz&tion. If they do not perform m&n&geri&l work, they m&y join or &ssist the r&nk-
&nd-file union &nd, if none exists, they m&y form one such r&nk-&nd-file org&niz&tion. From these, one c&n re&dily infer
th&t the l&w no longer recognizes supervisory Unions.
It follows &s & logic&l conclusion th&t the members of the Bulletin Supervisory Union, wholly composed of supervisors
employed by petitioner corpor&tion, &re not QUALIFIED to org&nize & L&bor Union of their own. Aside from this re&son,
is the f&ct th&t there is &lre&dy &n existing legitim&te l&bor union, the BEU, which enjoys & current collective b&rg&ining
&greement with the petitioner publishing comp&ny.

On the issue of strike, priv&te respondents decl&re th&t the prim&ry re&son which prompted their filing of & notice of
strike on, &re the &rbitr&ry &nd discrimin&tory retirement of four (4) members of the supervisors union, who were
&mong those who initi&ted the form&tion of their union; &s well &s the immedi&te promotion of some members of the
union to executive positions in order to remove the s&id persons promoted from the cover&ge of, or membership from
the supervisory union. Priv&te respondents ch&rge th&t these &cts &re t&nt&mount to union busting t&ctics &nd
constitute unf&ir l&bor pr&ctices th&t w&rr&nt & strike.

Furthermore, priv&te respondents cl&im th&t under the Collective B&rg&ining Agreement, petitioner does not h&ve &ny
definite policy governing the retirement of supervisory employees &s distinguished from r&nk-&nd-file employees. The
Court is not persu&ded by priv&te respondents' submissions. The m&in issues in this c&se &re the leg&lity of &
supervisory union &nd the certific&te of registr&tion issued therefor, &nd the v&lidity of & thre&tened strike by members
of such union. The m&tter of the retirement of the four retirees is only &n incident to the c&se. It m&y not be used to
skirt the re&l question of the leg&lity of the org&niz&tion of & supervisors union.

Respondents m&ke much &do th&t petitioner does not h&ve & definite policy reg&rding the retirement of supervisory
employees. Petitioner h&s s&tisf&ctorily shown to this Court th&t it h&s been m&n&gement policy to likewise &pply the
provisions of the Collective B&rg&ining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner &nd the r&nk-&nd-file union (BEU), &lso to
supervisors. According to the uncontroverted submission of petitioner, the provisions of Section 4 in rel&tion to Section
1 of Article X of the s&id CBA, h&ve been repe&tedly &pplied to supervisory personnel even if they &re not included in
the scope of the CBA.

The &foremention section explicitly decl&re, in no uncert&in terms, th&t retirement of &n employee m&y be done upon
initi&tive &nd option of the m&n&gement. And where there &re c&ses of volunt&ry retirement, the s&me is effective only
upon the &pprov&l of m&n&gement. The f&ct th&t there &re some supervisory employees who h&ve not yet been retired
&fter 25 ye&rs with the comp&ny or h&ve re&ched the &ge of sixty merely confirms th&t it is the singul&r prerog&tive of
m&n&gement, &t its option, to retired supervisors or r&nk-&nd-file members when it deems fit. There should be no unf&ir
l&bor pr&ctice committed by m&n&gement if the retirement of priv&te respondents were m&de in &ccord with the &greed
option.

It is even more unten&ble for priv&te respondents to suggest th&t the "sudden promotion" of the supervisors union
members to executive positions w&s intended to remove them from the cover&ge of or from membership in the
supervisory union. The promotion of employees to m&n&geri&l or executive positions rests upon the discretion of
m&n&gement. M&n&geri&l positions &re offices which c&n only be held by persons who h&ve the trust of the corpor&tion
&nd its officers. It is the prerog&tive of m&n&gement to promote &ny individu&l working within the comp&ny to & higher
position. It should not be inhibited or prevented from doing so.

In sum, where concerted &ctivities &re &imed &t compelling &n employer to ignore the cle&r m&nd&te of the L&bor Code,
&s in the inst&nt c&se, grounds b&sed on equity m&y be invoked from the courts in order to restr&in the questioned
&ctivities. We c&nnot rem&in oblivious to the f&ct th&t & strike, &s th&t contempl&ted by the supervisors union &g&inst
petitioner c&n c&use irrep&r&ble injury to its public&tions, diminish goodwill &nd seriously &ffect its continuity with its
regul&r re&ders. Tr&de unionism &nd strikes &re legitim&te we&pons of l&bor gr&nted by our st&tutes. But when these
instruments &re utilized by m&n&geri&l/supervisory employees in viol&tion of existing l&bor l&ws, the misuse of these
t&ctics c&n be the subject of judici&l intervention to forest&ll gr&ve injury to & business enterprise.
___________

C&se 5: Wise &nd Co., Inc. v. Wise & Co., Inc. Employees

F&cts: On April 3,1987 the m&n&gement issued & memor&ndum circul&r introducing & profit sh&ring scheme for its
m&n&gers &nd supervisors the initi&l distribution of which w&s to t&ke effect M&rch 31, 1988.

On July 3, 1987 the respondent union wrote petitioner through its president &sking for p&rticip&tion in this scheme. This
w&s denied by petitioner on the ground th&t it h&d to &dhere strictly to the Collective B&rg&ining Agreement (CBA).

In the me&ntime, t&lks were underw&y for e&rly negoti&tion by the p&rties of the CBA which w&s due to expire on April
30, 1988. The negoti&tion thus begun e&rlier th&n the freedom period. On November 11, 1987 petitioner wrote
respondent union &dvising the l&tter th&t they were prep&red to consider including the employees covered by the CBA
in the profit sh&ring scheme beginning the ye&r 1987 provided th&t the ongoing negoti&tions were concluded prior to
December 1987. However, the collective b&rg&ining negoti&tions re&ched & de&dlock on the issue of the scope of the
b&rg&ining unit. Concili&tion efforts to settle the dispute on 29 M&rch 1988 were m&de but no settlement w&s re&ched.

On M&rch 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sh&ring benefit not only to m&n&gers &nd supervisors but &lso to &ll
other r&nk &nd file employees not covered by the CBA. This c&used the respondent union to file & notice of strike
&lleging th&t petitioner w&s guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice bec&use the union members were discrimin&ted &g&inst in the
gr&nt of the profit sh&ring benefits. Consequently, m&n&gement refused to proceed with the CBA negoti&tions unless
the l&st notice of strike w&s first resolved. The union &greed to postpone discussions on the profit sh&ring dem&nd until
& new CBA w&s concluded.

After & series of concili&tion conferences, the p&rties &greed to settle the dispute through volunt&ry &rbitr&tion. After
the p&rties submitted their position p&pers, & rejoinder &nd reply, on M&rch 20,1989 the volunt&ry &rbitr&tor issued &n
&w&rd ordering petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sh&ring scheme to the members of
respondent union.

Issue: Whether or not petitoner w&s guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice bec&use the union members were discrimin&ted
&g&inst in the gr&nt of the profit sh&ring benefits.

Ruling: The Court holds th&t it is the prerog&tive of m&n&gement to regul&te, &ccording to its discretion &nd judgment,
&ll &spects of employment. This flows from the est&blished rule th&t l&bor l&w does not &uthorize the of the employer in
the conduct of its business. Such m&n&gement prerog&tive m&y be &v&iled of without fe&r of &ny li&bility so long &s it is
exercised in good f&ith for the &dv&ncement of the employers' interest &nd not for the purpose of defe&ting or
circumventing the rights of employees under speci&l l&ws or v&lid &greement &nd &re not exercised in & m&licious,
h&rsh, oppressive, vindictive or w&nton m&nner or out of m&lice or spite.

The gr&nt by petitioner of profit sh&ring benefits to the employees outside the "b&rg&ining unit" f&lls under the &mbit of
its m&n&geri&l prerog&tive. It &ppe&rs to h&ve been done in good f&ith &nd without ulterior motive. More so when &s in
this c&se there is & cl&use in the CBA where the employees &re cl&ssified into those who &re members of the union &nd
those who &re not. In the c&se of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms &nd conditions of the
CBA contr&ct which constitute the l&w between the contr&cting p&rties.8 Both the employer &nd the union members
&re bound by such &greement.

However, the court serves notice th&t it will not hesit&te to strike down &ny &ct of the employer th&t tends to be
discrimin&tory &g&inst union members. It is only bec&use of the peculi&r circumst&nces of this c&se showing there is no
such intention th&t this court ruled otherwise.
___________

C&se 6: Phil. Gr&phic Arts v. NLRC

F&cts: In October, 1984, the petitioner corpor&tion w&s forced by economic circumst&nces to require its workers to go
on m&nd&tory v&c&tion le&ve in b&tches of seven or nine for periods r&nging from 15, 30, to 45 d&ys. The workers were
p&id while on le&ve but the p&y w&s ch&rged &g&inst their respective e&rned le&ves. As & result, the priv&te
respondents filed compl&ints for unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &nd discrimin&tion.

On April 9, 1986, the L&bor Arbiter dismissed the compl&int for unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice on grounds of discrimin&tion,
forced le&ve &nd reduction of working d&ys for l&ck of merit. The priv&te respondents then filed & "p&rti&l &ppe&l" with
the NLRC concerning the forced v&c&tion le&ves which were &ctu&lly without p&y.

On June 19, 1986, the NLRC &ffirmed the &rbiter's decision with modific&tion.

Issue: Whether or not the forced v&c&tion le&ve constitutes unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &nd if not &n unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice,
whether or not it w&s t&inted with &rbitr&riness.

Ruling: No. As found by the NLRC, the priv&te respondents themselves never questioned the existence of &n economic
crisis but, in f&ct, &dmitted its existence. There is b&sis for the petitioner's contentions th&t the reduction of work
schedule w&s tempor&ry, th&t it w&s t&ken only &fter notice &nd consult&tions with the workers &nd supervisors, th&t &
consensus w&s re&ched on how to de&l with deterior&ting economic conditions &nd reduced s&les &nd th&t the
tempor&ry reduction of working d&ys w&s & more hum&ne solution inste&d of & retrenchment &nd reduction of
personnel. The petitioner further points out th&t this is in conson&nce with the collective b&rg&ining &greement
between the employer &nd its employees.

There is &lso no showing th&t the imposition of forced le&ve w&s exercised for the purpose of defe&ting or
circumventing the rights of employees under speci&l l&ws or under v&lid &greements. Likewise the forced le&ve w&s
enforced neither in & m&licious, h&rsh, oppressive, vindictive nor w&nton m&nner, or out of m&lice or spite. Ap&rt from
priv&te respondents concurrence th&t the forced le&ve w&s implemented due to economic crisis, wh&t only "hurts"
them "is th&t s&id m&n&gement's pl&n w&s not even discussed in the griev&nce procedure so th&t the Union members
thereof m&y well be &pprised of the re&son therefor.

The decision to resort to forced le&ves w&s, under the circumst&nces, & m&n&gement prerog&tive. The workers' cl&im
of non-resort. to the griev&nce m&chinery is neg&ted by their f&ilure to initi&te steps for its employment.

As the l&w st&nds, both employers &nd b&rg&ining represent&tive of the employees &re required to go through the
griev&nce m&chinery in c&se & griev&nce &rises. And though the l&w does not provide who, &s between l&bor &nd
c&pit&l, should initi&te th&t s&id griev&nce be brought first to the, griev&nce m&chinery, it is only logic&l, just &nd
equit&ble th&t whoever is &ggrieved should initi&te settlement of the griev&nce through the griev&nce m&chinery. To
impose the compulsory procedure on employers &lone would be oppressive of c&pit&l, notwithst&nding the f&ct th&t in
most c&ses the griev&nce is of the employees.

In the c&se &t b&r, when petitioners sent notice to compl&in&nts, no griev&nce between petitioners &nd priv&te
respondents th&t need be threshed out before the griev&nce m&chinery h&s yet m&teri&lized. But then, priv&te
respondents, who received such notice &nd being &ggrieved thereof, instituted & c&se before the L&bor Arbiter for
unf&ir l&bor pr&ctices &nd discrimin&tion.
__________

C&se 7: S&n Miguel Brewery v. Ople

F&cts: On April 17, 1978, & collective b&rg&ining &greement (effective on M&y 1, 1978 until J&nu&ry 31, 1981) w&s
entered into by petitioner S&n Miguel Corpor&tion S&les Force Union (PTGWO), &nd the priv&te respondent, S&n Miguel
Corpor&tion, Section 1, of Article IV of which provided &s follows:
Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the &ppropri&te b&rg&ining unit sh&ll be entitled to & b&sic monthly compens&tion
plus commission b&sed on their respective s&les.

In September 1979, the comp&ny introduced & m&rketing scheme known &s the "Complement&ry Distribution
System" (CDS) whereby its beer products were offered for s&le directly to wholes&lers through S&n Miguel's s&les
offices.

The l&bor union (herein petitioner) filed & compl&int for unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice in the Ministry of L&bor, with & notice of
strike on the ground th&t the CDS w&s contr&ry to the existing m&rketing scheme whereby the Route S&lesmen were
&ssigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer, &nd wholes&lers h&d to buy beer products from
them, not from the comp&ny. It w&s &lleged th&t the new m&rketing scheme viol&tes Section 1, Article IV of the
collective b&rg&ining &greement bec&use the introduction of the CDS would reduce the t&ke-home p&y of the s&lesmen
&nd their truck helpers for the comp&ny would be unf&irly competing with them.

The Minister of L&bor dismissed the notice of strike filed by the petitioner. The m&n&gement however is hereby ordered
to p&y &n &ddition&l three (3) months b&ck &djustment commissions over &nd &bove the &djusted commission under
the complement&ry distribution system. He &rgued th&t the est&blishment of such scheme w&s p&rt of its over&ll pl&n
to improve efficiency &nd economy &nd &t the s&me time g&in profit to the highest. While it m&y be &dmitted th&t the
introduction of new s&les pl&n somewh&t disturbed the present set-up, the ch&nge however w&s too insignific&nt &s to
convince this Office to interpret th&t the innov&tion interferred with the worker's right to self-org&niz&tion.

Furthermore, the petitioner f&iled to consider is the f&ct th&t coroll&ry to the &doption of the &ss&iled m&rketing
technique is the effort of the comp&ny to compens&te wh&tever loss the workers m&y suffer bec&use of the new pl&n
over &nd &bove th&n wh&t h&s been provided in the collective b&rg&ining &greement.

Issue: Whether or not the Minister of L&bor w&s correct in &pproving the priv&te respondent's m&rketing scheme,
known &s the "Complement&ry Distribution System" (CDS) &nd dismissing the petitioner l&bor union's compl&int for
unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice.
Ruling: Yes. Public respondent w&s correct in holding th&t the CDS is & v&lid exercise of m&n&gement prerog&tives:
Except &s limited by speci&l l&ws, &n employer is free to regul&te, &ccording to his own discretion &nd judgment, &ll
&spects of employment, including hiring, work &ssignments, working methods, time, pl&ce &nd m&nner of work, tools to
be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regul&tions, tr&nsfer of employees, work
supervision, l&y-off of workers &nd the discipline, dismiss&l &nd rec&ll of work.

Every business enterprise ende&vors to incre&se its profits. In the process, it m&y &dopt or devise me&ns designed
tow&rds th&t go&l. And &s provided by jurisprudence, even &s the l&w is solicitous of the welf&re of the employees, it
must &lso protect the right of &n employer to exercise wh&t &re cle&rly m&n&gement prerog&tives. The free will of
m&n&gement to conduct its own business &ff&irs to &chieve its purpose c&nnot be denied.

So long &s & comp&ny's m&n&gement prerog&tives &re exercised in good f&ith for the &dv&ncement of the employer's
interest &nd not for the purpose of defe&ting or circumventing the rights of the employees under speci&l l&ws or under
v&lid &greements, this Court will uphold them. S&n Miguel Corpor&tion's offer to compens&te the members of its s&les
force who will be &dversely &ffected by the implement&tion of the CDS by p&ying them & so-c&lled "b&ck &djustment
commission" to m&ke up for the commissions they might lose &s & result of the CDS proves the comp&ny's good f&ith
&nd l&ck of intention to bust their union.
___________

C&se 8: D&buet v. Roche Ph&rm&ceutic&ls

F&cts: On 1 M&rch 1973, herein individu&l petitioners who were &n officers of the Roche Products L&bor Union, the l&bor
org&niz&tion existing in the firm, &nd with whom the respondent comp&ny h&d & collective b&rg&ining &greement which
w&s due for re-negoti&tion th&t month, wrote the respondent comp&ny expressing the griev&nces of the union &nd
seeking & form&l conference with m&n&gement reg&rding the previous dismiss&l of the union's president &nd vice-
president.

At s&id meeting, however, inste&d of discussing the problems &ffecting the l&bor union &nd m&n&gement, Mr. Eric
Menth&, the comp&ny's gener&l m&n&ger, &llegedly ber&ted the petitioners for writing s&id letter &nd c&lled the letter
&nd the person who prep&red it &s "stupid." Feeling th&t he w&s the one &lluded to, since he h&d prep&red the letter,
counsel for the l&bor union filed & c&se for gr&ve sl&nder &g&inst Mr. Menth&. The ch&rge w&s b&sed on the &ffid&vit
executed by the petitioners.

The respondent comp&ny, furthermore, construed the execution by petitioners of the &ffid&vit &s &n &ct of bre&ch of
trust &nd confidence &nd inimic&l to the interest of the comp&ny, for which they were suspended. Subsequently, the
respondent comp&ny filed with the NLRC & petition for cle&r&nce to termin&te their employment. The petitioners filed
&n opposition thereto &nd, &t the s&me time, filed ch&rges of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice, union busting, &nd h&r&ssment
&g&inst the comp&ny.

After due proceedings, the compulsory &rbitr&tor found th&t the petitioners' dismiss&l w&s without justifi&ble c&use, but
th&t there w&s no unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice committed &nd directed th&t petitioners be p&id sep&r&tion p&y. Petitioners
filed & motion for reconsider&tion &nd/or &ppe&l to the NLRC which &greed with the findings of the &rbitr&tor th&t the
petitioners' dismiss&l w&s without just &nd v&lid c&use. However, it dis&greed with the &rbitr&tor on the relief gr&nted.
The NLRC ordered the reinst&tement of the petitioners with two (2) months s&l&ry &s b&ck w&ges. Both p&rties
&ppe&led to the Secret&ry of L&bor who set &side the decision of the NLRC &nd entered &nother one ordering the
p&yment of sever&nce p&y only.

The petitioners &ppe&led to the Office of the President, &nd on 27 April 1976, the l&tter rendered & decision finding the
respondents guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice &nd directing the reinst&tement of the petitioners with b&ck w&ges from the
time of their suspension until &ctu&lly reinst&ted, without loss of seniority rights. The respondent comp&ny w&s,
likewise, ordered to extend to the petitioners &ll fringe benefits to which they &re entitled h&d they not been dismissed.
The respondent comp&ny filed & motion for reconsider&tion of the decision, &nd on 16 November 1976, the Office of the
President gr&nted the motion &nd reversed its previous decision. It ruled th&t, while the petitioners' dismiss&l w&s not
for just &nd v&lid c&use, no unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice h&d been committed.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent comp&ny, in termin&ting the employment of the petitioners without just &nd
l&wful c&use, committed &n unf&it l&bor pr&ctice.
(2) Whether or not the SC h&s jurisdiction to t&ke cogniz&nce of the inst&nt petition.

Ruling: (1) Yes. The letter written by &nd for the union &ddressed to m&n&gement referred to employee griev&nces &nd/
or, l&bor-m&n&gement issues &nd the employees concerned were &ll officers of the union, then seeking & renegoti&tion
of the collective b&rg&ining &greement, & f&ct which respondent comp&ny does not deny, there should, &ll the more, be
& recognition of such letter &s &n &ct for the mutu&l &id, protection &nd benefit of the employees concerned. This
recognition, in turn, should extend to petitioners' execution of &n &ffid&vit in support of the ch&rge of sl&nder &g&inst
priv&te respondent, Eric Menth&, for c&lling the union's l&wyer, who prep&red the letter, &nd the contents thereof &s
"stupid."

Bre&ch of trust &nd confidence, the grounds &lleged for herein petitioners' dismiss&l, "must not be indiscrimin&tely used
&s & shield to dismiss &n employee &rbitr&rily. For who c&n stop the employer from filing &n the ch&rges in the books for
the simple exercise of it, &nd then hide behind the pretext of loss of confidence which c&n be proved by mere
preponder&nce of evidence." Hence, their dismiss&l, under the circumst&nces, &mounted to interference with, &nd
restr&int or coercion of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right to eng&ge in concerted &ctivities for their mutu&l &id
&nd protection.

As the respondent comp&ny w&s guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice, reinst&tement of the dismissed employees should follow
&s & m&tter of right. It is &n est&blished rule th&t &n employer who commits &n unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice m&y be required to
reinst&te, with full b&ck w&ges, the workers &ffected by such &ct, the &mount not to exceed b&ck w&ges for three (3)
ye&rs.

(2) Yes. Respondents contend th&t pursu&nt to Art. 222 (should be Art. 223) of the L&bor Code. the Office of the
President is the fin&l &ppell&te &uthority within the &djudic&tive m&chinery for h&ndling l&bor disputes. Art 223 of the
L&bor Code does not provide for review of the decisions Of the Office of the President by the Supreme Court. This does
not me&n, however, th&t the power Of judici&l review does not extend to decisions of
the Office of the President.

In the long line of c&ses decided by the court, it provided th&t it is gener&lly understood &s to &dministr&tive &gencies
exercising qu&si-judici&l or legisl&tive power th&t there is &n underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the &cts of
such &gencies on questions of l&w &nd jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by st&tute. The purpose of
judici&l review is to keep the &dministr&tive &gency within its jurisdiction &nd protect subst&nti&l rights of p&rties
&ffected by its decisions'. It is p&rt of the system of checks &nd b&l&nces which restricts the sep&r&tion of powers &nd
forest&lls &rbitr&ry &nd unjust &djudic&tions.

Accordingly, we rest&te th&t this Court, in the exercise of its power of judici&l review, m&y review decisions of the Office
of the President on questions of l&w &nd jurisdiction, when properly r&ised. This does not me&n judici&l suprem&cy over
the Office of the President but the perform&nce by this Court of & duty specific&lly enjoined upon it by the Constitution,
&s p&rt of & system of checks &nd b&l&nces.
__________

C&se 9: Insul&r Life Assur&nce v. Insul&r Life Co.

Doctrine: Although the Unions &re on strike, the employer is still oblig&ted to b&rg&in with the union &s the employeesʼ
b&rg&ining represent&tive. Further, it is &lso &n &ct of interference for the employer to send individu&l letters to the
employees notifying them to return to their jobs, otherwise, they would be repl&ced. Individu&l solicit&tion of the
employees urging them to ce&se union &ctivity or ce&se striking consists of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice.

F&cts: The Insul&r Life Assur&nce Co., Ltd., Employees Associ&tion-NATU, FGU Insur&nce Group Workers & Employees
Associ&tion-NATU, &nd Insul&r Life Building Employees Associ&tion-NATU (herein&fter referred to &s the Unions), while
still members of the Feder&tion of Free Workers (FFW), entered into sep&r&te CBAs with the Insul&r Life Assur&nce Co.,
Ltd. &nd the FGU Insur&nce Group (herein&fter referred to &s the Comp&nies).

Two of the l&wyers &nd officers of the Unions n&mely Felipe En&je &nd R&mon G&rci&, tried to dissu&de the Unions from
dis&ffili&ting with the FFW &nd joining the N&tion&l Associ&tion of Tr&de Unions (NATU), to no &v&il. En&je &nd G&rci&
soon left the FFW &nd secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Bo&rd of the Dep&rtment of Justice &nd were
there&fter hired by the comp&nies - G&rci& &s &ssist&nt corpor&te secret&ry &nd leg&l &ssist&nt, &nd En&je &s
personnel m&n&ger &nd ch&irm&n of the negoti&ting p&nel for the Comp&nies in the collective b&rg&ining with the
Unions.

Unions jointly submitted propos&ls to the Comp&nies; negoti&tions were conducted on the Unionʼs propos&ls, but these
were sn&gged by & de&dlock on the issue concerning l&bor dem&nds but with no s&tisf&ctory result due to & st&lem&te
on the m&tter of s&l&ry incre&ses.
Me&nwhile, 87 unionists were recl&ssified &s supervisors without incre&se in s&l&ry nor in responsibility while
negoti&tions were going on in the Dep&rtment of L&bor &fter the notice to strike w&s served on the Comp&nies. These
employees resigned from the Unions. On M&y 21, 1958 the Comp&nies through their &cting m&n&ger &nd president,
sent to e&ch of the strikers & letter offering free coffee, occ&sion&l movies, be p&id overtime, &rr&ngement for their
f&milies in exch&nge for their return to work.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of & few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
&fores&id letter. From the d&te the strike w&s c&lled on M&y 21, 1958, until it w&s c&lled off on M&y 31, 1958, some
m&n&gement men tried to bre&k thru the Unionsʼ picket lines &nd succeeded in penetr&ting the s&me in front of the
Insul&r Life Building, thus c&using injuries to the picketers &nd &lso to the strike-bre&kers due to the resist&nce offered
by some picketers.
Alleging th&t some non-strikers were injured &nd with the use of photogr&phs &s evidence, the Comp&nies then filed
crimin&l ch&rges &g&inst the strikers with the City Fisc&lʼs Office of M&nil&.

Another letter w&s then sent by the comp&ny to the individu&l strikers if they f&il to return to work by June 2, 1958, they
might be repl&ced in their jobs. Bec&use of the issu&nce of the writ of prelimin&ry injunction &g&inst them &s well &s the
ultim&tum of the Comp&nies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be repl&ced, the striking
employees decided to c&ll off their strike &nd to report b&ck to work on June 2, 1958.

Upon their return to work, they were subjected to & screening process by & m&n&gement committee, &mong the
members were G&rci& &nd En&je. After screening, eighty- three (83) strikers were rejected due to pending crimin&l
ch&rges, &nd &d&m&ntly refused re&dmission of thirty-four (34) offici&ls &nd members of the Unions who were most
&ctive in the strike on the ground th&t they committed “&cts inimic&l to the interest of the respondents,” without
however st&ting the specific &cts &llegedly committed.

CIR prosecutor then filed & compl&int for unf&it l&bor pr&ctice &g&inst the Comp&nies under R.A. 875 due to the &cts of
the comp&nies in interfering with the members of the Union in their exercise of their right to concerted &ction by
sending the &forest&ted letters &nd discrimin&ting &g&inst the members of the Union with reg&rd to their re&dmission.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent comp&ny is guilty of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice

Ruling: Yes. The &ct of &n employer in notifying &bsent employees individu&lly during & strike following unproductive
efforts &t collective b&rg&ining th&t the pl&nt would be oper&ted the next d&y &nd th&t their jobs were open for them
should they w&nt to come in h&s been held to be &n unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice, &s &n &ctive interference with the right of
collective b&rg&ining through de&ling with the employees individu&lly inste&d of through their collective b&rg&ining
represent&tives.

Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under oblig&tion to b&rg&in with the union &s the employeesʼ
b&rg&ining represent&tive.

Individu&l solicit&tion of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his represent&tive urging the
employees to ce&se union &ctivity or ce&se striking, constitutes unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice. All the &bove-det&iled &ctivities
&re unf&ir l&bor pr&ctices bec&use they tend to undermine the concerted &ctivity of the employees, &n &ctivity to which
they &re entitled free from the employerʼs molest&tion.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinst&tement &nd &ttempted to “bribe” the strikers with “free coffee &nd
occ&sion&l movies,” “overtime” p&y for “work performed in excess of eight hours,” &nd “&rr&ngements” for their
f&milies, so they would &b&ndon the strike &nd return to work, they were guilty of strike-bre&king &nd/or union-busting
&nd, consequently, of unf&ir l&bor pr&ctice. It is equiv&lent to &n &ttempt to bre&k & strike for &n employer to offer
reinst&tement to striking employees individu&lly, when they &re represented by & union, since the employees thus
offered reinst&tement &re un&ble to determine wh&t the consequences of returning to work would be.

Furthermore, the respondents did not merely discrimin&te &g&inst &ll the strikers in gener&l. They sep&r&ted the &ctive
from the less &ctive unionists on the b&sis of their milit&ncy, or l&ck of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the
first c&tegory were refused re&dmission even &fter they were &ble to secure cle&r&nces from the competent &uthorities
with respect to the crimin&l ch&rges filed &g&inst them.

Moreover, not & single dismissed striker w&s given the opportunity to defend himself &g&inst the supposed ch&rges
&g&inst him. As e&rlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported b&ck for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to re&dmit them unless they first secured the necess&ry cle&r&nces; but when &ll, except three,
were &ble to secure &nd subsequently present the required cle&r&nces, the respondents still refused to t&ke them b&ck.
Indeed, the individu&l c&ses of dismissed officers &nd members of the striking unions do not indic&te sufficient b&sis
for dismiss&l. This is &n &ct of discrimin&tion pr&cticed by the Comp&nies in the process of rehiring &nd is therefore &
viol&tion of Sec. 4(&)(4) of the Industri&l Pe&ce Act.