Jala, Charmaine I.

08/28/2018
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MANGASER vs. UGAY

FACTS: On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed a complaint for Forcible
Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay). In his complaint, petitioner alleged
that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur,
Caba, La Union, covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13 787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707;
that on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and
occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent.

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following
defenses, to wit: that he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and
when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place which
is now designated as Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union. He introduced improvements on said
property and fenced it based on his recollection. Respondent further alleged that petitioner
was never in actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October
31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged intrusion.

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual
or physical possession or occupation but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action
of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right; that
the CA should have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as proofs of prior
physical possession over the property; and that the issuance of the same are considered to
by law as proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

Issue I: Whether or not petitioner was able to establish prior possession for forcible entry to
prosper.

HELD: Yes. Prior possession is established by petitioner.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have
prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one
(1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
physical possession of the property.

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material
possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as
to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not
admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than
prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal possession
in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a
ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in
respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only
by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will
or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force
of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration
of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his
will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could
not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he
would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject
property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under
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Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on
March 18, 1987.

ISSUE II: Whether or not petitioner was able to establish ownership over the property

HELD: Yes. The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences ownership
and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that
a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof.

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Together with the Torrens title, the tax
declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of possession
over the land before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent
that he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in
the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of
ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property.
When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of respondent over his registered prope1iy,
he immediately filed a complaint with the Lupong Tagapamayapa and subsequently filed an
action for forcible entry with the MTC. Instead of taking the law into his own hands and
forcefully expelling respondent from his property, petitioner composed himself and followed
the established legal procedure to regain possession of his land.
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AGUILAR vs. AGUILAR

G.R. No. 141613 December 16, 2005

FACTS: On October 28, 1993, Senen and Virgilio purchased a house and lot located in
Parañaque City, Metro Manila for the benefit of their father, Maximiano Aguilar (now
deceased). The brothers wanted their father to enjoy his retirement in a quiet neighborhood.
On February 23, 1970, they executed a written agreement stipulating that their shares in the
house and lot would be equal; and that Senen would live with their father on condition that
he would pay the Social Security System (SSS) the remaining loan obligation of the former
owners.

In 1974, their father died. Virgilio then demanded that Senen vacate the house and that the
property be sold, the proceeds to be divided between them. Senen refused to comply with
Virgilio’s demand.

On January 12, 1979, Virgilio filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance. Virgilio
prayed that Senen be compelled to sell the property so that the proceeds could be divided
between them.

On July 26, 1979, the trial court rendered its Decision, declaring the brothers co-owners of
the house and lot and are entitled to equal shares; and ordering that the property be sold,
the proceeds to be divided equally between them. The trial court also ordered Senen to vacate
the property and to pay Virgilio rentals with interests corresponding to the period from
January 1975 until he leaves the premises.

On March 27, 1995, Senen filed with the Regional Trial Court, an action for legal redemption
against Virgilio and another brother, Angel. In his complaint, Senen alleged that while he
knows that Virgilio sold his ½ share of the property to Angel in January 1989, however, he
(Senen) was not furnished any written notice of the sale. Consequently, as a co-owner, he
has the right to redeem the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Senen’s action for legal redemption may prosper.

HELD: NO. Legal redemption (retracto legal de comuneros) is a privilege created by law,
partly by reason of public policy and partly for the benefit of the redemptioner to afford him
a way out of a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust.

With respect to redemption by co-owners, in case the share of a co-owner is sold to a third
person, the governing law is Article 1620 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable rate.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do
so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common."

The purpose behind Article 1620 is to provide a method for terminating the co-ownership and
consolidating the dominion in one sole owner.

As Provided under Article 1623, the following are the requisites for the exercise of legal
redemption: (1) There must be a co-ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a
stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right
of redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to
be counted from the time that he or they were notified in writing by the vendee or by the co-
owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of the sale.

In this case, the sale took place in January 1989. Petitioner admits that he has actual
knowledge of the sale. However, he only asserted his right to redeem the property in March
1995 by filing the instant complaint. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that
this was seven (7) years late.

Petitioner, however, now contends that there being no written notice to him of the sale by
the vendee or vendor, the thirty-day redemption period has not prescribed.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. The old rule is that a written notice of the sale by the
vendor to his co-owners is indispensable for the latter to exercise their retracto legal de
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comuneros. More recently, however, we have relaxed the written notice requirement. Thus,
in Si v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled
to a written notice for such would be superfluous. The law does not demand what is
unnecessary.

Petitioner has actual knowledge of the sale of Virgilio’s share to Angel in 1989. As provided
by Article 1623, he has thirty days from such actual knowledge within which to exercise his
right to redeem the property. Inexplicably, petitioner did not take any action. He waited for
seven (7) years before filing his complaint. Definitely, such an unexplained delay is
tantamount to laches. To be sure, to uphold his right would unduly cause injury to respondent-
intervenor, a purchaser in good faith and for value.

Moreover, by the time Senen filed Civil Case No. 95-039 for legal redemption, his right was
no longer available to him. We have held that after a property has been subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to
sustain any right of pre-emption or redemption.
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TORRES, JR. vs. LAPINID AND VELEZ

G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014

FACTS: On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano) 5 and
Carlos Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 before RTC Cebu City praying for the nullification
of the sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery
of possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several
parcels of land including the disputed Lot. No. 4389 7 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu.
Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the
petitioners and other co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On 13 August 2001, a
judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein
they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said properties
and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the
agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Pursuant to their
mandate, the petitioners inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a
specific portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed
by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by petitioner that as a consequence of what
they discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid.

The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale
of a definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without
force and effect.

ISSUE: whether or not Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-
owns in favor of another person.

HELD: Yes. A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in
the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the
extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be
affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners
have no right to enjoin a coowner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion
or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from
any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights
of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not
perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as
co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common. Thus, from the
perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the
property.

Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor
of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.

In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim
title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner
only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he
disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null
and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the
results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be
unaffected by the alienation.
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CORPUZ vs. Sps. AGUSTIN

G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012

FACTS: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion
and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land
located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976
by the Laoag City Register of Deeds.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original
Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951
to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin
to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired
the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March
15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco
Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in
their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied
Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, and considering
further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as owners, and have
been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon. Defendants are the ones
entitled to the possession

The CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed
between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by
the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of
ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property was
not by mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of
ownership.

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to
respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to
initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.
ISSUE: who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties --
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a
notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?

HELD: Respondent has better right.

In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical
possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession
de jure.

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the
property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only
provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed
properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the
disputed properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this
date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending that he has registered
the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system.
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He asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title
holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession
thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession
of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere
tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious
possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject
properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact,
petitioner has not established when respondents’ possession of the properties became
unlawful – a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements
sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The
lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in
the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner.

We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale
of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less
five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner
registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name
under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the
properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their
ownership.

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed
ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by
petitioner’s father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that
petitioner came to know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No.
T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued
to him was an "act of fraud" on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral
attack against the Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful
detainer case.1âwphi1

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral
attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. It is a well-established
doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer
case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de
jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.