3/19/2018 WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS | 659 So.2d 1306 (1995) | 2d130611680 | Leagle.

com

LAWYER LOGIN

Home /  Browse Decisions /  So.2d /  659 So.2d /  659 So.2d 1306 (1995)

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS
No. 94-1418. Email | Print | Comments (0)

View Case Cited Cases

659 So.2d 1306 (1995)

Barbara Law WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. James L. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

September 6, 1995.

https://www.leagle.com/decision/19951965659so2d130611680 1/3
3/19/2018 WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS | 659 So.2d 1306 (1995) | 2d130611680 | Leagle.com

Attorney(s) appearing for the Case

Mark D. Ewart, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Patrice A. Talisman of Russo & Talisman, P.A., Coconut Grove, and the Law O ces of Ronald Polk, Miami, for appellee.

GUNTHER, Chief Judge.

Appellant, Barbara Law Williams, petitioner below (Former Wife), appeals the trial court's nal judgment of dissolution of marriage. Although Former
Wife raises numerous issues on appeal, we nd one dispositive of the entire case. We reverse because the trial court erred in bifurcating the proceedings,
sua sponte.

Former Wife petitioned the trial court for a dissolution of marriage. After hearing the testimony, the trial court valued all marital assets and awarded
Former Husband $138,886.50 in assets and granted Former Wife $115,051.50 in assets. In addition to distributing the marital assets, the trial court
awarded Former Wife rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years. Although it awarded Former Wife both the aforementioned rehabilitative alimony
and attorney's fees, the trial court failed to establish an amount for the same and instead, without a request from either party, directed the parties to
mediation on these issues. The trial court speci cally reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of both the rehabilitative alimony and attorney's
fees in the event that mediation proved unsuccessful. Mediation did, in fact, prove unsuccessful, and before a hearing was set on the amount issues, the
trial judge voluntarily recused himself.

A trial court obviously has the power to bifurcate any judicial proceeding. Weasel v. Weasel, 419 So.2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). However, such procedure
should be employed with caution and should be the exception rather than the rule. Id.; see also Woods v. Woods, 610 So.2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Thus,
only in exceptional circumstances should a trial court exercise its discretion to bifurcate. Weasel, 419 So.2d at 700. As the supreme court warned in
Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1980):

Although we approve the granting of the nal dissolution with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine property, custody, and
support issues, we believe the trial court should avoid this split procedure. The general law and our procedural rules at both the trial and appellate
levels are designed for one nal judgment and one appeal. Splitting the process can cause multiple legal and procedural problems which result in
delay and additional expense to the litigants. This split procedure should be used only when it is clearly necessary for the best interests of the
parties or their children.

In the instant case, the bifurcation was not clearly necessary for the best interests of the parties. The record reveals no justi cation for the trial court
dissolving the parties' marriage without simultaneously resolving the issue concerning the amount of rehabilitative alimony. At the dissolution
hearing, the trial court heard all relevant testimony pertaining to the amount of the rehabilitative alimony needed by Former Wife. Referring the parties
to mediation without setting an amount merely prolonged the litigation and left Former Wife without the bene t of the rehabilitative alimony
previously
[659 So.2d 1308]

awarded by the trial court. Thus, splitting the process resulted in delay and additional expenses to the litigants without any justi cation. Additionally, it
has hindered our review of the nancial aspects of the dissolution as we are unable to view the "whole picture."

In conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion in splitting the dissolution proceeding, sua sponte, where no exceptional circumstances were present
necessitating the bifurcation. Because of the unusual procedural posture of this case and because the amount of rehabilitative alimony is interrelated to
other nancial considerations in a dissolution proceeding, the trial court, at its discretion, may revisit any nancial issue upon remand.

Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.

Comment

Your Name

Your Email

Comments

Submit
1000 Characters Remaining

Leagle.com reserves the right to edit or remove comments but is under no obligation to do so, or to explain individual moderation decisions.

https://www.leagle.com/decision/19951965659so2d130611680 2/3
3/19/2018 WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS | 659 So.2d 1306 (1995) | 2d130611680 | Leagle.com

Copyright © 2017, Leagle, Inc. Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Statement | About Us | Contact Us

https://www.leagle.com/decision/19951965659so2d130611680 3/3