II.

Due Process
A. Person
1. Roe versus Wade 410 U.S 113 (1973)
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the declaratory
relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion
laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.In 1970, Norma L
McCorvey( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of rape), filed a suit against the
defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. She
argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy
as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later,
she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on behalf of herself and all other women similarly
situated;” thereby becoming a class suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right
to abort her child.
HELD: Yes. The “right of privacy xxx is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.“ state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts
from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy
stage and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

B. Liberty
2. Republic versus Cagandahan 565 SCRA 72 (2008)
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on a person concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences.
Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Birth Certificate. During her childhood, she
suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had
minimized. She had no breast or menstruation. She was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia, a condition where a person suffering from such possesses secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones. According to her, for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition
at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed
to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
Issue: Whether Cagandahan can change her gender to male and change her name to Jeff.
Held: YES. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male. In so ruling the Court does no more
than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deal with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus helps make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case. As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, the Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.

3. U.S versus Windsor 570 U.S. (No. 12- 307, 26 June 2013)
Facts: Two women, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, married in Canada in 2007 and the State of New
York recognized their marriage. At the time of their marriage, they were resident in New York and
they had registered as domestic partners when New York City gave that right to same-sex couples in
1993. Spyer died in 2009, leaving her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor attempted to claim the
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but was prevented from doing so under section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA is a federal act which amends the Dictionary Act to
define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples. Windsor paid the estate taxes but
requested a refund from the Inland Revenue Service, which was denied. Windsor brought a refund
suit in the District Court, claiming that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment equal protection
principles. While the case was pending, the Department of Justice decided not to defend the
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of
Representatives (BLAG) intervened in the litigation to do so. The District Court ruled against the
United States, finding section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional and ordering the Treasury to refund
Windsor’s tax with interest. An appeal was filed and the District Court’s decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. Although the US government did not seek to defend the
constitutionality of DOMA, they refused to pay the refund to Windsor. A petition for writ of certiorari
was filed on 11 September 2012. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on 27 March 2013.
Issue:
1) The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), section 3
2) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Held: The Court held that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as it amounts to a deprivation of the
equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. The first question that the Court
addressed was whether it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. All parties agreed that
the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but the court appointed an amicus curiae to argue the
opposite position. She argued that once the District Court ordered a refund, the case should have
ended and the appeal should have been dismissed, as the parties were no longer adverse. However,
the Court decided that because the US government had refused to pay the tax refund, this, combined
with the fact that BLAG had intervened to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA with a
“substantial adversarial argument”, was a controversy which was sufficient for the Court to have
jurisdiction in this case.

The Court considered that historically, and by tradition, the definition and regulation of marriage had
been treated as being within the realm of the separate states. It stated that DOMA, which controlled
over 1,000 statutes and many federal regulations, had a much greater reach than any previous
legislation enacted by Congress to regulate the meaning of marriage. The Court held that DOMA
meant to to injure the very class of people that New York sought to recognize and protect by giving
them the right to marry. In doing so, DOMA violated “basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government”. The Court held that “interference with the equal
dignity of same-sex marriages was the “essence” of DOMA, which identified and made unequal a
“subset of state-sanctioned marriages”. It stated that DOMA sought to, and did in fact, provide a
disadvantage, separate status and stigma on those who entered into same-sex marriages.
Furthermore, the Court said: “[DOMA] frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating equality by
writing inequality into the entire United States Code (...) creating two contradictory marriage regimes
within the same State”.

The Court went on to state that DOMA: “[P]laces same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in
a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects (...) and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates
tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it
even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and
its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Because the Court found
that the principle purpose and effect of DOMA was to “demean those persons who are in a lawful
same-sex marriage”, it held that “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution”. It therefore affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Of the nine Justices presiding over this case, five were of
the majority opinion, with the remaining four dissenting. The dissenting Justices did not all agree
with each other in their opinions, but broadly considered that the Court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case and, on the merits, that DOMA was not unconstitutional. Justice Alito, in his dissenting
opinion, stated that:

“Same-sex marriage presents a highly emotional and important question of public policy – but not a
difficult question of constitutional law. The constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a
same-sex marriage. Indeed, no provision of the Constitution speaks to the issue.” Justice Scalia gave
a scathing dissenting opinion, in which he stated that “[b]y formally declaring anyone opposed to
same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms well any challenger to a state law
restricting marriage to its traditional definition.”

C. Property
4. Quiao versus Quiao 675 SCRA 642 (2012)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of
their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between
the spouse subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities. Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion
for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held
that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court
a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly
argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.
Held:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights
over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil
Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husband and wife.” While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there
is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the
petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed
in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the
petitioner prayed that the trial court divides the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot
claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the
spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net
profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits
shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

5. Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation versus Philippine Ports Authority 378 SCRA
82 (2002)
FACTS: Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review, one filed by the Terminal Facilities
and Services Corporation (TEFASCO) and the other by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
TEFASCO is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with
principal place of business at Barrio Ilang, Davao City. It is engaged in the business of providing port
and terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring and other port-related services at its own
private port at Barrio Ilang. Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the
construction of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and a provision for port services
in Davao City. To ease the acute congestion in the government ports at Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City,
PPA welcomed the proposal and organized an inter-agency committee to study the plan. The
committee recommended approval. On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution
No. 7 accepting and approving TEFASCO's project proposal. Long after TEFASCO broke round with
massive infrastructure work, the PPA Board curiously passed on October 1, 1976 Resolution No. 50
under which TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to submit an application for
construction permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application imposed additional significant
conditions.
The series of PPA impositions did not stop there. Two (2) years after the completion of the port
facilities and the commencement of TEFASCO's port operations, or on June 10, 1978, PPA again issued
to TEFASCO another permit, under which more onerous conditions were foisted on TEFASCO's port
operations. In the purported permit appeared for the first time the contentious provisions for ten
percent (10%) government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income and one hundred
percent (100%) wharfage and berthing charges.
On February 10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing
among others for (a) acknowledgment of TEFASCO's arrears in government share at Three Million
Eight Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos and Seventy-Five Centavos
(P3,807,563.75) payable monthly, with default penalized by automatic withdrawal of its commercial
private port permit and permit to operate cargo handling services; (b) reduction of government share
from ten percent (10%) to six percent (6%) on all cargo handling and related revenue (or arrastre
and stevedoring gross income); (c) opening of its pier facilities to all commercial and third-party
cargoes and vessels for a period coterminous with its foreshore lease contract with the National
Government; and, (d) tenure of five (5) years extendible by five (5) more years for TEFASCO's permit
to operate cargo handling in its private port facilities. In return PPA promised to issue the necessary
permits for TEFASCO's port activities. TEFASCO complied with the MOA and paid the accrued and
current government share. On August 30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port Manager, and Port
Officer in Davao City for refund of government share it had paid and for damages as a result of alleged
illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees. The
complaint also sought to nullify the February 10, 1984 MOA and all other PPA issuances modifying
the terms and conditions of the April 21, 1976 Resolution No. 7 above-mentioned.
PPA appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in its original
decision recognized the validity of the impositions and reversed in toto the decision of the trial court.
TEFASCO moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals found partly meritorious. Thus the
Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision partially affirmed the RTC decision only in the sense that
PPA was directed to pay TEFASCO (1) the amounts of Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos (P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage
fees and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Six
Centavos (P3,961,964.06) representing thirty percent (30%) berthing fees which TEFASCO could
have earned as private port usage fee from 1977 to 1991. The Court of Appeals held that the one
hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees were unenforceable because they had not been
approved by the President under P.D. No. 857, and discriminatory since much lower rates were
charged in other private ports as shown by PPA issuances effective 1995 to 1997. Both PPA and
TEFASCO were unsatisfied with this disposition hence these petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collection by PPA of one hundred percent (100%) wharfage fees and
berthing charges; (c) the propriety of the award of fifty percent (50%) wharfage fees and thirty
percent (30%) berthing charges as actual damages in favor of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to
1991 is valid.
Held: The imposition by PPA of ten percent (10%), later reduced to six percent (6%), government
share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income of TEFASCO is void. This exaction was never
mentioned in the contract, much less is it a binding prestation, between TEFASCO and PPA. What was
clearly stated in the terms and conditions appended to PPA Resolution No. 7 was for TEFASCO to pay
and/or secure from the proper authorities "all fees and/or permits pertinent to the construction and
operation of the proposed project." The government share demanded and collected from the gross
income of TEFASCO from its arrastre and stevedoring activities in TEFASCO's wholly owned port is
certainly not a fee or in any event a proper condition in a regulatory permit. Rather it is an onerous
"contractual stipulation" which finds no root or basis or reference even in the contract
aforementioned.
6.Board of Medicine versus Ota 558 SCRA 234 (2008)
D. Hierarchy of Rights and the Standards of Review or levels of Scrutiny
7. Philippine Blooming Mills and Employees Organization versus Philippine Blooming Mills
Co 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration
in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After
learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by
the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second
meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and
No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to
freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."The freedoms of speech and of the
press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.”
8. Estrada versus Sandiganbayan 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
Facts: Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080 also
known as “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because the assailed law is said to be
vague, it dispenses the “reasonable doubt” standards in criminal prosecution and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code which he claims to be
violative of the due process clause of our Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague.
Ruling: NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to
define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. A statute or act may be said
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language
but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes

9. White Light Corporation versus City of Manila 567 SCRA 416 (2009)
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and
it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it
held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such,
it is unconstitutional. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc.,
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity
in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude
into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted
in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by
the State. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with
the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates
to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
“the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should
be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment
of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
10. Samahan ng mga progresibong Kabataan versus Quezon City 835 SCRA 469 (2015)
E. Relativity of Due Process
11. Secretary of Justice versus Lantion 343 SCRA 377 (2000)
Facts: The Philippines and USA signed in Manila an extradition treaty between the two countries.
The
Department of Justice received from the DFA a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the
United States. On the same day, the petitioner designated authorized lawyers to handle the case.
Pending the evaluation of the request, Mark Jimenez wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice to be
furnished copies of the extradition request and he be given ample time to comment on the same. The
Secretary of Justice denied the request stating that Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty where it
states that the Philippines must present the interests of the US in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.
Issue: Whether a citizen’s basic right to due process must prevail over the government’s duties on
honoring
a treaty.
Ruling: YES. In the absence of a law or principle of law, the rules of fair play must be applied. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or
the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. We have ruled
time and again that the Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic
law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid. Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process
which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. True to the
mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal
and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein
and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties.

12. Cudia versus Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy 751 SCRA 649 (2015)
The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements
of the due process clause must be satisfied.
Facts: Cudia was given a demerit by his tactical officer because he was claimed to have lied after
being late for his English class. He did not agree with such and appealed to the Senior Tactical Officer.
The STO sustained the TO’s decision. He was then reported to the PMA’s honor Commitee for a
violation in the Honor Code for his alleged lying. The PMA found him guilty of his infraction and was
placed inside PMA’s holding center. Cudia and his family sent letters to various military officers for a
reinvestigation for alleged irregularities done in the investigation of his issue. His case was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeal Board of the PMA. Cudia’s family brought the case to the CHR
averring that his “sham” investigation violated his rights to due process, education and
communication. The CRAB ruled against Cudia but the CHR held in favor of him however the PMA
claimed that its findings are merely recommendatory.
Issue: Whether a cadet of the PMA can raise due process when punished.
Ruling: YES. Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which
has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his
peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the
good of the group." It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were
adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the
PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal
requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a
view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that career.
F. Procedural Due Process
13. Mullane versus Central Hangover Trust. Co. 339 U.S 306 (1950)
Facts:
Central Hanover Bank (P) was the trustee of a common trust fund formed by pooling the assets of a
number of smaller trusts. Central Hanover Bank petitioned to the New York Surrogate’s Court for a
judicial settlement of the trust. The only notice provided to beneficiaries was via publication in a
newspaper. Mullane (D) was appointed attorney and special guardian for a number of beneficiaries
who either were unknown or did not appear.
Mullane objected to the statutory provision for notice by publication, arguing that it was
unconstitutional for lack of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Surrogate’s Court
overruled Mullane’s objection and the ruling was affirmed on appeal to the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted cert.
Issue: WON the notice and the statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to
afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
Held:
The Surrogate court held that the notice required and given was sufficient. However, in the New York
Banking Law that does not require notice to all persons whose whereabouts are known, violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because contracting beneficiaries by mail at their
last known address is not particularly burdensome. Therefore, the judgement is reversed since the
basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are also known substantial
property rights.

14. La Chance versus Erickson 522 U.S 262 (1998)

Facts:
The respondents were federal employees subject to adverse actions by their agencies, each made
false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were
charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse
action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him ir her to the Merit Systems
Protection Board. The Board upheld the portion of each penalty based on the underlying charge. The
Board held that an employee’s false statement could not be used for purposes of impeaching the
employee’s credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for
employee’s underlying misconduct.
Issue:WON either the due process clause or the civil service reform act (CSRA) precludes federal
agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency
Held:
The Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Civil service reform act precludes a federal
agency for making false statement to the agency regarding this alleged employee related misconduct.
Chief Justice Renquist wrote that the core of due process is the right to notice and meaningful
opportunity to be heard but we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle. The view
expressed by the court of appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard include a
right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.

15. Civil Service Commission versus Lucas, 301 SCRA 560 (1999)
Facts:
Raquel Linatok filed with the office of filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a photographer of the same agency
for misconduct. The complaint stemmed from the alleged act of Jose Lucas of touching and caressing
complainant's thigh running down to her ankle. After a formal investigation by the Board of
Personnel Inquiry, it issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and
recommending a penalty of suspension for one month and one day. The CSC, however, found him
guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court
of Appeals set aside the CSC resolution and reinstated that of the board and ruled that respondent
was denied due process as he came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when
he received notice of the CSC resolution dismissing him from the service. In its petition to the
Supreme Court, petitioner contended that a formal charges in an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution.

Issue:WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on the charge of simple misconduct

Held:
Yes. As Lucas was merely charged with simple misconduct but was convicted of grave misconduct,
he was deprived of his right to due process. In which the Court held that “We sustain the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed
of the charges against him and that (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was
not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and proceedings.”

16 Anonymous versus Radam 541 SCRA 12 (2007)

Facts

In an anonymous letter-complaint, Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of
Court of RTC of Alaminos, was charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that
respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in October 2005 and that her
behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. Judge Abella conducted a discreet investigation to verify
the allegations. In his report 6 months after, Judge Abella made the following findings:

 She was unmarried and gave birth

 She refused to marry the father because they planned to migrate to Canada
 She expressed remorse and promised not to commit the same mistake
 The father of the child is unknown as seen in the birth certificate
 She gave birth to 2 other babies while she worked abroad and before she was employed by the
RTC

Judge Abella’s Recommendation: Such conduct fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel
and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the judiciary
demands upright men and women. She is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT
EMPLOYEE. 1 month suspension or fine of 5 thousand pesos.

After reviewing the findings of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that:
  She be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving
birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker.
 She be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000 for
stating in the birth certificate that the father was “unknown” to her

ISSUES

1. Whether giving birth out of wedlock is an immoral and disgraceful conduct that would make
Radam administratively liable – NO
2. Whether Radam should be administratively liable for the incorrect entry in the birth certificate
that the father of the child is unknown – NO

RATIO

1. Giving birth outside of wedlock is not an immoral conduct that merits administrative
liability.

For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not per
se immoral. To warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.

(Estrada v. Escritor): there’s a distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality. This is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

For a particular conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral” behavior under civil service laws, it
must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on
“cultural” values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights
(such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may
be frowned upon by the majority.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded:

(1) If the father of the child is himself unmarried: the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

(2) If the father of the child is himself married to another woman: there is a cause for administrative
sanction against either the father or the mother.

As applied to the case, there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons. The situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution. The “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of having extramarital relations with a
married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized.In this case, she and the
father of her child were unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child out of wedlock.

2. Radam was not informed of the second charge.

Radam was charged only for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was
informed. The recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection with
an entry in the birth certificate came like a thief in the night. It was unwarranted. She was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge
of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.

The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s side,
whether written or verbal. Radam was deprived of due process with regard to her alleged
unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child. An
employee must be informed of the charges against him, and the normal to do so is by furnishing him
with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot be
dispensed with. The second minimum requirement is that the employee must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter. One’s employment is not merely a species of property
rights. It is also the means by which he and those who depend on him live. It is therefore protected
by the guarantee of security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no government
employee may be removed, suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided by law and after due
process. The administrative complaint is DISMISSED. She is, however, strongly advised to be more
circumspect in her personal and official actuations in the future.

17. Pefianco versus Moral, 322 SCRA 439 (2000)

A respondent in an administrative case is NOT entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of
record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee.

18. Ylaya versus Gacott, 698 SCRA 203 (2009)

Facts:

The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels
of land. Prior to the acquisition of these... properties, was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa. The RTC already fixed the price and
issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the
property. The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The
complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the
sale of... the property. The respondent then fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and
contrary to their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute
Sale... selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia
Carlos So, the complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother's sister) are his uncle and his aunt...
the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the
Case... the complainant executed an Affidavit... affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness
and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale

IBP Commissioner... found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01(A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner's finding, but
increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning... the respondent filed a
Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP's findings

Issues: whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively
liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13- SC

Ruling:

We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board
of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV
of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's properties.
We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting...
interests without the written consent of the represented parties... and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. we agree with the respondent and find the evidence
insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1)... the evidence against
the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the
complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold... no prohibition exists against the
notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is the notary's relative within the
4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized the documents.
We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests
without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being
remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of

Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a
penalty, he is SUSPENDED

19. Macias versus Macias,601 SCRA 203 (2009)

20. Office of the court administrator versus Indar, 669 SCRA 24 (2012)
21. Ingraham versus Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
Facts: Two students, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews were subjected to particularly harsh
corporal punishment for minor infractions at the Charles R. Drew Junior High School. The people
administering the punishments were the school’s principal and assistant principals. Florida law
allowed corporal punishment that was not “degrading or unduly severe,” suggesting as appropriate
hitting a child’s rear with a paddle five times. Ingraham, however, was struck 20 times by the school
principal to the point where Ingraham needed medical attention. Andrews was paddled several
times and also hit on the arms, which left an injury that lasted a week. The families of the children
filed suit against the administrators and school system in federal court. The suit alleged that the
punishment violated the children’s constitutional rights.

Procedural History:

 The District Court, after a trial, found no constitutional basis for relief. It noted that the
punishment did not rise to cruel and unusual punishment and dismissed the suit.
 On appeal, one panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to reverse.
 However, after a rehearing before the Fifth Circuit en banc, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
District Court.
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue and Holding: Does corporal punishment in public school violate the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? No.

Judgment: The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied: The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment does not apply to corporal punishment in public schools, nor does due process
require notice and a hearing before imposing such punishment.

Reasoning:The history of the Eighth Amendment demonstrates that the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment was meant to apply to criminals, not school children. Further, the openness of
public schools and the community’s supervision of schools provide enough safeguards against
excessive discipline of children. Moreover, if a punishment is too harsh, then an administrator is
liable in civil or criminal court. With regard to due process, the practice of corporal punishment is
limited by the common law. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not
require notice and a hearing before imposing corporal punishment. The Florida corporal
punishment law provides significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment. Adding
constitutional requirements intrudes too far into the State’s educational responsibilities.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:

Dissenting Opinion (White):

The Court is wrong to rule out the Eighth Amendment entirely. It is possible that corporal
punishment can be so severe that it implicates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Essentially, punishment is punishment regardless of whether it is in the
criminal context or in school. Thus, the Eighth Amendment can apply. Further, students should be
entitled to some type of hearing before having a beating inflicted upon them. They should at least be
allowed to provide their side of the story.
Dissenting Opinion (Stevens):Justice White’s analysis is correct. It is important to add that, with
regard to due process, a remedy for a due process violation after there was a deprivation of liberty
may be sufficient.

Significance:Ingraham v. Wright is a landmark case because it held that corporal punishment in

public school could not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. To this day, there are still some states that allow corporal punishment in public
schools. In addition, corporal punishment is legal in private schools in every state except New Jersey
and Iowa.

22. Guzman versus National University, 142 SCRA 699(1986)

FACTS:
Due Process – Due Process in Educational Institutions In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others
complained that the National University (NU)barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU
argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al
spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were
violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that
Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest
of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in the case at
bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which
school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they maybe expelled
from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to
determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions. Under the
Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were
being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. ”Therefore, in effect, NU, by
barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the students without due
investigation – such act is illegal. The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are:1. That the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;2. That they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;3. That
they shall be informed of the evidence against them;4. That they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case

23. De La Salle University Inc. versus Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 22 (2007)

THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an
offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino
Lux Fraternity.

On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two
other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted
the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony,
one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical
violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.

On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft
Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He
panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands – “parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind
Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also
punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards
arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who
attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko na kita ang mukha niya,
hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the
group.

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,”
while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[2][7] with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints[3][8] were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-
APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin
A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear
and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the
written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m.
at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in
your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your
witnesses.On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through
the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit
the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained
of.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them. On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution[5][18] finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of
automatic expulsion,[6][19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and
thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.

ISSUE : Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown
hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?

HELD: Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated.

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here
are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance of the counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.”]Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.[9][67] Notice and
hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot
be said that there was denial of due process.[12][70]

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be
heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them
by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity
to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were
also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University[15][73]where this Court held that “x xx the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x xx an essential part thereof.”

24. Tumey versus Ohio, 273 U.S 510, 71 L. Ed 749, 47 S Ct 437 (1927)
Facts:
Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College
Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the
motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and
costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of
common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the
ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals
of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment
of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumeys application to require the
Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as
of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on
constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed
for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was
then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state
Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in
prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters
merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case,
to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are
paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came
before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the
defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation
of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when
he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually
imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curatlex.
The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a
minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought
before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect
of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest
of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law
is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the
country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The
trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review
confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing
court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so
manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an
impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the
disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial
needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification.

25. Macalintal versus Teh, 280 SCRA 623 (1997)

26. Office of the Court Administrator versus Floro, Jr. 486 SCRA 66 (2006)
FACTS:
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that
“a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory”—a parallel proscription for lawyers is found
in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: “a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.”—Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory.” A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.” This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the
exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, “(i)f lawyers
are prohibited from x xx using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement
regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with
more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification.
Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.”

Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that
the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted—by including therein the
honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar top-notcher, Judge Floro breached
the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.—In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that
the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card “may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced.” In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards
cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar top-notcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and
modesty required of judges.

Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.—We find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing
self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human
upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking
publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the
confines of the code they swore to observe.

Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications
especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign
of insecurity. As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing
in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as
platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who
very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges
as the bastion of justice—confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the
judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’
approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence
until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated.—As to the argument of Judge Floro
that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly
reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals wherein we
held that “no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of
Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation.” Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss
in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance
of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, “People v. Luisito
Beltran,” “People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,” “People v. Rowena Camino,” and “People v. John Richie
Villaluz.” From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge
Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural
rule.

Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors in handling probation cases. We perceive
three
fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring
the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order
granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open
court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Floro’s insistence
that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and
uphold it conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and
simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise “would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the
fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments.” This rule, however, admits of an
exception as “good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error.” Thus, even if a judge acted in
good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.

Same; Same; Like Caesar’s wife a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion—his language, both
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.—Canon
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” This means that a judge whose duty is
to apply the law and dispense justice “should not only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest” as well. Like Caesar’s wife,
a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality.
Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections
to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. “His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.”

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found
that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.—SEC. 12. Suspension of
arraignment.—The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears
to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The above-cited
rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike
Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made “upon motion by the proper party.” Thus, it was well within the discretion of
Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motuproprio based on his own assessment
of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings
if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional
advice to client.—Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: “No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client.” Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: “A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law.”

Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking.—Be that as it may, though Judge Floro
might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for
signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon
City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only
logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or
put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily,
Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a “judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.” By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very
awkward position.

Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a
judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in
resolving controversies.—Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary
duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the
case of People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited
the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a
“fairytale” or a “fantastic story.” He then went to state that “psychic phenomena” was destined to
cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.—The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge,
however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. This power—consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts—is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an
adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a
final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.—The rule now is that a Judge
can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90
days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him
or her. This is because Unlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged
with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a
judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield
the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption
of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of justice where
litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary
consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil
servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges
are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA
66(2006)]

27.Zambales Chromite Mining Co. versus Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 21 (1979)

Facts:
Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case fled by the
petitioners Zambales chromite mining co that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior
locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in santacruz, zambales. On the basis of
the petitioner’s evidence the private respondents did not present any evidence and they fled a
demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest., Director Gozon found that the petitioners
did not discover any mineral nor stated and located mining claims in accordance with law the
petitioners then appealed from that order to the secretary of ariculture and natural resources while
the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed secretary of agriculture and natural resources
instead of inhibiting himself', he decided the it he was adjudicating the case 'or the first time thus,
secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director oillnes
e acted as reviewing authority in the appeal 'rom his own decision% Or, to use another analogy, he
acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’ s right to due process is violated
Held: Yes, Petitioners appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental airness, when
secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director o' #ines%&n order that the review o' the
decision o' a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a 'arce the reviewing offcer must er'orce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view
or there would be no real review o' the case the decision o' the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view on the case sense on proportion and consideration 'or the fitness of things
should have deterred Secretary Gozon 'rom reviewing his own decision as Director o' #ines% e
should ha e as/ed his undersecretary to undertake the review

28.Singson versus National Labor Relations Commission, 724 SCRA 358 (1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay
Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and
vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each would be detached at the start of each
leg of the trip. Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon
corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was not
until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to Manila. Singson
commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before
the Regional Trial Court. CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that
CATHAY’s refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of
gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner
P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages,
P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs. On appeal
by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that there was gross negligence
amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for
moral and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s fees as well.

ISSUES:

1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of
petitioner.

2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.

HELD:

1.) Yes. x xx the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written
contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written
contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger
agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong
back to the Philippines, and the carrier’s acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back
home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket;
and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place
of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the
instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. , x xx the loss of the coupon was attributable to the
negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's
return flight.

2.) Yes. x xx Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the negligence of the carrier is so
gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes
entitled to recover moral damages.

x xx these circumstances reflect the carrier’s utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights
of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the
rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have
acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in
addition to actual damages, is proper.

However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court have to be reduced. The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends
upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited
by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to
indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are
not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to
alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's
culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount
of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.

In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an
award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.

On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of P20,000.00
granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed.

As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was therefore
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court; consequently,
petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead of P100,000.00
earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable.

29. Tejano versus Ombudsman. 462 SCRA 560 (2005)

Facts: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons involved in
the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas ordered petitioner to file their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against petitioner and was
thereafter referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer, Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the
memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer. Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor,
concurred in the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the
Sandigan bayan petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner
filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was
assigned to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner
Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was
approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal
note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor
Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the
Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the
case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer
III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the
prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was the
second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of
the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special
Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March
2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion. In a
memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial
of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos
changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring
in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired,
approved Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case. The First
Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. The instant petition was
transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

Issue: where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in
the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of
appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desiertoto recuse himself from participating in
the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his
Deputies

30. Office of the Ombudsman versus Quimbo, 751 SCRA 632 ( 2015)
FACTS:
Even if the Ombudsman is not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers
include defending its decisions before the Court of Appeals. Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial
Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar filed a complaint for Sexual Harassment and Oppression
against Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas alleging that, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead and nape and, in the
course thereof, he said, “You had been lying to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I
have to see yours?” Also, Quimboordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan,
Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of
the personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office because of her refusal to submit to his sexual
advances. Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint but was denied by the Ombudsman-
Visayas. The Ombudsman-Visayas dismissed the case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but
finding him guilty of oppression. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it reversed the ruling
of the Ombudsman-Visayas and denied the motion for intervention of the latter.
ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman possess the requisite legal interest to intervene in the proceedings where its
decision is in question?
RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may validly
intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court
elucidated in Ombudsman v. De Chavez thus: The Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in
the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping
with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority. The
Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its
decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed
against the government and public interest.

31.Legaspi versus City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771 (2013)

FACTS
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City. On July 29, 1997, Atty.
Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.)
brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for
being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records
and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized
by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM
that he had first to pay P4,20 0.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car
but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was
also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the
violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his
car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was
immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the
release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded
the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay
exterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not obstructing
the flow of traffic. The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664
valid. Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came
to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional?
HELD: YES. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests
of a valid ordinance thusly: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable. As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of
the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authoritv. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962,
March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied) In the present case,
delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu. The CA opined, and correctly
so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and
regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. The police power granted to local
government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of
the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty and property. Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of
law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review,
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times". To reiterate, the
clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance
against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated
on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
G. Substantive Due Process
32. Buck versus Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)

Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the
sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of
society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine
whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.
Question Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process
of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made
clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the
substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the
patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme
Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of
observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a
law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough."

33. Michael H. versus Gerald D. 491 U.S 110 (1989)

Facts:

In May, 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with,
appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has
always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant
Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's
first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at
times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June, 1984. In
November, 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity
and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-
complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and
Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no
triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal.Evid. Code § 621, which provides that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a
child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and
then only in limited circumstances. Moreover, the court denied Michael's and Victoria's motions for
visitation pending appeal under Cal. Civ. Code § 4601, which provides that a court may, in its
discretion, grant "reasonable visitation rights . . . to any . . . person having an interest in the [child's]
welfare." The California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting Michael's procedural and substantive due
process challenges to § 621 as well as Victoria's due process and equal protection claims. The court
also rejected Victoria's assertion of a right to continued visitation with Michael under § 4601, on the
ground that California law denies visitation against the wishes of the mother to a putative father who
has been prevented by § 621 from establishing his paternity.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, affirmed. JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
and in part by JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE KENNEDY, concluded that:

1. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing to establish
his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man. Pp. 491 U. S. 118-130.

(a) Michael's contention that procedural due process requires that he be afforded an opportunity to
demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing fundamentally misconceives the nature of § 621.
Although phrased in terms of a presumption, § 621 expresses and implements a substantive rule of
law declaring it to be generally irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during,
and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband and had a prior
relationship with him, based on the state legislature's determination, as a matter of overriding social
policy, that the husband should be held responsible for the child and that the integrity and privacy of
the family unit should not be impugned. Because Michael's complaint is that the statute categorically
denies all men in his circumstances an opportunity to establish their paternity, his challenge is not
accurately viewed as procedural. Pp. 491 U. S. 119-121.

(b) There is no merit to Michael's substantive due process claim that he has a constitutionally
protected "liberty" interest in the parental relationship he has established with Victoria, and that
protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state interest to support
termination of that relationship. Michael has failed to meet his burden of proving that his claimed
"liberty" interest is one so deeply imbedded within society's traditions as to be a fundamental right.
Not only has he failed to demonstrate that the interest he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been
accorded protection by society, but the common law presumption of legitimacy, and even modern
statutory and decisional law, demonstrate that society has historically protected, and continues to
protect, the marital family against the sort of claim Michael asserts. 491 U. S. 121-130.

2. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon any constitutional right of a child to maintain a
relationship with her natural father. Victoria's assertion that she has a due process right to maintain
filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald is, at best, the obverse of Michael's claim and fails
for the same reasons. Nor is there any merit to her claim that her equal protection rights have been
violated because, unlike her mother and presumed father, she had no opportunity to rebut the
presumption of her legitimacy, since the State's decision to treat her differently from her parents
pursues the legitimate end of preventing the disruption of an otherwise peaceful union by the
rational means ofnot allowing anyone but the husband or wife to contest legitimacy. Pp. 491 U. S.
130-132.

JUSTICE STEVENS, although concluding that a natural father might have a constitutionally protected
interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another
man at the time of the child's conception and birth, also concluded that the California statutory
scheme, as applied in this case, is consistent with the Due Process Clause, since it did not deprive
Michael of a fair opportunity to prove that he is an "other person having an interest in the welfare of
the child" to whom "reasonable visitation rights" may be awarded in the trial judge's discretion under
§ 4601. The plurality's interpretation of § 621 as creating an absolute bar to such a determination is
not only an unnatural reading of the statute's plain language, but is also not consistent with the
reading given by the courts below and California courts in other cases, all of which, after deciding
that the § 621 presumption barred a natural father from proving paternity, have nevertheless gone
on to consider the separate question whether it would be proper to allow the natural father visitation
as an "other person" based on the best interests of the child in the circumstances of the particular
case. Here, where the record shows that, after its shaky start, the marriage between Carole and Gerald
developed a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving and harmonious family home, there
was nothing fundamentally unfair in the trial judge's exercise of his discretion to allow the mother to
decide whether the child's best interests would be served by allowing the natural father visitation
privileges. Pp. 491 U. S. 132-136.

SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
joined, and in all but n. 6 of which O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part, in which KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 132. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 491 U. S. 132. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 136. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 157.

34. Kansas versus Hendricks, 521 U.S 346 (1997)

Facts of the case
As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of
child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent
Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from
pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment
under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in "predatory
acts of sexual violence" brought on by "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder[s]." On appeal
from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

Question

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental
abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

Conclusion

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain
a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by
requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to
repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined
persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked
other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy
guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST

Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons
who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," are likely to engage in "predatory
acts of sexual violence." Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to commit respondent
(and cross petitioner) Hendricks, who had a long history of sexually molesting children and was
scheduled for release from prison. The court reserved ruling on Hendricks' challenge to the Act's
constitutionality, but granted his request for a jury trial. After Hendricks testified that he agreed with
the state physician's diagnosis that he suffers from pedophilia and is not cured and that he continues
to harbor sexual desires for children that he cannot control when he gets "stressed out," the jury
determined that he was a sexually violent predator. Finding that pedophilia qualifies as a mental
abnormality under the Act, the court ordered him committed. On appeal, the State Supreme Court
invalidated the Act on the ground that the pre commitment condition of a "mental abnormality" did
not satisfy what it perceived to be the "substantive" due process requirement that involuntary civil
commitment must be predicated on a "mental illness" finding. It did not address Hendricks' ex post-
facto and double jeopardy claims.
Held:

1. The Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies "substantive" due process requirements. An
individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding physical restraint may be
overridden even in the civil context. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,197 U.S. 11, 26. This Court has
consistently upheld involuntary commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to control
their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, provided the confinement
takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Foucha v. Louisiana,504 U.S.
71, 80. The Act unambiguously requires a pre commitment finding of dangerousness either to one's
self or to others, and links that finding to a determination that the person suffers from a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder." Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if
it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or
"mental abnormality," see, e.g., Heller v. Doe,509 U.S. 312, 314-315, for these additional requirements
serve to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its pre commitment
requirement of "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." Contrary to Hendricks' argument,
this Court has never required States to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil
commitment statutes and leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have
legal significance. Cf. Jones v. United States,463 U.S. 354, 365, n. 13. The legislature is therefore not
required to use the specific term "mental illness" and is free to adopt any similar term. Pp. 8-13.

2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post-facto
lawmaking. Pp. 13-24.

(a) The Act does not establish criminal proceedings, and involuntary confinement under it is not
punishment. The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal is a question of
statutory construction. Allen v. Illinois,478 U.S. 364, 368. Nothing on the face of the Act suggests that
the Kansas Legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme. That
manifest intent will be rejected only if Hendricks provides the clearest proof that the scheme is so
punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Kansas' intention to deem it civil. United States v. Ward,448
U.S. 242, 248-249. He has failed to satisfy this heavy burden. Commitment under the Act does not
implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Its
purpose is not retributive: It does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct, but uses such
conduct solely for evidentiary purposes; it does not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for
commitment; and it lacks a scienter requirement, an important element in distinguishing criminal
and civil statutes. Nor can the Act be said to act as a deterrent, since persons with a mental
abnormality or personality disorder are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. The
conditions surrounding confinement--essentially the same as conditions for any civilly committed
patient--do not suggest a punitive purpose. Although the commitment scheme here involves an
affirmative restraint, such restraint of the dangerously mentally ill has been historically regarded as
a legitimate nonpunitive objective. Cf. United States v. Salerno,481 U.S. 739, 747. The confinement's
potentially indefinite duration is linked, not to any punitive objective, but to the purpose of holding
a person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. He is thus
permitted immediate release upon a showing that he is no longer dangerous, and the longest he can
be detained pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year. The State's use of procedural
safeguards applicable in criminal trials does not itself turn the proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. Allen, supra, at 372. Finally, the Act is not necessarily punitive if it fails to offer
treatment where treatment for a condition is not possible, or if treatment, though possible, is merely
an ancillary, rather than an overriding, state concern. The conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive
removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post-facto claims. Pp.
13-21.

(b) Hendricks' confinement does not amount to a second prosecution and punishment for the offense
for which he was convicted. Because the Act is civil in nature, its commitment proceedings do not
constitute a second prosecution. Cf. Jones, supra. As this commitment is not tantamount to
punishment, the detention does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though it follows a
prison term. Baxstrom v. Herold,383 U.S. 107. Hendricks' argument that, even if the Act survives the
"multiple punishments" test, it fails the "same elements" test of Blockburger v. United States,284 U.S.
299, is rejected, since that test does not apply outside of the successive prosecution context. Pp. 22-
23.

(c) Hendricks' ex post-facto claim is similarly flawed. The Ex Post-Facto Clause pertains exclusively to
penal statutes. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales,514 U.S. 499, 505. Since the Act is not
punishment, its application does not raise ex post-facto concerns. Moreover, the Act clearly does not
have retroactive effect. It does not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment or deprive
Hendricks of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes. Pp. 23-24.

259 Kan. 246, 912 P. 2d 129, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts II and III.

35. Washington versus Glucksberg, 521 versus 702 (1997)

 Four doctors, three terminally ill patients, and a non-profit group brought a suit challenging
the State of Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide.
 They argued that the ban was unconstitutional because it violated due process.
 The District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the ban was
unconstitutional.
 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that the Due Process Clause is not violated by laws
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.

Statement of the Facts:

The State of Washington has historically made the promotion of suicide a crime, and the most recent
State law prohibited assisted suicide. Dr. Harold Glucksberg, three other doctors, three terminally ill
people, and the non-profit group Compassion in Dying – an organization that provided guidance for
people considering assisted suicide – challenged the Washington State law in federal court. They
argued that the “right to die with dignity” was a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural History:

 The District Court agreed that the prohibition on assisted suicide was unconstitutional.
 On appeal, one panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to reverse.
 However, the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court’s decision following a
hearing en banc.
  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue and Holding:Does a law prohibiting assisted suicide violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? No.

Judgment:The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:There is no fundamental liberty interest in assisted

suicide such that a State would be wrong to ban the practice.

Reasoning:

A review of our country’s history, legal traditions, and practices show that assisted suicide has been
either punished or met with disapproval for over 700 years. Assisted suicide is a crime in almost
every State in the country. The prohibitions on assisted suicide have been recently reexamined and,
for the most part, reaffirmed in many States. Also, the President signed the Federal Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997, prohibiting the use of federal funds for physician-assisted suicide.
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. In evaluating a substantive due process challenge, the
Court must see if a right is rooted in this Nation’s history, and that the liberty interest is “carefully
described.” Here, the right is not rooted in our history, and the liberty interest has been described in
many different ways.

We see the interest being asserted here as whether there is a “right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so.” We do not believe such a right is fundamental in our
society. The right asserted here is different than the right to refuse medical treatment. The
difference is in dying from natural causes versus inducing death from medication.Finally,
Washington’s law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The State has a legitimate
interest in life, in preventing suicide, in medical ethics, and in protecting those who may not actually
consent to life-ending medication.The debate this country is having over assisted suicide should
continue, and this Court need not stifle the debate at this point.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:

Concurring Opinion (O’Connor):

The respondents in this case urge not a general right to “commit suicide.” Rather, they seek an
answer to the narrower question as to whether a mentally competent person, who is experiencing
immense suffering, has a constitutionally recognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of
his or her imminent death. In the context of this case, there is no reason to reach that question.

Concurring Opinion (Stevens):

While the Court’s holding is consistent with allowing a vigorous debate on the assisted-suicide issue
to continue, it should be noted that there is also room for debate on the constitutional limits on a
State to punish the practice of assisted suicide.

Concurring Opinion (Souter):

There are strong liberty interests on both sides of this debate, and the Court properly remained out
of the debate on this emerging issue. State legislatures should have the freedom to consider this
issue. While the right to assisted suicide should not be foreclosed for all time, it is properly being
debated in State legislatures throughout the country.

Concurring Opinion (Ginsburg):

Justice Ginsburg concurs for the reasons stated in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion.

Concurring Opinion (Breyer):

Justice O’Connor’s opinion has more significance than the Court’s opinion my suggest. In a different
case, in which a patient seeks to avoid pain at the end of life, the Court would likely have to revisit its
conclusions.

Significance:

Washington v. Glucksberg is a landmark case because it holds that assisted suicide is not a right
protected by the Due Process Clause. When compared to the Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
Health decision, it creates a distinction between recognizing a right to accept a natural death
(Cruzan) and not recognizing a right to induce death when a person could naturally remain alive
(Glucksberg).

36.Lawrence versus Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003)

Statement of the facts:

Lawrence and Garner were engaging in sexual activity when an officer entered the home of Lawrence
in response to a reported weapons disturbance. The officer arrested both Lawrence and Garner and
held each in overnight custody. The two men were later charged in Texas by a Justice of the Peace.

Procedural History:

Lawrence was convicted and exercised his right to a new trial. His convictions were affirmed.
Lawrence then appealed to the Texas court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the decision and
after petitioning the Supreme Court, certiorari was granted.

Issue and Holding:

Is the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct, including homosexual activities,
protected under the constitution? Yes.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

The right of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct in the privacy of their homes is protected
by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment’s liberty interest. This right encompasses
homosexual activities.
Judgment:

Overruled, two consenting adults may engage in sexual activity in the privacy of their own home.

Reasoning:

The Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 168 (1986), upheld a statute in Georgia which prohibited
consensual, private, sodomy amongst both hetero and homosexuals. The Bower’s Court incorrectly
framed the issue as whether homosexuals have a right to engage in sexual activity under the
Constitution. This Court held that a ruling stating the right is not protected, would essentially have
the same consequence as determining whether or not homosexual relationships, in general, are
lawful. This determination would intrude on the fundamental right of homosexuals to participate in
familial relationships as well as intimate and personal relationships.

This Court held there is no historical precedent in America of laws directed at prohibiting distinct
homosexual conduct. In addition, enforcing legal punish for consensual conduct would be very
difficult.

The Bower’s Court was largely overstated when it relied on historical traditions in prohibiting
homosexual activity and was likely based on religious and moral preferences of each Justice.

This Court noted that many states that have laws in place prohibiting homosexual conduct do not
prosecute those who engage. The result is likely a reflection of the increasing social and legal
acceptance of the right to privacy of consenting adults and homosexuals. The Court cites Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) as authority stating evidence of this tendency.

The Court held that the rights of consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity is protected
under the liberty interest of the substantive due process clause. Here, the sexual activity in question
is protected by the Due Process Clause and Bowers is unconstitutional and overturned.

Concurring/Dissenting opinion:

Concurring (O’Connor)

The Majority’s basis for invalidating the Texas statute is improper. The law only punishes
homosexual conduct and should be held unconstitutional as a violation of Equal Protection. The state
of Texas’ only goal is a … “desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”

Dissenting (Scalia):

Bowers should be accorded respect in regards to the principals of stare decisis. In addition, the court
should not take into consideration public opinion or foreign laws when making such a ruling.

Dissent (Thomas):

Although the state statute is “uncommonly silly” and should be repealed, there is nothing in the
Constitution or its Bill of Rights that prevents the state from enacting the law in question.
Significance:

Lawrence v. Texas was the landmark case that decriminalized homosexual conduct and “keeps the
government out of our bedrooms” so to speak. The right of consenting adults both homo and
heterosexual to engage in sexual conduct was recognized as a constitutional right protected under
the right to privacy.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST

Facts of the case

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John
Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private,
consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual
intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual
Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by
different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do
their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated
premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia,
with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

37.Dela Cruz v. Paras , 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners
contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power
to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given
to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal
or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation
of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other
similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far
as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed
one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.
84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
Held: NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation
of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language
of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted
by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one
that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Gov’t Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject
to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their
business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of
an assumed power to prohibit.
38. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority versus Virtron Transportation Co. Inc. 530
SCRA 341.

Facts: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation
System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been
the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination
of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass
transport terminal facilities to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the
commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport
System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the
Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support
of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed
the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O.,
insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property
without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to
provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common
carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the
closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before
the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the
respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the
authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of
police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.

HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,”
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179
ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in
her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department)
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated
the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer
comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is
the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as
may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise
the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project,
which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of
control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the
Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of
the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation
of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing
agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924,
MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924
authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including
transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground
in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature
of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila
Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondent’s terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its
exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a
public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the
worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the
increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing
transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to
eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-
designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondent’s
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On
the contrary, the elimination of respondent’s bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and
the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in
line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of
vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by
provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of
suitable terminal sites.

39.ELENA P. DYCAICO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION 467,
SCRA 538 (2005)
An "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the due process clause.
Facts:
When Elena Dycaico’s husband, Bonifacio, died, she filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s
pension. Her application was denied on the ground that they were not living under the benefits of
marriage when Bonifacio became a member of the SSS using Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 as basis. The
RTC ruled in favor of the SSS, so does the CA.
Issue:
Whether the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which
qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, violates due process.
Ruling:
YES. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul
of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages
to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard. By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective
marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement, the proviso "as of the date
of his retirement" qualifying the term "primary beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement to
survivor’s pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date
of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282.
This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive
presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally
true. In this case, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was
Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his
primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a property
interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due
process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to
Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s
pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS
members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.

40. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS 707 SCRA 584 (2013)

FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a
marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to
pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios
declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00. However, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case don’t fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if
it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these
are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
41. Imbong versus Ochoa Jr. 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
FACTS
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions
shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE: WON RH Law violates the right to health
HELD: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products. Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions. This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly
ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status
quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be
maintained. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will
still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available
to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must
first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction. Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination
42. Obergefell versus Hodges 576 U.S. (No. 14-556, 26 June 2015)
Facts of the case

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to
recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages.
The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims
under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and
refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Question

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of
the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion

 5–4 decision for Obergefell

majority opinion by Anthony M. Kennedy

The Fourteenth Amendment requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex
couples.Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one
of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same
manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most
intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal
recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the
keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-
sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that
right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally
been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated
principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution
protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does
not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-
sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage
might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the
purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this
issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The
Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws
regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial
policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional
limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore
there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice
Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the
judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the
courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the
dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds
of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so
in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of
whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the
issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the
Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In
taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth
Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the
legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due
Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to
protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them
rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion
impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the
state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice
Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the
Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is
reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By
allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from
the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the
Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

43. Mosqueda versus Pilipino Banana Growers and Export Association Inc. 800 SCRA 313
(2016)

Facts: After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. The
Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.),
filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that
the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
valid and constitutional. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance, being based on
a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was
distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher
degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution. On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive; The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of
protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand,
and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues: whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power:
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b)
in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof
in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers...
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated. Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged
health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of
the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the
general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed,
however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its
mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of
police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have
properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of
its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it
employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing
the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to
taking without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if
it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands
that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the
means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition
against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification
includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction? We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose
or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

H. Void- For Vagueness, Overbreadth and Facial Challenges

44.Romualdez versus Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 (2008)

The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is
not
appropriate.
Facts:
Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn applications for Voter’s
Registration. They indicated that they are residents of Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were
residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them with violations of Omnibus Election Code and Voter’s
Registraion Act. The Comelec recommended the filing of information against the Spouses Romualdez
for violation of Voter’s Registration Act. Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due
process of law when the elections offenses for which they are charged by Garay are different from
the resolution of the Comelec. The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is
vague on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in
particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j)
of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.
Issue: Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration is vague.
Ruling: NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, the Court
has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate. Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The Court has similarly
stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. As structured, Section 4541 of
Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is,
without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders
itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. The
Court does not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague. Notably, herein petitioners do
not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand.
This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada
rejected the argument.

I. Constitutional and Statutory Due Process

45 Serrano versus National Labor Relations Commission , 32 SCRA 445 (2000)
FACTS
Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of IsetannDepartment Store. He was
charged with the task of supervising securitycheckers in their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and
preventing pilfirege of merchandise). On October 11, 1991, the management sent him a
letterimmediately terminating his services as security section head, effective on the same day. The
reason given by the management was “retrenchment”;they had opted to hire an independent security agency
as a cost-cuttingmeasure. Serrano filed a complaint for ID, illegal layoff, ULP, underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the LA. The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It
stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner
wasnot accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann employed
a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the former. The NLRC on the other hand
reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of
service, unpaid salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise
of management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment
in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety
supervisor’s position was long in place prior to Serrano’s separation from the company, or the phase-out of the
Security Section.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner’s dismissal was illegal.

RULING: Valid, but ineffectual (without legal effect)payment of backwages, separation pay and other
monetary claims No. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283
of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow
the procedural requirement provided by Art. 283 of LC. For termination due to authorized causes,
the employer must give a written notice of termination to the employee concerned and to the DOLE
at least 30 days prior to its effectivity. This Isetann failed to do. The question now arises as to whether
the failure of Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements renders the dismissal invalid, or,
in the event that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be meted out. Prior to the
doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in Wenphil Corp. NLRC in 1989, the termination of an
employee, even for just cause but without following the requisite procedure, renders such dismissal
illegal, and therefore null and void. In the Wenphil doctrine this was reversed; the said rule was
unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid but the employer was sanctioned
by way of the payment of indemnity (damages)in that case, P1,000. The amount of indemnity will be
depended on the circumstances of each case, taking into account the gravity of the offense committed
by the employer. Now, the Court once again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the effect
of the Wenphil doctrine was such that there has been a “dismiss now, pay later” policy where the employers were able
to circumvent the procedural requisites of termination, which is more convenient than the compliance
with the 30-day notice. Panganiban said that the monetary sanctions were too insignificant,
niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the deprivation of due process
which must be accorded to the employee renders the dismissal illegal. Puno quoted that Legislative,
Executive and Judicial proceedings that deny due process do sounder the pain of nullity.
Panganiban stated that such denial of due process renders decisions and proceedings void for lack of
jurisdiction. The present ruling of the Court held that the dismissal of the employee is merely
ineffectual, not void. The dismissal was upheld but it is ineffectual. The sanction provided was the
payment of backwages from the time of dismissal up to the decision of the court finding just or
authorized cause. This was thought to balance the interests of both parties, recognizing the employee’s
right to notice and at the same time the right of the employer to
dismiss for any of the just and authorized causes. The Court also responded to the arguments of
Justices
Puno and Panganiban
by stating that the violation in the procedural requirement of termination is not a denial of the
fundamental right to due process. This is because of the ff reasons:1)
The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the exercise of private
power, such as in this case. The provision “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law” pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to do the same. 2) The purpose of the
notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide an opportunity for the employee to be
heard before the power of the organized society is brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283,
however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to
determine whether economic causes exist to justify termination. It is not to give opportunity to be
heard there is no charge against the employee under Art. 2833)

The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause. Not all notice
requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be followed
before a right granted to party can be exercised; others are an application of the Justinian precept.
Such is the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a procedure for the termination
of employment which makes the termination of employment merelyineffectual.5)

Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without just or authorized cause renders such
dismissal illegal. To consider termination without observing procedural requisites as also ID is to add another
ground for ID, thereby amending Art. 279.; Further, there is a disparity in legal treatment, as
employees who resign without giving due notice are only liable for damages; it does not make their
resignation void. In this case, the separation pay was a distinct award from the payment of backwages
as a way of penalty. Petition was denied.

46. Agabonverus National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445 (2000)

Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when
they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned
their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned
their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. Petitioners also claim that private
respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on
the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.

Issues: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Ruling: To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but
also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It
is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For
a valid finding... of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by...
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The
intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified. an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his
employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job.

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs
to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements
and instead... argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a
valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last... known
address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due
process. that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements
of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions,
however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in
the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal,
or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The violation of the
petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at
bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED
to pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with
statutory due process.

Principles:

Labor Law
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify
the employee for the violation of his statutory rights

Political Law... we affirmed the presumption that all constitutional provisions are self-executing.

to declare otherwise would result in the pernicious situation wherein by mere inaction and...
disregard by the legislature, constitutional mandates would be rendered ineffectual.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide... a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty
for the violation of a self-executing... constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be... self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as
self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need
for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions... are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees... of "full protection to labor" and
"security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest
interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation... implies an unimpeachable right to continued
employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure
the protection and promotion, not... only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as
well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own
conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution. Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of
Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of
an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by
several framers of the 1987

Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.

II. Due Process

A. Person
1. Roe versus Wade 410 U.S 113 (1973)
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the declaratory
relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion
laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.In 1970, Norma L
McCorvey( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of rape), filed a suit against the
defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. She
argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy
as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later,
she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on behalf of herself and all other women similarly
situated;” thereby becoming a class suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the right
to abort her child.
HELD: Yes. The “right of privacy xxx is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.“ state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts
from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy
stage and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

B. Liberty
2. Republic versus Cagandahan 565 SCRA 72 (2008)
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on a person concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences.
Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Birth Certificate. During her childhood, she
suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had
minimized. She had no breast or menstruation. She was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia, a condition where a person suffering from such possesses secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones. According to her, for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition
at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed
to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
Issue: Whether Cagandahan can change her gender to male and change her name to Jeff.
Held: YES. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male. In so ruling the Court does no more
than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deal with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus helps make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case. As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, the Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.

3. U.S versus Windsor 570 U.S. (No. 12- 307, 26 June 2013)
Facts: Two women, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, married in Canada in 2007 and the State of New
York recognized their marriage. At the time of their marriage, they were resident in New York and
they had registered as domestic partners when New York City gave that right to same-sex couples in
1993. Spyer died in 2009, leaving her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor attempted to claim the
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but was prevented from doing so under section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA is a federal act which amends the Dictionary Act to
define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples. Windsor paid the estate taxes but
requested a refund from the Inland Revenue Service, which was denied. Windsor brought a refund
suit in the District Court, claiming that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment equal protection
principles. While the case was pending, the Department of Justice decided not to defend the
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of
Representatives (BLAG) intervened in the litigation to do so. The District Court ruled against the
United States, finding section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional and ordering the Treasury to refund
Windsor’s tax with interest. An appeal was filed and the District Court’s decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. Although the US government did not seek to defend the
constitutionality of DOMA, they refused to pay the refund to Windsor. A petition for writ of certiorari
was filed on 11 September 2012. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on 27 March 2013.
Issue:
1) The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), section 3
2) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Held: The Court held that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as it amounts to a deprivation of the
equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. The first question that the Court
addressed was whether it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. All parties agreed that
the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but the court appointed an amicus curiae to argue the
opposite position. She argued that once the District Court ordered a refund, the case should have
ended and the appeal should have been dismissed, as the parties were no longer adverse. However,
the Court decided that because the US government had refused to pay the tax refund, this, combined
with the fact that BLAG had intervened to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA with a
“substantial adversarial argument”, was a controversy which was sufficient for the Court to have
jurisdiction in this case.
The Court considered that historically, and by tradition, the definition and regulation of marriage had
been treated as being within the realm of the separate states. It stated that DOMA, which controlled
over 1,000 statutes and many federal regulations, had a much greater reach than any previous
legislation enacted by Congress to regulate the meaning of marriage. The Court held that DOMA
meant to to injure the very class of people that New York sought to recognize and protect by giving
them the right to marry. In doing so, DOMA violated “basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government”. The Court held that “interference with the equal
dignity of same-sex marriages was the “essence” of DOMA, which identified and made unequal a
“subset of state-sanctioned marriages”. It stated that DOMA sought to, and did in fact, provide a
disadvantage, separate status and stigma on those who entered into same-sex marriages.
Furthermore, the Court said: “[DOMA] frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating equality by
writing inequality into the entire United States Code (...) creating two contradictory marriage regimes
within the same State”.

The Court went on to state that DOMA: “[P]laces same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in
a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects (...) and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates
tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it
even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and
its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Because the Court found
that the principle purpose and effect of DOMA was to “demean those persons who are in a lawful
same-sex marriage”, it held that “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution”. It therefore affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Of the nine Justices presiding over this case, five were of
the majority opinion, with the remaining four dissenting. The dissenting Justices did not all agree
with each other in their opinions, but broadly considered that the Court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case and, on the merits, that DOMA was not unconstitutional. Justice Alito, in his dissenting
opinion, stated that:

“Same-sex marriage presents a highly emotional and important question of public policy – but not a
difficult question of constitutional law. The constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a
same-sex marriage. Indeed, no provision of the Constitution speaks to the issue.” Justice Scalia gave
a scathing dissenting opinion, in which he stated that “[b]y formally declaring anyone opposed to
same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms well any challenger to a state law
restricting marriage to its traditional definition.”

C. Property
4. Quiao versus Quiao 675 SCRA 642 (2012)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of
their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between
the spouse subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities. Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion
for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held
that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court
a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly
argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.
Held:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights
over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil
Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husband and wife.” While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there
is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the
petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed
in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the
petitioner prayed that the trial court divides the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot
claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the
spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net
profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits
shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

5. Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation versus Philippine Ports Authority 378 SCRA
82 (2002)
FACTS: Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review, one filed by the Terminal Facilities
and Services Corporation (TEFASCO) and the other by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
TEFASCO is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with
principal place of business at Barrio Ilang, Davao City. It is engaged in the business of providing port
and terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring and other port-related services at its own
private port at Barrio Ilang. Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the
construction of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and a provision for port services
in Davao City. To ease the acute congestion in the government ports at Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City,
PPA welcomed the proposal and organized an inter-agency committee to study the plan. The
committee recommended approval. On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution
No. 7 accepting and approving TEFASCO's project proposal. Long after TEFASCO broke round with
massive infrastructure work, the PPA Board curiously passed on October 1, 1976 Resolution No. 50
under which TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to submit an application for
construction permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application imposed additional significant
conditions.
The series of PPA impositions did not stop there. Two (2) years after the completion of the port
facilities and the commencement of TEFASCO's port operations, or on June 10, 1978, PPA again issued
to TEFASCO another permit, under which more onerous conditions were foisted on TEFASCO's port
operations. In the purported permit appeared for the first time the contentious provisions for ten
percent (10%) government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income and one hundred
percent (100%) wharfage and berthing charges.
On February 10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing
among others for (a) acknowledgment of TEFASCO's arrears in government share at Three Million
Eight Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos and Seventy-Five Centavos
(P3,807,563.75) payable monthly, with default penalized by automatic withdrawal of its commercial
private port permit and permit to operate cargo handling services; (b) reduction of government share
from ten percent (10%) to six percent (6%) on all cargo handling and related revenue (or arrastre
and stevedoring gross income); (c) opening of its pier facilities to all commercial and third-party
cargoes and vessels for a period coterminous with its foreshore lease contract with the National
Government; and, (d) tenure of five (5) years extendible by five (5) more years for TEFASCO's permit
to operate cargo handling in its private port facilities. In return PPA promised to issue the necessary
permits for TEFASCO's port activities. TEFASCO complied with the MOA and paid the accrued and
current government share. On August 30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port Manager, and Port
Officer in Davao City for refund of government share it had paid and for damages as a result of alleged
illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees. The
complaint also sought to nullify the February 10, 1984 MOA and all other PPA issuances modifying
the terms and conditions of the April 21, 1976 Resolution No. 7 above-mentioned.
PPA appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in its original
decision recognized the validity of the impositions and reversed in toto the decision of the trial court.
TEFASCO moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals found partly meritorious. Thus the
Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision partially affirmed the RTC decision only in the sense that
PPA was directed to pay TEFASCO (1) the amounts of Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos (P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage
fees and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Six
Centavos (P3,961,964.06) representing thirty percent (30%) berthing fees which TEFASCO could
have earned as private port usage fee from 1977 to 1991. The Court of Appeals held that the one
hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees were unenforceable because they had not been
approved by the President under P.D. No. 857, and discriminatory since much lower rates were
charged in other private ports as shown by PPA issuances effective 1995 to 1997. Both PPA and
TEFASCO were unsatisfied with this disposition hence these petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collection by PPA of one hundred percent (100%) wharfage fees and
berthing charges; (c) the propriety of the award of fifty percent (50%) wharfage fees and thirty
percent (30%) berthing charges as actual damages in favor of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to
1991 is valid.
Held: The imposition by PPA of ten percent (10%), later reduced to six percent (6%), government
share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income of TEFASCO is void. This exaction was never
mentioned in the contract, much less is it a binding prestation, between TEFASCO and PPA. What was
clearly stated in the terms and conditions appended to PPA Resolution No. 7 was for TEFASCO to pay
and/or secure from the proper authorities "all fees and/or permits pertinent to the construction and
operation of the proposed project." The government share demanded and collected from the gross
income of TEFASCO from its arrastre and stevedoring activities in TEFASCO's wholly owned port is
certainly not a fee or in any event a proper condition in a regulatory permit. Rather it is an onerous
"contractual stipulation" which finds no root or basis or reference even in the contract
aforementioned.
6.Board of Medicine versus Ota 558 SCRA 234 (2008)
D. Hierarchy of Rights and the Standards of Review or levels of Scrutiny
7. Philippine Blooming Mills and Employees Organization versus Philippine Blooming Mills
Co 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration
in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After
learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by
the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second
meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and
No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to
freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."The freedoms of speech and of the
press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.”
8. Estrada versus Sandiganbayan 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
Facts: Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080 also
known as “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because the assailed law is said to be
vague, it dispenses the “reasonable doubt” standards in criminal prosecution and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code which he claims to be
violative of the due process clause of our Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague.
Ruling: NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to
define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. A statute or act may be said
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language
but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes

9. White Light Corporation versus City of Manila 567 SCRA 416 (2009)
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and
it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it
held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such,
it is unconstitutional. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc.,
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity
in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude
into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted
in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by
the State. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with
the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates
to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
“the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should
be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment
of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
10. Samahan ng mga progresibong Kabataan versus Quezon City 835 SCRA 469 (2015)
E. Relativity of Due Process
11. Secretary of Justice versus Lantion 343 SCRA 377 (2000)
Facts: The Philippines and USA signed in Manila an extradition treaty between the two countries.
The
Department of Justice received from the DFA a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the
United States. On the same day, the petitioner designated authorized lawyers to handle the case.
Pending the evaluation of the request, Mark Jimenez wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice to be
furnished copies of the extradition request and he be given ample time to comment on the same. The
Secretary of Justice denied the request stating that Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty where it
states that the Philippines must present the interests of the US in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.
Issue: Whether a citizen’s basic right to due process must prevail over the government’s duties on
honoring
a treaty.
Ruling: YES. In the absence of a law or principle of law, the rules of fair play must be applied. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or
the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. We have ruled
time and again that the Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic
law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid. Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process
which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. True to the
mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal
and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein
and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties.

12. Cudia versus Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy 751 SCRA 649 (2015)
The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements
of the due process clause must be satisfied.
Facts: Cudia was given a demerit by his tactical officer because he was claimed to have lied after
being late for his English class. He did not agree with such and appealed to the Senior Tactical Officer.
The STO sustained the TO’s decision. He was then reported to the PMA’s honor Commitee for a
violation in the Honor Code for his alleged lying. The PMA found him guilty of his infraction and was
placed inside PMA’s holding center. Cudia and his family sent letters to various military officers for a
reinvestigation for alleged irregularities done in the investigation of his issue. His case was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeal Board of the PMA. Cudia’s family brought the case to the CHR
averring that his “sham” investigation violated his rights to due process, education and
communication. The CRAB ruled against Cudia but the CHR held in favor of him however the PMA
claimed that its findings are merely recommendatory.
Issue: Whether a cadet of the PMA can raise due process when punished.
Ruling: YES. Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which
has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his
peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the
good of the group." It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were
adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the
PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal
requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a
view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that career.
F. Procedural Due Process
13. Mullane versus Central Hangover Trust. Co. 339 U.S 306 (1950)
Facts:
Central Hanover Bank (P) was the trustee of a common trust fund formed by pooling the assets of a
number of smaller trusts. Central Hanover Bank petitioned to the New York Surrogate’s Court for a
judicial settlement of the trust. The only notice provided to beneficiaries was via publication in a
newspaper. Mullane (D) was appointed attorney and special guardian for a number of beneficiaries
who either were unknown or did not appear.
Mullane objected to the statutory provision for notice by publication, arguing that it was
unconstitutional for lack of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Surrogate’s Court
overruled Mullane’s objection and the ruling was affirmed on appeal to the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted cert.
Issue: WON the notice and the statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to
afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
Held:
The Surrogate court held that the notice required and given was sufficient. However, in the New York
Banking Law that does not require notice to all persons whose whereabouts are known, violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because contracting beneficiaries by mail at their
last known address is not particularly burdensome. Therefore, the judgement is reversed since the
basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are also known substantial
property rights.

14. La Chance versus Erickson 522 U.S 262 (1998)

Facts:
The respondents were federal employees subject to adverse actions by their agencies, each made
false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were
charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse
action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him ir her to the Merit Systems
Protection Board. The Board upheld the portion of each penalty based on the underlying charge. The
Board held that an employee’s false statement could not be used for purposes of impeaching the
employee’s credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for
employee’s underlying misconduct.
Issue:WON either the due process clause or the civil service reform act (CSRA) precludes federal
agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency
Held:
The Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Civil service reform act precludes a federal
agency for making false statement to the agency regarding this alleged employee related misconduct.
Chief Justice Renquist wrote that the core of due process is the right to notice and meaningful
opportunity to be heard but we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle. The view
expressed by the court of appeals in this case that a meaningful opportunity to be heard include a
right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.

15. Civil Service Commission versus Lucas, 301 SCRA 560 (1999)
Facts:
Raquel Linatok filed with the office of filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a photographer of the same agency
for misconduct. The complaint stemmed from the alleged act of Jose Lucas of touching and caressing
complainant's thigh running down to her ankle. After a formal investigation by the Board of
Personnel Inquiry, it issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and
recommending a penalty of suspension for one month and one day. The CSC, however, found him
guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court
of Appeals set aside the CSC resolution and reinstated that of the board and ruled that respondent
was denied due process as he came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when
he received notice of the CSC resolution dismissing him from the service. In its petition to the
Supreme Court, petitioner contended that a formal charges in an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution.

Issue:WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on the charge of simple misconduct

Held:
Yes. As Lucas was merely charged with simple misconduct but was convicted of grave misconduct,
he was deprived of his right to due process. In which the Court held that “We sustain the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed
of the charges against him and that (b) a person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was
not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and proceedings.”

16 Anonymous versus Radam 541 SCRA 12 (2007)

Facts

In an anonymous letter-complaint, Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of
Court of RTC of Alaminos, was charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that
respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in October 2005 and that her
behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. Judge Abella conducted a discreet investigation to verify
the allegations. In his report 6 months after, Judge Abella made the following findings:

 She was unmarried and gave birth

 She refused to marry the father because they planned to migrate to Canada
 She expressed remorse and promised not to commit the same mistake
 The father of the child is unknown as seen in the birth certificate
 She gave birth to 2 other babies while she worked abroad and before she was employed by the
RTC

Judge Abella’s Recommendation: Such conduct fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel
and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the judiciary
demands upright men and women. She is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT
EMPLOYEE. 1 month suspension or fine of 5 thousand pesos.

After reviewing the findings of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that:
  She be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving
birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker.
 She be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000 for
stating in the birth certificate that the father was “unknown” to her

ISSUES

3. Whether giving birth out of wedlock is an immoral and disgraceful conduct that would make
Radam administratively liable – NO
4. Whether Radam should be administratively liable for the incorrect entry in the birth certificate
that the father of the child is unknown – NO

RATIO

2. Giving birth outside of wedlock is not an immoral conduct that merits administrative
liability.

For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not per
se immoral. To warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.

(Estrada v. Escritor): there’s a distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality. This is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

For a particular conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral” behavior under civil service laws, it
must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on
“cultural” values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights
(such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may
be frowned upon by the majority.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded:

(1) If the father of the child is himself unmarried: the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

(2) If the father of the child is himself married to another woman: there is a cause for administrative
sanction against either the father or the mother.

As applied to the case, there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons. The situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution. The “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of having extramarital relations with a
married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized.In this case, she and the
father of her child were unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child out of wedlock.

3. Radam was not informed of the second charge.

Radam was charged only for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was
informed. The recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection with
an entry in the birth certificate came like a thief in the night. It was unwarranted. She was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge
of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.

The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s side,
whether written or verbal. Radam was deprived of due process with regard to her alleged
unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child. An
employee must be informed of the charges against him, and the normal to do so is by furnishing him
with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot be
dispensed with. The second minimum requirement is that the employee must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter. One’s employment is not merely a species of property
rights. It is also the means by which he and those who depend on him live. It is therefore protected
by the guarantee of security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no government
employee may be removed, suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided by law and after due
process. The administrative complaint is DISMISSED. She is, however, strongly advised to be more
circumspect in her personal and official actuations in the future.

17. Pefianco versus Moral, 322 SCRA 439 (2000)

A respondent in an administrative case is NOT entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of
record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee.

18. Ylaya versus Gacott, 698 SCRA 203 (2009)

Facts:

The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels
of land. Prior to the acquisition of these... properties, was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa. The RTC already fixed the price and
issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the
property. The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The
complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the
sale of... the property. The respondent then fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and
contrary to their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute
Sale... selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia
Carlos So, the complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother's sister) are his uncle and his aunt...
the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the
Case... the complainant executed an Affidavit... affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness
and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale

IBP Commissioner... found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01(A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner's finding, but
increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning... the respondent filed a
Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP's findings

Issues: whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively
liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13- SC

Ruling:

We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board
of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV
of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's properties.
We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting...
interests without the written consent of the represented parties... and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. we agree with the respondent and find the evidence
insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1)... the evidence against
the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the
complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold... no prohibition exists against the
notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is the notary's relative within the
4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized the documents.
We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests
without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being
remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of

Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a
penalty, he is SUSPENDED

19. Macias versus Macias,601 SCRA 203 (2009)

20. Office of the court administrator versus Indar, 669 SCRA 24 (2012)
21. Ingraham versus Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
Facts: Two students, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews were subjected to particularly harsh
corporal punishment for minor infractions at the Charles R. Drew Junior High School. The people
administering the punishments were the school’s principal and assistant principals. Florida law
allowed corporal punishment that was not “degrading or unduly severe,” suggesting as appropriate
hitting a child’s rear with a paddle five times. Ingraham, however, was struck 20 times by the school
principal to the point where Ingraham needed medical attention. Andrews was paddled several
times and also hit on the arms, which left an injury that lasted a week. The families of the children
filed suit against the administrators and school system in federal court. The suit alleged that the
punishment violated the children’s constitutional rights.

Procedural History:

 The District Court, after a trial, found no constitutional basis for relief. It noted that the
punishment did not rise to cruel and unusual punishment and dismissed the suit.
 On appeal, one panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to reverse.
 However, after a rehearing before the Fifth Circuit en banc, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
District Court.
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue and Holding: Does corporal punishment in public school violate the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? No.

Judgment: The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied: The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment does not apply to corporal punishment in public schools, nor does due process
require notice and a hearing before imposing such punishment.

Reasoning:The history of the Eighth Amendment demonstrates that the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment was meant to apply to criminals, not school children. Further, the openness of
public schools and the community’s supervision of schools provide enough safeguards against
excessive discipline of children. Moreover, if a punishment is too harsh, then an administrator is
liable in civil or criminal court. With regard to due process, the practice of corporal punishment is
limited by the common law. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not
require notice and a hearing before imposing corporal punishment. The Florida corporal
punishment law provides significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment. Adding
constitutional requirements intrudes too far into the State’s educational responsibilities.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:

Dissenting Opinion (White):

The Court is wrong to rule out the Eighth Amendment entirely. It is possible that corporal
punishment can be so severe that it implicates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Essentially, punishment is punishment regardless of whether it is in the
criminal context or in school. Thus, the Eighth Amendment can apply. Further, students should be
entitled to some type of hearing before having a beating inflicted upon them. They should at least be
allowed to provide their side of the story.
Dissenting Opinion (Stevens):Justice White’s analysis is correct. It is important to add that, with
regard to due process, a remedy for a due process violation after there was a deprivation of liberty
may be sufficient.

Significance:Ingraham v. Wright is a landmark case because it held that corporal punishment in

public school could not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. To this day, there are still some states that allow corporal punishment in public
schools. In addition, corporal punishment is legal in private schools in every state except New Jersey
and Iowa.

22. Guzman versus National University, 142 SCRA 699(1986)

FACTS:
Due Process – Due Process in Educational Institutions In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others
complained that the National University (NU)barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU
argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al
spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were
violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that
Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest
of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in the case at
bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which
school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they maybe expelled
from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to
determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions. Under the
Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were
being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. ”Therefore, in effect, NU, by
barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the students without due
investigation – such act is illegal. The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are:1. That the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;2. That they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;3. That
they shall be informed of the evidence against them;4. That they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case

23. De La Salle University Inc. versus Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 22 (2007)

THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an
offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino
Lux Fraternity.

On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two
other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted
the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony,
one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical
violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.

On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft
Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He
panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands – “parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind
Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also
punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards
arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who
attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko na kita ang mukha niya,
hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the
group.

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,”
while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[2][7] with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints[3][8] were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-
APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin
A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear
and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the
written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m.
at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in
your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your
witnesses.On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through
the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit
the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained
of.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them. On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution[5][18] finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of
automatic expulsion,[6][19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and
thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.

ISSUE : Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown
hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?

HELD: Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated.

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here
are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance of the counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.”]Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.[9][67] Notice and
hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot
be said that there was denial of due process.[12][70]

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be
heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them
by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity
to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were
also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University[15][73]where this Court held that “x xx the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x xx an essential part thereof.”

24. Tumey versus Ohio, 273 U.S 510, 71 L. Ed 749, 47 S Ct 437 (1927)
Facts:
Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College
Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the
motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and
costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of
common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the
ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals
of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment
of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumeys application to require the
Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as
of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on
constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed
for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was
then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state
Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in
prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters
merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case,
to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are
paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came
before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the
defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation
of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when
he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually
imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curatlex.
The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a
minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought
before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect
of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest
of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law
is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the
country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The
trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review
confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing
court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so
manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an
impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the
disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial
needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification.

25. Macalintal versus Teh, 280 SCRA 623 (1997)

26. Office of the Court Administrator versus Floro, Jr. 486 SCRA 66 (2006)
FACTS:
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that
“a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory”—a parallel proscription for lawyers is found
in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: “a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.”—Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory.” A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.” This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the
exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, “(i)f lawyers
are prohibited from x xx using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement
regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with
more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification.
Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.”

Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that
the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted—by including therein the
honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar top-notcher, Judge Floro breached
the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.—In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that
the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card “may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced.” In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards
cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar top-notcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and
modesty required of judges.

Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.—We find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing
self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human
upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking
publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the
confines of the code they swore to observe.

Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications
especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign
of insecurity. As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing
in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as
platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who
very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges
as the bastion of justice—confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the
judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’
approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence
until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated.—As to the argument of Judge Floro
that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly
reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals wherein we
held that “no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of
Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation.” Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss
in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance
of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, “People v. Luisito
Beltran,” “People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,” “People v. Rowena Camino,” and “People v. John Richie
Villaluz.” From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge
Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural
rule.

Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors in handling probation cases. We perceive
three
fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring
the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order
granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open
court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Floro’s insistence
that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and
uphold it conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and
simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise “would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the
fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments.” This rule, however, admits of an
exception as “good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error.” Thus, even if a judge acted in
good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.

Same; Same; Like Caesar’s wife a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion—his language, both
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.—Canon
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” This means that a judge whose duty is
to apply the law and dispense justice “should not only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest” as well. Like Caesar’s wife,
a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality.
Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections
to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. “His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.”

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found
that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.—SEC. 12. Suspension of
arraignment.—The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears
to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The above-cited
rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike
Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made “upon motion by the proper party.” Thus, it was well within the discretion of
Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motuproprio based on his own assessment
of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings
if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional
advice to client.—Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: “No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client.” Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: “A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law.”

Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking.—Be that as it may, though Judge Floro
might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for
signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon
City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only
logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or
put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily,
Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a “judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.” By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very
awkward position.

Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a
judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in
resolving controversies.—Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary
duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the
case of People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited
the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a
“fairytale” or a “fantastic story.” He then went to state that “psychic phenomena” was destined to
cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.—The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge,
however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. This power—consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts—is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an
adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a
final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.—The rule now is that a Judge
can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90
days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him
or her. This is because Unlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged
with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a
judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield
the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption
of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of justice where
litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary
consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil
servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges
are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA
66(2006)]

27.Zambales Chromite Mining Co. versus Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 21 (1979)

Facts:
Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case fled by the
petitioners Zambales chromite mining co that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior
locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in santacruz, zambales. On the basis of
the petitioner’s evidence the private respondents did not present any evidence and they fled a
demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest., Director Gozon found that the petitioners
did not discover any mineral nor stated and located mining claims in accordance with law the
petitioners then appealed from that order to the secretary of ariculture and natural resources while
the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed secretary of agriculture and natural resources
instead of inhibiting himself', he decided the it he was adjudicating the case 'or the first time thus,
secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director oillnes
e acted as reviewing authority in the appeal 'rom his own decision% Or, to use another analogy, he
acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’ s right to due process is violated
Held: Yes, Petitioners appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental airness, when
secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director o' #ines%&n order that the review o' the
decision o' a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a 'arce the reviewing offcer must er'orce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view
or there would be no real review o' the case the decision o' the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view on the case sense on proportion and consideration 'or the fitness of things
should have deterred Secretary Gozon 'rom reviewing his own decision as Director o' #ines% e
should ha e as/ed his undersecretary to undertake the review

28.Singson versus National Labor Relations Commission, 724 SCRA 358 (1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay
Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and
vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each would be detached at the start of each
leg of the trip. Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon
corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was not
until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to Manila. Singson
commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before
the Regional Trial Court. CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that
CATHAY’s refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of
gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner
P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages,
P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs. On appeal
by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that there was gross negligence
amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for
moral and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s fees as well.

ISSUES:

1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of
petitioner.

2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.

HELD:

1.) Yes. x xx the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written
contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written
contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger
agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong
back to the Philippines, and the carrier’s acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back
home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket;
and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place
of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the
instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. , x xx the loss of the coupon was attributable to the
negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's
return flight.

2.) Yes. x xx Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the negligence of the carrier is so
gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes
entitled to recover moral damages.

x xx these circumstances reflect the carrier’s utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights
of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the
rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have
acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in
addition to actual damages, is proper.

However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court have to be reduced. The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends
upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited
by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to
indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are
not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to
alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's
culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount
of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.

In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an
award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.

On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of P20,000.00
granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed.

As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was therefore
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court; consequently,
petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead of P100,000.00
earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable.

29. Tejano versus Ombudsman. 462 SCRA 560 (2005)

Facts: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons involved in
the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas ordered petitioner to file their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against petitioner and was
thereafter referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer, Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the
memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer. Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor,
concurred in the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the
Sandigan bayan petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner
filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was
assigned to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner
Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was
approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal
note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor
Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the
Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the
case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer
III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the
prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was the
second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of
the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special
Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March
2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion. In a
memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial
of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos
changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring
in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired,
approved Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case. The First
Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. The instant petition was
transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

Issue: where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in
the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of
appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desiertoto recuse himself from participating in
the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his
Deputies

30. Office of the Ombudsman versus Quimbo, 751 SCRA 632 ( 2015)
FACTS:
Even if the Ombudsman is not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers
include defending its decisions before the Court of Appeals. Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial
Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar filed a complaint for Sexual Harassment and Oppression
against Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas alleging that, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead and nape and, in the
course thereof, he said, “You had been lying to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I
have to see yours?” Also, Quimboordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan,
Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of
the personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office because of her refusal to submit to his sexual
advances. Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint but was denied by the Ombudsman-
Visayas. The Ombudsman-Visayas dismissed the case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but
finding him guilty of oppression. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it reversed the ruling
of the Ombudsman-Visayas and denied the motion for intervention of the latter.
ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman possess the requisite legal interest to intervene in the proceedings where its
decision is in question?
RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may validly
intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court
elucidated in Ombudsman v. De Chavez thus: The Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in
the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping
with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority. The
Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its
decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed
against the government and public interest.

31.Legaspi versus City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771 (2013)

FACTS
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to
authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City. On July 29, 1997, Atty.
Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.)
brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for
being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records
and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized
by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM
that he had first to pay P4,20 0.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car
but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was
also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the
violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his
car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was
immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the
release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded
the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay
exterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not obstructing
the flow of traffic. The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664
valid. Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came
to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional?
HELD: YES. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests
of a valid ordinance thusly: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable. As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of
the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962,
March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied) In the present case,
delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu. The CA opined, and correctly
so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and
regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. The police power granted to local
government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of
the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty and property. Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of
law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review,
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times". To reiterate, the
clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance
against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated
on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

G. Substantive Due Process

32. Buck versus Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)

Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the
sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of
society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine
whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.
Question Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process
of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made
clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the
substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the
patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme
Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of
observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a
law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough."

33. Michael H. versus Gerald D. 491 U.S 110 (1989)

Facts:

In May, 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with,
appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has
always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant
Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's
first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at
times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June, 1984. In
November, 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity
and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-
complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and
Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no
triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal.Evid. Code § 621, which provides that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a
child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and
then only in limited circumstances. Moreover, the court denied Michael's and Victoria's motions for
visitation pending appeal under Cal. Civ. Code § 4601, which provides that a court may, in its
discretion, grant "reasonable visitation rights . . . to any . . . person having an interest in the [child's]
welfare." The California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting Michael's procedural and substantive due
process challenges to § 621 as well as Victoria's due process and equal protection claims. The court
also rejected Victoria's assertion of a right to continued visitation with Michael under § 4601, on the
ground that California law denies visitation against the wishes of the mother to a putative father who
has been prevented by § 621 from establishing his paternity.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, affirmed. JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
and in part by JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE KENNEDY, concluded that:

1. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing to establish
his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man. Pp. 491 U. S. 118-130.

(a) Michael's contention that procedural due process requires that he be afforded an opportunity to
demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing fundamentally misconceives the nature of § 621.
Although phrased in terms of a presumption, § 621 expresses and implements a substantive rule of
law declaring it to be generally irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during,
and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband and had a prior
relationship with him, based on the state legislature's determination, as a matter of overriding social
policy, that the husband should be held responsible for the child and that the integrity and privacy of
the family unit should not be impugned. Because Michael's complaint is that the statute categorically
denies all men in his circumstances an opportunity to establish their paternity, his challenge is not
accurately viewed as procedural. Pp. 491 U. S. 119-121.

(b) There is no merit to Michael's substantive due process claim that he has a constitutionally
protected "liberty" interest in the parental relationship he has established with Victoria, and that
protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state interest to support
termination of that relationship. Michael has failed to meet his burden of proving that his claimed
"liberty" interest is one so deeply imbedded within society's traditions as to be a fundamental right.
Not only has he failed to demonstrate that the interest he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been
accorded protection by society, but the common law presumption of legitimacy, and even modern
statutory and decisional law, demonstrate that society has historically protected, and continues to
protect, the marital family against the sort of claim Michael asserts. 491 U. S. 121-130.

2. The § 621 presumption does not infringe upon any constitutional right of a child to maintain a
relationship with her natural father. Victoria's assertion that she has a due process right to maintain
filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald is, at best, the obverse of Michael's claim and fails
for the same reasons. Nor is there any merit to her claim that her equal protection rights have been
violated because, unlike her mother and presumed father, she had no opportunity to rebut the
presumption of her legitimacy, since the State's decision to treat her differently from her parents
pursues the legitimate end of preventing the disruption of an otherwise peaceful union by the
rational means ofnot allowing anyone but the husband or wife to contest legitimacy. Pp. 491 U. S.
130-132.

JUSTICE STEVENS, although concluding that a natural father might have a constitutionally protected
interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another
man at the time of the child's conception and birth, also concluded that the California statutory
scheme, as applied in this case, is consistent with the Due Process Clause, since it did not deprive
Michael of a fair opportunity to prove that he is an "other person having an interest in the welfare of
the child" to whom "reasonable visitation rights" may be awarded in the trial judge's discretion under
§ 4601. The plurality's interpretation of § 621 as creating an absolute bar to such a determination is
not only an unnatural reading of the statute's plain language, but is also not consistent with the
reading given by the courts below and California courts in other cases, all of which, after deciding
that the § 621 presumption barred a natural father from proving paternity, have nevertheless gone
on to consider the separate question whether it would be proper to allow the natural father visitation
as an "other person" based on the best interests of the child in the circumstances of the particular
case. Here, where the record shows that, after its shaky start, the marriage between Carole and Gerald
developed a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving and harmonious family home, there
was nothing fundamentally unfair in the trial judge's exercise of his discretion to allow the mother to
decide whether the child's best interests would be served by allowing the natural father visitation
privileges. Pp. 491 U. S. 132-136.

SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
joined, and in all but n. 6 of which O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part, in which KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 132. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 491 U. S. 132. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 136. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 157.

34. Kansas versus Hendricks, 521 U.S 346 (1997)

Facts of the case
As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of
child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent
Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from
pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment
under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in "predatory
acts of sexual violence" brought on by "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder[s]." On appeal
from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

Question

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental
abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

Conclusion

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain
a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by
requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to
repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined
persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked
other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy
guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST

Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act establishes procedures for the civil commitment of persons
who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," are likely to engage in "predatory
acts of sexual violence." Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to commit respondent
(and cross petitioner) Hendricks, who had a long history of sexually molesting children and was
scheduled for release from prison. The court reserved ruling on Hendricks' challenge to the Act's
constitutionality, but granted his request for a jury trial. After Hendricks testified that he agreed with
the state physician's diagnosis that he suffers from pedophilia and is not cured and that he continues
to harbor sexual desires for children that he cannot control when he gets "stressed out," the jury
determined that he was a sexually violent predator. Finding that pedophilia qualifies as a mental
abnormality under the Act, the court ordered him committed. On appeal, the State Supreme Court
invalidated the Act on the ground that the pre commitment condition of a "mental abnormality" did
not satisfy what it perceived to be the "substantive" due process requirement that involuntary civil
commitment must be predicated on a "mental illness" finding. It did not address Hendricks' ex post-
facto and double jeopardy claims.
Held:

1. The Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies "substantive" due process requirements. An
individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding physical restraint may be
overridden even in the civil context. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,197 U.S. 11, 26. This Court has
consistently upheld involuntary commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to control
their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, provided the confinement
takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Foucha v. Louisiana,504 U.S.
71, 80. The Act unambiguously requires a pre commitment finding of dangerousness either to one's
self or to others, and links that finding to a determination that the person suffers from a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder." Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if
it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or
"mental abnormality," see, e.g., Heller v. Doe,509 U.S. 312, 314-315, for these additional requirements
serve to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its pre commitment
requirement of "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." Contrary to Hendricks' argument,
this Court has never required States to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil
commitment statutes and leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have
legal significance. Cf. Jones v. United States,463 U.S. 354, 365, n. 13. The legislature is therefore not
required to use the specific term "mental illness" and is free to adopt any similar term. Pp. 8-13.

2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post-facto
lawmaking. Pp. 13-24.

(a) The Act does not establish criminal proceedings, and involuntary confinement under it is not
punishment. The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal is a question of
statutory construction. Allen v. Illinois,478 U.S. 364, 368. Nothing on the face of the Act suggests that
the Kansas Legislature sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme. That
manifest intent will be rejected only if Hendricks provides the clearest proof that the scheme is so
punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Kansas' intention to deem it civil. United States v. Ward,448
U.S. 242, 248-249. He has failed to satisfy this heavy burden. Commitment under the Act does not
implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Its
purpose is not retributive: It does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct, but uses such
conduct solely for evidentiary purposes; it does not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for
commitment; and it lacks a scienter requirement, an important element in distinguishing criminal
and civil statutes. Nor can the Act be said to act as a deterrent, since persons with a mental
abnormality or personality disorder are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. The
conditions surrounding confinement--essentially the same as conditions for any civilly committed
patient--do not suggest a punitive purpose. Although the commitment scheme here involves an
affirmative restraint, such restraint of the dangerously mentally ill has been historically regarded as
a legitimate nonpunitive objective. Cf. United States v. Salerno,481 U.S. 739, 747. The confinement's
potentially indefinite duration is linked, not to any punitive objective, but to the purpose of holding
a person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. He is thus
permitted immediate release upon a showing that he is no longer dangerous, and the longest he can
be detained pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year. The State's use of procedural
safeguards applicable in criminal trials does not itself turn the proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. Allen, supra, at 372. Finally, the Act is not necessarily punitive if it fails to offer
treatment where treatment for a condition is not possible, or if treatment, though possible, is merely
an ancillary, rather than an overriding, state concern. The conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive
removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post-facto claims. Pp.
13-21.

(b) Hendricks' confinement does not amount to a second prosecution and punishment for the offense
for which he was convicted. Because the Act is civil in nature, its commitment proceedings do not
constitute a second prosecution. Cf. Jones, supra. As this commitment is not tantamount to
punishment, the detention does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though it follows a
prison term. Baxstrom v. Herold,383 U.S. 107. Hendricks' argument that, even if the Act survives the
"multiple punishments" test, it fails the "same elements" test of Blockburger v. United States,284 U.S.
299, is rejected, since that test does not apply outside of the successive prosecution context. Pp. 22-
23.

(c) Hendricks' ex post-facto claim is similarly flawed. The Ex Post-Facto Clause pertains exclusively to
penal statutes. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales,514 U.S. 499, 505. Since the Act is not
punishment, its application does not raise ex post-facto concerns. Moreover, the Act clearly does not
have retroactive effect. It does not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment or deprive
Hendricks of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes. Pp. 23-24.

259 Kan. 246, 912 P. 2d 129, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts II and III.

35. Washington versus Glucksberg, 521 versus 702 (1997)

 Four doctors, three terminally ill patients, and a non-profit group brought a suit challenging
the State of Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide.
 They argued that the ban was unconstitutional because it violated due process.
 The District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the ban was
unconstitutional.
 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that the Due Process Clause is not violated by laws
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.

Statement of the Facts:

The State of Washington has historically made the promotion of suicide a crime, and the most recent
State law prohibited assisted suicide. Dr. Harold Glucksberg, three other doctors, three terminally ill
people, and the non-profit group Compassion in Dying – an organization that provided guidance for
people considering assisted suicide – challenged the Washington State law in federal court. They
argued that the “right to die with dignity” was a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural History:

 The District Court agreed that the prohibition on assisted suicide was unconstitutional.
 On appeal, one panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to reverse.
 However, the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court’s decision following a
hearing en banc.
  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue and Holding:Does a law prohibiting assisted suicide violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? No.

Judgment:The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:There is no fundamental liberty interest in assisted

suicide such that a State would be wrong to ban the practice.

Reasoning:

A review of our country’s history, legal traditions, and practices show that assisted suicide has been
either punished or met with disapproval for over 700 years. Assisted suicide is a crime in almost
every State in the country. The prohibitions on assisted suicide have been recently reexamined and,
for the most part, reaffirmed in many States. Also, the President signed the Federal Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997, prohibiting the use of federal funds for physician-assisted suicide.
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. In evaluating a substantive due process challenge, the
Court must see if a right is rooted in this Nation’s history, and that the liberty interest is “carefully
described.” Here, the right is not rooted in our history, and the liberty interest has been described in
many different ways.

We see the interest being asserted here as whether there is a “right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so.” We do not believe such a right is fundamental in our
society. The right asserted here is different than the right to refuse medical treatment. The
difference is in dying from natural causes versus inducing death from medication.Finally,
Washington’s law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The State has a legitimate
interest in life, in preventing suicide, in medical ethics, and in protecting those who may not actually
consent to life-ending medication.The debate this country is having over assisted suicide should
continue, and this Court need not stifle the debate at this point.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions:

Concurring Opinion (O’Connor):

The respondents in this case urge not a general right to “commit suicide.” Rather, they seek an
answer to the narrower question as to whether a mentally competent person, who is experiencing
immense suffering, has a constitutionally recognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of
his or her imminent death. In the context of this case, there is no reason to reach that question.

Concurring Opinion (Stevens):

While the Court’s holding is consistent with allowing a vigorous debate on the assisted-suicide issue
to continue, it should be noted that there is also room for debate on the constitutional limits on a
State to punish the practice of assisted suicide.

Concurring Opinion (Souter):

There are strong liberty interests on both sides of this debate, and the Court properly remained out
of the debate on this emerging issue. State legislatures should have the freedom to consider this
issue. While the right to assisted suicide should not be foreclosed for all time, it is properly being
debated in State legislatures throughout the country.

Concurring Opinion (Ginsburg):

Justice Ginsburg concurs for the reasons stated in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion.

Concurring Opinion (Breyer):

Justice O’Connor’s opinion has more significance than the Court’s opinion my suggest. In a different
case, in which a patient seeks to avoid pain at the end of life, the Court would likely have to revisit its
conclusions.

Significance:

Washington v. Glucksberg is a landmark case because it holds that assisted suicide is not a right
protected by the Due Process Clause. When compared to the Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
Health decision, it creates a distinction between recognizing a right to accept a natural death
(Cruzan) and not recognizing a right to induce death when a person could naturally remain alive
(Glucksberg).

36.Lawrence versus Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003)

Statement of the facts:

Lawrence and Garner were engaging in sexual activity when an officer entered the home of Lawrence
in response to a reported weapons disturbance. The officer arrested both Lawrence and Garner and
held each in overnight custody. The two men were later charged in Texas by a Justice of the Peace.

Procedural History:

Lawrence was convicted and exercised his right to a new trial. His convictions were affirmed.
Lawrence then appealed to the Texas court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the decision and
after petitioning the Supreme Court, certiorari was granted.

Issue and Holding:

Is the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct, including homosexual activities,
protected under the constitution? Yes.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

The right of consenting adults to engage in sexual conduct in the privacy of their homes is protected
by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment’s liberty interest. This right encompasses
homosexual activities.
Judgment:

Overruled, two consenting adults may engage in sexual activity in the privacy of their own home.

Reasoning:

The Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 168 (1986), upheld a statute in Georgia which prohibited
consensual, private, sodomy amongst both hetero and homosexuals. The Bower’s Court incorrectly
framed the issue as whether homosexuals have a right to engage in sexual activity under the
Constitution. This Court held that a ruling stating the right is not protected, would essentially have
the same consequence as determining whether or not homosexual relationships, in general, are
lawful. This determination would intrude on the fundamental right of homosexuals to participate in
familial relationships as well as intimate and personal relationships.

This Court held there is no historical precedent in America of laws directed at prohibiting distinct
homosexual conduct. In addition, enforcing legal punish for consensual conduct would be very
difficult.

The Bower’s Court was largely overstated when it relied on historical traditions in prohibiting
homosexual activity and was likely based on religious and moral preferences of each Justice.

This Court noted that many states that have laws in place prohibiting homosexual conduct do not
prosecute those who engage. The result is likely a reflection of the increasing social and legal
acceptance of the right to privacy of consenting adults and homosexuals. The Court cites Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) as authority stating evidence of this tendency.

The Court held that the rights of consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity is protected
under the liberty interest of the substantive due process clause. Here, the sexual activity in question
is protected by the Due Process Clause and Bowers is unconstitutional and overturned.

Concurring/Dissenting opinion:

Concurring (O’Connor)

The Majority’s basis for invalidating the Texas statute is improper. The law only punishes
homosexual conduct and should be held unconstitutional as a violation of Equal Protection. The state
of Texas’ only goal is a … “desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”

Dissenting (Scalia):

Bowers should be accorded respect in regards to the principals of stare decisis. In addition, the court
should not take into consideration public opinion or foreign laws when making such a ruling.

Dissent (Thomas):

Although the state statute is “uncommonly silly” and should be repealed, there is nothing in the
Constitution or its Bill of Rights that prevents the state from enacting the law in question.
Significance:

Lawrence v. Texas was the landmark case that decriminalized homosexual conduct and “keeps the
government out of our bedrooms” so to speak. The right of consenting adults both homo and
heterosexual to engage in sexual conduct was recognized as a constitutional right protected under
the right to privacy.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST

Facts of the case

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John
Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private,
consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual
intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual
Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by
different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do
their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated
premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia,
with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

37.Dela Cruz v. Paras , 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners
contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power
to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given
to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal
or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation
of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other
similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far
as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed
one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.
84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
Held: NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation
of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language
of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted
by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one
that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Gov’t Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject
to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their
business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of
an assumed power to prohibit.
38. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority versus Virtron Transportation Co. Inc. 530
SCRA 341.

Facts: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation
System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been
the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination
of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass
transport terminal facilities to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the
commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport
System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the
Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support
of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed
the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O.,
insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property
without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to
provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common
carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the
closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before
the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the
respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the
authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of
police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.

HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,”
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179
ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in
her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department)
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated
the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer
comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is
the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as
may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise
the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project,
which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of
control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the
Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of
the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation
of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing
agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924,
MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924
authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including
transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground
in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature
of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila
Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondent’s terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its
exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a
public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the
worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the
increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing
transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to
eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-
designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondent’s
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On
the contrary, the elimination of respondent’s bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and
the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in
line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of
vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by
provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of
suitable terminal sites.

39.ELENA P. DYCAICO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION 467,
SCRA 538 (2005)
An "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the due process clause.
Facts:
When Elena Dycaico’s husband, Bonifacio, died, she filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s
pension. Her application was denied on the ground that they were not living under the benefits of
marriage when Bonifacio became a member of the SSS using Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 as basis. The
RTC ruled in favor of the SSS, so does the CA.
Issue:
Whether the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which
qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, violates due process.
Ruling:
YES. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul
of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages
to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard. By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective
marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement, the proviso "as of the date
of his retirement" qualifying the term "primary beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement to
survivor’s pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date
of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282.
This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive
presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally
true. In this case, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was
Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his
primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a property
interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due
process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to
Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s
pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS
members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.

40. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS 707 SCRA 584 (2013)

FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a
marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to
pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios
declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00. However, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case don’t fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if
it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING: NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these
are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
41. Imbong versus Ochoa Jr. 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
FACTS
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions
shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE: WON RH Law violates the right to health
HELD: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products. Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions. This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly
ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status
quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be
maintained. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will
still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available
to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must
first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction. Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination
42. Obergefell versus Hodges 576 U.S. (No. 14-556, 26 June 2015)
Facts of the case

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to
recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages.
The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims
under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and
refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Question

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of
the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion

 5–4 decision for Obergefell

majority opinion by Anthony M. Kennedy

The Fourteenth Amendment requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex
couples.Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one
of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same
manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most
intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal
recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the
keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-
sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that
right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally
been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated
principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution
protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does
not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-
sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage
might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the
purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this
issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The
Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws
regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial
policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional
limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore
there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice
Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the
judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the
courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the
dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds
of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so
in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of
whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the
issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the
Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In
taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth
Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the
legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due
Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to
protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them
rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion
impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the
state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice
Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the
Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is
reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By
allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from
the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the
Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

43. Mosqueda versus Pilipino Banana Growers and Export Association Inc. 800 SCRA 313
(2016)

Facts: After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. The
Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.),
filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that
the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
valid and constitutional. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance, being based on
a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was
distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher
degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution. On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive; The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of
protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand,
and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues: whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power:
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b)
in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof
in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers...
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated. Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged
health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of
the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the
general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed,
however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its
mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of
police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have
properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of
its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it
employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing
the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to
taking without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if
it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands
that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the
means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition
against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification
includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction? We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose
or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

H. Void- For Vagueness, Overbreadth and Facial Challenges

44.Romualdez versus Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 (2008)

The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is
not
appropriate.
Facts:
Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn applications for Voter’s
Registration. They indicated that they are residents of Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were
residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them with violations of Omnibus Election Code and Voter’s
Registraion Act. The Comelec recommended the filing of information against the Spouses Romualdez
for violation of Voter’s Registration Act. Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due
process of law when the elections offenses for which they are charged by Garay are different from
the resolution of the Comelec. The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is
vague on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in
particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j)
of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.
Issue: Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration is vague.
Ruling: NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, the Court
has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate. Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The Court has similarly
stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. As structured, Section 4541 of
Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is,
without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders
itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. The
Court does not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague. Notably, herein petitioners do
not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand.
This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada
rejected the argument.

I. Constitutional and Statutory Due Process

45 Serrano versus National Labor Relations Commission , 32 SCRA 445 (2000)
FACTS
Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of IsetannDepartment Store. He was
charged with the task of supervising securitycheckers in their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and
preventing pilfirege of merchandise). On October 11, 1991, the management sent him a
letterimmediately terminating his services as security section head, effective on the same day. The
reason given by the management was “retrenchment”;they had opted to hire an independent security agency
as a cost-cuttingmeasure. Serrano filed a complaint for ID, illegal layoff, ULP, underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the LA. The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It
stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner
wasnot accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann employed
a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the former. The NLRC on the other hand
reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of
service, unpaid salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise
of management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment
in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety
supervisor’s position was long in place prior to Serrano’s separation from the company, or the phase-out of the
Security Section.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner’s dismissal was illegal.

RULING: Valid, but ineffectual (without legal effect)payment of backwages, separation pay and other
monetary claims No. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283
of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow
the procedural requirement provided by Art. 283 of LC. For termination due to authorized causes,
the employer must give a written notice of termination to the employee concerned and to the DOLE
at least 30 days prior to its effectivity. This Isetann failed to do. The question now arises as to whether
the failure of Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements renders the dismissal invalid, or,
in the event that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be meted out. Prior to the
doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in Wenphil Corp. NLRC in 1989, the termination of an
employee, even for just cause but without following the requisite procedure, renders such dismissal
illegal, and therefore null and void. In the Wenphil doctrine this was reversed; the said rule was
unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid but the employer was sanctioned
by way of the payment of indemnity (damages)in that case, P1,000. The amount of indemnity will be
depended on the circumstances of each case, taking into account the gravity of the offense committed
by the employer. Now, the Court once again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the effect
of the Wenphil doctrine was such that there has been a “dismiss now, pay later” policy where the employers were able
to circumvent the procedural requisites of termination, which is more convenient than the compliance
with the 30-day notice. Panganiban said that the monetary sanctions were too insignificant,
niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the deprivation of due process
which must be accorded to the employee renders the dismissal illegal. Puno quoted that Legislative,
Executive and Judicial proceedings that deny due process do sounder the pain of nullity.
Panganiban stated that such denial of due process renders decisions and proceedings void for lack of
jurisdiction. The present ruling of the Court held that the dismissal of the employee is merely
ineffectual, not void. The dismissal was upheld but it is ineffectual. The sanction provided was the
payment of backwages from the time of dismissal up to the decision of the court finding just or
authorized cause. This was thought to balance the interests of both parties, recognizing the employee’s
right to notice and at the same time the right of the employer to
dismiss for any of the just and authorized causes. The Court also responded to the arguments of
Justices
Puno and Panganiban
by stating that the violation in the procedural requirement of termination is not a denial of the
fundamental right to due process. This is because of the ff reasons:1)
The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the exercise of private
power, such as in this case. The provision “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law” pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to do the same. 2) The purpose of the
notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide an opportunity for the employee to be
heard before the power of the organized society is brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283,
however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to
determine whether economic causes exist to justify termination. It is not to give opportunity to be
heard there is no charge against the employee under Art. 2833)

The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause. Not all notice
requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be followed
before a right granted to party can be exercised; others are an application of the Justinian precept.
Such is the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a procedure for the termination
of employment which makes the termination of employment merelyineffectual.5)

Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without just or authorized cause renders such
dismissal illegal. To consider termination without observing procedural requisites as also ID is to add another
ground for ID, thereby amending Art. 279.; Further, there is a disparity in legal treatment, as
employees who resign without giving due notice are only liable for damages; it does not make their
resignation void. In this case, the separation pay was a distinct award from the payment of backwages
as a way of penalty. Petition was denied.

46. Agabonverus National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445 (2000)

Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when
they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned
their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. Upon denial of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned
their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. Petitioners also claim that private
respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on
the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.

Issues: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Ruling: To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but
also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It
is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For
a valid finding... of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by...
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The
intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified. an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his
employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job.

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs
to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements
and instead... argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a
valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last... known
address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due
process. that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements
of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions,
however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in
the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal,
or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The violation of the
petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at
bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED
to pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with
statutory due process.

Principles:

Labor Law
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify
the employee for the violation of his statutory rights

Political Law... we affirmed the presumption that all constitutional provisions are self-executing.

to declare otherwise would result in the pernicious situation wherein by mere inaction and...
disregard by the legislature, constitutional mandates would be rendered ineffectual.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide... a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty
for the violation of a self-executing... constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be... self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as
self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need
for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions... are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees... of "full protection to labor" and
"security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest
interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation... implies an unimpeachable right to continued
employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure
the protection and promotion, not... only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as
well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own
conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution. Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of
Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of
an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by
several framers of the 1987

Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.