Catu v.
Rellosa public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law,
FACTS:
Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and
Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a
building in Malate which was owned by the former.
The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where
respondent was the punong barangay.
The parties, having been summoned for conciliation
proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement,
were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where
respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant
administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground
that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants
despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to
Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was
financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient
ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the
prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for
the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a
breach of Canon 1.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent was then recommended suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the
transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on
the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD:
No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of
Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies
only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited
from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case
at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay.
Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said
provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA
6713 which governs the practice of profession of elective local
government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all
constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under
RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition,
the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice
his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have
procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of
his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The
failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party
without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the
exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent
failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he
disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the
lawyer's oathand/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby
found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath
as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his
receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.
Lee vs Tambago 544 SCRA 393 (2008)
FACTS:
1. Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty.
Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the
Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a wil.
2. The will was alleged to be spurious in nature in
containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent,
Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the absence of notation of the Residence
Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective
voter's affidavit.
3. In addition to such, the contested will was executed
and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but
bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January
5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of
the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA).
4. Respondent refuted that all allegations were falsely
given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary
Public with due care and with due regards to the provision
of existing law and had complied with elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties and that the
complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result
of a criminal case against him filed by complainant in the
Ombudsman that did not prosper.
5. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a
copy to the Archives Division of NCAA.
6. In a resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP
and the decision of which found respondent guilty of
violations of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as
found in the Administrative Code. The violation constituted
an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule
1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
7. Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension
of respondent for a period of three months.
8. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved,
with modifications, the recommendation of the CBD and
ruled that Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of
law for one year and his notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two
years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tambago acted negligently
in exercising his duties as Notary Public.
RULING: No. Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed
in the performance of the elementary duties of his office.
The Court finds that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing
the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less
severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his
commission and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.
The Civil Code requires that a will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct
and separate provision.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the
notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his
demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in
the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in
question shows that this particular requirement was neither
strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was
the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in
the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators
old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a
clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost
fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by
law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot
be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate
nature of a will, considering that the testator and the
witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the
instrument and to confirm its contents. Accordingly,
respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The
validity of the will was seriously compromised as a
consequence of his breach of duty.
OCA V. Judge Indar Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of
marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2)
docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued
decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied
with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled
“Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling.” Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar
declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that
petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting
Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty.

CASTANEDA V AGO WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clien

CASTRO; July 30, 1975
NATURE
- -
Petition for review of the decision o
f t h e C o u r t o f Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit
against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries.-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and
Henson- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court
issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was
made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the
sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed
the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal-
Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of pr
e l i m i n a r y injunction to restrain sheriff from
enforcing the w rit ofexecution; his motions were denied-
1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and
Henson; Ago failed to redeem- 1964 – sheriff
executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of
possession to the properties- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint
upon the judgment rendered against him in the
replevin su it saying it was his personal obligation
and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could
not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of
QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from
registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining
order continued- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from
enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos
filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition- Agos
filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA which gave due course to the
p e t i t i o n a n d granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
t s t o a v o i d controversy
HELD
No. Despite the pendency in the tria
l c o u r t o f t h e complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners,
long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin
suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos
abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison,have misused
legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to
the extended prejudice of the petitioners.- Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sw orn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty.L u i s o n h a s a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e c o m e
an instigator ofc o n t r o v e r s y a n d a p r e d
a t o r o f c o n f l i c t i n s t e a d o f a mediator
for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead o f a t r u e e x p o n e n t o f t h e p r i m a c y o f
truth and m o r a l justice.- A counsel’s
assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what the SC does not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the
patent futility of his client’s position .It is the
duty of the counsel to advice his client on the
merit or lack of his cas e. If he finds his client’s
cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to
advice the latter
toa c q u i e s c e a n d s u b m i t r a t h e r
t h a n t r a v e r s e t h e incontrovertible.
A l a w y e r m u s t r e s i s t t h e w h i m s a n d caprices
of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate
 Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot,

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so
avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the
poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot
for Malpractice.

Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the court’s
mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement
he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason
of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

Pangan V Ramos

93 SCRA 87 – Legal Ethics – Lack of Candor by a Lawyer – Proper name to be used by a lawyer

In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because
Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which
Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos
said he has the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos.
“D.D.” stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name
listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood.
As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”, respondent has violated his
solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.