This article was downloaded by: [190.47.216.

29]
On: 10 February 2013, At: 17:41
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of General Systems

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ggen20

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS TO FRANCISCO VARELA' S

CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE
a a
RICHARD HERBERT HOWE & HEINZ VON FOERSTER
a
Biological Computer Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A
Version of record first published: 31 May 2007.

To cite this article: RICHARD HERBERT HOWE & HEINZ VON FOERSTER (1975): INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS TO FRANCISCO
VARELA' S CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE, International Journal of General Systems, 2:1, 1-3

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03081077508960827

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to
anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should
be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,
proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Int. I . General Syxtems
1975, Vol. 2, pp. 1-3.
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS TO FRANCISCO VARELA'S
CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE
RICHARD HERBERT HOWE and HEINZ VON FOERSTER
Biological Computer Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A.
Etymologically speaking, correct opinion is ortho-
dox; paradox, however, lies beyond opinion.
Unfortunately, orthodox attempts to establish the
Downloaded by [190.47.216.29] at 17:41 10 February 2013
orthodoxy of the orthodox result in paradox, and,
conversely, the appearance of paradox within the
orthodox puts an end to the orthodoxy of the
orthodox. In other words, paradox is the apostle of
sedition in the kingdom of the orthodox. This is a
headache, and has been ever since the Cretan
philosopher Epirnenides put forth the proposition
that "All Cretans are liars". The paradoxical pro-
position is seditious . because it maintains an
undesirable autonomy vis-a-vis any orthodox
attempt to, apprehend it: when apprehended as
true, it turns out to be false; when apprehended as
false, it turns out to be true.
As long as was possibJe, logical orthodoxy
attempted to treat such sed~tiousintrusions just as
would any other orthodoxy, that is, to dismiss them
as cranks, as (syntactic) pathologies, (semantic)
freaks, in short, as aberrations (of thought). Para-
dox survived in the kingdom of the orthodox only
by virtue of the asylum granted it as an entertain-
ment'for the learned, much as in happier times the
insane were displayed for the amusement of the
curious.
This comfortable state of affairs, however,
abruptly changed when Bertrand RusseH dis-
covered that paradox is central-and not peripheral
-to all logical inquiry, that is, it affects the general
validity of logical formalism per se, and must be
dealt with at the outset in any logical theory.
Consequently, already in the introductory 'chap-
ters of the Principia Mathematical Whitehead and
Russell ( W & R) address themselves to logical
problems that arise with "certain contradictions"
(i.e., the paradoxes) and to remedies that bring
about their solution: "An analysis of the paradoxes
to be -avoided shows that they all result from a
certain kind of vicious circle."' In order for their
readers to appreciate the similarity of these para-
Q Gordon and Breach Science Publishers Ltd.
Printed in Great Britain
doxes, W & R describe seven of the most popular
ones, including Epimenides remark and, of course,
Russell's class of all classes that are not members of
themselves.
"In all the above contradictions (which are merely ~tlcctions
from an infinite number) there is a common characteristic,
which we may describe as self-reference or reflexiveness. The
remark of Epimenids must include itself in its own scope.
If all classes, provided they arc not members of themselves,
are members of w this must also apply to w ; and similarly
for the analogous relational contradictions".'
Now that the seditious spirit corrupting ortho-
doxy in logic was identified as Self-Reference,
W & R could go about exorcising it. The method,
known as the Theory of Logical Types, by which
the two liberal gentlemen sumssfully performed
this operation, was simply to prohibit self-
referential utterances, statements, propositions,
descriptions, etc.
This prohibition not only eliminates the potenti,al
for formulating paradoxes of the above kind, it also
eliminates the potential for contaminating utter-
ances, statements, propositions, descriptions, etc.
with the properties of those who utter, state,
propose, describe, etc. In other words, implicit in
the Theory of Types is the proviso that is the '
ultimate protector of the Claim to Objectivity:
"The properties of the observer shall not enter into
the description of his observations."*
The logic of our Western industrial corporate
society (with limited liability) is unidirectional,
deductive, competitive, and hierarchical, and the
keystones of its paradigms are the Claim to
Objectivity and the Theory of Types, which exclude
in principle the autonomy of paradox and of the
individual. In the scientific revolution that we now
create and experience, however, we perceive a shift
from causal unidirectional to mutualistic systemic
thin~ung,~.' from a preoccupation with the
properties of the observed to the study of the
 2 COMMENTS TO VARELA'S CALCULUS
properties of the o b s e r ~ e r .The
~ initiator of this
shift was Kant, who placed the autonomy of the
observer at the center of his philosophy, thus
making this autonomy responsible for the pro-
perties of the observed.' It can bc no coincidence
that the realization of this shift in our contemporary
scientific paradigm takes place just as the relation-
ship of (individual) autonomy to (social) responsi-
bility has become intensely problematical. One
manifestation of this shift is our rapid recovery of
the significance of both paradox and self-reference,
and of their intrinsic relationship.
For instance, in psychiatry the significance of
the relationship paradolr-self-reference, which in
one context may have destructive, but in another
context constructive consequences has been pointed
Downloaded by [190.47.216.29] at 17:41 10 February 2013
out again and again by George Bateson.'? In the
destructive (pathological) case, a paradoxical
interpersonal (e.g., mother-daughter) relation
exists, the "double bind", in which autonomy of
one partner (daughter) is encouraged by the other
(mother) on one level of discourse, but denied on
another (say, the interpretive) level; the (con-
trolled) breakdown of the "metalogue" causes the
victim to withdraw affectively, and other schizo-
phrenic symptoms develop."
On the other hand, stress experienced through
the irresolvability of paradox in known domains
(c.g., two incongruent flat retinal images of the
" s k e w scene) necessitates creating new dimensions
("depth").
"A parndox is a contradiction in which you take sides-
both sides. Each half of the paradox p r o m the other . . .
..
if you s w a t out one of these paradom YOU embark. on a
voynge, which may include hallucinations and tram . . .
But you come out knowing something you didn't know
before, something about the nature of where you arc in the
universe"."
Even in the context of inquiries into the structure
of logical form it became evident that dogmatic
prohibitions as expressed in the Theory of Logical
Types are untenable in a general theory of logical
fonns. For instance, according to Curry and Feys:'
"We can no longer 'explain' a paradox by running
away from it; we must stand and took it in the eye."
And, indeed, these authors not only looked para-
doxes in the eye, but also constructed a whole class
of operators, t l ~ e"paradoxical combinators," one
of which, Y, called "the paradoxical combinator,"
may be used to construct logico-mathematical
objects of a more or less paradoxical nature. For
instance, Y may be used to construct Russell's
paradox and " . . . the famous argument of Godel
may, evidently, be thought of as an application of
y.PPl.4
The immediate precursor of Francisco Varela's
Calculus for Self-Reference(CRS)and, most likely,
a necessary prerequisite for understanding it, is.
of course, G. Spencer Brown's Laws of Form.15
Although a skeleton of the form of these laws is
given by Vareia in the appendix to his paper, those
unfamiliar with this formalism should get hold of
Laws of Form for the sake of enjoying an amazing
book and for relishing Varela's Calculus.
The train of thoughts leading to CRS is initiated
by G . Spencer Brown's Calculus of Indications
(CI), which is implemented with ultimate parsimony
by a single operator marked 1 (a "distinctor"),
which does several things at one time. Since we
cannot make an indication without drawing a
distinction, when this mark is taken as a token for
indicating the state distinguished by the distinctor,
then 1is zn "indicator" (for the state so marked is
now the marked state); a "signal" (signalling
distinction); and an "intentor" (since use of any
signal is intent). The state not marked with the
mark 1is the unmarked state.
Rules for concatenating this operator to give a
primary arithmetic are determined by two axioms
(no other ones are needed):
Axiom 1. The law of calling.
The value of a call made again is the value of the call.
That is to say, if a name is called and then is called
again, the value indicated by the two calls taken
together is the value indicated by one of them.
That is to say, for any name, to recall is to call.
(In notation:
the "form of condensation.")
Axiom 2. The law of crossing.
The value of a crossing made again is not the ualue of
the crossing.
' That is to say, if it is intended to cross a boundary
and then it is intended to cross it again, the value
indicated by the two intentions taken together is the
value indicated by none of them.
That is to say, for any boundary, to recross is not
to cross.
(In notation:
7s
the "form of cancellation.")
 COMMENTS TO VARELA'S CALCULUS
With two initials
Initial 1. Position
1- = hence no ethics.' Ethics-and not subjectivity-is
Initial 2. Transposition
' r n l =mI
r paradox of the Cretan liar. With his calculus of
the primary algebra is established.
Letf(X) be the form of an algebraic expression,
then expressions of arbitrary length can be estab-
lished recursively (where Xi = f(Xi+l) and, e.g.,
f 2 ) ( x i=) f(f(Xi)) etc.):
y = f '"'(X,).
Downloaded by [190.47.216.29] at 17:41 10 February 2013
For n -+ these become recursive expressions
of indefinite length, and because of the identity
y = lirn f("-')(X,-,) = lim f'"'(Xn)
n-m n-m
the function may re-enter its own scope to give,
when so collapsed
the formal equivalent to Russell's paradox
f =A
Thanks to the ingenious notation, the bi-stable
nature of such expressions becomes transparent,
forcing a new logical dimensiok which Spencer-
Brown interprets as Time.
Starting from precisely this point, Varella goes
through Russell's argument backwards, interpreting
this bi-stability as indicating indication: self-
indication, self-reference, autonomy, which he
indicates by the stylized symbol of the snake eating
its own tail:
The calculus now being developed from the
calculus of indication augmented by the state of
self-indica:ion or otttono_my has not only logical
but also epistemological significance. In placing
the autonomy of the observer at the center of his
philosophy, Kant's intention was not to effect a
3
shift from objectivity to subjectivity but rather to
initiate an ethics, for he clearly saw that without
autonomy there could be no responsibility and
the complement of objectivity. Lying-and not
objectivity-is the problem and the force of the
the paradoxical, the sel f-referential, the autono-
mous, Varela has opened for the first time the
possibility of a Calculus of Responsibility.
REFERENCES
I. A. N. whitehead and B. Russell, Principio Mathematico,
Second Edition, University Press, Cambridge, 1925.
2. lbid, p. 37.
3. lbid, p. 61.
4. R . Abramovitz er 01.. Cybernetics of Cybernetics,
B.C.L. Report No. 73.38, Biological Computer Labora-
tory, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1974, p. 374.
5. T. Kuhn, Tlre Structrrre of Sciertti/ic Revolurions,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961.
6. W. R. Ashby, "Systems and their informational
rncasures." In: Tretld~ irr Cerreral Sysrems Theory,
edited by G . J. Klir, John Wiley, New York, 1972,
pp. 78-97.
7. S. Beer, Decbiorr uric1 Conrrol, John Wiley, New York,
1964.
8. H. R. Maturana, Bio/ogy oJ~Cognitio)t,B.C.L. Report
No. 9.0, Biological Computer Laboratory, University
of l l l i ~ ~ o iUrbana,
i, 1970.
9. 1. Kant, Kririlik k r reir~en Vernurtfr, Kiiniglich Preus-
sische Akallemie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1903.
10. C. Baleson, Steps to or1 Ecolofy o j Mind, Ballantine,
Ncw York, 1972.
11. G.Bateson, D. D. Jackson, J. Haley, and J. H. Weak-
land, "Toward a theory of schizophrenia," Behavior01
Scietrre, 1, No. 4, 1956.
12. S. Brand, "Both sides of the necessary paradox (Con-
verutions with Gregory Bateson)." I n : I1 Cyberrtetic
Frorltiers, by S. Brand, Random House, New York,
1974, pp. 9-36.
13. H. B. Curry and R. Feys, Combinarory Logic, North
Holland, Amsterdam, p. 5.
14. Ibid, p. 178.
15. G. Spencer-Brown, Lrr~nso j Form, First edition : George
Allen and Unwin. London, 1969. Second edition:
Julian Press, New York, 1972.
16. 1. Kant, Grwrdlegutrg zur Metapllysik der Sirten.
Koniglich Preussische Akadernie dcr Wissenschaften,
Berlin, 1903.