G.R. No.
185125 January 30, 2012 against whom the search warrant is issued, there
Ruben Del Castillo
vs.
People of the Philippines
(Presumption of Innocence)
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner
Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the
house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the
RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to
implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small
structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men
were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the
place. They all went back to the residence of Del
Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods who searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the
residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the
nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance.
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among
others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found
inside the nipa hut.
Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation
of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere
presumption that the petitioner has dominion and
control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be
searched or seized should be owned by the person
Ombudsman found probable cause. Petitioner was
must be sufficient showing that the property is under
petitioner’s control or possession. The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the
nipa hut in question nor was it established that he
used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well
as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the
said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs
in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s
control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective
on the status of the accused — in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
[G.R. NO. 172035 - July 4, 2012]
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
(Right to be heard)
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M.
Lucido and other local officials3 of Koronadal City,
South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman)4 charging the petitioner, among
others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
in connection with the consultancy services for the
architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the
construction supervision and management of the
proposed Koronadal City public market
(project).6ςrνll
asked to submit his counter affidavit. Multiple
extensions to submit were asked and granted but
instead of submitting a counteraffidavit petitioner
eventually submitted a motion to quash. OSP filed a
motion to suspend pendent lite and petitioner filed a
“Vigorous Opposition” against based on the "obvious
and fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege
that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages was done through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Suspension was granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
1. Abuse of discretion by SB because there
was failure to allege in the information the
giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages.
2. WON lack of pre suspension hearing
invalidates the suspension order.
Ruling:
The test of the information s sufficiency is whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the
accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In
particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged
in the complaint or information shall establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined
in the law. The raison d etre of the requirement in the
Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.34ςrνll
In arguing against the validity of the information, the
petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a
"person of common understanding" in appreciating
the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." A reading of the information
clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the
petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to his co-accused private
individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us
believe that this elemental phrase was actually
omitted in the information35 when, in his reaction to
the OSP s comment, what the petitioner actually
disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase s position,
in relation with the other averments in the information.
Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being
qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if
at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not
for the quashal of an information which sufficiently
alleges the elements of the offense charged.36ςrνll
The pre-suspension order is valid.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered
the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution s
motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to
dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution
s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was
reached in Juan v. People,46 where the Court
ruled:ςrαlαω
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension
hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against petitioners,
we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the goal of this
procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor
just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous
Opposition (to the OSP s Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling
from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued
against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP s
Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.49 Given this
opportunity, we find that the petitioner s continued
demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension
hearing based on the same alleged "defect in the
information,"50 which we have found wanting has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner s
position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a
liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public
official and a strict construction against the
State.51 The suspension required under this provision
is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused
official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
his suspension.52ςrνll
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 is a mere preventive measure
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
(Right to Counsel)
Nag withdraw yung group ng 230K pampasahod ng
San Sebastian Allied Services. Nung nag stop sa
intersection biglang may lumapit sa passenger side at
nanunutok ng baril and asked for the bag where the
money was contained. Itinakbo nung isa, Bautista,
kaso nabaril siya at nakuha yung pera. One time yung
witness, Sumulong, nakita si Lara naglalakad along
Pasig kasi tumawag siya ng police para arestohin.
Line up was done for identification. Walang counsel
yung accused during the line up.
Defense: Plumber siya and on the alleged day he was
doing plumbing work at a house. On June 7, ma
dumating nalang dawn a police sa bahay niya and
hinuli siya. 2 witnesses corroborated.
LC: guilty. CA affirmed this.
ISSUE:
WON identification made by Sumulong during the
polic line up is inadmissible because Lara was without
counsel.
RULING:
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided
with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up
did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without
the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to
counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting
point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court
previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of
Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts
the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-
up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the
case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent
case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be
assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police line-up because it is
not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not
yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course
of the line-up.23(Citations omitted)
G.R. No. 198753
JOSE "PEPE" SANICO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER
SON-TENIO, Respondents.
(RIGHT TO COUNSEL)
FACTS:
Sanico and Baitquin were charged with trespassing
and theft of minerals. They were acquitted with the
trespassing charge but were found guilty of violation
of the Philippine Mining Act.
Accused filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. RTC
ordered them to file a memo on appeal but they were
not able to file so the appeal was dismissed.
New lawyer then filed an MR against the dismissal of
appeal stating that the previous counsel was not able
to file memo on appeal because Sanico’s wife was
sick with a debilitating disease and likewise the former
counsel was also encountering a medical condition.
RTC denied MR. PR to CA but was also denied due
to non payment of docket; (-) proof of service etc. MR
but was denied by CA also.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in holding against him his former
counsel’s gross and inexcusable negligence, thereby
depriving him of his right to have the conviction
reviewed by the RTC.
RULING:
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a
ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil
cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal
cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the
RTC the duty to decide the appeal "on the basis of the
entire record of the case and of such memoranda or
briefs as may have been filed" upon the submission of
the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the
expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the
dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly
premised on the failure to file the memorandum on
appeal.
Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect
that his counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to
observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the
protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client
– as manifested in the multiple defects and
shortcomings discovered in the petition for review –
was gross negligence in any language because the
defects were plainly avoidable by the simple
application of the relevant guidelines existing in
the Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel
was so great and the error committed as a result was
so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of
his day in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened to
give to the client another chance to present his case.
The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly
the right to have his conviction reviewed by the RTC
as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the
altar of technicalities.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
(Right against self-incrimination)
175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.
It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL’s
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees’ Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating
his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also
stating that he was prevented from settling said
amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did
not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’
written admission and statement, to which defendants
argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that accused was
not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct
in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.
Held:
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be
a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled
meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition
of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer
to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to him, the answer to which
may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-
executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by
a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a
party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify
by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer
a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put
to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to
testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness
stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34And, as the
law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him." 35
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a
crime and subsequently charged with its commission
in court, has the following rights in the matter of his
testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with
the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation),
but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of
these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him
by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some
crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales
in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of
no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been
marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it
is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K)
that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise
his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and
even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the
Ateneo Law joined Aquila Legis, one of which was the
victim, Lenny. They were brought to Caloocan during
the initiation night. They were subjected to beating.
During the rites, lenny received several blows, one
sent him sprawling to the ground. He complained of
difficulty of breathing. After an hour of sleep leny was
shivering and saying incoherent mumblings. He was
rushed to the hospital and was pronounced dead on
arrival. 35 Aquilans were charged with a criminal case
for homicide.
In 1993, trial court held 26 Aquilans quilty. Case for
the remaining 9 were held in abeyance but
commenced a few weeks after.
CA set aside the ruling on conspiracy and modified
the criminal liability of each according to participation.
19 acquitted because guilt beyond RD was not
proven. 4 found guilty of slight PI. 2 were found guilty
beyond RD for homicide.
In 2002, trial court reversed the findings against 5
people on the basis of violation of their right against
speedy trial. Hence, the petition before SC which
were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to
speedy trial
RULING:
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs
dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the
violation of their right to speedy trial.
While we are prepared to concede that some of the
foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the
trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly
violated in this case.
Since there is nothing in the records that would show
that the subject of this Petition includes accused
Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the
effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due

to the fact that the records of the case were elevated
to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure
to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it
to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as
September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued
an Order requiring the prosecution, through the
Department of Justice, to secure the complete records
of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there
was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is
not stated when such order was complied with. It
appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial
court because the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by
co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995,

until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven
years, there was no action at all on the part of the
court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which
was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17,
1998 which the court did not act upon, the case
remained dormant for a considerable length of time.
This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the
kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of

the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated.