mandate of this law.

Expediency must not be allowed to sap its

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or
wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been
IN POLITICAL LAW changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard result in the
usurpation of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to
2018 illegitimate power.4
By Professor Noel T. Tiampong
Q: Can you explain the prospects of the Constitution.
A: The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial,
the root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of the
Q: What is political law? edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of a dream that must
A: Political law is that branch of public law which deals with the take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but
organization and operations of the governmental organs of the slowly “in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,” where it will in
State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and
its territory.1 finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like
the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Q: What is a constitution? Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an
A: In the Philippine context, as in the United States, a constitution is instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to
a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of restructure and march apace with the progress of the race,
government are established, limited, and defined, and by which drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality
these powers are distributed among several departments, for that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing living
their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.5
politic.2

Q: What are the three essential substantive parts of a good written

constitution?
A: The three essential substantive parts of a good written constitution
The 1987
are known as the constitution of liberty, the constitution of Constitution of the Philippines
government, and the constitution of sovereignty.3
PREAMBLE
Q: What do you mean by the supremacy of the Constitution?
A: The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
officials of the land must defer. No act shall be valid, however in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that
nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
1 People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.
2 Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States 64 (1893); I Schwartz, The Powers
of the Government 1 (1963). 4 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 11.
3 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 397. 5 Isagani A.Cruz, A Quintessential Constitution, San Beda Law Journal, April 1972.

1
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Q: What are the purposes for the preamble?
A: The preamble is not a source of power or right for any department
of government6 for its purpose is only to introduce, i.e., “to walk
before,” the Constitution. It also indicates the authors of the
Constitution, it enumerates their primary aims and aspirations,
and it is useful as an aid in the construction and interpretation of
the text of the Constitution.
Q: How are the provisions of the Constitution generally interpreted?
A: In case of the doubt, the provisions of the Constitution should be
interpreted as self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.7
Q: What is a state?
A: A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an
independent government organized for political ends to which the
great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.8
Q: What are the elements of a state?
A: The elements of a state are: people, territory, government, and
sovereignty.
Q: What do you mean by people?
A: People refers simply to the inhabitants of the state.9
Q: What do you mean by territory?
6 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 22 (1905).
7 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459, 15
February 2011. See also Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82 (1987).
8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, page 41.
9 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 14.
A: Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited
by the people of the state.10
Q: What do you mean by government?
A: Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will
of the state is formulated, expressed, and realized. 11
Q: What do you mean by sovereignty?
A: Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in
the state by which the state is governed.12
Q: Can you distinguish “nation” from “state”?
A: The nation is only a racial or ethnic concept but the State is a
legal concept.
Q: Can you distinguish “state” from “government”?
A: The government is the agency or instrumentality through which
the will of the State is formulated, expressed, and realized. The
State is the principal while the government is its agent.
Q: Can you distinguish “nation” from “people”?
A: The people are more comprehensive and less cohesive than the
nation. Starting from an amorphous group of individuals
inhabiting the same territory, the people may develop and share
certain characteristics and interests, such as a common
language, a common religion, and a common set of customs and
traditions that will unite them into the more closely-knit entity
known as the nation.
Malcolm defines a nation as “a people bound together by
common attractions and repulsions into a living organism
possessed of a common pulse, a common intelligence and
inspiration, and destined apparently to have a common history
and a common fate.”
Q: Can you distinguish between de facto and de jure government?
10 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, page 15.
11 Pointdexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 250.
12 Garner, Political Science and Government, 238, 170.
2
A: A de jure government has rightful title but no power or control,
either because it has been withdrawn from it or because it has not
yet actually entered into the exercise thereof. A de facto
government, on the other hand, is a government of fact, that is, it
actually exercises power or control but without legal title.
Q: Can you distinguish “government” from “administration”?
A: The government is distinguished from administration, which is a
group of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for
the time being. The administration runs the government, as a
machinist operates his machine. Administration is transitional
whereas the government is permanent.
Q: Can you define the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines?
A: Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms
of local government.13
Q: What are the characteristics of sovereignty?
A: Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, absolute,
indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible.14 (Code: PECA-III)
Classification of Sovereignty
Legal and Political
Internal and External
Q: How is sovereignty classified?
13 Section 2(1), Administrative Code of 1987.
14 Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
A: Sovereignty may be legal or political, internal or external.
Q: What do you mean by legal sovereignty?
A: Legal sovereignty is the authority which has the power to issue
final commands.
Q: Who is the legal sovereign in the Philippines?
A: The Congress of the Philippines is the legal sovereign in the
Philippines.
Q: What do you mean by political sovereignty?
A: Political sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or
the sum of the influences that operate upon it.
Q: Who constitute the pollical sovereign in our country?
A: The political sovereign in our country are the different sectors that
mold opinion.
Q: What do you mean by internal sovereignty?
A: Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to control its
domestic affairs.
Q: What do you mean by external sovereignty?
A: External sovereignty, which is the power of the State top direct its
relations with other States, is also known as independence.
Belligerent Occupation
Rufffy v. Chief of Staff
Laurel v. Misa
Q: What is the effect of a belligerent occupation to the sovereignty of
a state?
A: During a belligerent occupation, sovereignty is not deemed
suspended although acts of sovereignty cannot be exercised by
the legitimate authority.
Q: What is the effect a belligerent occupation on the political laws of
the occupied territory?
A: There being no change of sovereignty during a belligerent
occupation, the political laws of the occupied territory are merely
3
 suspended, subject to revival under the jus postiliminium upon the
end of the occupation.
Q: What is the effect of a belligerent occupation on the non-political
laws of the occupied territory?
A: Non-political laws of the occupied territory are deemed continued
unless changed by the belligerent occupant since they are
intended to govern the relations of individuals as among
themselves and are not generally affected by changes in regimes
or rulers.15
Q: Does the suspension of political law during a belligerent
occupation affect all citizens?
A: The rule suspending political laws affects only civilian inhabitants
of the occupied territory and is not intended to bind the enemies
in arms.16
Q: During a belligerent occupation, are all political laws suspended
as far as civilians are concerned?
A: No, the law on treason although decidedly political in character is
still effective as far as civilians are concerned.17
Change in Sovereignty
People v. Perfecto
Macariola v. Asuncion
Vilas v. City of Manila
Q: What is the effect of the change of sovereignty on the political
laws of the former sovereign?
A: Where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign are not merely suspended but abrogated.
Q: What is the effect of the change of sovereignty on the non-political
laws of the former sovereign?
A: Non-political laws, by contrast, continue in operation, for the
reason that they regulate private relations only, unless they are
changed by the new sovereign or are contrary to its institutions.
15 Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285.
16 Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875.
17 Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
State within a State
Q: What is the international law concept of “association”?
A: An “association” is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence.18
Q: Is the concept of “association” recognized under the present
Constitution? Explain your answer.
A: The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.19
Q: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) containing the following provisions: The
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is expanded
into an entity to be known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE). The entity is given the capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries. GRP commits to ensure the
BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies. GRP also continues to be responsible
over external defense. BJE has the right to participate in
Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
18 C.I. Keitner and W.M. Reisman, FREE ASSOCIATION: THE UNITED STATES
EXPERIENCE, 39 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1 (2003).
19 Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
4
 pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. Is the creation of
the BJE in accordance with law and the Philippine Constitution?
A: The MOA is contrary to law and the Philippine Constitution. BJE
is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention,20 namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. The act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Q: What are the components of a territory?
A: The components of a territory are: the terrestrial domain, the
maritime or fluvial domain, and the aerial domain.
Q: What is the National Territory of the Philippines?
A: The national territory of the Philippines is defined in Section 1 of
Article I of the Constitution as follows:
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.
Q: What territories are covered by Article I of the Constitution?
20 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
A: The definition in Article I of the Constitution covers the following
territories:
a. Those ceded to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898;
b. Those defined in the treaty concluded between the United
States and Spain on November 7, 1900, which are not defined
in the Treaty of Paris, specifically the islands of Cagayan, Sulu
and Sibuto;
c. Those defined in the treaty concluded on January 2, 1930,
between the United States and Great Britain, specifically the
Turtle and Mangsee islands;
d. The island of Batanes, which was covered under a general
statement in the 1935 Constitution;
e. Those contemplated in the phrase “belonging to the
Philippines by historic right or legal title” in the 1973
Constitution.
Q: What does UNCLOS mean?
A: UNCLOS means United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Seas.
Q: What is meant by territorial sea?
5
A: Territorial sea or territorial
waters, as defined by the
1982 UNCLOS is a belt of
coastal waters extending at
most 12 nautical miles from
the baseline (usually the
mean low-water mark) of
a coastal state. The territorial
sea is regarded as the
sovereign territory of the
state, although foreign ships
(both military and civilian) are
allowed innocent passage
through it; this sovereignty
also extends to the airspace
over and seabed below.

Q: How are straight archipelagic baselines drawn?

A: Straight archipelagic baselines are drawn by joining the outermost
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the
main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the
water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1
and 9 to 1.21
Q: What is the maximum length of the baselines?
A: The length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a
maximum length of 125 nautical miles.22
Q: What is the right of the state over territorial waters?
A: Under Article 2 of the UNCLOS, the state may exercise
sovereignty over territorial waters.
Q: What are included in the internal waters of the Philippines?
A: When we say internal waters, we mean internal waters under the
Archipelagic doctrine which is contained in Article I of the
Constitution stating that “the waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breath and
dimensions, from part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”23

Q: What is the limit of the territorial waters? Q: What is the limit of the contiguous zone?
A: 12 nautical miles from the baselines. A: 24 nautical miles from the baselines.

Q: What is the right of the state over its contiguous zone?

21 Article 47, paragraph 1of UNCLOS III.
22 Article 47, paragraph 2 of the UNCLOS III.
A: Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, the state may exercise
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone.
23 Second sentence of Section 1, Article I of the Constitution.

6
Q: What is the limit of the exclusive economic zone?
A: 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
Q: What is the right of the state over its exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf?
A: Under the UNCLOS, the state may exercise the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
(Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
What is a republic
Essence of republicanism
Purpose of a republican government
Q: What is a republic?
A: A republic is a representative government, a government run by
and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people
govern themselves directly.
Q: What is the essence of republicanism?
A: The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation,
the selection by the citizenry or a corps of public functionaries
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and
discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to
the Constitution, “at all times be accountable to the people” they
are sworn to serve.
Q: What is the purpose of a republican government?
A: The purpose of a republican government is the promotion of the
common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
Will of the people
Rule of majority Art. VI, Sec. 16
Plurality -highest
Minority – Sandiganbayan PD 1606
Villavicencio v. Lukban
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
Ichong v. Hernandez
Q: What is the effect of entering into treaties with other states on the
sovereignty of the state?24
A: By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually
have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive
and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in
this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a
pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant
the same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale
that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution.25 Such waiver does not amount to an
24.
25 Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
7
 unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.26
Q: How can international law become part of the sphere of domestic
law?
A: In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Health Secretary, 27
the Supreme Court said that International law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have force of domestic
law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
Q: How can generally accepted principles of international law
become part of the law of the land?
A: In Mijares v. Ranada,28 the Supreme Court said that “generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations,”
specifying examples “renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person’s
right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda,
among others.”
Agustin v. Edu
– early warning device
– 1968 Vienna Convention
Magallanes v. Ermita
– UNCLOS III
– RA 9522
26 Dizon v. Phil. Ryubus Command, 81 Phil. 286 (1948); cited in Agpalo, Public International
Law, 222-223 (2006).
27 G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265.
28 G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 327.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the
State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory.
Article VII, Section 18
– Commander in Chief
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State
and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
People v. Lagman
– had a father, no military leanings,
does not wish to kill or be killed
People v. Zosa
– fatherless, had a mother
and 8 brothers to support
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.
8
 Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Meyer v. Nebraska – German
Pierce v. Society of Sisters – Private Schools
People v. Ritter – Pedophile
Cabanas v. Pilapil
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
DepEd v. San Diego
Virtouso v. Municipal Judge
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Q: Is Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution referring to the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the capital of public utilities
self-executing?
A: Yes.29
Q: In the operation if a public utility, how much of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens?
A: Sixty percent (60%).30
Q: What do you mean by the term “capital”?
A: Considering that common shares have voting rights which
translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually
have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to
vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in
29 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, En Banc, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011.
30 Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
9
 Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of government units to develop not only at their own pace and
stock that can vote in the election of directors.31 discretion but also with their own resources and assets. 34

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
investments. public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development
and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Doctrine of State Immunity

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section
information in nation-building. 3)

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Basis - Cases
Kawanakoa v. Polybank
Q: What is local autonomy? Syquia v. Almeda Lopez
A: Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local De Haber v. Queen of Portugal (unduly vex the peace of nations)
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate Actions - Cases
making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal Garcia v. Chief of Staff
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Sanders v. Veridiano
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal Ruiz v. Cabahug
corporations euphemistically to “small republics.”32
Fernando v. Festejo
Q: How autonomous should a local government unit be? Santiago v. Republic
A: The local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. 33 Forms of Consent to be Sued
Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
decentralized, enabling especially the peripheral local (1) Express
a. General Law (Act No. 3083)
31 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011, En Banc. 34Alvarez v. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, En Banc, 31 January 1996, citing Pimentel, Jr.,
32 Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93252, En Banc, 5 August 1991. Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development, 1993
33 Local Government Code, Section 2. Edition, p. 4.

10
b. Special Law (Merritt v. Gov’t. of the P.I.)
Note: Republic v. Purisima, Amigable v. Cuenca Q: Is this doctrine available to foreign states insofar as they are
CA 327 and PD 1445 sought to be sued in the courts of the local state?
A: Yes, this doctrine is available to foreign states insofar as they are
(2) Implied sought to be sued in the courts of the local state. 36
a. Files an Action asking for affirmative relief
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. Q: What is the reason why other states can also invoke the doctrine
But not in Lim v. Brownell of state immunity?
b. Enters into a proprietary contract A: Other states can invoke the doctrine of state immunity because of
U.S.A v. Guinto the principle of sovereign equality of states, under which one
But not in U.S.A. v. Ruiz state cannot assert jurisdiction over another state for this would
be in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.
Suits Against Agencies
a. Charter Q: Instead of suing the Republic of the Philippines, the plaintiff sues
Bermoy v. Phil. Normal College the officer of the government who is supposed to discharge the
Palafox v. Prov. of Ilocos Norte responsibility or grant the redress demanded. Can the action
Torio v. Fontanilla now be considered as a suit not against the State?
Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan A: In this case, it must be determined if the State is the real party in
interest, that is, that the claim if proved will be the direct liability of
b. Function the State and not merely of the officer impleaded. If this is
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro shown, the action can be dismissed as a suit against the State
unless its immunity had been previously waived.
Note:
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association Q: Garcia filed a claim against the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service of the Philippines for damages for injuries he sustained while
Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA undergoing military training as required by law. Is the action a suit
against the State?
Liability A: The suit is actually a suit against the State although filed against
Republic v. Villasor (AFP) the Chief of Staff in his personal capacity since it would need an
PNB v. Pabalan (PVTA) appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment if the claim
Merritt v. Gov’t of the P.I. were allowed.37

Q: Two American employees of the Subic Naval Base sued its

Q: What is the doctrine of state immunity?
A: It means that the State may not be sued without its consent. 35
The doctrine of non-suability is based not on any formal
conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends.
35 Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution.
commanding general and the director of special services for
damages for allegedly defamatory remarks made by the
defendants. Is the action a suit against the state?
A: The defendants were being sued as officers of the United States
Government. As they have acted on behalf of that government
36 Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
37 Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120.

11
 and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the defendants, personally, that is responsible for their acts.
Assuming that trial can proceed and it is proved that claimants
have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to
be satisfied not by the defendants in their personal capacity but
by the United States Government as their principal. This will
require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to
cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.38
Q: Are all suits directed against a public officer necessarily suit
against the State?
A: No. There are many instances when a public officer may be sued
in his official capacity without the action being considered as a
suit against the State. In cases where, assuming a decision is
rendered against the public officer impleaded, enforcement
thereof will not require an affirmative act from the State, such as
the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the judgment,
then those actions are not considered as suits against the State.
Q: Suppose an action is filed against a public officer to require him to
do a duty mandated by law, or to restrain him from performing an
act alleged to be unconstitutional, or to recover from him taxes
unlawfully assessed or collected,39 would any of these be
considered a suit against the State?
A: No. These actions are not suits against the State as they would
not require an appropriation of the needed amount for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Q: Suppose an action is filed against the Director of Public Works
who took over without authority property belonging to the plaintiff
and constructed thereon a public irrigation canal. Is this a suit
against the State?
A: The action for the recovery of the land or its value was properly
filed against the defendant in his personal capacity and is
therefore not covered by the doctrine of State immunity. 40
38 Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88.
39 Houston v. Hormes, 252 U.S. 569; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378.
40 Festejo v. Fernando, 50 O.G. 1556.
Q: The plaintiff sued the government for revocation of a donation on
the ground of failure of the defendant to comply with the
stipulated conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
its consent to be sued. Decide on the motion to dismiss.
A: The motion should be denied. The suit can prosper because it
does not involve money claim against the State as what the
plaintiff is seeking is the return only of the property donated. 41
Q: Suppose an action is filed against a public officer for recovery of
title or possession of property and in addition a claim for the
recovery of damages, such as accrued rentals. Is this a suit
against the State?
A: Inasmuch as its allowance would require the government to
appropriate the necessary amount for the satisfaction of the
judgment, the action is a suit against the State. 42
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued either expressly or
impliedly.
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued expressly?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued expressly either through a
general law or through a special law.
Q: May the State give its consent to be sued expressly through a
lawyer?
A: No. The express consent of the State to be sued must be given in
a duly enacted statute and may not be given by a mere counsel
of the government.43
Q: Do we have a general law whereby the State has expressly given
its consent to be sued?
A: Yes. We have Act No. 3083 declaring that “the Government of the
Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
41 Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294.
42 Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
43 Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470.
12
 implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties.”
Q: How does a party file a suit against the State?
A: Under Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1445, a claim against the government must first be
filed with the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within
sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect
sue the State with its consent.44
Q: The plaintiff sued the government for recovery of the value of her
property which had been converted into public streets without
payment to her of just compensation. Suppose the plaintiff failed
to previously file he claim with the Commission on Audit as
required by law, may the action be dismissed for failure to comply
with the law?
A: No. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it,
and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of
the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use
defined in the judgment. If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, plaintiff would not be in the said plaint they
are now.
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued impliedly?
A: The State is deemed to have given its consent to be sued when
(a) it files a complaint asking for an affirmative relief or (b) when it
enters into a proprietary contract.
Q: Suppose the government files a complaint in intervention for the
purpose of recovering a vessel. Is the State deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit?
A: Yes. The government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting a
44 P.D. No. 1445, Sections 49-50.
claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of
a vessel.45
Q: The Philippine government, as successor in interest of the United
States to the properties being claimed from the latter, filed a
complaint in intervention to join the defendant in invoking the
doctrine of State immunity to secure the dismissal of the action.
Is the Philippine government in doing so deemed to have waived
its immunity from suit?
A: No. As the Philippine government was not asking for any
affirmative relief from the plaintiff but had intervened only for the
purpose of resisting the claim, the Supreme Court held that no
implied waiver of immunity could be assumed.46
Q: The United States, through its Engineering Command in the U.S.
Navy, had entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the repair
of wharves in Subic Bay. For the failure of the United States to
comply with the contract, plaintiff filed a action against it or pay
damages. The United States moved to dismiss invoking its non-
suability. Rule on the issue.
A: The state may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 47 In this case,
the United States is not deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
Q: Is the United States Government considered to have waived its
immunity from suit if it engages in a restaurant business or
operates a barbershop?
45 Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060, 30 September 1950.
46 Lim v. Brownell, 107 SCRA 345.
47 United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487.
13
A: Yes. These are proprietary acts (jure gestionis) not governmental
acts (jure imperii).48
Q: How does the State give its consent to be sued when it is acting
through government agencies?
A: The State gives its consent to be sued through the charter of the
government agency or, in the absence thereof, if the government
agency is performing a proprietary function.
PROBLEM:
TESDA is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government directly attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment. One of its functions is to “develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification
in the country.” To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-
printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to
trainees who have passed the certification process. It entered
into a contract of with PROVI for the printing and encoding of
PVC cards. According to PROVI, TESDA’s liability amounts to
P39,475,000.00. But TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00,
leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00. Despite the
two demand letters that PROVI sent TESDA, the outstanding
balance remained unpaid. PROVI subsequently filed with the
RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against
TESDA.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has
effectively waived its immunity when it entered into a contract with
PROVI for a commercial purpose. According to PROVI, since the
purpose of its contract with TESDA is to provide identification
PVC cards with security seal which TESDA will thereafter sell to
TESDA trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial
transactions not incidental to its governmental functions.
TESDA’s response to this position is to point out that it is not
engaged in business, and there is nothing in the records to show
that its purchase of the PVC cards from PROVI is for a business
48 U.S.A. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644.
purpose. While TESDA admits that it will charge the trainees with
a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only to recover
their costs and is not intended for profit.49
Q: If you were the judge, would you entertain the case?
A: No, the case should be dismissed because TESDA is immune
from suit. Being an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government, the test for its suability is on the function that it
performs. The fact that TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees
for a fee does not characterize the transaction as industrial or
business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA Act,
cannot be considered separately from TESDA’s general
governmental functions, as they are undertaken in the discharge
of these functions. Along this line of reasoning, the Supreme
Court held in Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre Services:50
“Now, the fact that a non-corporate government
entity performs a function proprietary in nature does
not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident
to its governmental function, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit
extended to such government entity.”
Q: Assuming that TESDA may be sued and subsequently damages
are awarded in favor of PROVI, may the funds of TESDA be
garnished?
A: Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract
with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued,
TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the
valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. TESDA
funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to
the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public
officials. The Supreme Court specifically spoke of the limits in
dealing with this fund in Republic v. Villasor51 when it said:
49 Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009.
50 G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.
51 G.R. No. L-30671, 28 November 1973, 54 SCRA 84.
14
 or attachment proceedings. [Emphasis supplied.]
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935
Constitution is now made explicit in the revised
charter. It is therein expressly provided, ‘The State ARTICLE IV
may not be sued without its consent.’ A corollary, CITIZENSHIP
both dictated by logic and sound sense, from such a
basic concept, is that public funds cannot be the Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
object of garnishment proceedings even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case adoption of this Constitution;
of Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego,
such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
opinion of Justice Teehankee:
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
The universal rule that where the State gives its elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
the stage of execution' and that the power of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
government funds and properties may not be seized
in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
natural-born citizens.
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
manner provided by law.
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
law to have renounced it.
appropriated by law. [Emphasis supplied.]
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine in Traders Royal
interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,52 where it said:

The NMPC’s implied consent to be sued

notwithstanding, the trial court did not have the
power to garnish NMPC deposits to answer for any
eventual judgment against it. Being public funds, the
deposits are not within the reach of any garnishment
52 G.R. No. 68514, 17 December 1990, 192 SCRA 305.
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines,
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age,

15
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they
shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
Q: What are the two tests to determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power?
A: The two tests are (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test.
Q: When is a delegation considered complete?
A: A delegation is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. 53
Q: When is a delegation considered to have sufficient standard?
A: There is sufficient standard when the limits of the delegate’s
authority have been specified, the legislative policy has been
53 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965), cited in Abakada Guro v. Purisima, En
Banc, G.R. 166715, 14 August 2008.
announced, and the conditions under which the delegate’s power
is to be implemented are identified.54 (Code: LPC)
Q: What are some of the recognized sufficient standards?
A: Some of the sufficient standards recognized by the Supreme
Court are “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.”55
Q: May Congress delegate the power to create a province?
A: No, Congress cannot delegate the power to create a province. 56
Q: What is the reason why Congress cannot delegate the power to
create a province?
A: A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that “each province shall have
at least one representative.” The creation of a province other than
by Congress will detract from the constitutional principle that the
power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to
Congress.57
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may
be provided by law.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-
five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
54 See Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 Edition, page 97, cited in Abakada Guro
v. Purisima, En Banc, G.R. 166715, 14 August 2008.
55 Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214, 19
September 2006, 502 SCRA 295, cited in Abakada Guro v. Purisima, En Banc, G.R. 166715,
14 August 2008.
56 Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
57 Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
16
day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more
than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term of which he was elected.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Q: Explain the two steps before a party or organization can join
electoral contests?
A: To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo
the two-step process of registration and accreditation.
Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for
purposes of our elections laws; accreditation on the other hand,
relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant
to qualified registered parties.58
Q: Explain how is the 20% party-list representatives in the total
membership of the House of Representatives computed?
A: In BANAT v. Comelec,59 the Supreme Court declared that in
determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:
58 Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651.
59 G.R. No. 179271, En Banc, penned by Justice Carpio, 21 April 2009.
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
Q: Can major political parties participate in the party-list system? If
so, give reasons and examples.
A: Yes. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. Excluding the major political parties in party-
list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. Read
17
 together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal
Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista
Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.60
Q: Explain the qualifications of party-list nominees?
A: The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section
9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No
person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able
to read and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election,
and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the
age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that
60 BANAT v. Comelec, En Banc, G.R. No. 179271, penned by Justice Carpio, 21 April 2009.
the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity” as there is no financial status required in
the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Q: Are elected officials considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy?
A: No, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of
candidacy. Section 14 of the Fair Election Act repealed Section
67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected
officials) of the Omnibus Election Code.61
Q: Are appointive officials considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy?
A: Yes, appointive officials are considered ipso facto resigned from
their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of
candidacy. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.62
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
Q: Is there a specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district?
61 Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003, 417
SCRA 503.
62 Quinto and Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010.
18
A: No, there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.63
Q: Must the population of a city be increased by another 250,000 in
order to be entitled to an additional district?
A: No. While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. 64
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Q: What is reapportionment?
A: Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. 65
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
63 Aquino III v. Comelec,En Banc, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 640. See
also Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
64 Aquino III v. Comelec, En Banc, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 641. See
also Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
65 Bagabuyo v. Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008).
Q: Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988
for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and
served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When
Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty
position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who
was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule. Is Capco
disqualified?
A: Finding for Capco, the Supreme Court held that for the
disqualification rule to apply, “it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.” There
was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco
“was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law” when a permanent
vacancy occurred in that office.66
Q: Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-
2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the
holdover of elective officials. Is Latasa qualified to run as mayor
of Digos City in the 2001 elections?
A: No, Latasa is disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City in the
2001 elections as he will be violating the three-term limit rule for
the following reason: The very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. He never
ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief
executive of Digos.67
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of
the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held
on the second Monday of May.
66 Borja, Jr. v. Comelec and Jose T. Capco, Jr.,September 3, 1998, 295
SCRA 157, cited in Abundo, Sr. v. Comelec, en banc, 688 SCRA 149, 169
67 Latasa v. Comelec, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, cited in
Abundo Sr. v. Comelec, en banc, 688 SCRA 149.
19

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of
their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of
a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by
law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call
a special session at any time.
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment,
affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
20
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Q: Is the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a political question?
A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the selection of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators is not a
political question. The choice of these members did not depend
on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations.68
Q: Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
have the jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list
nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office?
A: Yes, the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, “elected members” of
the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted
upon was their party.69
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting
of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Q: Is the apportionment among political parties the seats to which
each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments a
political question?
A: No, the issue is justiciable, “even if the question were political in
nature,” since it involved “the legality, not the wisdom, of the
68 Cited in Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, 18 November 1998
69 Bello v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 59.
manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.” [Daza v. Singson,70
Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.71 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales72]
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of
the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet
only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are
herein conferred upon it.
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall
be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as
the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Q: When must the rules of procedure in inquiries in aid of legislation
in the Senate be published?
A: The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution requires the Senate of every
70 180 SCRA 496, 21 December 1989.
71 187 SCRA 377, 12 July 1990.
72 214 SCRA 789, 20 October 1992.
21
 Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one
before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three
(3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term.
Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit.73
Q: Is it sufficient to publish the rules of procedure in booklet form and
make them available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senate’s internet web page?
A: No. The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of
the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.74
Q: Is the invocation of the provisions of the of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
correct to support a claim of valid publication of the rules of
procedure of the Senate through the internet?
A: R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.75
73 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
74 Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc,
G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008 consolidated with Ranada et al. v. Senate, G.R. No.
179275.
75 Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc,
G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008 consolidated with Ranada et al. v. Senate, G.R. No.
179275.
Q: Does the pendency of the cases in court bar the Congress from
conducting inquiries in aid of legislation?
A: A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings have different purposes. 76 On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through
the application of a law, actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other
hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as
tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and,
thus, legislate wisely and effectively; 77 and to determine whether
there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation,78 albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential
legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation. Standard Chartered
Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank)79
provides the following reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is
an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or administrative
investigation.
As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––
76 Cited in Regis Romero II v. Senator Jinggoy Estrada et al, En Banc, G.R. No. 174105, 2
April 2009.
77 Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
78 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 168; citing W. Keefe & M. Ogul, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 20-23 (4th ed., 1977).
79 G.R. No. 167173, 27 December 2007, 541 SCRA 456, 471-472.
22
 [T]he power of inquiry––with process to
enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information––which is not infrequently
true––recourse must be had to others who possess
it.
Q: What must appear in an invitation in an inquiry aid of legislation
under Section 21 of Article VI or in a request for appearance
under Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution?
A: In Senate v. Ermita, the Supreme Court ruled that the invitations
should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.” Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both
under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This
must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said
Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. 80
Q: Distinguish between the right of Congress or any of its
committees to obtain information in aid of legislation and the
people’s right to public information.
A: In Senate v. Ermita, the Supreme Court declared that:
“There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people
to information on matters of public concern. For one,
the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the
right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
80 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen.”81
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.
Q: May a person invited as resource person to a legislative inquiry in
aid of legislation invoke the right to counsel?
A: The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a
person under custodial investigation suspected for the
commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. Resource persons invited to a legislative
inquiry cannot therefore validly invoke the right to counsel. 82
Q: What are the two (2) kinds of executive privilege?
A: The two (2) kinds of executive privilege are (a) the presidential
communications privilege and (b) the deliberative process
privilege.83
Q: What does the presidential communications privilege include?
A: The presidential communications privilege pertains to
“communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential.” 84
Q: What are the elements of the presidential communications
privilege?
A: The elements of the presidential communications privilege are as
follows:
81 Cited in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
82 Philcomsat v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 611.
83 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
84 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
23
 1. The protected communication must relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power”;
2. The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President;
3. The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.85
Q: What does the deliberative process privilege include?
A: The deliberative process privilege includes “advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” 86
Q: Distinguish presidential communications privilege and deliberative
process privilege.
A: Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making
of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to
decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s
unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety,
and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-
deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege.87
85 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
86 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
87 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
Q: Cite some instances where the Executive may withhold
documents as falling under executive privilege?
A: The Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets, identity of government informers in some
circumstances, and information related to pending investigations.
An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign
relations.88
Q: May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?
A: Yes, the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue
of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence
a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice.89
Q: What is the remedy of Congress if a military officer refuses to
appear before it?
A: Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is
not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. 90
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall
88 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008.
89 B/Gen. Gudani v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, En Banc, 15 August 2006.
90 B/Gen. Gudani v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, En Banc, 15 August 2006.
24
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Q: The Court is being asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine
and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as a
Republic Act, was properly approved by the legislative body.
Petitioners are claiming that certain procedural rules of the House
had been breached in the passage of the bill. They aver further
that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules is a
violation of the Constitution itself. Should the Court entertain the
petition?
A: The Court should dismiss the petition, because the matter
complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House,
with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated in Arroyo v.
De Venecia that:91
“It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in
the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
discretion were it to do so. x x x In the absence of
91 277 SCRA 268, 14 August 1997.
25
 anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.”
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-
thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of
any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of
the Government.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence.
Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act
or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
26
 Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Q: May the president be sued during his incumbency?
A: In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Supreme Court declared that
indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and
why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from
any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. x x x.92
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation.
92 G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224-225.
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not
be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Q: Petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive
Department, cannot create the Philippine Truth Commission, the
Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the Presidential Electoral
27
 Tribunal in the absence of an act of the legislature. Is Petitioner’s
contention correct?
A: No, Petitioner’s argument is not valid. A plain reading of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to
the Supreme Court sitting en banc.93
Q: What is the doctrine of necessary implication?
A: Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the conferment of
additional jurisdiction includes the means to carry it into effect. 94
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting
President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute
its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the
Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries
of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall
not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent
during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act
as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
93 Macalintal v. PET, 7 June 2011, En Banc, 651 SCRA239, 250, 253.
94 Macalintal v. PET, 7 June 2011, En Banc, 651 SCRA239, 250.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice
President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently
disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who
is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President
shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of
the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,
or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and
Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in
case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President.
He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall
nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
28
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution.
The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is
not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and
without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall
be informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge
of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness.
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice and other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days
from his assumption or re-assumption of office.
Q: Distinguish between appointment and designation.
A: In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.,95 the Supreme Court distinguished
between the terms appointment and designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
95 G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154.
29
 person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism
is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation
may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified
public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only
in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.96
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Q: Is the prohibition against midnight appointments under Section 15
of Article VII of the Constitution applicable to appointments of
Members of the Supreme Court?
A: The prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not apply to the Members of the Supreme
Court.97
Q: Did the framers of the Constitution intend the prohibition against
midnight appointments under Section 15 of Article VII of the
96 G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154, 158-159.
97 De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.
Constitution to be applicable to appointments in the Judiciary?
Why?
A: No. The framers of the Constitution did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.98
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Q: Distinguish ad interim appointments from appointments in an
acting capacity.
A: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments
in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may
be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but,
98 De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.
30
 if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.99
Q: May the President appoint department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session?
A: Yes, the President may appoint department secretaries in an
acting capacity while Congress is in session. The office of a
department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office.100
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Q: What is command responsibility?
A: “Command responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.”
In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity.101
Q: Does the doctrine of command responsibility apply in an amparo
proceeding?
A: The doctrine of command responsibility is not applicable in
an amparo proceeding but it does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded
99 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 772 (1996) cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, penned by Justice
Carpio, G.R. No. 164978, En Banc, 13 October 2005.
100 See Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., G.R. No. 93711, 25 February 1991, 194 SCRA 390, cited
in Pimentel v. Ermita, En Banc, penned by Justice Carpio, G.R. No. 164978, 13 October
2005.
101 Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, 13 December 2012 citing the opinion of
Fr. Joaquin Bernas in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010,
613 SCRA 233.
—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. 102
Q: In relation to an amparo proceeding, what is responsibility?
A: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance.103
Q: In relation to an amparo proceeding, what is accountability?
A: Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.104
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
102 Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 211, cited
in Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, 13 December 2011.
103 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, 606 SCRA 598.
104 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, 606 SCRA 598.
31

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
Q: For purposes of exercising his calling out power, should the
President first make a declaration of a state of rebellion?
A: For the purpose of exercising the calling out power, the
Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration
of a state of rebellion.105 The only criterion is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” 106
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does
not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion.107
105 Sanlakas v. Reyes, 159085, 3 February 2004.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
Q: Is the concurrence of (a) actual invasion or rebellion and (b)
public safety required in the exercise of the calling out power of
the President?
A: The concurrence of two conditions, namely (a) an actual invasion
or rebellion, and (b) that public safety requires the exercise of
such power are not required in the exercise of the calling out
power.108
Q: What are the two (2) requirements needed for the exercise by the
President of the power to declare martial law or suspend of the
privilege of habeas corpus?
A: In the exercise of these two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely (a) an actual invasion or
rebellion, and (b) that public safety requires the exercise of such
powers.109
Q: May a local chief executive exercise the calling out power?
A: No, a local chief executive is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. The calling
out power contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President.110
Q: May a general who has retired from service be proceeded against
for violation of the Articles of War?
A: Yes, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers
cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until
his case is terminated.111
Read Lagman v. Medialdea G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
on Martial Law in Mindanao.
108 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
109 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora , G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
110 Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482.
111 Abadilla v. Ramos, No. L-79173, 7 December 1987, 156 SCRA 92 cited in B/Gen.
Gudani v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 170165, 15 August 2006.
32

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter
of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
Q: What is a treaty?112
A: Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between states
in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular
designation.”113 International agreements may be in the form of
(1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to
treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence
and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of
subject matters than treaties.114 Under international law, there is
no difference between treaties and executive agreements in
112 Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
113 Executive Order No. 459, dated November 25, 1997, contains a similar definition.
114 B.A. Boczek, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 346 (2005).
terms of their binding effects on the contracting states
concerned,115 as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers.116 Neither, on the domestic sphere,
can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. 117 Authorities
are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for
accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement
aspect.118 As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a
treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and
the people;119 a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement,
takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. 120
Q: Does “exchange of notes” fall into the category of inter-
governmental agreements?121
A: Yes, an “exchange of notes” falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,”122 which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations
Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as
follows: An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
115 Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138587, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 2000 citing Richard
Erickson, “The Making of Executive Agreements by the US Department of Defense,” 13
Boston U. Intl. L. J. 58 (1955); Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 Ohio St. L.J., p. 4; see
also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 301 (1987), which states that “[t]he
terminology used for international agreements is varied. Among the terms used are: treaty,
convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration,
concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, memorandum of
understanding, and modus vivendi. Whatever their designation, all agreements have the same
legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate
otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.)
116 Id. at 489; citing 5 Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 395; cited
in USAFE Veterans Association Inc. v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil. 1030, 1037
(1959).
117 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 77 S. Ct.1230.
118 In the US constitutional system, it is the legal force of treaties and executive agreements
on the domestic plane.
119 Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 224 (2nd
ed., 1996).
120 Prof. Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements – Reply, Yale Law Journal,
June 1945; cited in Justice Antonio T. Carpio’s Dissent in Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. Nos.
175888, 176051 & 176222, February 11, 2009, 578 SCRA 438.
121 Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
122 Harris, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 801 (2004).
33
 agreement, that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one
signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual
procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering
State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either
because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the
process of legislative approval.123 In another perspective, the
terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered
a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action.124 On the other hand, executive agreements
concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’”125
Q: Who has the power to enter into treaties?126
A: By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the
President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the country. 127 The
Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into
international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the
required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier
indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into
without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers
and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is,
as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has
been confirmed by long practice. 128 In Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary,129 the Supreme Court stressed that the
123 Official Website of the UN <http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp.>; cited in Abaya v.
Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720.
124 Abaya v. Ebdane.
125 Id.; citing The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts by Francis Sayre.
126 Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
127 Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138587, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 2000.
128 Id.; citing Commissioner of Customs.
129 G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622.
power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role
relative to the ratification of a treaty is limited merely to concurring
in or withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-
making power of the President is his or her prerogative to refuse
to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latter’s
consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it. 130 This
prerogative, the Court hastened to add in Bayan Muna v. Alberto
Romulo,131 is the President’s alone and cannot be encroached
upon via a writ of mandamus.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty
days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of
its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Q: What is judicial power?
A: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
130 Id. at 637-638; citing Cruz, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (1998).
131 G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
34
 there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.132
Q: What are the pillars of limitations/requisites of judicial review?
A: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement (locus standi);
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.133 (Code: ALEL)
Q: What do you mean by “actual case or controversy”?134
A: An actual case or controversy is a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.135
Q: When is a case or controversy ripe for adjudication?
A: A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 136
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture.137
Q: What does locus standi mean?
132 Second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
133 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 35;
and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003) cited in Biraogo v.
The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 7 December 2010.
134 Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
135 Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998.
136 Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428 (1998).
137 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 901-902 (2003).
A: Locus standi means “a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question.”138 Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result”139 of the act being challenged,
and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”140
Q: What is the “direct injury test”?
A: In Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman, the United
States Supreme Court declared that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has
a general interest common to all members of the public. In
People v. Vera, our Supreme Court ruled that person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.141
Q: What are the exceptions to the stringent requirement of the “direct
injury test”?
A: The following are the exceptions: taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue (Code:
TVCL), provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must
be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.142
138 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
139 Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475;
citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
140 Ibid.
141Cited in Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October
2008.
35
Q: What is the requirement for a citizen’s suit to be entertained? 143
A: In Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.144 the Supreme Court expounded on
this, thus: When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.145
Q: Senators Pimentel, Angara, Enrile, Ejercito-Estrada, Estrada,
Lacson, Lim, Madrigal, and Osmena are questioning before the
Supreme Court the constitutionality of the President’s
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session. While the other petitioners are members
of the Commission on Appointments, the following are not:
Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal. Do Senators
Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal have the legal standing to
question the constitutionality of said appointments?
A: No, Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal have no legal
standing to question the constitutionality of said appointments.
The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments. Considering the independence of the Commission
on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim
standing in the present case as members of Congress. Thus, on
142 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in
Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008;
Gunsi, Sr. v. The Honorable Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23
February 2009 (580 SCRA 70, 76).
143 Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, En Banc, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.
144 G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 45.
145 Id. at 136-137.
the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the
Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson,
Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the
petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim,
and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived
prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in
the present petition.146
Q: What is a moot and academic case?147
A: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground
of mootness.148
Q: Sinsuat filed a petition for the denial of due course to or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of his opponent Gunsi
claiming that the latter is disqualified. While the case was still
pending, Sinsuat was proclaimed winner so that the Comelec
second division issued a resolution dismissing the petition as the
same had become moot and academic. The proclamation of
Sinsuat was, however, later annulled by the Comelec second
division. It issued a resolution clarifying that its first ruling
dismissing the petition has become ineffective because Sinsuat’s
proclamation had been annulled. Thereupon it ruled that Gunsi is
indeed disqualified. Gunsi filed a motion for reconsideration but
the Comelec en banc denied it. When the case was filed before
the Supreme Court, the term of office of Sinsuat, for which
position Gunsi was declared by Comelec to be disqualified, had
already expired. May the Supreme Court still exercise
jurisdiction?
A: The expiration of term is a supervening event which renders this
case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that
146 Pimentel v. Ermita, penned by Justice Carpio, G.R. No. 164978, En Banc, 13 October
2005.
147 Gunsi Sr. v. Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23 February 2009,
580 SCRA 70, 76; (2) Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, En Banc, 11 February 2010, 612
SCRA 308.
148 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in
Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
36
 ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 149 The rule, however,
admits of exceptions. Thus, courts may choose to decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, the
constitutional issue reaised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review. 150 None of the
foregoing obtains in this case.151
Q: Bautista was appointed Undersecretary of the DOTC and later
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Following
the resignation of the MARINA Administrator, Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of MARINA
Administrator, in a concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Funa filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
designation alleging that the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants are
prohibited by the Constitution from holding any other office or
employment. During the pendency of the petition, Bautista was
appointed MARINA Administrator. May the court still entertain the
issue considering that the case has become moot and academic
because of the appointment of Bautista as MARINA Administrator
and her relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport?
A: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.152 However, the Supreme Court held in
149 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, cited in
Province of North Cotabato et al. v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, En Banc, 14 October 2008.
150 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,
171489, 171424, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
151 Gunsi Sr. v. Commissioners of Comelec, G.R. No. 168792, En Banc, 23 February 2009,
580 SCRA 70, 76
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma153 that supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made
the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and public. 154 As a rule, the writ of
prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as
an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable or repetition yet evading
review.155 In the present case, the mootness of the petition does
not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
President’s appointment or designation of a Department
Undersecretary as officer-in-charge of an attached agency will
arise in every such appointment.
Q: After more than three years from the first time the “Hello Garci”
tapes were played, former Comelec Commissioner Garcillano
implores from the Supreme Court the issuance of an injunctive
writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing
the tape recordings and from including the same in their
committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. May an
injunctive writ be issued?
A: No. It must be noted that the recordings were already played in
the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
152 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, citing
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, 10 March 2004, 425
SCRA 129; Vda. de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, 23 March 2004, 426
SCRA 91; Paloma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145431, 11 November 2003, 415 SCRA
590; Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, 26 January
2004, 421 SCRA 21; and Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 10 May 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
153 G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 756.
154 Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 756
citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736,
757; and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 522; 384 SCRA 152, 177 (2002).
155 Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, 13 October 2005, 472 SCRA 587, 593, citing
Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 438; Gil v. Benipayo,
G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (Unsigned Resolution) ; Chief Supt. Acop v. Secretary
Guingona, Jr., 433 Phil. 62; 383 SCRA 577 (2002), Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 342 Phil. 184;
277 SCRA 409 (1997) and Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467; 276 SCRA 501 (1997).
37
 publicized fact that the committee reports on the “Hello Garci”
inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by
the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these
events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot
and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.156
Q: Ordinarily, when the case has become moot and academic there
is no more actual case or controversy. What are the exceptions
to the “moot and academic” principle?
A: In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,157 the Court held that the “moot and
academic” principle not being a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (1) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; 158 (2) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 159
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;160 and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.161 Another exclusionary circumstance that may be
considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed
and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does
not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and
determine the case and does not render the case moot especially
when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief
against the possible recurrence of the violation.162 (Code: GEFC)
156 Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information et al., En Banc,
G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008.
157 G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
158 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
159 Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001).
160 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
161 Albaña v. Comelec, 478 Phil. 941 (2004); Chief Supt. Acop v. Guingona Jr., 433 Phil. 62
(2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
162 US v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); US v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn, 166 U.S.
290, 308-310 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963); Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Q: What are political questions?
A: Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.163
Q: What is the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
A: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest
the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and
effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.”164
Q: What are the elements of enforced disappearances?
A: The following are the elements of enforced disappearances
AARR: (1) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty; (2) that it be carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization; (3) that it be followed by the
State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and (4) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.165
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
163 Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No.
146710-15, En Banc, March 2, 2001.
164 Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 618.
165 Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 618.
38
 No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations
for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue
.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law
is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
39
 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen
of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private
sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties
as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed
by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the
lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted in thereon.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative function.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing
of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented,
or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.
40
 No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the
opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary.
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
Q: What does the term “initiate” mean?166
166 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459,
15 February 2011.
41
A: In Francisco v. House of Representatives, 167 the Supreme Court
declared that the term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action
to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on
the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to
deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal
branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution
itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The
Supreme Court is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had
the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules
published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the
case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries,
per Neri. Other than “promulgate,” there is no other single formal
term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance
without need of it being published.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than oOo
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Q: Must the rules on impeachment be published?168

A: Not necessarily. “Promulgation” must thus be used in the
context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general
must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted
sense was to be used.169 Since the Constitutional Commission did
not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within

167 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 927 (2003).

168 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, En Banc, G.R. No. 193459,
15 February 2011.
169 Marcos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239 (1951).

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