Psychological Manipulation, Hypnosis, and Suggestion
Jose Fernández Aguado
Pehuén Institute of Psychology, Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
A widespread vision links hypnosis to
psychological manipulation. The mass media
favor this image, thus making it popular. Traces
of that point of view can even taint scientific
views at scientific forums. Nevertheless, this
widespread vision is essentially false. In this
paper I deal with some of the possible causes of
that confusion, the main one being that a major
characteristic of hypnosis (namely, an increase
in suggestibility one experiences while under
hypnosis) is also a key characteristic of people
in manipulative and abusive environments. I will
give some well-established and agreed-upon
definitions of hypnosis and explain why one’s
suggestibility is enhanced while hypnotized. My
conclusion is that one’s confidence in the
process and the hypnotizer plays a major role in
any enhanced suggestibility while under
hypnosis. I compare what occurs during
hypnosis to what occurs in the mildly or overly
manipulative contexts of seduction and coercion,
where suggestibility is also enhanced. I conclude
that the main difference in the case of hypnosis
lies in the ease with which one can exit that
enhanced state of suggestibility. I introduce the
concepts of dissociation and integration for the
purpose of increasing readers’ understanding
about the twofold route to higher states of
suggestibility and the way back from them, and
of showing how this way back can be hampered
in manipulative contexts.
Keywords: hypnosis, psychological
manipulation, suggestibility, dissociation,
integration
Introduction
One of the oldest questions in the literature on
hypnosis is whether deeply hypnotized
individuals can be induced to perform antisocial
or self-destructive acts (Orne, 1962), or whether
those individuals can be induced to perform acts
48
that are against their core principles and that
they would never perform if they were not under
hypnosis.
The answer that many have given to these
questions is “No” (Capafons, 2001; Lynn and
Kirsch, 2006; Orne, 1962). The impossibility of
getting persons to do anything under hypnosis
that they would not do without hypnosis,
therefore, has been widely proven.
Nevertheless, Wells (1941), Rowland (1939),
Young (1948), Estabrooks (1993), Wolberg
(1945; 1948), and Weitzenhoffer (1949) have
been leading proponents of the view that,
provided the hypnotist’s technique is adequate,
the subject in hypnosis may be forced to do
anything. But according to Orne (1962), the
evidence shown by all of these authors to
support their view is inconsistent, if not clearly
biased. Orne points out that, before asserting that
by means of hypnosis a person can make
someone act against her will, one must prove
that, without hypnosis, the individual would not
have been predisposed to carry out such an act.
Orne skillfully proves how none of these authors
had controlled the influence the hypnotist may
have had on the subject prior to hypnosis, which
Orne considers a key shortcoming of these
studies.
Therefore, confusion continues to reign. This
confusion has been present since the beginning
of the modern history of hypnosis in the 18th
century, with Mesmer, whose utilization of what
he termed animal magnetism was related to
confusion and deceit. The confusion has
continued to the present day, enhanced by the
popular vision that the mass media have
attributed to hypnosis. More seriously, though,
is the fact that mental-health professionals and
academicians as well often ascribe these
characteristics to hypnosis. For example, Hassan
(1988) states that it is possible to get people who
are under hypnosis to carry out acts that they
would not do if they were not hypnotized.
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
In this paper I deal with the main causes, from
my point of view, of this confusion: primarily
that the increase in suggestibility produced while
one is under hypnosis, which is a major
characteristic of hypnosis, is also a core feature
of contexts in which people are being
manipulated.
However, despite this similarity between
hypnosis and manipulation, there is a key
difference: Persons under hypnosis have the
freedom to reverse the process under which their
suggestibility has been heightened. In other
words, they have total freedom in choosing
when to come out of hypnosis (a state that they
also entered freely) whenever they desire to do
so. I will give some examples of this difference.
States of high suggestibility can be attained in
many ways (ways that imply a lesser or higher
degree of manipulation). Hypnosis is merely one
of these ways.
To offer a better explanation of this distinction, I
will first pay attention to what hypnosis is, and
what its essential components are. Then I will
compare what occurs during hypnosis with what
happens in other high-suggestibility contexts. I
will pay special attention to what occurs when
these states are manipulative, such as in cases of
seduction and coercion.
To conclude, I will observe that what occurs
during hypnosis is more because of the
characteristics of human beings than of any
characteristics associated with hypnosis. In other
words, the strength to make us more suggestible
is internal, stemming from our cognitive and
affective architecture, rather than external,
stemming from hypnosis.
Hypnosis and Psychological Manipulation
I am not going to pay much attention to
explaining the impossibility of getting someone
to do something through hypnosis that he would
not do without it. Instead, I will offer some
references that have been widely agreed on
(Capafons, 2001; Lynn & Kirsch, 2006; Orne,
1962) for those wishing to expand their
understanding about this issue. To give one
example, Barber and colleagues (Barber,
Spanos, & Chaves, 1974) obtained from highly
motivated but not hypnotized participants, and
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
from hypnotized participants, in one task, the
same responses to the same suggestions. The
researchers concluded that hypnosis was not
needed, or at least that no more than high
motivation was needed, to account for the
responses to the suggestions.
Orne (1962) points out that the view sustained
by the likes of Wells (1941), Rowland (1939),
Young (1948), Estabrooks (1993), Wolberg
(1945; 1948), and Weitzenhoffer (1949)—that
under hypnosis the subject can be led to do
anything—becomes untenable when one poses
the question as follows: “Does hypnosis increase
the amount of social control that the hypnotist
has over the subject above that which existed
before the induction of hypnosis?”
However, it is fair to say that Orne leaves a door
open for the potential of hypnosis to increase the
amount of social control one may have over a
person under special conditions. These
conditions would be when the person is
ambivalent toward the realization of an action.
Orne (1962) says that
In such a situation, he might well refuse
to carry out the behavior in his normal
waking state, but he could be induced
to carry it out under certain special
circumstances. One condition sufficient
to resolve the ambivalence might be
hypnosis. (…) Quite possibly, in some
instances hypnosis, like alcohol, might
provide the necessary rationalization
for the execution of normally
unacceptable actions. (pp. 186–187)
It is of note, though, that any shift in behavior in
these special circumstances would be as a
consequence of the significance the person who
is hypnotized attached to the term hypnosis
rather than a consequence of hypnosis itself.
That significance would affect both the
hypnotized and the hypnotizer, as the following
quotation from Lynn and Kirsch indicates in
reference to clinical hypnosis (2006):
Other meanings attached to the term are
responsible for its therapeutic efficacy.
As we mentioned earlier, hypnosis can
provide a disinhibiting context,
allowing patients to exhibit responses
that they do not realize they are capable
49
 of making. That is why people are more
responsive to suggestion—including
therapeutic suggestions—after a
hypnotic induction than they were
before it. It also can disinhibit
therapists by providing a context for
therapeutic behaviors that might seem
inappropriate in other settings (T. X.
Barber, 1985). For example, the
hypnotic context permits the therapist
to repeat statements over and over,
which enhances their forcefulness and
salience. Outside the hypnotic context,
this style of communication would
seem strange and inappropriate. (pp.
35–36)
Bearing in mind the circumstances just
mentioned, the existence of huge
misconceptions in the general understanding of
hypnosis has been widely agreed on. The
Society of Clinical Hypnosis (SCH) (APA-
Division 30) has listed some myths with regard
to commonly held beliefs about hypnosis. One
of these myths is that under hypnosis a person
can be induced to do acts that he would not do
without hypnosis. My main aim in this paper is
to clarify, to the extent possible, some of the
possible causes of the error that leads to this
particular myth. Another related myth the SCH
lists is that people may not be able to come out
of hypnosis, and thus become stuck in a
hypnotic state. Again, the mass media has had a
significant role in spreading these myths as if
they were true.
Where does this confusion come from? Apart
from the historical reasons sketched above, the
main cause of these misconceptions is, from my
point of view, that a characteristic of the
hypnotic state, namely, a rise in suggestibility, is
also a characteristic of people who find
themselves in manipulative contexts.
What Is Suggestibility and What Are Its
Constituents?
Yapko (1995) defines suggestibility as an
openness to accept and respond to new ideas and
information. According to Spiegel and Spiegel
(2004), we can refer to situations as being
conducive to states of high suggestibility when
we find the following:
50
a) high dissociation
b) low critical thinking
These two elements, high dissociation and low
critical thinking, are the essential constituents of
suggestibility.
High Dissociation
It will be of use to our discussion to look first at
what we understand dissociation to mean.
Dissociation is one of the more controversial
terms in psychiatry and psychology. Recent
developments (Cardeña, 1994; Spiegel &
Cardeña, 1996) establish a basic distinction
between pathological and nonpathological
dissociation. An example of the first is
dissociative amnesia, wherein we are unable to
retrieve basic information about our identity. An
example of the second is daydreaming, a state of
concentration that makes us dissociate from
everything lying outside the focus of our
attention. Daydreaming, to be concentrated in
our thoughts while we are driving to the extent
of not remembering anything of our journey
afterward, is an example of this second type of
dissociation. This second type of dissociation is
the one I will be referring to in this paper
because it is the dissociation implied in
hypnosis. However, it is likely that the line that
separates pathological dissociation from
nonpathological dissociation is blurred.
We could characterize dissociation as looking at
one part and forgetting about the whole: One
sees the trees but not the wood, and not
necessarily all the trees, but perhaps just a few.
In this state, a person concentrates so much on
one part that she loses perspective of the whole
of which it is a part. However, dissociation
could also imply one seeing the wood without
seeing the trees. In that case, the person centers
herself so much on the big picture that she loses
touch with the particulars. When a mind can
switch easily between a vision of individual
trees and that of the whole forest, and vice-
versa, then integration is reached, and that is
considered the healthy way to perceive. This
ability of perception to change perspective easily
allows a person to have a more accurate view of
reality. This integrative capacity is lost or
impaired in certain more or less pathological
situations.
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
Two examples of these perspectives are
provincialism and fundamentalism (I will let the
reader judge which category these examples fall
into). Provincialism occurs when you can pay
attention only to some trees without seeing other
trees or the entire forest. Fundamentalism occurs
when you can see only the forest and therefore
want to apply a theory to all cases, without
paying attention to the individuality of each tree.
We may speculate that the line that separates
pathological from nonpathological dissociation
lies in the difficulty or ease with which one can
reach this perceptual integration (this is at least
one of the lines that separates the two; there will
surely be others). Thus, pathological dissociation
would be characterized by an incapacity or a
difficulty in being able to change one’s point of
view. Sticking to the example of the trees and
the forest, the person would be trapped in her
perception either of one part or of the whole,
without being able to swap her point of view
from one to the other, or to change viewpoint
without difficulty. In contrast, in
nonpathological dissociation, the person would
be able to easily change her perception of one
part for that of the whole, and vice versa, and
thus achieve perceptual integration.
Critical Thinking
Critical thinking is something we all understand,
and I do not see the need to expand on the
concept further. However, it is important to note
that the increase in dissociation and the decrease
of critical thinking are two sides of the same
coin. Each is enhanced by the other. That is to
say, the more evidence of dissociation, the less
critical thinking will be on display, and the less
critical thinking is evident, the more dissociation
there is. Here lies the essence of suggestion. Let
us look at an example.
A drug addict who has been able to abstain for
some months, and who is in what is considered,
according to Prochaska and Di Clemente (1983),
the maintenance phase, suddenly sees his drug
of preference and craves it (conditioned
abstinence). In the addict’s mind in those
moments, only the good experiences related with
the drug are being considered, despite the fact
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
that these experiences represent only a tiny
proportion of his story with the drug. In
accordance with our example, the addict sees
only some of the trees in that situation. This is
clearly a dissociation. He sees only a part, which
actually is the smallest part, and does not see the
rest: the long and painful history of disastrous
consequences of his addiction. This high level of
dissociation stimulates a very low level of
critical thinking, since he will derive no
evaluation of the negative consequences related
to the consumption of the drug from
remembering only the good moments associated
with it. In such circumstances, he does not
regard his perspective of consuming the drug as
highly dangerous—an assessment which, in turn,
feeds a high dissociation, in a vicious circle in
which both factors provide feedback to one
another. The floating state of a former cult
member would be another example of this
process.
Different Ways of Eliciting High-
Suggestibility States
According to Spiegel and Spiegel (2004), there
are three basic ways of putting people into a
high suggestibility state, or trance, as they refer
to it:
a) Hypnosis
b) Seduction
c) Coercion
In other words, as Figure 1 depicts, by means of
hypnosis, seduction, or coercion, a state of high
suggestibility can be induced in another. Thus,
this similarity in the outcome can lead to
confusion with regard to the cause; that is to say,
hypnosis, seduction, and coercion all lead us to
the same place, but they do so along different
routes and are therefore not the same thing.
The great difference between these ways of
getting to the same level of suggestibility lies in
the ease with which one can get out of each
circumstance. That outcome depends on the way
one takes to get there, and it also has direct
consequences on the person’s freedom (see
Figure 2).
51
Figure 1. Contexts of hypnosis, coercion, and seduction and a high-suggestibility state.

More Freedom

Hypnosis: No manipulation; based upon trust and information.

Seduction: Mildly or moderately manipulative; based upon desire.
Coercion: Highly manipulative; based upon fear and/or guilt.
Less Freedom

Figure 2. Impact of hypnosis, seduction, and coercion on personal freedom.

While under hypnosis, a person is totally free at
any moment to snap out of it, as free as he was
to enter into that state. As noted above, that one
may be trapped in a hypnotic state is a myth.
Hypnosis is based upon the person’s confidence
in the procedure and trust in the hypnotist. The
suggestions the hypnotist presents encourage the
person to go with the flow, thus reducing the
participant’s critical thinking and heightening
his dissociation in that situation (in the sense
explained above); this ultimately increases the
individual’s suggestibility. It is because he trusts
that he is more suggestible (Kirsch, 1994);
following Yapko’s definition of suggestibility
stated above, it is because he trusts that he is
more open to accept and respond to new ideas
and information.
What Is Hypnosis?
According to the American Psychological
Association (APA)’s Division 30, whose focus
is hypnosis, “hypnosis is a procedure during
which a health professional or researcher
suggests, while treating someone, that he or she
experience changes in sensations, perceptions,
thoughts, or behavior….” (APA,
http://www.apa.org/topics/hypnosis/media.aspx?
item=1). In 2014, the APA completed the
official Division 30 definition and description of
hypnosis as follows: “A state of consciousness

52 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015

involving focused attention and reduced
peripheral awareness characterized by an
enhanced capacity for response to “suggestion”
(Society of Psychological Hypnosis,
http://psychologicalhypnosis.com/info/the-
official-division-30-definition-and-description-
of-hypnosis/). There are more definitions of
hypnosis and some theories that have tried to
establish its basic principles. In accordance with
that, some authors (Capafons, 1999) have
asserted that hypnosis is everything that is
labeled as such. When I was drawing up this
paper, my sources were both the neodissociative
(Hilgard, 1991) and sociocognitive theories of
hypnosis (Lynn & Kirsch, 2006), which
HYPNOSIS
Consent (Informed)
Change of focus
Figure 3. Components of hypnosis.
Consent
For consent to be valid, it must be based upon
accurate information about what is and what is
not hypnosis. Basically, this means that
(a) under hypnosis, nothing will happen that
would not occur in many everyday
situations; that is to say, hypnosis is a
natural process (Capafons 1998; Lynn S.
J., & Kirsch, I. 2006; Spiegel & Spiegel
2004).
(b) the person undergoing hypnosis, never
the hypnotizer, always has control of
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
constitute what I consider to be an accurate
representation of current views on hypnosis. I
will not deal with the differences between those
theories because that would represent a long
diversion, and the reader can expand further on
them via the bibliographical references.
However, both theories would agree in defining
hypnosis as a ritual or procedure in which the
following three constituents must be present:
consent, change of focus, and suggestion, as
Figure 3 depicts. Therefore, if all these
components or conditions are not present, there
will be no hypnosis, since they all are essential
to it. Let us take a closer look at each of them.
Suggestion
what happens during hypnosis. No one
can be induced by hypnosis to do
something that she would not do without
hypnosis. According to Lynn, Rhue, and
Weekes (1990), the participant retains
the ability to control her behavior during
hypnosis, to refuse to respond to
suggestions, and even to oppose
suggestions.
If the information given to the person does not
stress these points and so make them clear, or if
such information is somehow based on the
53
myths cited above about hypnosis, the person’s
expectations will be mistaken, which will have
consequences. The major consequence will be
that whatever may be performed in that context
will not be hypnosis but something else (with or
without manipulative nuances). Note that the
fact of one not giving proper information is in
itself a manipulative nuance. According to
Kirsch (1985, 1991), a person’s expectations
about what will occur during hypnosis are the
main causes of the actual occurrence of those
responses. That is why Kirsch developed the
response expectancy theory, which is an
extension of Rotter’s social learning theory.
Kirsch’s response expectancy theory is based on
the idea that expectancies can generate
nonvolitional responses. Kirsch’s research has
shown that a wide variety of hypnotic responses
vary in accordance with people’s beliefs and
expectancies about the occurrence of these
responses. In fact, Kirsch claims that throughout
the history of hypnosis many have confused the
products of hypnosis with its essence. This
confusion is because, consistently, subjects
under hypnosis perform the type of responses
that are expected from them. Thus, Mesmer’s
subjects convulsed, whereas those of later
hypnotizers relaxed. And they all did so because
the hypnotizers conveyed to them, more or less
explicitly, an expectation of what the “proper”
response to hypnosis was. Expectations, and
their correct handling by means of the
information given to a person about what
hypnosis is and what it is not, are, therefore,
very important—so much so that Kirsch and
Lynn (1995) consider response expectancy to be
the essence of hypnosis.
At the same time, for consent to be free, it
cannot be forced. That is to say,
a) The person undergoing hypnosis must
not be pressed to experience certain
responses to suggestions, nor be
reprimanded if these responses are not
forthcoming.
b) The person’s limits should not be
overreached; for example, overloading
the participant with information, not
giving him time to assimilate what he is
being told, bombarding him with
repetitive and monotonous stimuli
54
patterns, or putting him into an inferior
or submissive position with regard to the
hypnotizer (i.e., using coercion
techniques).
In the cult literature we frequently find the
expressions hypnotic techniques, hypnotic
inductions (Garvey, 1993), or posthypnotic
suggestion (Tobias, 1993) when the authors
make reference to a situation in which
psychological manipulation is present. It is
suggested subsequently that, in a way,
psychological manipulation arises from the
hypnotic features of those techniques, when in
fact it occurs because of their coercive features.
It is necessary to understand that, in such
contexts, hypnosis is one thing and coercion
another, although the two may become
intermingled.
In short, the utilization of these methods would
have more to do with coercion than with
hypnosis. The method would not then be
hypnosis, whatever happened while one was
practicing it. Spiegel (2004) and Kirsch (1994)
as we have said, noted that hypnosis is based
upon the confidence and freedom that induces
the person voluntarily to let herself go and
become involved in the suggestions the
hypnotist presents. The same confidence and
freedom allows the person under hypnosis to get
out of it whenever she wants to. Only under
coercion will a person have more difficulty,
precisely because she is being coerced.
Therefore it would not be appropriate to refer to
such a situation by the term hypnosis.
In this sense, hypnosis is always self-hypnosis.
The hypnotist offers a proposal, but it is our
choice to go with that suggestion or not. To
choose well, we must not be coerced in any way
(Capafons, 1998; Kirsch, 1991; Spiegel, 2004).
Change of Focus
Change of focus is related to changing our
perceptual perspective. Doing this, in turn, will
favor a state of concentration or absorption
toward whatever is the current focus of our
attention. We thus dissociate ourselves from
everything that lies outside the boundaries of
that focus of attention.
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
Suggestion above, our openness to accept and respond to
new ideas and information intensifies. Figure 4
In this state of heightened concentration or
illustrates this relationship.
absorption, our capacity to respond positively to
certain suggestions increases. Or, as quoted

Figure 4. Theory of hypnosis. (Adapted from Spiegel & Spiegel [2004], Trance and Treatment, American
Psychiatric Publishing, Washington, DC (p. 20.)

Going to the cinema to see a movie is a good were real, although we know, deep down, that
example in which all these conditions—consent, they are not. We temporarily forget that
change of focus, and suggestion—are met. In knowledge, suspending our disbelief and letting
fact, while watching a film, we are essentially ourselves go, drawn in by what the director is
under hypnosis (Capafons, 2001). Going to the presenting to us (suggestion).
cinema is a voluntary action (consent) that raises
If we were constantly fully aware of the falsity
some expectations about what will happen in
of what is happening on the screen, it would be
that place. When we enter the cinema, we sit
very difficult for us to let ourselves go, and
down and the lights are lowered; we change the
therefore difficult to be moved by the film.
focus of our attention (change of focus) so that
Nevertheless, even when we let ourselves go and
we concentrate totally on what is on the screen,
are drawn into the movie, forgetting it is a mere
forgetting or dissociating ourselves from
representation and experiencing it as reality, we
anything else. We get so involved in the movie
retain the capacity to withdraw from that
that we experience the events in it as if they

International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015 55

experience at any moment. We will use this
capacity if for any reason an intense stimulus
distracts us from the film, or even if the film is
just not to our liking. When the film finishes, we
often need a few seconds to adapt ourselves
again to the external world.
Although we can experience a film with
intensity, in no case can we get stuck in it to the
point at which we confuse film and reality. An
honest presentation of hypnosis must inform us
that what occurs while we are in hypnosis is
similar to what occurs when we go to the
cinema.
Hypnosis vs. Seduction and Coercion: A
Comparison
To help us better to understand the differences
of hypnosis with regard to psychological
manipulation, it is useful to compare what
occurs while one is under hypnosis with what
occurs while one is in the manipulative contexts
of seduction and coercion. This is the focus of
the following subsections.
Seduction
Seduction can be sexual, nonsexual, or both
simultaneously. We are seduced when someone
has something we do not have but wish to have.
Let us consider amorousness as a means of
seduction. When we are in love, we are seduced
by the other person. This means that we are
dissociated from all that is negative about them.
Although we can perceive things that we do not
like in the other, it is as if we do not actually see
them. This state is what dissociation involves:
seeing without seeing. This dissociated way of
perceiving is truly a hurdle for critical thinking,
so much so that critical thinking will disappear
under such circumstances. That absence of
critical thinking will be a stimulus for the
continuation of dissociated perception. Thus,
dissociation will enhance low critical thinking,
and vice versa, as in the following example of
what might occur when a person is feeling the
initial stages of strong attraction, or
amorousness, toward another person.
Amorousness results in the following:
↑ Dissociation: I see only the good.
Any bad that I see, I do not truly
56
perceive (We see through the eyes of
the mind)
↓ Critical Thinking: Everything is
good.
Coercion
We understand coercion as a relationship based
upon fear, guilt, or both. Thus, the following two
sentences stated by the leader of a cult group are
oriented to provoke fear and guilt, respectively,
in the recipient:
If you go away, you will be miserable.
After all we have done for you, you
cannot be so selfish as to abandon us.
Because fear and guilt are two powerful
emotions that strongly interfere with freedom of
thought, these sentences are coercive because
they are intended to elicit in the recipient a
certain behavior and way of thinking by means
of fear and guilt respectively. When these
situations are repeated over time, they will
clearly contribute to establishing a manipulative
context that will stimulate the victim’s high
dissociation and decrease in critical thinking.
This combination will provoke a state of
heightened suggestibility that will favor the
aggressor. In that state of high suggestibility, the
recipient loses perspective of the portion of
reality he is being dissociated from; he begins to
lose even the very notion of being in a coercive
environment, up to the point at which he feels
himself to be totally free and able to make any
decision required. A person in such a state will
not even see the aggressor as such. That is why
we say that the victim’s heightened state of
suggestibility will favor the aggressor in this
coercive context. Let us examine two examples.
Example 1: Stockholm syndrome. In this
context, a person in a hostage situation
dissociates from the whole situation and
perceives merely a part of it. So at each instance
of care exhibited by her captor, for instance, the
victim may lack the ability of seeing the whole
context, even beginning to feel, as a
consequence, an affective closeness toward that
captor. If the victim saw beyond the immediate
concern, she would perceive the global situation
in which she was being held and deprived of her
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
liberty by the very same person from whom she
is receiving care. But the victim does not see this
because she has become dissociated. Such
dissociation from the global situation will
greatly facilitate a situation in which any sign of
affection from the captor will cause the victim to
consider her captor as considerate, which clearly
shows a lack of critical thinking in that situation.
This lack of critical thinking will stimulate, in
turn, the perceptual dissociation from the global
situation, and so on, in a vicious circle. To
summarize:
↑ Dissociation: I don’t see the harm
they have done me, depriving me of
freedom being the main one.
↓ Critical thinking: They take care of
me, so they are good.
Example 2: Battered women. The dissociated
thinking that we are referring to here, “seeing
without seeing,” is stressed in the following
example. A woman receiving systematic
maltreatment from her partner is aware of it.
However, a mental mechanism we call
dissociation allows her not to pay attention to
that reality, despite having it right in front of her.
Dissociation is a mental mechanism that we all
use within our daily lives, and it has adaptive
functions. In our daily lives, dissociation allows
us to turn our back on painful situations so we
can fully focus on survival tasks, or the
achievement of our goals. Thus, the worried
father in the morning leaves his son at home
with a fever and goes to work, where he has a
very important meeting and is able to totally
forget about his son (dissociate) while in the
meeting because that meeting is also very
important to him.
When we are concentrated on something
significant to us, we are able to completely
forget anything else, no matter how dear to us
this “anything else” may be. This capacity to
dissociate is adaptive. It allows us to perform
better in each concrete situation we face without
being distracted from the relevant stimuli to that
situation, or rather, thanks precisely to our
attention not being distracted from the relevant
stimuli to that situation.
International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015
However, this mental resource that allows us to
dissociate, while adaptive in everyday life, in
extreme contexts of maltreatment or
psychological manipulation can end up
contributing to a dysfunction. In such situations,
we may dissociate from the relevant stimuli that
would help us recognize the maltreatment or
psychological abuse we are the victim of. This
disassociation can lead us to fixate our attention
on other stimuli that absorb us totally, and that
are irrelevant, or contradictory, with regard the
global situation we are in.
In the case of the battered woman, despite living
in a reality in which her partner treats her badly
99% of the time, she focuses her attention on
that portion of time when her partner treats her
well and that represents 1% only of her reality.
Having dissociated from 99% of her experience,
the woman takes the 1% of her reality as a
representation of the whole 100%. This is
possible because, while concentrating on the 1%
in which her partner treats her well, she totally
forgets anything else, just as the father who
leaves his son with a fever at home does during
that important meeting at work. Both are able to
do this because of their capacity to dissociate.
The fundamental difference between these
examples lies in each individual’s ability to get
out of the dissociation. Thus, when the meeting
is finished, if he is not very absentminded, the
father will probably remember his son’s fever;
he will connect once again with the perception
of the whole of his day. Meanwhile, the woman,
as long as no drastic change occurs in her life,
will remain stuck in her dissociation,
interpreting that 1% for 100% of her reality. The
father whose focus of attention can fluctuate
from his work to his son achieves a better
perception of the whole of his life; in other
words, he has a perception in which there is a
sound integration of those two parts of his life.
It is precisely the coercion exerted upon the
battered woman, in the other example, that is
responsible for her permanent dissociation. Such
dissociated perception will have drastic
consequences on her critical thinking, which
now is based merely on 1% of her reality, that
percentage in which her partner behaves well
toward her. Her vision of reality will then be
partial or nonintegrated:
57
 ↑ Dissociation: I perceive the 1% of the
time in which he treats me well, and not
the 99% of the time in which he treats
me badly.
↓ Critical Thinking: My husband is
good.
Many means of psychological manipulation, if
not all of them, are based upon seduction and
coercion, or a mixture of both, which will
produce the natural effects of increased
dissociation and decreased critical thinking.
Hypnosis, where we can also find these
phenomena, is based on the opposite extreme; it
is based on confidence and freedom. Actually,
confidence and freedom are the elements that in
the context of hypnosis promote an increase in
dissociation and a diminishing of critical
thinking. Confidence has its origins in relevant
and true information, among other factors.
People under hypnosis will let themselves go,
and due to a heightened state of suggestibility,
will experience the responses the hypnotizer or
the people themselves (when under self-
hypnosis) have suggested to them as if they were
real, even though they always know this is not
really the case (Capafons 1998, Lynn & Kirsch
2006). In the event of any setback or unforeseen
circumstance, persons under hypnosis will return
to their normal state of awareness. This is not
guaranteed under manipulative contexts. In such
cases, as we have seen, persons can get stuck
within the artificial construct. Here lies the
fundamental difference between hypnosis and
psychological manipulative environments,
namely, the reversibility that in the case of
hypnosis has the process of making us more
suggestible by the increase in our dissociation
and reduction in our critical thinking.
Conclusions
We are all potential victims of manipulation
because of our ability both to dissociate and to
renounce critical thinking. However, it is
because of those abilities that we also are
creative.
• Both abilities represent two sides of the
same coin.
• Both abilities are natural.
58
As a consequence, our ability to dissociate and
diminish our critical thinking is neither good nor
bad in itself; the significance depends on the use
we make of these abilities. Used well, they are
adaptive resources of great value. Used
inappropriately, they make us very vulnerable.
The heightened suggestibility that occurs in high
dissociation and low critical-thinking situations
is, therefore, a characteristic that can make us
either freer or more dependent.
To summarize with regard to hypnosis: Any
power present is not contained within the tool
that is hypnosis, or in the hypnotizer; rather, the
power lies within each person’s mind. Hypnosis
is just a tool that can aid us in putting these
mental resources to work—resources that are
inside, not outside each person, and not within
the tools or the hypnotizer.
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Acknowledgements
I want to thank the members of the Association
for the Advancement of Experimental and
Applied Hypnosis (AAHEA) for their generous
feedback and advice while writing this paper,
especially Dr. Antonio Capafons and Andrés

International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 6, 2015 59

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