Energy Theft and Defective Meters Detection in

AMI Using Linear Regression

Sook-Chin Yip∗† , Chia-Kwang Tan∗ , Wooi-Nee Tan† , Ming-Tao Gan† and Ab-Halim Abu Bakar∗
∗ Um Power Energy Dedicated Advanced Centre (Umpedac), University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA.
† Facultyof Engineering, Multimedia University, Persiaran Multimedia, 63100 Cyberjaya, Selangor, MALAYSIA.
Email: scyip@mmu.edu.my, cktan@um.edu.my, wntan@mmu.edu.my, mtgan@mmu.edu.my, a.halim@um.edu.my

Abstract—Electricity theft is always a ticklish problem faced by 


utilities around the world. To mitigate and detect energy theft,  

utilities are leveraging on the consumers’ energy consumption
dataset obtained from advanced metering infrastructure to iden-
tify anomalous consumption patterns. However, real energy theft  

sample as well as the distribution station smart meter readings do


not exist in Malaysia because smart grid is not fully implemented.   
Therefore, we design and construct a small-scaled advanced 
metering infrastructure test rig in the laboratory to evaluate
the performance and reliability of our previously proposed linear  

regression-based detection schemes for energy theft and defective  

meters in small grid environment. Simulations and electrical tests 


are conducted and the results show that the proposed algorithms


can successfully detect all the fraudulent consumers and discover
faulty smart meters in smart grids.
Keywords— Energy theft detection; Defective meter detec-
tion; Smart Grid; Linear regression; AMI;
I. I NTRODUCTION
A significant advantage of implementing advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) in smart grid (SG) is the feature to allow
utilities to monitor and curb power theft and proliferation. With
the introduction of smart meter (SM), communication between
the consumers and utilities becomes bi-directional. Therefore,
it is easier to detect occurrences of energy fraud. Nonetheless,
the real power theft samples and the distribution station SM
readings are not available as SG is not fully implemented in
Malaysia [1]. In this paper, we design and set up a small-scaled
AMI test rig to assess the performance of our previously pro-
posed linear regression-based detection schemes [2] for energy
theft and defective meters in SG environment. The key idea
of the proposed schemes is to adopt multiple linear regression
for estimating consumers’ anomaly coefficients based on the
consumers’ energy consumption data collected from AMI [2].
Specifically, any anomalies not following the utilization trend
may be indicative of energy frauds or metering defects.
Classification-based energy theft detection techniques based
on testing datasets consisting of the normal and attack class
samples using machine learning [3] have been proposed in [4],
[5], [6]. However, the SVM-based energy theft detection
schemes [4]-[6] usually require a large volume of training
data with load profiles collected from SMs to extract fea-
tures from the historical data. On the other hand, authors
in [7] proposed a LU decomposition-based (LUD) algorithm
to solve for consumers’ honesty coefficients while protecting
consumers’ privacy. Nonetheless, their proposal is not flexible
978-1-5386-3917-7/17/$31.00 

Fig. 1. The design of a small-scaled AMI test rig.
as it is restricted by the dimension of the consumers’ energy
consumption data. That is, the data matrix must be a square
matrix due to the characteristic of LUD. Hence, the authors
have to change the time granularity in order to meet the
dimension requirements. However, it might not be practical to
reduce the sampling period due to the memory size of SMs.
To address some of the limitations of previous works,
linear regression-based detection schemes for energy thefts
and defective meters which are not restricted by the time
granularity as well as the dimension of consumers’ power
consumption data are proposed in our previous work [2].
To take the technical losses (i.e., distribution losses) and
measurement noise that exist in real SG environment into
consideration, a small-scaled AMI test rig is built in the
laboratory to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed energy
theft detection schemes.
II. H ARDWARE D ESIGN AND E XPERIMENT S ETUP
In this work, a small-scaled AMI test rig, consisting of three
consumers, a distribution station (DS) and an operation center
as illustrated in Fig. 1 is constructed in the laboratory as shown
in Fig. 2 so as to evaluate the performance of our proposed
energy theft algorithms in SG environment. The schematic
diagram of the test rig as shown in Fig. 3 is designed so that
each consumer can choose different loads at each time interval
to simulate real-world load profiles. As shown in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, three single-phase Phoenix 2 SMs are used to track
the power consumption of each consumer. This SM model is
c 2017 IEEE
 TABLE I
D ESCRIPTION OF an

Scenario Description
an = 0 Consumer n is honest in energy consumption reporting
an > 0 Consumer n reports less than what was consumed
an < 0 The n-th SM reports more than what was consumed

consumers and DS. The cable length between two consumers

and the cable length from the DS to the first consumer are 7m
and 8.23m, respectively.
A series of electrical tests are conducted and test results
obtained are correlated with Matlab simulation results in order
to confirm the reliability and performance of the proposed
energy theft detection schemes.

III. M ATHEMATICAL M ODELS

A. The LR-ETDM Algorithm
We have previously designed a Linear Regression-based
scheme for Detection of Energy Theft and Defective Smart
Meters (LR-ETDM) to identify energy thieves and metering
defects [2]. In the proposal, we first assume a constant
Fig. 2. The hardware setup of the small-scaled AMI test rig in the laboratory. scenario where the fraudulent consumers always steal energy
throughout the entire day. Meanwhile, faulty SMs are assumed
to always report more than what the corresponding consumers


    actually consumed. The real cause of the under/over-reporting
   
can be distinguished during physical inspection of the SM in

 
 
 question.

 
Consider a service area consisting of N consumers. SM
reading is recorded at time stamp T = t1 , t2 , · · · , t48 . The
parameters in our proposed algorithms are defined as follows:
pti,n = the near real-time energy consumption recorded

 
 

by consumer n at time interval ti ∈ T ,
an = anomaly coefficient for each consumer n,
yti = discrepancy in meter reading at time interval ti ∈ T .



Ideally, the sum of energy consumption reported by all

the consumers must agree with the total load consumption
 measured by the collector at time interval ti . In the event









 



 
 of any under/over-reporting by SM’s, the following can be





Fig. 3. The schematic diagram of the small-scaled AMI test rig.
used by Tenaga Nasional Berhad Malaysia in the SG pilot
projects [1]. A master SM, known as the collector, is installed
in the DS to measure the aggregated power supply from the
utilities (i.e., 3-phase power supply) to all three consumers at
each time interval. Then, all the SMs as well as the collector
are configured to send their power consumption readings to
the operation center (i.e., Omron NJ101-1020 data logger [8])
at half-hourly interval. Miniature Circuit Breakers (MCBs) are
utilized to configure different load settings at each time interval
to generate real-world load demands. PVC insulated 10mm2
low-voltage distribution copper cables are used to connect the
formulated [7]:
a1 pti,1 + a2 pti,2 + ... + aN pti,N = yti , ∀ti ∈ T. (1)
Our objective is to find all an , n = 1, 2, · · · , N from (1) so
as to evaluate the reliability of SM endowed in each household
or anomalous behavior of each consumer. In particular, there
are three possibilities as shown in Table I.
B. The CVLR-ETDM Algorithm
Nevertheless, LR-ETDM may not detect all thieves when
consumers only cheat during a particular period in a day. Thus,
in the second part of our previous work, we proposed another
algorithm, Categorical Variable-Enhanced Linear Regression-
based scheme for Detection of Energy Theft and Defective
Smart Meters (CVLR-ETDM), by introducing categorical
variables in linear regression through dummy coding to resolve TABLE II
the varying cheating problem. B EHAVIORAL C HARACTERIZATION BASED ON an , βn AND (an + βn )
Consider a service area consisting of N consumers and each Scenario an βn (an + βn ) Behavior
of them commits energy theft independently. The parameters 1 =0 =0 =0 Honest
are defined as follows: 2 >0 =0 >0 Cheating constantly
3 <0 =0 <0 Faulty constantly
xn = categorical variable of consumer n, where
4 =0 >0 >0 Cheating during on-peak
 5 =0 <0 <0 Faulty during on-peak
0, off-peak hours (08:00 P.M. to 07:59 A.M.), >0 −an
xn = 6 =0 Cheating during off-peak
1, on-peak hours (08:00 A.M. to 07:59 P.M.), 7 −βn >0 =0 Faulty during off-peak
βn = detection coefficient of consumer n during on-peak
hours.
The period of energy theft or metering defect (i.e., off-peak IV. R ESULT D ISCUSSION
and on-peak) can be identified by solving for an and βn in In this section, we present the regression results and assess
a1 pti,1 +...+aN pti,N +β1 pti,1 x1 +...+βN pti,N xN = yti , (2) the performance of our proposed energy theft and faulty meters
detection algorithms. We assume that each consumer has a
for ∀ti ∈ T . randomly selected combination of the loads to be used at
In (2), an itself denotes the anomaly coefficient of consumer different times of the day. The rand function built in Matlab
n, n = 1, 2, · · · , N during off-peak period while (an + βn ) R2014b is used to generate random load demand combinations
denotes the anomaly coefficient of consumer during on-peak for each consumer at each time interval. Subsequently, each
hours. By investigating the estimated an and βn , we can consumer can select different loads based on the generated
deduce whether anomalous behavior occurs only during a demands by switching the MCBs.
particular period in a day or all the time. The seven possible Meanwhile, real-world SG energy theft samples rarely, or
scenarios are summarized in Table II. do not, exist in Malaysia because SG is not fully imple-
mented. Therefore, based on the benign consumers’ con-
C. Two-tailed p-value Approach sumption data readings collected from the AMI test rig,
In multiple linear regression, the purpose of t-statistic is Pn = {pt1,n , pt2,n , · · · , pt48,n }, for time interval T =
to make inferences about each estimated coefficient to test {t1 , t2 , · · · , t48 }, malicious samples are generated as follows:
the null hypothesis that it is equal to zero. Specifically, the 1) h1 (pti,n ) = νpti,n ;
estimated coefficient is likely to be zero if its corresponding 2) h2 (pti,n ) = δti pti,n , where
t-statistic is not significant, and vice versa. ν, start < ti < end
For a hypothesis test on coefficient an , i.e., δti =
1, otherwise

H0 : a n = 0 ν is defined as ν = ([0.1, 0.9] ∪ [1.1, 2.0]), start and end
, (3)
H1 : an = 0 are the starting and ending time of on-peak or off-peak
an periods.
the t-statistic defined by t = SE(a n)
follows a Student’s t-
In the first scenario, h1 multiplies the measured meter read-
distribution [9]. SE(an ) is the standard error of the estimated
ings by the same randomly chosen percentage. Specifically, the
anomaly coefficient an . Meanwhile, p-value is a function of
fraudulent consumer consistently reports a fraction of his/her
t-statistic which is utilized for computing the probability of
consumed energy (e.g., 40% of the actual consumed data,
rejecting the null hypothesis. Particularly, the p-value will be
ν = 0.4). Meanwhile in h2 , the energy thief cheats only during
compared against a threshold value, which is referred to as the
a certain period in a day (i.e., either on-peak or off-peak hours
significance level, under a two-tailed test. Common choices for
only). For instance, he/she under-reports the consumed data
the significance levels are 5% or 1%. However, the latter is
by 50% during on-peak hours (i.e., δti = 0.5) and reports the
chosen in our work for higher accuracy. For instance, if the
actual consumption data (i.e., δti = 1) during off-peak hours.
p-value is smaller than a 1% significance level, it suggests
The fitlm function built in the Statistics Toolbox of
that the observed data are inconsistent with the assumption
Matlab R2014b is used to solve for the estimated an , βn
that the null hypothesis is true, hence the null hypothesis
and p-values in (1) and (2) based on daily consumers’ energy
an = 0 will be rejected. In other words, an an with p-value less
consumption meter readings (48 data points).
than a 1% significance level implies that there is a significant
cause and effect relationship between pti,n and yti . In our
proposed algorithms, p-value approach is used to shortlist TABLE III
the estimated coefficients which are meaningfully affecting C OMPARISON BETWEEN an AND ãn OBTAINED BY LR-ETDM
yti . Subsequently, the estimated anomaly coefficient of the
Consumer n Description an ãn p-valueã
consumer n is further investigated to evaluate the honesty level 1 Honest 0.00 0.0045 0.0004
of the consumer n as shown in Table I and II. 2 Reports 60% less 1.50 1.5046 8.1259E-97
3 Reports 50% more -0.33 -0.3291 2.2084E-87
 TABLE IV
C OMPARISON BETWEEN an & βn AND ãn & β̃n OBTAINED BY CVLR-ETDM

Consumer n Description an βn (an + βn ) ãn p-valueã β˜n p-valueβ̃ (a˜n + β˜n )

1 Reports 60% less constantly 1.50 0.00 1.50 1.4870 1.9532E-72 0.0126 0.0997 1.4996
2 Reports 50% less during on-peak 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.0020 0.2283 1.0076 2.1266E-71 1.0096
3 Honest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0044 0.0141 -0.0030 0.3663 0.0015

1 energy thief and 1 defective SM found 2 energy thieves and 0 defective SM found
1.6
1.6 off-peak
1.4 on-peak

Anomaly Coefficient, a & (a+β)

1.4
1.2 1.2
Anomaly Coefficient, a

1 1

0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 0
-0.2 0 1 2 3
Consumer ID
-0.2 Consumer ID
-0.4

Fig. 4. Value of ãn obtained by LR-ETDM. Fig. 5. Value of ãn and (ãn + β̃n ) obtained by CVLR-ETDM.

A. Constant Cheating Behavior collector can compute the percentage of under/over-reporting

The constant cheating/malfunctioning scenario is set up as based on the estimated ãn and (ãn + β̃n ).
shown in Table III. Values of an are exact settings from It can be seen from Table IV that p-value of ã1 is less
the test rig, whereas, ãn are estimated values obtained by than a 1% significance level, implying consumer 1 is unlikely
the proposed algorithms. Fig. 4 depicts the values of ãn . to be honest (i.e., ã1 = 0). Meanwhile, p-values of both β̃1
It can be observed from Table III that the p-values of all and β̃3 are greater than 0.01, indicating that both consumer
three anomaly coefficients (i.e., ã1 , ã2 and ã3 ) are smaller 1 and consumer 3 have β̃n = 0 and hence do not change
than a 1% significance level. Thus, all three coefficients are the cheating behaviors. Specifically, consumer 1 under-reports
shortlisted for further investigation. It is quite obvious from energy consumption all the time and consumer 3 is always
Fig. 4 that consumer 2 is an energy thief (since ãn > 0) and honest. On the other hand, the p-value of β̃2 is less than
the third SM is faulty (since ãn < 0). Then, based on these 0.01, indicating that consumer 2 is likely to have β̃2 = 0. A
anomaly coefficients, the collector can compute the fraction non-zero β̃n implies that the consumer has different cheating
1 patterns throughout the period of observations. In such a case,
of reported usage by 1+ã n
. Consumer 2 only reports 40%
of his/her energy consumption since 1+1.5046 1
≈ 0.4, while consumer 2 only cheats during on-peak hours.
consumer 3 over-reports what was consumed by 50% since The technical losses in the test rig is approximately 0.15%,
1 which might cause the slight differences between the computed
1+(−0.3291) ≈ 1.5. On the other hand, for consumer 1, we have
1 and estimated coefficients in Table III and IV.
1+0.0045 ≈ 1 which leads us to classify him/her as honest.

C. Scalability of the Proposed Algorithms

B. Varying Cheating Behavior
Meanwhile, we also conducted test for the case when there
are energy thieves that cheat on their energy reporting during a
certain period of the day as shown in Table IV. Fig. 5 depicts
the values of ãn and (ãn + β̃n ). Results in Fig. 5 suggest that
there are two dishonest consumers. In particular, consumer 1
steals energy all the time (i.e., black and white bars co-appear,
ã1 > 0, (ã1 + β̃1 ) > 0) and consumer 2 reports less than what
was consumed only during on-peak period (i.e., only white bar
appears, ã2 = 0, (ã2 + β̃2 ) > 0). Consumer 3 is always honest
in energy reporting (i.e., ã3 = 0, (ã3 + β̃3 ) = 0). Similarly, the
In order to study how multiple linear regression estimation
scales with the number of consumers (i.e., sizes of 30 con-
sumers) in the neighborhood, the energy data from the UKERC
Energy Data Center are extracted from [10] in our study. It
consists of half-hourly energy usage reports for residential and
commercial premises in United Kingdom. For simplicity, we
assume that technical losses due to transmission are trivial and
hence ignored. As the energy theft samples of the dataset do
not exist, we have generated the malicious samples (i.e., h1
and h2 ) for each half-hourly readings based on the dataset
in [10] for the case when fraudulent consumers pilfer their
energy reporting all the time/during a certain time interval as
 TABLE V
C OMPARISON BETWEEN an & βn AND ãn & β̃n OBTAINED BY CVLR-ETDM FOR THE SIZE OF 30 CONSUMERS

Consumer n Description an βn (an + βn ) ãn p-valueã β̃n p-valueβ̃ (ãn + β̃n )

1 Reports 50% less constantly 1 0 1 1.00 1.61E-158 -4.03E-14 1 1.00
2 Honest 0 0 0 -5.53E-14 1 7.87E-14 1 0.00
3 Reports 25% less during on-peak 0 0.33 0.33 7.37E-15 1 0.33333 1.19E-156 0.33
4 Honest 0 0 0 1.12E-13 1 1.91E-13 1 0.00
5 Honest 0 0 0 -1.23E-14 1 -2.49E-13 1 0.00
6 Honest 0 0 0 -1.16E-14 1 -1.21E-14 1 0.00
7 Reports 25% more constantly -0.20 0 -0.20 -0.20 5.20E-144 -1.13E-13 1 -0.20
8 Honest 0 0 0 -1.81E-14 1 2.52E-13 1 0.00
9 Honest 0 0 0 5.86E-14 1 -5.75E-14 1 0.00
10 Reports 20% less during off-peak 0.25 -0.25 0 0.25 2.58E-149 -0.25 2.80E-147 0.00
11 Honest 0 0 0 1.19E-13 1 -7.25E-14 1 0.00
12 Honest 0 0 0 -4.16E-14 1 5.64E-14 1 0.00
13 Honest 0 0 0 -1.21E-13 1 2.41E-15 1 0.00
14 Reports 35% less during on-peak 0 0.54 0.54 5.92E-14 1 0.54 1.46E-157 0.54
15 Honest 0 0 0 -5.90E-14 1 1.69E-13 1 0.00
16 Report 40% less constantly 0.67 0 0.67 0.67 2.20E-168 -4.51E-15 1 0.67
17 Honest 0 0 0 -3.59E-14 1 1.54E-14 1 0.00
18 Honest 0 0 0 1.01E-13 1 -1.17E-13 1 0.00
19 Honest 0 0 0 -3.32E-14 1 9.72E-14 1 0.00
20 Report 20% less during off-peak 0.25 -0.25 0 0.25 7.07E-160 -0.25 2.42E-158 0.00
21 Honest 0 0 0 -1.17E-13 1 7.80E-14 1 0.00
22 Honest 0 0 0 2.62E-14 1 -7.55E-14 1 0.00
23 Honest 0 0 0 5.91E-14 1 -1.67E-14 1 0.00
24 Honest 0 0 0 -2.52E-14 1 3.80E-14 1 0.00
25 Report 40% less during on-peak 0 0.67 0.67 -3.65E-14 1 0.67 7.16E-181 0.67
26 Honest 0 0 0 -2.78E-14 1 2.10E-14 1 0.00
27 Honest 0 0 0 -1.40E-14 1 1.47E-14 1 0.00
28 Honest 0 0 0 3.04E-14 1 -6.91E-14 1 0.00
29 Report 30% less constantly 0.43 0 0.43 0.42857 2.99E-165 4.49E-14 1 0.43
30 Honest 0 0 0 3.38E-14 1 -5.78E-15 1 0.00

8 energy thieves and 1 defective SM found 1 (i.e. not significant at a 1% significance level, β̃n = 0).
1 off-peak In other words, the cheating/malfunctioning behavior of these
on-peak
consumers remain unchanged all the time. Meanwhile, it can
Anomaly Coefficient, a & (a+β)

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
-0.2 Consumer ID
Fig. 6. Value of ãn and (ãn + β̃n ) obtained by CVLR-ETDM (size of 30
consumers).
shown in Table V. Fig. 6 depicts the values of ãn and (ãn + β̃n )
obtained by CVLR-ETDM for the size of 30 consumers.
Results in Fig. 6 suggest that there are eight fraudulent
consumers and a defective SM. Specifically, consumer 1, 16
and 29 pilfer energy consumption all the time (i.e., white and
black bars co-appear, ãn > 0, (ãn + β̃n ) > 0) while the
7-th SM is always out of order (i.e., white and black bars
co-appear, ã7 < 0, (ã7 + β̃7 ) < 0). It can be observed
from Table V that the p-values of β̃1 , β̃7 , β̃16 and β̃29 are
be seen from Fig. 6 that consumer 3, 14 and 25 only under-
report their energy consumption during on-peak hours (i.e.,
only white bar appears, ãn = 0, (ãn + β̃n ) > 0). Consumer
10 and 20 report fraction of their energy consumption only
during off-peak hours (i.e., only black bar appears, ãn > 0,
(ãn + β̃n ) = 0). Results in Table V show that the p-
values of β̃3 , β̃10 , β̃14 , β̃20 and β̃25 are significant at a 1%
significant level, which implies that β̃n = 0, indicating that
these consumers have different cheating patterns throughout
the period of observations. Besides, we can also easily identify
the other honest consumers in the service area who have
ãn = 0 and (ãn + β̃n ) = 0. Based on these results, the
collector can effectively detect all the energy thieves as well
as the defective SMs, then computes how much less or more
they have paid in their monthly bills.
In addition, the simulation results of our previous work
in [2] also show that the proposed algorithms can be extended
quite straight-forwardly to accommodate more consumers (i.e.,
sizes of 15 and 45 consumers) and successfully detect all the
fraudulent consumers and/or faulty SMs.
 V. C ONCLUSION
In this work, we have designed and constructed an AMI
test rig to evaluate the performance of the proposed linear-
regression-based energy theft detection algorithms in smart
grid environment. The results show that the proposed algo-
rithms are capable in identifying the energy thieves as well as
locating the faulty equipment, regardless of whether they steal
energy at a constant and/or variable rate. The proposed models
vary from other work done because regression analysis is:
1) Not restricted by the dimension of consumers’ power
consumption data;
2) Able to reveal the amount of energy theft/loss based on
a small volume of reported consumers’ power consump-
tion data regardless of technical losses/noise.
These additional features lead to greater flexibility and im-
proved realism in residential/commercial energy theft detec-
tion. Moreover, the proposed model can be extended quite
straight-forwardly to accommodate more consumers for non-
technical losses detection within the service area as discussed
in [2]. As further work, we shall design algorithms to pre-
serve consumers’ privacy while still being able to reveal the
locations of meter tampering and defects.
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