TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke
the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency,
scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic
helpers through petitioners employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees
ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were
constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) [1] of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was
to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it
cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money
to unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from
respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment
abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him
that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic,
however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to
collect fees.

Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a
corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of penalties,
any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of cancellation, the license of respondent
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered
CANCELLED, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.[2] (Underscoring supplied)

On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny
it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign
principals, but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally,
it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioners license pending
resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991.On January 30, 1992, however, petitioners motion for reconsideration
was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative
grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on
the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its
registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797[3] (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),[4] the POEA was established and
mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and
the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the
powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary
of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:

ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel
any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of
Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and
other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,[5] we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among
others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority,
conferred by Section 36, not only to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies, but also to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making
power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, [6] on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request
for investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the
license or authority of any agency or entity for certain enumerated offenses including -

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what
is prescribed by the Administration, and

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.[7]

The Administrator was also given the power to order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the
respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof. [8] (Underscoring supplied)
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz,[9] viz.:

A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority
to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied)

In view of the Courts disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioners alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center
rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesors explanation, to wit:

On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as
amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified
and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not
prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by
this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.

Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties. [10]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of
Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Darvin v Court of Appeals & People of RP

Darvin v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998

Facts:

Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one
Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the
necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air
fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged
with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear
that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however,
is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.

By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment
activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the
crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the
People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty,
and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her confinement.

PEOPLE VS. NAVARRA

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

Deceptis non decipientibus, jura subveniunt.*

It is a sad commentary that many of our countrymen migrate to other countries for work. They leave all that is familiar and endure
loneliness and separation from their families and friends for the coveted dollar hoping that such will better their lot and ensure their families
a modicum of economic stability.
What is more disheartening is that there are those who take advantage of the hopefuls. These are the illegal recruiters. On them,
we must let the full force of the law fall, and fall heavily.

The Case

The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Quezon City[1] finding accused Rodolfo Navarra,
Sr. and Job Navarra (hereafter Rodolfo and Job, respectively) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in a large
scale resulting to economic sabotage and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos, each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to return to complainants the sums they received
from them.

The Facts

Job and Rodolfo, along with Rodolfos wife[2] Corazon, operated an agency which purported to have the authority to recruit and place
workers for employment in Taiwan. The agency[3] was named Rodolfo Navarras Travel Consultant and General Services
(RNTCGS),[4] which in the course of its operation was able to victimize several hapless victims who never left Philippine soil, and in due
time, filed complaints with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (hereafter POEA) against accused for illegal recruitment.
 Neither RNTCGS nor Rodolfo, Corazon or Job in their personal capacities were licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration to recruit workers for overseas employment.[5]
The trial court summarized the testimonies of complainants, thus: [6]

MERLIE VILLESCA identified Rodolfo as the one with whom she applied to for employment in Taiwan on May 6, 1992, at the
RNTCGS office in Novaliches, Quezon City. As placement fee she paid fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to Inday Padawan
(Rodolfos cook and laundrywoman,[7] hereafter, Inday), at Corazon and Rodolfos house, and another fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) on December 22, 1992. She identified Job as the administrative officer of RNCTGS, who entertained her and the
other applicants during the times she visited the agencys office to follow up her application. [8]

GLICERIA MARINAS singled out Job as the one who recruited her for employment in Taiwan as a factory worker. She testified
that she was recruited by Job on April 24, 1992 at RNTCGS where she was told that she and her co-applicants would leave for
Taiwan two months after they applied on April 24, 1992. She gave Job all the requirements the agency asked for including her
passport and birth certificate. She was also required to pay a placement fee of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), although the
receipt given to her was only for the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). She gave her passport to Job and she
handed the placement fee to Inday who gave it to Corazon in her presence. [9]

BEINVENIDA AMUTAN testified that while in Rodolfos house in Novaliches, Quezon City, on May 11, 1992, Rodolfo promised
her that she would be able to leave for Taiwan upon payment of a twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) placement fee. On April
11, 1992, Beinvenida paid the amount to Inday who gave it to Corazon in Beinvenidas presence. She never had the chance to go
to Taiwan. Upon investigation with the POEA, she discovered that RNTCGS was not registered. [10]

ERNESTO AMUTAN testified that in April 1992, he filed an application to work at a factory in Taiwan before Corazon in the
RNTCGS office. It was Corazon who interviewed him and asked him to submit some requirements. While at the said office, he
saw Rodolfo there, who gave him the assurance that he would be able to leave for Taiwan immediately. He was never deployed
to Taiwan, despite paying a placement fee of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).[11]

FLORIE ROSE RAMOS testified that she applied with RNTCGS as a factory worker for Taiwan and that she paid a placement fee
of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) and another payment of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) as medical fee. She went to
RNTCGS during the last weeks of February, March and April 1992 and was interviewed by Job. She was introduced to Rodolfo by
her co-complainant Evelyn Llacas.She was not able to leave for Taiwan, neither was she able to retrieve her payments from
RNTCGS for when she went to the office on December 23, 1993, it had already been raided by the CIS and POEA for recruiting
for overseas employment without license or authority.[12]

LIWAYWAY CRUZ testified that she visited Rodolfo and Corazons house and came to know that Rodolfo was the President of
RNTCGS, an agency which deported itself to her as and agency purporting to have authority to recruit workers for placement in
Taiwan. That on April 1993, she went to Rodolfos house to inquire about the processing of her papers for employment in
Taiwan. There she was assured by Rodolfo that Corazon was in Taiwan and was already taking care of her application. [13]

LOIDA MACASO testified that she came to know Rodolfo when she visited Inday on December 3, 1991, at Rodolfos house and
Rodolfo and Corazon recruited her to work as a factory worker in Taiwan. For this purpose she paid the spouses ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) placement fee on January 8, 1992. She was never sent to Taiwan.[14]

On December 22, 1992, (PC) CIS agents arrested Inday Padawan after she received placement fees from complainant Merlie
Villesca.[15] The amount received was one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) in one hundred peso (P100.00) bills, which were dusted with
ultraviolet powder.[16]
On February 26, 1993, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan Emily G. Reyes, on detail with the Department of Justice, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 90, an information against accused for illegal recruitment committed in a large
scale. We quote:[17]

That on or about February, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to MERLIE VILLESCA, GLICERIA MARINAS, JOSE LLORET,
BEINVENIDA AMUTAN, MELBA YACAS, MARITES DE SAGUN, VILMA MARANA, ERNESTO AMUTAN, FLORIE ROSE RAMOS,
RONALD ALLAN SANTOS and HENRY DELA CRUZ without first securing the required license and/or authority from Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 29, 1993, upon arraignment, Job pleaded not guilty.[18]

On July 14, 1993, upon arraignment, Rodolfo likewise pleaded not guilty. [19]
 After due trial, on December 29, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Rodolfo and Job, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby finds both accused RODOLFO NAVARRA, SR. and JOB NAVARRA guilty of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment Committed in a Large Scale Resulting to Economic Sabotage, as charged in the Information, and hereby sentences each
of them to Life Imprisonment and also each of them to pay a fine of P100,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
pursuant to Art. 39 (a) of the Labor Code.

They are likewise ordered to return to complainants Florie Rose Ramos the sum of P25,000.00; to Ernesto Amutan, P15,000.00; to
Bienvenida Amutan, P15,000.00; to Loida (Loyda) Macaso, P10,000.00; to Gliceria Marinas, P15,000.00; and to Merlie (Merly) Villesca,
P30,000.00.

Let alias warrants of arrest be issued for accused Corazon Navarra, said warrants to be served by both the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Eastern Police District Command.

SO ORDERED. [20]

Hence, this appeal.[21]

Rodolfo and Job submit that the trial court gravely erred in disregarding their defense of denial and in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.[22]

The Courts Ruling

We find the appeal without merit.

Bare denials, without clear and convincing evidence to support them, [23] can not sway judgment. They are self-serving
statements,[24] that are inherently weak and can easily be put forward.[25]
The rule is well-entrenched that as an appellate court, we will not disturb the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses as
it was in a better position to appreciate the same. The rule is specially so given that there is no showing that the trial court plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance or value, which, if considered, may affect the result of the case. [26]
Illegal recruitment has two essential elements: First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Second, the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. [27]

Recruitment and Placement

A nonlicensee or nonholder of authority means any person, corporation or entity without a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment or placement from the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or the Secretary of Labor. [28] Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and
placement refer to:

...any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

From the evidence adduced, accused-appellants committed acts of recruitment and placement, such as promises to the
complainants of profitable employment abroad and acceptance of placement fees. Accused-appellants gave the impression that they had
the power to send the complainants to Taiwan for employment. [29]
With the certification from the Department of Labor and Employment stating that RNTCGS was not authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment,[30] and promises by the accused of employment abroad for complainants on payment of placements fees, the
conclusion is inescapable that accused are liable for illegal recruitment. [31]

Economic Sabotage

Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P. D. No. 2018 provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage if any of the following qualifying circumstances exists: First, when illegal recruitment is committed by a
syndicate. For purposes of the law, a syndicate exists when three or more persons conspire or confederate with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. [32] Second, there is economic sabotage when illegal recruitment is committed
in a large scale, as when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. [33]
The acts of accused-appellants showed unity of purpose. All these acts establish a common criminal design mutually deliberated
upon and accomplished through coordinated moves. [34]
Even assuming that there was no conspiracy, the record clearly shows illegal recruitment committed in a large scale, since at least
six (6) complainants were victims, which is more than the minimum number of persons required by law to constitute illegal recruitment in
a large scale, resulting in economic sabotage.

Penalty Imposable

The penalty imposable on such offense is life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). [35]

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 90 in Criminal Case No. 93-
42592, dated December 29, 1994.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

EASTERN ASSURANCE AND SURETY CORP VS. CA

J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was
its surety beginning January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B recruited 33 persons but none of
them were ever deployed. These 33 persons sued J&B and the POEA as well as the Secretary of Labor
ruled in favor of the 33 workers and ordered J&B to refund them (with Eastern Assurance being solidarily
liable). Eastern Assurance assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the Secretary of Labor have no
jurisdiction over non-employees (since the 33 were never employed, in short, no employer-employee
relations).
ISSUE: Whether or not Eastern Assurance can be held liable in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. But only for the period covering from January 1985 when the surety took effect (as already held
by the Labor Secretary). The Secretary of Labor was given power by Article 34 (Labor Code) and Section
35 and 36 of EO 797 (POEA Rules) to “restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all
agencies,” but also to “promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions” governing said activities.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the
respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been
fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in
excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending
recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims.
Though some of the cases were filed after the expiration of the surety bond agreement between J&B and
Eastern Assurance, notice was given to J&B of such anomalies even before said expiration. In this
connection, it may be stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the
surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent Eastern
Assurance is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly
in favor of the surety.
NORBERTO SORIANO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (M)85-12-0953 entitled "Norberto
Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation and Knut Knutsen O.A.S.", which denied petitioner's claim for salary differential
and overtime pay and limited the reimbursement of his cash bond to P15,000.00 instead of P20,000.00.

In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought
employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines,
Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine
Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He
admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the
petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23,
1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote
petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to
US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila.

In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for short), a complaint against private
respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash
bond allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by
reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. Although
repatriated, he claims that he failed to receive payment for the following:

1. Salary for November which is equivalent to US$800.00;

2. Leave pay equivalent to his salary for 16.5 days in the sum of US$440.00;

3. Salary differentials which is equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the total sum
of US$1,020,00;

4. Fixed overtime pay equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the sum of
US$1,020.00;

5. Overtime pay for 14 Sundays equivalent to US$484.99;

6. Repatriation cost of US$945.46;

7. Petitioner's cash bond of P20,000.00. 1

In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-
complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to
the Accreditation Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the version of
complainant that there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract seems to
have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the
withholding of a certain amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have
been requested by petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that petitioner deposited a total amount of
P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond.2

Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and
severally within ten (10) days from receipt hereof the amount of P15,000.00 representing the reimbursement of the
cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83 (to be converted to its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment).

Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed against respondents.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 3
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA to the National Labor Relations Commission.
Complainant-petitioner's appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while respondents' appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this recourse.

Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by
disregarding the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent. Petitioner claims that the alteration by private
respondent of his salary and overtime rate which is evidenced by the Crew Agreement and the exit pass constitutes a violation of Article
34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 6

On the other hand, public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends that, as explained by the POEA: "Although the
employment contract seems to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to said office. 7

Apparently, petitioner emphasizes the materiality of the alleged unilateral alteration of the employment contract as this is proscribed by
the Labor Code while public respondent finds the same to be merely innocuous. We take a closer look at the effects of these alterations
upon petitioner's right to demand for his differential, overtime pay and refund of his return airfare to Manila.

A careful examination of the records shows that there is in fact no alteration made in the Crew Agreement 8 or in the Exit Pass. 9 As the
original data appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word "inclusive" is indicated under the column
overtime rate. With the supposed alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures US$800.00 while the figures
US$240.00 were also written above the word "inclusive".

As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner
is entitled under the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime
pay. Otherwise stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive under the agreement as
approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or overtime pay included. 10

Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility that petitioner could have
misunderstood the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for
statements contrary or inconsistent with what appears in the records. Thus, he claimed: [a] that private respondent extended the
duration of the employment contract indefinitely, 11 but admitted in his Reply that his employment contract was extended for another six
(6) months by agreement between private respondent and himself: 12 [b] that when petitioner demanded for his overtime pay,
respondents repatriated him 13which again was discarded in his reply stating that he himself requested for his voluntary repatriation
because of the bad faith and insincerity of private respondent; 14 [c] that he was required to post a cash bond in the amount of
P20,000.00 but it was found that he deposited only the total amount of P15,000.00; [d] that his salary for November 1985 was not paid
when in truth and in fact it was petitioner who owes private respondent US$285.83 for cash advances 15 and on November 27, 1985 the
final pay slip was executed and signed; 16 and [e] that he finished his contract when on the contrary, despite proddings that he continue
working until the renewed contract has expired, he adamantly insisted on his termination.

Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure of respondent company to give the petitioner the desired
promotion which appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut Provider continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of
charterers. 17

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were
passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as
to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a
deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results."18

There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation
of law.

Specifically, the law provides:

Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads:

Prohibited Practices. — It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:

xxxx

(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of
the Department of Labor.
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations
as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination
can be considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition,
exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable,
sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and
conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the
Margin Law. 19

The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged
amendment served to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would
go beyond the bounds of reason and justice.

As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be concern, sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the
working class, is meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the
evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an unreasonable or unfair
rule. 20 But to disregard the employer's own rights and interests solely on the basis of that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust and
unacceptable.

Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the National Labor Relations Commission which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 21

In fact since Madrigal v. Rafferty 22 great weight has been accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the government
agency called upon to implement the same. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry
into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a
dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due
process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995
People of the Phil., plaintiff-appellee
vs Loma Goce, et. al., accused-appellant
Ponente: Regalado

Facts:
On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39
of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or
about during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the City of Manila, the accused conspired
and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested. Hence, on February 1989, the RTC
prdered the case archived but issued a standing warrant os arrest against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly
Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police. Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing
for purpose of due process and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty and the
trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and reciepts of the processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her participation in the recruitment and denied
knowledge of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale with
sentence of life imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.

Issues:
Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the couple does not fall within the meaning
of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 in relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3)
there is no proof that appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal recruitment because, the complainants
had a previous interview with Agustin (as employee of the Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral.
Agustin collected the payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other expenses.On the
issue of proof, the court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear enough to prove the payments and transaction made.