CULPA V.

DOLO  In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was
People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011, 658 SCRA 367 | *Understand the crime killed.
charged (Parricide) as compared to Homicide and Homicide through reckless  There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
imprudence. deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.
DOCTRINE:  As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
Parricide is committed when:
 As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
(1) a person is killed;
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

FACTS:
 On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively,
left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission
of their parents. They did not return home that night.
 When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to
return home but their mother prevailed upon them.
 When the two kids reached home a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.
 With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them
with a thick piece of wood.
 When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor.
 He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.
 Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle
to take them to a hospital.
 As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that
Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
 Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing.
 In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.
 Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before
September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
 On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15
minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
 The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.  YES

HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

Parricide is committed when:

(1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
 Bagajo v. Marave, G.R. No. L-33345, November 20, 1978
DOCTRINE:
She did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the
bamboo-stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record.
Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to
have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had
done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel
such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.
FACTS:
 In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left
her classroom to go to the principal's office. While the teacher was thus out of the room,
complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with
Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another
classmate.
 At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who
suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting
the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail of the
desk. She fainted.
 At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room. She asked Wilma what
happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken place.
 Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was
using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the
following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:
1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four inches in length
and 1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface
of the right thigh.
The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (Pages 26-27, Record.)
 Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in
convicting her of the crime of slight physical injuries.
 She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil Wilma for
tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so.
 She contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in this pose
by the Solicitor General, who recommends her acquittal, coupled with the observation
that although "petitioner is not criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held
accountable for her conduct administratively.
ISSUE: WN Bagajo is criminally liable  Just administratively.
HELD:
 In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises
substitute parental authority over the students. (Article 349, Civil Code.) More
specifically, according to Article 352, "The relations between teacher and pupil, professor
and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution.
In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall
cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student." And
pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual
enjoins:
o The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out
cruel and unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for
bad conduct, holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and
expressions tending to destroy the pupil's self-respect, and the permanent
confiscation of personal effects of pupils are forbidden.
 In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no
teacher may impose corporal punishment upon any student in any case. But We are
not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative liability of petitioner.
Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil liability other than what could
be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be the outcome hereof.
 The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal relates exclusively to her criminal
responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as defined in Article
266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted
and convicted in the courts below.
 She did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil,
Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record.
 Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be
found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did
not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish
Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are
convinced that the means she actually used was moderate and that she was
not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.
 The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most
4 inches long and ¼ cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind
the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline
her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other
words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal
offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
 Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use
of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here is that in
the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication
beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that
petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by
complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner.
 What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher
exercising authority over her pupil inloco parentis, she was within her rights
to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she
exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules
governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and
in this case, to determine.
 Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary
measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150 of the Bureau of
Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities.
 After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary
eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the
petitioner -accused is entitled to acquittal. ,
  WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice
to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting
exdelicto. HELD:

People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001  There was no criminal intent on the part of the accused to kill the boy. It was shown that
DOCTRINE: the accused are members of a cult and the bizarre ritual was consented to by the parents
The RPC states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or of the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought to
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are guilty of reckless imprudence
precaution on the person performing such an act. Intentional felonies such as murder or resulting in homicide and not murder.
homicide, what takes the place of the element of is the failure of the offender to take precautions  The RPC states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
due to lack if skill. doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the person performing such an act. Intentional felonies such as
murder or homicide, what takes the place of the element of is the failure of the offender
FACTS: to take precautions due to lack if skill.
 The accused lack medical skills in treating the victim of his ailment, resulted in the latters
 A boy named Randy Luntayao was believed by his father (Eddie) to have a ‘nervous death.
breakdown’ manifested by him talking and laughing by himself. He thinks that the  Treachery in this case cannot be appreciated in the absence of intent to kill. The acts of
breakdown was caused by skipping meals whenever he took the boy with him to the the accused therefore considered by the court as treachery are in fact efforts by the
farm. accused to restrain the boy so that they can cure him. Thus, the decision of the RTC is
 Upon the suggestion of one of the accused in this case, Eddie, wife Perlita and their three affirmed and modified declaring the accused guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
children went with said accused to Cebu. Upon arriving in Cebu they went to the house homicide
of another accused Carmen and diagnosed the boy to be possessed with a ‘bad spirit’ and
that she could exorcise. Warning that in conducting exorcism, the bad spirit might
transfer to Eddie it was best to do the healing prayer without him. Eddie, wife and
children were locked inside a room in the house.
 The exorcism conducted by Carmen was witnessed by two children who were playing
‘takyan’ when they heard a shout asking for help from his mother. They ran to the
direction of the house of Carmen and saw that Randy was being immersed in water head
first by the 4 accused. They also saw him being tied on a bench while Carmen poured
water into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused
Alexander banged the boy’s head against the bench. She also witnessed accused
Celedonia dropped her weight on the body of the boy. They also took turns in pounding
the boy’s chest with their clenched fist. Then Carmen asked one of the accused to get a
knife and after which the knife was slowly plunged into the left side of the boy’s body.
Then the boy was carried into the house.
 Around 5 o’clock in the afternoon Randy was already dead.
 After Eddie and his family
returned to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought the assistance from the Bombo Radyo
station in Bacolod City. As the incident took place in Cebu, NBI in Cebu conducted the
investigation and autopsy report of the exhumed body.
 The family filed a case in court against Carmen et.al of murder. The trial court found
them guilty of murder arguing that killing a person with treachery is murder. It cited a
court decision stating that even if there is no intent to kill, in inflicting physical injuries
with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder.
 Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. In the case at bar, there is
enough evidence that the accused confederated with each other in inflicting physical
harm to the victim (illegal act). These acts were intentional and thus they should be liable
for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act.
.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of murder?  NO.

Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA 402 | *Explain
how Yapyuco developed his theory that he should be liable only for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide and frustrated homicide.
DOCTRINEL
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right
or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that:
(a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or
office, and
(b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is based
on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt
of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence
FACTS:
 The accused-petitioners were Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan
and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra
(Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime
Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan,
Del Carmen and Telebastagan.
 They allegedly received information concerning a reported presence of armed NPA
members in Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the
victims would make an inevitable turn to which the accused all await. Believing that the
victims were the armed NPA members, the accused opened fire to the passengers of the
said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all charged with murder, multiple attempted
murder and frustrated murder.
ISSUE: WN the theory of mistaken belief is applicable in the present case.
HELD:
 At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the
offense charged requires proof of only general intent.
 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the
belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires
(a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that
it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
 Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is
otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith
on the part of the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
 The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which
he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we
think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is
no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.
Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006
DOCTRINE:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies and
culpable felonies
Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1
FACTS:
 February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they
crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
 Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy
of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he
punched him
 Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a
man’s fist and hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was
already able to ran away.
o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from
any other act of violence
 Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also
of stomach ache and was unable to eat
 By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body
felt numb
o Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just
continue to wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when
he asked.
o After eating a little, he vomited.
o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
 The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by
Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest
due to suspected food poisoning
 With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation,
an autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal
hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.
 RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide
 RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that Calimutan
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8
years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as
compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
 o NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to
run thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on
the left side was a treacherous
o criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act
even if the ultimate result had not been intended
 CA: Affirmed RTC
 Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings
on the cause of death constituted reasonable doubt
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide  NO!
HELD:
o NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto
mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner
Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages
 Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty
and the exclusion of all possibility of error)
 Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the
Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death
 Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the
result would NOT have occurred
 Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre
was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
 Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive
autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen
as the cause of death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence
by the courts
 Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by
which they are committed, in particular:
 (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
o § act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
 (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
o § act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
o § the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill
 Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code
 Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE V. RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
People v. Vistan, G.R. No. 17218, September 8, 1921
SUMMARY: Vistan, a conductor of a streetcar, was receiving passengers, and allegedly signaled
the motorman to go ahead without taking into account that Borromeo was about to board the
car. Borromeo was thrown off the car and his foot was crushed. He then charged Vistan with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The SC said that he was only guilty of
simple, and not reckless imprudence, and differentiated the two (see Holding). 

FACTS: 

 Vistan was charged at the CFI Manila of the crime of serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and sentenced to imprisonment. 

 Vistan was the conductor-in-charge of street car no. 203 of Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Co. 

 When he was receiving the passengers on the streetcar, he allegedly signaled the
motorman of the streetcar to go ahead without minding and without taking into account
that Hugo Borromeo was at that very moment about to board the car with one foot on
the running board. 

o Note: Borromeo was boarding after his two sons had already boarded.) 

 Borromeo was then thrown off of the moving car, and his foot was crushed by the rear
wheels of the car. He wasn’t able to go to work for more than 90 days, and his left foot
had to be amputated. 

 Defense of Vistan:
o Tried to prove that the street car being in motion, the offended party ran after
it and attempted to board it, but unfortunately missed the running board and
upon falling down one of his feet was caught by the wheels of the car.
 SC believes it to be clear that at the time of boarding the car, the offended party was
watching the man who gave the signal to start, that is, the conductor, and the latter, who,
had his eyes toward the door, seeing the nobody was alighting or boarding the car, rang
the bell, whereupon the car started. It is not improbable that when the accused saw the
last passenger with both hands clinging to the holding device of the car and one foot on
the running board, he thought that the passenger had completely boarded the car and
that is why he gave the signal to start.
ISSUE: WN accused acted with reckless negligence  NO! Simple negligence only.
HELD:
 The term "rash imprudence," as used in the Spanish Code, would seem to be
approximately equivalent to the "gross negligence" of the common law
 In common usage the word "rash" seems sometimes to imply a wanton disregard of
consequences, indicative of a state of mind bordering upon deliberate intention to inflict
a positive injury.
 The Court differentiated reckless and simple negligence.
Reckless Negligence:
where immediate personal harm, preventable in the exercise of
reasonable care, is threatened to a human being by reason of a course of conduct which is being
pursued by another, and the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor, the failure
to use reasonable care to prevent the threatened injury
SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE:
mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the
danger is not openly visible
Taking into consideration all the circumstances ofthe case at bar, we are of the opinion that the act
of the accused in giving the order to start the car, when the offended party had his hands already
on the holding devices of the car and his foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or
negligence, but does not show grave fault amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused having
acted with simple imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty provided by article 590, case
No. 4, of the Penal Code.
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence: are
(1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
For one to be liable for negligence, It must be shown that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
FACTS:
 Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis
Oriental.
 At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a
fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman
Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was
at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney
which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the
conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at
that point. The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of
the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney.
 Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the left
side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard a strong impact coming
from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle.
Dayata was then seen lying on the ground] and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner
felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right
side.
 Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of
death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having
run over by the jeepney.
ISSUE: WN petitioner is negligent  YES!
HELD:
 Yes but Gaid is not liable.
 -presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the
operative events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases
or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned
on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second
stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over
and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
 During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.
 -Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an
act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
 Petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified
to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this fact
on cross-examination. Petitioner stated that he was driving at no
more than 15 kilometers per hour.
 -It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner,
who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He
also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was
focused on the road ahead. In Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running,
his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only
saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.
 -With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage.
Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own
negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.
 For the second stage, petitioner is negligent for failing to stop driving at the time when
he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle
 Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
 The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of
the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the
danger is not clearly manifest.
 The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
 For one to be liable for negligence, It must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a
motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there
was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
 -The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the
immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was
crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it
would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
 Petition Granted. Norman Gaid is acquitted.