G.R. No.

153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10,
2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to
Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was
then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear
and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond
will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that
the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that
the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before
a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This
Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking
into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed
the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to
bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which
is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions
dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile
argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further
be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right.
Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application
for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the
maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors
this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his
physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix
the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be
deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is
strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty
and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot
be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[[21] The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.
The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail
is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that
a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for
it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong
objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of
whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section
19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35

Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion
temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in
Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense
that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long
years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but
which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-
PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2,
1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes
1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes
1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;
 e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risk s to the
life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could
indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could
be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by
the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in
your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we
have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v.
The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion
to admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually
suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in
said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine
are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for
the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.
Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14
CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some
other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134938 June 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLOS FORCA (at large), RUFINO TESTON and ROGELIO GACO, accused,
RUFINO TESTON and ROGELIO GACO, accused-appellants.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

On July 12, 1995, CARLOS FORCA, 1 RUFINO TESTON alias Toto, ROGELIO GACO alias Yoyong and MANUEL
OSORIO alias Maning were charged with MURDER before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City. Except for FORCA who has remained at large, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the following
information: 2

That on or about the 14th day of April, 1995, in the afternoon, at Brgy. Sowangan, Municipality of Quezon,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed weapons, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack with their bladed weapons, one
VLADINER DECENA, hitting him in the different vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple stab
and hack wounds which cause [sic] cardio-pulmonary arrest which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death shortly thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On July 19, 1996, acting upon a motion filed by the prosecution, the trial court excluded OSORIO from the
information so that he could serve as a state witness. 3

The witnesses for the prosecution were Victor Bucol, OSORIO, Delfin Decena and Alex Inaje; on the other hand,
testifying for the defense were accused GACO and TESTON, Atty. Onos Mangotara — Chief of the National Bureau
of Investigation, and Katong Lantay — barangay chairman of Sowangan.

Victor Bucol 4 testified that on April 14, 1995, at about 2:30 p.m., he went to the plaza of barangay Sowangan,
Quezon, Palawan, where he played basketball with Vladiner Decena. FORCA, TESTON, GACO and OSORIO were
already there drinking at a nearby store. After they had finished playing, he and Vladiner watched the butchering of
a shark; Vladiner was seated inside a cart, while Bucol stood about ten meters away from him. When Bucol turned
to look at his friend, he saw FORCA about to stab Vladiner with a bolo, prompting him to shout "Toto, sasaksakin
ka," but nevertheless, Vladiner was stabbed. FORCA stabbed the victim three times. TESTON hacked the victim 19
times, using a bolo about 15 inches long, while GACO held him by his armpits and OSORIO held him by his hair. 5

On cross-examination, Bucol testified that immediately before the attack, FORCA and Vladiner had a fight and were
about to hit each other.6 Meanwhile, on re-direct and re-cross examination, Bucol clarified his testimony on the
details of the attack. He testified that, immediately after the averted boxing incident, Forca stabbed Vladiner, and
that it was after this first stabbing blow that OSORIO and GACO held down Vladiner, thus allowing FORCA to stab
Vladiner two more times. OSORIO and GACO then released Vladiner, and it was at this point that TESTON came
forward and hacked him several times. 7

The autopsy report 8 prepared by Dr. Marcela Remigio described the cause of death as "cardio-pulmonary arrest
secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to multiple hacking and stab wounds." It also listed the wounds
sustained by the victim as follows:

1. Hacking wound 8 inches in length from the occipital along the midsternal line passing the left lateral side
of the neck down to the left supra scapular region.

2. Hacking wound 3.5 inches in length 1 inch left of the midsternal line on the occipital region.

3. Hacking wound 2.5 inches in length at the occipital region beside the second lession.

4. Hacking wound 3 inches in length left supra scapular region 1 inch left of the midsternal line.

5. Hacking wound 3 inches in length left supra scapular region beside the above lesion.

6. Hacking wound 3 inches in length left supra scapular region beside the above lesion.

7. Hacking wound 3 inches in length left supra scapular region beside the above lesion.

8. Hacking wound 8.5 inches in length left scapular region.

 9. Stab wound 1 inch in length at the interscapular region along the midsternal line.

10. Stab wound 0.5 inch in length at the axillary region 2.5 inches posterior to the right axillary line.

11. Stab wound 1.5 inch at the right lumbar region.

12. Stab wound .5 inch in length at the left lumbar region.

13. Hacking wound 5 inches in length at the left lumbar region.

14. Hacking wound 2.5 inches in length middle third of left forearm.

Although Dr. Remigio was unable to testify in court, the defense admitted the authenticity and veracity of the
autopsy report. 9

The testimony of OSORIO, who was discharged as a state witness, departed substantially from that given by Bucol.
OSORIO claimed that on April 14, 1995, at around 3:00 p.m., while he was waiting for a shark to be butchered at the
house of Nilo Pasiones in barangay Sowangan, 10 an altercation erupted between FORCA and Vladiner. As he was
only twenty meters away from the two, he noticed that FORCA was wielding a knife, while Vladiner was holding a
stone. However, the two were pacified by TESTON. Vladiner ran away and shouted "Wait for me, I will be back."
After a short while, Vladiner returned with a .38 caliber gun, which he fired at FORCA and TESTON, who were
hiding behind a post beside OSORIO's house. Vladiner continued firing, although unsuccessfully, at the two
accused, and as he got closer to them, the latter ganged up on him — FORCA stabbed Vladiner with a knife, while
TESTON hacked him with his bolo. 11 According to OSORIO, Vladiner dropped the gun upon being stabbed by
FORCA. 12 GACO picked up the gun and subsequently surrendered it to the barangay captain. Apart from this,
GACO had no other involvement in the attack upon Vladiner. 1

Alex Inaje 14 testified that two days prior to the killing of Vladiner, he was at the house of a certain Berting Bartolome
in sitio Simunong in barangay Sowangan, together with FORCA, TESTON, GACO and OSORIO. 15 While the
accused were drinking, FORCA proposed the killing of a member of the Decena family, which proposal was
approved by TESTON, GACO and OSORIO. Inaje was the only one who disapproved the plan. 16 He further stated
that he did not know what propelled the accused to come up with such a scheme. 17 Inaje, however, failed to tell the
Decenas about the conversation of the accused. 18

Delfin Decena, the father of Vladiner, testified that on April 14, 1995, at around 3:30 p.m., he was roused from his
sleep by a certain Jesus Pimentel, who informed him of the incident at the plaza. He then ran towards the plaza only
to find his son bloodied and mortally wounded. With the help of a certain Jerick Jones, Delfin brought his son to a
hospital in Quezon, Palawan. 19 On the way to the hospital, he asked his son who had attacked him. Vladiner
identified FORCA, TESTON and GACO as his assailants. 20 On cross-examination, Delfin denied that he owned a
gun or that he had given one to his son. 21 He also testified that Vladiner and FORCA had a fistfight about a week
prior to the killing. 22

Delfin claimed that he had spent P30,000 for burial expenses, but that he had no receipts to substantiate such
amount. He also testified that, at the time of his death, Vladiner, who was single and working as a fisherman, had a
monthly income of P2,000. 2

Accused GACO's account of the events which transpired on April 14, 1995, largely coincided with OSORIO's
testimony. He maintained that Vladiner and FORCA, who had grudges against each other, got into a fistfight and
were pacified by TESTON and OSORIO; that Vladiner ran away and returned with a gun which he fired at FORCA
and TESTON; that he did not know at first if the two accused were hit, but that he later on saw TESTON bleeding;
and that FORCA stabbed Vladiner while TESTON hacked him, causing Vladiner to drop his gun.

GACO insisted that he did not participate in the attack on Vladiner, maintaining that all he did was to pick up the
latter's gun which he surrendered to the barangay captain. 24 He claimed that he was able to identify the gun as
belonging to Delfin Decena because he had once repaired it sometime in February, 1995. 25

In connection with the gun allegedly recovered by GACO from Vladiner, the defense presented Katong Lantay, the
barangay chairman of Sowangan at the time, who testified that on April 14, 1995, GACO surrendered to him a gun,
which was allegedly retrieved from Vladiner, together with three spent and three live bullets. Lantay turned the gun
1avv phi 1

over to the local police of Quezon, Palawan. 26

Meanwhile, also testifying for the defense was Atty. Onos Mangotara, the Chief of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), who declared that a gun was forwarded to his office by the Philippine National Police of Quezon,
Palawan for ballistic examination. 27

TESTON claimed that he hacked Vladiner in self-defense. Like GACO, he testified that on April 14, 1995, Vladiner
and Forca were quarreling and that he pacified the two; after which Vladiner ran towards his house only to return
shortly after with a gun, which he fired three times at TESTON and FORCA, hitting TESTON on his left wrist. As
Vladiner was getting closer to them, FORCA repeatedly stabbed Vladiner, causing the latter to drop the gun he was
holding. 28 On cross-examination, TESTON admitted to having hacked Vladiner. The day after the killing, TESTON
went to a doctor to have his wound treated. However, despite TESTON's insistence, the doctor refused to give him
a medical certificate stating that his wound was due to a gun shot, maintaining that TESTON had suffered a hacking
wound. 29

The trial court found Victor Bucol's testimony to be more credible than the testimonies of GACO, TESTON or
OSORIO. TESTON's plea of self-defense was, according to the trial court, belied by the number of wounds
sustained by the victim. Additionally, the trial court explained that, even assuming that Vladiner had a gun, OSORIO
himself testified that after Vladiner was stabbed he dropped the gun, yet FORCA and TESTON did not let up on
their attack. Meanwhile, GACO's claim that he did not participate in the killing was directly contradicted by Bucol's
positive identification of GACO as the person who held Vladiner by the armpits as he was being stabbed and
hacked by FORCA and TESTON.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery was ruled out by the trial court. It held that since the attack upon Vladiner
was preceded by an altercation between FORCA and the victim, the latter was sufficiently forewarned of the danger
to himself and furthermore, the altercation reveals that the accused did not consciously adopt their mode of attack.
Evident premeditation was also rejected by the trial court for, despite Inaje's testimony that two days before the
killing the accused agreed to kill any member of the Decena family, the prosecution failed to present proof of an
overt act of the accused to show that they had clung to their determination to commit the crime. However, the trial
court declared that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing, as shown by the
fact that while GACO and OSORIO held down Vladiner, FORCA and TESTON stabbed and hacked him. Thus, the
court explicitly rejected OSORIO's claim that only FORCA and TESTON attacked Vladiner and that the latter was
armed with a gun.

Finally, the trial court found that the accused acted in conspiracy. It held that, in the killing of Vladiner, each of the
accused performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination so as to indicate a common purpose and
design.

Thus, in the decretal portion of its decision, the trial court held —

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RUFINO TESTON and
ROGELIO GACO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of murder, and there being
no modifying circumstances appreciated, and pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, in relation to Article 63 (2) of the same Code, and not being entitled to the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the heirs of
Vladiner Decena civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 and the costs.

As co-accused Carlos Forca remains at large, the case against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be
prosecuted upon his apprehension.

Issue alias warrant for the arrest of Carlos Forca.

SO ORDERED. 30

Accused TESTON and GACO are now before this Court appealing their conviction for murder. In their Brief, 31 the
accused make a lone assignment of error, that —

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED RUFINO TESTON AND ROGELIO GACO
BASED ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF VICTOR BUCOL & ALEX ENAJE WHICH ARE FULL OF
INCONSISTENCIES AND HENCE NOT WORTHY OF CREDIBILITY FOR BEING DEVOID OF TRUTH.

Basically, accused-appellants are questioning the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, claiming that Bucol and Inaje's testimonies are intrinsically unbelievable and that they are biased
witnesses since they are somehow related to the victim. Furthermore, they claim that Bucol cannot be relied upon to
give an accurate account of the events which transpired on the day of the killing since he is only in second year high
school and has a very short memory. Instead, accused urge this Court to adopt the testimony of OSORIO, whom
they claim is a "neutral witness." Pursuant to OSORIO's narration of events, they insist that they should be acquitted
since TESTON acted in self-defense, whereas GACO had no participation in the killing.

In its Brief, 32 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the trial court was correct in upholding the
credibility of Bucol who positively identified the accused and described their participation in the killing of Vladiner
Decena, in the absence of any evidence that he was actuated by improper motives. Any inconsistencies which may
be found in Bucol's testimony refer only to minor and unsubstantial matters and strengthen, rather than diminish, his
credibility since they remove all suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. It is a well-settled rule that the appellate court
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court with regards to the credibility of witnesses.

The OSG also reiterates the trial court's ruling that the number of wounds sustained by the victim negates
TESTON's claim of self-defense and instead, indicates a determined effort to kill the victim. Meanwhile, GACO's
denial of participation in the killing was rendered futile by Bucol's testimony which, as above mentioned, was
granted full faith and credit by the trial court.

In full agreement with the trial court, the OSG asserts that accused acted in conspiracy. Based on the testimony of
Bucol, FORCA stabbed Valdiner, after which GACO held him by the armpits, while OSORIO grabbed his hair.
Thereupon, TESTON hacked the victim several times with his bolo. Their various acts clearly show that they were
animated by the same purpose and impelled by a common design. The manner in which the accused attacked
Vladiner also shows that they acted with abuse of superior strength since they clearly outnumbered the victim who
was utterly defenseless. Thus, the trial court was correct in holding the accused liable for the crime of murder.

It has long been established that the trial court's evaluation of a witnesses' trustworthiness is entitled to the highest
respect for it has the distinct opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether he
is telling the truth. 3 Thus, absent any showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some
facts of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would have altered the result of the case, we are
compelled to uphold the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. 34 After carefully studying the
transcripts of this case, we find that the trial court was justified in giving full faith and credence to Bucol's testimony,
which was clear and straightforward. Any inconsistencies in his testimony refer only to minor details and do not
impair his credibility. 35 Moreover, the defense has not presented any evidence that Bucol was impelled by dubious or
improper motives, therefore it must be presumed that he was not so moved. 36 It matters little that, apart from the
accused, Bucol is essentially the lone eyewitness to the killing of Vladiner. The testimony of a single prosecution
witness, if found credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, for the truth is not established by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies. 37

Besides, in the case of TESTON, the credibility of Bucol is no longer the issue since he has invoked the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Whenever an accused admits inflicting a fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-
defense, the burden of proof immediately shifts from the prosecution to the defense; the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence. 38 In order for self-defense to
be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. 39 In the present case, there is no unlawful aggression to begin with. Bucol testified
that it was only after Vladiner was already stabbed three times, that Teston began to hack him repeatedly. On direct
examination, the attack was described by Bucol in the following manner —

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And Carlos Forca was one of those you saw attacking Vladiner Decena?

A: Yes, Sir, he was the one who stabbed.

Q: Mr. Witness, you said that Carlos Forca stabbed Vladiner Decena, what kind of weapon was he using?

A: It looks like a small bolo, more or less one foot.

Q: What about this Rufino Teston, what was he doing at that time?

A: He just kept hacking Vladiner Decena.

Q: And what kind of instrument did he use?

A: A bolo.

Q: About how long is that bolo?

A: More or less 15 inches.

Q: Mr. Witness, how many times did Carlos Forca stab Vladiner Decena?

A: Three times.

Q: And did you see what part of his body was hit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of his body?

A: The right side of his body.

Q: And this Rufino Teston alyas Toto, how many times did he hack Vladiner Decena?
 A: 19 times.

Q: What about Rogelio Gaco, what was he doing?

A: He was holding Vladiner Decena by his two armpits while raising his arms.

Q: What about Manuel Osorio alyas Maning, what was he doing at that time?

A: He was holding Vladiner by his hair.

Q: Mr. Witness, when Carlos Forca stabbed Vladiner Decena three times and Rufino Teston hacked
Vladiner Decena 19 times, after that what happened next?

A: They just left him thinking that he was already dead. 40

xxx xxx xxx

Bucol further clarified some of the details of the attack on re-direct examination —

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR

(to witness)

Mr. witness you said that Rogelio Gaco held Vladimir by the armpit at what stage did he hold Vladimir
Decena in his armpit when Carlos Porca was stabbing the victim?

A The victim was already stabbed when he was held.

Q You said that Carlos Porca stabbed the victim three (3) times was it after the first time he was hit by
Carlos Porca that Rogelio Gaco held Vladimir by his armpit?

A Yes sir.

Q Or could it be during or after the second stabbing?

A After the first stabbing sir.

Q And not after the third stabbing?

A No sir it was during the first stabbing.

Q What about the hacking, at what stage of the hacking was Vladimir held by the armpit by Rogelio Gaco?

A Vladimir was released and then he was hacked.

Q Which came first, the stabbing or the hacking?

A The stabbing came first.

COURT

(to witness)

Are we made to understand that the three (3) stabbing was already done when the hacking was started by
Tiston?

A Yes sir after the stabbing the victim was released from their hold and then he was hacked at the back until
he fell.

PROSECUTOR.

(to witness)

To whom are you referring when you said released by the two who were those two (2)?
 A I was referring to Maning Osorio and Rogelio Gaco. 41

xxx xxx xxx

Apparently, Vladiner was already seriously injured by FORCA's stabbing blows when he was hacked by TESTON.
In this condition, Vladiner could not have possibly assaulted TESTON or gave him the impression that he was in
danger of an imminent attack. The trial court disbelieved OSORIO's assertion that Vladiner was armed with a gun
and that he shot at FORCA and TESTON. 42 As stated earlier, this finding goes into the trial court's assessment of a
witness' credibility and will not be disturbed by this Court. 4 The fact that there was actually a gun at the scene of the
crime 44 still does not prove that Vladiner owned or had used such weapon. Defense witness Katong Lantay,
barangay chairman of Sowangan, merely testified that on April 14, 1995, GACO surrendered to him a gun and some
bullets. 45 NBI Chief Atty. Onos Mangotara stated that such gun was forwarded to his office by the PNP for ballistic
examination, but he did not testify as to the results of such examination, or for that matter, whether such an
examination was even conducted. 46 Clearly, the defense obviously failed to establish that Vladiner had a gun and
that he actually used it against the accused.

Even assuming that Vladiner had a gun and that he fired it at accused, according to OSORIO's own testimony,
Vladiner had already dropped the gun after he was stabbed by FORCA; thus, he was totally defenseless and
unarmed when TESTON repeatedly hacked at him. 47 When the unlawful aggression which had begun no longer
exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. 48

Moreover, TESTON's own judicial admission belies his claim of having acted in self-defense. In their appellants'
brief, it was stated that "As it is Carlos Forca and Rufino Teston only acted in self-defense after they were fired upon
by Vladimir Decena and so the killing is justified although there was an over kill." 49 The only sense which we can
make of these words is that accused themselves were keenly aware that their assault upon Vladiner was grossly
disproportionate with the aggression which the victim had allegedly exhibited. Thus, by the defense's own
admission, another indispensable element of self-defense is missing in this case — that is, the means employed
was not reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression.

Finally, we agree with the trial court that the number of wounds sustained by Vladiner stands as an irrefutable
argument against the existence of self-defense. According to the autopsy report, the victim had ten (10) hacking
wounds and four (4) stab wounds in various parts of his body. The number and nature of the wounds sustained by
the victim in this case are persuasive indicia that the assault was not a simple act of self-defense but a determined
and murderous aggression. 50

Accused GACO asserts that he had absolutely no participation in the killing of Vladiner; that he merely picked up the
gun used by the victim and surrendered it to the local authorities. 51 However, GACO's claims are directly
contradicted by the positive testimony of Bucol who identified him as one of Vladiner's assailants. Bucol declared
that GACO held Vladiner by his armpits, while FORCA stabbed him. 52 Between the categorical identification of the
accused by a prosecution witness and the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime,
greater weight is always given to the former. 5

We disagree with the trial court's ruling that treachery did not attend the killing. Treachery is present when the attack
is sudden and unexpected, depriving the victim of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the offender. 54 The lower court held that since Vladiner and FORCA fought
on the day of the killing, Vladiner was forewarned of the danger to himself. Also, it considered the fight as evidence
that the accused did not consciously adopt their mode of attack "as their confrontation was coincidental." 55

That the victim and the accused had an altercation immediately before the attack upon the victim does not negate
the presence of treachery. In People v. Molina, 56 we held that "[t]reachery may also be appreciated even when the
victim was warned of danger or initially assaulted frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and
had no means to defend himself or to retaliate." Similarly, in People v. Villonez, 57 this Court declared that —

However, we do not share the assessment of the trial court that there was no treachery in this case because
the victim had engaged in a fight previous to the killing and was thus forewarned of an attack against him.
Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
The overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact
that the victim's hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by the victim.

In the instant case, it has been established that while Vladiner was being held down by GACO and OSORIO,
FORCA stabbed him several times. However, despite Vladiner's helpless and vulnerable condition, TESTON still
hacked him repeatedly, guaranteeing that the victim would not survive the attack. This undoubtedly constitutes
treachery for the means employed by accused ensured the execution of their nefarious designs upon the victim
without risk to themselves arising from any defense which the offended party might have made. 58

Having appreciated treachery, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength need no longer be taken
against accused since it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 59
We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation has not been proven. The
elements of evident premeditation are the following: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2)
an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 60 Although the testimony of Alex Inaje established that accused had
decided to kill a member of the Decena family at least two days before the actual killing of Vladiner, the prosecution
has not pointed to any external act of accused indicating that they had clung to their decision to commit the crime.

We hold that the acts of accused in this case indubitably establish conspiracy. As earlier discussed, after FORCA
first stabbed Vladiner, GACO held down the victim's arms while OSORIO held him by his hair, thus enabling
FORCA to stab the victim two more times. After releasing him, TESTON moved in and mercilessly hacked at the
already seriously injured Vladiner at least ten times, as indicated by the autopsy report. As shown by their concerted
acts, accused clearly harbored and were united in the execution of the same criminal purpose — to end the life of
Vladiner Decena. 61 Since conspiracy has been proven, it need not be determined who among the accused delivered
the fatal blow. All of the accused are liable as principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation,
for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 62

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by
the trial court. 63 Pursuant to current jurisprudence, accused-appellants are also ordered to pay jointly and severally
the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) by way of indemnity for the killing. 64 However,
no actual damages may be awarded since the prosecution failed to produce receipts to substantiate the same. 65

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused.

SO ORDERED. 1âw phi 1.nêt

G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.

Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for
petitioner.

Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of
P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting
excessive bail.1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the
above order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had
escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for
the guidance of lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental,
was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the
killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan
del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court
of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder2 and another for multiple murder3 against petitioner, his co-
accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14,
1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was
no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence.
Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10,
1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.

Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that
there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the
opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00
for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then
came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of
such order, sent a telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration
to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.

The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the
above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any charge that he wasguilty of
grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challengedorder would find support in circulars of the
Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.

In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner and respondents
with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a
memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.

Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that
petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained at large. There was a
reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated
June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently
interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of
merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present
petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras
who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of
bail."4

While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted, still, as set forth at
the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude thisTribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of theConstitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is
strong.5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would
just simply make himself scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that
such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial.6 Nor is there, anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.

2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental
law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive
bail.7As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonablycalculated to
fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment."8

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated
murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there
being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in
this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.

3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be indefensible by the
alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano.9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the
offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength
of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the
accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the
above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress,
however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and
render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the
required remedy." 11

No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an
accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum.
What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the
fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a
purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a
stateof desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required
could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were
informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have beenno disappointment of
expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the
hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."12 It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left
resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not
entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.

Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a
decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that
there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement
may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order
complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say
that it is at war with thecommand of reason.With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no
ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the above order.

WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to costs.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321 March 10, 2004

VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T. HERNANDEZ, President, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.
 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) against respondent Judge Reynaldo B.
Bellosillo, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani, Bataan, and Acting Presiding
Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along the National Highway of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana died the following
day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000, VLI and the
heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement/Undertaking.1 On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI of the claims,
Faustina M. Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of the heirs of the victim, executed a Release of
Claim2 and an Affidavit of Desistance3 in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la Cruz.

However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marciana’s sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who were
also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay4 against Reino de la Cruz. On
the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512.

After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of
a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted in cash. He further directed the
Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately impound the bus involved in the accident, which could be
released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,000.6

On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court under protest
a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After making the deposit, VLI’s counsel presented the receipt
issued by the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, who then released
the bus.

On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent’s court a petition8 to declare null and void the order directing it to post
bond for the release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.

On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo issued an order directing the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, and his deputies and investigators to explain in writing why they should not be held in contempt of court for,
and be administratively charged with, having released without a court order the Victory Liner bus involved in
Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the bus was re-impounded by the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan.

Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted on VLI’s Manifestation and Motion dated 30 March 2000
and issued an order9 for the release of the bus.

On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified complaint10 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) claiming that the
respondent (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus and requiring it to post a cash bond for
the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his authority when it revoked the surety bond of one of VLI’s driver Edwin
Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373; (c) knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order when he increased the
bond to P350,000 and required that it be posted in cash; (d) gravely abused his authority when he ordered the
police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to file a case against Reino de la Cruz; and (e) is guilty of inaction or
dereliction of duty in failing to resolve, despite the lapse of two months, VLI’s petition for the nullification of the order
requiring the posting of a cash bond for the release of the bus involved in the accident. Later, VLI filed with the
Office of the Chief Justice a verified supplemental complaint against the respondent, which was forthwith indorsed to
the OCA.

In his comment,11 respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in the exercise of his sound discretion and in the greater
interest of justice and fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of the police-impounded vehicle
to answer for damages by way of subsidiary liability in case of accused’s insolvency. The requirement of a bond for
the release of impounded vehicles involved in reckless imprudence cases is practiced not only by him but by other
judges throughout the country.
As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus, respondent Judge claims that it was just under the
circumstances considering that its prior release was illegal. The payment of cash bond for the release of the
impounded vehicle was made by the VLI when respondent Judge was at his official station in the MCTC of Orani-
Samal, Bataan. Thus, in his absence, no order could have been issued for the release of the impounded vehicle. If
ever said vehicle had to be re-impounded, it was the fault of VLI’s counsel, as he was the one who misled the police
authorities into believing that with the payment of the bond, the bus could already be released.

The respondent justifies the substitution of the surety bond of accused Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373
with a cash bond on the strength of the prayer of the prosecutor that the bond be posted in cash in view of the
gravity of the offense. The Rules of Court leave to the discretion of trial judges the question of whether a bail should
be posted in the form of a corporate surety bond, property bond, cash deposit, or personal recognizance. Having
found that Serrano’s surety bond, which was not even attached to the information but merely noted on the third page
thereof, was in a minimal amount and had expired already, he required a cash bond. He increased the bond after
considering that Serrano was a fugitive from justice.

Respondent Judge Bellosillo denies that he ordered the police authorities of Dinalupihan to file the criminal case
against Reino de la Cruz. He points to (a) the Pinagsamang Salaysay dated 3 March 2000 of Rolando B. Soriano
and Jimmy B. Morales, which was the basis for the filing of the criminal complaint by the police investigator and; (b)
the fact that said criminal complaint filed by the police investigator was duly approved by the Chief of Police. Thus,
with these circumstances, it could not be said that he compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case.

As to the charge of dereliction of duty for failure to act on the petition for the nullification of the order requiring a
bond for the release of VLI’s bus, respondent Judge avers that the same is baseless. Contrary to VLI’s contention,
he acted on that petition as early as 10 April 2000, which was the date set by VLI’s counsel for the hearing of such
petition.12 VLI’s counsel did not appear on that date and refused to accept or receive notices of hearing and court
orders from court personnel.

In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom this case was
referred by the Court, submits that Judge Bellosillo’s resignation, which was accepted by the Court En Banceffective
27 March 2002, does not render moot and academic the instant administrative complaint. He finds that the
respondent Judge erred in ordering the impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of P50,000
for its release; in fixing an excessive bail bond for Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512; and in increasing
the bail bond of Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 unconscionably from P60,000 to P350,000. He then
recommends that the respondent Judge be penalized with a fine of P20,000. But for lack of evidence, he exonerates
respondent Judge from complainant’s charge that he compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case
against De la Cruz. As to respondent’s alleged inaction on VLI’s petition to declare null and void the order requiring
a bond for the release of the subject bus, Justice Atienza finds that the said petition was resolved on 10 April 2000,
right on the day it was submitted for resolution. Likewise, he disregards the additional charges in the supplemental
complaint, there being no showing that the respondent received a copy thereof.

Justice Atienza also notes that in A.M. No. 00-1293, promulgated on 5 July 2000, respondent Judge was
reprimanded for issuing a policy action and an order beyond the scope of his authority; and in MTJ No. 00-1308,
promulgated on 16 December 2002, respondent Judge was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and
was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be taken from his retirement benefits. He further notes the pending
administrative cases against respondent Judge: (1) OCA IPI No. 96-232-MTJ for conduct unbecoming a judge;
(2) OCA IPI No. 98-533-MTJ for ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and gross misconduct; (3) OCA IPI
No. 96-203-MTJ for issuing an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law; (4) A.M. No. 99-1222 for
violation of the constitutional rights to information and to speedy trial; and (5) undocketed cases for unprofessional
and ill-mannered conduct, refusing to receive documents, and illegal possession of firearms.

Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and academic the instant administrative
case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its
jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would
be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.13

We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent from the charges of inaction on a pending motion and
of compelling the police authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz. We, however, hesitate to hold the
respondent administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1) the impounding of the vehicle
involved in the vehicular accident and (2) the posting of a P50,000 bond for the release of the vehicle, both of which
were found by OCA Consultant Atienza to be erroneous.

Notably, in its Motion to Resolve, VLI submits that this case presents a good occasion for us to resolve, among
other issues, "the legality of the imposition by trial judges on bus operators to post bail bond for their impounded
vehicles in accident cases, in addition to the bail bond required for the provisional liberty of accused-drivers."
According to VLI, our ruling on this matter would guide trial court judges nationwide in accident cases so that bus
operators and their personnel would not be at the mercy of judges like the respondent in this case, who during his
incumbency had been requiring vehicle owners involved in accidents to post cash bonds for the release of
impounded vehicles.
In Lacadin v. Mangino,14 the respondent Judge therein was sought to be administratively liable for extending the
lifetime of a search warrant issued by him. We held that even if he may have committed an error of judgment or an
abuse of discretion for such act, he cannot be punished administratively therefor in the absence of proof that he was
motivated by ignominy or ill-will. Moreover, we ruled that the administrative case is not the right forum to determine
whether the life of a search warrant may be extended by the court upon proper motion filed before the expiration of
the 10-day period.

Worth noting also is the case of Cañas v. Castigador.15 In that case, an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a vehicular
mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the trial court where the criminal case against
its driver was pending. That order was addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, or any officer of the
law. In an earlier order of 14 August 1996, the vehicle owner was required to surrender the truck to the court.
Subsequently, on motion of the prosecutor, the trial court declared the vehicle owner guilty of indirect contempt for
continued defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the vehicle owner’s petition, we found
respondent’s order holding the petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be highly improper for several
reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the legality of the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular
accident. We did not declare the order for the impounding of the vehicle to be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it
could have been one of the several reasons for admonishing the respondent Judge therein.

In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s
order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in
the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,16 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must be put to a halt.17

It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent judge’s court a Petition to Declare Order Directing
Victory Liner, Inc., to Post Bond for the Release of the Bus Null and Void.18 In that petition, VLI submitted that there is
no legal basis for the order directing the impounding of the bus and the posting by the bus owner of a cash bond for
its release, and hence that order is void ab initio.19 However, despite notice, VLI’s counsel Atty. Reynaldo R. Romero
did not appear on 10 April 2000, the schedule20 for the hearing of that petition as set by him.21 The respondent
thereupon issued an order22 dismissing the petition outright on grounds of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction,
and ordering that a copy of the said order be furnished VLI’s counsel at his given address. However, VLI’s counsel
reportedly refused to accept or receive from court personnel notices of hearing and court orders. And, according to
respondent Judge, he (VLI’s counsel) never appeared and continued not to appear before the respondent for
reasons known only to him.23 VLI cannot, therefore, resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less through a
mere verified administrative complaint or motion to resolve.

To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an administrative case
would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would
thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a proper petition, including the
payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case.

In any event, the absence of a ruling in Cañas v. Castigador on the legality of the impounding of vehicles involved in
an accident, as well as the foregoing statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve, implies that there is yet no clear-cut
policy or rule on the matter. They would, therefore, negate a finding of gross ignorance of the law or grave abuse of
authority on the part of respondent Judge. Moreover, even assuming that the acts of the respondent in ordering the
impounding and subsequent re-impounding of the subject vehicle and in requiring the posting of a cash bond for its
release were erroneous, as found by OCA Consultant Atienza, such are errors of judgment that cannot be the
subject of a disciplinary action absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or bad faith.24 A judge may not be held
administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render a
judicial office unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in rendering a judgment. For a judge to be held administratively liable for ignorance of the
law, it is necessary that the law be sufficiently basic that all that the judge must do is to simply apply it;25 or that the
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.26

We, however, find respondent administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on accused Reino de la
Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.

The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.27 Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended,28 provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge must primarily consider the
following factors:

a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

c) Penalty for the offense charged;

d) Character and reputation of the accused;

 e) Age and health of the accused;

f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;

g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;

h) Forfeiture of the bonds;

i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail shall
not be required.29 In implementing this mandate, the accused’s financial capability should particularly be considered.
What is reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so to a man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail
exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.30

Moreover, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice (DOJ), crimes of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, bail shall be P30,000
regardless of the number of deaths. 31

De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Although
permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was capable of posting a cash bail bond of
P50,000 and P350,000, respectively. In fixing such amounts, the respondent apparently did not take into account
the gravity of the offense charged and the financial capability of the accused. He thereby willfully disregarded the
guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, and the 2000 Bail
Bond Guide of the DOJ. In effect, he violated the constitutional right of the accused to bail, as well as the prohibition
against excessive bail, making the right, in the words of Justice Jackson, "a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest
in a pauper’s will."32

The bail fixed by the respondent is all the more excessive because it was in the form of cash. The posting of a cash
bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold
hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying the accused’s constitutional right to
bail. On the other hand, a surety bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small
premium. A surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the
property owner. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at
the various proceedings leading to conviction or acquittal.33

While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to
the accused,34 as can be gleaned from the language of Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended,35 which read:

SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with
the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by
the court or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case, and upon submission of a
proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of
Section 2 hereof, the accused shall be discharged from custody….

The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in converting Serrano’s surety bond to cash bond and in demanding
that De la Cruz post a cash bond to obtain their provisional liberty.36

It bears repeating that judges should exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the basic legal norms and
precepts, as well as with statutes and procedural rules. As advocates of justice and visible representations of the
law, they are expected to keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence, and be proficient in the application and
interpretation thereof. When the law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than
that is gross ignorance of the law.37

In light of our current jurisprudence,38 the respondent should be fined in the amount of P10,000 for his act of
imposing on accused De la Cruz and Serrano an excessive bail to be posted in cash in violation of pertinent rules
and guidelines, as well as the constitutional right of the accused to bail and the proscription against excessive bail.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive cash bail bonds on Reino de la
Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373, respondent Judge Reynaldo B.
Bellosillo is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to be taken from his retirement
benefits.

SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.