GUILTY CLIENTS

Chua vs. Mesina 1

Francisco vs. Portugal 2
People vs. Pastor 3
People vs. Sandiganbayan 4
Que vs. Revilla 5
Resurreccion vs People 6
Spouses Telan vs. CA 6
Tri-Samonte vs. Obias 7
Santiago vs Fojas 8
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent.
A.C. No. 4904 August 12, 2004
Per Curiam NATURE: Conflict of Interest
FACTS:
Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for
breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother. Respondent's mother defaulted in paying a loan that she
obtained in a bank, thus respondent convinced complainants to help her mother if paying the said obligation, to which the
complainants acceded. It was agreed among that that in consideration for the act of complainants, the property which
they are leasing will be transferred to their name. The complainants complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of
sale concerning such property was executed.
However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent instructed complainants to execute another deed of sale
which will be antedated 1979, wherein the capital gains tax was not yet in effective.
Subsequently, after the execution of the deed of sale, respondents instructed his clients [complainants] to execute a simulated
deed of sale which will reflect that the property was re-conveyed to his mother.
The cunning acts of respondent did not end there. Respondent went to the house of complainants and got the owners
certificate of title of the said property which is still under the name of her mother. he promised to the complainants that he
will process the transfer of the property to their name. Years passed, but respondent never returned the said title to the
complainants.
Meanwhile, another lessee file a criminal case against the complainants and respondents for falsification. He claims that was
also given the promise that the property will be offered to him before it will be sold to another, but respondents sold it to
complainants without offering to him. Because of the foregoing circumstances, complainants filed an administrative case
against respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost
honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is
a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch
these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for,
by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus,
no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor.
Yes, said the Court- "This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital
gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale
wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed
dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owner’s
copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his
mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.

That the signature of “Felicisima M. Melencio” in the 1985 document and that in the 1979 document are markedly different is
in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both.

Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants,
consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the
purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.

Respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
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SO ORDERED.

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, vs.

ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL
A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006
TINGA, J NATURE: Guilty Clients
FACTS:
SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin were involved in a shooting incident which
resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them
before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder.

Complainants engaged the services ofAtty. Portugal for the accused. Atty. Portugal then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and an Urgent Motion forLeave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, as well as a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. Complainants never heard from Atty. Portugal again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his
office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to
Atty. Portugal’s last known addres sonly to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.

They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution denying the petition for late filingand non-
payment of docket fees. Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality andwarrants of
arrest had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remainedunknown, did
nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.6. Respondent states that it is of vital
significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of theaccused. He was merely requested by the
original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the herculean efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after
the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the
original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of
adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further
professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3
Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining
his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused
to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry
receipt issued for the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of
Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly
aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty Portugal’s withdrawal and disappearance are violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
DOCTRINES | HELD:
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be
circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more
importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it,
among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a
very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x
The Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was
engaged in. He described the incident, thus: the accused police officers who had been convicted of homicide for the
salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and attempted homicide of Mario C. Macato. Rule 14.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is
ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that salvaged the victims.
Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the
Sandiganbayan had not done so.
RULING:
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELPIDIO PASTOR, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 140208 March 12, 2002
Puno, J. Guilty Clients
FACTS:
In an Information dated March 12, 1999, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Incestuous Rape. On April 8,
1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of PAO lawyer Atty. Perpetuo Magallano, entered a plea
of not guilty.

During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio of PAO manifested that after a conference with accused-
appellant, the latter had decided to change his plea from Not Guilty to Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous
plea of not guilty be set aside and that accused-appellant be arraigned anew. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the Information which was read and translated to him in the Visayan dialect. Thereafter, the trial
court propounded clarificatory questions to accused-appellant to ascertain whether he understood the consequences of
his plea. On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of incestuous rape. Defendant appealed his case.

In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial court gravely erred in not applying the guidelines for a plea
of guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is
contended that the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello and People
vs. Dayot. Allegedly, the questions propounded to the accused-appellant were limited to his family background and
personal circumstances. Accused-appellant thus prays that the case be remanded to the court a quo for a full-blown trial.
ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court gravely erred in not applying the guidelines for a plea of guilty to a capital offense provided in Section
3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is duty bound to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3)
inquire from the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.The rationale
behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form,
namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
I. SEARCHING INQUIRY
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court miserably failed to discharge its duty to conduct a "searching
inquiry,"

First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in English but there is nothing in the records to show that
accused-appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding acquaintance with the English language.
Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant the elements of the crime of rape.

Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that accused-appellant was informed,
either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.

II.
The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused-
appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that the judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which
he based accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated that the complainant "positively declared that on
May 7, 1998, her father (the accused in this case), without her consent, forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her,
which resulted in her being pregnant." He then concluded that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to
sustain a conviction, and made a bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.
There is no discussion of the facts of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, in utter
disregard of the constitutional injunction that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”

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III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that accused-appellant was informed,
either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.

Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense counsel, Atty. Damalerio, for his client's cause when he
refused to cross examine the complainant, on the pretext that accused-appellant has pleaded guilty. We reiterate that it
is the bounden duty of lawyers to protect the constitutional right of an accused even when he has pleaded guilty to the
crime charged

This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty. Damalerio's perfunctory discharge of his obligation to present
evidence in behalf of accused-appellant. After the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Damalerio manifested that since the
accused-appellant had already pleaded guilty, he is not presenting any defense, and merely prayed that his client be
credited with the mitigating circumstances earlier claimed by him. To say the least, Atty. Damalerio's attitude falls short of
the noble duty of a lawyer to defend an accused however guilty he may appear to be if only to assure that his prosecution
is in accord with the procedure laid down by our law. In cannot be over emphasized that even the guilty cannot be
prosecuted by means revolting to the civilized demands of due process.
RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings in accord with the guidelines set forth in this Decision. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET,
G.R. No. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
Regalado, J. NATURE:GUILTY CLIENTS
FACTS:
The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who was formerly the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a
free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already designated and
reserved as a school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations
in his application, and somebody came forward and led a case of perjury against him. However, the same was
dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again, another case was #led against him for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
o0cials to favorably on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by respondent Atty.
Sansaet, a practicing attorney. Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged under the same set
of facts and the same evidence where such complaint. A perjury case where he was already arraigned has already
een dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and
transcripts as proof of his arraignment in theperjury case.Hwever, the documents were found to be falsified, in
conspiracy with Paredes, counsel and the clerk of court where the perjury case was filed.

Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another
case was filed for falsification of judicial records. 1t was then that respondent Sansaet ordered to testify as a state witness
against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the
ground of double jeopardy by havinghim and corespondent prepare and falsify the subject documents. But the
Sandiganayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege sincethe lawyer could not testify against
his own client. 1n view of such relationship, confidential matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to
accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the testimony of Sansaet, as state witness is barred by attorney-client privilege. NO.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar
as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the
past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or
with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal
which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same

4
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or
in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial
dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
Despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a
distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future
crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears,
however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on
alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a
defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case against the
latter.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and ORDERING
that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent
Sandiganbayan.

QUE VS. REVILLA, JR.

A.C. NO. 0754 December 04, 2009
NATURE: Guilty Clients
FACTS:
Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final judgment of the lower court against his client. Respondent
successfully filed a petition of certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two petitions of annulment of title and a petition
for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of the lower
court’s decision against his client.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accused lawyer violated various canons and provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple actions praying for the same cause delayed the
execution of the final judgment of the court. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood is also
alleged by the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the
late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients. The respondent’s
repeated attempts go beyond legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the
interests of his clients. The respondent violated his duty as an attorney “never to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR, and is found liable for professional misconduct
for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court
disbarred the respondent from the practice of law.

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x
xx
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. [37] The
recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17,
2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar

5
Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify
the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

PEDRO RESURRECCION VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192866 July 9, 2014
Guilty Clients
FACTS:
At the time of the controversy the accused was occupying the position of Municipal Mayor together with his co-accused
as Municipal Budget Officer and Municipal Engineer. They were charged with several counts of violation of RA. 3019 for
payment of construction materials intended for the improvement of the Municipal Building, and the purchase of one unit
of typewriter without public bidding and basic procedures for the disbursements of public funds were not followed. Further,
the petitioner was also charged for violating Article VI of the Constitution for receiving the amount of P3,000.00 as
reimbursement for his donation to the religious organization..
ISSUE/S:
WON petitioner is guilty of the offense charged
DOCTRINES | HELD:
Besides, as far as the court is concerned, the petitioners were already duly notified, through their counsel, of the entire
proceedings in the case. If they failed to inquire from their counsel as to the status and developments of their case, they
alone should be blamed.
YES. The Supreme Court held that Verily, Atty. Corpuz cannot be faulted for the waiver of the petitioners' defense. "For a
claim of a counsel's [gross] negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be
shown." "[T]he gross negligence, too,] should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice."

Here, Atty. Corpuz was present all throughout the presentation of the prosecution's evidence. While he allegedly failed
to communicate with the petitioners for nearly three years and to inform them about the status of their case, this
omission, however, does not amount to abandonment that qualifies as gross negligence. If at all, the omission is only an
act of simple negligence, and not gross negligence that would warrant the annulment of the proceedings below.

Besides, as far as the court is concerned, the petitioners were already duly notified, through their counsel, of the entire
proceedings in the case. 29 If they failed to inquire from their counsel as to the status and developments of their case,
they alone should be blamed. As held in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People:

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case
entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer
that everything is being taken care of is not enough. [citation omitted]

As clients, it is the petitioners' correlative duty to be in contact with Atty. Corpuz from time to time to inform themselves
of the status of their case. Considering that what is at stake is their liberty, they should have exercised the standard of
care which an ordinarily prudent man devotes to his business. The petitioners cannot simply leave the fate of their case
entirely to their counsel and later on pass the blame to the latter. "Diligence is required not only from lawyers but also
from their clients."

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision dated February 11, 2010 and the resolution
dated July 10, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25235-39 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN
G.R. No. 95026 October 4, 1991
SARMIENTO, J.: NATURE: Guilty Clients
FACTS:

The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who settled in 1973 on a property
abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela.
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his residence to the other side of the
national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. Because the lot

6
was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises
such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents Roberto Telan
and Spouses Vicente and virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their
own eatery within the same lot.

On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate from the Development Bank of the
Philippine (DBP). This was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said demand. Apparently VICENTE
and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by PEDRO
and ANGELINA.

Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.

On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case was dismissed. PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty.
Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case, but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, they asked another
person to sign for them.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal interposed
by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant
to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of Demolition for the enforcement of the
decision.

On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the Court without giving due course
required the respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days form notice thereof. At the same time, as prayed for,
effective "immediately" and "continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER was
issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated September 12, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the appellant/petitioner shall be afforded legal counsel even if the judgment is final and exxecutory
DOCTRINES | HELD:
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there
would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due
process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is
in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of
livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right
that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. No arrangement
or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786 are hereby REINSTATED and the
respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits.

MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE v EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS

A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013

Per Curiam Guilty Clients

FACTS:

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 Sometime in 1997, the spouses Nestor and Pura Tria hired Atty. Fanny Obias in a package arrangement for a parcel of
land they had bought for P2.8 million: to get the full consideration and deliver it to the sellers, to get the title and secure
the execution of the deed of sale, to pay all the taxes and other expenses, to transfer the title to the name of the buyers,
and to work for the conversion of the land from agricultural to residential.

Fanny got the money and the necessary documents. However, after some time, and despite repeated follow-ups, Fanny
failed to comply with her undertakings. Meantime, Nestor died and his daughter Jennifer, the complainant, took over.
She discovered that Fanny had notarized a deed of sale with a consideration of P200,000.00 over the same land in favor
of somebody. Jennifer filed an administrative complaint against fanny for grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice
with the Supreme Court. In defence, Fanny argued that Nestor instructed her not proceed with the sale and instead to
look for another buyer. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in 1999.

In 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner then issued a Report found that Fanny violated her oath her oath as a lawyer
because she “participated in the second sale of the subject property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the
prior sale of the same property to the Spouses Tria.” He recommended that Fanny be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of 5 years.

ISSUE/S:

W/ON the Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code?

DOCTRINES | HELD:

Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. These unyielding standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP but increased the penalty. Fanny was disbarred from the practice
of law. Citing Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court held that the “core ethical
principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in them. They are duty-bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.” The Supreme Court found that Fanny transgressed (these) rules as her actions were evidently prejudicial to her
clients’ interests.

Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she willfully
notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed from protecting
the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had in fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the subject property,
respondent (Fanny) participated and was even instrumental in bringing about the defeat of their rights over the said
property.

Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. These unyielding standards respondent (Fanny) evidently failed to adhere to.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is accordingly DISBARRED.

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO et.al, vs. ATTY. AMADOR R. FOJAS

A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
Davide Jr, J. Guilty Clients
FACTS:
An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador and ordered the complainants to pay,
jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals. The complainants lost in their
petition at the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or serious neglect of their counsel, Atty.
Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas assured them that everything was in order and he
had already answered the complaint. However, the appellants soon discovered that he never answered it after all
because, according to him, he was a very busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his “mistake” in failing to file an answer for the
expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for
reconsideration was denied. Atty. Fojas defended his negligence with the reason that the case was a losing cause after
all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the

8
complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a
disbarment case.
ISSUE/S:
WON committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an
answer
DOCTRINES | HELD:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. In his motion
for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly
invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he
attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to
file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence
and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.