Art. 249, Homicide.

- Any person who, not falling within the

provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of
any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion
temporal.

Homicide, defined.

Homicide is the unlawful killing of any person, which is neither parricide,

murder, nor infanticide.

Elements:

(1) That a person was killed;

(2) That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
(3) That the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
(4) That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.

“Shall kill another.”

In homicide, the victim must be killed to consummate the crime. If the

victim is not killed, it is either attempted or frustrated homicide.

Penalty when the victim of homicide is under 12 years of age.

The penalty for homicide shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is
under 12 years of age. (Sec.10, R.A. No. 7610)

Intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death resulted.

When death resulted, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is

homicide, not merely physical injuries, because with respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof. (U.S. v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333)

Evidence of intent to kill is important only in attempted or frustrated

homicide.

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent

to kill the victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of offender, he is liable
for physical injuries. (Arts. 263-266) only.

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the
offender and the parts of the victim’s body at which the weapon was aimed,
as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo,
is used to stab the victim in the latter’s abdomen, the intent to kill can be
presumed.

Exception:

But if the accused went to his wife, who was living separately from him,
to entreat her to live with him again, but a cousin of his wife provoked him
then and there and caused him to assault him (wife’s cousin) and her son by
first marriage, with a bolo, inflicting physical injuries, caused indiscriminately
and not deliberately, the purpose of the accused in going to the house, and
not the kind of weapon he carried nor the parts of the bodies of the victims
on which the wounds were inflicted, is indicative and determinative of his
intention. The accused is liable only for physical injuries. (People v. Penesa,
81 Phil. 398)

Note: The bolo which the accused carried with him is one ordinarily used
by farm laborers and the accused was such a farm laborer.

Intent to kill must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner had no intention to

kill the offended party, in view of petitioner’s testimony:
 “Q - In other words you want to tell us that you will do
everything you could to stop Nacionales digging the canal,
because you need water?

A - Yes, sir, because I need the water.”

Held: The intent to kill being an essential element of frustrated or

attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Such element must be proved with the same degree of certainty as
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt. (Mondragon v. People, G.R. No. L-17666,
June 30, 1966)

That the death of the deceased was due to his refusal to be operated
on, not a defense.

The fact that the victim would have lived had he received appropriate
medical attention is immaterial. Hence, the refusal of the deceased to be
operated on does not relieve the offender of the criminal liability for his death.
(People v. Sto. Domingo, C.A., G.R. No. 3783, May 31, 1939; People v. Flores,
CA-G.R. No. 3567, May 25, 1939)

Note: This ruling is based on Article 4, par. 1, Book I, R.P.C.

The killing must not be justified.

If the accused killed the deceased in self-defense, defense of a relative,

defense of a stranger, or under any of the other justifying circumstances
(Art.11), the accused is not liable for homicide or any other crime.
“Without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article” or of the qualifying circumstances of
parricide or infanticide.

In the absence of clear proof of any circumstance that would qualify as

murder the killing of the deceased, the guilty person should be sentenced only
for homicide. (People v. Cuaresma, et al., 94 Phil. 304)

The offender should not be the father, mother or child, or legitimate

other ascendant or legitimate other descendant or spouse of the deceased, for
otherwise the crime would be parricide.