EN BANC

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984

CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, and JUNE
LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of the National Capital
Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION; CESAR MIJARES, in his capacity as the President of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, GONZALO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean of Student
Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. LEONARDO PADILLA, in his capacity as
Chief Legal Counsel & Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY.
FABLITA AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE and EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as members of the
Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents.

Honesto N. Salcedo for petitioners.

The Solicitor General and Leonardo G. Padilla & Pablita G. Ammay for respondents.

FERNANDO, CJ.:

The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free
speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,
in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio D.
Ramento, Director of the National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. 1 The nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento
affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta University Foundation finding petitioners
guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is sought in this petition.

The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a
meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the
second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At
10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It
was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was,
as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day
why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they
were formed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus
with damages against private respondents 2 and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners
guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically
their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.

On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent ex-
parte motion for the immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for
petitioners, dated November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
enjoining all respondents or any person or persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing the
order of the Ministry of' Education and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of
the charges against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year with a stern warning that a
commission of the same or another offense will be dealt with utmost severity, effective as of this date
and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus allowing them to enroll, if so minded. 3

Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the petition "for lack of factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting of the
temporary restraining order dated November 16, 1982." 4 Public respondent Ramento, on the other
hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the
following conclusion: "Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent Director of the MECS
did not commit any error, much less abused his discretion, when he affirmed the decision of respondent
University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools and the Revised Student's Code of Discipline .and ordering their suspension for one (1)
academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been enforced except only briefly,
thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr., Lucas and Malabanan to finish their courses, and allowing
petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding is now moot and
academic. 5

With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and private respondents,
the case was ready for decision.

This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing
semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so. Moreover, there
is the added circumstance of more than a year having passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent
Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its validity
having been put in issue, for being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable
assembly and free speech, there is need to pass squarely on the question raised.

This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free
speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being
unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit
and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused
the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have
been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit.
Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be
granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.

1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." 7

2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park
to the gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and
of the streets leading to the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and
parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of
assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public issues. 8

3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private
premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this
relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required." 9 Petitioners did seek
such consent. It was granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit
granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme Student Council where your petitioners are
among the officers, held a General Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent
university." 10 There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent University as to a
permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a student assembly. 11 The specific question to be
resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free
speech.

4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They
enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 12 "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 13While, therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this
formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among
those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of
the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's
rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially
interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without
colliding with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 14

5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a
disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor,
but subject to qualification in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that
specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the
disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such
assembly.

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That
there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the
fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem (iisang malaking
suliranin.") 15 They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional
headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang."). 16 If in the course of
such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at
times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid,
diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth, They
may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is
without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were denied the right to
peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v. Apurado, 17 the facts disclosed that shortly
before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred
residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the
session, a substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that the
municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be dismissed, submitting at the
same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its conformity. Such individuals were
wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except
in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder
and misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in religious differences. The defendant
Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and convicted of sedition in that they
allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed. Justice Carson, who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the prosecution
be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd
as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities,
then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a
snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner
would expose all those who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the purposes which
they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities." 18 The principle to
be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty
individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in
drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
assembly and a tumultuous uprising." 19 A careful reading of this decision is in order before private
respondents attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the
students under the leadership of petitioners.

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than
that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of
respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.
m. 20 Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,
even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could
and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction considering the places where and the
time when the demonstration took place-there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of
the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious
view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion
of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of
fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the offense connoted
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a
due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-
week suspension would be punishment enough.
9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case,
especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the
essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked
by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great importance, whether concerning their
welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the
Bill of Rights.

10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this Court to
lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to
a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there
may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of respondent Ramento
imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court in the resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that date, petitioners had been
suspended for more than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.
 DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For almost a century, this Court has sought that elusive equilibrium between the
law on defamation on one hand, and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of
speech and press on the other. This case revisits that search.

On 30 September 1990, the following news item appeared in the Peoples Journal, a
tabloid of general circulation:

Swiss Shoots Neighbors Pets

RESIDENTS of a subdivision in Paraaque have asked the Bureau of

Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors
pets that he finds in his domain.

The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained

that the deportation of Francis Thoenen, of 10 Calcutta BF Homes Phase
III, could help prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future.

Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and cats
when they slip out of their dwellings unnoticed.

An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he shot

recently threatens to exacerbate the problem, Angara said.

Cristina Lee[1]
The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently
residing in this country with his Filipina wife and their children. Claiming that the
report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in
failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for
damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid,
Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee.

Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed
in the community, and that since it had been published, he and his wife received
several queries and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives. For the
impairment of his reputation and standing in the community, and his mental
anguish, Thoenen sought P200,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorneys fees.

The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a social
and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the
public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people, and that the story was
published in good faith and without malice.[2]

The principal source of the article was a letter[3] by a certain Atty. Efren Angara
addressed to Commissioner Andrea Domingo of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration), which states:

Dear Madame:

We would like to request your office to verify the true

status/authenticity of the residency in the Philippines of a foreign
national (a Swiss) by the name of Francis Thoenen who is presently
residing at No. 10 Calcuta cor. Beirut Street, BF Homes (PH. III),
Paraaque, Metro Manila. I received (sic) complaint from my clients
residing around his vicinity that this foreigner had (sic) been causing
troubles ever since he showed up. He is too meticulous and had (sic)
been shooting dogs and cats passing his house wall everytime.
 Such act which (sic) is unacceptable to the owners especially if
inspite (sic) of control their pets slips (sic) out unnoticed. A
confrontation between him and the owner of the dog he shoot, (sic)
already occurred last time. In some instances this guy had been always
driving his car barbarously inside the subdivision with children playing
around (sic) the street. Before my clients petitioned themselves with the
endorsement of the Homeowners Association and filed to your office
for deportation were respectfully seeking your assistance to investigate
this alien to prevent further incident occurrence (sic) in the future. He
should not be allowed to dominate the citizens of this country.

Very truly yours,

Atty. Efren B. Angara

The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the
CID, acquired a copy of the above letter from a trusted source in the CIDs
Intelligence Division. They claimed to have reasonable grounds to believe in the
truth and veracity of the information derived (from their) sources.[4]

It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The
headline, which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the
practice of shooting pets, was untrue.[5] Moreover, it is immediately apparent
from a comparison between the above letter and the news item in question that
while the letter is a mere request for verification of Thoenens status, Lee wrote that
residents of BF Homes had asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss
who allegedly shoots neighbors pets. No complaints had in fact been lodged
against him by any of the BF Homeowners,[6] nor had any pending
deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of Immigration.[7]

Thoenen also submitted a Certification[8] from the Office of the Bar Confidant that
there was no lawyer in its rolls by the name of Efren Angara, earlier cited by
petitioner Lee as the author of the letter on which she based her article. Finally, the
trial also showed that despite the fact that respondents address was indicated in the
letter, Cristina Lee made no efforts to contact either him or the purported letter-
writer, Atty. Angara.[9]

The petitioners claim that Lee sought confirmation of the story from the
newspapers correspondent in Paraaque, who told her that a woman who refused to
identify herself confirmed that there had indeed been an incident of pet-shooting in
the neighborhood involving the respondent.[10] However, the correspondent in
question was never presented in court to verify the truth of this allegation. Neither
was the alleged CID source presented to verify that the above letter had indeed
come from the Department, nor even that the same was a certified true copy of a
letter on file in their office.

On 31 August 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, rendered a
Decision[11] in favor of the petitioners, which reads in part:

There is no malice on the part of the defendants in publishing the

news item done in the exercise of their profession as journalists reporting to
the people on matters of public interest. The news report was based on an
official communication filed with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.

As noted by the Court of Appeals in Marti(r)ez vs. Alanao, CA-G.R

No. 27086, September 30, 1991, which is similar to the present case:

While indeed, the news item subject of the present

case might have ruffled the sensitivities of plaintiff, this Court
however believes that the alleged defamatory articles falls
within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged matter, and that
therefore, it cannot be presumed to be malicious. The onus of
proving malice is accordingly shifted to the plaintiff, that is,
that he must prove that the defendants were actuated by ill-
will in what they caused to be printed and published, with a
design to carelessly or wantonly injure the plaintiff. (US vs.
Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731)
 This, plaintiff failed to do, consequently, his case must fall.

The publication in question is a privileged communication protected

by the freedom of the press.

WHEREFORE, the Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED

WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS.[12]

On appeal, the court a quo reversed[13] the trial court. It held that although freedom
of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously
guarded in the Constitution, still, in the exercise of these rights, Article 19 of the
Civil Code requires everyone to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The appellate court emphasized that Thoenen was
neither a public official nor a public figure, and thus,
. . . [E]ven without malice on the part of defendants-appellees, the news
item published in the 30 September 1990 edition of Peoples Journal had
been done in violation of the principle of abuse of right under Article 19 of
the Civil Code, in the absence of a bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof, i.e., to observe honesty and good faith, which makes their act a
wrongful omission. Neither did they act with justice and give everyone his
due, because without ascertaining the veracity of the information given
them by the Intelligence Bureau of the Bureau of Immigration, they
published a news article which they were aware would bring the person
specifically named therein, viz, Francis Thoenen, the plaintiff-appellant in
this case, into disrepute.
.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision appealed

from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead, We find for the
appellant and award him moral damages of P200,000.00; exemplary
damages of P50,000.00, and legal fees to P30,000.00; all of which shall be
borne jointly and severally by appellees.[14]
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, [15] this
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was filed
on the following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioners Cristina Lee,

Nuguid and PJI liable under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioners liable for libel
even if the article was based on a letter released by the Bureau of
Immigration, hence a qualified privilege communication.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners did not

ascertain the truth of the subject news item.

4. The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages notwithstanding that

the same was excessive unconscionable and devoid of any basis.

The petitioners argue that this case is one for damages arising from libel, and
not one for abuse of rights under the New Civil Code. They further claim the
constitutional protections extended by the freedom of speech and of the press
clause of the 1987 Constitution against liability for libel, claiming that the article
was published in fulfillment of its social and moral duty to inform the public on
matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral [fabric]
of the people.[16] They insist that the news article was based on a letter released by
the Bureau of Immigration, and is thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. To
recover damages, the respondent must prove its publication was attended by actual
malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.[17]

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the constitutional privilege
granted under the freedom of speech and the press against liability for damages
does not extend to the petitioners in this case.
 The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. The freedom of
speech and press and assembly, first laid down by President McKinley in the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of 07 April 1900, is an
almost verbatim restatement of the first amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.[18] Enshrined in Section 4, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution, it states, No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

But not all speech is protected. The right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words - those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. [19]

Libel is not protected speech. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines
libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be met: (a)

the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.[20] In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,[21] we had occasion to further explain.
Thus:
 An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the
commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which
tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person.
It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about the
libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the
libelous statement, for a mans reputation is the estimate in which others
hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be
shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as
the object of the defamatory statement.
Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive
for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or
security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions. (citations omitted, emphasis
supplied)

In this case, there is no controversy as to the existence of the three elements.

The respondents name and address were clearly indicated in the article ascribing to
him the questionable practice of shooting the wayward pets of his neighbors. The
backlash caused by the publication of the article was in fact such that stones had
been thrown at their house, breaking several flower pots, and daily and nightly
calls compelled him to request a change of their telephone number. [22] These facts
are not contested by the petitioners. What the petitioners claim is the absence of
proof of the fourth element - malice.

As a general rule, malice is presumed. Article 354 of the Revised Penal

Code states:

ART. 354. Requirement of Publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The article is not a privileged communication. We first discussed the

freedom of speech and press and assembly vis-a-vis the laws on libel and slander in
the groundbreaking case of US v. Bustos,[23] where we applied the prevailing
English and American jurisprudence to the effect that:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a

full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public
life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only
thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is
less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
good? Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief
Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of
Government - public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy. (citations omitted)
 The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the
orderly administration of government inevitably lead to the adoption of
the doctrine of privileged communication. A privileged communication may be
either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in
bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless
found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this
genre belong private communications and fair and true report without any
comments or remarks.[24]

The appellate court correctly ruled that the petitioners story is not privileged
in character, for it is neither private communication nor a fair and true report
without any comments or remarks.

US v. Bustos defined the concept of private communication thus:

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable. A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or
conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter.[25]

This defense is unavailing to petitioners. In Daez v. Court of Appeals[26] we

held that:
 As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of
any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to
those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is
qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on
privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints
should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire
into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to
perform or interest in connection therewith. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious
Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the
matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general
population. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated in public,[27] which was what the
petitioners did in this case.

Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or
remarks of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no
proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns only false imputations
against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life.

The petitioners also claim to have made the report out of a social and moral
duty to inform the public on matters of general interest.

In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354
is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We stated
that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it
must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.[28]

Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the

respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. We are
persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,[29] that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods
about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not
claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the
falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.[30]

Having established that the article cannot be considered as privileged

communication, malice is therefore presumed, and the fourth requisite for the
imputation of libel to attach to the petitioners in this case is met. The news article
is therefore defamatory and is not within the realm of protected speech. There is no
longer a need to discuss the other assignment of errors, save for the amount of
damages to which respondent is entitled.

In Policarpio v. Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc.,[31] we awarded damages

where the defendants deliberately presented a private individual in a worse light
that what she actually was, and where other factual errors were not prevented
although defendants had the means to ascertain the veracity of their report. Such
are the facts obtaining here.

We must point out that Lees brief news item contained falsehoods on two
levels. On its face, her statement that residents of BF Homes had asked the Bureau
of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors pets is patently
untrue since the letter of the spurious Atty. Angara was a mere request for
verification of Thoenens status as a foreign resident. Lees article, moreover, is also
untrue, in that the events she reported never happened. The respondent had never
shot any of his neighbors pets, no complaints had been lodged against him by his
neighbors, and no deportation proceedings had been initiated against him. Worse,
the author of Lees main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently
either does not exist, or is not a lawyer. Petitioner Lee would have been
enlightened on substantially all these matters had she but tried to contact either
Angara or Thoenen.

Although it has been stressed that a newspaper should not be held to account
to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of
words,[32] even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the
publication of falsehoods, especially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination
of patent lies.[33] There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances societys interest in
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate.[34]The use of the known lie as a tool is
at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly
manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. Calculated
falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality The knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection (citations
omitted).[35]

The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation
of the individuals for the harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehood. After
all, the individuals right to protection of his own good name reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.[36]

The appellate court awarded Thoenen moral damages of P200,000.00,

exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and legal fees of P30,000.00, to be borne jointly
and severally by the herein petitioners. In Guevarra v. Almario,[37] we noted that
the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and
the sound discretion of the court, although appellate courts were more likely to
reduce damages for libel than to increase them.[38] So it is in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 January 2000

reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, of 31
August 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that petitioners are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages of P30,000.00, and legal fees of P20,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.