G.R. No.
183591 October 14 2008 RULINGS:
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the
Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the
legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the
people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing
laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The
failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere
act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which
are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi
in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned
law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt
act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President,
who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective
does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees
the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same
self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by
law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of
paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the
agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among
other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the
BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate,
a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under
the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity
as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version
of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would
not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship
between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it
is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a
state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing
laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the
MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority,
as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and
submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in
light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s
authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the
required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress
or the people, in whom constituent powers are
vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany project
or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD
is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants
from their total environment.

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII

(DELINEATION, CONCLUSION:

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS) In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the
birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples
of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act
No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only provisions but the very concept underlying them,
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by namely, the associative relationship envisioned
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional,
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the for the concept presupposes that the associated
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in way to independence.
has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,”
the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights
of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples

Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
MAGALONA VS ERMITA
G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011
Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners,
vs
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive
Secretary, et al., Respondents.
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the
Congress to comply with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27,
1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the
validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are
as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory,
and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of
islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of
certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA
9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory
Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly
affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we
connect the outermost points of our archipelago
with straight baselines and consider all the waters
enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit
definition in congruent with the archipelagic
doctrine.
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It
is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s
maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and
continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of
internal waters into archipelagic waters will not
risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of
the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast. It is further stated that the
regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not
affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the
exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space,
bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws
are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to
precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a
notice to the international family of states and it is
in no way affecting or producing any effect like
enlargement or diminution of territories.
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the
Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions
amounting to $400,000 were collected during the
Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an
earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left
untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable
institution, in need for more working capital,
petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of
$80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called
upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000.
The respondent bank declined to comply with this
order upon the ground that only the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not
the Department of Finance had the right to order
the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the
Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General,
bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a
recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After
due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with
legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the
costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of
errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring
the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries
themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is
competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank for the reimbursement of the
money of the intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae.
The government being the protector of the rights
of the people has the inherent supreme power to
enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with
such right hence as “parents” of the people the
government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the
Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The
legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries
of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating
their rights, and justly look for protection to the
sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They
show that this beneficient functions has not ceased
to exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in
the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of
justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases
whatever.
Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No, 127325, March 19,
1997
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin (President
of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action or PIRMA) filed with
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials (Delfin
Petition) through Peoples’ Initiative based on
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
where Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order:
fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country;
causing the necessary publications of the said
Order in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all
regions to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations at the time and dates
designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC through its Chairman issued an
Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition; and setting the case for hearing.
At the hearing, the petitioner-intervenors
appeared and on the same day, Senator Roco filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioner filed the special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
The constitutional provision on people’s initiatives
to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed by Congress.
RA No. 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative
(Constitution, statutes, local legislation) but it
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution.
RA 6735 only covers laws and not constitutional
amendments.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (1991) to govern
the conduct of initiative is ultra vires (beyond legal
capacity) because only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass implementing law.
People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution and not revision.
Congress has not yet appropriated funds for
people’s initiatives.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether RA No. 6735 was intended to cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution – NO.
Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid – NO.
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a
petition solely intended to obtain an order – NO.
Whether the lifting of term limits as proposed in
the Delfin Petition would constitute a revision or
an amendment to the Constitution – MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.
Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC – YES.
RATIO:
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is
not self-executor and RA 6735 cannot be the
implementing legislation.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is
not self-executory. The details for carrying out the
provision are left to the legislature. The
interpellations which ensued on the modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was
a legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Furthermore, the modified
amendment confines initiative to amendments to
and not revision of the Constitution. However, RA
6735 does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution because
there was no subtitle provided for it. Hence, RA
6735 is not sufficient to be the implementing
legislation for Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The COMELEC Resolution is not valid.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form
of delegation of legislative authority under the rule
that what has been delegated cannot be delegated.
It will only be valid if the law a) is complete in itself;
and b) fixes a standard. However, these
requirements were not met.
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition solely
intended to obtain an order.
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing and thus, becomes the
initiatory pleading. The Delfin petition is not an
initiatory pleading since it does not contain
signatures of the required number of voters (under
Sec 2 of Article XVII), COMELEC has no jurisdiction
before its filing.
There is no need to discuss whether the petition
presents an amendment or revision of the
Constitution.

The discussion on the issue of whether it is an

amendment or a revision is unnecessary if not
academic since COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the

present petition for prohibition.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction so it must be stopped

from proceeding further. Moreover, petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy. In this case, the
writ is necessary in view of the highly divisive
consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Order. This political instability and legal confusion
climate begs for judicial statesmanship because
only the SC can save the nation in peril and uphold
the majesty of the Constitution when the system of
constitutional law is threatened.
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had
the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting
at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes
the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the
“draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people
“before” they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that “before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition” is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents

observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present

petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not

Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure

to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation
or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome
of the present petition. Thus, this Court must
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed
a petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A
provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is
a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of
the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51%
of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners
when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity
to do so than let the government develop the habit
of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines
and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

It is not premature. Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
the national economy and patrimony, thereby
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
necessary agreements and documents to effect the
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
the purpose.
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

The Court does not discount the apprehension that

this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know
his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. HON.
AGUSTIN S. DIZON, et al.
FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered
into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction and renovation of
the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas.
UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was
not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission
on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP
to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its
decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB
Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the
UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders,
the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied
UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the
RTC its motion for execution despite their previous
motion having already been granted and despite
the writ of execution having already issued. On
June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for
execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC
had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary
banks and the RTC ordered the release of the
funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The
CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?
II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been
filed out of time?
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not
subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the
UP remains to be a "chartered institution"
performing a legitimate government function.
Irrefragably, the UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds
sourced from the fees and income enumerated
under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations,
to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of
Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All
the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a
"special trust fund," the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UPs mission and
purpose, and should always be subject to auditing
by the COA. The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include the
income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of
the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly
stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
v. Firme: A distinction should first be made
between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The
execution of the monetary judgment against the UP
was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It
was of no moment that a final
and executory decision already validated the claim remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal
against the UP. would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be
correct to find that the judgment of the RTC
became final and immutable thereafter due to the
notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002.
HELD: The period of appeal did not start without
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final
effective service of decision upon counsel of record.
against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule
(The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment;
contained in the second paragraph of Section 3,
service of judgments; fresh-period rule;
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the
computation of time)
filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted
the running of the period for filing the appeal; and
that the period resumed upon notice of the denial
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason,
of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for
garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
is the finality of the judgment based on the
supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC
declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a
However, equity calls for the retroactive
decision that has attained finality becomes
application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period
immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
rule that the Court first announced in
modified in any respect, even if the modification is
mid-September of 2005 through its ruling
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize
law, and whether the modification is made by the
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
court that rendered it or by this Court as the
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
highest court of the land. But the doctrine of
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
immutability of a final judgment has not been
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions,
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors;
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
(b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause
trial or motion for reconsideration." The
no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and
retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a
(d) whenever circumstances transpire after the
procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the
finality of the decision that render its execution
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea
of the order denying the motion for new trial,
for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
exceptional power to disregard the declaration of
or any final order or resolution," is impervious to
finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in
any serious challenge. This is because there are no
clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
vested rights in rules of procedure.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for

Consequently, even if the reckoning started from
reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB
May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the
Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he
denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice
was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP.
of appeal was not tardy within the context of the
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of
reconsideration could only be validly made upon
15-days counted from service of the denial of the
the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that
motion for reconsideration would end on June 1,
where a party has appeared by counsel, service
2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had
must be made upon such counsel. This is clear
until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a
enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule
Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with
13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If
Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon
that: "If the last day of the period, as thus
him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
the court. Where one counsel appears for several
shall not run until the next working day.
parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any
paper served upon him by the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon

Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July
21, 2003
SEPTEMBER 12, 2018
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office
following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No.
1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”)
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether
in the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated
various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team
served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant
captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition.” The raiding team seized the items
detailed in the seizure receipt together with other
items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land
titles.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition
for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No.
1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was
amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged
mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint further alleged that
Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an
army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture
of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment
in favor of the State.
Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan
subsequently dismissed the complaint because
there was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated, among others.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice
that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues that
a revolutionary government was operative at that
time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel
were “taking power in the name and by the will of
the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the
revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which
guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary
right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary
right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the
search. Therefore, the government may confiscate
the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use
the same in evidence against her since at the time
of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy
any constitutional right.
Issue:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was
legal
Held:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were
NOT legal.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25
February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986,
the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal
limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration
orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of
the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the
take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the
due process and search and seizure clauses of the
Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power
was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum.
The protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing
itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance
with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each
signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.”
The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
Although the signatories to the UDHR did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only
a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR as
part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Thus,
the revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the UDHR.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate
the ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the ICCPR or
the UDHR is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
UDHR as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects
of the rules of international law laid down in the
ICCPR. The fact is the revolutionary government
did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As
the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government
became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders
void. The Provisional Constitution adopted
verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The Provisional Constitution served as a
self-limitation by the revolutionary government to
avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it
by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or
Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued
by government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted them
by the revolutionary government. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the ICCPR
or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant
since the revolutionary government did not
repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon
proper application, specified the items to be
searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the
warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain
Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The
search warrant did not particularly describe these
items and the raiding team confiscated them on its
own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis
to seize these items without showing that these
items could be the subject of warrantless search
and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se, and
they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner
of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus
hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from
suit
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class
mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel
“to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay
for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for
fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20
a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of
the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in
the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not US respondents may be held liable
for damages caused by USS Guardian.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit
under VFA applies in this case.
HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it
is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
“calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest
so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed
by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future
generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the
USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 During the deliberations, Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system,
brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where
they fail to comply with the rules and regulations
of the coastal State regarding passage through the
latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by
Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to
it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for
damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a
warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in
subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships
and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s
unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one
situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to
the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date
has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound
by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in
UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US
refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep
seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to
do with its the US’ acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s
view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does
not mean that the US will disregard the rights of
the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to
bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding
which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time
ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our
vital marine resources, would shirk from its
obligation to compensate the damage caused by its
warship while transiting our internal waters. Much
less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations
to cooperate in the global task to protect and
preserve the marine environment as provided in
Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional
basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in
formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the
protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the
present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States
shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations
of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
 The waiver of State immunity under the
VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition
for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling

on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel
who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this

point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we
cannot grant damages which have resulted from
the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
allows the recovery of damages, including the
collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.
Case Digest: KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No.
142396 February 11, 2003)
Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,”
was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic
agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was
said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in
the discharge of his official duties as being merely
an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
of the United States Department of Justice.
These may be inadequate to support the
“diplomatic status” of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government
has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers
and, after having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be expected to
make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal
witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that, being a special agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note of the United States Embassy addressed to
DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice
Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note
is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to

diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be

cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can
be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine

government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between

agencies of the government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the Philippine

Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy

Participation of members of the Philippine

Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo
Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon
doctrine of sovereign immunity
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
G.R. No. 154705 405 SCRA 126 June 26, 2003
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY
AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER
COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name
and style of VINZON TRADE AND
SERVICES, respondent.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made
by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of
Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and
voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and
jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that
petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by
its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the
Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim
assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he
allegedly found respondent’s work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.
Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he
filed a complaint against the petitioners which
opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can
invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin
and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein
in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its
consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States.
The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal
right against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. In the case of foreign
States, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude
would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.
The rules of International Law, however, are not
unbending or immune to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the
discharge of their governmental functions brought
about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This
concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public
acts of the government of a state), but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the
commercial activities of a state.)
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of
Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract
by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it
is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is
only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute
that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an
act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts
with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a
sovereign activity when it entered into a contract
with the respondent. The maintenance agreement
was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in
the discharge of its governmental functions. It
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall
enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction,
except in the case of:

a real action relating to private immovable

property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending
State for the purposes of the mission;

an action relating to succession in which the

diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person
and not on behalf of the sending State;

an action relating to any professional or

commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall

under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision
clearly applies only to a situation where the
diplomatic agent engages in any professional or
commercial activity outside official functions,
which is not the case herein.
ATCI v. Echin October 11, 2010 G.R. No. 178551
Liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency, Probationary
employment
SEPTEMBER 4, 2018
FACTS:
Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical
technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a MOA.
Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees
undergo a probationary period of one year.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000
but was terminated from employment on February
11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.
Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for
illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal,
and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was
illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of her contract.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that
their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to
meet the performance rating within the one-year
period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service
Laws.
The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent.
RULING:
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency,
cannot evade responsibility for the money claims
of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is
a government agency clothed with immunity from
suit, or that such foreign principals liability must
first be established before it, as agent, can be held
jointly and solidarily liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in
line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to
allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the
judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable
renders the law on joint and solidary liability
inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor
laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondents employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in
fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the
same was not substantiated.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party
invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine
of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of
foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged;
they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with the Rules of Court.
These documents submitted by petitioners do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under
Kuwaiti civil service laws.
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a
corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042:
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provision shall be incorporated in the contract
for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond
to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to
the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency
is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages.
The petition is DENIED
Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008.
Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city
7/13/2010 must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local governmen
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not confli
0 Comments
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority

Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional
to delegate to Assembly,
regional orexercising its power
local legislative to the power to create local g
bodies
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, under
enacteditsMuslim
plenaryMindanao
legislativeAutonomy Act No. 201
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislati
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
local of theunits,
government eightsubject
municipalities in the first
to reasonable standards and provided no co
district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, an
the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to complian
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of theinoriginal nine
the Local municipalities
Government constituting
Code, Shariff requirement in Section 10
and the plebiscite
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities toConstitution.
11. Thus, whatHowever,
was left ofunder
Maguindanao
the Localwere the
Government Code, “only x x x an A
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato
provinces,City, although
cities part of Maguindanao’s first
or municipalities.
legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City provides,
Constitution passed Resolution
“Each cityNo. 3999
with a population of at least two hundred
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabatoshall
Cityhave
in view of theone
at least conversion of the First
representative” District
in the House of Representatives. Sim
of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act appended
201. to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of thefollowing
immediately COMELEC’s Law Department
election under
to at least one a
Member x x x.”
Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district becau
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
Article resolves,
VI of the to adopt
Constitution the as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
as well
recommendation of the Law Department that pending thesame enactment
reason,ofa the
cityappropriate law byof
with a population Congress,
250,000 to
or more cannot also be cre
maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
district.
Maguindanao.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. is 7902, subject
logical. of these
Congress is apetitions, amending and any increase in its allowable
national legislature
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district
membership through the creation of Province
in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan legislativewith
districts must be embodied
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
canCotabato City).”
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislativ
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legisl
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative b
Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily – In view of certiorari and mandamus
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
The purposeareof
proper to test
the writ the
of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discreti
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen
compelas arepresentative of Shariffboard,
tribunal, corporation, Kabunsuan
officer, or person to perform an act “w
Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
enjoins as a duty.”

(B) On the merits –

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating
In view to
of the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
mootness
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
There is also noandmerit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclam
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created2007
by the ARMM for
elections Regional Assemblyofunder
representative “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cota
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
This case doesto not
oneconcern
representative in theDilangalen’s
respondent House of election. Rather, it invo
Representatives without need of a national law creating aoflegislative
COMELECdistrict for such
Resolution No. province.
7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA A
of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, d
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
cast in Cotabato No.representative
City for 7902 is valid for
of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff
will be included in the canvassingKabunsuan Province
of ballots. However, this incidental cons
with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao towith Cotabato
proceed City]”),
with the despiteofthe
resolution thecreation of theraised here. The Court’s
novel issues
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato
not only City). concluded elections but also all the other succeeding e
the recently
question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in

Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic

In view ofActthe
No.Felwa
9054case
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
As further supportMindanao the power
for her stance, to create
petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa
provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao
createdAutonomy
by statute,Act
theNo. 201 creatingrepresentative
corresponding the district comes into exi
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule thatthat
COMELEC
statute —Resolution No. 7902
which cannot is VALID.
provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, b
Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional
representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts
without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative
districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of
the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided
under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces
were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a
regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from
Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces
which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district
is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have
at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its
creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the
census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.

Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160,
namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square
kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
“[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x
x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is
established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S
COLLEGE, GR No. 161107, 2013-03-12
Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of
land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters,
located in Marikina Heights and covered by
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located
within the property are SSA-Marikina, the
residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of the
novices, and the retirement house for the elderly
sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete
perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago.
Abutting the fence along the West Drive are
buildings, facilities, and other... improvements.[3]
The petitioners are the officials of the City
Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City
enacted Ordinance No. 192,[4] entitled "Regulating
the Construction of Fences and Walls in the
Municipality of
Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos.
217[5] and 200[6] were enacted to amend Sections
7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls
allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1)
Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one
(1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1)
meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty
percent (80%) see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built
within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the
building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious
institutions.[7]
Issues:
The ultimate question before the Court is whether
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government
of Marikina.
Ruling:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real
intent of the setback requirement was to make the
parking space free for use by the public,
considering that it would no longer be for the
exclusive use of the respondents as it would also
be available for use by the general... public. Section
9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
on eminent domain, provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it
will substantially divest the respondents of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 is... invalid.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to
discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment
of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal
of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime
to ensure public safety and security. The means
employed by the petitioners,... however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private
rights.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it
does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80%
see-thru fence would provide better protection and
a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. It may even be... argued that such
exposed premises could entice and tempt
would-be criminals to the property, and that a
see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and
breach. It also appears that the respondents'
concrete wall has served as more than sufficient
protection over the last 40 years.
`
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed
ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may
not, under the guise of police power, infringe on
private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic
appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court
cannot perceive how a... see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a
community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their
fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is,
thus, a clear encroachment on their right to
property, which necessarily includes their right to
decide how best to protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their
property via a see- thru fence is violative of their
right to privacy, considering that the residence of
the Benedictine nuns is also located within the
property. The right to privacy has long been
considered a fundamental... right guaranteed by
the Constitution that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is
essentially the right to be let alone,[37] as
governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of its... citizens

Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it

is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of
their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 1 92
against the respondents. The CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the
writ of prohibition. The... petitioners must
permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1
and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the
respondents' property in Marikina City.

Principles:

The test of a valid ordinance... substantive

requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public

policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:[28]

As with the State, local governments may be

considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2)... the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence
of a lawful subject and lawful method.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the

police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a
violation of the due process clause
Pelaez vs Auditor General The power of control under this provision implies
the right of the President to interfere in the
undue delegation of legislative power exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law
in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as
Caption: PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
1965 respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits
him to wield no more authority than that of
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
checking whether said local governments or the
vs.
officers thereof perform their duties as provided
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as
the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority.

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act

pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. Rulings:
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the
powers. The alleged power of the President to
margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
create municipal corporations would necessarily
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
connote the exercise by him of an authority even
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
greater than that of control which he has over the
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
representatives and agents, from passing in audit
Code does not merely fail to comply with the
any expenditure of public funds in implementation
constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the
of said executive orders and/or any disbursement
President less power over local governments than
by said municipalities.
that vested in him over the executive departments,
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does
null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 the exact opposite, by conferring upon
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. him more power over municipal corporations than
2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an that which he has over said executive departments,
undue delegation of legislative power. The third bureaus or offices.
paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress.”
Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised

Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

Discussions:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law

ordains:

The President shall have control of all the

executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
[COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST] Belgica v.
Executive Secretary
Click here for the shorter digest (substantive issues
only).
Click here for the full text of the Decision.
* FACTS:
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of
American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork
Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional
Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period,
the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon
Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno
Aquino III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF
ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform
to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That
preference shall be given to projects located in the
4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents
identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For
this purpose, the implementing agency shall
submit to Congress said priority list, standard or
design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of
this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of
his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of
Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary
legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of
projects to be identified by legislators shall be as
follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List
Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000)
for soft programs and projects listed under Item A
and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the
purposes of which are in the project menu of
Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects
listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed
under Item B, the purposes of which are in the
project menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year
and applicable Special Provisions on the use and
release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the
foregoing amounts may be released in the first
semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%)
may be released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this
Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public
Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry are also
authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i)
for infrastructure projects, realignment is within
the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project; (ii) allotment
released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM
must be informed in writing of any realignment
within five (5) calendar days from approval
thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under
this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects
listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments,
modifications and revisions of projects to be
implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall
certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed
and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the
project identification shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing
agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds
shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be
released to the implementing agencies subject to
the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and
the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the
petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by
then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital
to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund
was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869
(1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended
by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court
(the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association
v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of
the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the
issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel
system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork
Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all
other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it
are unconstitutional considering that they violate
the principles of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork
Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section
8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines”
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for
their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that
the issues related thereto had been rendered moot
and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the
2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which,
being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the
PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has
no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its
legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness,
nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that
“the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court
in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the
Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of
the Constitution with respect to the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved: This is
also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved – the constitutionality of the very
system within which significant amounts of public
funds have been and continue to be utilized and
expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. The present petitions,
in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
system’s flaws have never before been magnified.
To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers,
and the government’s own recognition that
reforms are needed “to address the reported
abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie
pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds
petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is
the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. if only for the purpose of validating
the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems
the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable
largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a
compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in
order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more
importantly, so that the government may be
guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the
manner in which certain public funds are spent, if
not resolved at this most opportune time, are
capable of repetition and hence, must not evade
judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork
Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government
but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing
the contours of the system along constitutional
lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely
because it is an exercise of judicial power. More
importantly, the present Constitution has not only
vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to
file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before
the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
“dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing
“Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they
pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally
fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as
matters “of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s
statement during the Oral Arguments that the
present controversy involves “not [merely] a
systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of
controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues
involved. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. This required identity is not
attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004
PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at
bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the
entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in
LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot
apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response
to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call
for a more holistic examination of (a) the
inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles
with each other, formative as they are of the entire
“Pork Barrel System” as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein
warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against
a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that
the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
decisis. Since the Court now benefits from
hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report), it must partially abandon its previous
ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same
was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases, stare
decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork
Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have
been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the
evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities” and the “regulation and
release of funds”, in violation of the separation of
powers principle. That the said authority is treated
as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the
Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa. The Court also points out that
respondents have failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority
of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as
well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared
that informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the
principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which, as settled
in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
The power of appropriation, as held by the Court
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by
law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount
of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a “budget within a budget”
which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not
be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation
law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the President’s
power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the
CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget
or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.”
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct
of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, this
very same concept of
post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that
the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per
se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office.
This is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility
that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through
the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter
largely borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s
intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by
law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by
and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing
law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated
argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how
the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate
political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of “making equal the unequal”
(Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to
the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is
that even Senators and Party-List Representatives
– and in some years, even the Vice-President – who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from
the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of
legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already
legally mandated to “assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork
Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to
“energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government” under
the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to
include – or be restricted to – things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3)
reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as
a statutory reference of specific things from which
the general phrase “for such other purposes” may
be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and,
third, the Executive department has used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is
limited only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of
the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance
energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that
the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,]
finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails
the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities. The first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a
“priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of
“infrastructure” is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects” must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since –
similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
MENDOZA vs PEOPLE RULING:

DANILO DANNY MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. NO. 139759, January 14, 2005
FACTS:
The trial court convicted accused Danilo Mendoza,
petitioner herein, for homicide wherein the victim
was Alfonso Nisperos. Petitioner does not seek
acquittal but merely prays that the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
be considered in his favor.
Herein petitioner narrated the antecedent facts as
follows:
No, the petitioner cannot be accorded with
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
should be clearly established to make the claim of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
acceptable.
In the case at bar, the court found that there was
no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
This element being absent, petitioner cannot be
accorded the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.

That during a drinking spree, he had an altercation

with a certain Willy Baluyot.

Feeling bad, he slammed the table with a pitcher

containing water. Then he left.

At a distance, he heard the victim calling him.

When they were close to each other, the victim
blamed him for his conduct. He apologized but the
victim started stabbing him with a knife.

He tried to parry the attack as he retreated. That

moment, his back was against the wall. He then
grappled for the knife which he was able to wrench
from the victim. They rolled over on the ground. At
that point, he repeatedly stabbed the victim with
his own knife.

On the other the hand, the prosecution, to prove

that the petitioner was the aggressor presented
Loreta Nisperos, mother of the victim.

Loreta said:

Alfonso Nisperos, stepped out of their house. When

he returned, he told her that he saw a person near
their cow tied to a tamarind tree.

Alfonso then went out again to check on the person

he saw. After a short while, Loreta suddenly heard
Alfonso screaming “Mother, help me!”

She rushed to her son. She found him lying, face

down, with petitioner on top of him, stabbing him
with a knife.

She then approached petitioner, pleading to him

not to kill her son. But instead of heeding her plea,
he suddenly attacked her with his knife, hitting her
right arm. Petitioner then dashed away from the
scene.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the

privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense