1) G.R. No.
129282 November 29, 2001 estafa without having reserved the
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT
COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI),
petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis
Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA
VILLEGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Doctrine of the Case:
Statement of the Facts: Special civil action for
certiorari. An information for estafa was filed
against Camen Mandawe for for alleged failure
to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the
amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas
entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an
employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently,
Villegas filed a complaint for sum of money
and damages with preliminary attachment
arising out of the same transaction against
Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI.
Statement of the Case: Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the civil case on the following
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal
case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same
facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to
contain a certification against forum shopping
as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-
91. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Upon MR, the trial court recalled the dismissal
of the cae, hence this petition
Issue:
(1) Whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a
certification against forum shopping in
the complaint is a ground to dismiss the
case
(2) Whether the civil case could proceed
independently of the criminal case for
filing of the civil action.
Decision
1. No. Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme
Court requires a certificate of non-forum
shopping to be attached to petitions filed before
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
This circular was revised on February 8, 199411
by extending the requirement to all initiatory
pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Respondent Villegas' failure
to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in
her complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-
91, because at the time of filing, the
requirement applied only to petitions filed with
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.12
Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is
inapplicable for the reason that the complaint
was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before
April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the
circular.
2. Yes. Under the present rule, only the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is
deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action. There is no more need for
a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. “The reservation and waiver
referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery
of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which
may be prosecuted separately even without a
reservation. Procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an
independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against
respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, may proceed independently even if
there was no reservation as to its filing.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February
21, 1997.
2) G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
Statement of the Facts: Petition for review on
certiorari. Two vehicles, one driven by
respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and
driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan
("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.
On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict.
Statement of the case: When the civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground
of forum shopping considering the pendency of
the criminal case. The MCTC granted the
motion. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac.
The Capas RTC dismissed the complaint. The
Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas
RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on
the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of
judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Issue: WON an accused in a pending criminal
case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
Decision
Yes. Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in
Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is
barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint in the criminal case.
However, the same provision states that
"any cause of action which could have been
the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint) may be litigated in
a separate civil action." The present Rule
111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn
which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-
delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice.
Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states it is with prejudice. Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice,
the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus,
the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the
matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order
dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party
is to file a special civil action under Rule 65.
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that
“where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule
65.”Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing
the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (“2000
Rules” for brevity) expressly requires the
accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit: “SECTION 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) x
x x. No counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action.” (Emphasis
supplied) Since the present Rules require the
accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there
can be no forum-shopping if the accused files
such separate civil action.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (“1985 Rules” for brevity),
as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a
separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party
reserved the right to file such civil action.
Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution, all civil actions arising
from the same act or omission were deemed
“impliedly instituted” in the criminal case.
These civil actions referred to the recovery of
civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Thus, to
file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended
party had to reserve in the criminal action the
right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil
action was deemed “impliedly instituted” in the
criminal action.
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what
is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action
is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the
other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed
instituted,” and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action is not
a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles
of the Civil Code.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its
counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the “offended party” to bring
an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the “offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.” There is no
question that the offended party in the criminal
action can file an independent civil action for
quasidelict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the
“offended party” may bring such an action but
the “offended party” may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule
111 refers to the offended party in the criminal
action, not to the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No.
2089 is REINSTATED.
3)HERMANA R. CEREZO VS. DAVID
TUAZON
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country
Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a
tricycle along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. As a result, the tricycle
was severely damaged and its driver, Tuazon,
suffered serious physical injuries.
Subsequently, Tuazon filed a complaint for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the
bus line, her husband Atty. Cerezo, and bus
driver Foronda.
TRIAL COURT
 made no pronouncement on Forondas
liability because there was no service of
summons on him.
 did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon
failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business
benefited the family, pursuant to Article
121(3) of the Family Code.
 held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from
the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee,
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which states in part:
“Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.”
Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief from judgment
on the grounds of fraud, mistake or excusable
negligence was denied by the court saying that
the proper remedy should have been a notice of
appeal.
CA
 Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the
CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. -
DENIED
The petition questioned whether the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case considering
there was no service of summons on Foronda,
whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an
indispensable party.
The CA denied the petition for certiorari and
affirmed the trial courts order denying the
petition for relief from judgment.
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
praying for the annulment of the decision of the
trial court.
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the
present petition for annulment is lack of
jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial
court could not validly render judgment since it
failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs.
Cerezo points out that there was no service of
summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed
to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action.
ISSUE:
1.Whether Fronda is an indispensable party to
Tuazon’s action for damages against
Mrs.Cerezo thus requring the court’s
jurisdiction over his person to enable rendition
of a valid judgment.
RULING:
NO. Foronda is not an indispensable party to
the case
 An indispensable party is one whose interest
is affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible.
 The same negligent act may produce civil
liability arising from a delict under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give
rise to an action for a quasi-delict under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 An aggrieved party may choose between the
two remedies. An action based on a quasi-
delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action.
 Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the
point of view of criminal law and not of civil
law. The basis of the present action of
Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code,
not delict under the Revised Penal Code
 The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this
case, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to
pay for the entire obligation in full. There is
no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either
of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from
either.
 Moreover, an employers liability based on
a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while
the employers liability based on a delict is
merely subsidiary. Although liability
under Article 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding
the damage. While the employer is civilly
liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employees criminal negligence, the
employer is also civilly liable directly and
separately for his own civil negligence in
failing to exercise due diligence in selecting
and supervising his employee. The idea that
the employers liability is solely subsidiary is
wrong.
 The action can be brought directly against
the person responsible for another,
without including the author of the act.
The action for responsibility of the
employer is in itself a principal action
 In contrast, an action based on a delict
seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of
the employer for the criminal negligence
of the employee as provided in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the
employer liable in a subsidiary capacity
under a delict, the aggrieved party must
initiate a criminal action where the
employees delict and corresponding
primary liability are established. If the
present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is
necessary. However, the present action is
clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo
and not for the delict of Foronda.
 Thus, there is no need in this case for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.
 We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction
and was competent to decide the case in favor
of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in
the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs.
Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the present case. It is
not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the
filing of a separate civil action because he
opted to file a civil action for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly
liable for her own civil negligence.
4) MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ vs. Hon.
THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in Her
Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; and GLADYS NOCOM
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Separate informations were separately filed
against petitioner Rodriguez before the proper
courts, for Estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22
The informations for violation of BP. 22 against
were filed and raffled to the MeTC of Quezon
City. On the other hand, the informations for
estafa cases were filed and raffled to the RTC
of Quezon City.
The public respondent court (RTC) issued an
Order allowing the appearance of the private
prosecutor in the above-entitled criminal cases
upon payment of the legal fees
Petitioner opposed the private prosecutor’s
entry of appearance. She contends that the
private prosecutor is barred from appearing
before this Court (RTC) as his appearance is
limited to the civil aspect which must be
presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending
before the MeTC of Quezon City. Petitioner
theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising
from the criminal case pending before the
MeTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the
institution of the corresponding civil action in
the criminal case for estafa now pending before
the RTC
TRIAL COURT: allowed the private
prosecutor to appear and intervene in the
proceedings.
Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22
is without prejudice to any liability for violation
of any provision of the Revised Penal Code (BP
22, Sec. 5), the civil action for the recovery of
the civil liability arising from the estafa cases
pending before this Court is deemed instituted
with the criminal action . The offended party
may thus intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense (Rule 110. Sec. 16).
The appearance of a private prosecutor is
allowed upon payment of the legal fees for
these estafa cases pending before this Court
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.Considering that the
offended party had paid the corresponding
filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing
of the BP 22 cases with the (MeTC), the RTC
allowed the private prosecutor to appear and
intervene in the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a private prosecutor can be
allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the above-entitled estafa cases
for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil
liability arising from the issuance of the checks
involved which is also subject mater of the
pending B.P. 22 cases.
RULING:
YES.
 Settled is the rule that the single act of
issuing a bouncing check may give rise to
two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and
violation of BP 22.
 ELECTION OF REMEDY. "In its broad
sense, election of remedies refers to the
choice by a party to an action of one of
two or more coexisting remedial rights,
where several such rights arise out of the
same facts. In its more restricted and
technical sense, the election of remedies is
the adoption of one of two or more
coexisting ones, with the effect of
precluding a resort to the others.
 As a technical rule of procedure, the
purpose of the doctrine of election of
 remedies is not to prevent recourse to
any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. However,
when a certain state of facts under the
law entitles a party to alternative
remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies
are not considered inconsistent
remedies. In such case, the invocation of
one remedy is not an election which will
bar the other, unless the suit upon the
remedy first invoked shall reach the
stage of final adjudication or unless by
the invocation of the remedy first sought
to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have
gained an advantage thereby or caused
detriment or change of situation to the
other. It must be pointed out that
ordinarily, election of remedies is not
made until the judicial proceedings has
gone to judgment on the merits.
 No binding election occurs before a
decision on the merits is had or a
detriment to the other party
supervenes. This is because the principle of
election of remedies is discordant with the
modern procedural concepts embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure which permits a
party to seek inconsistent remedies in his
claim for relief without being required to
elect between them at the pleading stage of
the litigation.
 Based on the rules (Rules 110 and 111 of the
ROC), an offended party may intervene in
the prosecution of a crime, except in the
following instances: (1) when, from the
nature of the crime and the law defining and
punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor
of a private offended party; and (2) when,
from the nature of the offense, the offended
parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a)
they waive the right to institute a civil
action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do
so or (c) the suit has already been instituted.
In any of these instances, the private
complainant’s interest in the case disappears
and criminal prosecution becomes the sole
function of the public prosecutor.
 None of these exceptions apply to the instant
case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot
be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.
 Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case .the
institution of the civil actions with the
estafa cases and the inclusion of another
set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are
not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with
each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies
that the necessary inclusion of a civil
action in a criminal case for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the
institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both
offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
 The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22
are different and distinct from each other.
There is no identity of offenses involved, for
which legal jeopardy in one case may be
invoked in the other. The offenses charged
in the informations are perfectly distinct
from each other in point of law, however
nearly they may be connected in point of
fact.
 The fact that the Rules do not allow the
reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases
cannot deprive private complainant of the
right to protect her interests in the criminal
action for estafa. Nothing in the current law
or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the
corresponding civil case exclusively in the
court trying the BP 22 criminal case.
 In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not
intend to leave the offended parties without
any remedy to protect their interests in estafa
cases.
 The trial court was, therefore, correct in
holding that the private prosecutor may
intervene before the RTC in the proceedings
for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of
the corresponding civil action in the
proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending
before the MTC. A recovery by the offended
party under one remedy, however,
necessarily bars that under the other.
Obviously stemming from the fundamental
 rule against unjust enrichment,this is in
essence the rationale for the proscription in
our law against double recovery for the same
act or omission.
5) HYATT INDUSTRIAL
MANUFACTURING CORP., Petitioners,
v.
ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a
complaint for recovery of sum of money
against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation.
The complaint alleged that respondent
purchased from petitioner various electrical
conduits and fittings amounting ₱1,622,467.14.
Respondent issued several checks in favor of
petitioner as payment. The checks, however,
were dishonored by the drawee bank on the
ground of insufficient funds/account closed.
The complaint further alleged that respondent
failed to pay despite demand. It prayed that
respondent be ordered to pay the amount of
purchase, plus interest and attorney’s fees.
Respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) the
civil action was deemed included in the
criminal actions for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by
petitioner against the officers of respondent
corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22
cases; and (3) respondent was guilty of forum
shopping and unjust enrichment.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It
ruled that since the act complained of arose
from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner
of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of
checks with insufficient funds, in accordance
with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil
action could proceed independently of the
criminal actions. It said that Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not apply to the obligation in
this case, it being ex-contractu and not ex-
delicto.
Respondent questioned said order before the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
The appellate court, reversed the order of the
trial court. It held that the civil actions deemed
instituted with the filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22 and Civil Case No. MC
01-1493 are of the same nature, i.e., for sum of
money between the same parties for the same
transaction. Considering that the courts where
the two criminal cases were pending acquired
jurisdiction over the civil actions, which were
deemed instituted therein, the respondent court
could no longer acquire jurisdiction over the
same case.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner can file a civil case
after filing the criminal complaints.
HELD:
NO. It appears that prior to the filing of the case
for recovery of sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
petitioner had already filed separate criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the
officers of respondent corporation, Gil Santillan
and Juanito Pamatmat.
The Court agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no
longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. —
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular
No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. It also requires the complainant to
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved. It should be stressed that
the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action.
The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can
no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead
of the criminal case.
The pendency of the civil action before the
court trying the criminal case bars the filing of
another civil action in another court on the
ground of litis pendentia. The elements of litis
pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action
are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases, is
such that any judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
First, the parties in the civil case represent the
same interests as the parties in the criminal
complaints were filed against the officers of
respondent corporation who signed the checks
as agents thereof.
Second, the civil case and criminal complaints
seek to obtain the same relief. With the implied
institution of the civil liability in the criminal
actions, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.
Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of
the criminal complaints is the same as that
sought in the civil case, that is, the recovery of
the amount of the checks, which, according to
petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by
respondent for its purchases. To allow
petitioner to proceed with the civil case despite
the filing of criminal complaints might result to
a double payment of its claim.
The Court find that the inclusion of additional
checks in the civil case is an attempt to
circumvent the rule against forum shopping, to
make it appear that the objects of the civil and
criminal proceedings are different. It is clear
from the records that the checks involved in the
criminal complaints are the same checks cited
by petitioner in the civil case. The Court will
certainly not allow petitioner to recover a sum
of money twice based on the same set of
checks. Neither will the Court allow it to
proceed with two actions based on the same set
of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a
favorable ruling.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
DENIED.
6) SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
vs. In their Answer, petitioners denied the
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN material allegations in the complaint and
LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN of a good father of a family in the selection and
LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death
TANGCO, respondent. was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the
latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral
G.R. No. 165732, December 14, 2006,
damages and attorney's fees.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Trial thereafter ensued, the RTC rendered its
FACTS: On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50
Decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and against
p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to
defendants, ordering said defendants to pay the
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
plaintiffs, jointly and severally.
City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the
bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder
damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he
with corresponding permit to carry the same
merely acted in self-defense. It gave no
outside her residence, approached security
credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that
guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area
bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag
prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had
to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
not made such report to the head office and the
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service
police authorities. The RTC further ruled that
shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly
being the guard on duty, the situation demanded
causing her death.
that he should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline for
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together
him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting
with his six minor children (respondents) filed
her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
convicted of Homicide in the criminal case; and
City, a criminal case of Homicide against
that he also failed to proffer proof negating
Pajarillo. Respondents reserved their right to
liability in the instant case.
file a separate civil action in the said criminal
case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of
convicted Pajarillo of Homicide. On appeal to
Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with
the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with
Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded
modification as to the penalty. Entry of
that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in
Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents
show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of
filed with RTC of Marikina, a complaint for
a good father of a family in the supervision of
damages against Pajarillo for negligently
its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for
showed that it required its guards to attend
failing to observe the diligence of a good father
trainings and seminars which is not the
of a family to prevent the damage committed by
supervision contemplated under the law; that
its security guard. Respondents prayed for
supervision includes not only the issuance of
actual, moral and exemplary damages and
regulations and instructions designed for the
attorney's fees.
protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations
and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the
CA which AFFIRMED, with the modification
that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil
liability in this case is only subsidiary under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily
liable, the CA held that the applicable
provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-
delicts, but the provisions on civil liability
arising from felonies under the Revised Penal
Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty
of Homicide in a final and executory judgment
and is said to be serving sentence in
Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable
under the provisions of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code since the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said
liability arises from the offense charged and no
other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the
penal liability with a pronouncement that the
fact from which the civil action might proceed
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability
arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities
based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
liability of an employer for the civil liability of
their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or
solidary. Petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which the CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether the liability of Safeguard is
only subsidiary.
RULING: NO.
An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
Although the judgment in the criminal case
finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is
already final and executory, such judgment
has no relevance or importance to this case.
It would have been entirely different if
respondents' cause of action was for
damages arising from a delict, in which case
the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be
only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
As clearly shown by the allegations in the
complaint, respondents' cause of action is based
on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or the
employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
As the Court have earlier held, Pajarillo failed
to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank
and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting
incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to
Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his
imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the
bank.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is
primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former. Safeguard is
presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and the supervision of its employee.
The records also failed to show that there was
adequate training and continuous evaluation of
the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had
only attended an in-service training conducted
by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as
security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard.
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's
training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever
conducted further training of Pajarillo when he
was later assigned to guard a bank which has a
different nature of business with that of Toyota.
In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a
bank is different from being on duty in a
factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.
With regard the award of damages, the Court
find that the award of actual damages for the
burial. As to the award of moral damages,
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the
spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. In this
case, respondents testified as to their moral
suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so
sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife
and a mother to six children who were all
minors at the time of her death. Hence, the
Court hold that the respondents are also entitled
to the amount of one million pesos as
Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her
husband and minor children as they were
deprived of her love and care by her untimely
demise.
The Court likewise uphold the award of
exemplary damages. Under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-
delict, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in
the instant case, exemplary damages are
awarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
DENIED.
7. G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon
Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6)
years and to pay damages. The court further
ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment against accused had become final and
executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and
remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner],
filed a notice of appeal which was denied by
the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the
notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner]
filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of
the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court
gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed
its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of
the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the
OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs
authority to represent People is confined to
criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per Our resolution of May 31,
1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private
prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
RULING:
NO.
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the
accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellants Brief filed with the CA and from its
Petition before us, both of which claim that the
trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by
competent evidence.
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court
implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate
court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This
is the risk involved when the accused decides to
appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed,
appellate courts have the power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.
If the present appeal is given course, the whole
case against the accused-employee becomes
open to review. It thus follows that a penalty
higher than that which has already been
imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his
right against double jeopardy, since the
judgment against him could become subject to
modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the
reason why the accused effectively waived his
right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear,
though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles
governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by
jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the court below final. Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is
deemed to have waived his right to
appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and
executory.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of
petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that
the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA
and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the present
case, because it has followed the Courts
directive to the employers in these cases to take
part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its
employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself
from the undisputed rulings laid down in these
leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these
cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost
track of the most basic tenet they have laid
down -- that an employer’s liability in a finding
of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees
in the event of the latters insolvency. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 --
are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court
need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person
who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and
implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability
fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the
latters consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon
the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
Before the employers subsidiary liability is
exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed
the employers of the convicted employees; (2)
that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by
the employees in the discharge of their duties;
and (4) that the execution against the latter has
not been satisfied due to insolvency.
The resolution of these issues need not be done
in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended
party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the
same criminal action in which the employees’
liability, criminal and civil, has been
pronounced; and in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as
part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated
in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither
will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained
finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner,
fairness dictates that while the finality of
conviction could be the proper sanction to be
imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the
same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into
two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-
employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly
evident. There is only one criminal case against
the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has
both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height
of absurdity for this single case to be final as to
the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an
entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is
incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary
civil liability of the accused-employee. Since
the civil liability of the latter has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent
is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the
imposition of the primary civil liability.
8. G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001
GEORGE MANANTAN vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS
FACTS:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal
of Isabela filed an information charging
petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of
September 1982, in the municipality of
Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile bearing
Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully
drove and operated the same while along
the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in
said municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without
taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence said automobile driven and
operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep
bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles
Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile
to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of
Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982,
Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He
invited the deceased who told him that they
(should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused
George Manantan who is also from
Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford
Fiera but said that the accused also wanted to
(come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased dropped by the accused at the
Manantan Technical School. They drank beer
there before they proceeded to the farm using
the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm
they consumed one (more) case of beer. At
about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then
at about 2:00 or 3:00 oclock that afternoon,
(defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and
(Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the
house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They
cooked the duck and ate the same with one
more case of beer. They ate and drank until
about 8:30 in the evening when the accused
invited them to go bowling. They went to
Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of
the accused who drove the same. They went to
the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant
alley.While waiting for a vacant alley they
drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40
minutes and still no alley became vacant the
accused invited his companions to go to the
LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took
some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour,
they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby
store where they ate arroz caldoand then they
decided to go home. Again, the accused drove
the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused
in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal
Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased
immediately behind the accused. The accused
was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers
per hour along the Maharlika Highway at
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion
of the highway (although according to Charles
Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80
to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane
of the highway because the car was overtaking
a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney
with bright lights on. The accused immediately
tried to swerve the car to the right and move his
body away from the steering wheel but he was
not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the
two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road.
As a result of the collision the car turned
turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of
the highway immediately at the approach of the
street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the
back half portion was at its right lane five
meters away from the point of impact as shown
by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon
the following morning at the Police
Headquarters at the instance of his
lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost
consciousness. When he regained
consciousness, he was still inside the car (lying)
on his belly with the deceased on top of
him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and
then he was pulled out of the car by
Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was
still unconscious was pulled out from the
car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased
were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased
died that night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio
suffered only minor injuries to his head and
legs.
The defense version as to the events
prior to the incident was essentially the same as
that of the prosecution, except that defense
witness Miguel Tabangin declared that
Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to
the accident, the defense claimed that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right
lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the
road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the
National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright
lights which was coming from the opposite
direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the cars lane and bumped the car
which turned turtle twice and rested on its top
at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown
by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit 1)
and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn by the accused
during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit
on the driver’s side. As a result of the collision,
the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal
Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas
died at the Flores Clinic where they were all
brought for treatment.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any
further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that
petitioners’ acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
RULING:
(1) NO.
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the
Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of the trial court on the lack of
negligence or reckless imprudence under the
guise of determining his civil liability. He
argues that the trial courts finding that he was
neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis
for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He
submits that in finding him liable for indemnity
and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put
him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial
court found that petitioners’ guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state
in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner
was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court
acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil
liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
Court of Appeals had to review the findings of
the trial court to determine if there was a basis
for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision
of the appellate court awarding indemnity
placed him in double jeopardy is
misplaced. The constitution provides that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. When a person is
charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense. This is double
jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the
following elements must be established: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as the first. In the
instant case, petitioner had once been placed in
jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066
and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of acquittal became
immediately final. Note, however, that what
was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second
criminal offense identical to the first
offense. The records clearly show that no
second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower
courts judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it
order the filing of a second criminal case
against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no
second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim
of having been placed in double jeopardy is
incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. This is the situation contemplated in
Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is for the same act or
omission. Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the
civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the
criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence
in the civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions involve
the same act or omission. The reason for this
rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was
not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioner’s negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he
was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly
imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is
predicated on the criminal offense, he argues
that when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded. He concludes that his
acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at
the trial courts judgment shows that the
judgment of acquittal did not clearly and
categorically declare the non-existence of
petitioner’s negligence or imprudence. Hence,
they argue that his acquittal must be deemed
based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29
of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion
of the appellate court that the acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners’
civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial courts declaration
that did not discount the possibility that the
accused was really negligent. However, it found
that a hypothesis inconsistent with the
negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is
consistent with the record the Courts mind
cannot rest on a verdict of conviction. The
foregoing clearly shows that petitioners
acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that
his guilt had not been established with moral
certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce
civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
9. Josephine Sanchez vs Far East Bank Company
Facts:
 Kai J. Chin was the director and
representative of Chemical Bank. Its
subsidiary, the Chemical International
Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in
Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC- Respondent)
 In representing the interest of CIFL in
FEBTC, Chin was made a director and sr.
vice president of FEBTC.
 Josephine Sanchez (Petitioner) was
assigned as secretary of Chin.
 CIFL also maintained a checking account in
FEBTCs investment arm, the Far East Bank
Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin was one of
the authorized signatories in the said current
and money market accounts.
 According to FEBTC, Sanchez made
unauthorized withdrawals from the account
of CIFL in FEBTC through the use of
forged or falsified applications for cashiers
checks which were deposited to her
personal accounts. Once credited to her
account, she withdrew the amounts and
misappropriated, misapplied and converted
them to her personal benefit and advantage,
to the damage of FEBTC.
 Sanchez allegedly employed three modes in
the said fraudulent transactions
 First, petitioner caused the issuance of a
cashiers check payable to bearer. This is the
subject of Crim. Case No. 93-126175. She
presented a forged letter of confirmation
bearing the forged signature of Chin
addressed to Beatriz Bagsit, Cash
Department Head of FEBTC.
 Second Mode, petitioner filed applications
forms to purchase cashiers checks payable
to her, with Chin as the supposed purchaser.
Said applications were accompanied by a
forged memorandum of Chin confirming
petitioner as the payee-beneficiary.
 Third Mode, was frequently used which
involved checks payable to Chin. Petitioner
was designated as Chins representative to
purchase cashiers checks using
applications which bore forged signatures
of Chin as a purchaser and the payee.
 Petitioner allegedly confessed to Chin that
she tampered with the CIFL account.
 All the cashiers checks, funded by an
unauthorized debit against the CIFL
account, as well as the corresponding
applications for their issuance were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. All
of Chins signatures borne on all the checks
and applications were found to have been
good forgeries.
 With the damage done, FEBTC had to
reimburse the CIFL account and ultimately
suffered the total misappropriated amount
of P3,787,530.86.
 Petitioner asserted that she had deposited
the checks to her account, under the
authority and instructions of Kai Chin.
Afterwards, petitioner withdrew the
amounts and gave them to him.
Kai Chin denied that he had given that
authority to her, and insisted that she had
signed the subject documents. However, he
did not rebut her testimony that she had
turned over the proceeds of the checks to
him.
RTC:
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not
find Kai Chin to be a credible witness.
According to the RTC, FEBTCs records
showed that, contrary to his testimony, he
had expressly authorized petitioner to
transact matters concerning Chemical
Banks account.
 The RTC added that the allegedly
fraudulent transactions had occurred from
September 1992 to June 1993, with the use
of documents bearing the signatures of
other officials and employees of
respondent. In other words, all the
questioned transactions had been approved
and allowed by the bank officials
concerned, despite apparent procedural
infirmities. Yet, only petitioner was
indicted.
 FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds and
so holds that the prosecution failed to
prove the culpability of the accused in
any of these cases with moral certainty,
and consequently acquits her from all the
charges, with costs de oficio. Her bail
bonds are released and the hold departure
order as well as the order of attachment are
lifted.
Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC
Decision.
 In an Order dated March 20, 1996, the trial
court denied reconsideration. Quoting
portions of its Decision, the RTC said in its
Order that the acquittal of the accused
was not exactly on the ground of
reasonable doubt, but that she was not
the author of the frauds allegedly
perpetrated. Thus, it held that no civil
liability against her may properly be
made.
CA:
 Granted FEBTC’s appeal
 Trial Court’s judgment of acquittal did
not preclude recovery of civil indemnity
based on a quasi delict.
 The outcome of the criminal case, whether
conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential
in adjudging civil liability arising from the
same act that could also be considered a
quasi delict.
 Moreover, FEBTC did not have to reserve
its right to file a separate civil action for
damages, because the law had already made
that reservation on respondents behalf.
 Contrary to the trial courts clarifications in
its March 20, 1996 Order, petitioner had
been acquitted merely on reasonable
doubt arising from insufficiency of
evidence to establish her identity as
perpetrator of the crime. Her acquittal
was not due to the nonexistence of the
crime for which civil liability could arise.
 CA nonetheless found petitioner liable for
her failure to turn over to respondent the
proceeds of the checks. The failure
supposedly constituted an actionable fraud
 CA ordered petitioner to pay
respondent P1,187,530.86 as actual
damages, representing the value of the
checks that had been paid in her name and
to her account.
Issue:
1. Whether the judgment of conviction had already
become final at the time the motion for
reconsideration of the civil aspect was filed by the
complainant-appellant? NO.
2. Whether Sanchez should be civilly liable in spite
her acquittal in the criminal case? NO
1. Because the RTC Decision had been promulgated
on December 15, 1995, and respondents Motion for
Reconsideration was filed two months after, on
February 14, 1996, petitioner instantly concludes
that the Motion was filed out of time.
 Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
states as follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An
appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be
suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time
the balance of the period begins to run.
 Clearly, the period available to the
accused for filing an appeal is fifteen (15)
days from the promulgation of the judgment
or from notice of the final order appealed
from.
 Respondent undisputedly claims that
petitioner received notice of the RTC
Decision only on February 1, 1996. Records
show that FEBTC filed its Motion for
Reconsideration on February 14, 1996. The
Motion was thus filed within the
reglementary period.
2. Petitioner contends that her acquittal was
based merely on the determination that she was not
the author of the imputed felonies. She reiterates the
trial courts ruling in its March 20, 1996 Order that
she could not be held civilly liable, because she was
not responsible for the crimes charged.
Respondent, asserts that the offended
party may appeal the civil aspect of the
criminal proceeding despite the judgment of
acquittal.
Civil Action Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Proceeding
 Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of
Court, an action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from an offense charged is
necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings, unless (1) there is an express
waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a
reservation to institute a separate one, or (3)
the civil action was filed prior to the
criminal complaint.
 In the present case, the original action
involved a prosecution for estafa or
swindling through falsification of
commercial documents, an offense defined
under the RPC. Records do not show -- and
respondent does not claim -- the presence of
any of the three instances precluding the
automatic institution of the civil action
together with the criminal complaint.
Ineluctably, respondents right to damages,
if any, was deemed prosecuted in the
criminal proceeding. Thus, a separate civil
action may no longer be instituted.
Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the
Decision Acquitting the Accused
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
1. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of.
 This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator
of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if
 any, which may be instituted must
be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111
of the Rules of Court.
2. The second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused.
 In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated
in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages
is for the same act or omission.
Petitioner did not commit the crime imputed to
her. Hence, her acquittal likewise extinguished
the action for her civil liability.
 Petitioner consistently claimed that
she had acted merely upon the
instructions and authority of her
superior, Kai Chin. While admitting
that she had deposited the proceeds
of some of the checks to her
personal account, she firmly
insisted that she subsequently
withdrew the cash proceeds and
turned them over to him. She
denied -- and the records do not
show -- that she had ever
appropriated those moneys for her
personal gain.
 Kai Chin did not even bother to
rebut the statement of petitioner
that she had turned over the
proceeds of the checks to him. All
he asserted was that he had neither
signed the applications for the
purchase of the checks nor
endorsed those checks.
 As early as April, 1992, Kai Chin
had already authorized the accused
to transact matters concerning the
Chemical account, through a
memorandum he sent to Mrs.
Beatriz Bagsit and one Ms.
Enriquez. The authority conferred
by Kai Chin upon petitioner was
also borne out by the reports of the
FEBTC Investigating Committee
 Kai Chin never denied his signature
on this document, either on direct
evidence or on rebuttal (as he was
not presented as a rebuttal witness).
 Thus, the trial court emphatically
concluded that petitioner was not
the author of the frauds allegedly
perpetrated if any. The Court of
Appeals concurred in that
conclusion when it categorically
held thus: We rule out the issue of
forgery as this was not satisfactorily
proved
In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was
based on the fact that she had not committed the
offense imputed to her. Consequently, she cannot
be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as
well as her testimony, was credible, the trial court
cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or negligence.
Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the
proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands
unrebutted.
Addtl:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but
the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
case within the period therefor.
10. Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
Inc. vs Calaunan
Facts:
 The vehicles involved in this case are:1.Bus
owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and 2 owner-
type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
 At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North
Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
 The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing
the latter to move to the shoulder on the
right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage.
 Respondent suffered minor injuries while
his driver was unhurt.
 By reason of such collision, a criminal case
was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries.
 Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
 The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. Among those who testified in the
criminal case were respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
 When the civil case was heard, counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) of the
testimonies in the criminal case be received
in evidence in the civil case in as much as
these witnesses are not available to testify
in the civil case.
 The versions of the parties are summarized
by the trial court as follows:
According to the respondent and his
driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60
to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of
the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of
overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus
hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the
back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony
of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver,
Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus bumped the jeep in question. They
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus
was about to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left
because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it. Such was their testimony before the
RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before
this Court in the instant case.
 Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it
observed and exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic.
RTC: Rendered its decision in favor of respondent
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and
solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing as well as the repair and
the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including
appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
CA: Finding no reversible error in the decision of
the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
Issue:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be
admitted in evidence for the civil case. YES
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held
liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the
criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part. YES
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due
diligence and supervision of its employee. NO
Ruling:
1. The testimonies of the three witnesses are still
admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI
failed to object on their admissibility. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the
time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall
be treated as waived.
In the case at bar, PRBLI did not object to the TSNs
containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court.
2. From the complaint, it can be gathered that
the civil case for damages was one arising from,
or based on, quasi-delict. Petitioner Manliclic was
sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was
sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic.
The CA held that absent evidence of negligence,
therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries. From the foregoing
declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of
the act complained of which is based on Section
2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can
still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-
quoted section applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime – a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability based on quasi delict.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the
author of the act or omission complained of. The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
3. If one would believe the testimony of the
defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collision took place, the point of collision on the
jeep should have been somewhat on the left side
thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep
should have fallen on the road itself rather than
having been forced off the road.
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence that caused the smash up, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both.
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees,
petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible
for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.
11. G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, v HON.
ADRIANO OSORIO, ZANAIDA GAZA
BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA
BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA,
repondents-appellee
Facts: In the facts alleged by the provate
respondents, they were the legitimate
possessors of a lot in Malabon, Rizal by virtue
of sale in their favor by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Respondents claim that under cover of
darkness, intimidation, and stealth,
petitioner placed bamboo posts, or
“staka” around a 400 sq m portion of thr
disputed lot.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss tge
complaint, stating that the agreement between
the DAR and private repondents has been
cancelled. He also asserts that there is an
administrative case between him and the
private repondents involving the lot in dispute.
He claims that the administrative case was
determinative of private respondents right to
eject him from the lot, hence a prejudicial
question which bars a judicial action after its
determination.
MTC denied the motion to dismiss, stating that
the case is for recovery of physical possession,
hence it has jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
CFI of Rizal, with injuction against public
respondent Judge Adriano Osorio praying for
the issuance of writ if preliminary injunction
ordering respondent judge to suspend the
hearing in ejectment case.
Private petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,
maintainoing that the administrative case did
not constitute a prejudicial question as it
invovled merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, DAR intervened alleging ghe
pendency of the administrative case between
the same partied on the same subject matter,
and praying ghe petition for certiorari be
granted.

CFI dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order previously issued.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case
constitutes a prejudicial question which would
operate as a bar to said ejectment case (NO)
Ruling: No. The essential elements of a
prejudicial question as provided under Section
5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
[a] the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
 Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical
consequence of the issue involved in the
pending administrative case assailing
the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award of the disputed portion to
petitioner. If the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award to petitioner are voided, then
private respondents would have every
right to eject petitioner from the
disputed area. Otherwise, private
respondent's light of possession is lost
and so would their right to eject
petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken
is to hold the ejectment proceedings in
abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such
move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not
only the parties but the court as well to expend
time, effort and money in what may turn out to
be a sheer exercise in futility.
12. G. R. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, v. MARTIN
PARAS and ALFREDO BARCELONA, SR.,
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan,
South Cotobato, respondents
FACTS: Martin Paras sold to Juliana Yap, his
sister, sis share in the intestate estate evidence
by a private document. Nineteen years later
Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-
ang.
When Yap learned the second sale, she filed a
complaint for estafa against Patas and Saya-
ang and on the same date, filed a complaint for
the nullification of the said sale witht he RTC
of General Santos City.
Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal case
with the MTC of Glan-Malapatan, presided by
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelonna, Sr. He further
motu proprio issued an order disissing the
criminal case on the ground that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action,w hich
must be ventilated in the proper civil court.
He further used the ruling in Ras v Rasul,
which stated that “a criminal action for Estafa
for alleged double sale of property is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity
of the alleged Deed of Sale.”
 Petitioner contends that where there is a
prejudicial question in a civil case, the
criinal action may not be dismissed but
only suspended.
The Court noted that the counsel for private
repondent paras is the son of Judge Barcelona.
He has made it of record that he was not the
counsel of Paras at the time the questioned
order of dismissal was issued by his father, he
thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against
his father.
Issue: Whether or not in cases involving
prejudicial question, the criminal case must
only be suspended, and not dismissed (YES)
Ruling: YES. A prejudicial question is defined
as that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the congnizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case
before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
 We have held that "for a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the
criminal action pending the
determination of the civil action, it must
appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused".
 It is the issue in the civil action that is
prejudicial to the continuation of the
criminal action, not the criminal action
that is prejudicial to the civil action.
 The excerpt quoted by the respondent
judge in his Order does not appear
anywhere in the decision of Ras v.
Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only
misquoted the decision but also wrongly
applied it. The facts of that case are not
analogous to those in the case at bar.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend
the criminal action on the ground that the
defense in the civil case — forgery of his
signature in the first deed of sale — had to be
threshed out first. Resolution of that question
would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast,
there was no motion for suspension in the case
at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent
judge had not been informed of the defense
Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge
Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the
issue raised in the civil action would determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
 The order dismissing the criminal action
without a motion for suspension in
accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended, and even without the
accused indicating his defense in the
civil case for the annulment of the
second sale, suggests not only ignorance
of the law but also bias on the part of
the respondent judge.
 Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is
sternly reminded that under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be
 faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence" and "should
administer justice impartially." He is
hereby reprimanded for his questionable
conduct in the case at bar, with the
warning that commission of similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
13. RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and
the MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR; represented by
MAYOR DOMICIANO E. REAL vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE
MEDINA and FORTUNATA ROSELLON
GUTIERREZ, JR.
FACTS:
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside
the decision and resolution dated January 21,
1991 and February 20, 1991, respectively of the
Court of Appeals which declared as null and
void the October 10, 1991 order of the
petitioner Judge in a civil case "for ejectment
with preliminary injunction and damages" filed
by petitioner municipality against the private
respondents granting the petitioner
municipality's motion for a writ of possession
and the writ issued pursuant to it.
The plaintiff (petitioner municipality herein) is
the owner of a parcel of residential land located
at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
with an area of 5,894 square meters more or
less; that the parcel of land was reserved for
public plaza under Presidential Proclamation
No. 365. During the incumbency of the
late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958, the
municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square
meters to the defendants (respondents herein)
subject to the condition that they should vacate
the place in case it is needed for public
purposes; that the defendants religiously paid
the rentals until 1967
The defendants refused to pay the rentals; that
the incumbent mayor discovered that the
defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said
lot
The complaint further alleged that the national
government had allotted an appropriation for
the construction of a municipal gymnasium but
the said construction which was already started
could not continue because of the presence of
the buildings constructed by the defendants;
that the appropriation for the construction of
the gymnasium might be reverted back to the
national government which would result to
"irreparable damage, injury and prejudice" to
the municipality and its people who are
expected to derive benefit from the
accomplishment of the project.
The petitioner Judge issued an order
setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or writ of possession on October 10, 1990.
Instead of filing an answer, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging
the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, since
the complaint is for illegal detainer which is
within the original jurisdiction of the municipal
court and the pendency of a cadastral case
The petitioner Judge issued two (2)
orders. The first order denied the motion to
dismiss. The second order granted the petitioner
municipality's motion for a writ of possession
"with the ancillary writ of demolition to place
in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of
this case, to the end that the public construction
thereon will not be jeopardized."
According to the petitioner Judge, the
necessity of a writ of possession is greater in
the instant case considering that the parcel of
land is covered by a Presidential Proclamation
and the on-going construction thereon is being
endangered to be left unfinished on account of
the buildings standing on the parcel of land
because the appropriation for the construction
might be reverted back to the national treasury.
The private respondents filed their
answer to the complaint alleging therein that
the subject parcel of land has been owned,
occupied and possess by respondent Vicente
Medina since 1947 when he bought the subject
parcel from a Subanan native; that the other
respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from
Medina a portion of the parcel of land; that the
respondents were never lessees of the petitioner
municipality; that Proclamation No-365 issued
on March 15, 1968 recognized "private rights";
and, that a case is pending before the Cadastral
court between respondent Medina and
petitioner municipality as regards the
ownership of the subject parcel of land.
The appellate court rightfully upheld the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the
case based on the allegations in the complaint.
The allegations and not the title control the
cause of action of the complaint.
The action may really be considered one for
recovery of possession. For though a lease is
alleged, the lease would be void and the
municipality could recover the possession of
the land. This is the teaching of the leading case
of Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas in which it
was held that the lease by a municipal
corporation of a public plaza is null and void
because land for public use is outside the
commerce of man and, therefore, the lessee
must restore possession of the land by vacating
it.
Prescinding from the finding that the complaint
is for recovery of possession the appellate court
concluded that the trial court did not have
authority to issue a writ of possession and a
writ of demolition citing the case of Mabale
v.Apalisok to wit:
In that connection, it should be borne in mind
that the law specifies when a writ of possession
may be issued. That writ is available (1) in a
land registration proceeding, which is a
proceeding in rem (2) in an extra-judicial
foreclosure of a realty mortgage (3) in a
judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in
rem proceeding,provided that the mortgagor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no
third person, not party to the foreclosure suit,
had intervened and (4) in execution sales.
The appellate court also ruled that the trial court
committed an error when it applied by analogy
the rule on eminent domain (Rule 67, Revised
Rules of Court) to justify the issuance of the
writ of possession and writ of demolition. In the
case at bar, there is neither statutory authority
for the trial court's action nor bond given to
compensate the petitioners for the deprivation
of their possession and the destruction of their
houses if it turns out that the land belongs to
them.
The petitioners now contend that the
allegations in the complaint constitute a cause
of action for abatement of public nuisance
under Article 694 of the Civil Code. On the
basis of this proposition, the petitioners assert
that petitioner municipality is entitled to the
writ of possession and writ of demolition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioner municipality is
entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of
demolition even before the trial of the case
starts.
2. Whether or not the municipality has a cause
of action for the abatement of public nuisance
under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
RULING
1. Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the
following remedies against a public nuisance:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any
local ordinance; or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
The petitioner municipality had three remedies
from which to select its cause of action. It chose
to file a civil action for the recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by the
private respondents. Obviously, petitioner
municipality was aware that under the then
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) the
Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an
ordinance before the municipality may
summarily abate a public nuisance. (Sec. 149(z)
(ee).
A public plaza is outside the commerce of man
and constructions thereon can be abated
summarily by the municipality. (Villanueva
v. Castañeda, Jr)
If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint
are true and that the parcel of land being
occupied by the private respondents is indeed a
public plaza, then the writ of possession and
writ of demolition would have been justified. In
fact, under such circumstances, there would
have been no need for a writ of possession in
favor of the petitioner municipality since the
private respondents' occupation over the subject
parcel of land can not be recognized by any
law. A writ of demolition would have been
sufficient to eject the private respondents.
However, not only did the municipality avoid
the use of abatement without judicial
proceedings, but the status of the subject parcel
of land has yet to be decided.
It is to be noted that even before the
Proclamation, the parcel of land was the subject
of cadastral proceedings before another branch
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Sur. One of the claimants in the cadastral
proceedings is private respondent Vicente
Medina who traced his ownership over the
subject parcel of land as far back as 1947 when
he allegedly bought the same from a Subanan
native.
Considering therefore, the nature and purpose
of the Cadastral proceedings, the outcome of
said proceedings becomes a prejudicial
question which must be addressed in the
resolution of the instant case. We apply by
analogy the ruling in the case of Quiambao
v. Osorio, to wit:
The essential elements of a prejudicial question
as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court area: [a] the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the
resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in
character, it is obvious that technically, there is
no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally
apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
between said two [2] proceedings, stemming
from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on the
resolution of the pending administrative case.
For while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in
question, at the time of the institution of the
ejectment case, such right of possession had
been terminated, or at the very least, suspended
by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.
Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise
in the instant case since the two actions
involved are both civil in nature. However, we
have to consider the fact that the cadastral
proceedings will ultimately settle the real
owner/s of the disputed parcel of land.
In case respondent Vicente Medina is adjudged
the real owner of the parcel of land, then the
writ of possession and writ of demolition would
necessarily be null and void. Not only that. The
demolition of the constructions in the parcel of
land would prove truly unjust to the private
respondents.
Parenthetically, the issuance of the writ of
possession and writ of demolition by the
petitioner Judge in the ejectment proceedings
was premature. What the petitioner should have
done was to stop the proceedings in the instant
case and wait for the final outcome of the
cadastral proceedings.
Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in
the interest of justice, we rule that the petitioner
municipality must put up a bond to be
determined by the trial court to answer for just
compensation to which the private respondents
may be entitled in case the demolition of their
buildings is adjudged to be illegal.
Moreover, the appellate court correctly ruled
this Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court on
eminent domain cannot be made a subterfuge to
justify the petitioner Judge's issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of petitioner
municipality. Even if we concede that Rule 67
is applicable to the instant case and that
petitioner municipality had the lawful right to
eject the private respondents from the subject
parcel of land the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of petitioner municipality
would still not be legal if the petitioner
municipality really owns the land.
2. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as follows:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property
or anything else which:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
while Article 695 provides:
Art. 695 Nuisance is either public or private. A
public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. . . .
Applying these criteria, we agree with the
petitioners that the complaint alleges factual
circumstances of a complaint for abatement of
public nuisance.
However, the appellate court stated:
We do not, however, have jurisdiction over
petitioners' claim for damages. This must be
pursued in an appropriate action instituted in
the Regional Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The questioned decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. The trial court is ordered to
require the petitioner municipality to put up a
bond to be determined by the court after
hearing to answer, for just compensation due
the private respondents in case the demolition
of their buildings is adjudged to be illegal. The
"Motion to Declare in Contempt" filed by
petitioner Judge is referred to the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18 in
Civil Case No. 3156 for appropriate action.
14. SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND
DEMETRIA LEE-YU vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK
The court holds that the rule on indivisibility of
the real estate mortgage cannot be equated
with the venue of foreclosure proceedings on
mortgaged properties located in different
provinces since these are 2 unrelated concepts.
Also, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a
Certificate of Sale & a Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Possession in a special proceeding
since the 2 cases are both civil in nature which
can proceed separately & take their own
direction independently of each other.
FACTS
On April, 1995, Spouses Vicente Yu &
Demetria Lee- Yu, among others mortgaged
their title, interest & participation over several
parcels of land located in Dagupan City in favor
of the respondent, Philippine Commercial
International Bank, as security for the payment
of loan; As the petitioners failed to pay the
loan, interests & penalties due thereon,
respondent filed a Petition for Extra- Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate on Dagupan City
properties before the RTC, Dagupan City.
Auction sale of the said properties was
scheduled on September 10, 1998 where
respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
On September 14, 1998, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of the respondent;
On October 1, 1998, the sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds, Dagupan City; On
August 20, 1998, about 2 months before the
expiration of the redemption period, respondent
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of
Possession before the RTC, Dagupan City,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 99-00988-
D & raffled to Branch 43; On September 14,
1999, a hearing was conducted where the
respondent presented its evidence ex-parte by
the testimony of Rodante Manuel
On September 30, 1999, petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss & to Strike Out
testimony of Rodante Manuel stating that the
Certificate of Sale dated Sept. 14, 1998, is void
because respondent violated Article 2089 of the
Civil Code in the indivisibility of the
mortgaged by conducting 2 separate foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged properties in
Dagupan City & Quezon City. Likewise the
petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment for
a Certificate of Sale before the RTC of
Dagupan City. On February 14, 2000, RTC
Branch 43 denied petitioners’ Motion to
Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony of
Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a
motion to dismiss is not allowed in petitions for
issuance of writ of possession under Section 7
of Act No. 3135.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, further arguing that the
pendency of Civil Case is a prejudicial issue to
the Special Proceeding the resolution of which
is determinative on the propriety of the issuance
of a writ of possession.
RTC denied because the pending case before
RTC Branch 44 is also is civil case & not a
criminal case
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA
The CA dismissed petitioners’ Petition for
Certiorari on the grounds that petitioners
violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and
disregarded the rule against multiplicity of suits
despite full knowledge of the pendency of the
Special Proceeding. MR likewise denied.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a real estate mortgage
over several properties located in
different locality ( sic ) can be
separately foreclosed in different
places?
2. Whether or not the pendency of a
prejudicial issue renders the issues in
Special Proceedings No. 99-00988-D (
sic ) moot & academic?
RULING
1. As to the first issue, the court finds that
petitioners have mistaken a notion that the
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage relates to
the venue of extra judicial foreclosure
proceedings. The rule on indivisibility of a real
estate mortgage is provided for in Article 2089
of the Civil Code which provides.
Article 2089: A pledge or mortgage is
indivisible even though the debt may be divided
among the successors in interest of the debtor
or the creditor.
This rule presupposes several heirs of the
debtor or creditor and therefore not applicable
to the present case. Furthermore, what the law
proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of
the property or a number of the several
properties mortgaged corresponding to the
unpaid portion of the debt where, before
foreclosure proceedings, partial payment was
made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan
or obligation.
On the other hand, the venue of the extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings is the place
where each of the mortgaged property is
located, as prescribed by Section 2 of Act No.
3135
Indivisibility means that the mortgage
obligation cannot be divided among the
different lots, that is each & every parcel under
mortgage answers for the totality of the debt.
The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage by
conducting 2 separate foreclosure proceedings
on mortgaged properties located in different
provinces as long as each parcel of land is
answerable for the entire debt.
2. As to the second issue, civil Case No. 999-
01369-D & Special Proclamation no. 99-00988-
D are both civil in nature. The issue in the civil
case No. 99-01369-D is whether the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executive by the petitioners in favor
of the respondent & the sale of their properties
at public auction are null & void, whereas, the
issue in Special Proclamation No. 99-00988-D
is whether the respondent is entitled to a Writ
of Possession of the foreclosed properties.
Clearly, no prejudicial question can arise from
the existence of the 2 actions. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid 2 conflicting decisions.Two cases can
proceed separately & take over their own
direction independently of each other.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the
CA’s view that petitioners violated Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 and disregarded the proscription
on multiplicity of suits by instituting a separate
civil suit for annulment of the certificate of sale
while there is a pending petition for issuance of
the writ of possession in a special proceeding.
Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is not applicable to
the present case since at the time of the filing of
the separate civil suit for annulment of the
certificate of sale in RTC Branch 44, no writ of
possession was yet issued by RTC Branch 43.
Similarly, the Court rejects the CA’s
application of the principle of litis pendentia.
For litis pendentia to be invoked, the
concurrence of the following requisites is
necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such
as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
Applying the foregoing criteria in the instant
case, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case
because of the absence of the second and third
requisites. The issuance of the writ of
possession being a ministerial function,
and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits, but simply an incident
in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case
for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res
judicata.
Furthermore, since the one-year period to
redeem the foreclosed properties lapsed on
October 1, 1999, title to the foreclosed
properties had already been consolidated under
the name of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
15. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000, FIRST
DIVISION
He who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity.
Facts:
>In 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted
a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
>In 1996, without said marriage having been
annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani
contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
>In 1998, Imelda filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Isagani.
>Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license.
>Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
-invoking the pending civil case for nullity
of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to
the criminal case.
>Imelda argues that
-her marriage to Isagani was exempt from
the requirement of a marriage license
-and claims that prior to their marriage,
they had already attained the age of majority
and had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years
-argues that Isagani should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy
case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
Article 40 of the Family Code.
>RTC granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.
Ruling:
No.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil
case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case. Consequently, the defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed. Its two essential
elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused
but simply tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all
the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment
or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge
of the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear
implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity
at the time the second marriage was contracted.
It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which
would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first
marriage.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family
Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that
the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of
a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
The issue in this case is limited to the existence
of a prejudicial question, and we are not called
upon to resolve the validity of the first
marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state
that the Civil Code, under which the first
marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. Hence, parties should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of
their marriage, for the same must be submitted
to the determination of competent courts. Only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. No matter how obvious,
manifest or patent the absence of an element is,
the intervention of the courts must always be
resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which
only the courts can render.
Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who
contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended on
the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, the court held that the pendency
of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
ruling applies here by analogy since both
crimes presuppose the subsistence of a
marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,
respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered
into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before
any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void. The reason
is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was
for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action
for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated
above, respondent cannot be permitted to use
his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.

Petition is GRANTED. The order of RTC is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial
court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed
with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
16. DIONISIO CARPIO v. HON. SERGIO
DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC ) and EDWIN
RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989 SECOND
DIVISION, PARAS, J
The filing of a separate complaint against the
operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not
necessary since his liability is clear from the
decision against the accused. Such being the case, it
is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the
appellate court’s decision.
Facts:
> In 1985, Accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez,
while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and
operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio
Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street. Carpio
suffered from a fractured left clavicle and sustained
injuries which required medical attention for a
period of 3 months.
>An information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed
against Edwin Ramirez with the MTC. Ramirez
voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and
was accordingly convicted under Art. 365 of the
RPC.
>MTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 1
month and 1 day to 2 months of Arresto Mayor in
its minimum period and to indemnify Carpio of
P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of
tomatoes lost; P200.00 for hospital fees, and
P1,500.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of
this suit.
>Accused filed an application for probation.
>The private prosecutor manifested his desire to
present evidence to establish the civil liability of
either the accused driver or the owner-operator of
the vehicle.
>Ramirez’s counsel moved that the court summon
the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in
court, on the ground that the accused is not only
indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any
civil liability. The private prosecutor did not move
for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
>RTC awarded moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40,
and attorney’s fees of P5,000.00. AC modified the
moral damages to P5,000.00.
>A writ of execution was duly served upon Ramirez
but returned unsatisfied due his insolvency. Carpio
moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the
vehicle.
>Trial Court denied the writ on two grounds,
namely:
1. the decision of the appellate court made no
mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo
Toribio, and
2. the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-
aquiliana" and not "culpa-contractual."
> Carpio maintains that
the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies
that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator
may be enforced in the same proceeding and a
separate action is no longer necessary in order to
avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that
said employer was not made a party in the criminal
action.
He relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v.
Señeris which enunciates that "the subsidiary
liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the
judgment, because if a case were to be filed against
said operator, the court called upon to act thereto
has no other function than to render a decision
based on the indemnity award in the criminal case
without power to amend or modify it even if in his
opinion an error has been committed in the
decision."
> Ramirez averred that the owner-operator cannot
be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following
reasons, namely:
(a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not
raised on appeal;
(b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Señeris,
the injuries sustained by the complainant did not
arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but
from "culpa-aquiliana" ;
(c) the judgments of appellate courts may not
be altered, modified, or changed by the court of
origin; and
(d) said owner was never made a party to the
criminal proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator may be enforced in the same criminal
proceeding against the driver where the award was
given (or in a separate civil action).
Held:
Yes, it doesnot need to be filed in separate civil
action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103
in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads
"Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.
The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties."
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v.
Señeris cannot be applied to the present case, the
former being an action involving culpa-contractual,
while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a
declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in
Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary
liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in
character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a
delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art.
2180 is founded on culpa- aquiliana. The present
case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor
for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can
this be regarded as a civil action for the primary
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New
Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held
subsidiarily liable for the employee’s civil
liability in the criminal action, it should be
shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in
any kind of industry, (2) that the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing
Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action.
All these requisites present, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
employee’s conviction and upon proof of the
latter’s insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar
satisfies all these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-
operator has been deprived of his day in court,
because the case before us is not one wherein the
operator is sued for a primary liability under the
Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil
liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee’s criminal negligence is sought to be
enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability
imposed upon the employer by law, he is in
substance and in effect a party to the criminal case.
Ergo, the employer’s subsidiary liability may be
determined and enforced in the criminal case as part
of the execution proceedings against the employee.
This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v.
Señeris, supra, that "The proceeding for the
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. A case in which an
execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution,
and this power carries with it the right to determine
every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution.
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be
held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in
like manner, the appellate court’s decision made no
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no
moment.
As already discussed, the filing of a separate
complaint against the operator for recovery of
subsidiary liability is not necessary since his
liability is clear from the decision against the
accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from
the appellate court’s decision.
In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Señeris, 115
SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following
pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an
indemnity in the absence of any collusion between
the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive
upon the employer in an action for the enforcement
of the latter’s subsidiary liability not only with
regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in
Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no
other function than to render decision based upon
the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has
no power to amend or modify it even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision.
A separate and independent action is, therefore,
unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the
agony of the heirs of the victim.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent
appellate court that to grant the motion for
subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to
amend its decision which has already become final
and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the
owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary
liability does not constitute an amendment of the
judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as
earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a
separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary
liability can be enforced in the same case where the
award was given, and this does not constitute an act
of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent
upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ
of execution (but only after the employer has been
heard), upon conviction of the employee and after
execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee’s insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court
disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of
execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is
directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding
the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-
operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against
private respondent.
17. G.R. No. L-18966 November 22,
1966
VICENTE BANTOTO, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
SALVADOR BOBIS, ET AL., defendants.
CRISPIN VALLEJO, defendant-appellant
FACTS
Appellant Crispin Vallejo was the registered
owner of a "jeepney" named "Jovil 11", with
plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him in
Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis.
On 24 October 1948, through the driver's
negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old
girl, Damiana Bantoto, a daughter of appellees,
inflicting serious injuries that led to her death a
few days later. The City Fiscal of Bacolod filed
an information charging Bobis with homicide
through reckless imprudence, to which Bobis
pleaded guilty. He was, accordingly, sentenced
to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and to
indemnify the deceased girl's heirs (appellees
herein) in the sum of P3,000.00.
By amended complaint of 8 October
1959, appellees Vicente Bantoto and Florita
Lanceta, for themselves and their other
children, instituted the present action against
Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved)
and Crispin Vallejo in the court of first
instance, pleading the foregoing facts and
seeking to have the three defendants declared
solidarily responsible for damages, consisting
of the civil indemnity required of the driver
Bobis in the judgment of conviction, plus moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys' fees and
costs.
Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action against him,
for the reason that the amended complaint did
not aver that the driver, Bobis, was insolvent.
The court overruled the motion to dismiss, and
on 20 February 1960 Vallejo answered the
complaint, setting up denials and affirmative
defenses, specifically averring that the brothers
and sisters of the deceased were not real parties
in interest; that the complaint stated no cause of
action against Vallejo; that his liability was
only subsidiary; that the action was barred by
prior judgment; and that the liability had been
satisfied. Bobis was declared in default.
At the trial, the court of origin (overruling
Vallejo's objections) admitted as Exhibit "A"
for plaintiffs the writ of execution against the
driver, Salvador Bobis, issued in the criminal
case.
Vallejo presented no evidence.
Wherefore, the court absolved defendant
Maceda and rendered judgment against Crispin
Vallejo in the terms described at the start of this
opinio
ISSUES
MAIN WON The master's liability, under the
Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed
by his servants and employees in the discharge
of their duties, is not predicated upon the
insolvency of the latter. Thus, is Vallejo liable?
OTHER WON the defendant-appellant should
pay to the appellees the sum of P3,000.00 as
indemnity, P1,000.00 as moral damages,
P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P500.00
as attorney's fees
RULING
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employees, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
The insolvency of the servant or employee is
nowhere mentioned in said article as a
condition precedent.
 In truth, such insolvency is required
only when the liability of the master is
being made effective by execution levy,
but not for the rendition of judgment
against the master.
 The subsidiary character of the
employer's responsibility merely
imports that the latter's property is not
be seized without first exhausting that of
the servant. And by analogy to a regular
guarantor (who is the prototype of
persons subsidiarily responsible),
 the master may not demand prior
exhaustion of the servant's (principal
obligor's) properties if he can not "point
out to the creditor available property of
the debtor within Philippine territory,
sufficient to cover the amount of the
debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article 1060).
This rule is logical, for as between the offended
party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or
employer, it is the latter who is in a better
position to determine the resources and
solvency of the servant or employee.
Appellant invokes the following passage
in our decision in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil.
571:
The subsidiary liability of the
master, according to the provisions of
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
arises and takes place only when the
servant, subordinate, or employee
commits a punishable criminal act while
in the actual performance of his
ordinary duties and service, and he is
insolvent thereby rendering him
incapable of satisfying by himself his
own civil liability.
The underlined passage is, however, mere
obiter because the part immediately preceding
the quotation shows that the ratio decidendi of
the case was that the accident involved, unlike
in the case at bar, did not occur in the
performance of the driver's assigned duties.
OTHER
We agree with appellant, that, as the case was
predicated upon the sentence of conviction in
the criminal case, the award of exemplary
damages was improper. No such damages were
imposed on the driver, and the master, as
person subsidiarily liable, can not incur greater
civil liability than his convicted employee, any
more than a guarantor can be held responsible
for more than the principal debtor (Cf. Civil
Code, Article 2064).
But we do not agree that the award of
attorney's fees should be disallowed. Appellant
had reason to know that his driver could not
pay the P3,000.00 indemnity imposed in the
criminal case, because if he could, or if he had
money or leviable property worth that much,
Bobis would be operating his own jeepney
instead of another's.
 In fact, Article 2208, paragraph 9,
authorizes the award of counsel's fees
"in a separate civil action to recover the
civil liability arising from a crime."
As in awarding only P500.00 attorney's fees
the court below could envisage only the
services of counsel up to the date of its
judgment, and it could not know then that
the decision would be appealed, we are of
the opinion that counsel fees should now be
at least doubled.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision under
appeal is modified by eliminating the award of
P1,000.00 exemplary damages and doubling the
award for counsel fees, with the result that
appellant shall pay the indemnity of P3,000.00,
with interest at 6% from the filing of the
complaint, plus P1,000.00 attorney's fees. In all
other respects, said decision is affirmed. No
costs.
18. [G.R. No. 112346. March 29, 1996]
EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS
OF HECTOR CAETE, respondents.
FACTS
In Criminal Case No. 01 106-L, Elmer
Ouano was charged with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide in an
information which averred -
That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M.,
in Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota
Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly
registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and
owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and
operate it in a negligent and reckless manner,
without taking the necessary precaution to
avoid injuries to person and damage to
property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle
he was then driving bumped and hit Hector
Caete, which caused the latters instantaneous
death, due to the multiple severe traumatic
injuries at different parts of his body.[2]
When arraigned, the accused pleaded
guilty and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court
pronounced its judgment
Finding therefore the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
against him and taking into account the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fiscal
readily accepted, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer and undergo an
imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and
8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the
sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim;
P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in
connection with the burial and the nightly
prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00
as attorneys fees.[3]
On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was
issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May
1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated
that he had served the writ on accused Elmer
Ouano but that the latter had manifested his
inability to pay the money obligation.
Forthwith, private respondents presented a
motion for subsidiary execution with neither a
notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner.
Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial
court issued an order, dated 29 May 1992,
directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary
execution. The sheriff went to petitioners
residence to enforce the writ, and it was then,
allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was
informed of Ouanos conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to
recall the subsidiary writ of execution
principally anchored on the lack of prior notice
to her and on the fact that the employers
liability had yet to be established. Private
respondents opposed the motion.
the trial court denied petitioners motion. On 23
September 1992, petitioners plea for
reconsideration of the denial was likewise
rejected
The appellate court initially restrained the
implementation of the assailed orders and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately,
however, the appellate court, in its decision
of 28 September 1993, dismissed the petition
for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated:
Even assuming that issuance of writ of
subsidiary execution requires notice and
hearing, we believe a hearing in the present
case would be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary
formality, because, as employer, petitioner
became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction
of her accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof
of the latters insolvency. Petitioner intimated
no defense which could absolve her of
subsidiary liability under the premises. Then,
too, after the denial of her motion to stay and
recall subject writ, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but in her motion for
reconsideration, she averred no exculpatory
facts which could save her from subsidiary
liability, as employer of the convicted Elmer
Ouano
ISSUES
WON Petitioner should be subsidiarily liable?
RULING
petitioner additionally reminds the
Court that Ouanos conviction was not the result
of a finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt
but from his spontaneous plea of guilt.
The statutory basis for an employers
subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.[5] This Court has
since sanctioned the enforcement of this
subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty,[6] on the thesis that it really
is a part of, and merely an incident in, the
execution process of the judgment.
But, execution against the employer
must not issue as just a matter of course, and it
behooves the court, as a measure of due
process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the
purpose, the legal applicability and
propriety of the employers liability.
The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that execution against the
convicted employee cannot be satisfied.
The court must convince itself that the :
 convicted employee is in truth in the
employ of the employer;
 that the latter is engaged in an industry
of some kind; that the employee has
committed the crime to which civil
 liability attaches while in the
performance of his duties as such; and
 that execution against the employee is
unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.[
The assumption that, since petitioner in this
case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her
motion to stay and recall, as well as in her
motion for reconsideration, which could save
her from liability, a hearing would be a futile
and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The
employer must be given his full day in court
To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code requires
a) the existence of an employer-
employee relationship;
b) that the employer is engaged in some
kind of industry;
c) that the employee is adjudged guilty
of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits
while in the discharge of such duties);
and
d) that said employee is insolvent. The
judgment of conviction of the
employee, of course, concludes the
employer[8] and the subsidiary
liability may be enforced in the same
criminal case, but to afford the
employer due process, the court
should hear and decide that liability
on the basis of the conditions
required therefor by law
WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29
May 1992, as well as the order of 24 August
1992 to have been improvidently issued, said
orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall
be given the right to a hearing on the motion for
the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution
filed by private respondents, and the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings conformably with our foregoing
opinion. No costs.