Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the context of Smart Grids

Alexandre N. S. Balieiaa, Andrés A. Zúñigab, João F. P. Fernandesb, P. J. Costa Brancob

a
Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Rovisco Pais 1, Lisboa, 1049-001, Portugal
b
IDMEC, LAETA, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Rovisco Pais 1, Lisboa, 1049-001, Portugal

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Article history: Reliability assessment in traditional power distribution systems has played a key role in power system
Received 00 December 00 planning, design and operation. The emergence of the smart systems concept to face future energetic needs
Received in revised form 00 January 00 requires alternative approaches for evaluating the reliability of modern distribution systems, especially in
Accepted 00 February 00 the smart grids environment. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative reliability
assessment method that can be applied to establish the impact of faults on the smart grid performance,
Keywords: considering different failure modes of power and cyber network main components to stablish a risk level
Smart Grids for each of these analyzed failure modes. In addition, preventive maintenance tasks are proposed and
FMEA systematized to minimize the impact of high-risk failures and to increase reliability of the proposed test
Reliability analysis system.
Failure modes © 2014 xxxxxxxx. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction  the increased complexity of the electrical system, creating a

Electric energy plays a crucial role in today’s society. It is the most versatile
and easily controlled form of energy and it is involved in almost all aspects
of society’s daily routine.
In recent years, several new challenges have been emerging due to the
expansion of renewable energy sources (intermittent sources) in the
electrical grid, to the electrification of new industrial sectors or due to new
huge volume of online data generated from electrical systems. Moreover,
in the future smart grids, it is expected that energy becomes available
everywhere from dispersed sources associated with the growth of mobile
loads and the increasing number of energy storage equipment [1], [2]. With
this, new technological functionalities are required to provide energy
management in a more reliable, effective and secure way.
Conventional electric grid is a passive and rigid grid characterized by
predictable power flow directions, conventional energy sources and
expected load profiles. On the contrary, a smart grid can be described as an
active grid, with constant fluctuations due to the intermittent operation of
renewable energy sources, as solar or wind, unexpected load profiles, and
unpredictable power flow directions, making a more dynamic grid.
Consumers participation in demand response and in electricity markets are
also expected to play an important role in energy efficiency [2] [3].
However, new problems arise, such as:
considerable number of barriers to the development of such systems,
regarding technical and non-technical challenges;
 the correct operation of every single equipment in a smart grid will be
directly or, at least, indirectly dependent on the correct behavior of other
equipment;
 the needed to endow the grid of intelligence and robustness due to the
interdependence between cyber and power systems. A malfunction of
even a minor equipment can put in danger the efficiency and reliability
of electrical grid.
The lack of adequate control and management strategies can lead to
power outage of parts of the grid. Also, if the smart-grid is not capable of
handle cyber threats, a complete outage of the system may occur.
Reliability assessment in traditional power distribution systems
considers reliability probability modelling for power components such as
electrical lines, circuit breakers or transformers [6]. However, it is
important to evaluate the reliability and security of a smart power system
through alternate reliability approaches that take into account the
complexity previously described.
When considering reliability assessment tools, Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) arises as one of the most important methods. Benefits
of an RCM approach far exceed those of any type of maintenance program
and it has been widely used by the aircraft, spacecraft or nuclear industry
[7]. However, the use of RCM is relatively new in industries outside of
these areas. RCM strategies and its impact on power systems is still

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2 XXX 00 (2014) 000–000
undefined due to the lack of evidences and current applications. The study
of the RCM’s impact on these systems still require some developments.
Being used as a part of any RCM evaluation, Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative reliability method used to define, identify
and eliminate known and/or potential failures, problems and errors from the
system, design, process and/or service [8], [9]. It has been proofed that
FMEA is good tool for exhaustively identifying and recording the local
effects that arise from component failures and, thus, inferring the effects of
those failures at the system level. FMEA methodology will then be used in
a smart grid test system to evaluate smart grid risks and to study FMEA
contributions for reliability assessment in energy systems.
Several FMEA applications have been performed in the context of
smart grids and renewables systems. Concerning wind energy, in [10] is
shown a classical FMEA approach applied to assess the reliability on a
2MW wind turbine using three commercial softwares: XFMEA from
Reliasoft, Reliability Workbench from Isograph, and Relex Reliability
Studio 2007 from Crimson Quality. In [10], the three risk factors of FMEA
(Severity, Occurrence and Detection) were divided in four categories. It
was identified eight mechanical failure modes, five electrical failure modes
and three failure modes related to the turbine. Results show that when using
the product of the Occurrence and Detection risk factors, FMEA under-
estimates the operation field failure rates in new turbine designs. Authors
also concluded that a procedure for failures prioritization using their risk
priority number (RPN) value could be a useful tool for designers to identify
weaknesses in wind turbine designs [10].
Another FMEA application on wind energy is shown in [11], where
onshore and offshore wind turbines were considered. The classical FMEA
is compared with a modified FMEA that studies the probability of
occurrence instead a ranking for occurrence, considers the cost of the failure
mode instead of severity rank, and uses a non-detection possibility based
on failure data instead a of the detection ranking. The paper also proposes
a priority number called as cost-priority number (CPN), which was
obtained by multiplication of the new three risk factors considered [11].
Results show that, in general, the priority number from both approaches,
the RPN and CPN, produce very similar prioritization for most of the major
components considered.
In [12], the FMEA analysis is conducted to assess the reliability of
hydraulic turbines and to compare FMEA with the Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) method. Seven main hydraulic turbine components were considered
for both analyses. This work concluded that FMEA and FTA are
complementary methodologies because, while FMEA makes an exhaustive
analysis for each failure mode, FTA allows having a general vision of the
system and the relations between different components.
Another example of FMEA application is in (PV) systems. In [13]
FMEA is applied in a simple test system composed by four PV strings,
string combiner devices, inverter, cable system (aerial and underground), a
three-phase transformer and also its connection to the grid. Five categories
were defined for each of the FMEA’s risk factors ranking. Author clearly
shows that FMEA can improve the early detection of some hidden failures
that could not immediately affect the PV plant, but would induce a
degradation if no action is taken.
Another FMEA application in PV systems can be found in [14]. Authors
used relevant criteria and practical experience provided by personnel
working in a PV plant instead of using the one from theoretical and office
technicians. In this paper were identified 94 failure modes, 16 of which had
a RPN greater than 100 and were considered as the most critical failure
modes for prioritization. Authors’ conclusions establish substantial
differences between FMEA results using criteria from practical personnel,
like maintenance operators, and those results using a FMEA performed
considering the criteria of office and manage technicians, like engineers.
About energy storage (ES) technology, a recent analysis is developed
in [15], where a review of the failure modes that affect lead-acid batteries
(LCA) is done. The analysis focus on three aspects: (i) positive active
material degradation with loss of adherence to the metallic grid, and also
positive electrode grid corrosion; (ii) irreversible sulfating of the negative
active material; and (iii) the electrolyte, separator, charge–discharge
regime, and other elements that contribute to the battery failure. This work
shows the importance of identifying the failure modes and associated
mechanisms in lead-acid batteries and in lead-carbon batteries (LCB)
because it has a great potential for innovation and extensive applications in
solar integration projects.
Another extensive analysis of failure modes on lithium-based batteries
(LIB) is presented in [16], which is one of the most popular energy storage
technologies for several applications including electric cars. This paper
covers several experimental and simulation results to characterize different
failures modes and respective mechanisms in LIB technology. Most
important, authors claim the urgency for development of computational
direct simulation techniques for LIB based on its chemo-mechanical
models, to have a better perspective about possible material failures [16].
FMEA was also applied in power system components. For example, in
[17] a FMEA analysis is conducted to assess reliability in capacitors banks
used in distribution power system at the Sultanate of OMAN. Five
categories were defined for each FMEA risk factor ranking, and seventeen
main failure modes were identified and analyzed. In [18], FMEA was used
to identify the main failure modes to be used as input for a probabilistic
method to assess the reliability of a 400 kV transmission system at
substation equipment level.
In [19] a modified FMEA based on Fuzzy Logic was developed. Three
FMEA risk factor categories were represented by fuzzy sets and based on
three continuity indexes: the loss of power in distribution transformers
when a failure mode occurs, the frequency of interruption in each consumer
unit, and the duration of interruption in each customer unit. Results show
that the FMEA based on fuzzy logic achieve better prioritization results for
the analyzed equipment.
Power transformers failures have been extensively analyzed through
FMEA method because of its high impact in the electric power grids. In
[20], a FMEA including criticality analysis is performed on 92 power
transformers, identifying three critical components: windings with high
criticality, load-tap-changer (OLTC), and bushings with medium criticality.
In [21], a FMEA with criticality was applied on 384 non-failed
distribution transformers in India. Results show that component insulation
failures has the greater RPN and is caused by corrosion, moisture, high
acidity, hot spot due to overloading and, or low quantity of oil. Second
priority is achieved by winding failures that may be due to manufacturing
defects, transient overvoltage, lightening, short-circuit and faulty
connections [21].
At last, FMEA applications for smart grids as a whole was developed
in [25], where FMEA analysis was applied in distribution systems as a part
of RCM method to prioritize the maintenance for critical failure modes. In
[26], a FMEA analysis is conducted to identify the failure modes in micro-
grid equipment including different generation technologies. In [27], these
authors presented an FMEA analysis for a smart grid framework. A
comparison with a modified FMEA that combines the classical FMEA with
a fuzzy inference system was studied to improve the prioritization of failure
modes. Our results clearly showed that fuzzy-based FMEA obtains better
 ARAB ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS JOURNAL 00 (2014) 000–000 3

prioritization criteria for the analyzed failure modes when compared with Initiate FMEA of an
item
classical FMEA applied to a smart-grid framework.

Select a component of the item to analyze

2. Failure modes and effect analysis FMEA: main points

Identify failure modes of the selected component

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis is a systematic methodology designed
to identify known and potential failure modes, their causes and effects on Modification data
Select the failure mode to analyze
system performance [8], [17]. It was originally developed in the 1960s to
be used in the aerospace industry.
FMEA can be viewed as a proactive procedure for evaluating a process Identify the occurrence of the failure mode
by identifying where and how it might fail and assessing the relative impact
of different failures [23]. Despite FMEA primary objective to improve the
Determine the causes of each failure mode
system design, it can be applied in any stage of a project, aiming to mitigate
risks produced by failure modes through recommended actions. Identify inmediate effect and the final effect of the
FMEA considers three factors, called as risk factors to characterize each failure mode
failure mode: occurrence OCC, severity SEV, and detection DET.
Occurrence represents the number of times the failure mode occurs, Determine the current controls or mitigation method
of each failure mode
severity assigns a numerical value, in a qualitative way, to each possible
consequence associated with a failure, and detection represents how
detectable a failure can be before it happens. Based on these three risk Occurrence rank O Detectability rank D Severity rank S
factors, a risk priority number (RPN) is computed, assigning a numerical
value to determine the qualitative assessment of each failure modes in the Calculate the RPN for
FMEA. The RPN value is obtained multiplying the risk factors, as selected failure mode
expressed in (1):

RPN  OCC  SEV  DET (1) System correction

System modifications
YES required?

The higher the RPN of a failure mode, the greater the risk is for the
system reliability. Hence, proper actions should be preferentially taken on NO
the high-risk failure modes so that the system should increase its FMEA report
availability.
Fig. 1 – FMEA procedure (from [8]).
2.1. FMEA procedure

The general procedure for conducting an FMEA can be summarized in a

flowchart as that shown in Fig. 1 [8]. When all RPN’s are computed, the Table 2 - Traditional ratings for failure mode’s severity (SEV) [8]
recommended corrective modifications must be implemented (main loop in
the FMEA flowchart), and the analysis is performed again to verify if these Rating Effect Severity of effect
corrective actions reduced the risk in the system. The final FMEA report Highest severity ranking of a failure mode,
Hazardous
10 occurring without warning, and consequence
contains all the failure modes ordered by their RPN ranking. without warning
hazardous.
The risk factors OCC, SEV and DET are divided in categories; each of Hazardous with
Higher severity ranking of a failure mode,
9 occurring with warning, and consequence
these categories is rated by an integer number, usually in a scale from 1 to warning
hazardous.
10 as in [8] (or 1 to 5). Risk factor’s categories and ratings used in this work Operation of system or product is broken down
8 Very high
are in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3: without compromising safe
Operation of system or product may be
7 High continued, but performance of system or
Table 1 - Traditional ratings for failure mode’s occurrence (OCC) [8] product is affected
Operation of system or product is continued,
Rating Probability of failure Possible failure rate 6 Moderate and performance of system or product is
degraded
10 Extremely high ≥1 in 2
Performance of system or product is affected
5 Low
9 Very high 1 in 3 seriously, and the maintenance is needed
Performance of system or product is less
8 Repeated failures 1 in 8
4 Very low affected, and the maintenance may not be
7 High 1 in 20 needed
6 Moderately high 1 in 80 System performance and satisfaction with
3 Minor minor effect
5 Moderate 1 in 400 System performance and satisfaction with
2 Very minor slight effect
4 Relatively low 1 in 2000
1 None No effect
3 Low 1 in 15000
2 Remote 1 in 150000
1 Nearly impossible ≤1 in 150000
4 XXX 00 (2014) 000–000
Table 3 - Traditional ratings for failure mode’s detection (DET) [8]
Rating Detection Criteria
Absolutely Design control does not detect a potential cause of
10
impossible failure mode, or there is no design control
Very remote chance the design control will detect a
9 Very remote
potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Remote chance the design control will detect a
8 Remote
potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Very low chance the design control will detect a
7 Very low
potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Low chance the design control will detect a
6 Low
potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Moderate chance the design control will detect a
5 Moderate
potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Moderately high chance the design control will
Moderately
4 detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent
high
failure mode
High chance the design control will detect a
3 High potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Very high chance the design control will detect a
2 Very High potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
Almost Design control will almost certainly detect a
1 potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode
certain
3. Brief description of the smart grid test system
A simple smart grid test system was selected to apply the FMEA method,
shown in Fig. 2. It is composed by a four-bus power system and its
respective communication and control system.
3.1. Description of the smart grid test system
The smart grid test system in Fig. 2 represents a 30kV simplified smart
distribution network (detailed in black line) considered for our test system.
The power network is a meshed grid consisted of four 30kV substations.
The system presents redundancy in the 30kV grid, i.e., there are different
ways for energy transport between BUS1, BUS2, BUS3 and BUS4.
An 110MW conventional generation station (CG) is connected to
BUS1, while distributed renewable generation stations are referred to BUS2
with a 130 MW wind park (WE), and BUS4 with a 100MW photovoltaic
power plant (PV). Bus BUS3 is linked to a 50MW energy storage system
(ES). A total of four power transformers and fifteen circuit breakers are also
included in the grid.
Consumers in Fig. 2 are pointed as three load points: LPB2, LPB3 and
LPB4, connected to BUS2, BUS3 and BUS4, respectively. Point LPB2
represents a 20MW residential area, while LPB3 and LPB4 represent
industrial and commercial areas referred as 85MW and 40MW load points,
respectively.
In this smart grid test system, only bus bars, power cables (aerial lines),
circuit breakers (CB) and power transformers are considered for reliability
analysis. Storage facility and generation stations were not regarded into this
FMEA analysis.
Failure rates for each component have been collected from two main
sources: Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) and specialized databases. Table
4 lists the power components’ reliability data used in our research. Note
that relative to aerial cables and for simplification purposes, it was assumed
that different substations are equally distanced between each other (about
2,5km length).
Table 4 - Power equipment’s reliability data
Failure
Length Failure
Equipment rate Source
[km] rate [f/yr]
[(f/yr)/km]
Busbar 30kV - - 0.01 [29]
Cable 30kV 0.0054 2.5 0.135 EDP Distribuição
Circuit
- - 0.023 EDP Distribuição
breaker 30 kV
Transformer - - 0.01 EDP Distribuição
3.2. Description of the cyber network of the smart grid test system
In order to create a smart electrical system, a scheme of a cyber network
topology to integrate the power system functions as control, monitoring,
and protection is proposed. Among all possible cyber network topologies,
a cyber-ring topology shown in Fig. 2 was selected for our test model due
to its elementary architecture. The cyber-control network is a bus topology
LAN-Ethernet and WAN-optical fiber network consisted of human-
machine interfaces (HMIs), ethernet switches (SWs), servers (SVs), energy
boxes (EBs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and ethernet and optical
fiber links (all in blue, red and green lines in Fig. 2).
The metering infrastructure is composed by smart meters and
represented in Fig. 2 as energy boxes EBs, being linked to load points in
order to collect data about energy consumption. Note that, in practice, it is
assumed each customer is connected to a single EB but, for simplifying
purposes in this work, we consider only a main EB for all customers in each
load point.
IEDs, acting as interface devices between power and communication
network, include measuring units, protective relays, and controllers. Each
IED is responsible for monitoring and executes the commands received
from HMIs. Table 5 lists the cyber-power links between individual IED
controllers and their corresponding power elements (bus and circuit
breakers).
As shown in Fig. 2, each IED or EB element is connected to an Ethernet
switch (SW) through a LAN-Ethernet communication, which is then
responsible for redirecting information through the corresponding
communication links. Ethernet switches are all connected through a ring
topology towards WAN-optical fiber network links (green lines in Fig. 2).
A central Ethernet device (MAIN SW) is responsible for gathering
information from all points of the communication network, sending it to the
corporate and control centers (up blue blocks in Fig. 2).
In the control center, all data concerning the power system status is
available for monitoring, analysis and decision making. The control center
is responsible for scheduling power generation to meet consumers’ demand,
also managing major system problems by executing automatic procedures
or manual instructions through the HMIs. Real-time data gathered from the
power system are also displayed on the HMI, which allows real-time
intelligent data handling and network status monitoring. An Inter-Control
Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) server is specified to provide data
exchange over WANs between utility control centers and substations. As
also indicated in Fig. 2 up, An APPLICATIONS SERVER and an ENGINEERING
SERVER manage a big amount of data and information, which are stored in
an ENGINEERING DATABASE to efficiently operate the power system in a
safer, more reliable and cost-effective way.
 ARAB ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS JOURNAL 00 (2014) 000–000 5

CONTROL CENTER CORPORATE CENTER

REMOTE
ENGINEER /
DATABASE ICCP APPLICATIONS BUSSINESS AGENT E-MAIL WEB APPS FTP
BACKUP SERVER SERVER SERVER SERVER SERVER

ENGINEERING / OPERATIONS LAN SW SW CORPORATE LAN

FIREWALL FIREWALL

INTERNET

ENGINEERING BUSSINES BUSSINESS CORPORATE

ENGINEERING SERVER ENGINEERING CONSOLE SERVER DATABASE
CONSOLE DATABASE
FIREWALL

FIREWALL
OPTICAL FIBER LINK OPTICAL FIBER LINK

MAIN SW
IED5 IED6
CG CG WE

CB1 CB4
IED2
TR1 TR2
FIREWALL SW NET2 FIREWALL
IED1 BUS 1 BUS 2

CB2 CB3 CB5 CB7

CB6
EB2
L1
LPB2
L2 L3
IED3
L4
CB8 CB12
CB9 CB11 IED4

BUS 3 BUS 4
EB3 TR3 TR4 EB4
CB10 CB13
FIREWALL SW CB11 CB14 SW FIREWALL
LPB3 LPB4
ES PV

SW SW

IED7 IED8
FIREWALL FIREWALL

Fig. 2 – Cyber-Power network representing the smart grid test system.

The CORPORATE CENTER (Fig. 2 up, right) is responsible for managing

Table 5 - Cyber-power links between power and cyber network
a high number of energy market players that will compete to provide the
Link Linked equipment best power quality at best price. Cost fluctuations on energy generation (due
(IED1:BUS1), (IED1:CB2), to different penetration levels of distributed generation and dynamic energy
1
(IED1:CB3) demand) are managed in the BUSINESS SERVER in order to optimize cost
(IED2:BUS2), (IED2:CB5),
2
(IED2:CB6)
effectiveness operations and optimize the balance between energy demand,
(IED3:BUS3), (IED3:CB8), storage and production. A CORPORATE DATABASE is responsible for
3
(IED3:CB9) collecting and storing all energy markets information in the corporate
(IED4:BUS4), (IED4:CB12),
4 center, while E-MAIL SERVER, WEB APPS SERVER and FILE TRANSFER
(IED4:CB13)
5 (IED5:CG), (UED5:CB1) PROTOCOL (FTP) servers make it accessible for all market stakeholders.
Table 6 summarizes the reliability values of each cyber equipment
6 (IED6:WE), (IED6:CB4)
described in the anterior paragraph. All values were obtained from
7 (IED7:ES), (IED7:CB11)
datasheets and reliability statistics, and all derived using reliability theory
8 (IED8:PV), (IED8:CB14) about failure rates [27]. For the Ethernet links, reliability data was not found
explicitly in literature. To surpass this we assumed a very low failure rate
6 XXX 00 (2014) 000–000

value. Related to the optical fiber links, hawse assumed a total length of
10km in the communication network.
Table 6 - Reliability values for each cyber-control equipment.
 Circuit Breaker: protect an electrical circuit from damage by
interrupting current flow after a fault detection. Table 9 list the failure
modes considered for circuit breakers.
Table 9 – Failure modes for power cables.

Equipment Failure rate [f/year] Source Failure mode Criteria

Insulation failure Loss of dielectric properties can damage the CB.
HMI 0.172 EKE-electronics Improper parameterization or manual installation
Wrong operation
0.0225 leads to spurious opening or closures.
SW Cisco
Lightnings or external short circuits can damage
SV 0.027 Bushing breakdown
Backblaze the bushing.
Schweitzer Moisture can increase ohmic resistance in
Bushing terminal hotspot
IED 0.0526 Engineering bushing terminals, resulting in bushing damage.
Laboratories Loss of dielectric strength Heat, oxidation, acidity and moisture can lead to
EB 0.005 Frontier Economics in bushings bushing degradation.
Ethernet link ≤1E-6 - Mechanical failure in Lack of lubrication, contamination or corrosion
operating mechanism prevent CB from acting when necessary.
Optical fiber link 0.0438 [30] Contact wear and electrical treeing can damage
Contacts degradation
the equipment.

4. Identifying potential failure modes in the smart grid test

system  Power Transformer: step up or step down voltage, also providing a
secondary output voltage that is within statutory limits. Failure modes
Potential failure modes that can occur in the smart grid test system shown associated to transformer are listed in Table 10.
in Fig. 2 is needed to evaluate their causes and their impacts on the system.
Table 10 – Failure modes for power cables.
This section summarizes potential failure modes of each equipment in our
smart grid test system. First, each one is categorized according to their type
Failure mode Criteria
and their function in the test system. By this way, several failure modes are
Lightning or external short circuits can damage
defined and briefly described for each electrical power equipment. Bushing breakdown
transformer bushings.
Moisture can increase ohmic resistance in
Bushing terminal hot spot
bushing terminals, resulting in bushing damage.
4.1. Failure modes—electrical power equipment
Loss of dielectric strength Heat, oxidation, acidity and moisture can lead to
in bushings bushing degradation.
 Busbar: collect electric power from the incoming feeders and Magnetic-core Harmonics or corrosion can induce core
delamination degradation.
distributes them to the outgoing feeders. Table 7 list the four main Tap changer mechanical Corrosion, friction or contamination can lead to
busbar failure modes. failure in drive mechanism transformer unstable operation.
Tap changer contacts Contact wear and electrical treeing can lead to
Table 7 – Failure modes for busbar. degradation transformer unstable operation.
Vibration-induced damage, corrosion or
Tank rupture cracking of welds result in oil leakage and
Failure mode Criteria possible catastrophic event.
Oil contamination, oil moisture or short circuits
Loss of Metallic strip can lose its mechanical integrity due to Windings isolation
and overloads can damage transformer
structural support insulators breakdown, cracking of welds and degradation or breakdown
windings.
integrity fracture of the copper bar.
Distortion, loosening or
Loss of electrical displacement of the Can lead short circuits.
Occurrence of arc flashes degrades the copper bar.
continuity windings
Loss of electrical Internal short circuits or human sabotage can
Moisture and humidity can lead to short circuits. Transformer explosion
efficiency lead to catastrophic events.
Electrical Short circuits between buses and harmonics can lead to Damaged fans or cooling pipes obstruction can
operation failure ohmic heating. Cooling system failure
also lead to catastrophic events.

4.2. Failure modes— cyber-control equipment

 Power Cable: carry load and fault currents safely and reliably, without
overheating or causing damage to the environment. Table 8 list the Related to the cyber-control equipment, their functions in the
failure modes considered for power cables. communication network are described below for each component:

Table 8 – Failure modes for power cables.

 IED: to monitor, control and optimize the effective utilization of energy
between generation and load. Failure modes are listed in Table 11.
Failure mode Criteria
The ageing process results in the eventual failure of the
Insulation failure
insulating and sheathing materials.
Cable integrity Manufacturing imperfection, incorrect installation or
defect hostile environments can result in cable breakdown.
Electrical Moisture, shield damage, overloads or short circuits can
operation failure damage the cable.
 ARAB ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS JOURNAL 00 (2014) 000–000 7

Table 11 – Failure modes for IED. Table 15 – Failure modes for EB.

Failure mode Criteria Failure mode Criteria

Related to the susceptibility of cyber equipment to lose Related to the susceptibility of cyber equipment to
Security failure Security failure
their integrity. lose their integrity.
Damaged transducers or poor signal can lead to Related to remote disconnection of power,
Defective Power failure
intermittent communication between IED and remaining affecting normal operation of cyber network.
communication
cyber-network. Communication
Related to the remote disconnection of power, which Poor signal with SV leads to no transmission data.
Power failure error
affects the normal operation of cyber network. Power consumption Manual manipulation or significant measurement
misreading error lead to incorrect data acquisition.
Improper EB programming or defective
 SV: to provide functionality for other programs and centralize grid Operational failure
installation result in incorrect data acquisition.
information. Failure modes for SV are listed in Table 12. Catastrophic failure Temperature stress can severely damage the EB.

Table 12 – Failure modes for SV.

Related to network links, two types were considered: optical fiber links
for communications in long distances, and Ethernet links for short
Failure mode Criteria distances. Their inherent characteristics result in different failure modes.
Related to the susceptibility of cyber equipment to lose their
Security failure They are:
integrity.
Related to remote disconnection of power, affecting normal
Power failure
operation of cyber network.  Optical fiber link: to assure the connection between two cyber
Lower storage capacity or unexpected large amount of data
Data overload equipment in long distances. The failure modes identified for optical
to storage results in defective data storage.
Hardware Physical damage, overheating, humidity or hard drive crash, fiber link are listed in Table 16.
crash all result in loss of data.
Operational
Inherent software errors can corrupt stored data. Table 16 – Failure modes for optical fiber link.
failure

 HMI: to manually monitor and control the grid. Associated failure Failure mode Criteria
Stress, corrosion or fatigue can lead to microcracks,
modes are listed in Table 13. Fracture
resulting in cable breakdown.
Lead-bonds
Temperature stress can damage plated contacts.
Table 13 – Failure modes for HMI. degradation
Humidity
Electro-chemical oxidation in transmitters and receivers.
induced
Failure
Criteria
mode
 Ethernet link: to assure the connection between two cyber equipment
Security Related to the susceptibility of cyber equipment to lose their
failure integrity. in short distances. Failure modes associated are listed in Table 17.
Power Related to remote disconnection of power, affecting normal
failure operation of cyber network. Table 17 – Failure modes for ethernet link.
Related to inherent problems in the HMI operation that
Data error
compromises its function.
Failure mode Criteria
Excessive traffic of packets results in congestion and
 SW: to centralize communications among multiple connected devices Cross talk
overload of data.
and select paths to transfer information through network connections. Manufacturing imperfection, incorrect installation or RJ45
Failure modes associated to SW are listed in table Table 14. Integrity defect connectors degradation results in delays in data
transmission, or even its interruption.
Link breakdown Cable breakdown due to external physical damage.
Table 14 – Failure modes for SW.

Failure mode Criteria

5. Results
Related to the susceptibility of cyber equipment to lose
Security failure
their integrity.
Related to remote disconnection of power, affecting A complete FMEA analysis was fulfilled to the smart grid test system
Power failure
normal operation of cyber network.
shown in Fig. 2, considering the failure modes, its causes and potential
Performance Congestion of packets in communication network can
decrease decrease the SW operational performance. impacts of each power and cyber equipment on the smart grid. Notice that
Operational Inherent problems in SW configuration or module failure FMEA always took into account the main interdependencies between
failure can blackout the SW.
Network/Cyber Broadcast of excessive amount of messages in
power and cyber systems topology. Current controls of each failure were
storm uncontrollable way can congestion SW operation. also proposed.
The three risk factors (Severity SEV, Occurrence OCC and Detection
 EB: to record and communicate electric energy consumption. The DET) were first assigned for each failure mode according to rankings
failure modes related to EB are listed in Table 15. depicted in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. For DET assignment,
it was taken into account the ability to detect the failure before it could
affect the system; for SEV rating, the seriousness of the failure and its
effects in the system is taken in consideration; in its turn, OCC rating is
specified according to equipment’s failure rates specified in Table 4
andTable 6. It is important to note that the assignment of these ratings is
8 XXX 00 (2014) 000–000

performed in a subjective manner according to the FMEA’s evaluators warning and are difficult to prevent, while strong negative impacts on
criteria. Even OCC rating, which seems to be the one whose assignment the smart grid operation have also a repercussion in high SEV ratings;
could be accurately performed, can be revised in accordance with specific  Finally, a conclusion regarding human interference in future smart grids
failure cause that seems to be more or less likely to occur according to the must be pointed out. In fact, HMI’s operational failure due to human
FMEA’s evaluators criteria. error proves to have negative impacts on the grid. This human error is
In a general way, a failure mode is expected to be assigned with unintentional and its high probability of occurrence and unpredictability
different DET and OCC ratings, depending on the causes that trigger the (as seen in Table 19) makes it a high-risk failure cause. This way, it is
respective mode of failure, while SEV rating should be unique for each expected main weaknesses in future smart grids are related to some
failure mode. Since each failure mode’s priority is evaluated by its RPN tasks that demand human interference.
from (1), this may lead to different RPN values for the same failure mode
since each cause of failure has its own RPN. Table 18 shows some failure Table 18 – Selected failure modes for analysis and discussion..
modes, classified by equipment and failure mode, with equal consequence
Failure
but different RPNs .Consequently, the final RPN for each failure mode will Equipment
Mode(s)
Failure Cause(s) OCC DET SEV RPN
correspond to the highest RPN obtained between its respective failure Fracture of the
5 9 7 315
causes, as indicated in Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.. copper bar
Loss of
Break of the support
After a stressful analysis, our research rose Table 19 listing the 40 Busbar structural 6 9 7 378
insulators
integrity
highest risk failure modes linked to the smart grid test system. A total of Cracking of
5 9 7 315
connection welds
107 failure modes were identified and analyzed, ordered from highest risky
Short circuit between 320
to lowest risky, but here one selected only the 40 ones. Table 19 includes Electrical 4 10 8
Busbar bus bars
disturbances
the failure modes’ causes and the suggested recommended actions in order Harmonics 4 8 8 256
to minimize the impact of these failure modes in the smart grid. The Operational SW is locked up 6 10 6 360
complete FMEA table can be found in [27]. SW failure (SW
blackout) Module failure 5 10 6 300
To systematize Table 19 main conclusions, one divided the equipment
Poor communication
in power and cyber categories. between IED and
5 8 6 240
Power equipment: remaining cyber
Communication network
 SVs and transformers have the most critical failure modes, achieving IED
failure Signal processing
4 8 6 192
RPNs of 480 and 450, respectively. Their high-risk cause of failure error (corrupted data)
compromises the correct smart grid operation; Network/Cyber storm 5 7 6 210
 Bus bar failure modes were also identified as critical, in the sense that
their impact of failure in the smart grid is significant (several failure
modes with high RPN); 6. Discussion
 Failure modes that provoked unstable behaviors in power sources,
possibly causing partial or total (less frequent) power outages in the In order to obtain the final result of FMEA, it has to take into account that
grid, were also classified with high RPNs. important information is lost during FMEA procedure. This situation can
. compromise final conclusions concerning high-risk failure modes and their
Cyber equipment: impact on the reliability of the system.
 Related to cyber equipment, failure modes with the highest RPNs are As a matter of fact, Table 19 shows the final result of FMEA in the
those that express themselves as operational failures, being verified in system, giving prioritization of high-risk failure modes (based on their RPN
equipment like HMIs, SWs or IEDs; value) with their respective high-risk causes of failure. This means that,
 Ethernet links, optical fiber links and EBs as the less critical according to FMEA, maintenance strategies should be prioritized from the
equipment in the cyber system, mainly due to their low failure rates; highest RPN to the lowest in order to increase smart grids reliability. This
 In the domain of cyber equipment, failure modes concerning security implies that it will be the origin of the failure that must receive special
reasons, despite the enormous impacts cyberattacks can cause, were attention in any maintenance task. Doing this means decrease or eliminate
not considered by FMEA as high-risk failures; any risk of a failure in the system, thus reducing some failure mode impact
 This is explained due to low occurrence ratings, in the sense that in on the smart grid. This is established with the aim of decreasing the number
spite of the expected increase of cyberattacks attempts in future years, of times in which the respective failure manifests itself so that system
they will not be necessarily successful; reliability increases as pretended.
 Power outages in a cyber equipment’s power supply are expected to However, this also means that numerous failure causes are herein
be less frequent, thus expressed in Table 19 with lower RPN values. discriminated as long as high-risk causes of failure of each failure mode are
not taken into account for final FMEA analysis. In fact, some failure modes
In fact, a general outlook on Table 19 outcomes shows that: with critical causes have, sometimes, less RPN values than certain less
 Besides all ratings were treated as equals, one can see OCCurrence critical failure modes, although identified as prioritized because their higher
rating remains with low variations between different failure modes RPN in Table 7. In these situations, maintenance strategies for these failure
with high and low RPNs, not being a decisive rating with impact on modes with less RPN values are ignored.
high-risk failures; For instance, as seen in Erro! A origem da referência não foi
 Failure modes characterized by high levels of unpredictability are more encontrada., focusing on bus bar failure modes, this equipment can have
likely to be more critical. These modes of failure occur without early electrical disturbances due to short circuits between bars with different
phases or due to harmonics (also causing thermal losses); these two causes
 ARAB ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS JOURNAL 00 (2014) 000–000
has different RPN, that is, short circuit has a RPN of 320 and harmonic has
RPN of 256 (see [27]). Although harmonics still have a high RPN, meaning
it is a high-risk cause of failure, its importance could be neglected because
it is ranked in 7th place from the 10 failure modes-causes in Table 18 and
therefore maintenance strategies are not recommended for this cause in
order to decrease its risk of failure [27].
One can thus point out that maintenance tasks cannot efficiently
prioritized in terms of risk decrease according to the classical FMEA
approach when applied in a smart grid framework. Therefore, it has
implications in maintenance costs/risk-decrease ratio.
Besides that, the relative importance among OCC, SEV, and DET risk
factors is not taken into account in the classical FMEA. The three are treated
as equals, with the same weight in the RPN computation. It is thus clear
that it may not be adequated when considering a practical application of
FMEA in smart grids.
As an illustration, Table 19 indicates that software errors in IEDs
control applications have high negative impact on system performance
(thus in terms of severity risk), when compared to unintentional human
error in HMI operations (SEV rating is assigned with 8 and 5, respectively,
for IED and HMI). However, one can see that HMI operational failure due
to human error has a higher-risk failure mode instead of IEDs control
failure. The severity of the failure seems to be herein neglected.
Likewise, different combinations of OCC, SEV and DET values may
produce the same RPN rating, but their hidden risk implications may be
different. For instance, wrong operation in CB due to overloads and
magnetic-core delamination in transformers have the same RPN – 168 more
precisely –, but their ratings are different. Their impacts on the system could
be different, but unfortunately FMEA could not distinguish them.
This clearly shows FMEA is limited in the prioritization of maintenance
tasks. FMEA is not able to assign different weights for its ratings, leading
to some misreading concerning the risk of a failure mode.
For a correct application of FMEA, it is of utmost importance to
assemble subject experts with a high level of knowledge of the smart grid
operation. This condition is related to the fact that failure modes and failure
causes must be enumerated and exhaustively detailed and discussed in order
to evaluate, as accurately as possible, the impacts of failure in a smart grid.
In the literature, one verified the lack of failure rates information
discriminated for each failure mode, either for power and cyber equipment.
Even data found in the Portuguese electric energy utility (EDP
Distribuição), a big company with interests in cost-effective maintenance
methodologies, was inconclusive. In our research, failure mode’s rates were
subjectively discriminated from equipment’s failure rates, which may have
led to some errors in RPN final calculation, especially for OCC rating,
which seemed to cause low impact for RPN the way it was obtained.
So that FMEA may be correctly applied, experimental failure rates for
each mode of failure must be detailed. If possible, extensive research would
be useful to get experimental rates for each cause of failure.
Therefore, for a deeper understanding on the criticality of a certain
failure, the collection of data on the frequency of failure for each power and
cyber equipment, by specifying failure rates for each failure mode and their
causes, would be profitable for reliability purposes. Knowing the frequency
of a certain failure, as long as bearing in mind the real impact that failure
triggers in the smart grid, would make FMEA more efficient (more
reliability of OCC rating) and maintenance strategies more precise
(strategies based on maintenance frequency adjustments are improved).
Finally, in order to ensure system’s high reliability level, a cost-
effective maintenance strategy must be achieved by prioritizing failure
9
modes from the most critical to the lowest, as long as one has to take into
consideration maintenance costs for each equipment and each failure mode.
This way, in what concerns the level of risk of the analyzed smart grid
test system (note that, concerning the economic side, it is not evaluated in
the present study), it is of utmost importance to establish maintenance
strategies according to their risk number.
Strategies with the aim of (i) mitigating or eliminating failure modes in
order to decrease OCC rating, (ii) increasing failure detectability for the
purpose of lowering DET rating, and (iii) minimizing losses or negative
impacts when a failure occurs in order to diminish SEV rating must be
performed in order to increase reliability of a smart grid.
7. Conclusions
This paper shows the application of FMEA analysis in a smart grid
environment. A simple smart grid test system was defined, where
fundamental failure modes and interdependencies between cyber and power
infrastructure were identified. Results of qualitative assessment of
reliability analysis was performed, and a critical analysis of FMEA was
carried out.
FMEA is a powerful tool used in reliability and risk analysis since main
strength of FMEA allows an exhaustive failure modes and causes of failure
identification, also analyzing their impacts on the system. Furthermore, a
review on the determination of each risk number must be taken. Despite
FMEA must be carried out by a team of subject matter experts, which
presupposes a weighted evaluation of each topic, the assignment of a value
for each risk factor is uncertain and not consensual. It is based on different
experiences and different levels on the knowledge of the target subject. A
failure mode can be more critical to one team -member, while another
expert treats it as irrelevant.
Besides that, criticality of a failure mode depends on its penetration
level on the system, and the manner in which a failure occurs could be seen
in different perspectives, depending on the complexity of the system and
where and how it expresses itself.
Additionally, the RPN method is only measuring from the risk
viewpoint while ignoring the importance of corrective actions, and then it
cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of corrective actions. RPN
calculation considers risk factors mainly in terms of criticality and other
important risk factors such as economic impacts are ignored.
As a final comment, it is important to say that FMEA is very successful
in assemble failure modes and their causes in a given smart grid. However,
for a better reliability assessment and risk analysis of a smart grid using
FMEA, it needed to adopt possible adjustments in FMEA technique in order
to improve risk prioritization so that maintenance strategies can be
efficiently applied.
Acknowledgements
This work has been partially supported by: national funds through the
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) of the Portuguese
Government with references UID/EEA/50008/2013 and through IDMEC,
under LAETA, project UID/EMS/50022/2013, and also supported by
Secretaría Nacional de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e
Innovación (SENESCYT) of the Ecuadorian Government, reference CZ05-
000291-2017.
10 XXX 00 (2014) 000–000

Table 19 - Final RPN obtained for highest risk selected failure modes

Rank Equipment Failure Mode(s) Failure Cause(s) OCC DET SEV RPN Recommended action(s)

1 SV Hardware crash Hard drive crash 6 10 8 480 Install redundant SV

2 Transformer Transformer explosion Internal short circuit 5 10 9 450 Real-time signal analysis

3 HMI Operational failure Human error 5 10 5 400 Hire or educate qualified employees
Defective data processing (software
4 IED Control failure 7 7 8 392 Periodic software update
error)
5 Bus bar Loss of structural integrity Break of the support insulators 6 9 7 378 Implement hot spot alert strategies

6 Cable Electrical operation failure Short circuits transients 6 10 6 360 Real-time current analysis
Operational failure (SW
7 SW SW is locked up 6 10 6 360 Periodic reboot
blackout)
8 Bus bar Loss of electrical continuity Arc flash 4 10 8 320 Improve preventive maintenance actions

9 Bus bar Electrical disturbances Short cuircuits between bus bars 4 10 8 320 Real-time current analysis
Distortion, loosening or
10 Transformer Short circuits 5 9 7 315 Real-time current analysis
displacement of the winding
11 CB Bushing breakdown External short circuit 5 10 6 300 Real-time current analysis
Periodic software update: periodic data
12 SV Data errors Software malfunction 5 10 6 300
backup
13 Transformer Winding overheating Overload 6 7 7 294 Real-time signal analysis
Use of active lightning protection
14 Cable Cable integrity defect Lightnings 7 5 8 280
equipment
Electrical treeing (partial
15 CB CB contacts degradation 5 9 6 270 Implement hot spot strategies
discharges)
Establish optimized communication
16 SW Performance decreased Mististatic traffic 7 6 6 252 network topology for better performance;
SW replacement
Poor communication between IED Establish alternative paths for
17 IED Communication failure 5 8 6 240
and remaining cyber-network communication
Winding isolation degradation or
18 Transformer Short circuits and overloads 4 10 6 240 Real-time current analysis
breakdown
19 Transformer Bushing breakdown External short circuit 4 10 6 240 Real-time current analysis

20 Transformer Tank rupture Cracking of welds 3 9 8 215 Implement hot spot aler strategies
Install a capacity external battery for
21 IED Power outages Remote disconnection of power 3 10 7 210
backups (UPS)
Install a capacity external battery for
22 SV Power outages Remote disconnection of power 3 10 7 210
backups (UPS)
Signal analysis optimization in order to
23 CB Insulation failure Loss of dielectric prerties 5 7 6 210
find opening patterns
24 SV Security failure Denial of Service attacks (DoS) 2 10 10 200 Enforce appropiate security policies
Mechanical stress due to external Establish preventive cleaning and terminal
25 CB Bushing terminal hot spot 4 8 6 192
short circuit conditions squeeze routines
Faulty information injection Enforce appropiate security policies and
26 IED Security failure 3 7 9 169
(cyberattack) configuration
Cross data with other monitored data in
27 IED Monitoring failure Significante measurement error 5 6 6 180
the grid
Restrick access to specialist personnel and
28 HMI Security failure Human retaliation 2 10 9 180
controlled by security check
Install a capacity external battery for
29 SW Power outage Remote disconnection of power 3 10 6 180
backup (UPS); install PLC system
Broadcast of excessive amount of Install higher-peroformance SWs;
30 SW Network/Cyber storm messages in uncontrollable way 4 7 6 168 establish communication network
(misleading information) topology for better performance
Periodic cooling system maintenance
31 Transformer Cooling system failure Cooling pipes obstruction 3 7 8 168 (Check for leaks, rust or accumulation of
dirt)
Wrong operation (Spurious
32 CB Overload 6 4 7 168 Real-time current analysis
opening and closure)
33 Transformer Magnetic-core delamination Harmonics 4 7 6 168 Real-time current analysis
Mechanical stress due to external Establish preventive cleaning and terminal
34 Transformer Bushing terminal hot spot 4 7 6 168
short circuit conditions squeeze routines
Electrical treeing (partial
35 Transformer Tap changer contacts degradation 3 9 6 162 Implement hot spot alert strategies
discharges)
Significant measurement error, or
36 EB Power consumption misreading even inhability to measure power 5 8 4 160 Correct smart meter calibration
consumption
Install a capacity external battery for
37 HMI Power outage Remote disconnect of power 3 10 5 150
backuo (UPS)
Improper EB programming and
38 EB Operation failure 4 8 4 128 Good installation practice
parametrization
Optical fiber Stress, corrosion for fatigue due to
39 Fracture 3 10 4 120 Increase cable robustness
link microcracks
Optical fiber Electro-chemical oxidation of
40 Humidity induced 3 10 4 120 Use of hermetically sealed package
link transmitter and receivers
 ARAB ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS JOURNAL 00 (2014) 000–000
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