[G.R. No. 120921.

January 29, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN
BULUSAN, accused-appellants.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law,
and further sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily -

1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the
amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with interest;

2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and
actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS
(P61,785.00), with interest;

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND FORTY
CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), with
interest;

4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.

5. The costs.

The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they had undergone preventive
imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time during which they had
undergone preventive imprisonment.[1]

In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel
Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a
carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at
Carusipan to attend a dance.The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar
Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity,
they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
 The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the
rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the topdown jeep and landed just beside it. He scurried
to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the
stomach and died.[2] Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the
right thigh, and legs and thighs, respectively.[3] The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat
and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney.[4] He did not survive. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left
two people dead and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan
were issued. Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder, an information was filed as
follows:

That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with evident premeditation and
treachery, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack and shot Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and
Ronnel Tolentino, with the use of firearms which caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino having
performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of Murder, but which did not by reason of causes
independent of the will of the defendant, namely the able and timely medical assistance given to said Vidal Agliam,
Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino which prevented their death.

All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Bulusan was not
tested for nitrates.
In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the basketball court,
as alleged by the complainants. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate
himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just
consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible, and that his
hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was
not even present at the crime scene when the firing incident took place; hence, he could not have been one of those
who strafed the jeep.[5]
For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on May 28, 1991, at around
7:00 oclock in the evening, he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home within thirty
minutes and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied himself with some
chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. To counter the
finding of traces of nitrates on his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes, as it
was very painful for him to use his right hand. He likewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the
victims.[6]
Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw only Galo on the evening of the
dance but did not talk to him. He denied joining the two later that night because after the dance, he went straight to the
house of Michael Viloria, where he spent the night until he went to work at 7:00 oclock in the morning of the following
day.[7]
The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the decision of the trial court be reversed and that
a new one be entered acquitting them of the charges.
The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the decision of the lower court. Was it correct in
finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt? We answer in the affirmative.
Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the
assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well
illumined by the moon. The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte, where the
air is free from darkening elements and turbidity. It being a summer evening, there could not have been any fog to
becloud the atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from clearly seeing
their assailants. They pinpointed the location of the malefactors to be approximately three meters from where they
stood.[8] Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly
identify their assailants. It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and his brother, a butcher, since he
used to deal with them in his business of buying and selling cattle.[9] Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan
School. Generally, people in rural communities know each other both by face and name.[10] Bulusan and Agliam were,
not only townmates, but former classmates as well. The constant interaction between them through the years would
necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one would have been able to recognize the
other easily.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. A distinction is herein timely made
between motive and intent. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent, on the
other hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.[11] Motive alone is not proof of a crime.[12] In
order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution. Motive is hardly ever
an essential element of a crime. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led to commit a crime, without a
real motive but just for the sake of committing it.[13] Along the same line, a man who commits a crime with an apparent
motive may produce different results, for which he is punished. As held in a line of cases, the rule is well-settled that the
prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the
author of the crime.[14] Lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction thereof where
there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony.[15]
Accused-appellants attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their
hands is futile. Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these
are minimal and, unlike those found in gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.
The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by
this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he
was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[16] This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. On the
night of May 28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan attended the dance at the barangay hall. After the dance, they went their
separate ways but remained within the barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan slept over at the house of
Michael Viloria, which was within walking distance from the dance hall.
The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is
easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence.[17] This is especially true in case of
positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses,[18] which renders their alibis worthless.[19] Positive
identification prevails over denials and alibis.[20]
Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires total
freedom from any quantum of doubt. This is not so. Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,

(p)roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit
of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on
imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.[21] Reasonable doubt is that engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt.[22] A precise example would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in the case at bar where accused-appellants
individually interposed the wavering defense of alibi. Galo failed to elucidate on his whereabouts after the dance,
whereas Bulusan claimed to have slept in the house of one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros attested that he was not at the
dance hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses.In fact,
they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the
night in question. Had they done so, the presentation of corroborative testimony would have reenforced their defense
of alibi. As held in People vs. Ligotan,[23] an alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.
The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery. Under Paragraph 16, Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code, (t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1)
(t)hat at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.[24] As regards the second requisite, the
accused must make some preparation to kill his victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. [25] There must be evidence that such
form of attack was purposely adopted by the accused.[26] Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient
opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of
the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the
dance. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims, totally unaware of their presence, from
behind. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves, the attack being so sudden that Eduardo
Tolentino was shot right where he sat.
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as the
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.[27] Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained,[28] whereas
moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offenders
wrongful act or omission.[29] In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must
present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like,[30] as corroborated by his testimony.[31] Here,
the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by
receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court.[32]Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However,
the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be
amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) is given to the heirs
of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.[33] As regards moral damages, the amount of
psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable,[34] may be determined by
the trial court in its discretion.Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO
MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115,
promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its
resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa
against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of
this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos
St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract
of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property
may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos
Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as
follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and
then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank
(Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways.
The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's
residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses.
The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P.
Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been
built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and
"1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma.
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter
was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a
pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of
their footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)

On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and egress, to
the public street;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of
Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On
November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only
insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages,
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.5

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the
present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal
from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be
satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee
can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the
decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to
maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in
the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the
decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.8

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.9

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.11

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another
but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful,
but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage,
that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which
the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of
a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding
duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of
the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts
done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20 although the act
may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give
no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 114118 August 28, 2001

HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, ADELAIDA BORLADO, LORETO BORLADO, REYNALDO BORLADO,
RICARDO BORLADO, FRANCISCO BORLADO and ALADINO DORADO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN, BIENVENIDO BULAN, JR., NORMA B. CLARITO
and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of cause of action and ordering
as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; and

"1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of palay
every year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question;

"2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;

"3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum of P5,000.00
as litigation expenses; and

"4. To pay the costs of the suit.

"SO ORDERED.

"Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.

"(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR

"Judge"2

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"The records show that plaintiffs-appellants3 (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents
were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the
Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.

"On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero (Exh. "C", p. 247, MTC Record) for Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francisco on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio
Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: Nicolas, Valentin and
Luzviminda, all surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses
Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954 (Exh. 65,
pp. 243-245, id.).

"Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with
the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947
(Exh. "65", supra). Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de
Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 (Exh. "F",
p. 254, Record [MTC]). She paid the corresponding taxes as evidenced by the Tax Receipts marked as
Exhibits "K", "J", "I", "G", "F" and "H" (pp. 248-253, Record, id.). Salvacion and her co-defendants-
appellees'4possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until
November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.
 "On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for
ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners (p. 1, id.). The ejectment case was decided in
favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their families
were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all
improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually
from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and
to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had
paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. "57", pp. 256-261, id.). Instead of
appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983, petitioners
filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-
4887. This case was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was
quoted earlier."5

On 24 November 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the appealed decision.6

Hence, this appeal.7

The Issue

The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of the lot in
question.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition. The issue is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals.8 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,9 unless the case falls under any of the
exceptions to the rule.10

Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.11 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.12 It is not
our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.13 A question of
fact would arise in such event.14 Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme
Court and are not proper for its consideration.15

Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable to pay
respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in
question.

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the award. "Palay" is not
legal tender currency in the Philippines.

El Fallo del Tribunal

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
18980 with modification that petitioners' liability to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year
from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack of basis.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12736 July 31, 1961

FRANCISCO L. LAZATIN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANGEL C. TWAÑO and GREGORIO T. CASTRO, defendants-appellees.

Leonardo Abola for plaintiff-appellant.

Manuel O. Chan for defendants-appellees.

PAREDES, J.:

The case at bar had its genesis in Civil Case No. 213, CFI, Manila, entitled "Angel C. Twaño and Gregorio T. Castro,
plaintiffs, versus F. L. Lazatin, et al., defendants, Dionisio P. Tanglao, Intervenor," for the recovery of P35,000.00,
plus interest, realized in connection with the purchase by them (plaintiffs and defendants) from the U.S. government,
and the subsequent sale, of some 225 auto-trucks. After trial, the CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint as well as
the intervention. The order of dismissal was taken to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 4533-R), which, on
November 3, 1950, rendered judgment reversing the said order and declaring that plaintiffs and defendants were co-
owners in the business of buying and selling surplus auto-trucks, and ordered the defendants (one of them Lazatin)
to pay to the plaintiff s therein, the sum of P10,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint. The said
decision became final; it was executed, with the levy of the properties of defendant Lazatin and their subsequent
sale at public auction, wherein the plaintiffs Twaño and Castro were the purchasers. Before the expiration of the
redemption period, on August 2, 1952, defendant Lazatin, deposited with the Sheriff of Pampanga the sum of
P13,849.88, redemption price. On August 9, 1952, the same Francisco Lazatin, filed the present action, to recover
from the same Twaño and Castro the sum of P19,676.09, supposedly a balance of the proceeds of auto-trucks, sold
directly to purchasers by said defendants. On the same date, plaintiff Lazatin, alleging that "there is no security
whatsoever for the payment of the amount claimed in the complaint and that the defendant defendants are removing
or are about to remove or dispose of their property with intent to defraud their creditors, particularly the plaintiff,"
secured a writ of attachment on the amount he deposited, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Pampanga refused to
deliver the sum of P13,849.88, which should have been paid to the herein defendants.

On August 12, 1952, the herein defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment on
the following grounds:

1. That the plaintiff has no cause of action because (a) the right of action, if any, has prescribed, and (b) the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment; and

2. That the allegations in the petition for the issuance of the writ and in the affidavit in support thereof are
false.

On September 10, 1952, the lower court, after due hearing, dissolved the writ.

Subsequently, the defendants filed their answer and after the customary admissions and denials, interposed as
special defenses, the same grounds averred in the motion to lift the writ and counterclaimed:

1. That the plaintiff herein has filed a clearly unfounded civil action against the herein defendants as a result
of which the latter had suffered actual or compensatory damages by way of attorney's fees in the sum of
P3,000.00

2. That as a result of the wrongful attachment and the false statements made by the plaintiffs, under oath, in
support of his Ex-Parte Petition for the Writ, the herein defendants have suffered moral damages to the
amount of P10,000.00

3. That the wrongful attachment against the properties and the sum of P13,849.88 had caused actual
damages to the herein defendants, represented by the legal interest on such amount.

On May 9, 1953, plaintiff Lazatin died and on March 10, 1954, Gil Gotiangco was appointed and qualified as
administrator of plaintiff's estate.
On the date set for hearing, the defendants herein were granted, a preliminary hearing on their special defenses
(Sec. 5, Rule 8). The lower court on November 12, 1954, entered an order, dismissing the complaint on the ground
that it was barred by a prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. At the same time, the Court set the case for
hearing on defendants' counterclaim. On October 28, 1955, the trial court rendered judgment, ordering the estate of
Lazatin to pay the defendants therein the following sums: —

(1) P3,000.00 for the fees of Attorney Manuel O. Chan;

(2) P,500.00 for moral damages to each of the defendants;

(3) Six percent (6%) interest on the amount of P13,849.88 from August 6, 1952 until said amount is actually
delivered to and receipted by the defendants; and

(4) To pay the costs.

Judgment is also rendered against the Central Surety and Insurance Co., which is solidarily liable with the
Estate of the deceased plaintiff Francisco L. Lazatin on its bond for the sum of P20,000.00, filed by said
Company for the issuance on the writ of attachment for the amounts mentioned in Nos. (2) and (3) of the
dispositive part of this decision.

Upon appellant's request, the appeal was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court, as the issues involved
therein are purely legal in character.

The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code (Arts. 2195 to 2235). The rules governing damages laid
down in other laws, and the principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so far as they are not in
consistent with the Code (Arts. 2196 and 2198). Article 2197 mentions the kind of damages recoverable, among
which are (1) actual or compensatory and (2) moral Article 2219 provides that moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases . . . (3) malicious prosecution. There is an abundance of case holding that the
action to recover damages from the attachment plaintiff, for the wrongful issuance and levy of an attachment
(malicious attachment) is identical or is analogous to the ordinary action for malicious prosecution (Eastern v. Bank
of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 56 Am. Rep. 77, 4 Pac. 1106; Robinson v. Kellum 6 Cal. 399; Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644;
King v. Montgomery 50 Cal. 115; Gonzales v. Cobliner 68 Cal 151, 8 Pac. 697; Asevado v. Orr 100 Cal. 293, 34 Pac.
777). It may logically be inferred, therefore, that in order hat moral damages may be recovered in connection with he
writ of attachment under consideration, malice is an essential ingredient thereof. In Songco v. Sellner, 37 Phil. 154,
where the evidence showed that defendant offered damages to his credit, as a result of writ of attachment
wrongfully issued, the Court declared that such damages were remote and speculative and that there was no
'ending that the attachment was maliciously sued out. In Aboitiz v. Da Silva, 45 Phil. 883, the Court refused to grant
damages for loss of reputation by reason of an improper attachment, on the ground that there was no evidence from
which malice on the part of the plaintiff or loss of credit to the defendant, may be inferred or presumed. In Masterson
v. Smith Navigation, 60 Phil. 366 ' damages to good name, allegedly suffered by the defendant as a result f a writ of
attachment wrongfully issued, were disallowed in the ground that such damages were very problematical. In
American jurisdictions where the principles of the general laws on damages in common law (adopted by Art. 198 of
the new Civil Code), are in force, only actual or compensatory damages are recoverable for wrongful but not
malicious attachment. An allowance may be made r injury to feeling if the attachment was sued out maliciously and
without probable cause; but in the absence of his element there can be no recovery (6 C.J. 533- 534; 541). "The
authorities are quite uniform in holding that, in the absence of malice, injuries to credit, reputation and business are
too remote and speculative to be recovered" (Union Nat. Bank v. Cross, 100 Wis. 174, 75 NW 992). There is no
issue of malice, damages must be compensatory merely, and confined to the actual loss from deprivation of the
property attached or injury to it, or in case of closing business, to the probable profits of the business, during the
time of its stoppage (Holiday Bros. Cohen 34 Ark. 707). All of which go to show that the attachment defendant is not
entitled to moral damages, unless it is alleged and established that the writ was maliciously sued out.

This notwithstanding the defendants-appellees invoke the following rule, in support of their thesis.

SEC. 4. Bond required from plaintiff. — The party applying for the order must give a bond executed to the
defendant in amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the plaintiff claim that the plaintiff will pay all the
costs which it may be adjudged to the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. (Rule 59, R.C.)
They claim that under the above section, malice and want of probable cause are not essential (II Moran's Rules of
Court , 2nd Ed. pp. 19-20); that the language used therein is clear and its intent and purpose are obvious; its
provision cannot be given a broader scope than what it imports; and the element of malice cannot be implied from
the terms thereof. It is finally argued that as the attachment-plaintiff, according to the rule, should pay "all the
damages" which the attachment defendant might sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto, the ruling of the trial court that the appellant should pay the
appellees moral damages, is correct. We do not share this view. It should be observed that Sec. 4 of Rule 59, does
not prescribe the remedies available to the attachment defendant in case of a wrongful attachment, but merely
provides an action for recovery upon the bond, based on the undertaking therein made and not upon the ability
arising from a tortious act, like the malicious suing of an attachment. Under the first, where malice is not essential,
the attachment defendant, is entitled to recover only the actual damages sustained by him by reason of the
attachment. Under the second, where the attachment is maliciously sued out, the damages recoverable may include
a compensation for every injury to his credit, business or feelings (Tyler v. Mahoney 168 NC 237, 84 SE 362;
Pittsburg etc. C 73, 47 SE 234). And considering the fact that the rules of court are of older vintage than the new
Civil Code, the matter of damages in the said rules should be encompassed within the framework Of the Civil Code
(Art. 2196 Civil Code). It is quite true that said section 4 employs the expression "all damages", but this should be
understood to refer to the damages resulting from the undertaking itself, the recovery of which is subject to "the
principles of the general law on damages", earlier discussed. (Art. 2198, Civil Code, supra).

A cursory perusal of the decision would show that the trial court did not make any express ruling that the writ of
attachment was maliciously sued out by the plaintiff or any finding of facts or circumstances from which it may be
necessarily inferred that the attachment was thus obtained. The decision does not make any finding that the
defendants-appellees did in fact suffer mental anguish or injury to their credit or reputation. The decision simply
states: "Coming now to the moral damages which defendants have suffered consisting of mental anguish, serious
anxiety and besmirched reputation, it is believed that sing businessmen of good commercial standing and reputation,
each of them should be awarded at least P2,500.00." Moreover the dissolution of the writ was due to a technicality
No moral damages can be inferred from the mere act that the redemption price to which defendants were entitled,
had been retained by the provincial sheriff for a period of 38 days. The trial court held that the present action was
already investigated and adjudged in CA-G.R. To 4533-R and the right of action was barred by the state of
limitations, and that since the writ of attachment was only a remedy adjunct to the main suit, plaintiff-appellant was
not entitled to the writ. While the lower court declared that the defendants-appellees had an outstanding balance of
P171,947.80, in the bank and that they were not disposing their property in fraud of creditors or of the plaintiff, as
alleged in the petition for the issuance of the writ still the said court did not make any finding that the said petition
was maliciously sued out. We are, therefore, the opinion that the defendants-appellants are not entitled to moral
damages.

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be covered,
except: . . .

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff.

xxx xxx xxx

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered." (Art. 2208, Civil Code).

Defendants' counterclaim for the recovery of attorney's fees is based on paragraph 4 of the cited provision, for legal
services rendered in defending the main suit. There is no showing in the decision appealed from that plaintiffs'
action is "clearly unfounded". Plaintiffs-appellants' complaint was not dismissed because the facts alleged therein
were found untrue, but on purely technical grounds; the special defenses of prescription of the action and res
adjudicata. While it may be hard to believe that the plaintiff had labored under the impression that the matters
involved in his complaint had not been adjudicated in the previous litigation between the same parties (Civil Case
No. 213 CFI Manila), because plaintiff himself was a lawyer such error of judgment on his part would not justify the
inference that the action was "clearly unfounded". As aptly observed by appellants' counsel, defenses as the one
interposed by appellee in their counterclaim "raise questions of law not always of obvious and easy solution." While
it may appear also that the move was a scheme to prevent the defendants-appellees from reaping the benefits of
the final judgment rendered in their favor in said case CA- G.R. No. 5433-R, still one cannot nullify, without cause,
the good and honest motive, which should be presumed, when a litigant goes to court for the determination of his
alleged right.

Withal, and considering the fact that defendants-appellant lees were drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant
and were compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them, and taking into account the work done by said
attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings, we deem it just and equitable to award at attorney's
fees for defendants-appellees. The sum of P3,000.00 adjudicated by the trial court, is reasonable under the
circumstances (par. 11 Art. 2208, Civil Code).

It appears that plaintiffs-appellants have abandoned their appeal with respect to the payment of 6% interest in the
amount of P13,849.88.

Modified, with the elimination of moral damages, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against plaintiff-appellant