GR.
No 140033 - Witness, Was awoken around 2-3 Am to four men beating up the
People v Moreno
Victim: Marites Felix y Tacedddena
Accused: Rogelio Moreno y Reg
-12:45 A.M, Marites was going home after finishing her duties at the
Burger Machine Outlet in Makati.
- A man wielding a fan-knife pulled her to the side of the ABC
Complex who she recognized to be Rogelio, who would pass by the
Burger Machine Outlet but would never order.
- She tried to offer her personal belongings to her the latter told her
“Mamaya na yan”. She asked if the accused needed money, to
which the latter replied “I do not need money” before having sexual
intercourse with Marites.
- He then ordered Marites to insert his organ inside her she replied
with “Ayoko”. At this point, she heard someone running nearby.
Rogelio then snatched Marites’ belonging and started running away.
- A vendor saw her and together went to the police. They found her
ring around the area.
- They saw a group of men who started running away, one of them
being Rogelio. They then found Rogelio inside his house with the
lights off and with the help of the Tanod they went to the back of
the house and was able to arrest Rogelio who at the time was in
hiding.
- Marites exclaimed that the was her rapist and took his jacket and
hat off revealing that he was wearing her Burger Machine T-shirt.
Alibi of the Accused:
- At the time of the incident he was sleeping in a folding bed located
outside the house of his uncle.
- The T-shirt was given to him by his friend almost a year ago.
- Witness, They were playing basketball from 5-8 PM, Accused
bought merienda, they stayed at the accused’s residence til 10
because accused claimed that he was about to go to sleep.
accused and Marites proclaiming that accused was wearing her
shirt.
- The court finds the accused guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape.
Issue: 1. W/N Robbery with Rape
2. W/N the police failed to inform accuse of his right to remain
silent
3. was the incident done with the aggravating circumstance of
night time.
Held:
1. The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article
293 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, employs the clause "when the robbery shall
have been accompanied with rape." In other words, to be liable for
such crime, the offender must have the intent to take the personal
property of another under circumstances that makes the taking one
of robbery, and such intent must precede the rape. If the original
plan was to commit rape, but the accused after committing the rape
also committed robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the
robbery should be viewed as a separate and distinct crime
2. The issue of failure by the arresting officers to inform ROGELIO of
his constitutional rights and to afford him the benefit of counsel
during the custodial investigation requires strong and convincing
evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcers acted
in the regular performance of their official duties. Besides, even
granting arguendo that the constitutional requirements were not
observed, the same is of no significance because it does not appear
that ROGELIO executed a statement or confession.
3. However, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For nocturnity to be
properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the 2. Having established that the personal properties of the victims
offender. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was were unlawfully taken by the appellant, intent to gain was
not alleged in the information. sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the Robbery
with Rape were clearly established. As regard the last requirement.
Although the victim AAA did not exactly witness the actual rape
GR. No 181902 because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence
People V Evangelio shows that the victim was raped by the appellant and the other
Victim: (Raped) AAA, (Robbed: total of P336,000) BBB, CCC, and accused
Josefina Manlolo. In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-
Accused: Edgar Evangelio, Joseph Evangelio, Atilano Agaton, Noel accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion
Malipas. of the robbery
- Accused forcibly entered the residence of BBB and stole from them
personal belongings, and then had carnal knowledge with AAA, a
minor, against her will and consent after she has lost consciousness
due to the accused banging her head against the bathroom floor.
- Prosecution Witness Evelyn, who was tutoring her nieces at the
time recognized one of the accused Edgar who used to work for her
husband and Noel who lives in Tacloban.
-BBB came home around 7 PM and the accused were able to tie him
up.
-CCC came home and saw the accused even though she was warned
that her children would be killed if she didn’t come in she ran to the
police which after a few moments arrived at the scene.
-Alibi of accused was that he was sleeping in his house with his
mother and sisters.
RTC – Robbery with Rape
CA – Affirmed the decision of RTC
Issue – W/N there is Robbery with Rape.
Held: 1. Defense was unable to prove that it was impossible for the
vitim to be at the scene of the crime even with said alibi. And
defense failed to put both mother and sisters to stand.
GR. 200922
People v Concepcion
Facts: Criminal case filed against accused, CESAR CONCEPCION,
conspiring together, confederating with his co-accused Rosendo
Ogardo, JR. Y Villegas, for the crime of robbery with homicide under
Art 294 of the RPC.
- Private complainant, Jennifer Quiampo, was walking down a
street, which seemed to be deserted at that time, when a male
person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she
later identified in open court as the accused, snatched her brown
bad. The black motorcycle came from behind her. As the motorcycle
sped away, the accused even raised and waved the bad that he
snatched from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but cry and
look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the
process.
- Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de Felipe was
driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed the subject
snatching incident. As the accused was waving the bad at Jennifer,
he blew his horn. Ogardo drover faster so that de Felipe gave a
chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually, Orgardo lost control
of the motorcycle and it crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two
occupants to the pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from
the taxi with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At the juncture,
some police officers from Kamuning Police Station 10, EDSE, arrived.
Seeing that the snatchers were badly injured, the policemen
brought them to the East Avenue Medical Center, Quezon City
where Ogardo Later died.
Facts by the Defense:
Accused denies participation in the snatching incident and contends
that he and his companion, Rosendo Ogardo, were riding in a
motorcycle when suddenly they were chased by a taxi. A taxi
bumped their motorcycle and Rosendo was thrown to the gutter.
Rosendo was severely injured. The police brought them to the East
Avenue Medical Center where Rosendo Died. Thereafter, he was
brought to the police station where a woman pointed to him as
snatcher. A case for robbery with homicide was filed against him on
the same day.
RTC- Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide
CA- Affirmed with RTC
ISSUE: W/N the snatching of the shoulder bag in this case is robbery
or theft.
HELD: In this case, the prosecution failed to establish that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching
Acampado’s shoulder bag. Acampado herself testified that
Concepcion snatcher her shoulder bag but did not say that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her
shoulder bag. Given the facts, Conepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s
shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.
Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his use of a
motorcycle in committing the crime.
Since Concepcion, as passenger in the motorcycle, did not perform
or execute any act that caused the death of Ogardo, Concepcion
cannot be held liable for homicide.
GR. 160188
Valenzuela V. People
Accused: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon
Victim: SM
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area
of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling
a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them
where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then
returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more
cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and
started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about
to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the
merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted
both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.
Held:
No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following
elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of
persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced
when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to
gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed
all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has
already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
GR. 218830
Coson V. People
Facts:
Petitioner is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Good
God Development Corporation (GGDC)
On December 21, 2001, GGDC, through its President Jack Christian
Coson, borrowed P2,522,000.00 from private complainant Atty.
Nolan Evangelista (hereinafter "private complainant"). The purpose
of the loan was to buy the land owned by the First eBank
Corporation ("First eBank") and covered by Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No. 250201, which is adjacent to GGDC's property situated in
Barrio Maningding, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 252245. A Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage[5] was executed by the parties whereby the property
owned by GGDC was put up as collateral for the loan.
After the sale of First eBank's property was consummated, title
thereto was transferred in the name of GGDC under TCT No.
261204.
On May 29,2003, another Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[7] was
executed by GGDC through petitioner by virtue of Board Resolution
No. 0093, series of 2002,[8] in favor of private complainant for a
loan of P4,784,000.00. The land covered by TCT No. 261204 was
given as security for the said loan. On the same date, petitioner
executed a Promissory Note[9] acknowledging his indebtedness of
P4,784,000.00 and promising to pay the said amount in accordance
with the schedule mentioned in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
dated May 29, 2003.
On July 29, 2003, petitioner and private complainant executed a
Memorandum of Agreement[10] (MOA) stipulating, inter alia, that
petitioner was desirous of borrowing the mortgaged TCT No.
261204 to be surrendered to the Home Development Mutual Fund
or PAG-IBIG Fund[11] to obtain a loan the proceeds of which shall
be paid to private complainant in satisfaction of petitioner's
obligation; that the parties shall open a joint account with a
reputable banking institution where the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG
Fund loan shall be deposited; and that petitioner shall make 11
installment payments as per schedule set forth in the said MOA.
Pursuant to the MOA, petitioner issued 11 postdated Banco de Oro
checks, the first check for P3,000,000.00 and the other 10 checks, a
uniform amount of P185,000.00 for each check.On September 8,
2003, GGDC, through petitioner and PAG-IBIG Fund, executed a
Loan Agreement[12] whereby GGDC, as borrower, was granted a
developmental Joan by PAG-IBIG Fund in an amount not exceeding
P30,000,000.00 to finance the development of Carolina Homes
subject of the MOA[13] of the same date (September 8, 2003)
executed by the parties.
In view of the failure of petitioner to pay the loan of P4,784,000.00
to private complainant despite repeated demands therefor, or to
return TCT No. 261204 as agreed upon in the MOA dated July 29,
2003, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
On February 27, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision[17] in Criminal
Case No. 2005-0498-D finding petitioner (accused therein) guilty as
charged
The CA found no reversible error in the ruling of the RTC and
affirmed it in toto.
Issues:
whether or not the CA erred in affirming in toto the Decision of the
RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
RPC.
Ruling:
The Petition has merit.
The essential elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) are as
follows:[T]hat money, goods or other personal properties are
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same;[T]hat there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of the receipt thereof;[T]hat the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and[T]hat there is a demand made by the offended party
on the offender.
It is clear from the evidence on record that the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage[28] dated May 29, 2003 and the MOA dated July 29,
2003[29] were both executed by petitioner, as the duly authorized
officer of GGDC. GGDC is also the borrower from the PAG-IBIG Fund.
The May 29, 2003 Real Estate Mortgage expressly stated that
petitioner was authorized to enter into such transaction by virtue of
Board Resolution No. 0093, series of 2002[30] of GGDC; that GGDC
is the registered owner of the property covered by TCT No. 261204;
and, finally, petitioner signed said document as Chairman and CEO
of GGDC, and not in his personal capacity. On the other hand, the
first Whereas Clause of the MOA categorically stated that petitioner
was expressly authorized by GGDC to enter into such transaction;
and that GGDC, through petitioner, was desirous of borrowing TCT
No. 261204 to be surrendered to PAG-IBIG Fund in support of its
loan application.
Based thereon, there cannot be any misappropriation or conversion
by petitioner to his own personal use, benefit or advantage, of TCT
No. 261204 or the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan granted to
GGDC since private complainant is fully aware of the purpose of
petitioner/GGDC for borrowing TCT No. 261204 and how the
proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan should be applied. Moreover,
TCT No. 261204 and the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds are owned by
GGDC and not by petitioner, and more so, not owned by private
complainant If there was any misappropriation or conversion of TCT
No. 261204 or the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds, the aggrieved
party should be GGDC, and certainly not the private complainant.
For his uncollected debt, private complainant's remedy is not a
criminal action, but a civil action against petitioner.
To stress, misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition
of another's property as if it were his own or devoting it to a
purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of one's property
without any right.[34] As earlier stated, TCT No. 261204 and the
PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds belong to and are owned by GGDC,
and not by private complainant.
n fine, based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and so holds that
no estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) was committed by petitioner.
There was no misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204 or
the proceeds of the PAGIBIG Fund loan by petitioner to his own
personal use, benefit or advantage. In all his dealings with private
complainant, he acted for and in behalf of GGDC which owns the
title and the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan from private
complainant and from the PAG-IBIG Fund was in pursuance of the
housing business of GGDC, which is not totally unknown to private
complainant. Moreover, the Promissory Note dated May 29,
2003[47] of petitioner acknowledging his indebtedness and the
demand letters of private complainant to petitioner to pay his
obligation[48] clearly show that the obligation contracted by
petitioner on behalf of GGDC is purely civil and for which no criminal
liability may attach.
A new judgment is hereby entered ACQUITTING petitioner Jesus V.
Coson of the crime charged.
GR. 163662
People V Villanueva
FACTS: Villanueva made 9 checks drawn against Philippine National
Bank (PNB), 8 of which were postdated for the jewelry she had
purchased. Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. The
draweee bank paid only one of the eight postdated checks since the
remaining checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed or
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. As a result thereof, Madarang
suffered prejudice since she failed to collect from Villanueva the
balance of Php995,000.00. Villanueava was charged with the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal
Code.
ISSUE: Did Villanueva commit estafa in issuing the postdated
checks?
HOLDING: YES. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph 2(d)
may be committed when:
(1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) At the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender
has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check; and
(3) The payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the
efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or
simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. All the elements were
proven.
The first element was admitted by Villanueva. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of
valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless
Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was
likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account
was already closed. The third element was also proved by the
showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect
from Villanueva the balance of P995,000.00.

GR. 176114
Trinidad V. People
GR. 180016
Corpuz V. People
FACTS:
 Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces
of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after
the expiration of 30 days.
 The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to
Tangcoy.
 When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he
will pay, but to no avail.
 Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence
against Corpuz.
 Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being
a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the
jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is
different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without
violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a
general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in
court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with
abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates
that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July
1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise
time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of
confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are
as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The
specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere
query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property],
would be tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was
tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility
of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an
opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding
is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining
the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.
GR. 182061
People V. Baluntong
Facts:
- Jovelyn saw the accuse putting dry hay around the house where
the fire started but ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
- Other neighbors noticed the fire, and saw Celerina enter the
burning house and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
- Celerina and Alvin suffered 3rd degree burns which led to their
death. Joshua sustained 2nd degree burns.
- Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi,
claiming that he, on his mother Rosalinda's request, went to
Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and
stayed there until February 1999. Rosalinda corroborated
appellant's alibi.
- RTC found accused guilty of the complex crime of Double Murder
with Frustrated Murder.
- Appellate court agreed with the RTC but reduced the penalty of
the accused.
ISSUE: W/N Accused had the main objective to kill Celerina and
her housemates and that the fire was used to reach that goal.
Held:
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder
or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective
is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is,
likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
- homicide/murder and arson.

- The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant's main

objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire
was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.